Tag: Texas

Tax Credits in the Inflation Reduction Act Aim to Build a More Equitable EV Market

In February of this year, it was high time for me to buy a new car. I had driven the same car since 2008, and getting this-or-that replaced was costing more and more every year. As a first-time car buyer, I had two criteria: I wanted to go fast, and I wanted the car to plug in.

Like many prospective purchasers, I started my search online and by speaking with friends and who drove electric vehicles, or EVs for short. I settled on a plug-in hybrid sedan, reasoning that a plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV) was the best of both worlds: the 20-mile electric range was perfect for my short commute and getting around Houston’s inner loop, and the 10-gallon gas tank offered freedom to roam. In the eight months since I’ve had the car, I’ve bought less than ten tanks of gas. As the price of a gallon in Texas soared to $4.69 in June, the timing of my purchase seemed miraculous.

When it was time to transact, the dealer made vague mention of rebates and tax credits, but didn’t have a comprehensive understanding of the details. Enter Texas’s Light-Duty Motor Vehicle Purchase or Lease Incentive Program (LDPLIP). Administered by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), the program grants rebates of up to $5,000 for consumers, businesses, and government entities who buy or lease new vehicles powered by compressed natural gas or liquefied petroleum gas (propane), and up to $2,500 for those who buy or lease new EVs or vehicles powered by hydrogen fuel cells.

Rebates are only available to purchasers who buy or lease from dealerships (so some of the most popular EVs in the U.S. don’t qualify). There is no vehicle price cap, nor is there an income limit for purchasers. In June of 2022, the average price for a new electric vehicle was over $66,000, according to Kelley Blue Book estimates. But the median Texan household income (in 2020 dollars) for 2016-2020 was $63,826.

According to the grant specialist to whom I initially sent my application, the TCEQ has received “a vigorous response” from applicants, however, the TCEQ is limited in the number of rebate grants that it can award: 2,000 grants for EVs or vehicles powered by hydrogen fuel cells, and 1,000 grants for vehicles powered by compressed natural gas or liquefied petroleum gas (propane).

The grant period in Texas ends on January 7, 2023, but on July 5, 2022, the TCEQ suspended acceptance of applications for EVs or vehicles powered by hydrogen fuel cells. As of the writing of this post, the total number of applications received and reservations pending on the program’s website is 2,480.

In comparison with Texas’s rebate program, the EV tax credits in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 demonstrate a commitment to building a more equitable EV market. While EVs may be cheaper to own than gas-powered vehicles—especially when gas prices are high—a lot of lower and middle-income families have historically been priced out of the EV market. The IRA takes several meaningful steps towards accessibility and sustainability for a more diverse swath of consumers:

  • Allows point-of-sale incentives starting in 2024. Purchasers will be able to apply the credit (up to $7,500) at the dealership, and because sticker price is such an important factor for so many purchasers, this incentive will make buying an EV more attractive up front.
  • Removes 200,000 vehicle-per-manufacturer cap. Some American manufacturers are already past the maximum. Eliminating the cap means bringing back the tax credit for many popular and affordable EVs, which should attract new buyers.
  • Creates income and purchase price limits. SUVs, vans, and pickup trucks under $80,000, and all other vehicles (e.g. sedans) under $55,000, will qualify for the EV tax credit. For new vehicles, purchaser income will be subject to an AGI cap: $150,000 for individuals and $300,000 for a joint filers.
  • Extends the tax credit to pre-owned EVs. As long as the purchase price does not exceed $25,000, purchasers of pre-owned EVs (EVs whose model year is at least two years earlier than the calendar year in which the purchase occurs) will receive a tax credit for 30% of the sale price up to $4,000. The income cap for pre-owned EVs is $75,000 for individuals and $150,000 for a joint filers.

A purchaser who qualifies under both programs can get both incentives. Comparing Texas’s state government-level incentives and those soon to be offered at the federal level reveals a few telling differences—new vs. used, income caps, purchase price caps, post-purchase rebates vs. up-front point-of-sale incentives—but the differences all fall under the same umbrella: equity. The IRA’s tax credits are designed, among other things, to make purchasing an EV more attractive to a wider audience.

Of course, the EV incentive landscape has greatly changed since the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 first granted tax credits for new, qualified EVs. The LDPLIP wasn’t approved by the TCEQ until late 2013, so the U.S. government has arguably had more time to get it right. Some might say that the fact that Texas’s program offers the purchaser of the $150,000+ PHEV the same opportunity to access grant funds as the purchaser of the $30,000 EV means that the LDPLIP is even more “equal.”

It is worth noting that the IRA also sets a handful of production and assembly requirements. For instance, to qualify for the credit, a vehicle’s final assembly must occur in North America. Further, at least 40% the value of the critical minerals contained in the vehicle’s battery must be “extracted or processed in any country with which the United States has a free trade agreement in effect” or be “recycled in North America”—and this percentage increases each year, topping out at 80% in 2027. There is also a rising requirement that 50% of the vehicle’s battery components be manufactured or assembled in North America, with the requirement set to hit 100% in 2029. It is unclear whether automotive manufacturers and the U.S. critical mineral supply chains will be able to meet these targets—and that uncertainty may cause a potential limiting effect on the options a purchaser would have for EVs that qualify for the tax credit.

