Confusion Amongst Texas Courts: When Can Insureds Recover Policy Benefits for Statutory Violations?

While first-party bad faith claims may appear to be a dying notion in other jurisdictions, the tort-based claim in Texas is alive and well. Throughout the years, courts have continued to search for ways to define the common-law standard and balance it with public interest due to the unequal bargaining power in the insured-insurer relationship.For this reason, the law of bad faith in Texas is constantly evolving.

Texas imposes a common law duty on insurers to “deal fairly and in good faith with their insureds.”A breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing gives rise to a tort cause of action that is separate from any action for breach of the underlying insurance policy.If an insurer breaches its duty of good faith and fair dealing, in addition to interest, court costs and attorney’s fees, the insured can recover actual, i.e. extra-contractual, damages for economic or personal injuries and exemplary damages if: (1) actual damages were awarded for an injury independent of the loss of policy benefits and (2) the insurer’s conduct was fraudulent, malicious, intentional or grossly negligent.Exemplary damages are within the jury’s discretion and “must be reasonably proportioned to actual damages.”5

Texas also provides a statutory scheme for bad-faith claims that allows recovery of extra-contractual damages through a private cause of action against an insurer. The statutory bad-faith tort is governed by Chapter 541 of the Texas Insurance Code (“Code”).The statutory claim is in addition, and a supplement, to the contractual cause of action against an insurer for breach of an insurance policy. Similar to the common law claim, for Code violations the insured may recover economic damages, but only up to three times the amount of economic damages, i.e. treble damages, for violations committed “knowingly.”7

It is not uncommon in first party bad-faith cases for the insured to assert a breach of contract claim against the insurer for breaching the insurance policy and a tort cause of action against the insurer for violations of the Code. However, extra-contractual tort claims brought pursuant to the Code require the same predicate for recovery as a bad faith claim under a good faith and fair dealing violation.Because the frameworks of the statutory and common law claims are so similar, most Texas courts have treated common law claims as redundant.

When considering the damages available under the policy and under the statute, there have been some inconsistencies amongst Texas courts regarding the recovery of policy benefits when there have been statutory violations of the Code. As such, in USAA Texas Lloyds Company v. Gail Menchaca, the Texas Supreme Court seized the opportunity clear up the confusion by addressing the issue of whether an insured can recover policy benefits for Code violations when there has been no breach of the insurance policy.9

USAA v Menchacha

In Menchaca, the Texas Supreme Court acknowledges, “When our decisions create such uncertainties, ‘it is our duty to settle conflicts in order that the confusion will as nearly as possible be set at rest.’”10 Thus, the goal in Menchaca was “to provide clarity regarding the relationship between claims for an insurance policy breach and Insurance Code violations.”11 The primary question was “whether an insured can recover policy benefits as actual damages caused by an insurer’s statutory violation absent a finding that the insured had a contractual right to the benefits under the insurance policy.”12

Following Hurricane Ike in September 2008, Gail Menchaca contacted her homeowner’s insurance company, USAA Texas Lloyds (“USAA”), and reported storm damage to her home.13 The USAA adjuster who inspected Menchaca’s claim found only minimal damage.14 USAA determined that the damage was covered under Menchaca’s policy but declined to pay benefits because the total repair costs did not exceed the deductible under Menchaca’s policy.15 Five months later, at Menchaca’s request, another USAA adjuster re-inspected Menchaca’s home.16 The second adjuster confirmed the first adjuster’s findings and again USAA declined to pay any policy benefits.17 Menchaca filed suit against USAA for breach of the insurance policy and for unfair settlement practices in violation of the Texas Insurance Code. Menchaca sought policy benefits for both claims.18 For the alleged breach of the insurance policy, she sought benefit of the bargain damages, i.e. the amount of her claim for policy benefits and attorney’s fees. For the statutory violations, she sought actual damages, i.e. the loss of the benefits that should have been paid pursuant to the policy, court courts and attorney’s fees.19

