Category: State and Local Law

Incorporating AI to Address Mental Health Challenges in K-12 Students

The National Institute of Mental Health reported that 16.32% of youth (aged 12-17) in the District of Columbia (DC) experience at least one major depressive episode (MDE).
Although the prevalence of youth with MDE in DC is lower compared to some states, such as Oregon (where it reached 21.13%), it is important to address mental health challenges in youth early, as untreated mental health challenges can persist into adulthood. Further, the number of youths with MDE climbs nationally each year, including last year when it rose by almost 2% to approximately 300,000 youth.

It is important to note that there are programs specifically designed to help and treat youth that have experienced trauma and are living with mental health challenges. In DC, several mental health services and professional counseling services are available to residents. Most importantly, there is a broad reaching school-based mental health program that aims to provide a behavioral health expert in every school building. Additionally, on the DC government’s website, there is a list of mental health services programs available, which can be found here.

In conjunction with the mental health programs, early identification of students at risk for suicide, self-harm, and behavioral issues can help states, including DC, ensure access to mental health care and support for these young individuals. In response to the widespread youth mental health crisis, K-12 schools are employing the use of artificial intelligence (AI)-based tools to identify students at risk for suicide and self-harm. Through AI-based suicide risk monitoring, natural language processing, sentiment analysis, predictive models, early intervention, and surveillance and evaluation, AI is playing a crucial role in addressing the mental challenges faced by youth.

AI systems, developed by companies like Bark, Gaggle, and GoGuardian, aim to monitor students’ digital footprint through various data inputs, such as online interactions and behavioral patterns, for signs of distress or risk. These programs identify students who may be at risk for self-harm or suicide and alert the school and parents accordingly.

Proposals for using AI models to enhance mental health surveillance in school settings by implementing chat boxes to interact with students are being introduced. The chat box conversation logs serve as the source of raw data for the machine learning. According to Using AI for Mental Health Analysis and Prediction in School Surveys, existing survey results evaluated by health experts can be used to create a test dataset to validate the machine learning models. Supervised learning can then be deployed to classify specific behaviors and mental health patterns. However, there are concerns about how these programs work and what safeguards the companies have in place to protect youths’ data from being sold to other platforms. Additionally, there are concerns about whether these companies are complying with relevant laws (e.g., the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act [FERPA]).

The University of Michigan identified AI technologies, such as natural language processing (NLP) and sentiment analysis, that can analyze user interactions, such as posts and comments, to identify signs of distress, anxiety, or depression. For example, Breathhh is an AI-powered Chrome extension designed to automatically deliver mental health exercises based on an individual’s web activity and online behaviors. By monitoring and analyzing the user’s interactions, the application can determine appropriate moments to present stress-relieving practices and strategies. Applications, like Breathhh, are just one example of personalized interventions designed by monitoring user interaction.

When using AI to address mental health concerns among K-12 students, policy implications must be carefully considered.

First, developers must obtain informed consent from students, parents, guardians, and all stakeholders before deploying such AI models. The use of AI models is always a topic of concern for policymakers because of the privacy concerns that come with it. To safely deploy AI models, there needs to be privacy protection policies in place to safeguard sensitive information from being improperly used. There is no comprehensive legislation that addresses those concerns either nationally or locally.
Second, developers also need to consider and factor in any bias engrained in their algorithm through data testing and regular monitoring of data output before it reaches the user. AI has the ability to detect early signs of mental health challenges. However, without such proper safeguards in place, we risk failing to protect students from being disproportionately impacted. When collected data reflects biases, it can lead to unfair treatment of certain groups. For youth, this can result in feelings of marginalization and adversely affect their mental health.
Effective policy considerations should encourage the use of AI models that will provide interpretable results, and policymakers need to understand how these decisions are made. Policies should outline how schools will respond to alerts generated by the system. A standard of care needs to be universally recognized, whether it be through policy or the companies’ internal safeguards. This standard of care should outline guidelines that address situations in which AI data output conflicts with human judgment.

Responsible AI implementation can enhance student well-being, but it requires careful evaluation to ensure students’ data is protected from potential harm. Moving forward, school leaders, policymakers, and technology developers need to consider the benefits and risks of AI-based mental health monitoring programs. Balancing the intended benefits while mitigating potential harms is crucial for student well-being.

