Tag: federal court

Not Ship Shape: SEC Sues Retired Chief Petty Officer for Fraudulent Offerings to Navy-Related Victims

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Office of Investor Education and Advocacy (“OIEA”), which dates from last century, is concerned with explaining aspects of the capital markets for “Main Street” investors and warning them against potential risks and fraud schemes. On Sept. 25, 2017, the Commission announced the formation of the Retail Strategy Task Force (“RSTF”) in its Division of Enforcement. Its purpose is to consider and implement “strategies to address misconduct that victimizes retail investors,” according to the SEC Press Release issued that day. A primary focus area of the OIEA and RSTF is so-called “affinity investments,” i.e., investment offerings aimed at groups such as churches, ethnic communities, college alumni groups, etc.

On Wednesday, July 27, 2022, the SEC filed suit in the Federal Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, against Robert F. Murray, 42, a retired U.S. Navy Chief Petty Officer residing in North Canton, Ohio, for conducting an unregistered offering of securities in Deep Dive Strategies, LLC, an Ohio private pooled investment fund (the “Fund”). Murray controlled the Fund and acted as investment adviser, telling investors the fund would invest in publicly traded securities. Murray marketed the offering through a Facebook group “with over 3500 active duty, reservists and veterans of the U.S. Navy who shared an interest in investing,” according to the Complaint. Most certainly an “affinity” group. Murray also created “a channel on the Discord social media platform where he live-streamed his trading activity and posted trading advice with a focus on options.”

The Fund was organized in September 2020 and solicited investors through February 2021. Although Murray told investors they could change their minds within 15 days and get their money back, in fact he “almost immediately began spending Fund money on personal expenses.” He transferred monies to his personal checking account and even withdrew cash from the Fund, so by February 2021, $148,000, or approximately 42% of the $355,000 invested by the unsuspecting “Goats” (a nickname for the Navy affinity group), had been “misappropriated” (i.e., stolen) by Murray. By March 2021 he had ceased regular communication with the Goats and failed to respond to requests to redeem “invested” dollars. Some of that misappropriated money was lost gambling at casinos in Cleveland and elsewhere in the Midwest.

Murray provided potential investors with both a Disclosure Statement and a copy of the Fund’s Operating Agreement, and the Complaint identifies several material misstatements and omissions in the two documents. In addition, Murray made oral material misstatements and omitted material information when speaking with potential and actual investors. In fact, Murray lost most of the Fund’s brokerage account on Jan. 13, 2021, when GameStop options purchased in the account saw their value plummet. In that connection see my Feb. 2, 2021, Blog “Rupture Rapture: Should the GameStop?” When the SEC began investigating Murray and the Fund, he asserted his Fifth Amendment rights and declined to answer questions.

In the Complaint, the Commission charges Murray with seven different securities law violations, each set out in a separate Count as follows:

  1. Violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and Rule 10b-5 thereunder by using devices, making untrue statements, and misleading omissions, and engaging in a business which operate as a fraud on securities purchasers.
  2. Violation of Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “33 Act”), by offering and selling securities by means of interstate commerce using devices to defraud.  Violations of the 33 Act can be proven without the need to prove scienter (broadly, intent).
  3. Violation of Section 17(a)(2) of the 33 Act by obtaining money or property in connection with the sale of securities by means of untrue statements of material facts and making misleading omissions, engaging in transactions which operate as a fraud on the purchaser, where Murray was at least negligent in engaging in these activities.
  4. Violation of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the 33 Act by selling securities without the offering being registered (or exempt from registration), and with the use of a prospectus where the offering was not registered.
  5. Violation of Section 206(1) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “40 Act”) by acting as an investment adviser using devices to defraud clients and prospective clients.
  6. Violation of Section 206(2) of the 40 Act by acting as an investment adviser engaging in transactions which operate as a fraud on clients and prospective clients.
  7. Violation of Section 206(4) of the 40 Act and Rule 206(4)-8 thereunder by acting as an investment adviser to a pooled investment vehicle, making untrue statements of material fact and making misleading omissions and engaging in acts that are fraudulent with respect to investors in the pooled investment vehicle.