The case proceeded to a jury trial and three questions were submitted to the jury.20 Question 1 addressed Menchaca’s breach of contract claim and asked whether USAA failed “to comply with the terms of the insurance policy with respect to the claim for damages filed by Gail Menchaca resulting from Hurricane Ike” and the jury answered “No.” Question 2 addressed Menchaca’s claim for statutory violations and asked “whether USAA engaged in various unfair or deceptive practices, including whether USAA refused to “pay a claim without conducting a reasonable investigation with respect to that claim” and the jury answered “Yes.” Question 3 asked the jury to determine Menchaca’s damages that resulted from either USAA’s failure to comply with the policy or its statutory violations, calculated as “the difference, if any, between the amount USAA should have paid Gail Menchaca for her Hurricane Ike damages and the amount that was actually paid” and the jury answered “$11,350.”21

Both parties moved for judgment in their favor. USAA argued that Menchaca was not entitled to recover for bad faith or extra-contractual liability because the jury found that it did not breach the insurance policy. Menchaca argued that the jury answered Questions 2 and 3 in her favor and neither were dependent on a favorable answer to Question 1. The trial court disregarded Question 1 and entered judgment in Menchaca’s favor. The court of appeals affirmed and the Texas Supreme Court granted USAA’s petition for review.22

In analyzing whether an insured can recover policy benefits as actual damages caused by an insurer’s statutory violation absent a finding that the insured had a contractual right to benefits under the insurance policy, the Court set forth “five distinct but interrelated rules that govern the relationship between contractual and extra-contractual claims in the insurance context.”23 Following the Court’s analysis of these rules, it determined that the court of appeals erred by affirming the trial court’s decision to disregard the jury’s answer to Question 1. The Court further stated, “In light of the parties’ obvious and understandable confusion over our relevant precedent and the effect of that confusion on their arguments in this case, we conclude that a remand is necessary here in the interest of justice.”24 The rules outlined by the Court are as follows:

Rule 1:

General Rule: An insured cannot recover policy benefits for an insurer’s statutory violation if the insured does not have a right to those benefits under the policy.25 This rule is derived from the Court’s rule in that “there can be no claim for bad faith when an insurer has promptly denied a claim that is in fact not covered.”26 Although the fact pattern in Stoker was limited to the bad faith denial of a claim, the Court has since applied the general rule to other types of extra-contractual violations, i.e. failing to properly pay a claim, failing to fairly investigate a claim and failing to effectuate a prompt and fair settlement of the claim.27 The general rule is derived from the fact that Code “only allows an insured to recover actual damages ‘caused by’ the insurer’s statutory violation.”28 In determining whether the insured has to establish a right to benefits and then a breach of the policy to recover policy benefits for statutory violations, the Court stated, “While an insured cannot recover policy benefits for a statutory violation unless the jury finds that the insured had a right to the benefits under the policy, the insured does not also have to establish that the insurer breached the policy by refusing to pay those benefits.”29

Rule 2:

Entitled to Benefits Rule: An insured who establishes a right to receive benefits under an insurance policy can recover policy benefits as “actual damages” under the statute if the insurer’s statutory violation causes the loss of the benefits.30 “If an insurer’s ‘wrongful’ denial of a ‘valid’ claim results from or constitutes a statutory violation, the resulting damages will necessarily include ‘at least the amount of the policy benefits wrongfully withheld.’”31

Rule 3:

Benefits Loss Rule: An insured can recover policy benefits as actual damages under the Insurance Code even if the insured has no right to those benefits under the policy, if the insurer’s conduct caused the insured to lose that contractual right. 32 The Court has recognized this principle in cases alleging claims against an insurer for misrepresenting a policy’s coverage, statutory violations by the insurer which prejudice the insured by waiving its right to deny coverage or is estopped from doing so, and statutory violations that cause the insured to lose a contractual right to benefits that it otherwise would have been entitled to.33 “[A]n insurer that commits a statutory violation that eliminates or reduces its contractual obligations cannot then avail itself of the general rule.”34

Rule 4:

Independent Injury Rule: The first aspect of the rule is that if an insurer’s statutory violation causes an injury independent of the insured’s right to recover policy benefits, the insured may recover damages for that injury even if the policy does not entitle the insured to receive benefits.35 This rule takes into account that there may be some extra-contractual claims that may not “relate to the insurer’s breach of contractual duties to pay covered claims” and recognizes that there may be compensatory damages different from policy benefits that result from the tort of bad faith under common law.36