© 2024 ArentFox Schiff LLP
by: David P. Grosso, Starshine S. Chun of ArentFox Schiff LLP

For more news on Artificial Intelligence and Mental Health, visit the NLR Communications, Media & Internet section.

Importance of Negotiating Assignment and Subletting Provisions in Health Care Leases

In our ongoing series of blog posts, we examine key negotiating points for tenants in triple net health care leases. We also offer suggestions for certain lease provisions that will protect tenants from overreaching and unfair expenses, overly burdensome obligations, and ambiguous terms with respect to the rights and responsibilities of the parties. These suggestions are intended to result in efficient lease negotiations and favorable lease terms from a tenant’s perspective. In our first two blog posts, we considered the importance of negotiating initial terms and renewal terms and operating expense provisions. This latest blog post in our series focuses on negotiating assignment and subletting provisions.

It is imperative for a commercial tenant, particularly a private equity-owned health care tenant, to include provisions in a lease which allow the tenant the flexibility to assign and sublease the commercial space without the necessity of having to obtain the landlord’s consent and/or to meet burdensome landlord conditions.

Most leases prohibit transfers by assignment and subletting or require landlord’s prior written consent subject to meeting certain burdensome conditions. In addition, landlords often include a “change of control” provision which provides that sale of a controlling interest is deemed a transfer requiring landlord consent. A health care tenant looking for flexibility for reorganization or internal transfer subject to private equity control will want to push back on change of control provisions and will want to ensure that their lease allows for certain permitted transfers that do not require landlord consent. Carving out “permitted transfers” customarily includes transfers to: (i) an affiliate of the named tenant under the lease (meaning, any entity, directly or indirectly, which controls, is controlled by or is under common control with tenant); (ii) a successor entity created by merger, consolidation or reorganization of tenant; or (iii) an entity which shall purchase all or substantially all of the assets or a controlling interest in the stock or membership of tenant. If the tenant is a management services organization (MSO), the lease should also include explicit landlord permission for a sublease between the MSO and the provider that will occupy the leased premises.

Landlords may accept the concept of permitted transfers but often seek to impose certain conditions to allowing such transfers. Certain conditions on permitted transfers are reasonable, such as requirements for advance notice, that the proposed permitted transferee assume all obligations under the lease, that the permitted transferee operate only for the permitted use set forth in the lease, and that a copy of the transfer document be provided to landlord. However, other conditions, such as requiring a net worth test for the assignee or financial reporting requirements, can be burdensome and serve to undermine the concept of permitted transfers without landlord consent. We advise our clients in these instances to push back or limit these conditions as much as possible.

Other common assignment and subletting provisions should expressly not apply to permitted transfers. These include recapture provisions which allow a landlord to terminate the lease and recapture the space, excess profit provisions which provide that any excess profits realized as the result of a transfer will be shared between landlord and tenant, and administrative fees and reimbursements to landlord which are often charged to tenants in connection with an assignment or subletting request. Restrictions on transfers should not apply to guarantor entities. Often with private equity, the guarantor is the parent entity and cannot be restricted by a landlord as to transfer, restructuring or reorganization at the top of its organization.

In the case of transfers that do not fall within the definition of “permitted transfers” and require landlord consent, a tenant will want to include language that landlord will not unreasonably withhold, condition, or delay such consent. Other tenant protections should also be considered, including a cap on administrative and review fees reimbursable by tenant to landlord, a reasonably short time period for landlord to approve or disapprove a request (i.e., 30 days) or be deemed to have approved, a reasonably short time period for landlord to exercise recapture rights or be deemed to have approved, and a provision that excess profits will be shared equally rather than all belonging to landlord.

Negotiation of assignment and subletting terms is critical for tenants, particularly with respect to private equity-owned health care tenants. The goal for tenants in negotiating these points is to provide flexibility for addressing future financial and operational needs. As with other highly negotiated lease terms, we recommend addressing assignment and subletting provisions in detail in advance in the letter of intent. This makes expectations of the parties clear, saves time and money by avoiding protracted negotiations, and results in an overall efficient lease negotiation process.

In our next post, we will cover the importance of negotiating maintenance and repair terms and will offer suggestions for limiting a tenant’s exposure.

©2024 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.
For more news on Health Care Leases, visit the NLR Health Law & Managed Care section.

