Tag: Texas

Texas-Sized Fraud: Corporate Relator Takes on Laboratory Referral Kickback Scheme

17 October 2024. In a qui tam whistleblower settlement, Jeffrey Madison, the former CEO of Little River Healthcare in Rockdale, Texas, has agreed to pay over $5.3 million to resolve alleged violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute. This successful whistleblower lawsuit illustrates the critical role of whistleblowers in uncovering fraudulent schemes and upholding ethical standards within the healthcare industry. The corporate whistleblower in this qui tam action, STF LLC, could be rewarded between 15-25% of the government’s recovery.

Understanding the Case

The allegations against Madison stem from violations of the False Claims Act, specifically linked to illegal payments made to physicians to induce laboratory referrals. These actions contravened the Anti-Kickback Statute, a federal law designed to ensure that medical decisions, particularly those about Medicare, Medicaid, or TRICARE beneficiaries, are based on patient welfare rather than financial incentives.

Key Allegations:

Kickback Scheme: The lawsuit alleged that between January 2015 and June 2018, Little River Healthcare, under Madison’s leadership, engaged in a scheme involving paying commissions to recruiters. These recruiters, using management service organizations (MSOs), funneled kickbacks to physicians who referred laboratory tests to Little River.

False Certifications: Madison was accused of knowingly falsely certifying compliance with the Anti-Kickback Statute in Medicare cost reports, resulting in fraudulent claims to federal healthcare programs, including Medicare, Medicaid, and TRICARE.

Disguised Payments: An additional component involved Dr. Doyce Cartrett Jr., who was allegedly paid $2,000 monthly to refer his laboratory testing business to Little River. These payments were allegedly disguised as “medical director fees” despite Dr. Cartrett rendering no medical director services.

The Importance of the Anti-Kickback Statute

Violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute can significantly harm patients by distorting medical decision-making priorities and eroding trust in healthcare providers. When healthcare decisions are influenced by financial incentives rather than patient welfare, there is a risk that unnecessary or substandard care is administered, potentially leading to adverse health outcomes. Patients may receive treatments not based on their individual needs but on the financial gains of unscrupulous providers. This not only affects the quality of care but also contributes to rising healthcare costs, ultimately burdening patients and taxpayers financially. Upholding the statute is crucial in ensuring that patient care is determined by medical necessity and clinical expertise.

This case underscores the vital role of whistleblowers in identifying and exposing fraudulent activities. By coming forward, whistleblowers not only protect taxpayer dollars but also ensure that healthcare decisions remain focused on patient care. As the Acting Special Agent in Charge of the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Defense Criminal Investigative Services, Southwest Field Office said about the case, “Our nation’s uniformed military service members and their families should never have to question the integrity of their healthcare providers. Medical decisions influenced by greed destroy the fundamental element of trust in patient care.” Healthcare fraud whistleblowers reporting unlawful kickback schemes under the False Claims Act can help restore that trust.

© 2024 by Tycko & Zavareei LLP
For more news on Kickback Fraud Settlements, visit the NLR Criminal Law & Business Crimes section.

Court Affirmed Holding That Plaintiffs Did Not Have Standing To Sue Regarding A Charitable Trust

In Dao v. Trinh, a group of five individuals who contributed money for membership in a religious community sued the person who they alleged misapplied their money for the benefit of a different religious community. No. 14-23-00131-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 3208 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 9, 2024, no pet. history). The plaintiffs brought fraud claims for alleged misrepresentations and breach of contract. The defendant filed a plea to the jurisdiction, alleging that the plaintiffs did not have standing to sue. The trial court entered an order dismissed the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice and expressly found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their fraud and breach of contract claims.

The court of appeals affirmed. The court first discussing standing to sue over a charitable trust:

No party disputes that the Cao Dai organization in question, for which Trinh is the founder and director, is a “charitable trust”. This is particularly significant because the attorney general “is the representative of the public and is the proper party to maintain” a suit “vindicating the public’s rights in connection with that charity.” A private individual has standing to maintain a suit against a public charity only if the person seeks vindication of some peculiar or individual rights, distinct from those of the public at large. Moreover, a private individual must similarly establish standing in a case such as this, brought against the trustee of a public charity in connection with their office or service.

Id. The court concluded that whether framed as a fraud or breach of contract claim, the plaintiffs did not have standing to sue for the return of their donations:

Based on the holding in Eshelman, we conclude the Temple Donor Parties’ allegations and proof for their fraud claims pertaining to their donations to a charitable fails to establish standing to bring their claims (whether under a fraud theory or conditional gift theory); that is, the facts alleged and undisputed do not vindicate of some peculiar or individual rights, distinct from any other donor or from the public at large.

Id.

© 2024 Winstead PC.
For more news on Claims Against Charitable Trusts, visit the NLR Estates & Trusts section.