Time will tell whether the intentions behind the EV tax credits in the IRA have the effect that this particular blogger and PHEV owner is hoping for. While we wait to see whether this bid at creating an equitable EV market bears fruit, we can at least admire this attempt at, as the saying goes, “giving everyone a pair of shoes that fits.”

Article By Dania Abbasi of Foley & Lardner LLP

For more energy and environment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Foley & Lardner LLP

Suing Attorneys In Texas For Participating in Fiduciary Breaches

It is not uncommon for an attorney to execute all or part of his or her client’s wishes, which may be in breach of a fiduciary duty owed by the client to a third party. The third party can certainly sue the client for breaching fiduciary duties. But can the third party also sue the attorney for participating in the client’s actions?

An officer or director of a company may set up a competing business and direct company business to the new competing business. If the officer or director uses an attorney to set up this business and the attorney knows that new business will be used to usurp opportunities, can the company sue the attorney for facilitating the creation of the new business? What if the attorney is an owner of the new company or works for the new company in a nonlegal position?

Certainly, Texas has legal theories that can hold a party liable for participating with a fiduciary in breaching duties owed by the fiduciary. There is a claim for knowing participation in a breach of fiduciary duty. See Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp., 138 Tex. 565, 160 S.W.2d 509, 514 (1942); Paschal v. Great W. Drilling, Ltd., 215 S.W.3d 437, 450 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, pet. denied) (holding wife liable for knowing participation in employee’s embezzlement where funds were placed in joint account and wife benefitted from stolen funds). See also Westech Capital Corp. v. Salamone, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143577, 2019 WL 4003093, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2019) (collecting cases that explain that “Texas appellate courts have routinely recognized the existence of a cause of action for knowing participation in the breach of fiduciary duty.”). The general elements for a knowing-participation claim are: 1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship; 2) the third party knew of the fiduciary relationship; and 3) the third party was aware it was participating in the breach of that fiduciary relationship. D’Onofrio v. Vacation Publ’ns, Inc., 888 F.3d 197, 216 (5th Cir. 2018); Meadows v. Harford Life Ins. Co., 492 F.3d 634, 639 (5th Cir. 2007). There is also a recognized civil conspiracy claim in Texas. The essential elements of a civil conspiracy are (1) two or more persons; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result. Juhl v. Airington, 936 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1996). Finally, there may be an aiding-and-abetting breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim. The Texas Supreme Court has stated that it has not expressly adopted a claim for aiding and abetting outside the context of a fraud claim. See First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 224 (Tex. 2017); Ernst & Young v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d 573, 583 n. 7 (Tex. 2001); West Fork Advisors v. Sungard Consulting, 437 S.W.3d 917 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.). Notwithstanding, some Texas courts have found such an action to exist. See Hendricks v. Thornton, 973 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1998, pet. denied); Floyd v. Hefner, 556 F.Supp.2d 617 (S.D. Tex. 2008). One court identified the elements for aiding and abetting as the defendant must act with unlawful intent and give substantial assistance and encouragement to a wrongdoer in a tortious act. West Fork Advisors, 437 S.W.3d at 921. Some courts have held that here is no aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claim. Hampton v. Equity Trust Co., No. 03-19-00401-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 5674 (Tex. App.—Austin July 23, 2020, no pet.). See also Midwestern Cattle Mktg., L.L.C. v. Legend Bank, N.A., 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 36966, 2019 WL 6834031, at *7 (5th Cir. Dec. 13, 2019); In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 888 F.3d 753, 782, 781 (5th Cir. 2018)  For a discussion of these forms of joint liability for breach of fiduciary duty, please see E. Link Beck, Joint and Several Liability, STATE BAR OF TEXAS, 10TH ANNUAL FIDUCIARY LITIGATION COURSE (2015).

It is clear that at least under some theories, that third parties can be held liable for participating in fiduciary breaches with the party owing fiduciary duties. Can the third party be an attorney? Prior to Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. 2015), it was unclear in Texas whether a party could assert a claim against an attorney not representing the party, such as for negligent misrepresentation or aiding and abetting fraud or breaches of fiduciary duty. Some courts allowed the claim if the attorney was committing or participating in fraud. Others did not.

The plaintiff in Cantey Hanger alleged that the attorneys who represented her husband in a divorce proceeding had committed fraud by falsifying a bill of sale to shift tax liabilities from the sale of an airplane from her husband to her. Id. at 479-80. The Texas Supreme Court held that attorney immunity barred the claim because “[e]ven conduct that is ‘wrongful in the context of the underlying suit’ is not actionable if it is ‘part of the discharge of the lawyer’s duties in representing his or her client.’” Id. at 481. The following are key excerpts from the opinion:

Texas common law is well settled that an attorney does not owe a professional duty of care to third parties who are damaged by the attorney’s negligent representation of a client. Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575, 577 (Tex. 1996); see also McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex. 1999) (explaining that a lack of privity precludes attorneys’ liability to non-clients for legal malpractice). However, Texas courts have developed a more comprehensive affirmative defense protecting attorneys from liability to non-clients, stemming from the broad declaration over a century ago that “attorneys are authorized to practice their profession, to advise their clients and interpose any defense or supposed defense, without making themselves liable for damages.” Kruegel v. Murphy, 126 S.W. 343, 345 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ ref’d). This attorney-immunity defense is intended to ensure “loyal, faithful, and aggressive representation by attorneys employed as advocates.” Mitchell v. Chapman, 10 S.W.3d 810, 812 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied).

