Category: Civil Procedure

Suing Attorneys In Texas For Participating in Fiduciary Breaches

It is not uncommon for an attorney to execute all or part of his or her client’s wishes, which may be in breach of a fiduciary duty owed by the client to a third party. The third party can certainly sue the client for breaching fiduciary duties. But can the third party also sue the attorney for participating in the client’s actions?

An officer or director of a company may set up a competing business and direct company business to the new competing business. If the officer or director uses an attorney to set up this business and the attorney knows that new business will be used to usurp opportunities, can the company sue the attorney for facilitating the creation of the new business? What if the attorney is an owner of the new company or works for the new company in a nonlegal position?

Certainly, Texas has legal theories that can hold a party liable for participating with a fiduciary in breaching duties owed by the fiduciary. There is a claim for knowing participation in a breach of fiduciary duty. See Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp., 138 Tex. 565, 160 S.W.2d 509, 514 (1942); Paschal v. Great W. Drilling, Ltd., 215 S.W.3d 437, 450 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, pet. denied) (holding wife liable for knowing participation in employee’s embezzlement where funds were placed in joint account and wife benefitted from stolen funds). See also Westech Capital Corp. v. Salamone, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143577, 2019 WL 4003093, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2019) (collecting cases that explain that “Texas appellate courts have routinely recognized the existence of a cause of action for knowing participation in the breach of fiduciary duty.”). The general elements for a knowing-participation claim are: 1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship; 2) the third party knew of the fiduciary relationship; and 3) the third party was aware it was participating in the breach of that fiduciary relationship. D’Onofrio v. Vacation Publ’ns, Inc., 888 F.3d 197, 216 (5th Cir. 2018); Meadows v. Harford Life Ins. Co., 492 F.3d 634, 639 (5th Cir. 2007). There is also a recognized civil conspiracy claim in Texas. The essential elements of a civil conspiracy are (1) two or more persons; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result. Juhl v. Airington, 936 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1996). Finally, there may be an aiding-and-abetting breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim. The Texas Supreme Court has stated that it has not expressly adopted a claim for aiding and abetting outside the context of a fraud claim. See First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 224 (Tex. 2017); Ernst & Young v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d 573, 583 n. 7 (Tex. 2001); West Fork Advisors v. Sungard Consulting, 437 S.W.3d 917 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.). Notwithstanding, some Texas courts have found such an action to exist. See Hendricks v. Thornton, 973 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1998, pet. denied); Floyd v. Hefner, 556 F.Supp.2d 617 (S.D. Tex. 2008). One court identified the elements for aiding and abetting as the defendant must act with unlawful intent and give substantial assistance and encouragement to a wrongdoer in a tortious act. West Fork Advisors, 437 S.W.3d at 921. Some courts have held that here is no aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claim. Hampton v. Equity Trust Co., No. 03-19-00401-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 5674 (Tex. App.—Austin July 23, 2020, no pet.). See also Midwestern Cattle Mktg., L.L.C. v. Legend Bank, N.A., 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 36966, 2019 WL 6834031, at *7 (5th Cir. Dec. 13, 2019); In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 888 F.3d 753, 782, 781 (5th Cir. 2018)  For a discussion of these forms of joint liability for breach of fiduciary duty, please see E. Link Beck, Joint and Several Liability, STATE BAR OF TEXAS, 10TH ANNUAL FIDUCIARY LITIGATION COURSE (2015).

It is clear that at least under some theories, that third parties can be held liable for participating in fiduciary breaches with the party owing fiduciary duties. Can the third party be an attorney? Prior to Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. 2015), it was unclear in Texas whether a party could assert a claim against an attorney not representing the party, such as for negligent misrepresentation or aiding and abetting fraud or breaches of fiduciary duty. Some courts allowed the claim if the attorney was committing or participating in fraud. Others did not.

The plaintiff in Cantey Hanger alleged that the attorneys who represented her husband in a divorce proceeding had committed fraud by falsifying a bill of sale to shift tax liabilities from the sale of an airplane from her husband to her. Id. at 479-80. The Texas Supreme Court held that attorney immunity barred the claim because “[e]ven conduct that is ‘wrongful in the context of the underlying suit’ is not actionable if it is ‘part of the discharge of the lawyer’s duties in representing his or her client.’” Id. at 481. The following are key excerpts from the opinion:

Texas common law is well settled that an attorney does not owe a professional duty of care to third parties who are damaged by the attorney’s negligent representation of a client. Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575, 577 (Tex. 1996); see also McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex. 1999) (explaining that a lack of privity precludes attorneys’ liability to non-clients for legal malpractice). However, Texas courts have developed a more comprehensive affirmative defense protecting attorneys from liability to non-clients, stemming from the broad declaration over a century ago that “attorneys are authorized to practice their profession, to advise their clients and interpose any defense or supposed defense, without making themselves liable for damages.” Kruegel v. Murphy, 126 S.W. 343, 345 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ ref’d). This attorney-immunity defense is intended to ensure “loyal, faithful, and aggressive representation by attorneys employed as advocates.” Mitchell v. Chapman, 10 S.W.3d 810, 812 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied).

….

In accordance with this purpose, there is consensus among the courts of appeals that, as a general rule, attorneys are immune from civil liability to non-clients “for actions taken in connection with representing a client in litigation.” Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied); see also Toles v. Toles, 113 S.W.3d 899, 910 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.); Renfroe v. Jones & Assocs., 947 S.W.2d 285, 287-88 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied). Even conduct that is “wrongful in the context of the underlying suit” is not actionable if it is “part of the discharge of the lawyer’s duties in representing his or her client.” Toles, 113 S.W.3d at 910-11;

….

Conversely, attorneys are not protected from liability to non-clients for their actions when they do not qualify as “the kind of conduct in which an attorney engages when discharging his duties to his client.” Dixon Fin. Servs., 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2064, 2008 WL 746548, at *9; see also Chapman Children’s Trust v. Porter & Hedges, L.L.P., 32 S.W.3d 429, 442 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (noting that “it is the kind of conduct that is controlling, and not whether that conduct is meritorious or sanctionable”).

Because the focus in evaluating attorney liability to a non-client is “on the kind—not the nature—of the attorney’s conduct,” a general fraud exception would significantly undercut the defense. Dixon Fin. Servs., 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2064, 2008 WL 746548, at *8. Merely labeling an attorney’s conduct “fraudulent” does not and should not remove it from the scope of client representation or render it “foreign to the duties of an attorney.” Alpert, 178 S.W.3d at 406 (citing Poole, 58 Tex. at 137); see also Dixon Fin. Servs., 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2064, 2008 WL 746548, at *9 (“Characterizing an attorney’s action in advancing his client’s rights as fraudulent does not change the rule that an attorney cannot be held liable for discharging his duties to his client.”).

….

Fraud is not an exception to attorney immunity; rather, the defense does not extend to fraudulent conduct that is outside the scope of an attorney’s legal representation of his client, just as it does not extend to other wrongful conduct outside the scope of representation. An attorney who pleads the affirmative defense of attorney immunity has the burden to prove that his alleged wrongful conduct, regardless of whether it is labeled fraudulent, is part of the discharge of his duties to his client.

Id. at 481-484.

Based on the holding in Cantey Hanger, if an attorney is performing duties that a lawyer would typically perform, the attorney immunity defense would apply. This defense would likewise apply to aiding and abetting fraud and breaches of fiduciary duty. See Kastner v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 231 S.W.3d 571, 577-78 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007); Span Enters. v. Wood, 274 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008).

In Bethel v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C., the Court extended the Cantey Hanger holding to allegations of criminal conduct. 595 S.W.3d 651, 657-58 (Tex. 2020). There, the plaintiff had urged the Court “to recognize an exception” to attorney immunity “whe[n] a third party alleges that an attorney engaged in criminal conduct during the course of litigation.” Id. The Court rejected the invitation to adopt an exception or state a categorical rule because doing so would allow plaintiffs to avoid the attorney-immunity defense through artful pleading—”by merely alleging that an attorney’s conduct was ‘criminal.’” Id. The Court eschewed a categorical exception for criminal conduct because such an exception would defeat the purposes of the attorney-immunity defense. Instead, the Court held that conduct alleged to be criminal in nature “is not categorically excepted from the protections of attorney civil immunity when the conduct alleged is connected with representing a client in litigation.” Id. As we explained there, a lawyer who is doing his or her job is not more susceptible to civil liability just because a nonclient asserts that the lawyer’s actions are fraudulent, wrongful, or even criminal. Id.