Amendments to New York LLC Transparency Act Delay Effective Date, Among Other Changes

New York Governor Kathy Hochul last month signed into law amendments to the recently enacted New York LLC Transparency Act (as amended, the “NYLTA”), extending the NYLTA’s effective date from December 21, 2024, to January 1, 2026 (the “Effective Date”).

The NYLTA will require all limited liability companies (“LLCs”) either formed under New York law or foreign LLCs that seek to be authorized to do business in New York to submit certain beneficial ownership information to the New York Department of State. LLCs will be required to disclose their beneficial owners unless the LLC qualifies for an exemption from the requirements. New York LLCs and foreign LLCs registered to do business in New York should evaluate their structure with counsel that is familiar with the NYLTA (and the federal Corporate Transparency Act (the “CTA”)) to determine whether they will have a filing obligation under the new law.

For New York LLCs formed on or prior to the Effective Date, and foreign LLCs authorized to do business in New York on or prior to the Effective Date, the deadline to file the required beneficial ownership report or the statement specifying the applicable exemptions(s) from the filing requirement is January 1, 2027. For New York LLCs formed after the Effective Date, and foreign LLCs authorized in New York after the Effective Date, the NYLTA will require that beneficial ownership information be submitted within thirty days of filing the articles of organization for an LLC formed under New York law or the initial application for registration filed by a foreign LLC. Thereafter, the NYLTA (as amended) imposes an ongoing requirement to file an annual statement with the New York Department of State confirming or updating (1) the beneficial ownership disclosure information; (2) the street address of the entity’s principal executive office; (3) status as an exempt company, if applicable; and (4) such other information as may be designated by the New York Department of State.

The definitions of important terms such as “exempt company,” “reporting company,” “applicant,” and “beneficial owner” used in the NYLTA refer to the equivalent definitions in the CTA but are limited in application only to LLCs. Correspondingly, the NYLTA shares the same 23 exemptions from the reporting requirements as the CTA. If an LLC falls within one or more of the available exemptions, however, in a departure from the CTA, the NYLTA requires the entity to submit a statement attested to under penalty of perjury indicating the specific exemption(s) for which the LLC qualifies.

Potential penalties for failing to comply with the NYLTA include monetary penalties of $500 for every day that a required filing under the NYLTA is past due, as well as a potential suspension or cancellation of an LLC.

The amendments to the NYLTA also provide that the beneficial ownership information relating to natural persons will be deemed confidential except (1) by written consent of or request by the beneficial owner of the LLC; (2) by court order; (3) to federal, state, or local government agencies performing official duties as required by statute; or (4) for a valid law enforcement purpose. This is in contrast to the original New York statute, which provided for beneficial ownership information to be made publicly available in a searchable database.

© 2024 Blank Rome LLP
For more news on the New York LLC Transparency Act, visit the NLR Corporate & Business Organizations section.

Dictionaries and the Law – Hunting, Poaching, and the Right to Food

The Law Court’s recent decision in Parker v. Department of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife is fascinating—it is a rare instance when the Court has been called upon to interpret and apply a new constitutional provision. The Maine Constitution has had relatively few amendments, but in 2021 Maine voters approved a “Right to Food Amendment.” Parker involved a challenge to Maine’s Sunday hunting law prohibition under the new amendment.

As is relevant here, the amendment provides that “[a]ll individuals have a natural, inherent and unalienable right to food, including the right to … grow, raise, harvest, produce and consume the food of their own choosing” for certain purposes, including nourishment. It then enumerates limitations on this right, conditioning the right on the requirement that the individual not commit “trespassing, theft, poaching or other abuses of private property rights, public lands or natural resources.”

The question in the case was whether the Maine law banning hunting on Sundays infringes on this right. In an interesting ruling, the Law Court said it did not. After reaching the straightforward conclusion that the plaintiffs could present a justiciable claim given the State’s denial of their request for a Sunday hunting permit, the Court took up the merits—and in so doing, raised some intriguing questions.

First, the Court accorded the Sunday hunting statute a presumption of constitutionality—even though the statute predated the constitutional amendment. But why? Normally the presumption accords the Legislature credit for seeking to act in accordance with existing constitutional limits. That rationale, the Court acknowledged, did not apply. The Court instead suggested that there are other reasons for according this presumption, but relied on cases stating that facial constitutional challenges are disfavored because they lack robust factual records and pose the risk of overbroad rulings. Those concerns seem to go to the particular vehicle for the challenge, not the presumed validity of the enactment itself. Isn’t the right answer, then, to apply the appropriate standard for facial challenges rather than apply a presumption? That point is at least debatable.