The second aspect of the independent-injury rule is that an insurer’s violation does not allow the insured to recover any damages beyond policy benefits unless the violation causes an injury that is independent from the loss of the benefits.37 For instance, the Court held in Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Davis that “an insured who prevails on a statutory claim cannot recover punitive damages for bad-faith conduct in the absence of independent actual damages arising from that conduct.38 Notably, as it relates to the independent-injury rule, the Court states that an independent-injury claim would be rare, they have yet to encounter one, and “have no occasion to speculate what would constitute a recoverable independent injury.”39

Rule 5:

No-Recovery Rule: An insured cannot recover any damages based on an insurer’s statutory violation unless the insured establishes a right to receive benefits under the policy or an injury independent of a right to benefits.40.

Conclusion

“It is the beginning of wisdom when you recognize that the best you can do is choose which rules you want to live by, and it’s persistent and aggravated imbecility to pretend you can live without any.”41 The Texas Supreme Court has attempted to clear up the confusion caused by its precedent by adopting five rules on the issue of recovery of policy benefits for statutory violations. While the rules appear fairly simplistic and undoubtedly will provide guidance, it remains to be seen whether the opinion actually brings clarity to the situation or simply a lesser degree of confusion for the courts to follow. In any event, the rules in Menchaca appear to weigh in favor of insurers because the law is settled, i.e. there must be a right to receive benefits or a (rare, but possible) independent injury to receive policy benefits for statutory violations.


[1] Universal Life Ins. Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48, 53 (Tex. 1997).

[2] Arnold v. Nat’l Cty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987).

[3]Viles v. Sec. Nat’l Ins. Co., 788 S.W.2d 566, 567 (Tex. 1990).

[4] Pena v. State Farm Lloyds, 980 S.W.2d 949, 958 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.); Giles, 950 S.W.2d at 54. See also Arnold, 757 S.W.2d at 168 (stating, “[E]xemplary damages and mental anguish damages are recoverable for a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing under the same principles allowing recovery of those damages in other tort actions.”).

[5] Pa Preston Carter Co. v. Tatum, 708 S.W.2d 23, 25 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, no writ). There is no set rule or ratio between the amount of actual damages and exemplary damages which will be considered reasonable and the determination is made on a case-by-case basis. Alamo Nat’l Bank v. Kraus, 616 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. 1981).

[6] Texas does not adhere to the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act adopted by many other states, but has its own set of laws, known as the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”). Chapter 541 of the Texas Insurance Code addresses the protection of consumer interests against deceptive, unfair, and prohibited practices within the context of insurance. Chapter 17.50(a)(4) of the DTPA incorporates Chapter 541 of the Texas Insurance Code in its entirety.

[7] TEX. INS. CODE § 541.152

[8] National Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Hurst, 523 S.W.3d 840, 840 (Tex. App.—Houston 14th Dist. 2017, no pet.).

[9] No. 14-0721, 2017 WL 1311752, at *1 (Tex. 2017).

[10] 2017 WL 1311752, at *1.

[11] Id. at *3.

[12[ Id. at *1.

[13] Id. 

[14] Id. 

[15] Id. 

[16] Id. 

[17] Id. 

[18] Id. 

[19] Id. at *3.

[20] Id. at *2.

[21] Id.

[22] Id.

[23] Id. at *4.

[24] Id. at *14

[25] TEX. INS. CODE § 541.151; Stoker, 903 S.W.2d at 341.

[26] Republic Ins. Co. v. Stoker, 903 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Tex. 1995).

[27] Menchaca, 2017 WL 1311752, at *5.

[28] Id. (citing TEX. INS. CODE § 541.151).

[29] Menchaca, 2017 WL 1311752, at *7.

[30] Id

[31] Id. (citing Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Castaneda, 988 S.W.2d 189, 188 (Tex. 1998).

[32] Menchaca, 2017 WL 1311752, at *10 (emphasis in original).

[33] Id.

[34] Id.

[35] Id. at *11.