In 2021, the Texas Supreme Court further clarified the holding in Cantey Hanger to state that “When an attorney personally participates ‘in a fraudulent business scheme with his client,’ as opposed to on his client’s behalf, the attorney ‘will not be heard to deny his liability’ because ‘such acts are entirely foreign to the duties of an attorney.’” Haynes & Boone, LLP v. NFTD, LLC, 631 S.W.3d 65, 77 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Poole v. Hous. & T.C. Ry. Co., 58 Tex. 134, 137 (1882)). The Court in Haynes & Boone, LLP, also expanded the Cantey Hanger holding to extend to transactional work that the attorney performs, in addition to litigation work covered in the Cantey Hanger opinion:

Today we confirm that attorney immunity applies to claims based on conduct outside the litigation context, so long as the conduct is the “kind” of conduct we have described above. We reach this conclusion because we see no meaningful distinction between the litigation context and the non-litigation context when it comes to the reasons we have recognized attorney immunity in the first place. We have recognized attorney immunity because attorneys are duty-bound to competently, diligently, and zealously represent their clients’ interests while avoiding any conflicting obligations or duties to themselves or others.

Id. at 79.

Most recently, in Taylor v. Tolbert, the Court reviewed whether there was an exception to immunity for private-party civil suits asserting that a lawyer has engaged in conduct criminalized by statute. No. 20-0727, 2022 Tex. LEXIS 385 (Tex. May 6, 2022). The court discussed the immunity defense as follows:

The common-law attorney-immunity defense applies to lawyerly work in “all adversarial contexts in which an attorney has a duty to zealously and loyally represent a client” but only when the claim against the attorney is based on “the kind of conduct” attorneys undertake while discharging their professional duties to a client. Stated inversely, if an attorney engages in conduct that is not “lawyerly work” or is “entirely foreign to the duties of a lawyer” or falls outside the scope of client representation, the attorney-immunity defense is inapplicable.

In determining whether conduct is “the kind” immunity protects, the inquiry focuses on the type of conduct at issue rather than the alleged wrongfulness of that conduct. But when the defense applies, counsel is shielded only from liability in a civil suit, not from “other mechanisms” that exist “to discourage and remedy” bad-faith or wrongful conduct, including sanctions, professional discipline, or criminal penalties, as appropriate.

Conduct is not the kind of conduct attorney immunity protects “simply because attorneys often engage in that activity” or because an attorney performed the activity on a client’s behalf. Rather, the conduct must involve “the uniquely lawyerly capacity” and the attorney’s skills as an attorney. For example, a lawyer who makes publicity statements to the press and on social media on a client’s behalf does “not partake of ‘the office, professional training, skill, and authority of an attorney’” because “[a]nyone—including press agents, spokespersons, or someone with no particular training or authority at all—can publicize a client’s allegations to the media.” Immunity attaches only if the attorney is discharging “lawyerly” duties to his or her client.

A corollary to this principle is that attorneys will not be entitled to civil immunity for conduct that is “entirely foreign to the duties of an attorney.” “Foreign to the duties” does not mean something a good attorney should not do; it means that the attorney is acting outside his or her capacity and function as an attorney. For that reason, whether counsel may claim the privilege turns on the task that was being performed, not whether the challenged conduct was meritorious.

This is so because the interests of clients demand that lawyers “competently, diligently, and zealously represent their clients’ interests while avoiding any conflicting obligations or duties to themselves or others.” To prevent chilling an attorney’s faithful discharge of this duty, lawyers must be able to pursue legal rights they deem necessary and proper for their clients without the menace of civil liability looming over them and influencing their actions. Attorney immunity furthers “loyal, faithful, and aggressive representation” by “essentially . . . removing the fear of personal liability,” thus “alleviating in the mind of [an] attorney any fear that he or she may be sued by or held liable to a non-client for providing . . . zealous representation.” In this way, the defense protects not only attorneys but also their clients, who can be assured that counsel is representing the client’s best interests, not the lawyer’s.

Id. The Court acknowledged that “there is a wide range of criminal conduct that is not within the ‘scope of client representation’ and [is] therefore ‘foreign to the duties of an attorney,’” and that “when that is the case, the circumstances do not give rise to an ‘exception’ to the immunity defense; rather, such conduct simply fails to satisfy the requirements for invoking the defense in the first instance.” Id. “[O]ur approach to applying the attorney-immunity defense remains functional, not qualitative, and leaves an attorney’s improper conduct addressable by public remedies.” Id.

The Court then held that the common-law defense of attorney immunity would still apply to state statutes (unless the statute specifically abrogated that defense). Id. The Court stated:

That does not mean that all conduct criminalized by the wiretap statute is immunized from civil liability or free of consequences. As we explained in Bethel, while criminal conduct is not categorically excepted from the attorney-immunity defense, neither is it categorically immunized by that defense. Criminal conduct may fall outside the scope of attorney immunity, and even when it does not, “nothing in our attorney-immunity jurisprudence affects an attorney’s potential criminal liability if the conduct constitutes a criminal offense.”

Id. However, regarding federal statutes, the Court concluded “that attorney immunity, as recognized and defined under Texas law, is not a defense under the federal wiretap statute because, quite simply, a state’s common-law defense does not apply to federal statutes.” Id.

In light of the foregoing authorities, it appears claims against attorneys merely doing work for a client (whether fraudulent, tortious, or even criminal) would be covered by attorney immunity and bar any participation in breach of fiduciary duty claim. However, if the misconduct relates to the attorney personally benefitting from the transaction, or having been a party to the transaction (as opposed to merely the attorney for a party), such an immunity would not apply. See, e.g., Olmos v. Giles, No. 3:22-CV-0077-D, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77134 (N.D. Tex. April 28, 2022) (refused to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claim and misrepresentation claim against attorneys where it was unclear whether the defendant attorneys were a part of the transaction).

Another issue that should be discussed is the impact on the attorney client privilege when an attorney participates in fraud or criminal activities. The attorney-client privilege cannot be enforced when “the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud.” Tex. R. Evid. 503 (d)(1). As one court describes:

The exception applies only when (1) a prima facie case is made of contemplated fraud, and (2) there is a relationship between the document at issue and the prima facie proof offered. A prima facie showing is sufficient if it sets forth evidence that, if believed by a trier of fact, would establish the elements of a fraud or crime that “was ongoing or about to be committed when the document was prepared.” A court may look to the document itself to determine whether a prima facie case has been established.…

We begin our analysis by examining the scope of the fraud portion of the crime/fraud exception. The Texas Rules of Evidence do not define what is intended in Rule 503(d)(1) by the phrase “to commit . . . [a] fraud.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines fraud as: “A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment.” The Texas common law tort of fraud also requires proof of misrepresentation, concealment, or non-disclosure. The legal concept of fraud therefore has at its core a misrepresentation or concealment. This definition also dovetails with the apparent reasoning behind inclusion of fraud in the exception: by keeping client communications confidential–pursuant to the attorney-client privilege –the attorney whose client intends to make a misrepresentation or concealment helps prevent the injured party from learning the truth about the misrepresentation or concealment. Thus, in that situation, the attorney’s silence affirmatively aids the client in committing the tort. This is not generally true of other torts (not based on misrepresentation or concealment) and explains why the exception is not the crime/tort exception.

In re Gen. Agents Ins. Co. of Am., Inc., 224 S.W.3d 806, 819 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, orig. proceeding). Moreover, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that this exception includes the work-product in the proper circumstances. Woodruff v. State, 330 S.W.3d 709, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 9569 (Tex. App. Texarkana Dec. 3, 2010), pet. ref’d No. PD-1807-10, 2011 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 749 (Tex. Crim. App. May 25, 2011), pet. ref’d No. PD-1807-10, 2011 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 770 (Tex. Crim. App. June 1, 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 977, 132 S. Ct. 502, 181 L. Ed. 2d 347, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7788 (U.S. 2011).

So, though an attorney may be immune from civil liability, the crime/fraud exception may open up attorney/client communications to the light of day. Regarding crimes involving breaches of fiduciary duty, in addition to theft crimes, the Texas Legislature has created the following crimes: (1) Financial Abuse of Elderly Individual in Texas Penal Code Section 32.55; 2) Financial Exploitation of Vulnerable Individuals in Texas Penal Code Section 32.53; (3) Misapplication of Fiduciary Property in Texas Penal Code Section 32.45; and (4) Failure to Report of the Exploitation of the Elderly or Disabled Individuals in the Texas Human Resources Code Section 48.051.

Article By David Fowler Johnson of Winstead

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© 2022 Winstead PC.

“My Lawyer Made Me Do It” is Not an Absolute Defense to Bankruptcy Court Sanctions

Last year, we offered a lesson and a moral from a North Carolina district court decision reversing a $115,000 sanctions order by a North Carolina bankruptcy court.