….

In accordance with this purpose, there is consensus among the courts of appeals that, as a general rule, attorneys are immune from civil liability to non-clients “for actions taken in connection with representing a client in litigation.” Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied); see also Toles v. Toles, 113 S.W.3d 899, 910 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.); Renfroe v. Jones & Assocs., 947 S.W.2d 285, 287-88 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied). Even conduct that is “wrongful in the context of the underlying suit” is not actionable if it is “part of the discharge of the lawyer’s duties in representing his or her client.” Toles, 113 S.W.3d at 910-11;

….

Conversely, attorneys are not protected from liability to non-clients for their actions when they do not qualify as “the kind of conduct in which an attorney engages when discharging his duties to his client.” Dixon Fin. Servs., 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2064, 2008 WL 746548, at *9; see also Chapman Children’s Trust v. Porter & Hedges, L.L.P., 32 S.W.3d 429, 442 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (noting that “it is the kind of conduct that is controlling, and not whether that conduct is meritorious or sanctionable”).

Because the focus in evaluating attorney liability to a non-client is “on the kind—not the nature—of the attorney’s conduct,” a general fraud exception would significantly undercut the defense. Dixon Fin. Servs., 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2064, 2008 WL 746548, at *8. Merely labeling an attorney’s conduct “fraudulent” does not and should not remove it from the scope of client representation or render it “foreign to the duties of an attorney.” Alpert, 178 S.W.3d at 406 (citing Poole, 58 Tex. at 137); see also Dixon Fin. Servs., 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2064, 2008 WL 746548, at *9 (“Characterizing an attorney’s action in advancing his client’s rights as fraudulent does not change the rule that an attorney cannot be held liable for discharging his duties to his client.”).

….

Fraud is not an exception to attorney immunity; rather, the defense does not extend to fraudulent conduct that is outside the scope of an attorney’s legal representation of his client, just as it does not extend to other wrongful conduct outside the scope of representation. An attorney who pleads the affirmative defense of attorney immunity has the burden to prove that his alleged wrongful conduct, regardless of whether it is labeled fraudulent, is part of the discharge of his duties to his client.

Id. at 481-484.

Based on the holding in Cantey Hanger, if an attorney is performing duties that a lawyer would typically perform, the attorney immunity defense would apply. This defense would likewise apply to aiding and abetting fraud and breaches of fiduciary duty. See Kastner v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 231 S.W.3d 571, 577-78 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007); Span Enters. v. Wood, 274 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008).

In Bethel v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C., the Court extended the Cantey Hanger holding to allegations of criminal conduct. 595 S.W.3d 651, 657-58 (Tex. 2020). There, the plaintiff had urged the Court “to recognize an exception” to attorney immunity “whe[n] a third party alleges that an attorney engaged in criminal conduct during the course of litigation.” Id. The Court rejected the invitation to adopt an exception or state a categorical rule because doing so would allow plaintiffs to avoid the attorney-immunity defense through artful pleading—”by merely alleging that an attorney’s conduct was ‘criminal.’” Id. The Court eschewed a categorical exception for criminal conduct because such an exception would defeat the purposes of the attorney-immunity defense. Instead, the Court held that conduct alleged to be criminal in nature “is not categorically excepted from the protections of attorney civil immunity when the conduct alleged is connected with representing a client in litigation.” Id. As we explained there, a lawyer who is doing his or her job is not more susceptible to civil liability just because a nonclient asserts that the lawyer’s actions are fraudulent, wrongful, or even criminal. Id.

In 2021, the Texas Supreme Court further clarified the holding in Cantey Hanger to state that “When an attorney personally participates ‘in a fraudulent business scheme with his client,’ as opposed to on his client’s behalf, the attorney ‘will not be heard to deny his liability’ because ‘such acts are entirely foreign to the duties of an attorney.’” Haynes & Boone, LLP v. NFTD, LLC, 631 S.W.3d 65, 77 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Poole v. Hous. & T.C. Ry. Co., 58 Tex. 134, 137 (1882)). The Court in Haynes & Boone, LLP, also expanded the Cantey Hanger holding to extend to transactional work that the attorney performs, in addition to litigation work covered in the Cantey Hanger opinion:

Today we confirm that attorney immunity applies to claims based on conduct outside the litigation context, so long as the conduct is the “kind” of conduct we have described above. We reach this conclusion because we see no meaningful distinction between the litigation context and the non-litigation context when it comes to the reasons we have recognized attorney immunity in the first place. We have recognized attorney immunity because attorneys are duty-bound to competently, diligently, and zealously represent their clients’ interests while avoiding any conflicting obligations or duties to themselves or others.

Id. at 79.

Most recently, in Taylor v. Tolbert, the Court reviewed whether there was an exception to immunity for private-party civil suits asserting that a lawyer has engaged in conduct criminalized by statute. No. 20-0727, 2022 Tex. LEXIS 385 (Tex. May 6, 2022). The court discussed the immunity defense as follows:

The common-law attorney-immunity defense applies to lawyerly work in “all adversarial contexts in which an attorney has a duty to zealously and loyally represent a client” but only when the claim against the attorney is based on “the kind of conduct” attorneys undertake while discharging their professional duties to a client. Stated inversely, if an attorney engages in conduct that is not “lawyerly work” or is “entirely foreign to the duties of a lawyer” or falls outside the scope of client representation, the attorney-immunity defense is inapplicable.