Second, the Court’s analysis of the amendment’s language raises interesting interpretive questions. The Court concluded that the term “harvest” includes hunting. The Court buttressed this conclusion by citing several authorities, including dictionary definitions, its own prior precedent, and statutory definitions. Based on these authorities, the Court reasoned, the amendment does include a right to hunt. The Court then observed that this right is subject to express limitations, including that the right does not include engaging in “poaching.” Citing dictionary definitions only, the Court then reasoned that the term “poaching” includes any illegal hunting. Thus, the Court held that the right to hunt does not include the right to hunt on Sundays, because the Legislature has made hunting on Sundays illegal.

One could imagine a potential criticism—does the reasoning in Parker render the right to hunt under the amendment meaningless? If the amendment is meant to protect the right to hunt, but does not circumscribe any law that renders hunting illegal, does the amendment protect hunting at all?

There are arguable critiques of the Court’s reliance on dictionary definitions. Two definitions cited, from Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary and Webster’s II New College Dictionary, suggest a broad definition of the term that includes any illegal taking of game. But query whether that is the ordinary understanding of the term. Various dictionaries, including Merriam Webster and Cambridge, suggest a primary meaning of “poaching” that relates to illegality in the manner in which the game is taken—i.e., taking game while encroaching on the land of another. Indeed, the Court’s citation to Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines poaching as the illegal taking of game “on another’s land,” supports this ordinary reading. At the very least, the availability of a narrower common meaning suggests the need for careful reliance on dictionaries, including analysis of primary definitions and the word’s context.

As Justice Scalia and Brian Garner note in Reading Law, the availability of multiple meanings for common words places great importance on evaluating not just to dictionary definitions but also the word’s context to determine its most likely meaning. Here, there are multiple hints at the word’s meaning to be found in the amendment’s context. The amendment itself references poaching and “other abuses of private property rights, public lands or natural resources.” The reference to “other abuses of private property” renders a definition of “poaching” that requires some sort of trespass more likely. And broader context might suggest the same; as mentioned above, a reading of “poaching” that includes any law rendering hunting illegal seems (at first blush) to render the amendment circular, and thus meaningless at least in part—a result that is generally discouraged. Of course, there may be rejoinders, but Parker does not provide them.

As Parker illustrates, constitutional and statutory interpretation requires careful, contextual analysis, and it is incumbent on attorneys to equip the Court with thorough arguments. That’s what a good appellate brief—whether by a party or by an interested party filing an amicus—is for. But for now, Parker answers a narrow question under the Right to Food amendment, while leaving many other questions about its scope and application open.

©2024 Pierce Atwood LLP. All rights reserved.
For more news on State Constitution Interpretation, visit the NLR Constitutional Law section.

Governor Signs Bill to Exempt Certain Businesses from Fast Food Minimum Wage

On March 26, 2024, Governor Newsom signed Assembly Bill (AB) 610, which amends the definition of “fast food restaurant” to exempt restaurants in airports, hotels, event centers, theme parks, museums, and certain other locations from the requirements set forth under the Fast Food Council requirements.

Last year, Newsom signed AB 1228, which repeals the FAST Recovery Act but establishes a modified version of the Fast Food Council (Council) until January 1, 2029. The bill also sets forth the minimum wage increases for fast food workers, with an increase to $20.00 effective April 1, 2024.

The bill includes an urgency clause which means it takes effect immediately. As such the exempted businesses will not need to comply with the minimum wage requirements past in 2023.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2024
For more news on Fast Food Minimum Wage Laws, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

UNDER SURVEILLANCE: Police Commander and City of Pittsburgh Face Wiretap Lawsuit

Hi CIPAWorld! The Baroness here and I have an interesting filing that just came in the other day.

This one involves alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5703, et seq., and the Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511, et seq.

Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5703, et seq., a person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if he:

(1) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, electronic or oral communication;

(2) intentionally discloses or endeavors to disclose to any other person the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, electronic or oral communication; or

(3) intentionally uses or endeavors to use the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or having reason to know, that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, electronic or oral communication.

Seven police officers employed by the City of Pittsburg Bureau of Police team up to sue Matthew Lackner (Commander) and the City of Pittsburgh.