The lesson from the case was that the bankruptcy court cannot sanction a creditor if there is an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor’s conduct is lawful.

The moral was that a creditor can avoid the time, expense, and risk associated with litigating contempt and sanctions issues by taking basic steps to ensure that confirmed Chapter 11 plans are clear and precise.  The moral is even more glaring now because a recent decision from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reveals that the parties continue to fight in court over the easily-avoidable sanctions order.  The decision also clarifies when and why a bankruptcy court can sanction a creditor.

Factual Background

In 2009, the Beckharts filed Chapter 11.  At the time, they were almost a year behind on a loan secured by the property at Kure Beach.  The loan servicer objected to planning confirmation because it did not specify how post-petition mortgage payments would be applied to principal and interest.  The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan without clarifying the issue, but the servicer did not ask the court to reconsider its order, nor did it appeal.

The Beckharts paid for five years.  Shellpoint acquired the loan from the original servicer and treated it as in default based on unpaid accrued arrearages.  Periodically, Shellpoint sent default letters to the Beckharts, who disputed the default.  Counsel for Shellpoint advised that the confirmation order had not changed the loan contract terms and that the loan remained in default.  The matter escalated with the Beckharts filing complaints with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.  Shellpoint commenced foreclosure, then represented to the Beckharts that it was ceasing foreclosure, but then posted a foreclosure hearing notice on the Beckharts’ door (allegedly due to error).

Litigation

In January 2020, the Beckharts moved the bankruptcy court to find Shellpoint in contempt and award them monetary sanctions.  The court held a hearing in June and, in September 2020, found Shellpoint in contempt.  The court tagged Shellpoint with $115,000 in sanctions for lost wages, “loss of a fresh start,” attorney’s fees, and travel expenses.

Bankruptcy courts have the power to hold a party in civil contempt and to impose sanctions for violation of a confirmed plan.  The test for liability is based on a recent United States Supreme Court decision — Taggart v. Lorenzen.  The Taggart test prohibits sanctions if there was an “objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor’s conduct might be lawful.” There can be contempt for violating the discharge injunction only “if there is no fair ground of doubt as to whether the order barred the creditor’s conduct.”

In reversing the bankruptcy court, the district court noted that the plan and confirmation order did not state how much the debtors would owe on confirmation, did not say how the $23,000 in arrears would be paid, and did not set the amount of the first payment.  Confusingly, the confirmation order also said that the original loan terms would remain in effect, except as modified.  Finally, the district court pointed out that Shellpoint was repeatedly advised by counsel that their behavior was authorized, and reliance on the advice of outside counsel is a sufficient defense to civil sanctions.  Based on all these facts, the district court found that Shellpoint acted in good faith and interpreted the confirmation order in a manner consistent with the contractual terms of the loan, and that was objectively reasonable.

Taggart was a Chapter 7 case involving a discharge violation, but the Fourth Circuit held that the “no fair ground of doubt” test applied broadly in bankruptcy – including in Chapter 11 cases.

But the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s decision to reverse the bankruptcy court because the creditor had requested and received legal advice from outside counsel.  The Fourth Circuit held that advice of counsel is not an absolute defense in civil contempt.   The Court suggested that, under the Taggart test, advice of counsel “may still be considered in appropriate circumstances as a relevant factor” and “a party’s reliance on guidance from outside counsel may be instructive, at least in part, when determining whether that party’s belief that she was complying with the order was objectively unreasonable.”

The Fourth Circuit held that both lower courts had made mistakes and sent the case back to the bankruptcy court to “reconsider the contempt motion under the correct legal standard, including any additional fact-finding that may be necessary.”

Creditors can take some comfort in the “no fair ground of doubt” test, which is more forgiving than a strict liability standard.  But creditors can’t blame their lawyer for perilous conduct and expect the court to exonerate them.

But the most important takeaway hasn’t changed:  Creditors should insist on clear and specific plan terms.  After over two years of litigation, Shellpoint remains in peril of sanctions.  All of this could have been avoided had the loan servicer insisted the plan specify how the Beckharts’ payments would be applied to satisfy the arrearage.

Article By Lance P. Martin of Ward and Smith, P.A.

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© 2022 Ward and Smith, P.A.. All Rights Reserved.

Adding Impact to Your Next Cross Examination: 5 Things to Consider When Presenting Witness Testimony

As every trial attorney knows, there are many strategies for cross examining a witness. Among the most effective is confronting a witness with their previous deposition testimony. Nothing beats an opportunity to use their own words against them.

In order to get the most impact from this practice, a savvy litigator will read transcript passages or play audio/video excerpts from the witness’s deposition. An alternate technique—most effective when there is a lot of testimony—is showing a witness’s testimony on-screen using slides. Of course, as with any PowerPoint presentation, there are several things to consider when using this tool to cross examine a witness.

Tips for Witness Testimony Presentation

1. FORMAT THE TRANSCRIPT TEXT

Rather than importing an image of the transcript page, consider copy/pasting or retyping the testimony into a slide. This will give you control over how large you make the text and can even allow you to emphasize certain words or statements that align with your case themes. In addition, most jurors sit 20-40 feet from the projection screen in the courtroom. A good rule of thumb is to use 20-point font type or larger.

2. USE BOLD FONT TYPE

By bolding questions within the transcript, jurors will more easily distinguish them from the witness’s answers to each question. Another tip is to stay away from unique fonts. While “French Script” might be a nice touch on a party invitation, it can be hard to read from the jury box.

3. ANIMATE EACH QUESTION AND ANSWER

If you are using PowerPoint or Key Note, consider adding animation to each question-and-answer text block. It’s natural for people to read ahead if there is more on the screen; by revealing each question and answer one-by-one, you will have a much better chance of holding the jurors’ attention. Effects like “appear,” “wipe,” or “fade” are all good options for this, but stay away from more flamboyant effects like “fly-in” or “zoom” since those are too distracting (and most judges will not allow that to go on for more than a few slides).

4. USE A PHOTO OF THE WITNESS

A photo of the witness will allow the jury to connect the testimony with the witness. If you didn’t videotape the witness, look for a picture on their company website or social media profiles. Obvious caveats apply here; you generally know what the court will allow and to what opposing counsel will object.

5. BE FLEXIBLE

Even though you have prepared all your testimony slides for the unexpected, consider having the entire transcript loaded in a trial presentation software (e.g., TrialDirector or Sanction) that allows you or your trial presentation consultant to jump to any portion of the transcript on the fly. It’s very possible that opposing counsel will argue that an answer is not complete, and the court might instruct you to continue on for several more lines of testimony.

In Conclusion

Visually displaying a witness’s deposition testimony during cross examination allows you to drive home the points most relevant to your arguments and case themes, and most salient to jurors you hope to influence. Following these five simple rules above will make that tactic even more effective in court.

Article By Adam Bloomberg of IMS Consulting & Expert Services

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Court of Appeals Rules That Oil and Gas Company Has Ongoing Obligation to Restore Property Despite General Release of Damages in Surface Use Agreement

On April 11, 2022, the Fourth District Court of Appeals issued a significant decision in Zimmerview Dairy Farms, LLC v. Protégé Energy III LLC establishing that a general release of damages signed in connection with a pad site surface use agreement did not release the oil and gas company from its ongoing obligations to remediate and restore damage to a landowner’s property.

In the Zimmerview case, Plaintiff Zimmerview Dairy Farms (“ZDF”) signed a surface use agreement with Defendant Protégé Energy III LLC (“Protégé”) permitting Protégé to construct and operate a pad-site for Utica Shale wells on a portion of the ZDF farm. The agreement consisted of three documents: a recorded surface use agreement (favorable to Protégé); a confidential supplemental agreement (with terms favorable to ZDF); and a damage release under which ZDF released Protégé from the anticipated damages already paid for by Protégé. This three-document structure is typical, especially for pipelines easements, and one which many oil and gas companies insist on. Often, the damage release is explained by landmen as an unimportant formality and that the company is still going to fix the land as required under the unrecorded agreement. However, what a landman says, what an agreement says and what a company does can differ dramatically.

In Zimmerview, Protégé proceeded to construct and operate its pad-site without adequately remediating, restoring and reseeding the areas disturbed during construction, including the slopes of the pad-site. Over several years, Protégé’s failure to remediate resulted in significant topsoil damage, invasive weed infestations and ongoing erosion, which rendered large portions of the ZDF farm unusable. Protégé refused to pay or fix the ZDF farm, claiming that the damage release signed by ZDF released Protégé from any obligation to remediate or pay for damages caused to the ZDF farm. When ZDF filed suit and won at trial, Protégé appealed.