Be Careful What You Write: What a Heavily Redacted Antitrust Complaint Teaches Us About Creating Problematic Documents in Transactions

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas to stop Tempur Sealy’s proposed acquisition of Mattress Firm. See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Tempur Sealy Int’l, Inc. and Mattress Firm Group Inc., Case No. 4:24-cv-02508 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 2, 2024). On the same day, the FTC also commenced an administrative proceeding in its own court to block the transaction. See In re Tempur Sealy Int’l, Inc. and Mattress Firm Group Inc., Docket No. 9433 (FTC Jul. 2, 2024). According to the complaints, Tempur Sealy is the world’s largest mattress supplier and Mattress Firm is the largest mattress retailer in the United States. Vertical mergers between manufacturers and retailers can often produce procompetitive benefits, but this transaction struck the FTC as anticompetitive. The FTC’s principal concern appears to be that Tempur Sealy would shut off its rivals’ access to Mattress Firm.

Supporting the FTC’s decision to sue, Federal Trade Commissioner Melissa Holyoak said, “Despite the increased likelihood of procompetitive effects from vertical mergers, they may still result in harm in some circumstances. Consistent with these well-established economic principles, I vote in favor of filing this complaint based upon the substantial evidence generated by staff’s thorough investigation, especially the parties’ own ordinary-course documents. I have reason to believe that the effect of Tempur Sealy’s acquisition of Mattress Firm ‘may be to substantially lessen competition.’” (Emphasis added).

What exactly was in these ordinary course documents that caused Holyoak to believe this merger violates Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act? The short answer is we don’t know. The complaints, which extensively quote some documents, are heavily redacted and the documents themselves, even in redacted form, are not attached to the complaints. Nor would we expect the documents to be attached, as they likely contain competitively sensitive information that ordinarily would not be on the public record. Rather than speculate about the documents themselves, let’s use the allegations in the FTC’s complaints as a tool to remind ourselves how documents are used in antitrust investigations and how lawyers and clients can work together to reduce the likelihood that potentially problematic documents are created.

  1. What’s an “ordinary course” document? As the name suggests, an ordinary course document is one that is created by the parties in the course of their ordinary business activities. It may be a routinely issued report, an email or text exchange by two employees, Slack messages, a slide deck, board minutes or any other form of written communication. Antitrust regulators routinely use these documents to gain insight into how the parties see themselves in relation to the competition, the rationale for a transaction, and how the parties view the likely competitive effects of a transaction. Often regulators will place more emphasis on communications from senior leadership in a corporation as those individuals may have greater knowledge of the transaction and have more authority to “speak” for an entity than lower-level employees. Regulators will use these documents not only to support their own theories and claims, but also to contradict the parties’ advocacy about the procompetitive aspects of a deal.
  2. How does the government obtain these ordinary course documents? In the case of the Tempur Sealy/Mattress Firm transaction and other high dollar value transactions, the parties were required to file Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) premerger notification forms. When an HSR filing is required, the parties must produce documents that discuss the transaction in relation to certain specific topics, such as competition, competitors, markets, and market shares. These documents are usually not ordinary course documents as they were created specifically for the deal but are nevertheless critical in the regulators’ review of potential competitive issues. Documents routinely produced in the HSR process, such as Confidential Information Memoranda (CIM) and Management Presentations, may contain statements that could create potential antitrust concerns. Clients should recognize that even the smallest of things in a CIM or Management Presentation have the potential to create big problems, as government regulators will read every page of what is submitted to them. For example, assume that an HSR filing contains a 100-page deck intended to serve as a Management Presentation, and one page of that deck contains a sentence that says: “We [seller] are the dominant player in our industry and we face minimal competition.” The rest of the deck might be completely innocuous, but depending on the circumstances, that one sentence has the potential to ignite regulators’ interest.Some transactions, such as Tempur Sealy/Mattress Firm, undergo a Second Request process after HSR is filed. A Second Request is an extensive subpoena requesting documents and data from the parties that goes far beyond the HSR process. The Second Request process is what likely turned up the “ordinary course” documents mentioned in Holyoak’s statement. This included text messages. See, e.g., Paragraph 108 of the federal complaint and Paragraph 99 of the administrative complaint. Judging from the amount of redacted material referenced in the complaints, the FTC appears to believe there are many documents that portray this transaction in an anticompetitive light.

    Clients should also be aware that the government’s authority to review and investigate transactions is not limited to only those transactions that require HSR filings; the government’s authority extends to any transaction that impacts competition in the United States. In addition to HSR filings, the government learns about deals through a variety of sources, such as press reports and third party complaints from customers or competitors. Accordingly, our views about document creation extend to all transactions, not just those requiring HSR premerger notification.