In determining whether conduct is “the kind” immunity protects, the inquiry focuses on the type of conduct at issue rather than the alleged wrongfulness of that conduct. But when the defense applies, counsel is shielded only from liability in a civil suit, not from “other mechanisms” that exist “to discourage and remedy” bad-faith or wrongful conduct, including sanctions, professional discipline, or criminal penalties, as appropriate.

Conduct is not the kind of conduct attorney immunity protects “simply because attorneys often engage in that activity” or because an attorney performed the activity on a client’s behalf. Rather, the conduct must involve “the uniquely lawyerly capacity” and the attorney’s skills as an attorney. For example, a lawyer who makes publicity statements to the press and on social media on a client’s behalf does “not partake of ‘the office, professional training, skill, and authority of an attorney’” because “[a]nyone—including press agents, spokespersons, or someone with no particular training or authority at all—can publicize a client’s allegations to the media.” Immunity attaches only if the attorney is discharging “lawyerly” duties to his or her client.

A corollary to this principle is that attorneys will not be entitled to civil immunity for conduct that is “entirely foreign to the duties of an attorney.” “Foreign to the duties” does not mean something a good attorney should not do; it means that the attorney is acting outside his or her capacity and function as an attorney. For that reason, whether counsel may claim the privilege turns on the task that was being performed, not whether the challenged conduct was meritorious.

This is so because the interests of clients demand that lawyers “competently, diligently, and zealously represent their clients’ interests while avoiding any conflicting obligations or duties to themselves or others.” To prevent chilling an attorney’s faithful discharge of this duty, lawyers must be able to pursue legal rights they deem necessary and proper for their clients without the menace of civil liability looming over them and influencing their actions. Attorney immunity furthers “loyal, faithful, and aggressive representation” by “essentially . . . removing the fear of personal liability,” thus “alleviating in the mind of [an] attorney any fear that he or she may be sued by or held liable to a non-client for providing . . . zealous representation.” In this way, the defense protects not only attorneys but also their clients, who can be assured that counsel is representing the client’s best interests, not the lawyer’s.

Id. The Court acknowledged that “there is a wide range of criminal conduct that is not within the ‘scope of client representation’ and [is] therefore ‘foreign to the duties of an attorney,’” and that “when that is the case, the circumstances do not give rise to an ‘exception’ to the immunity defense; rather, such conduct simply fails to satisfy the requirements for invoking the defense in the first instance.” Id. “[O]ur approach to applying the attorney-immunity defense remains functional, not qualitative, and leaves an attorney’s improper conduct addressable by public remedies.” Id.

The Court then held that the common-law defense of attorney immunity would still apply to state statutes (unless the statute specifically abrogated that defense). Id. The Court stated:

That does not mean that all conduct criminalized by the wiretap statute is immunized from civil liability or free of consequences. As we explained in Bethel, while criminal conduct is not categorically excepted from the attorney-immunity defense, neither is it categorically immunized by that defense. Criminal conduct may fall outside the scope of attorney immunity, and even when it does not, “nothing in our attorney-immunity jurisprudence affects an attorney’s potential criminal liability if the conduct constitutes a criminal offense.”

Id. However, regarding federal statutes, the Court concluded “that attorney immunity, as recognized and defined under Texas law, is not a defense under the federal wiretap statute because, quite simply, a state’s common-law defense does not apply to federal statutes.” Id.

In light of the foregoing authorities, it appears claims against attorneys merely doing work for a client (whether fraudulent, tortious, or even criminal) would be covered by attorney immunity and bar any participation in breach of fiduciary duty claim. However, if the misconduct relates to the attorney personally benefitting from the transaction, or having been a party to the transaction (as opposed to merely the attorney for a party), such an immunity would not apply. See, e.g., Olmos v. Giles, No. 3:22-CV-0077-D, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77134 (N.D. Tex. April 28, 2022) (refused to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claim and misrepresentation claim against attorneys where it was unclear whether the defendant attorneys were a part of the transaction).

Another issue that should be discussed is the impact on the attorney client privilege when an attorney participates in fraud or criminal activities. The attorney-client privilege cannot be enforced when “the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud.” Tex. R. Evid. 503 (d)(1). As one court describes:

The exception applies only when (1) a prima facie case is made of contemplated fraud, and (2) there is a relationship between the document at issue and the prima facie proof offered. A prima facie showing is sufficient if it sets forth evidence that, if believed by a trier of fact, would establish the elements of a fraud or crime that “was ongoing or about to be committed when the document was prepared.” A court may look to the document itself to determine whether a prima facie case has been established.…

We begin our analysis by examining the scope of the fraud portion of the crime/fraud exception. The Texas Rules of Evidence do not define what is intended in Rule 503(d)(1) by the phrase “to commit . . . [a] fraud.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines fraud as: “A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment.” The Texas common law tort of fraud also requires proof of misrepresentation, concealment, or non-disclosure. The legal concept of fraud therefore has at its core a misrepresentation or concealment. This definition also dovetails with the apparent reasoning behind inclusion of fraud in the exception: by keeping client communications confidential–pursuant to the attorney-client privilege –the attorney whose client intends to make a misrepresentation or concealment helps prevent the injured party from learning the truth about the misrepresentation or concealment. Thus, in that situation, the attorney’s silence affirmatively aids the client in committing the tort. This is not generally true of other torts (not based on misrepresentation or concealment) and explains why the exception is not the crime/tort exception.