Plaintiffs, Colleen Jumba Baker, Brittany Mercer, Matthew O’Brien, Jonathan Sharp, Matthew Zuccher, Christopher Sedlak and Devlyn Valencic Keller allege that beginning on September 27, 2003 through October 4, 2003, Matthew Lacker utilized body worn cameras to video and audio records Plaintiffs along with utilizing the GPS component of the body worn camera to track them.

Yes. To track them.

Plaintiffs allege they were unaware that Lacker was utilizing a body worn camera to video and auto them and utilizing the GPS function of the body worn camera. Nor did they consent to have their conversations audio recorded by Lacker and/or the City of Pittsburgh.

Interestingly, Lackner was already charged with four (4) counts of Illegal Use of Wire or Oral Communication pursuant to the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5703(1) in a criminal suit.

So now Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, including actual damages or statutory damages, punitive damages, and reasonably attorneys’ fees.

This case was just filed so it will be interesting to see how this case progresses. But this case is an important reminder that many states have their own privacy laws and to take these laws seriously to avoid lawsuits like this one.

Case No.: Case 2:24-cv-00461

© 2024 Troutman Amin, LLP
For more news on Wiretap Lawsuits, visit the NLR Communications, Media & Internet section.

California PFAS Ban in Products: 6th Largest Global Economy Enters the Fray

We reported extensively on the landmark legislation passed in Maine in 2021 and Minnesota in 2023, which were at the time the most far-reaching PFAS ban in the United States. Other states, including Massachusetts and Rhode Island, have subsequently introduced legislation similar to Maine and Minnesota’s regulations. While we have long predicted that the so-called “all PFAS / all products” legislative bans will become the trend at the state levels, it is significant to note that California, the world’s sixth largest economy, recently introduced a similar proposed PFAS ban for consumer products.

The California proposed legislation, coupled with the existing legislation passed or on the table, will have enormous impacts on companies doing business in or with the state of California, as well as on likely future consumer goods personal injury lawsuits. The California PFAS ban must therefore not be overlooked in companies’ compliance and product development departments.

California PFAS Ban

California’s SB 903 in its current form would prohibit for sale (or offering for sale) any products that contain intentionally added PFAS. A “product” is defined as “an item manufactured, assembled, packaged, or otherwise prepared for sale in California, including, but not limited to, its components, sold or distributed for personal, residential, commercial, or industrial use, including for use in making other products.” It further defines “component” as “an identifiable ingredient, part, or piece of a product, regardless of whether the manufacturer of the product is the manufacturer of the component.”

While the effective date of SB 903’s prohibition would be January 1, 2030, the bill gives the California Department of Toxic Substances Control (“DTSC”) the authority to prohibit intentionally added PFAS in a product before the 2030 effective date. It also allows DTSC to categorize PFAS in a product as an “unavoidable use”, thereby effectively creating an exemption to the bill’s ban, although California exemption would be limited to five years in duration. Similar carve outs were also included in the Maine and Minnesota bans. In each instance, certain information must be provided to the state to obtain an “unavoidable use” exemption. In California, an “unavoidable use” exemption would only be granted if:

  1. There are no safer alternatives to PFAS that are reasonably available.
  2. The function provided by PFAS in the product is necessary for the product to work.
  3. The use of PFAS in the product is critical for health, safety, or the functioning of society.

If a company sells a products containing PFAS in the state of California in violation of the proposed law, companies would be assessed a $1,000 per day penalty for each violation, a maximum of $2,500 per day for repeat offenders, and face possible Court-ordered prohibition of sales for violating products.

Implications To Businesses From The Minnesota PFAS Legislation

First and foremost of concern to companies is the compliance aspect of the California law. The state continues to modify and refine key definitions of the regulation, resulting in companies needing to consider the wording implications on their reporting requirements. In addition, some companies find themselves encountering supply chain disclosure issues that will impact reporting to the state of California, which raises the concern of accuracy of reporting by companies. Companies and industries are also very concerned that the information that is being gathered will provide a legacy repository of valuable information for plaintiffs’ attorneys who file future products liability lawsuits for personal injury, not only in the state of California, but in any state in which the same products were sold.