  3. Document creation in transactions is a team sport. That means lawyers and clients should work together as a team to minimize the creation of potentially harmful documents. The team should also include investment bankers and other advisors who are generating documents that analyze the transaction. In ideal circumstances, clients will involve experienced antitrust lawyers early on to understand: 1) whether the transaction potentially raises substantive antitrust concerns, such as when two direct competitors combine; 2) if the transaction will require HSR notification; and 3) whether or not HSR is required, what are the guardrails or best practices the client should observe. Recognizing that we don’t always operate in ideal circumstances and lawyers may only become involved after certain documents are created, lawyers should nevertheless remain vigilant about documents from the time they become involved in a deal. Coaching clients and their advisors about document creation best practices is always critically important.
  4. What are some best practices? Lawyers should proactively educate their clients on what to say (or not say) about the transaction and which words or phrases may be particularly susceptible to raising potential antitrust concerns. For example, words like “dominate” and “control” in relation to competition and competitors may create problems, as could market share statistics that overstate a seller’s prominence in a particular industry. Lawyers should also review drafts of documents such as CIMs, Management Presentations, and teasers to ensure that they are free of harmful verbiage.
  5. Expect statements to be misunderstood or taken out of context: Reading the Tempur Sealy/Mattress Firm complaints, two things are clear: 1) the government relied on portions of documents to support its allegations; and 2) the context of many of the quoted statements is unknown. It may be the case that some of the statements the FTC found important become less important when the entire document is reviewed and the context of the statement is made clear. Relatedly, there may be other documents not referenced in the complaints that indicate the transaction has procompetitive benefits. Allegations in a complaint are just that – allegations – and the evidence that emerges as the case progresses may or may not support those allegations. That being said, parties are wise to follow the best practices above. Similarly, they are also wise to avoid making exaggerated statements or statements intended to be humorous. These statements may be misunderstood by government regulators who do not know the specific industry or its players as well as clients do.
  6. Follow the general principle of “less is more” when it comes to document creation. Many transactions seem to move at lightning speed, but a moment of self-reflection can be very valuable. Ask yourself: do I need to write this, and if I do, what’s the best way to say it? Some organizations are more document-intensive than others, and there may be other reasons, unrelated to antitrust considerations, that require certain documentation. But in general, more documents are probably created than are truly necessary and more documents create the potential for more problems. Regardless, the key is to remember emails, texts, Slack messages, and slide decks may be read not only by their intended recipients but also by government antitrust regulators.
Copyright ©2024 Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP
For more news on Antitrust Complaints, visit the NLR Antitrust Trade & Regulation section.

Tax Credits in the Inflation Reduction Act Aim to Build a More Equitable EV Market

In February of this year, it was high time for me to buy a new car. I had driven the same car since 2008, and getting this-or-that replaced was costing more and more every year. As a first-time car buyer, I had two criteria: I wanted to go fast, and I wanted the car to plug in.

Like many prospective purchasers, I started my search online and by speaking with friends and who drove electric vehicles, or EVs for short. I settled on a plug-in hybrid sedan, reasoning that a plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV) was the best of both worlds: the 20-mile electric range was perfect for my short commute and getting around Houston’s inner loop, and the 10-gallon gas tank offered freedom to roam. In the eight months since I’ve had the car, I’ve bought less than ten tanks of gas. As the price of a gallon in Texas soared to $4.69 in June, the timing of my purchase seemed miraculous.

When it was time to transact, the dealer made vague mention of rebates and tax credits, but didn’t have a comprehensive understanding of the details. Enter Texas’s Light-Duty Motor Vehicle Purchase or Lease Incentive Program (LDPLIP). Administered by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), the program grants rebates of up to $5,000 for consumers, businesses, and government entities who buy or lease new vehicles powered by compressed natural gas or liquefied petroleum gas (propane), and up to $2,500 for those who buy or lease new EVs or vehicles powered by hydrogen fuel cells.

Rebates are only available to purchasers who buy or lease from dealerships (so some of the most popular EVs in the U.S. don’t qualify). There is no vehicle price cap, nor is there an income limit for purchasers. In June of 2022, the average price for a new electric vehicle was over $66,000, according to Kelley Blue Book estimates. But the median Texan household income (in 2020 dollars) for 2016-2020 was $63,826.

According to the grant specialist to whom I initially sent my application, the TCEQ has received “a vigorous response” from applicants, however, the TCEQ is limited in the number of rebate grants that it can award: 2,000 grants for EVs or vehicles powered by hydrogen fuel cells, and 1,000 grants for vehicles powered by compressed natural gas or liquefied petroleum gas (propane).

The grant period in Texas ends on January 7, 2023, but on July 5, 2022, the TCEQ suspended acceptance of applications for EVs or vehicles powered by hydrogen fuel cells. As of the writing of this post, the total number of applications received and reservations pending on the program’s website is 2,480.