In re Gen. Agents Ins. Co. of Am., Inc., 224 S.W.3d 806, 819 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, orig. proceeding). Moreover, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that this exception includes the work-product in the proper circumstances. Woodruff v. State, 330 S.W.3d 709, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 9569 (Tex. App. Texarkana Dec. 3, 2010), pet. ref’d No. PD-1807-10, 2011 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 749 (Tex. Crim. App. May 25, 2011), pet. ref’d No. PD-1807-10, 2011 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 770 (Tex. Crim. App. June 1, 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 977, 132 S. Ct. 502, 181 L. Ed. 2d 347, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7788 (U.S. 2011).

So, though an attorney may be immune from civil liability, the crime/fraud exception may open up attorney/client communications to the light of day. Regarding crimes involving breaches of fiduciary duty, in addition to theft crimes, the Texas Legislature has created the following crimes: (1) Financial Abuse of Elderly Individual in Texas Penal Code Section 32.55; 2) Financial Exploitation of Vulnerable Individuals in Texas Penal Code Section 32.53; (3) Misapplication of Fiduciary Property in Texas Penal Code Section 32.45; and (4) Failure to Report of the Exploitation of the Elderly or Disabled Individuals in the Texas Human Resources Code Section 48.051.

Article By David Fowler Johnson of Winstead

For more litigation and trial practice news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Winstead PC.

Court Reversed Order Appointing Temporary Administrator Due To A Lack Of A Bond

In In re Robinett, a party filed a petition for writ of mandamus, challenging a trial court’s order appointing a temporary administrator. No. 03-21-00649-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 926 (Tex. App.—Austin February 9, 2022, original proc.). The petitioner complained that the trial court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing and also appointed a temporary administrator without a bond. Regarding the hearing complaint, the court of appeals disagreed:

Under Section 55.001 of the Texas Estates Code, “[a] person interested in an estate may, at any time before the court decides an issue in a proceeding, file written opposition regarding the issue.” Relators are correct that such interested persons are entitled “to process for witness and evidence, and to be heard on the opposition.” Id. But, based on the record before us, they did not file any “written opposition” to the appointment until they filed their motion to reconsider three days after the appointment had already been decided. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by appointing the temporary administrator without first conducting a hearing pursuant to Section 55.001 because there was no requirement for the trial court to hold a hearing under that statute.

Id. The court, however, agreed that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing the temporary administrator without bond:

The Estates Code expressly requires that the order appointing a temporary administrator “set the amount of bond to be given by the appointee.” Moreover, the Estates Code requires that a party must enter into a bond unless they meet one of a limited number of exceptions: (1) a will directs that no bond be required; (2) all the relevant parties consent to not requiring bond; or (3) the appointee is a corporate fiduciary. And other statutory provisions require a hearing and evidence before “setting the amount of a bond.” Based on the record before us, there is no evidence that the temporary administrator met any of the exceptions to the bonding requirement, nor is there any indication that the trial court undertook any evidentiary hearing regarding the bond amount. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to follow the statutory requirements for setting bonds as part of a temporary administrator appointment.

Id.

© 2022 Winstead PC.
For more articles about civil procedures in litigation, visit the NLR Civil Procedure section.

Texas AG Sues Meta Over Collection and Use of Biometric Data

On February 14, 2022, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton brought suit against Meta, the parent company of Facebook and Instagram, over the company’s collection and use of biometric data. The suit alleges that Meta collected and used Texans’ facial geometry data in violation of the Texas Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier Act (“CUBI”) and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”). The lawsuit is significant because it represents the first time the Texas Attorney General’s Office has brought suit under CUBI.

The suit focuses on Meta’s “tag suggestions” feature, which the company has since retired. The feature scanned faces in users’ photos and videos to suggest “tagging” (i.e., identify by name) users who appeared in the photos and videos. In the complaint, Attorney General Ken Paxton alleged that Meta,  collected and analyzed individuals’ facial geometry data (which constitutes biometric data under CUBI) without their consent, shared the data with third parties, and failed to destroy the data in a timely matter, all in violation of CUBI and the DTPA. CUBI regulates the collection and use of biometric data for commercial purposes, and the DTPA prohibits false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.

Among other forms of relief, the complaint seeks an injunction enjoining Meta from violating these laws, a $25,000 civil penalty for each violation of CUBI, and a $10,000 civil penalty for each violation of the DTPA. The suit follows Facebook’s $650 million class-action settlement over alleged violations of Illinois’ Biometric Privacy Act and the company’s discontinuance of the tag suggestions feature last year.

Article By Hunton Andrews Kurth’s Privacy and Cybersecurity Practice Group

For more privacy and cybersecurity legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.

Court Rejected A Trustee’s Objection To Personal Jurisdiction In His Individual Capacity But Affirmed The Objection In His Capacity As Trustee

In Hanschen v. Hanschen, a trustee challenged a default judgment. No. 05-19-01134-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 4075 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 28, 2020, no pet. history). The family sued the trustee in his personal capacity and in his capacity as trustee for breaching fiduciary duties. While the trustee was in Texas, the family served him in his personal capacity. The family then obtained a default judgment against him in both capacities when he did not file an answer. Later, the trustee filed a special appearance challenging the court’s personal jurisdiction, and the trial granted the motion. The family then appealed.