It is of the utmost importance for businesses along the whole supply chain to evaluate their PFAS risk. Public health and environmental groups urge legislators to regulate these compounds. One major point of contention among members of various industries is whether to regulate PFAS as a class or as individual compounds. While each PFAS compound has a unique chemical makeup and impacts the environment and the human body in different ways, some groups argue PFAS should be regulated together as a class because they interact with each other in the body, thereby resulting in a collective impact. Other groups argue that the individual compounds are too diverse and that regulating them as a class would be over restrictive for some chemicals and not restrictive enough for others.

Companies should remain informed so they do not get caught off guard. Regulators at both the state and federal level are setting drinking water standards and notice requirements of varying stringency, and states are increasingly passing PFAS product bills that differ in scope. For any manufacturers, especially those who sell goods interstate, it is important to understand how those various standards will impact them, whether PFAS is regulated as individual compounds or as a class. Conducting regular self-audits for possible exposure to PFAS risk and potential regulatory violations can result in long term savings for companies and should be commonplace in their own risk assessment.

©2024 CMBG3 Law, LLC. All rights reserved.
For more news on PFAS Ban in California, visit the NLR Environmental, Energy & Resources section.

California’s Housing Overhaul Brings Significant Changes for Landlords and Tenants in 2024

California Senate Bill 567, i.e., the Homelessness Prevention Act, which goes into effect on April 1, 2024, seeks to cap rent hikes at 10% and prevents landlords from evicting tenants without a legal cause. California Assembly Bill 12, i.e., the new residential security deposit law, which goes into effect on July 1, 2024, limits the amount landlords can charge for security deposits. Both bills were signed into law in 2023 by Governor Newsom, and while they signal new protections and legal benefits for tenants, the potential financial exposure for landlords is elevated.

Senate Bill 567

SB 567 changes the rules by which California property owners may remove tenants in certain instances. Effectively, this new law directly impacts two sets of property owners:

  1. Property owners and their close family members (i.e. spouse, domestic partner, children, grandchildren, parents, or grandparents) who plan to move into an occupied/leased property before the expiration of the lease term with the tenant.
  2. “Fix and flip” investors planning on substantially remodeling or rebuilding an occupied/leased property for resale.

Under the current law (California Civil Code § 1946.2), after a tenant has continuously and lawfully occupied a residential property for 12-months, the landlord is prohibited from terminating the tenancy without “just cause.” In fact, the “just cause” must be stated in the written notice to the tenant for the termination of the tenancy to be effectuated. Of note, existing law distinguishes between “at-fault just cause” and “no-fault just cause,” wherein “no-fault just cause” has nothing to do with the nonpayment of rent and/or criminal activity on premises, but rather is defined as:

  1. the intent to occupy the premises by the owner and/or the owner’s spouse, domestic partner, children, grandchildren, parents, and/or grandparents;
  2. the withdrawal of the residential real property from the rental market;
  3. the owner complying with specific government orders that necessitate vacating the real property; or
  4. the intent to demolish or to substantially remodel the residential real property.

Regarding an eviction based on an intent to occupy, the new law now requires the owner and/or the owner’s family member(s) under such a scenario to occupy (i.e., move into) the residential real property within 90-days for a minimum of 12 continuous months, and to use the property as the person’s primary residence. Historically, it was quite simple for property owners to use the “move in” provision under the law as an excuse to evict a tenant that they did not like or as a means to increase the rent by evicting the old tenant and moving in a new tenant who was willing to pay a higher rent. There were no specific guidelines and/or restrictions in this regard. But now, a strict timeline regarding personal occupancy has been codified into law, the violations of which could result in financial exposure for the property owner including, but not limited to, a civil monetary award to the tenant with potential for treble damages (3-times the actual damages amount) and punitive damages.

This new law also requires an owner who displaces a tenant in order to substantially remodel or demolish a unit to provide the tenant with written notice that includes a description of the substantial remodel to be completed and the expected duration of the repairs or the expected date by which the property will be demolished, as well as a copy of the permits required to undertake the substantial remodel or demolition. This means that the property owner must do more than just advise the existing tenant that they are being evicted due to the substantial remodeling of the property or because of the intent to demolish it. Under the new law, the property owner must provide the tenant with written notice and documents setting forth a construction timeline and copies of the permitting for said work.