In comparison with Texas’s rebate program, the EV tax credits in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 demonstrate a commitment to building a more equitable EV market. While EVs may be cheaper to own than gas-powered vehicles—especially when gas prices are high—a lot of lower and middle-income families have historically been priced out of the EV market. The IRA takes several meaningful steps towards accessibility and sustainability for a more diverse swath of consumers:

  • Allows point-of-sale incentives starting in 2024. Purchasers will be able to apply the credit (up to $7,500) at the dealership, and because sticker price is such an important factor for so many purchasers, this incentive will make buying an EV more attractive up front.
  • Removes 200,000 vehicle-per-manufacturer cap. Some American manufacturers are already past the maximum. Eliminating the cap means bringing back the tax credit for many popular and affordable EVs, which should attract new buyers.
  • Creates income and purchase price limits. SUVs, vans, and pickup trucks under $80,000, and all other vehicles (e.g. sedans) under $55,000, will qualify for the EV tax credit. For new vehicles, purchaser income will be subject to an AGI cap: $150,000 for individuals and $300,000 for a joint filers.
  • Extends the tax credit to pre-owned EVs. As long as the purchase price does not exceed $25,000, purchasers of pre-owned EVs (EVs whose model year is at least two years earlier than the calendar year in which the purchase occurs) will receive a tax credit for 30% of the sale price up to $4,000. The income cap for pre-owned EVs is $75,000 for individuals and $150,000 for a joint filers.

A purchaser who qualifies under both programs can get both incentives. Comparing Texas’s state government-level incentives and those soon to be offered at the federal level reveals a few telling differences—new vs. used, income caps, purchase price caps, post-purchase rebates vs. up-front point-of-sale incentives—but the differences all fall under the same umbrella: equity. The IRA’s tax credits are designed, among other things, to make purchasing an EV more attractive to a wider audience.

Of course, the EV incentive landscape has greatly changed since the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 first granted tax credits for new, qualified EVs. The LDPLIP wasn’t approved by the TCEQ until late 2013, so the U.S. government has arguably had more time to get it right. Some might say that the fact that Texas’s program offers the purchaser of the $150,000+ PHEV the same opportunity to access grant funds as the purchaser of the $30,000 EV means that the LDPLIP is even more “equal.”

It is worth noting that the IRA also sets a handful of production and assembly requirements. For instance, to qualify for the credit, a vehicle’s final assembly must occur in North America. Further, at least 40% the value of the critical minerals contained in the vehicle’s battery must be “extracted or processed in any country with which the United States has a free trade agreement in effect” or be “recycled in North America”—and this percentage increases each year, topping out at 80% in 2027. There is also a rising requirement that 50% of the vehicle’s battery components be manufactured or assembled in North America, with the requirement set to hit 100% in 2029. It is unclear whether automotive manufacturers and the U.S. critical mineral supply chains will be able to meet these targets—and that uncertainty may cause a potential limiting effect on the options a purchaser would have for EVs that qualify for the tax credit.

Time will tell whether the intentions behind the EV tax credits in the IRA have the effect that this particular blogger and PHEV owner is hoping for. While we wait to see whether this bid at creating an equitable EV market bears fruit, we can at least admire this attempt at, as the saying goes, “giving everyone a pair of shoes that fits.”

Article By Dania Abbasi of Foley & Lardner LLP

For more energy and environment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Foley & Lardner LLP

Suing Attorneys In Texas For Participating in Fiduciary Breaches

It is not uncommon for an attorney to execute all or part of his or her client’s wishes, which may be in breach of a fiduciary duty owed by the client to a third party. The third party can certainly sue the client for breaching fiduciary duties. But can the third party also sue the attorney for participating in the client’s actions?

An officer or director of a company may set up a competing business and direct company business to the new competing business. If the officer or director uses an attorney to set up this business and the attorney knows that new business will be used to usurp opportunities, can the company sue the attorney for facilitating the creation of the new business? What if the attorney is an owner of the new company or works for the new company in a nonlegal position?

Certainly, Texas has legal theories that can hold a party liable for participating with a fiduciary in breaching duties owed by the fiduciary. There is a claim for knowing participation in a breach of fiduciary duty. See Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp., 138 Tex. 565, 160 S.W.2d 509, 514 (1942); Paschal v. Great W. Drilling, Ltd., 215 S.W.3d 437, 450 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, pet. denied) (holding wife liable for knowing participation in employee’s embezzlement where funds were placed in joint account and wife benefitted from stolen funds). See also Westech Capital Corp. v. Salamone, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143577, 2019 WL 4003093, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2019) (collecting cases that explain that “Texas appellate courts have routinely recognized the existence of a cause of action for knowing participation in the breach of fiduciary duty.”). The general elements for a knowing-participation claim are: 1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship; 2) the third party knew of the fiduciary relationship; and 3) the third party was aware it was participating in the breach of that fiduciary relationship. D’Onofrio v. Vacation Publ’ns, Inc., 888 F.3d 197, 216 (5th Cir. 2018); Meadows v. Harford Life Ins. Co., 492 F.3d 634, 639 (5th Cir. 2007). There is also a recognized civil conspiracy claim in Texas. The essential elements of a civil conspiracy are (1) two or more persons; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result. Juhl v. Airington, 936 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1996). Finally, there may be an aiding-and-abetting breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim. The Texas Supreme Court has stated that it has not expressly adopted a claim for aiding and abetting outside the context of a fraud claim. See First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 224 (Tex. 2017); Ernst & Young v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d 573, 583 n. 7 (Tex. 2001); West Fork Advisors v. Sungard Consulting, 437 S.W.3d 917 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.). Notwithstanding, some Texas courts have found such an action to exist. See Hendricks v. Thornton, 973 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1998, pet. denied); Floyd v. Hefner, 556 F.Supp.2d 617 (S.D. Tex. 2008). One court identified the elements for aiding and abetting as the defendant must act with unlawful intent and give substantial assistance and encouragement to a wrongdoer in a tortious act. West Fork Advisors, 437 S.W.3d at 921. Some courts have held that here is no aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claim. Hampton v. Equity Trust Co., No. 03-19-00401-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 5674 (Tex. App.—Austin July 23, 2020, no pet.). See also Midwestern Cattle Mktg., L.L.C. v. Legend Bank, N.A., 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 36966, 2019 WL 6834031, at *7 (5th Cir. Dec. 13, 2019); In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 888 F.3d 753, 782, 781 (5th Cir. 2018)  For a discussion of these forms of joint liability for breach of fiduciary duty, please see E. Link Beck, Joint and Several Liability, STATE BAR OF TEXAS, 10TH ANNUAL FIDUCIARY LITIGATION COURSE (2015).