On appeal, Protégé once again argued that ZDF had released Protégé from all damages resulting from construction and operation of the pad-site including damages from not remediating the ZDF farm. Despite the broad language of the release, however, the Court of Appeals rejected Protégé’s argument on the basis that the damage release, signed when the surface use agreement was executed, could not have been intended to release Protégé from damages that resulted from the ongoing obligations and requirements Protégé had just agreed to under the surface use agreement. Accordingly, the Fourth District affirmed the trial court judgment (and $800,000 verdict for damages) against Protégé. Given the common use (and abuse) of similar damage releases by both operators and pipeline companies, this decision is a welcome addition to Ohio caselaw and should assist (and hopefully encourage) Ohio landowners to insist on producers and pipeline companies meeting their construction and remediation obligations.

©2022 Roetzel & Andress
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Court Reversed Order Appointing Temporary Administrator Due To A Lack Of A Bond

In In re Robinett, a party filed a petition for writ of mandamus, challenging a trial court’s order appointing a temporary administrator. No. 03-21-00649-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 926 (Tex. App.—Austin February 9, 2022, original proc.). The petitioner complained that the trial court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing and also appointed a temporary administrator without a bond. Regarding the hearing complaint, the court of appeals disagreed:

Under Section 55.001 of the Texas Estates Code, “[a] person interested in an estate may, at any time before the court decides an issue in a proceeding, file written opposition regarding the issue.” Relators are correct that such interested persons are entitled “to process for witness and evidence, and to be heard on the opposition.” Id. But, based on the record before us, they did not file any “written opposition” to the appointment until they filed their motion to reconsider three days after the appointment had already been decided. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by appointing the temporary administrator without first conducting a hearing pursuant to Section 55.001 because there was no requirement for the trial court to hold a hearing under that statute.

Id. The court, however, agreed that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing the temporary administrator without bond:

The Estates Code expressly requires that the order appointing a temporary administrator “set the amount of bond to be given by the appointee.” Moreover, the Estates Code requires that a party must enter into a bond unless they meet one of a limited number of exceptions: (1) a will directs that no bond be required; (2) all the relevant parties consent to not requiring bond; or (3) the appointee is a corporate fiduciary. And other statutory provisions require a hearing and evidence before “setting the amount of a bond.” Based on the record before us, there is no evidence that the temporary administrator met any of the exceptions to the bonding requirement, nor is there any indication that the trial court undertook any evidentiary hearing regarding the bond amount. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to follow the statutory requirements for setting bonds as part of a temporary administrator appointment.

Id.

© 2022 Winstead PC.
For more articles about civil procedures in litigation, visit the NLR Civil Procedure section.

Look at Me, Not Through Me: Supreme Court Limits Federal Jurisdiction for Post-arbitration Award Petitions

On 31 March 2022, the United States Supreme Court in Badgerow v. Walters limited federal subject matter jurisdiction over post-arbitration award petitions under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) §§ 9 and 10. After years of widening disagreement between circuit courts regarding when a federal court may exercise jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an award, the Supreme Court weighed in and held that federal courts may only exercise jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an award if the face of the application supports diversity or federal-question jurisdiction. One of the implications of this ruling is that many more post-arbitration proceedings to confirm or vacate an arbitration award may be channeled into state courts.

BACKDROP: FAA SECTIONS AT ISSUE

Section 4 states that a party seeking to compel arbitration can file suit in any court that, “save for” the arbitration agreement, would have federal jurisdiction over the underlying dispute.1

Section 9 provides that parties may apply to confirm an arbitration award in the United States court “in and for the district” where the award was made.2

Section 10 provides that parties may apply to vacate an arbitration award in the United States court “in and for the district” where the award was made.3

PRELUDE: VADEN

In its 2009 decision in Vaden v. Discover Bank, the Supreme Court found that federal-question jurisdiction could exist under a “look-through” approach in a § 4 petition to compel arbitration.4 In that case, two questions were presented: (1) whether a district court, when asked to compel arbitration, should “look through” the petition and compel arbitration if the court originally would have had federal jurisdiction; and (2) if so, may the court exercise jurisdiction over the § 4 petition when the original complaint rests on state law but the counterclaim rests on federal law?

The Supreme Court answered the first question affirmatively. In doing so, it emphasized that a “federal court may ‘look through’ a § 4 petition to determine whether it is predicated on an action that ‘arises under’ federal law; in keeping with the well-pleaded complaint rule.”5 However, the Court found that the district court could not exercise jurisdiction over the petition presented in that case, because the complaint was “entirely state-based” and “federal-court jurisdiction cannot be invoked on the basis of a defense or counterclaim.”6

Since Vaden, circuit courts have been divided over whether the “look-through” approach also applies to applications to confirm or vacate awards under FAA §§ 9 and 10. For example, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the circuit split in Quezada v. Bechtel OG & C Constr. Servs., Inc., noting that the Third and Seventh Circuits decline to apply the look-through approach for confirmation, vacatur, or modification of arbitration awards, but the First, Second, and Fourth Circuits permit the look-through approach.7

Ultimately, a divided Fifth-Circuit panel in Quezada agreed with the majority and held that the Vaden look-through approach applies to applications to confirm or vacate arbitration awards.

OPENING ACTS: BADGEROW V. WALTERS IN THE LOWER COURTS

Badgerow v. Walters followed, implicating the Supreme Court’s Vaden decision and the Fifth Circuit’s Quezada decision on the issue of whether a federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction to review an application to confirm or vacate an arbitration award when the underlying dispute presents a federal question.

The plaintiff in Badgerow initiated arbitration against her former employer’s principals, alleging violation of federal employment law. The arbitration panel dismissed all of her claims, so she filed an action in state court to vacate the arbitration award. The defendants removed the action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and filed a motion to confirm the award. Plaintiff moved for remand to state court, arguing that the district court did not have jurisdiction over the award; however, the district court denied remand and granted defendant’s motion to confirm the award.8

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that it was bound by its precedent in Quezada and applied the look-through approach.9 The Fifth Circuit thus affirmed the district court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction over the dispute.

Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted on 17 May 2021.10

FEATURE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION

In an 8-1 decision,11 the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that FAA §§ 9 and 10 lack § 4’s “distinctive language directing a look-through” approach. Thus, without statutory language directing otherwise, “a court may look only to the application actually submitted to it in assessing its jurisdiction.”12 Noting that Congress could have replicated § 4’s look-through language in §§ 9 and 10 but chose not to, the Court held that a federal court only has jurisdiction over an application to confirm or vacate an arbitration award when the face of the application demonstrates diversity or federal-question jurisdiction.

Applying the new rule to the facts of plaintiff’s appeal, the Court explained that the parties were not contesting the federal employment dispute at this stage; rather, the parties were contesting enforcement of the arbitration award. Therefore, the Court held that federal jurisdiction was not appropriate because enforcement of the award, which was “no more than a contractual resolution of the parties’ dispute,” did not amount to federal-question jurisdiction and the parties were not diverse.

SOUVENIR: THE KEY TAKEAWAYS

Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Badgerow limiting federal subject matter jurisdiction over arbitration awards, counsel and parties seeking to confirm or vacate arbitration awards must analyze whether their application, on its face, supports an independent basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction if they wish to bring their application in federal court. Without the “look-through” approach for §§ 9 and 10 petitions, and in particular where the parties to arbitration provisions are citizens of the same state (and thus lack diversity jurisdiction), state courts will more likely be the primary venue for post-award petitions.

FOOTNOTES

1 9 U.S.C. § 4.

2 9 U.S.C. § 9.

3 9 U.S.C. § 10.

4 Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262, 1268 (2009) (“A federal court may ‘look through’ a § 4 petition and order arbitration if,” notwithstanding the arbitration agreement, “the court would have jurisdiction over ‘the [substantive] controversy between the parties.’” (citations omitted)).

5 Id. at 1273.

6 Id. at 1269.

7 Quezada v. Bechtel OG & C Constr. Servs., Inc., 946 F.3d 837, 841 (5th Cir. 2020) (“After Vaden, a circuit split developed regarding whether the same look-through approach also applies to applications to confirm an arbitration award under section 9, to vacate under section 10, or to modify under section 11.”).

8 Badgerow v. Walters, — S. Ct. —-, 2022 WL 959675, at *3 (2022).

9 Badgerow v. Walters, 975 F.3d 469, 472–74 (5th Cir. 2020).

10 Badgerow v. Walters, 141 S. Ct. 2620 (2021).

11 Justice Breyer in dissent wrote that although the Court’s decision “may be consistent with the statute’s text,” practical application would create curious consequences, artificial distinctions, and results that are “overly complex and impractical.” Badgerow, 2022 WL 959675, at *10 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

12 Badgerow, 2022 WL 959675, at *3.

Copyright 2022 K & L Gates
For more articles about Supreme Court cases, visit the NLR Litigation section.