The SEC seeks entry of findings by the Court of the facts cited in the Complaint and of conclusions of law that concur with the Commission’s assertions of violations. In addition, the SEC seeks entry of a permanent injunction against future violations of the cited securities laws; an order requiring disgorgement of all Murray’s ill-gotten gains plus prejudgment interest; an order imposing a civil penalty of $1,065,000; and an order barring Murray from serving as an officer or director of any public company.

Murray preyed on his fellow Naval servicemen in violation of the unspoken understandings of the “Goats,” that a fellow Navy NCO would not seek to take financial advantage of them. That is why the SEC’s July 28, 2022, Press Release reporting this matter includes an express warning from the OIEA and the RSTF not to make “investment decisions based solely on common ties with someone recommending or selling the investment.” One wonders whether, if the Goats were to catch up with Murray, he would be keelhauled.

Article By Peter D. Hutcheon of Norris McLaughlin P.A.

For more securities and SEC legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Norris McLaughlin P.A., All Rights Reserved

Federal District Court Says Pre-Shift COVID Screening Time Not Compensable

In the first reported decision we’ve seen addressing the issue head on, a federal district court in California dismissed a putative collective action claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) seeking payment for time spent in pre-shift COVID screening.

Prior to clocking in each day, the plaintiff—a non-exempt truck driver whose job duties included loading and transporting automobile parts from a central distribution center to stores throughout southern California—was required to submit to COVID-related health screening conducted on his employer’s premises.  During the screening process, a company employee asked the plaintiff a series of questions and took the plaintiff’s temperature.  The total time spent in the screening process often exceeded five minutes, which included waiting time.

The plaintiff filed a collective action claim, contending that the time spent by him and other employees participating in the daily screening was compensable under the FLSA.

Starting with the premise that time spent in pre-shift activities is only compensable under the FLSA if it is “integral and indispensable” to the employee’s “principal activities or activities which [the] employee is employed to perform,” the district court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss the FLSA claims, noting:

A pre-shift COVID screening is not the “principal activity or activities which [the] employee is employed to perform.”  29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1).  O’Reilly did not hire the employees to undergo health screenings, but instead to load and transport products to stores….  [T]he pre-shift COVID screenings were not “integral and indispensable” to the employees’ duties because the screening was not an intrinsic element of the loading and transporting of products to the stores.  The screenings were not indispensable to the employees’ duties because O’Reilly could eliminate them completely without hindering the employees’ ability to perform their duties….  A pre-shift COVID temperature check and short questions regarding exposure do not share the required nexus with Plaintiff’s duties of retrieving automotive parts and delivering them to auto part stores to make the screening a compensable activity that is integral and indispensable to those activities.

Notably, the court referenced—and then distinguished—the U.S. Department of Labor’s COVID-19 and the Fair Labor Standards Act Questions and Answers, which were issued during the height of the pandemic and which many employers felt were ambiguous on the issue of which COVID-related activities were and weren’t considered “hours worked” under the FLSA:

Unlike the nurse in the DOL example whose principal job duty is to keep patients healthy and has direct patient contact, Plaintiff’s principal activities consisted of manual labor and transportation of auto parts to stores.

We examined those agency Q&As—and the broader issues around compensability of time spent in vaccination, testing, and screening activities—in an earlier blog.

The decision is Pipich v. O’Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC (S.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2022).

Article By Allan S Bloom of Proskauer Rose LLP

For more coronavirus legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Proskauer Rose LLP.

Supreme Court’s New Arbitration Ruling: Limits Federal Jurisdiction For Confirming or Challenging Arbitration Awards Under the FAA

On March 31, 2022, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a decision in Badgerow v. Walters, No 20-1143, addressing when federal courts have jurisdiction to rule on motions to confirm, modify, or vacate arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). In an 8-1 decision, the Court narrowed the circumstances in which federal courts have such jurisdiction. Under the Court’s new decision, employers (and employees) will now more often be required to file their motions to confirm, modify, or vacate arbitration awards in state rather than federal court.