It is clear that at least under some theories, that third parties can be held liable for participating in fiduciary breaches with the party owing fiduciary duties. Can the third party be an attorney? Prior to Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. 2015), it was unclear in Texas whether a party could assert a claim against an attorney not representing the party, such as for negligent misrepresentation or aiding and abetting fraud or breaches of fiduciary duty. Some courts allowed the claim if the attorney was committing or participating in fraud. Others did not.

The plaintiff in Cantey Hanger alleged that the attorneys who represented her husband in a divorce proceeding had committed fraud by falsifying a bill of sale to shift tax liabilities from the sale of an airplane from her husband to her. Id. at 479-80. The Texas Supreme Court held that attorney immunity barred the claim because “[e]ven conduct that is ‘wrongful in the context of the underlying suit’ is not actionable if it is ‘part of the discharge of the lawyer’s duties in representing his or her client.’” Id. at 481. The following are key excerpts from the opinion:

Texas common law is well settled that an attorney does not owe a professional duty of care to third parties who are damaged by the attorney’s negligent representation of a client. Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575, 577 (Tex. 1996); see also McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex. 1999) (explaining that a lack of privity precludes attorneys’ liability to non-clients for legal malpractice). However, Texas courts have developed a more comprehensive affirmative defense protecting attorneys from liability to non-clients, stemming from the broad declaration over a century ago that “attorneys are authorized to practice their profession, to advise their clients and interpose any defense or supposed defense, without making themselves liable for damages.” Kruegel v. Murphy, 126 S.W. 343, 345 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ ref’d). This attorney-immunity defense is intended to ensure “loyal, faithful, and aggressive representation by attorneys employed as advocates.” Mitchell v. Chapman, 10 S.W.3d 810, 812 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied).

….

In accordance with this purpose, there is consensus among the courts of appeals that, as a general rule, attorneys are immune from civil liability to non-clients “for actions taken in connection with representing a client in litigation.” Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied); see also Toles v. Toles, 113 S.W.3d 899, 910 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.); Renfroe v. Jones & Assocs., 947 S.W.2d 285, 287-88 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied). Even conduct that is “wrongful in the context of the underlying suit” is not actionable if it is “part of the discharge of the lawyer’s duties in representing his or her client.” Toles, 113 S.W.3d at 910-11;

….

Conversely, attorneys are not protected from liability to non-clients for their actions when they do not qualify as “the kind of conduct in which an attorney engages when discharging his duties to his client.” Dixon Fin. Servs., 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2064, 2008 WL 746548, at *9; see also Chapman Children’s Trust v. Porter & Hedges, L.L.P., 32 S.W.3d 429, 442 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (noting that “it is the kind of conduct that is controlling, and not whether that conduct is meritorious or sanctionable”).

Because the focus in evaluating attorney liability to a non-client is “on the kind—not the nature—of the attorney’s conduct,” a general fraud exception would significantly undercut the defense. Dixon Fin. Servs., 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2064, 2008 WL 746548, at *8. Merely labeling an attorney’s conduct “fraudulent” does not and should not remove it from the scope of client representation or render it “foreign to the duties of an attorney.” Alpert, 178 S.W.3d at 406 (citing Poole, 58 Tex. at 137); see also Dixon Fin. Servs., 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2064, 2008 WL 746548, at *9 (“Characterizing an attorney’s action in advancing his client’s rights as fraudulent does not change the rule that an attorney cannot be held liable for discharging his duties to his client.”).

….

Fraud is not an exception to attorney immunity; rather, the defense does not extend to fraudulent conduct that is outside the scope of an attorney’s legal representation of his client, just as it does not extend to other wrongful conduct outside the scope of representation. An attorney who pleads the affirmative defense of attorney immunity has the burden to prove that his alleged wrongful conduct, regardless of whether it is labeled fraudulent, is part of the discharge of his duties to his client.