Legal News Reach – Season 2, Episode 1: Immigration & Its Impacts on the U.S. Labor Market with Raymond Lahoud [PODCAST]

Welcome to our first episode of Season 2! Rachel and Jessica speak with Raymond Lahoud, a Member of Norris McLaughlin, P.A., focusing on immigration law. Immigration issues are complicated enough, but how does that factor into boosting the U.S. economy?  Listen to our last episode to find out more.

Be sure to also check out the latest episode of Mr. Lahoud’s podcast, “Immigration Matters.”

We’ve included a transcript of our conversation below, transcribed by artificial intelligence. The transcript has been lightly edited for style, clarity, and readability.

Full Transcript

INTRO  00:02

Hello and welcome to Legal News Reach, the official podcast for The National Law Review. Stay tuned for our discussion on the latest trends, legal marketing, SEO, law firm best practices, and more.

Rachel  00:15

Today’s episode is the first of the second season, where we’re broadening our focus to trending topics in the legal industry. Today we’re speaking with Ray Lahoud, Member of North McLaughlin about the impact of COVID-19 on immigration and labor shortages. Ray, would you like to tell our listeners a little bit about yourself?

Raymond Lahoud  00:30

Well, thanks for having me, Rachel. It’s really awesome to be here on this podcast and to talk about such an interesting area of law right now, in the world, particularly immigration law. I’m a partner at Norris McLaughlin, where I serve as the Chair of the Immigration Law Group here. I handle employment-based immigration matters, removal defense, employment, verification, I noncompliance all types of immigration matters, a broad spectrum with my great team of attorneys, paralegals, and assistants here at North McLaughlin. So thank you again for having me. It’s great to be here.

Rachel  01:05

One of the first topics we wanted to focus on here is immigration’s impact on labor shortages. You’ve written a lot about the impacts on the U.S. economy due to labor shortages. Can you explain how immigration can help remedy the situation?

Raymond Lahoud 01:18

I think we can all agree that without labor without employees, without people to go and work in whatever company, whatever organization, whatever place that exists out there that that needs to provide services or goods to the American public needs, needs employees. Without labor, there’s no economy, immigration right now is really a huge part of the employment demand, or the employment shortage share. There’s a lot of Americans who are able to legally work who just don’t want to work or have you know, taken different decisions or different approaches on life or what they want to do with their life. But we still need people to perform some of these essential functions from farming, to nursing care to handling, you know, mushroom picking to manufacturing, immigration is the way that has long proven to be a way to solve that through temporary visa programs through you know, green card programs that existed out there. And under the Trump administration. And when COVID hit, things really got hit pretty hard and really slowed down the ability for people to bring in international employees to the United States that fill that gap.

Rachel  02:29

This has been an ongoing issue. So are there any policy changes on your radar that will help solve this issue, either through immigration or otherwise?

Raymond Lahoud 02:38

The only way to solve this issue is through comprehensive immigration reform. For over a decade now, we’ve been using the number of 11 million people that are in the country without documentation, I think we can all agree that that number is significantly higher, probably 20, or 30 million people, step one is going to be trying to figure out how we handle those 20 to 30 million people or even Federalists 11 million people that 11 to 20 million people that we have the United States without documentation. And that means that some people are going to have to be deported, who you know, may have certain crimes may have certain issues in terms of their background, but a significant number of these individuals have been in the country for a long time, working without authorization, pleading taxes. So there has to be a process of legalization for those individuals, which is the big issue. We don’t what is legalization for them. And then there also has to be a secure border where people can’t just cross the border without any documentation. I mean, every country has borders, borders are important. We can all see how important borders are right now with what’s happening in Ukraine. You know, comprehensive immigration reform includes having an ability for individuals to come into the United States to work to claim asylum if they have to, to help our employers here in the United States who need employees because people are just not taking part or not applying to Americans are just not applying to take on these jobs. The great resignation has, for some reason taken over the United States and it continues. So what do we need? We need comprehensive immigration reform? How do we get there? It’s getting members of Congress to agree daily, I’m talking to clients who will arrive in Pennsylvania and they’ll say how do I start working here I just crossed the border assuming that because they heard on Facebook before they came up here are on TikTok are though like that it would be very easy for them to claim asylum. So I’m dealing with a lot of clients and potentials and individuals who have just recently crossed the border now feel that they’re stuck in the United States because they can’t leave because they have to go through proceedings and they can’t work. I mean, there’s also in this representation, let’s say that we keep hearing the numbers, millions are coming to the United States. There are millions of encounters. So you may have one person try to come to the United States four or five times and each one is considered an encounter. And this is a problem that we see from President to President, by the way, and this is why I say we need comprehensive immigration reform. Because let’s go back to 1986. Ronald Reagan was going to deal with the immigration problem we had, you know, millions of people here in the United States back then. And he did put three amnesty 1213 14 million people were granted permanent resident status, they say that cost the turn of California to a blue state once they became citizens top political. In the end, they’re like going back to that every President has made immigration, much tougher, actually very tough. Actually, it was the administration that puts some of the toughest policies when it comes to what’s called the public charge rule. The way our system is written right now is that the executive branch just has so much ability and authority discretionary ability and authority over what to do or what not to do, what they can do what they can’t do in terms of immigration. And then every time a new president comes in, something changes drastically. So you had Obama come in, then he puts in place DACA, you know, gives eight 900,000 people, you know, a temporary quote-unquote, status, and you have President Trump come in, and he takes it away. And then you have President Biden come in. Again, it goes back to comprehensive immigration reform. It’s all just been patchwork since after ’86. Now we have 11, 12, 13, 14, 20 million people here. So it’s-I think the distaste is, is that we’re going to grant people status, and it’s just going to happen, again, has to be a two-fold fix as to be true, comprehensive immigration reform where we’re not, you know, 10 years down the road, we don’t have another 15 million people that don’t have documentation here.

Rachel  06:34

What can companies do to help deal with this shortage of immigrant labor or just labor in general?

Raymond Lahoud 06:39

Every day, I probably field 20 to 30 calls from employers who cannot find employees. It’s the biggest problem. I think that’s facing our country right now. And I’m not sure where it comes from, I really don’t understand what this great resignation is, I don’t know how people can live. Right now, there are several legal immigration processes that are available. One is the H Tubi. system, which is a great way of bringing in seasonal employees for farms for landscaping, contractors, painters, manufacturing work, which we bring workers over here year after year. The H1-B lottery is another visa process. So there’s visa processes that are out there, it’s good to avail as an employer to not be afraid of these processes to you know, when you’re recruiting globally recruit, and when you find a candidate, seek out an immigration attorney and say, Hey, is there a way that I can bring this person over legally sponsor them? Is there a pathway and there are. You have companies like the bigger tech companies that are getting all the big H1-B visas, you have the bigger farming companies that are getting all the H2-B visas, because the smaller ones are not really availing themselves, the legalized programs that exist there, we have a lot of people who are coming into the country across the border, these individuals, they’re turning themselves into the Customs and Border Protection. So there’s an expectation at some time that, you know, some of them have fears of returning, I mean, that they’re going to start going through processes. These are individuals that will likely have employment authorization documents, within a year or so don’t forget about the American worker offer good wages, offer good benefits offer time off the world’s change right now in terms of how things work. So if there’s, you know, remote operations that you can offer, do that offer child care services, if you could, but you have to be creative.

Jessica  08:25

So I would love to get your perspective since you’ve been involved in immigration law for so long, and you definitely have a great grasp on the history of a lot of immigration policy changes. I know with COVID, you know, the legal industry got backed up in general; just court cases being rescheduled, I would really like to know what the last two years for immigration law has looked for you how has it changed because of the pandemic updates on border restrictions? I’d love to get your take on that.

Raymond Lahoud 08:52

When the pandemic hit immigration really became incredibly, incredibly busy from the travel restrictions to a title 42 at the border expulsions to people that were detained in immigration custody that were getting COVID It was a disaster for a long time for a lot of people. A lot of people out there who are stuck in other countries, you know, travel bans were coming up and moving and changing by the minute. And companies. You know, the companies that we represent, the employers that we represent that keep operating there were essential. They were central companies and they were healthcare companies. They were companies that do industrial manufacturing or handle electricity and the like, so they needed their employees here. So during COVID, we spent a lot of time trying to figure out the ways to bring a lot of these employees into the United States through the waivers that existed. They’re reaching out to the State Department to seek special exemptions. And then at the same time, you know, the immigration to the deportation defense part of it really came to a halt. court hearings were halted for all like non detained cases, which took an already incredibly backlogged immigration court system and took it about I have four more years behind now. So you’re probably looking at a good 10 years before an immigration judge for a trial. And after continuances and the, like 10 cases COVID really spread pretty heavily, we have to file lots of petitions and requests to try to get clients that were detained by immigration out of custody within the United States. So a lot happened during COVID. And when it came to immigration, in those days, there were nights where I was awake at, you know, two, three in the morning, making sure a client was able to get back in.