Importantly, the new law prescribes new enforcement mechanisms, including making an owner who attempts to recover possession of a rental unit in material violation of this new law liable to the tenant in a civil action for damages up to three times the actual damages amount, as well as punitive damages and attorney’s fees/costs. Furthermore, the new law also authorizes the California’s Attorney General, and/or the City Attorney, and/or County Counsel within whose jurisdiction the rental unit is located, to bring actions for injunctive relief against the owner who is in violation of this new law. Also, many cities and counties throughout California have different (and often more restrictive) requirements when removing tenants. As such, it is always recommended for landlords to check the rules, regulations, and laws related to the jurisdiction where the property is located for any additional guidelines and requirements.

When using any of the “no fault” grounds for removing a tenant, the tenant is entitled to relocation costs equal to one month’s rent. However, landlords should be mindful that many cities and counties throughout California have even more stringent and/or more substantial relocations costs and requirements. As such, landlords should always check to see if there are any additional jurisdictional costs and/or requirements for removing a tenant.

Further, until January 1, 2030, the current existing law prohibits an owner of residential real property from, over the course of any 12-month period, increasing the gross rental rate for a dwelling or a unit more than 5% plus the percentage change in the cost of living, or 10%, whichever is lower, of the lowest gross rental rate charged for that dwelling or unit at any time during the 12-months before the effective date of the increase, subject to specified conditions. This new law, however, makes an owner who demands, accepts, receives, or retains any payment of rent in excess of the maximum increase allowed liable in a civil action to the tenant from whom those payments are or were demanded, accepted, received, or retained for certain relief including, upon a showing that the owner acted willfully or with oppression, fraud, or malice, damages up to three times the amount by which any payment demanded, accepted, received, or retained exceeds the maximum allowable rent. This new law also authorizes the California attorney general and/or the city attorney or county counsel within whose jurisdiction the residential property is located to enforce the new law’s provisions and to bring action for injunctive relief.

Assembly Bill 12

Under AB 12, landlords are permitted to ask for security deposits equivalent to one month’s rent for both furnished and unfurnished dwellings. This is a notable shift given that under the current existing law, landlords can charge up to two months’ rent for an unfurnished dwelling and three months’ rent for a furnished one. This law does not take effect until July 1, 2024, allowing landlords time to make any necessary adjustments to their practices given this new approach on the security deposit amount.

Also, please note that this new law has an exception for “small landlords” (as defined), if they own no more than two residential rental properties that collectively include no more than four dwelling units that are offered for rent. Additionally, to qualify as a “small landlord,” the owner must hold the real estate as a natural person, as a limited liability company where all members are natural persons, or as a family trust. If all these conditions are met, then the “small landlord” is permitted to collect up to two months’ rent as a security deposit. Again, AB 12 does not take effect until July 1, 2024, which gives California landlords who do not qualify as “small landlords” to make necessary adjustments. In enacting this new law, the California state legislators are hoping to make housing more accessible and affordable, especially for those residents who are struggling financially. Ironically, the law also is effectuating at a time when landlords are facing multiple hardships including limited rent increases, financial risk in the form of potential damage to their property and/or unpaid rent for which there will be no compensation, increasing maintenance and operational costs, having to navigate the complexities of local and state-level regulations, and stalled and/or slowed evictions of tenants who owe back-rent since the COVID-19 pandemic. These factors, amongst others, could hamstring landlords financially and potentially lead to significant portions of the housing market to fall into disrepair, as well as to cause a slow-down of development projects and community engagement. It also may cause landlords to become stricter with the screening processes of their tenants, including adopting higher income requirements and/or charging higher application fees, which can result in an even more challenging housing landscape for high-risk and/or low-income tenants. At this juncture, only time will tell.

Now What?

If you are a landlord, these new laws may seem onerous and riddled with potentially damaging financial exposure. We recommend consulting with a trusted attorney before entering into a landlord-tenant relationship, and also before terminating an existing lease in both the “at-fault just cause” or “no-fault just cause” scenarios.

© 2024 Much Shelist, P.C.
For more news on California’s New Housing Laws, visit the NLR Real Estate section.

740,000 Reasons to Think Twice Before Putting a Company in Bankruptcy

A recent decision from a bankruptcy court in Delaware provides a cautionary tale about the risks of involuntary bankruptcy.

In the Delaware case, the debtor managed a group of investment funds. The business was all but defunct when several investors, dissatisfied with the debtor’s management, filed an involuntary Chapter 7 petition.  They obtained an order for relief from the bankruptcy court, then removed the debtor as manager of the funds and inserted their hand-picked manager.  So far, so good.