Id. at 481-484.

Based on the holding in Cantey Hanger, if an attorney is performing duties that a lawyer would typically perform, the attorney immunity defense would apply. This defense would likewise apply to aiding and abetting fraud and breaches of fiduciary duty. See Kastner v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 231 S.W.3d 571, 577-78 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007); Span Enters. v. Wood, 274 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008).

In Bethel v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C., the Court extended the Cantey Hanger holding to allegations of criminal conduct. 595 S.W.3d 651, 657-58 (Tex. 2020). There, the plaintiff had urged the Court “to recognize an exception” to attorney immunity “whe[n] a third party alleges that an attorney engaged in criminal conduct during the course of litigation.” Id. The Court rejected the invitation to adopt an exception or state a categorical rule because doing so would allow plaintiffs to avoid the attorney-immunity defense through artful pleading—”by merely alleging that an attorney’s conduct was ‘criminal.’” Id. The Court eschewed a categorical exception for criminal conduct because such an exception would defeat the purposes of the attorney-immunity defense. Instead, the Court held that conduct alleged to be criminal in nature “is not categorically excepted from the protections of attorney civil immunity when the conduct alleged is connected with representing a client in litigation.” Id. As we explained there, a lawyer who is doing his or her job is not more susceptible to civil liability just because a nonclient asserts that the lawyer’s actions are fraudulent, wrongful, or even criminal. Id.

In 2021, the Texas Supreme Court further clarified the holding in Cantey Hanger to state that “When an attorney personally participates ‘in a fraudulent business scheme with his client,’ as opposed to on his client’s behalf, the attorney ‘will not be heard to deny his liability’ because ‘such acts are entirely foreign to the duties of an attorney.’” Haynes & Boone, LLP v. NFTD, LLC, 631 S.W.3d 65, 77 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Poole v. Hous. & T.C. Ry. Co., 58 Tex. 134, 137 (1882)). The Court in Haynes & Boone, LLP, also expanded the Cantey Hanger holding to extend to transactional work that the attorney performs, in addition to litigation work covered in the Cantey Hanger opinion:

Today we confirm that attorney immunity applies to claims based on conduct outside the litigation context, so long as the conduct is the “kind” of conduct we have described above. We reach this conclusion because we see no meaningful distinction between the litigation context and the non-litigation context when it comes to the reasons we have recognized attorney immunity in the first place. We have recognized attorney immunity because attorneys are duty-bound to competently, diligently, and zealously represent their clients’ interests while avoiding any conflicting obligations or duties to themselves or others.

Id. at 79.

Most recently, in Taylor v. Tolbert, the Court reviewed whether there was an exception to immunity for private-party civil suits asserting that a lawyer has engaged in conduct criminalized by statute. No. 20-0727, 2022 Tex. LEXIS 385 (Tex. May 6, 2022). The court discussed the immunity defense as follows:

The common-law attorney-immunity defense applies to lawyerly work in “all adversarial contexts in which an attorney has a duty to zealously and loyally represent a client” but only when the claim against the attorney is based on “the kind of conduct” attorneys undertake while discharging their professional duties to a client. Stated inversely, if an attorney engages in conduct that is not “lawyerly work” or is “entirely foreign to the duties of a lawyer” or falls outside the scope of client representation, the attorney-immunity defense is inapplicable.

In determining whether conduct is “the kind” immunity protects, the inquiry focuses on the type of conduct at issue rather than the alleged wrongfulness of that conduct. But when the defense applies, counsel is shielded only from liability in a civil suit, not from “other mechanisms” that exist “to discourage and remedy” bad-faith or wrongful conduct, including sanctions, professional discipline, or criminal penalties, as appropriate.

Conduct is not the kind of conduct attorney immunity protects “simply because attorneys often engage in that activity” or because an attorney performed the activity on a client’s behalf. Rather, the conduct must involve “the uniquely lawyerly capacity” and the attorney’s skills as an attorney. For example, a lawyer who makes publicity statements to the press and on social media on a client’s behalf does “not partake of ‘the office, professional training, skill, and authority of an attorney’” because “[a]nyone—including press agents, spokespersons, or someone with no particular training or authority at all—can publicize a client’s allegations to the media.” Immunity attaches only if the attorney is discharging “lawyerly” duties to his or her client.

A corollary to this principle is that attorneys will not be entitled to civil immunity for conduct that is “entirely foreign to the duties of an attorney.” “Foreign to the duties” does not mean something a good attorney should not do; it means that the attorney is acting outside his or her capacity and function as an attorney. For that reason, whether counsel may claim the privilege turns on the task that was being performed, not whether the challenged conduct was meritorious.