Jessica  10:34

We’re in such an interesting environment at this point, especially more recently with the Ukraine crisis, but we also had a changing of the hands in the White House, all the different elections. So there’s been a lot of transition period. And you know, we touched on it a little bit already. But the changes moving forward, I mean, now that the pandemic is having some type of release, besides needing that comprehensive immigration law changes, do you see any other changes now that we’re getting out of the pandemic, whether that’s Ukraine specifically, or just in general? What do you think is gonna happen here?

Raymond Lahoud 11:07

I think that we’ve, we’ve moved on to our next disaster with our next emergency, we’ll say, which is Ukraine right now. This is all that we hear about on the news, there aren’t COVID numbers at, you know, at the bottom, how do people are dying, how many people died and the like, I just feel that, you know, Ukraine has as taken over COVID. Now COVID brought on a time of remote hearings, which are still continuing now. The immigration courts, making fun of them with, you know, video, WebEx hearings in Zoom hearings, are able to move them quicker through the system and the like, and I have some serious issues. When it comes to remote hearings. You know, there’s huge due process concerns and having my client be able to testify in person where the judge can see his or her face. You know, there’s some very serious concerns in that. So they’re changes that, you know, came about from COVID, in terms of remote operations and the like, but I don’t know if they’re necessary to our benefit, even for, you know, immigrants work were coming in. And also, you would think that we really learned how to process things a lot faster. You know, what, we’re kind of hit with the crisis, and we just aren’t, you know, our embassies are still in a huge backlog when it comes to processing visas and, you know, fiance petitions and merit-based petitions and the like, but we are seeing movement here stateside within that, honestly, in terms of change. I mean, you just, it’s all patchwork.

Jessica  12:27

If memory serves me correctly, I know the Biden administration has put more emphasis on visas for STEM. I think people coming either for schooling or for employment, if I’m remembering correctly, do you think that’s a step in the right direction, I know it’s another “patch,” but…

Raymond Lahoud 12:43

 The United States has a huge number of international students in the United States, even locally here in what’s called the Lehigh Valley, Pennsylvania, Lehigh, Lafayette, Cedar Crest Moravian, their F huge international student populations and international student populations are critical to cultural diversity to you know, just to the growth of the school and it’s bringing the world together. So as part of it, so students will come here from abroad, Saudi Arabia, countries, China, Japan, Australia, they’ll come to the F1 visa complete their courses here to get a bachelor’s degree. And if they typically, if you come in under the f1 visa, regardless of your degree, you’ll get 12 months of what’s called occupational practical training. And that’s because you 12 months of just training in your, your area of of studies, when you were in school, if you earned a STEM degree science, tech, engineering or math degree, you can get an additional 24 months of occupational practical training. To me, that’s great to me for bringing people here, and we’re educating them, we should keep them here and you know, give them jobs here. I mean, we there’s no reason that you know, we should be training talent and, you know, bringing in talent from across the world, and then just sending them, you know, back to, you know, their home country, particularly if they’re willing to stay and work here and become members of society in good standing that contribute pay taxes. Why not? Even if you were you came in, you knew you were coming in across the border, see, you’re still a kid, and then you turn over all of your information to the government when you’re 17 or 18 years old. And then, you know, four, eight years later, the Trump ministration says that they are going to get rid of it and it goes through courts who put it back in and take it out and put it back in and then there’s an injunction lifted, and these are hundreds of thousands of lives in people’s hands. People really have to recognize that there are faces to these individuals that have deferred action that have temporary protected status that there are faces to them. And it’s more than just politics. But could you imagine if you were in that position with deferred action, not knowing should I finish going to college should I spend the money should I take a job, what do I do next?

Jessica  15:01

COVID already caused a very large limbo feeling if you’re coming from another country, or you’ve been here, and then you might be told, “oh, you gotta go back to where you came from.” And I can’t imagine being young when you come here and then going back to a country you don’t even really know.

Rachel  15:17

So we wanted to get your viewpoints on Ukrainian refugees and immigration, how does this compare to other refugee crises that we’ve had in the past

Raymond Lahoud 15:27

Ukraine refugee crisis has brought the US government to its peak when it comes to refugees, and the like, they’ve acted very quickly, to bring in them what’s called Temporary Protected Status. You compare it to you know, what happened in Afghanistan and the lake, there are a lot of differences, I would say just that how quickly they are granted temporary protected status. You know, if you’re from Ukraine, there’s countries that are setting up policies like Canada to try to bring in people from Ukrainian. And I hope that these policies that these countries are putting together to help refugees in times of crisis will stay for other countries to beyond Ukraine’s. Hopefully this won’t be the last time that you’ll see other countries open their doors to help people. My mom and dad are both born in Lebanon and immigrated here during the civil war in the late 70s. And it was devastating. And the US opened its doors to the Christians from the north, they came in and became an integral part of the society life here in Pennsylvania, it’s good to see that in Ukraine, but we’re going to have other countries that are going to have similar issues. And who knows where, you know, President Putin may stop, we just really have to think long term about it. Because we also have to be realistic. And we can only handle so many people in our country. I hate to say that.

Rachel  16:49

How does that factor into maybe some of the more, like, long-term policy changes that the country could implement? Is there a need to sort of rethink how we bring in refugees, and how many people we can take and how that process really goes?

Raymond Lahoud 17:02

There is, there is, but how do you rethink that? You know, how do you it’s even just saying, you know, how many people can we take in I know you just feel I feel internally bad because you don’t want to turn anybody away, that’s really hurting, you know, and but we have to, thankfully, I’m not in Congress to make up those decisions. But I think there has to be, you know, some sense of reason, and balance. And I’m not really sure what that is.

Rachel  17:29

Like the US has to work together with other countries to make sure that we help them out of people that need to be helped. I don’t think it’s realistic for one country to sort of shoulder most of the burden.

Raymond Lahoud 17:38

It’s very hard to get refugee status. I mean, you don’t just kind of come into the United States and walk-in and may take years to go through I mean, if you’re going to the Iraqi refugee have to go in through the United Nations refugee program, there’s a huge process you have to go through, it’s not easy. The things that happened in Afghanistan kind of made known the issues with our you know, the refugee program and the lake. But it’s not, it’s not an easy process to go through. You can’t just walk into an embassy, US Embassy and say, Hey, I’m I’m afraid of where I’m living, I want to go to United States,

Rachel  18:09

Right, yeah. And I imagine on top of even having to be in a situation where you have to flee your home.

Raymond Lahoud 18:15

Anybody that goes through pain, like a harm or fear, you know, I mean, whether it’s domestic violence, and those are the worst of cases where I have clients who are coming in suffered extreme domestic violence, like at the hands of their spouses and the like, and, and with those, you know, you know, what you do, you can send them back, you know, when that when the spouse is going to kill them on, you know, they’re dead on arrival. And so those are cases that we’re dealing with inside the United States right now. It’s like we have refugees coming in. But we also have asylees, here in the United States that were people who are in here applying affirmatively for asylum, we have a lot of people in the United States that are here on like a protective status we do. We do so much. And other countries are recognizing that if you take a look at Australia, so people are coming into the to Australia, they don’t go into the country, they sit off-island for a long period of time for they claim asylum or anything like that. The other countries that are out there, I think that they all have some pretty unique set of circumstances that are there, and in ours has a lot of issues that we have to really work through.

Rachel  19:16

So you’ve written about policy changes in Pennsylvania aimed at helping undocumented immigrants, you know, entrepreneurs, people who are getting driver’s licenses, things like that. I was curious to get your insight on how you see these changes impacting both immigrants in the state as a whole, like what sort of have been the changes there?