The court of appeals reversed the special appearance against the trustee in his personal capacity. The court held that because the trustee was personally served in Texas, the trial court had personal jurisdiction over him:

In this case, the family personally served James with the petition and citation while he was in Texas. The family concedes they “have never asserted that Texas has general jurisdiction over James or that the traditional minimum contacts analysis would be met in the absence of his physical presence.” They are correct and the case law is clear that a trial court has authority to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident where the court’s jurisdiction grew out of the personal service of citation upon the nonresident within the state. A nonresident, merely by reason of his nonresidence, is not exempt from a court’s jurisdiction if he voluntarily comes to the state and thus is within the territorial limits of such jurisdiction and can be duly served with process.

Id. The trustee also argued that the court did not have adequate jurisdiction over him in his personal capacity because there were no claims against him in that capacity, but the court of appeals disagreed:

While we may agree with James that the default judgment granted relief against the entities for which it would be necessary for Texas courts to have jurisdiction over James in representative capacities, the family’s petition pleaded causes of action against James individually for breaches of fiduciary duties arising from his role as trustee of the Progeny Trust and his roles in NBR-C2, NBR-C3, and NBR-Needham. The family seeks exemplary damages against James for these alleged breaches of fiduciary duties. James does not make a specific argument why these claims are not pleaded against him personally. In Texas, generally an agent is personally liable for his own tortious conduct. For these reasons, we agree with the family that James was personally served with process in Texas, so the trial court has personal jurisdiction over him in that capacity.

Id.

The court of appeals then turned to whether the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the trustee in his capacity as trustee. The court noted that the citation was not issued to him in that capacity. The court held that this defect was dispositive and affirmed the special appearance for the trustee in his representative capacity:

We have held, “[t]he capacity in which a non-resident has contact with a forum state must be considered in the jurisdictional analysis.” James was not served with a citation directed to him in any representative capacity; only “JAMES HANSCHEN WHEREEVER HE MAY BE FOUND.” At oral argument, the family argued the listing of all the parties in the citation was sufficient to constitute service on James in each representative capacity he was listed as a defendant. We reject this contention and the family’s counsel acknowledged in oral argument a citation addressed to one defendant inadvertently served on a different, unrelated defendant would not constitute good service of process merely because all defendants’ names were in the list of defendants in the style of the lawsuit… In this case, James was not served with citations which were returned to the court clerk stating he had been served in his representative capacities. Any failure to comply with the rules regarding service of process renders the attempted service of process invalid, and the trial court acquires no personal jurisdiction over the defendant. A default judgment based on improper service is void. Accordingly, the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over James in his representative capacities.

Id.

© 2020 Winstead PC.

Texas Governor Announces $50 Million Loan Program for Texas Small Businesses through Goldman Sachs/LiftFund Partnership

As discussed in our previous alert on this issue, the CARES Act established a $349 billion U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) to provide immediate access to capital for small businesses who have been impacted by COVID-19. On April 13, 2020, Texas Governor Greg Abbott provided additional guidance to Texas employers when he announced that investment banking, securities and investment management firm, Goldman Sachs, will partner with San Antonio-based nonprofit organization, LiftFund, to provide $50 million in loans to small businesses. Specifically, Goldman Sachs will provide the capital, and LiftFund and other community development financial institutions will administer the funds. Texas business owners can now apply for a PPP loan and find more information about the program on the LiftFund website.

“What this capital will do [is] provide these companies the resources they need to keep employees on the payroll for the remaining few weeks or so until businesses can begin [the] process of opening back up,” Governor Abbott said. Notably, Governor Abbott indicated that he intends to issue an executive order that will outline strategies to begin the gradual process of reopening businesses in Texas.

This is a matter that is evolving regularly.

Copyright © 2020, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.

For more on small business loans for COVID-19-relief, see the National Law Review Coronavirus News section.

Court Holds That A Deceased Testamentary Trust Beneficiary Can Still Be A Beneficiary

In In the Estate of Mendoza, a decedent’s son’s children filed a petition claiming their entitlement to their father’s beneficial interest in a trust created under the decedent’s will. No. 04-19-00129-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 1845 (Tex. App.—San Antonio March 4, 2020, no pet. history). The son had predeceased the decedent. The decedent’s daughters moved for summary judgment on the sole ground that a dead person could not be a beneficiary of a trust. The trial court granted the daughters’ summary judgment motion. The son’s children appealed.

The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment, holding that the mere fact that the decedent’s son predeceased the decedent did not establish the son’s beneficial interest in the trust created under the decedent’s will lapsed as a matter of law. The daughters argued that a dead person cannot be a beneficiary of a trust and cited to Longoria v. Lasater, 292 S.W.3d 156, 167 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. denied) and Section 112, comment f of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts. However, the court of appeals held that the daughters ignored the difference between an inter vivos trust, which was the type of trust analyzed in Longoria, and a testamentary trust. The court cited to Section 112, comment f, of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts:

A person who has died prior to the creation of a trust cannot be a beneficiary of the trust. Thus, if property is transferred inter vivos [i.e., not by will] in trust for a named person who is dead at the time of the transfer, no trust is created… So also, if a testator devises property in trust for a person who predeceases him, the devise of the beneficial interest lapses, and the person named as trustee ordinarily holds the property upon a resulting trust for the estate of the testator. By statute, however, in many States a devise does not lapse under certain circumstances, as for example if the devisee leaves a child; and under similar circumstances a devise of the beneficial interest under a trust does not lapse.

Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 112 cmt. f (1959) (internal citation omitted); see also Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 44 reporter’s notes on cmt. d (2003) (citing authorities discussing the application of the lapse doctrine and anti-lapse statutes to persons taking under trusts created by a will and noting “[a] comprehensive discussion of the lapse doctrine and anti-lapse statutes is beyond the scope of this Restatement”)). Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded: “the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Daughters based on the mere fact that Eduardo predeceased Jose because that fact alone did not establish Eduardo’s beneficial interest lapsed as a matter of law.” Id. Further, the court refused to address an argument about Texas’s anti-lapse statutes because the arguments had not properly raised below. The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

© 2020 Winstead PC.

Texas Appeals Court Rules Private Communications with Customers Not Protected Free Speech

In a case addressing the applicability of free speech as a defense to trade secret misappropriation, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas retracted its previous ruling, holding that communications with customers and suppliers did not involve a matter of public concern and were therefore not an exercise of free speech. Goldberg, et al. v. EMR (USA Holdings) Inc., et al., Case No. 05-18-00261-CV (Tex. App. Jan. 23, 2020) (Myers, J).

The case concerns allegations of trade secret misappropriation brought by EMR (USA Holdings) (EMR), against Kenneth Goldberg, his company Geomet Recycling (Geomet), and several Geomet employees who, like Goldberg, formerly worked for EMR. EMR and Geomet are both involved in the business of scrap metal recycling. EMR alleged that Goldberg, Geomet and the former EMR employees (collectively, “Defendants”) violated the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act (TUTSA), breached fiduciary duties and tortuously interfered with contracts by, among other things, using EMR’s trade secrets and confidential and proprietary information to contact purchasers and suppliers.

Defendants moved to dismiss all claims under the Texas Citizen’s Participation Act (TCPA), claiming that their contacts with purchasers and suppliers were protected free speech involving a matter of public concern. The TCPA allows litigants to seek early dismissal of a lawsuit if they prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legal action is based on, or is in response to, a party’s exercise of the right of free speech.

The TCPA defines “exercise of the right of free speech” as “a communication made in connection with a matter of public concern.” The statute states that a “‘[m]atter of public concern’ includes an issue related to: (A) health or safety; (B) environmental, economic, or community well-being; . . . or (E) a good, product, or service in the marketplace.” Id. § 27.001(7). Additionally, under the “commercial-speech exemption,” the TCPA does not apply to a legal action brought against a person engaged in the business of selling goods or services if the conduct arises out of a commercial transaction in which the intended audience is an actual or potential buyer or customer.

After the trial court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss without providing any reasoning, Defendants appealed.

On August 22, 2019, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Court held that the commercial-speech exemption to the TCPA applied to the Defendants’ communications with purchaser and suppliers. However, the Court also found that these communications concerned “an issue related to . . . a good, product, or service in the marketplace” and therefore involved a matter of public concern under the TCPA.

Both sides asked for rehearing. In its new ruling, the Court of Appeals reversed course and found that Defendants’ communications with purchasers and suppliers did not involve matters of public concern. Defendants argued that the business of recycling scrap metal relates to environmental, economic and community well-being, which are considered matters of public concern under the TCPA. The Court rejected this argument, noting that while scrap metal recycling may indeed relate to matters of public concern, the communications at issue “were private communications regarding private commercial transactions for the purchase and sale of a commodity.” The Court held that, because the communications themselves did not implicate matters of public concern, they were not subject to the TCPA.

Practice Note:

The new ruling significantly restricts the application of the TCPA. The holding indicates that the TCPA cannot shield defendants from trade secret claims based on communications between the defendant and potential customers or suppliers that solely relate to the purchase or sale of a commodity—even if the commodity at issue might arguably relate to matters of public concern.

© 2020 McDermott Will & Emery

For more on TCPA rule application, see the National Law Review Communications, Media & Internet law section.

Business Owners Take Note as Enterprise Completes Its Mission: Supreme Court Holds No Common Law Partnership Was Formed with ETP

Logic is the beginning of wisdom, not the end.

— Dr. Spock, Star Trek, Starfleet Officer

The long running legal saga between Enterprise Products Partners (“Enterprise”) and Energy Transfer Partners (“ETP”) finally concluded on January 31, 2020, when the Texas Supreme Court unanimously decided that no partnership had ever arisen between the parties. (Read) This dispute between two of the major players in the energy industry focused on the legal standard for determining when a partnership is formed. ETP argued that the test should be based on the parties’ conduct, while Enterprise maintained that the parties had agreed that specific conditions in their contracts had to be established before a partnership was created, and those conditions were never met.

As the Supreme Court’s opinion brings to a close eight years of hard-fought litigation between Enterprise and ETP, we will share our third, and hopefully last, blog post about the case and also review some important lessons for business owners gleaned from this legal conflict. ¹

Predictable Legal Result

The staggering $535 million jury verdict that ETP secured against Enterprise in 2014 had always rested on tenuous legal ground because it conflicted with the terms of the parties’ written agreements. At trial, ETP claimed that Enterprise had breached its fiduciary duty as a partner when it ditched ETP to enter into a new pipeline deal with a competitor, Enbridge. The result at trial rested on the jury’s finding that the parties’ conduct had created a partnership between them, which gave rise to a duty of loyalty that was owed by Enterprise. The jury’s verdict, however, disregarded the parties’ written agreements, which set forth specific conditions precedent to the formation of a partnership, including approval by both companies’ boards. Enterprise therefore argued that it had become subject to a “partnership by ambush.”