This is so because the interests of clients demand that lawyers “competently, diligently, and zealously represent their clients’ interests while avoiding any conflicting obligations or duties to themselves or others.” To prevent chilling an attorney’s faithful discharge of this duty, lawyers must be able to pursue legal rights they deem necessary and proper for their clients without the menace of civil liability looming over them and influencing their actions. Attorney immunity furthers “loyal, faithful, and aggressive representation” by “essentially . . . removing the fear of personal liability,” thus “alleviating in the mind of [an] attorney any fear that he or she may be sued by or held liable to a non-client for providing . . . zealous representation.” In this way, the defense protects not only attorneys but also their clients, who can be assured that counsel is representing the client’s best interests, not the lawyer’s.

Id. The Court acknowledged that “there is a wide range of criminal conduct that is not within the ‘scope of client representation’ and [is] therefore ‘foreign to the duties of an attorney,’” and that “when that is the case, the circumstances do not give rise to an ‘exception’ to the immunity defense; rather, such conduct simply fails to satisfy the requirements for invoking the defense in the first instance.” Id. “[O]ur approach to applying the attorney-immunity defense remains functional, not qualitative, and leaves an attorney’s improper conduct addressable by public remedies.” Id.

The Court then held that the common-law defense of attorney immunity would still apply to state statutes (unless the statute specifically abrogated that defense). Id. The Court stated:

That does not mean that all conduct criminalized by the wiretap statute is immunized from civil liability or free of consequences. As we explained in Bethel, while criminal conduct is not categorically excepted from the attorney-immunity defense, neither is it categorically immunized by that defense. Criminal conduct may fall outside the scope of attorney immunity, and even when it does not, “nothing in our attorney-immunity jurisprudence affects an attorney’s potential criminal liability if the conduct constitutes a criminal offense.”

Id. However, regarding federal statutes, the Court concluded “that attorney immunity, as recognized and defined under Texas law, is not a defense under the federal wiretap statute because, quite simply, a state’s common-law defense does not apply to federal statutes.” Id.

In light of the foregoing authorities, it appears claims against attorneys merely doing work for a client (whether fraudulent, tortious, or even criminal) would be covered by attorney immunity and bar any participation in breach of fiduciary duty claim. However, if the misconduct relates to the attorney personally benefitting from the transaction, or having been a party to the transaction (as opposed to merely the attorney for a party), such an immunity would not apply. See, e.g., Olmos v. Giles, No. 3:22-CV-0077-D, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77134 (N.D. Tex. April 28, 2022) (refused to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claim and misrepresentation claim against attorneys where it was unclear whether the defendant attorneys were a part of the transaction).

Another issue that should be discussed is the impact on the attorney client privilege when an attorney participates in fraud or criminal activities. The attorney-client privilege cannot be enforced when “the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud.” Tex. R. Evid. 503 (d)(1). As one court describes:

The exception applies only when (1) a prima facie case is made of contemplated fraud, and (2) there is a relationship between the document at issue and the prima facie proof offered. A prima facie showing is sufficient if it sets forth evidence that, if believed by a trier of fact, would establish the elements of a fraud or crime that “was ongoing or about to be committed when the document was prepared.” A court may look to the document itself to determine whether a prima facie case has been established.…

We begin our analysis by examining the scope of the fraud portion of the crime/fraud exception. The Texas Rules of Evidence do not define what is intended in Rule 503(d)(1) by the phrase “to commit . . . [a] fraud.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines fraud as: “A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment.” The Texas common law tort of fraud also requires proof of misrepresentation, concealment, or non-disclosure. The legal concept of fraud therefore has at its core a misrepresentation or concealment. This definition also dovetails with the apparent reasoning behind inclusion of fraud in the exception: by keeping client communications confidential–pursuant to the attorney-client privilege –the attorney whose client intends to make a misrepresentation or concealment helps prevent the injured party from learning the truth about the misrepresentation or concealment. Thus, in that situation, the attorney’s silence affirmatively aids the client in committing the tort. This is not generally true of other torts (not based on misrepresentation or concealment) and explains why the exception is not the crime/tort exception.

In re Gen. Agents Ins. Co. of Am., Inc., 224 S.W.3d 806, 819 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, orig. proceeding). Moreover, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that this exception includes the work-product in the proper circumstances. Woodruff v. State, 330 S.W.3d 709, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 9569 (Tex. App. Texarkana Dec. 3, 2010), pet. ref’d No. PD-1807-10, 2011 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 749 (Tex. Crim. App. May 25, 2011), pet. ref’d No. PD-1807-10, 2011 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 770 (Tex. Crim. App. June 1, 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 977, 132 S. Ct. 502, 181 L. Ed. 2d 347, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7788 (U.S. 2011).

So, though an attorney may be immune from civil liability, the crime/fraud exception may open up attorney/client communications to the light of day. Regarding crimes involving breaches of fiduciary duty, in addition to theft crimes, the Texas Legislature has created the following crimes: (1) Financial Abuse of Elderly Individual in Texas Penal Code Section 32.55; 2) Financial Exploitation of Vulnerable Individuals in Texas Penal Code Section 32.53; (3) Misapplication of Fiduciary Property in Texas Penal Code Section 32.45; and (4) Failure to Report of the Exploitation of the Elderly or Disabled Individuals in the Texas Human Resources Code Section 48.051.