[36] Id.. ; see also Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Davis, 904 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tex. 1995) (identifying mental anguish damages as an example).

[37] Menchaca, 2017 WL 1311752, at *11 (emphasis added).

[38] 904 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tex. 1995) (citing Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 284 (Tex. 1993) (stating that “[r]ecovery of punitive damages requires a finding of an independent tort with accompanying actual damages.”). Therefore, insurers are not liable for punitive damages if there is not an independent injury resulting in extra-contractual damages.

[39] Menchaca, 2017 WL 1311752, at *12.

[40].Menchaca, 2017 WL 1311752, at *12; Casteneda, 988 S.W.2d at 198.

[41] WALLACE STEGNER, ALL THE LITTLE LIVE THINGS (PENGUIN BOOKS 1991).

 

© Steptoe & Johnson PLLC. All Rights Reserved.
This post was written by Dawn S. Holiday of Steptoe & Johnson PLLC.

Litigation After Devastation: The Legal Storm Surge

Bridges crumbling in Texas. Houses turned to toothpicks in the USVIs. Newly-formed rivers ravaging the streets in South Florida. The devastating destruction from the recent hurricanes that have pummeled the U.S. has uprooted many peoples’ homes and lives, but we have only begun to feel the impact of the surge.

Massive relief efforts have begun, national fundraising, news coverage, responsive legislation, and building codes to name a few. A litigation surge is swelling as well. We have seen several types of cases and class actions churn from a hurricane’s aftermath. Here are some of the types of cases, coverage issues, and expert needs you may see after the storm.

Property Damage and Meteorological Causation

Insurance companies insuring the Southern United States are bracing for the waves of claims that will soon be flooding in. Just as it was following Hurricanes Katrina, Ivan, and Sandy, the hotly-debated issue of whether the damage was caused by wind or water will be the likely focus. While most homeowner insurance policies will cover water damage that was caused by a roof or window that was compromised by wind and allowed water intrusion, most do not cover water that rises from the ground level and enters the home. Experts will be relied upon to determine how water got into a structure, even when it is entirely obliterated.

Insurance companies and attorneys will be looking for experts in meteorology, often with advanced degrees and testifying experience, who can opine on the types of weather conditions that might have existed at a given time in a given place (i.e., Key West when Hurricane Irma struck). The experts could come from academia or environmental institutes and societies. They will be asked to review various data points and speak on weather conditions at a particular time and place to support causation for insurance coverage. Structural engineers will also be needed, preferably with experience in standard insurance practices, procedures, and protocols in evaluating damage caused by hurricanes. They will need to have an understanding of insurance claims handling and will be asked to review various reports and data, some from other engineers, discussing damage caused to structures by the hurricane and opine as to whether or not the reports and data are accurate.

Structural Failures and Faulty Design/Construction

While many large, concrete commercial buildings and bridges are designed to withstand 150+ mph winds and flooding,  they can still be left severely damaged after a storm blows through. Structural failure of buildings, roofs, bridges, and roadways that were expected to withstand hurricane winds will lead to litigation over damage caused by the failure. Structural engineers with expertise in the types of structures at issue, likely licensed engineers, will be needed to examine damage patterns through photos, video, or via a post-storm on-scene inspection. They will also need to use meteorological wind information to determine the cause of the failure and the quality of the design or construction.

Class Actions for Coverage Determinations

Often, the core issues in insurance-related storm damage cases are similar across a wide span of policyholders. These cases will vary depending on the coverage matter at issue, but the most sought-after experts will be familiar with insurance claims standards, protocols, and policy interpretation. Construction experts may also be needed to opine on the necessity and extent of certain repairs required after a storm. Also, standard practices and interactions between contractors and insurance companies during the re-build process will come into question. Class actions may be filed as well, simply as placeholders to toll certain claims-filing deadlines or allow broader bad faith discovery against insurance companies who refuse to pay mass claims.