The Texas Supreme Court has long championed the sanctity of contract. In numerous previous cases, the Court expressed the view that sophisticated business parties who enter into contracts must honor their bargain. Therefore, the Court’s decision on behalf of Enterprise was not surprising to Court watchers. In addition, a decision in ETP’s favor upholding its common law partnership claim would have created significant uncertainty in the business community as to when a partnership, and related partnership duties, would arise between contracting parties.

In its decision, the Court cited common law strongly favoring the freedom of contract, and held that parties can adopt conditions precedent that must be met before a partnership will be formed. The Court also cited language from a case it had decided more than a decade ago, and noted that: the Legislature did not “intend to spring surprise or accidental partnerships” on parties. While the Court acknowledged that the conditions precedent the parties agreed to could have been waived or modified, it held that ETP was required to either obtain a jury finding that the conditions had been waived or prove waiver conclusively at trial, and ETP had done neither. ²

Business Lessons Learned

While Enterprise ultimately prevailed in defeating ETP’s partnership claims, the legal battle required an enormous amount of time, caused considerable distraction and required each of the parties to incur millions of dollars in legal expense. Thus, the Court’s holding in ETP v. Enterprise provides some key take-aways for business owners. If the practices reviewed below are followed when parties are considering entering into a new business relationship, they may help to avoid future litigation. At a minimum, these practices will make it more likely that a court or an arbitration panel would grant a summary judgment dismissing before trial claims alleging that the parties entered formed a new partnership based on their conduct.

  • Get it clearly in writing — This is the clear guidance from the Supreme Court. If a party does not want to be saddled with partnership duties, it should confirm in writing that: (i) no partnership has been formed, and (ii) no partnership will be formed unless specifically stated conditions are met, e.g., the requirement that a written partnership agreement must be signed and approved by the company’s board and/or managers.
  • Address waiver — All agreements can be waived or modified, but the parties can expressly agree there will be no waiver or amending of any conditions to forming a partnership unless the waiver or amendment is signed and in writing;
  • Disclaim all fiduciary duties — In addition to making it clear that no partnership exists without specific conditions being met, the parties can also state that they do not owe each other any fiduciary duties unless and until they sign off on a binding written agreement between them;
  • Consider use of arbitration — The parties may require that all disputes arising between them will be decided by sophisticated business lawyers in an arbitration proceeding, and they can require that the arbitration hearing be held promptly, within 60 or 90 days;
  • Impose damage caps — The parties can agree to limit recoverable damages in a variety of days in any future dispute that arise between them, which can include their agreement to eliminate all claims for consequential damages, for lost profits and for punitive damages; and
  • Award fees to prevailing party — The parties can also award reasonable legal fees to the prevailing party, which will require the losing party to pay all of the legal fees that are incurred in the litigation or arbitration.

Conclusion

One man cannot summon the future. But one man can change the present!

Alternate Mr. Spock, “Mirror, Mirror”

The Supreme Court’s decision in the Enterprise case confirms the critical importance of securing written agreements that document the parties’ business relationship. Business owners who sign letters of intent, or enter into other preliminary documents before formally starting a new business relationship need to take care to ensure they are not forming a partnership or joint venture unless specific conditions are met. The failure to incorporate these conditions in a signed agreement may result in adverse consequences for the business owner, including being saddled with claims that a partnership was formed and that, as a result, they are now burdened with burdensome fiduciary duties.

¹ This post has a Star Trek reference based on the USS Enterprise, the name of the flagship in the show. As Star Trek fans know, the series was written in 1964, and first debuted on television in 1966. Perhaps it is a coincidence, but the first United States nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the USS Enterprise, entered into service just a few years before, in 1962.

² In issuing its decision, the Supreme Court upheld the opinion of the Dallas Court of Appeals, which had overturned the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court had determined that ETP had not shown that it met the conditions precedent set forth in the parties’ agreements and, further, there was no jury finding these conditions had ever been waived or modified by the parties.

 

© 2020 Winstead PC.

ARTICLE BY Ladd Hirsch of Winstead.
For more on common-law partnerships see the National Law Review Corporate & Business Organizations Law section.

Tax Amnesties Popping up…and should be taken seriously!

Alabama, Connecticut and Texas are offering tax amnesty programs that have some huge benefits. Amnesty programs are a great way to resolve nexus issues and underpayment issues. As with most amnesty programs, you must not have been contacted by the respective state’s Department of Revenue to be eligible.

In Alabama, the amnesty period runs from July 1, 2018 through September 30, 2018. It includes most tax incurred or due prior to January 1, 2017 and includes a full waiver of interest and penalties.

Connecticut’s program is already open and runs through November 30, 2018. Connecticut’s amnesty program includes periods up through December 31, 2016. Connecticut will waive all of the penalty and 50% of any interest due.

Texas will offer an amnesty for most taxes due prior to January 1, 2018. The amnesty period runs from May 1, 2018 through June 29, 2018 and includes full penalty and interest waivers.

 

© Horwood Marcus & Berk Chartered 2018.
This post was written by Jordan M. Goodman of Horwood Marcus & Berk Chartered.