Raymond Lahoud 19:33

Driver’s licenses in Pennsylvania, we’re seeing a movement. New Jersey, just fair aware, they pass legislation in the implement to the driver’s licenses, people who may not have a social security number or the like, right now in Pennsylvania. I believe it’s in the House Committee. It’s being discussed. I don’t see it moving out of there given the current makeup of the legislature. I don’t foresee it happening in Pennsylvania anytime soon. It does keep coming up a lot by members of the State House, I think it’s a good idea because people are driving. Let’s get real. There are people without papers in the United States. I mean, if we don’t realize that, I think that we’re just fooling ourselves. So, you know, it’s if it’s a way for them, they’re voluntarily providing their information, you know, why not register it, they can get their insurance. It’s not a federal issue. It’s a state issue as the as right to get driver’s licenses, it’s state-by-state. Pennsylvania considers that they look at it, they bring it up, but it always fills in committee doesn’t go anywhere. Pennsylvania, has the political planet as a swing state, as we all know, and immigration is a hot topic issue here.

Rachel  20:37

I’m glad to hear that at least it’s even if it’s not, you know, moving forward, I think it being on people’s minds is a good thing. So in terms of changes like that, and maybe large scale changes, like we spoken about how we just need really large scale immigration reform, I was wondering, we could talk about the changes that you think need be made to both attract and retain immigrants in the United States, I think there’s a lot of talk about specifically, after the Trump administration, a lot of international students to stop coming here, you know, the United States is losing talent to countries like Canada and other places like that. So I was curious to get your thoughts on that.

Raymond Lahoud 21:14

COVID-19 opened up a different way of kind of operating, we had spoken earlier, where, you know, these companies are now recognizing that they could get that global talent opened up a facility in India or, you know, have somebody remote in from Canada, or actually just physically move their locations to Canada, or their offices or their manufacturing sites to another country, because it’s easier to bring labor in. I think that other countries are starting to embrace certain kinds of immigration, like I know that Canada is, you know, they’ve implemented that another investment-based immigration system, they’ve made it easier for Indian workers a certain kind of ticket during COVID in the light. So there are countries that are taking no more proactive approach to bringing in people but during the Trump administration, people from abroad really felt they weren’t welcomed in the United States. And I saw that a lot with students, and there was a significant number. It’s coming back, and I’m seeing the numbers come back, and just from the schools locally, that that we’re working with. So in terms of the International Student Program, you know, I do feel that it’s picking back up after COVID. And after the Trump administration, I just think we have to kind of keep going with it to make sure that, you know, we know that the people that we’re inviting into our country, we know that we have to welcome them here and treat them kindly, and work with them. Because we’re just we are one world one people. I’m really just, I think it’s a realist here, and that, you know, you have immigration lawyers who, you know, will just, you know, push things to like an end and say, No, open borders, and you have no people on another end that would say, you know, close everything to anybody. And but I think we have to have recent ability. I mean, you just can’t close the United States to everything. I mean, you can’t close the United States to the globe’s cultures, we just have to find a middle ground. And I hope that, you know, I was able to kind of present some of that reason that no middle ground, that’s there being immigration where it’s hard to take, you know, some things that Trump did weren’t necessarily I’m going to do but if somebody heard me say that, and I will now, you know, they would be shocked at it. But I think that’s what the issue is, is that there’s no meeting of minds. People just become enemies, because somebody has a different political opinion. You know, I think there really has to come a realization that we just can’t shut the borders down completely. And you can’t open the borders up completely. There just has to be a middle ground that we all have to reach in. Our members of Congress really have to grow up and hopefully, they will. And hopefully, they’ll work with the Biden ministration. We’ll get somewhere.

Jessica  23:52

I actually have an interesting question. Since you’re located in Pennsylvania; Lancaster’s, a certified welcoming status for refugees. Do you think that’s helpful in situations like Ukraine? And like if more cities did that, do you see that as a positive direction?

Raymond Lahoud 24:06

I do, I do. I mean, like…Philadelphia has, like a welcome center for Lancaster was one of the counties like that. It’s really what they do with it is, yeah, it certainly hops. The more the better. Governor Wolf has actually taken very proactive actions towards the Ukrainian community here, even locally. But again, there’s more than just the Ukrainian community that are suffering from prosecution. So hopefully, it’ll open our minds to how we deal with other areas and in the future when this happens and how other countries can work together with it. But yeah, it does. It does help because it shows that we care you know, things like that only they can start shows that we care. You know, even if you know, New Jersey, they couldn’t give them give people a real ID driver’s license, but they gave them a license to drive and pencil and they can leave the state drive and add to it, it’s still a driver’s license so they can give What they want to know as much as they can give them and if that’s what Lancaster was able to give them, that’s what it was. They can’t give driver’s licenses but um, you know, that opens up a door for immigrants and to have stuff like that it’s good for them to have programs like that is good.

Rachel  25:14

Well, excellent. Thanks again, Ray for joining us today. We had a great conversation.

Raymond Lahoud 25:20

 It’s really been good being here talking about immigration. It’s an interesting topic. And hopefully, we’ll see things changing in the years to come and I’m here to talk to you whenever. Yeah, thank you for having me.

OUTRO  25:40

Thank you for listening to The National Law Review’s Legal News Reach podcast. Be sure to follow us on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts for more episodes for the latest legal news. Interested in publishing and advertising with us? Visit www.natlawreview.com. We’ll be back soon with our next episode.

Article By Rachel Popa and Jessica Scheck of The National Law Review / The National Law Forum LLC

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Copyright ©2022 National Law Forum, LLC

Supreme Court’s New Arbitration Ruling: Limits Federal Jurisdiction For Confirming or Challenging Arbitration Awards Under the FAA

On March 31, 2022, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a decision in Badgerow v. Walters, No 20-1143, addressing when federal courts have jurisdiction to rule on motions to confirm, modify, or vacate arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). In an 8-1 decision, the Court narrowed the circumstances in which federal courts have such jurisdiction. Under the Court’s new decision, employers (and employees) will now more often be required to file their motions to confirm, modify, or vacate arbitration awards in state rather than federal court.

The Court’s Decision

The Court’s decision addresses a number of arcane questions of civil procedure and federal jurisdiction that could make for a nightmarish law school exam.

The decision starts from the well-accepted premise that the FAA does not grant federal courts jurisdiction. The FAA does, however, give parties to arbitration agreements certain rights, including the right to move a court to compel arbitration and the right to move a court to vacate, modify, or confirm an arbitration award. So the question that follows is: When can parties file these FAA motions in federal court and when must they file them in state court?

Under Badgerow, we now know that the answer is not the same for motions to compel arbitration and motions to vacate, modify, or confirm arbitration awards.

Under the Court’s prior case law, Vaden v. Discover Bank (2009), an employer can file a motion to compel arbitration in federal court so long as the underlying dispute to be arbitrated involves a question under federal law. For example, if an employee is alleging claims under a federal statute, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Family and Medical Leave Act, or any of the myriad other federal employment laws, a federal court would have jurisdiction to rule on a motion to compel arbitration of those claims. In addition to this “federal question” jurisdiction, the federal court might also have jurisdiction based on the diversity of the parties. Under a federal court’s diversity jurisdiction, a court also has jurisdiction to hear disputes between parties that are citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

In Badgerow, the Court held that a different analysis applies to motions to vacate, modify, or confirm arbitration awards, which are governed by different sections of the FAA. Unlike motions to compel arbitration, federal courts are not permitted to “look through” a motion to vacate, modify, or confirm to see whether there is a federal question involved in the underlying arbitration matter. Instead, a federal court must determine whether it has jurisdiction based on the motion itself.

Asking a court to vacate, modify, or confirm an arbitration award will usually raise questions about contract interpretation and enforcement. Contract law is usually state law. Thus, a motion to vacate, modify, or confirm arbitration awards will generally present questions of state law rather than federal law.

Since motions to vacate, modify, or confirm arbitration awards will rarely present federal questions on their face, federal courts will rarely have “federal question” jurisdiction over such motions. Federal courts may still have diversity jurisdiction if the parties on opposite sides of the motion to vacate, modify, or confirm arbitration awards are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. It is also theoretically possible that a federal court could still have federal question jurisdiction on some other grounds, but the Badgerow decision did not delve into that subject.

Key Takeaways

Under the Supreme Court’s new decision, employers will more often need to turn to state courts for motions to confirm, modify, or vacate arbitration awards under the FAA.

State courts historically have been more hostile to arbitration than federal courts. In losing the option of going to federal court to confirm some arbitration awards, arbitration may become marginally less reliable. However, this new decision should not affect the overall benefits that many employers conclude they receive from using employment arbitration.

In addition, the new decision will likely affect employers’ strategies in moving to compel arbitration, because the scope of federal jurisdiction is broader for such motions. In seeking to compel arbitration, employers may now more frequently ask the federal court to retain jurisdiction pending the outcome of the arbitration so that the parties may return to that federal court to address any subsequent motion to vacate, modify, or confirm the resulting arbitration award.