Litigation Over Price-Gouging

One of the worst scenarios to follow a storm is wide-scale price-gouging and scamming by companies trying to capitalize on the desperation and vulnerability of storm victims. Before the storm, many people preparing for power outages or evacuation will see unfair spikes in essentials such as water and gas. After the storm, shady contractors and tree-removers often flood in, lie about their licensing and credentials, and charge exorbitant fees while performing shoddy, haphazard work, or no work at all. Many states, including Florida, have made it a crime for any service provider to offer or sell essential commodities for an amount that “grossly exceeds the average price” during the thirty days following a declaration of emergency. In the days before Hurricane Irma’s approach, many reported price-gouging for essentials such as water, ice, batteries, and gas when thousands of Floridians were stocking up or evacuating. Class actions alleging price-gouging will likely occur following the storm. Experts in standard industry pricing, manufacture costs, and storm clean-up and repair may be called in to opine on the “average price” of certain essential commodities and post-storm services.

In the wake of Hurricanes Harvey and Irma, we are gearing up for the incumbent waves of litigation and expert requests we anticipate will follow. What types of cases, class actions, and expert needs are you expecting?

This post was written by Annie Dike of IMS ExpertServices, All Rights Reserved. © Copyright 2002-2017
For more legal analysis go to The National Law Review

EPA Ready to Support FEMA, State Efforts on Hurricane Harvey

EPA has an organized emergency response program for responding to man-made and natural disasters and is positioned to support the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), state, local, and tribal partners in response to Hurricane Harvey.

“I am in regular contact with EPA Region 6 and want to commend them for their leadership and preparation,” said EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt. “EPA is closely coordinating with state and regional partners, and we have teams standing by to support FEMA.  EPA is ready to respond to anything that may occur due to Hurricane Harvey.”

EPA headquarters emergency operations center is monitoring the storm closely and making preparations to activate in order to support states and regions affected by the storm.

EPA’s Region 6 office in Dallas is taking action to ensure that Superfund sites are secured in advance of the storm, to assist approximately 300 public drinking water system rapid assessments, and to seamlessly integrate emergency response activities with Texas, Louisiana, and other federal response agencies.

EPA supports hurricane preparedness and response in a number of ways, including:
•    Addressing Fuel Shortages: The Clear Air Act allows EPA Administrator Pruitt, in consultation with Energy Secretary Perry, to waive certain fuel requirements to address shortages that occur as a result of the storm. If Administrator Pruitt determines that extreme and unusual fuel supply circumstances exist in a state or region as a result of the hurricane, a temporary waiver can help ensure an adequate supply of gasoline is available in the affected area, particularly for emergency vehicles. EPA has an experienced team standing by to expedite handling of any fuel waiver requests by the states.

•    Monitoring Public Water Systems: Water systems can be severely impacted during hurricanes due to storm surge, flooding, or loss of power. EPA Region 6 has developed a tracking system for us to identify systems in the storm’s pathway. About 300 public drinking water systems are in the path (red zone) of hurricane Harvey in Texas. Both Texas Commission on Environmental Quality and Louisiana Department of Hospitals have uploaded their potentially impacted systems into Response Manager, which enables planning for rapid assessments to restore water systems after the storm passes and flood waters recede. Following the storm, and if the state requests federal assistance, EPA conducts damage assessments of both drinking water and wastewater systems to identify impacts to critical assets and assist in the recovery.

•    Securing Superfund Sites: EPA assesses conditions at the NPL Superfund sites in the storm’s pathway and tasks each Superfund National Priorities List (NPL) remedial site manager to assess conditions and make on-site preparations for high winds and heavy rainfall.  Following the storm and receding floodwaters, EPA conducts rapid assessments to identify damage at sites and initiate cleanup plans if necessary. Any on-site activities at sites located in the storm’s path are ceased until the all clear is given and on-site equipment is secured.  In addition, freeboard for lagoons or ponds is increased to accommodate forecasted rainfall if possible. After a hurricane makes landfall and any flooding recedes, the EPA remedial managers will conduct assessments of each Superfund NPL site to ensure no damage has occurred.

•    Assessing Conditions at Major Industrial Facilities: EPA assesses conditions at the major industrial facilities in the storm’s pathway to identify potential impacts and countermeasures. Following the storm and receding floodwaters, spills and releases are reported to the National Response Center. NRC notifies US Coast Guard or EPA based on preapproved jurisdiction boundaries. EPA conducts follow up inspections and damage assessments in response to reports within EPA jurisdiction.