The debtor, who was not properly served with the involuntary petition and did not give the petition the attention it required, struck back and convinced the bankruptcy court to set aside the order for relief. The debtor then went after the involuntary petitioners for damages.  After 8 years of litigation, the Delaware court awarded the debtor $740,000 in damages – all of it attributable to attorneys’ fees and costs.

If you file an involuntary petition and the bankruptcy court dismisses it, then a debtor can recover costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.  The legal fees include the amount necessary to defeat the involuntary filing.  In addition, if the court finds that the petition was filed in bad faith, then the court also can enter judgment for all damages proximately caused by the filing and punitive damages.  The Delaware court awarded the debtor $75,000 for defeating the involuntary petition.

The debtor also sought a judgment for attorneys’ fees in pursuit of damages for violating the automatic stay.  The involuntary petitioners had replaced the debtor as manager without first obtaining leave from the court to do so.  The investment fund was barely operating and had little income to support a claim for actual damages.  Nevertheless, the Delaware court awarded $665,000 in attorneys’ fees related to litigating the automatic stay violation.

Because the debtor had no “actual” damages from the stay violation, the involuntary petitioners contended that the debtor was not entitled to recovery of attorneys’ fees.  The Delaware court pointed out that “actual” damages (e.g., loss of business income) are not a prerequisite to the recovery of attorneys’ fees, much to the chagrin of the defendants.  The court held that attorneys’ fees and costs are always “actual damages” in the context of a willful violation of the automatic stay.

The Delaware court also rejected defendants’ argument that the fee amount was “unreasonable” since there was no monetary injury to the business.  In other words, the debtor should not have spent so much money on legal fees because it lost on its claim.  The court held that defendants’ argument was made “with the benefit of hindsight” – at the end of litigation when the court had ruled, after an evidentiary trial, that debtor suffered no actual injury.  The court pointed out that the debtor sought millions in damages for the loss of management’s fees, and even though the court rejected the claim after trial, it was not an unreasonable argument for the debtor to make.  The court concluded that “the reasonableness of one’s conduct must be assessed at the time of the conduct and based on the information that was known or knowable at the time.”

The involuntary petitioners likely had sound reasons to want the debtor removed as fund manager.  But by pursuing involuntary bankruptcy and losing, they ended up having to stroke a check to the debtor for over $700,000.  Talk about adding insult to injury.  The upshot is that involuntary bankruptcy is an extreme and risky action that should be a last-resort option undertaken with extreme caution.

© 2024 Ward and Smith, P.A.. All Rights Reserved.

by: Lance P. Martin of Ward and Smith, P.A.

For more news on Bankruptcy Litigation, visit the National Law Review’s Bankruptcy & Restructuring section.

Nevada Reaffirms Inquiry Notice Standards for Medical Malpractice Statutes of Limitations

Igtiben v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 140 Nev. Adv. Op. 9 (App. Feb. 22, 2024), concerned a prisoner who was transported to a hospital for medical treatment and died in the hospital after treatment began. At the time, the applicable statute of limitations contained in NRS 41A.097(2) was “1 year after the plaintiff discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury….” This also is known as inquiry notice.

Applied here, the prisoner’s mother obtained his complete hospital medical chart six weeks after the death. Approximately fourteen months after the death, a forensic pathologist the family hired concluded professional negligence contributed to the death. The family filed their lawsuit eight months after receiving the forensic pathologist’s report. The hospital and physician moved to dismiss, arguing the family’s one-year statute of limitations had expired. The district court denied the motion, concluding a genuine issue of material fact was present because the family filed suit within eight months of the pathologist’s report.

Nevada’s Court of Appeals reversed and directed the district court to dismiss the complaint. In Nevada, inquiry notice for potential medical malpractice begins when the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s representative receives “all relevant medical records.” Applied here, the only relevant medical records were the hospital records. Thus, the family had the information necessary to investigate the care and treatment and trigger inquiry notice just six weeks after the death. The date that the forensic pathologist provided his report was irrelevant.

Igtiben might provide greater certainty to providers and patients as they evaluate potential professional negligence claims. However, it underscores the importance of careful responses to requests for medical records because if other “relevant” records existed but were not provided, inquiry notice might not be triggered.

© 2024 Wilson Elser
For more news on Medical Malpractice Statutes of Limitations in Nevada, visit the NLR Professional / Malpractice section.