Finally, by forcing employers (and other parties to arbitration agreements) more frequently to go to state court to vacate, modify, and confirm arbitration awards, the Badgerow decision will likely bring to the fore another question that has been looming on the horizon: do the FAA’s provisions permitting motions to vacate, modify, and confirm arbitration awards even apply in state court? Several courts around the country have suggested that they do not, meaning that employers (and other parties to arbitration agreements) will need to rely on state arbitration statutes for such motions in some jurisdictions. But that is another topic for another day.

© 2022, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
For more articles about arbitration, please visit the NLR ADR/Arbitration/Mediation type of law page.

Electronic Medical Record Provider Pays $930,000 in First Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative Settlement

For the first settlement as part of the Department of Justice’s Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative, DOJ settled a case against medical services government contractor Comprehensive Health Services, LLC (CHS) for $930,000.  This settlement resolves allegations brought forth in two qui tam lawsuits, where four whistleblowers filed suit on behalf of the government under the qui tam provision of the False Claims Act.  Three of the whistleblowers received $15,000, in addition to attorneys’ fees, and one relator received $127,050 for reporting fraud.

“This settlement serves notice to federal contractors that they will be held accountable for conduct that puts private medical records and patient safety at risk,” said the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York.

CHS, as part of the medical services they provided to the U.S. government, was paid to implement a secure electronic medical record (EMR) system as part of contracts with the State Department and Air Force at various U.S. consulate and military locations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The EMR system housed personal health information and medical records for anyone who received medical treatment at the locations CHS served, including U.S. service members, diplomats, officials, and contractors.  According to the allegations, CHS did not consistently store patients’ medical records on the secure EMR system and indeed left scans on a network drive which non-clinical staff could access.

As part of several contracts to which CHS was a party, CHS was supposed to provide medical supplies, including controlled substances subject to U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or European Medicines Agency (EMA) approval.  According to the allegations, CHS “knowingly, recklessly, or with deliberate ignorance” submitted claims for payment for controlled substances that they obtained by means not sanctioned by these contracts.  Not only did CHS lack a Drug Enforcement Agency license to export controlled substances, but CHS also obtained controlled substances by having their U.S.-based subsidiary request that a South African physician prescribe controlled substances, according to the allegations.  The South African physician prescribed these controlled substances, absent FDA or EMA approval, and a shipping company from the same country imported the substances to Iraq.

Government contractors are supposed to adhere to the terms of their contracts in order to receive reimbursement from the U.S. government.  This medical services provider ignored procurement guidelines to obtain controlled substances, undermining safety controls and misrepresenting their adherence to contract terms in providing medical services to U.S. military personnel.  The DOJ’s Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative brings the power of the False Claims Act to bear on contractors whose job is to protect sensitive information and critical systems.  Representing that data is secure when it is, in fact, not is a violation of the False Claims Act and constitutes cyber-fraud.  As the Special Agent in Charge of the U.S. Department of State OIG, Office of Investigations noted, “…this outcome will send a clear message that cutting corners on State Department contracts has significant consequences.”

Whistleblowers raised data privacy concerns to CHS, but the contractor failed to implement better cybersecurity protocols in response to their concerns.  The Department of Justice has rewarded its first whistleblowers as part of the Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative, and they’re just getting started.

© 2022 by Tycko & Zavareei LLP
For more articles about digital health, visit the NLR Health Care Law section.

Broad Majority Decisions in Terrorist Torture and Abortion Law Cases Resolve Important State Secrets and Intervention Procedural Issues: SCOTUS Today

The Court has decided two important cases today, United States v. Zubaydah, upholding the government’s assertion of the state secrets privilege and rejecting the al Qaeda terrorist leader’s discovery request for information concerning his torture by the CIA, and Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C., allowing the intervention of the Kentucky attorney general to assume the defense of the state’s abortion law after the official who had been defending the law decided not to seek further review. Both cases are, at root, about significant issues of public interest and policy—the torture of terrorists and restrictive abortion policies—but neither opinion resolves any such question. Indeed, the lessons learned from each of these cases are essentially procedural, and though the outcomes are determined by significant margins, the alliances of Justices on the multiple opinions published are also instructive.

Zubaydah has been among the most closely watched cases on the Court’s docket. Full disclosure: I am a board member of the Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law at the University of Pennsylvania, which has advocated for the closing of the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba, where Zubaydah is detained, and for the rejection of privilege claims as to non-classified information concerning torture. Though I am not surprised by the outcome in the case, it is contrary to what many human rights organizations have been advocating. The admixtures of Justices also provide interesting insights as to how they approach matters of privilege and national security.

In what likely will be one of the last majority opinions written by retiring Justice Stephen Breyer, and subject to various concurrences by Justices Thomas, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and upheld the government’s assertion of state secrets privilege to deny Zubaydah’s attempt to subpoena two CIA contractors from whom he sought to obtain information for use in litigation in Poland concerning his torture at an alleged “black site” in that country. The state secrets privilege allows the government to bar the disclosure of information that, were it revealed, would harm national security. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1, 6–7 (1953). While the Ninth Circuit had accepted much of the government’s claim, it concluded that the privilege did not cover information about the location of the detention site, which the court believed had already been publicly disclosed. Indeed, it is clear from the record in the case that there has been substantial public discussion of such a detention site in Poland. However, although the government has concluded that the “enhanced interrogation” to which Zubaydah had been subjected constituted torture, the fact of its location in Poland has never been formally confirmed by the United States. The state secrets privilege permits the government to prevent disclosure of information when that disclosure would harm national security interests, such as “the risk of revealing covert operatives, organizational structure and functions, and intelligence-gathering sources, methods, and capabilities.” Here, Justice Breyer, in a textbook case displaying the essential role that he has played on the Court in pragmatically fashioning majorities to form consensus opinions in controversial cases, accepted the view that verifying the existence, or non-existence, of a CIA black site in Poland, falls within the state secrets privilege because confirmation or denial of the site’s existence and location, even if such information has already been made public through unofficial sources, would harm relations among foreign intelligence services vital to U.S. interests. The majority also noted that the locational information is not essential to the case that Zubaydah is attempting to make, but it also rejected the remand to consider issues of Zubaydah’s treatment that Justices Kagan, concurring, and Justice Gorsuch (interestingly, joined by Justice Sotomayor), dissenting, would have allowed. In a case where there is virtually no disagreement among the Justices as to what the law is, the decision comes down to a procedural formulation that Justice Breyer loosely compares to applying exemptions under the Freedom of Information Act. In any event, the majority held that, as an objective matter, the government’s assertions of privilege and national security risk satisfied its burden of responding to the demand for information.

Notwithstanding the great public interest that surrounds the debate and litigation concerning the efforts of various state legislatures to restrict abortion and to obtain the reversal or narrowing of Roe v. Wade, the Court’s 8-1 majority (only Justice Sotomayor dissented) held only that the Court would not adopt an arbitrary claims-processing rule barring a non-party intervener from taking over an appeal, especially under the conditions presented here. Having first concluded that neither a jurisdictional requirement nor a mandatory claims-processing rule barred consideration of the attorney general’s motion, the Court concluded that no statute or rule restricts the jurisdiction of a court of appeals or provides a general standard to apply in deciding whether intervention on appeal should be allowed. The one passing reference to intervention made in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure only concerns the review of agency action. Accordingly, with “respondents cit[ing] no provision that deprives a court of appeals of jurisdiction in the way they suggest, and no such supporting language can be found in 28 U. S. C. §2107, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 and 4, or any other provision of law. . . [the] Court refuses to adopt what would essentially be a categorical claims-processing rule barring consideration of the attorney general’s motion. When a non-party enters into an agreement to be bound by a judgment in accordance with the agreement’s terms, it is hard to see why the non-party should be precluded from seeking intervention on appeal if the agreement preserves that opportunity. Here, the attorney general reserved ‘all rights, claims, and defenses . . . in any appeals arising out of this action.’ That easily covers the right to seek rehearing en banc and the right to file a petition for a writ of certiorari.”

Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, like the cheese, stands alone. She argues that every case should have a certain end point, and one should be applied here. One wonders if she would entertain a similar opinion in a case like this but where the plaintiffs are appealing. In any event, all of the other Justices are unified by the absence of any textual limitation on their jurisdiction to entertain a motion to intervene on appeal and the reasonable justification made for it by the state attorney general. Where Justice Alito found a constitutional basis for this conclusion and Justice Kagan would only have relied upon statutory interpretation, the vast majority of the Court agreed on the procedural regime adopted irrespective of the fact that there likely would be considerable disagreement about the constitutionality of the statute at issue in the underlying litigation.

©2022 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.
For more articles about Supreme Court cases, visit the NLR Litigation section.