As EPA prepares to support FEMA and its local and state partners, it continues to focus its message on the importance of public safety. For information and updates from EPA, please visit EPA’s emergency response website, www.response.epa.gov/Hurricaneharvey2017.

This post was written by the United States Environmental Protection Agency © Copyright 2017
For more Environmental Law analysis, go to The National Law Review

San Marcos, Texas Joins Growing Ranks of Cities Raising Minimum Wage to $15 Dollars

San Marcos Texas Minimum wageTaking its cue from other, larger cities, San Marcos, Texas, recently voted to raise the minimum wage to $15 dollars per hour for businesses applying for tax breaks and others incentives to build or expand in the city. In addition to the higher wage, businesses must also offer all employees and their dependents benefits equal to those offered to full-time employees. The San Marcos City Council saw requiring the higher pay rate as a way businesses could return the favor of receiving tax incentives to the local economy. This new law applies only to future businesses seeking economic development incentives, and not companies already doing business in San Marcos.  The city joins the ranks of cities such as Los Angeles, Seattle, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. that require a “living wage.”

Key Takeaways for Businesses in San Marcos

Businesses seeking tax incentives to build or expand in San Marcos need to be prepared to pay a higher minimum wage and offer benefits to all of employees. This trend is likely to continue in other cities across the nation.

© 2016, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.

FLSA Salary Basis Increase Put On Hold For Entire Country – What Now?

salary basis“The Court finds the public interest is best served by an injunction.” With those words, a district court in Texas put on hold the implementation of the new rules applicable to the White Collar Exemptions under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The rules, originally scheduled to go into effect on Dec. 1, 2016, have been indefinitely delayed for employers throughout the United States.

In granting the injunction, the court stated that the plaintiffs (various states and business groups) challenging the rule had shown a likelihood of success in their arguments that the Department of Labor (DOL) exceeded its statutory authority in issuing the rule. As a result, the court will now spend time reviewing the arguments of both parties in depth before making a final decision.

The next big date is Jan. 20, 2017, when President-elect Donald J. Trump is sworn in as president. It is not clear what a DOL under President Trump would do with the rule. Watch for hints about what could happen with the rule in the news media over the next few weeks, especially when President-elect Trump names a nominee for secretary of the DOL.

Will the judge lift the injunction and allow the rule to be implemented before Jan. 20, 2017?

The judge has already started the process for accepting arguments from both parties, and it is possible he could make a final decision before Jan. 20, 2017. That decision, however, could be appealed no matter who wins at the district court level. During an appeal, the injunction could remain in place.

Practically, what does this mean for employers?

It means you have options. In large part, an employer’s next steps depend on the message that has been delivered to employees already and systems you have in place to implement the new rule. Has the company informed those to-be-newly-non-exempt employees that they would start receiving overtime compensation as of Dec. 1? If so, then the company will need to decide whether to roll back that promise. (Note that, if you conducted an audit and determined that, based on the employee’s responsibilities they do not meet the duties test, you should nonetheless reclassify them as non-exempt to avoid potential claims in the future). Overtime for those newly non-exempt employees may not be required any longer as of Dec. 1, but a company must balance what is required by law with the human resources impact of taking that potential benefit away from employees.

Copyright © 2016 Godfrey & Kahn S.C.

Texas Judge Not Persuaded, Permanently Enjoins DOL’s New Reporting Rule

Stop, Rain, DOL Persuader ruleIn a major victory for the business community, Judge Sam R. Cummings of the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas issued a permanent nationwide injunction blocking the Department of Labor (DOL) from enforcing its new “persuader” rule. National Federation of Independent Business, et al. v. Perez, et al., Case No. 5:16-cv-00066. The rule attempted to expand disclosure requirements by employers and their consultants (including attorneys) related to union-organizing campaigns.

The new rule, which Judge Cummings had preliminarily enjoined prior to its effective date of July 1 of this year, would have greatly increased the reporting requirements under Section 203 of the Labor Management and Reporting Disclosure Act. That section requires employers and their labor relations consultants to disclose the terms (including financial terms) of any arrangement by which the consultant provides services that are intended to directly or indirectly persuade employees concerning their rights to organize a union or to bargain collectively with their employer.