The Court’s Decision

The Court’s decision addresses a number of arcane questions of civil procedure and federal jurisdiction that could make for a nightmarish law school exam.

The decision starts from the well-accepted premise that the FAA does not grant federal courts jurisdiction. The FAA does, however, give parties to arbitration agreements certain rights, including the right to move a court to compel arbitration and the right to move a court to vacate, modify, or confirm an arbitration award. So the question that follows is: When can parties file these FAA motions in federal court and when must they file them in state court?

Under Badgerow, we now know that the answer is not the same for motions to compel arbitration and motions to vacate, modify, or confirm arbitration awards.

Under the Court’s prior case law, Vaden v. Discover Bank (2009), an employer can file a motion to compel arbitration in federal court so long as the underlying dispute to be arbitrated involves a question under federal law. For example, if an employee is alleging claims under a federal statute, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Family and Medical Leave Act, or any of the myriad other federal employment laws, a federal court would have jurisdiction to rule on a motion to compel arbitration of those claims. In addition to this “federal question” jurisdiction, the federal court might also have jurisdiction based on the diversity of the parties. Under a federal court’s diversity jurisdiction, a court also has jurisdiction to hear disputes between parties that are citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

In Badgerow, the Court held that a different analysis applies to motions to vacate, modify, or confirm arbitration awards, which are governed by different sections of the FAA. Unlike motions to compel arbitration, federal courts are not permitted to “look through” a motion to vacate, modify, or confirm to see whether there is a federal question involved in the underlying arbitration matter. Instead, a federal court must determine whether it has jurisdiction based on the motion itself.

Asking a court to vacate, modify, or confirm an arbitration award will usually raise questions about contract interpretation and enforcement. Contract law is usually state law. Thus, a motion to vacate, modify, or confirm arbitration awards will generally present questions of state law rather than federal law.

Since motions to vacate, modify, or confirm arbitration awards will rarely present federal questions on their face, federal courts will rarely have “federal question” jurisdiction over such motions. Federal courts may still have diversity jurisdiction if the parties on opposite sides of the motion to vacate, modify, or confirm arbitration awards are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. It is also theoretically possible that a federal court could still have federal question jurisdiction on some other grounds, but the Badgerow decision did not delve into that subject.

Key Takeaways

Under the Supreme Court’s new decision, employers will more often need to turn to state courts for motions to confirm, modify, or vacate arbitration awards under the FAA.

State courts historically have been more hostile to arbitration than federal courts. In losing the option of going to federal court to confirm some arbitration awards, arbitration may become marginally less reliable. However, this new decision should not affect the overall benefits that many employers conclude they receive from using employment arbitration.

In addition, the new decision will likely affect employers’ strategies in moving to compel arbitration, because the scope of federal jurisdiction is broader for such motions. In seeking to compel arbitration, employers may now more frequently ask the federal court to retain jurisdiction pending the outcome of the arbitration so that the parties may return to that federal court to address any subsequent motion to vacate, modify, or confirm the resulting arbitration award.

Finally, by forcing employers (and other parties to arbitration agreements) more frequently to go to state court to vacate, modify, and confirm arbitration awards, the Badgerow decision will likely bring to the fore another question that has been looming on the horizon: do the FAA’s provisions permitting motions to vacate, modify, and confirm arbitration awards even apply in state court? Several courts around the country have suggested that they do not, meaning that employers (and other parties to arbitration agreements) will need to rely on state arbitration statutes for such motions in some jurisdictions. But that is another topic for another day.

© 2022, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
For more articles about arbitration, please visit the NLR ADR/Arbitration/Mediation type of law page.

EPA’s Stormwater General Permit is Safe. Does it Matter?

A Colorado-based NGO has dropped its 9th Circuit lawsuit challenging EPA’s Multi-Sector General Permit for stormwater discharges associated with industrial facilities.

On one hand, this is a victory for EPA which apparently offered nothing to settle the case before the NGO threw up its hands.