For years, the DOL took the position that no reporting was required unless the consultant had direct contact with employees by way of in-person meetings, telephone calls, letters, or emails. Similarly, no reporting was required if the consultant’s activities were limited to providing sample materials such as speeches, postings, letters to employees, and the like that the employer was free to accept, reject, or modify.

However, the new persuader rule expanded the disclosure requirements to include indirect contact with employees by the consultant, including:

  • Directing, planning, or coordinating the efforts of managers to persuade employees

  • Providing materials such as speeches, letters, or postings that are intended to persuade employees

  • Conducting union avoidance seminars if the consultant assists the employer in developing anti-union strategies

  • Developing personnel policies intended to persuade employees in the exercise of their organizational or collective bargaining rights.

The attorneys general for 10 states as well as various business groups challenged the new rule as infringing on employers’ First Amendment rights and conflicting with the attorney-client privilege. Judge Cummings agreed that the rule is unlawful and should be set aside. Presently, it is unknown if DOL intends to appeal Judge Cummings’ order.

ARTICLE BY Henry W. Sledz Jr. of Schiff Hardin LLP

New Texas Open Carry Law Has Significant Implications for Employers

On June 13, 2015, Texas Governor Greg Abbott signed into law HB 910, the Texas Open Carry Bill for Concealed Handgun Holders (“Open Carry Law”). The Open Carry Law becomes effective on January 1, 2016. The Open Carry Law expands the scope of a concealed handgun license and authorizes an individual carrying such a license to carry a handgun in plain view in a public place as long as the handgun is carried in a shoulder or belt holster.

The Open Carry Law also adds Penal Code Section 30.07 to establish a new offense for trespassing with an openly carried handgun if a license holder enters another’s property without effective consent and: (a) had notice that entry was forbidden, or (b) received notice that remaining on the property was forbidden and failed to depart. A license holder receives notice if an owner or someone with apparent authority to act on the owner’s behalf provides notice by verbal or written communication. However, the compliance requirements for a sufficient “written communication” are strict and detailed. The “written communication” may be a card, document or sign posted on the owner’s premises. Such a sign would be required to: (a) include Penal Code Section 30.07 language in English and Spanish, (b) have contrasting colors with block letters at least one inch in height, and (c) be conspicuously displayed and clearly visible at each entrance to the property.

The Open Carry Law additionally permits individuals with concealed handgun licenses to carry handguns in plain view in a motor vehicle or watercraft owned by the person as long as the gun is carried in a shoulder or belt holster.

Implications for Texas Employers

This new legislation raises several implications for Texas employers, as it expands individuals’ rights from parking lots to company property. Currently, employers may not prohibit employees from storing lawfully possessed firearms and ammunition in vehicles parked in the employer’s parking lot (or garage or other lot provided by the employer). Specifically, the 2011 Texas concealed handgun law permits the possessor of a firearm or ammunition to store those items in a locked, privately owned car, as long as the possessor holds a concealed handgun license.

The Open Carry Law, while permitting concealed handgun licensees to openly carry a holstered firearm, also allows public and private employers to prohibit licensees from carrying their firearms onto the “premises” of the business. Under the definition set forth in the Texas Penal Code, “premises” includes “the building or a portion of the building.” The term, however, “does not include any public or private driveway, street, sidewalk or walkway, parking lot, parking garage, or other parking area.”

One significant omission from the Open Carry Law is that it does not grant employers immunity from civil actions resulting from an occurrence involving the employee and his or her openly carried firearm. The 2011 Texas concealed handgun law expressly included a provision providing employers with such immunity, except in cases of gross negligence. That immunity, however, applied only to firearms and ammunition stored or transported in an employee’s vehicle and does not address an occurrence involving an employee who is openly carrying a firearm.

The Open Carry Law, similar to the 2011 legislation, does not create a private cause of action for employees against their employer if the employee contends that his or her right to openly carry has been infringed. Thus, it seems that an employee’s only remedy would be to report the employer’s alleged violation (e.g., a policy banning firearms from being openly carried) to the Attorney General’s office.

In light of this new legislation, employers must decide: (1) whether to allow employees with concealed handgun licenses to openly carry handguns on company premises, and (2) whether to permit visitors, vendors, guests and other third parties to openly carry handguns on company premises. Implementing and enforcing these decisions will require considerable planning, including a determination as to whether any existing company policies need to be updated to comply with the new law.

© 2015 Andrews Kurth LLP

Texas Supreme Court Clarifies Royalty Calculations For Enhanced Oil Recovery

steptoe-johnsonlogo

In French v. Occidental Permian, Ltd., the Texas Supreme Court clarified royalty calculations for enhanced oil recovery.  The Court:

  1. Rejected a royalty owners’ claim that royalties on casinghead gas should be determined as if the injected carbon dioxide (CO2) was not present
  2. Held that, under the applicable leases and Unitization Agreement, the costs of removing CO2 from the gas were post-production expenses that royalty owners must share with the working interest owner

In the opinion, the Court emphasized the importance of efficient production of oil and gas and the prevention of waste.

Background

The Plaintiffs-Appellants, Marcia Fuller French and others (“French”), were lessors on two different oil and gas leases.  Both lease royalty provisions provided that the casinghead gas royalty was net of post-production expenses, but not production expenses.  The Defendant-Appellee, Occidental Permian Ltd. (“Oxy”) owned a working interest.  The parties had entered into a Unitization Agreement to allow secondary recovery operations.

Oxy began injecting wells on these leases with CO2 in 2001 in order boost oil production when waterflooding became less effective.  As a result, the wells produced natural gas that was about 85% CO2.  Although Oxy could reinject the entire casinghead gas stream, Oxy had the gas treated off site to remove the CO2.   It sold the resulting gas and had the extracted CO2 sent back to the well to be reinjected.  Oxy paid royalties on the gas after it was treated and deducted the treatment costs from French’s royalties.

French sued arguing that, except for the removal of contaminants and the extraction of NGL, the costs of processing the casinghead gas (including transportation costs) were production costs that should be borne solely by Oxy.  Conversely, Oxy argued the CO2 removal was necessary to render the gas stream marketable.  At trial, the Court agreed with French and awarded her $10,074,262.33 in underpaid royalties and entered a declaratory judgment defining Oxy’s ongoing royalty obligations.  The court of appeals reversed with a focus on the damages calculations, but did not reach a decision on whether the cost of separating the CO2 from the casinghead gas was a production expense.

Supreme Court’s Decision

The Court examined the parties’ agreements noting that French consented to the injection of extraneous substances into the oil reservoir and gave Oxy the right and discretion to decide whether to reinject or process the casinghead gas.  The Court further pointed out the Agreement provided that the royalty owners agreed to forego royalties on any unitized substances used in the recovery process.  The Court found that French benefited from that decision and therefore must share in the cost of the CO2 removal.  The question then became whether the CO2 processing was a production or post-production cost.

French argued that the CO2 separation was akin to the removal of water from oil, which Oxy treated as a production cost.  The Court, however, found that oil and water are “immiscible” and separation of the two is a relatively simple process, unlike CO2 and gas separation, which requires special technology.  Water separation is necessary for reinjection into the reservoir and to make the oil marketable.  Conversely, CO2 separation is not necessary for continued production of oil.  The Court then noted that Oxy was not required to reinject the casinghead gas.  Therefore, based on the parties’ agreements, “French, having given Oxy the right and discretion to decide whether to reinject or process the casinghead gas, and having benefited from that decision, must share in the cost of the CO2removal.”  Id. at 7.

Conclusion

The Court indirectly emphasized efficient production of oil and gas and prevention of waste.  The gas processing was economically beneficial to both French and Oxy.  The CO2 separation increased the value of the stream to both Oxy and French by allowing sale of the extracted NGLs and allowing reinjection of more than 10% of the gas produced directly back into the field.  Because French received the benefit of Oxy’s decision, it had to share in the cost.

This opinion is an important reminder to carefully negotiate and agree to terms in all agreements.  It is a further reminder to proceed in an efficient and economic manner.