On the other hand, the General Permit is only applicable in Massachusetts, New Hampshire and New Mexico, the three states that have not been delegated the authority to issue such a permit (as well as tribal lands and other lands not subject to state jurisdiction).

Why did the NGO bring this suit to begin with?  Did it hope that the Biden Administration EPA would, when push came to shove, do something dramatically different than the Trump Administration EPA?

Whatever the reason, the NGO has apparently concluded that the current law and permit give it plenty of grounds to bring suits over stormwater discharges in the 9th Circuit and elsewhere.  There are already several such imaginative suits pending on the west coast.

Are the regulators in Massachusetts less able to issue and enforce stormwater permits than than their colleagues in 47 other states?  The answer is of course not.  They are completely able and more able than most.  And they already have authority under state laws and regulations that are broader in their reach than the federal law.

But the Massachusetts legislature has stood in the way, apparently because it doesn’t want to bear the costs of regulating in this area borne by 47 other states.  Uncertainty and the threat, if not the actuality, of litigation has been the unfortunate result of this dereliction for the regulated community, including the municipalities in which we live.

We deserve better.

“The Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) is dropping its legal challenge to EPA’s industrial stormwater general permit that sought stricter regulation of plastics pollution after settlement discussions were unfruitful, according to an attorney familiar with the litigation.“

Article By Jeffrey R. Porter of Mintz

For more environmental legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©1994-2021 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

Sixth Circuit Deals Blow to OSHA’s Proposed Expedited Briefing Schedule, Says it Will Keep ETS Case

In what is getting to be habit in the OSHA ETS litigation with courts issuing orders late Friday afternoons, the Sixth Circuit on December 3, 2021 tersely denied a petition to transfer the case back to the Fifth Circuit.  In the same order, the Sixth Circuit also denied, without explanation, the union petitioners’ bid to transfer the case to the D.C. Circuit where there is pending litigation of the OSHA Healthcare ETS issued in June 2020.

The order perfunctorily addressed several pending motions on the docket, including OSHA’s motion for an expedited briefing schedule, which would have set the close of briefing on the merits for December 29, 2021 with oral argument held as soon as practicable thereafter.  In denying the motion, the Sixth Circuit stated little more than it was reserving judgment on setting a merits briefing schedule.  Obviously, there are a tremendous number of parties with varied interests and a multitude of legal arguments both statutory and Constitutional, which the court clearly recognizes are at play and likely require a schedule that is not rushed.

The next big issue for the court to tackle will be OSHA’s motion to dissolve the stay with the close of briefing just a week away on December 10, 2021.  Whether the court will dole out more good news for employers, states, and other challengers to the ETS for the holiday season is anybody’s guess, but a decision before the holidays seems imminent.

Article By Melanie L. Paul of Jackson Lewis P.C.

For more coronavirus legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.
Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2021

Federal Jurors Get 25 Percent Pay Hike

For the first time in 28 years, jurors in federal court will receive a pay hike of 25 percent. That means that for each day that a person sits as a juror in federal court, he or she will receive a check for $50, up from $40 that has been in effect since 1990.

President Trump signed the bill into law that takes effect May 7. The raise was included in a bill that provided the federal judiciary with $7.1 billion in discretionary spending, an increase of $184 million from the previous fiscal year, according to a news release from the U.S. Courts that provides support to federal courts across the country.

Jurors who serve in Cook County Circuit Court receive $17.50 per day for their service.

Federal court jurors in the Chicago area serve at the Dirksen U.S. Courthouse in Chicago’s Loop. They also receive reimbursement for travel (54.5 cents a mile) as well as a paid lunch at the Fresh Seasons Cafe, on the courthouse’s second floor.

“This is an excellent result and enables the Judiciary to fulfill its mission,” James C. Duff, Director of the U.S. Courts Administrative Office in Washington, D.C., said in a statement. “We are especially pleased that Congress recognized the critical public service provided by the citizens who serve on juries as well as the attorneys who represent defendants who can’t afford a lawyer.”

 

© 2018 by Clifford Law Offices PC.
This post was written by Robert A. Clifford of Clifford Law Offices PC.