Article By David Fowler Johnson of Winstead

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Court Reversed Order Appointing Temporary Administrator Due To A Lack Of A Bond

In In re Robinett, a party filed a petition for writ of mandamus, challenging a trial court’s order appointing a temporary administrator. No. 03-21-00649-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 926 (Tex. App.—Austin February 9, 2022, original proc.). The petitioner complained that the trial court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing and also appointed a temporary administrator without a bond. Regarding the hearing complaint, the court of appeals disagreed:

Under Section 55.001 of the Texas Estates Code, “[a] person interested in an estate may, at any time before the court decides an issue in a proceeding, file written opposition regarding the issue.” Relators are correct that such interested persons are entitled “to process for witness and evidence, and to be heard on the opposition.” Id. But, based on the record before us, they did not file any “written opposition” to the appointment until they filed their motion to reconsider three days after the appointment had already been decided. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by appointing the temporary administrator without first conducting a hearing pursuant to Section 55.001 because there was no requirement for the trial court to hold a hearing under that statute.

Id. The court, however, agreed that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing the temporary administrator without bond:

The Estates Code expressly requires that the order appointing a temporary administrator “set the amount of bond to be given by the appointee.” Moreover, the Estates Code requires that a party must enter into a bond unless they meet one of a limited number of exceptions: (1) a will directs that no bond be required; (2) all the relevant parties consent to not requiring bond; or (3) the appointee is a corporate fiduciary. And other statutory provisions require a hearing and evidence before “setting the amount of a bond.” Based on the record before us, there is no evidence that the temporary administrator met any of the exceptions to the bonding requirement, nor is there any indication that the trial court undertook any evidentiary hearing regarding the bond amount. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to follow the statutory requirements for setting bonds as part of a temporary administrator appointment.

Id.

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For more articles about civil procedures in litigation, visit the NLR Civil Procedure section.

Texas AG Sues Meta Over Collection and Use of Biometric Data

On February 14, 2022, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton brought suit against Meta, the parent company of Facebook and Instagram, over the company’s collection and use of biometric data. The suit alleges that Meta collected and used Texans’ facial geometry data in violation of the Texas Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier Act (“CUBI”) and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”). The lawsuit is significant because it represents the first time the Texas Attorney General’s Office has brought suit under CUBI.

The suit focuses on Meta’s “tag suggestions” feature, which the company has since retired. The feature scanned faces in users’ photos and videos to suggest “tagging” (i.e., identify by name) users who appeared in the photos and videos. In the complaint, Attorney General Ken Paxton alleged that Meta,  collected and analyzed individuals’ facial geometry data (which constitutes biometric data under CUBI) without their consent, shared the data with third parties, and failed to destroy the data in a timely matter, all in violation of CUBI and the DTPA. CUBI regulates the collection and use of biometric data for commercial purposes, and the DTPA prohibits false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.

Among other forms of relief, the complaint seeks an injunction enjoining Meta from violating these laws, a $25,000 civil penalty for each violation of CUBI, and a $10,000 civil penalty for each violation of the DTPA. The suit follows Facebook’s $650 million class-action settlement over alleged violations of Illinois’ Biometric Privacy Act and the company’s discontinuance of the tag suggestions feature last year.

Article By Hunton Andrews Kurth’s Privacy and Cybersecurity Practice Group

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Copyright © 2022, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.

Court Rejected A Trustee’s Objection To Personal Jurisdiction In His Individual Capacity But Affirmed The Objection In His Capacity As Trustee

In Hanschen v. Hanschen, a trustee challenged a default judgment. No. 05-19-01134-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 4075 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 28, 2020, no pet. history). The family sued the trustee in his personal capacity and in his capacity as trustee for breaching fiduciary duties. While the trustee was in Texas, the family served him in his personal capacity. The family then obtained a default judgment against him in both capacities when he did not file an answer. Later, the trustee filed a special appearance challenging the court’s personal jurisdiction, and the trial granted the motion. The family then appealed.

The court of appeals reversed the special appearance against the trustee in his personal capacity. The court held that because the trustee was personally served in Texas, the trial court had personal jurisdiction over him:

In this case, the family personally served James with the petition and citation while he was in Texas. The family concedes they “have never asserted that Texas has general jurisdiction over James or that the traditional minimum contacts analysis would be met in the absence of his physical presence.” They are correct and the case law is clear that a trial court has authority to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident where the court’s jurisdiction grew out of the personal service of citation upon the nonresident within the state. A nonresident, merely by reason of his nonresidence, is not exempt from a court’s jurisdiction if he voluntarily comes to the state and thus is within the territorial limits of such jurisdiction and can be duly served with process.

Id. The trustee also argued that the court did not have adequate jurisdiction over him in his personal capacity because there were no claims against him in that capacity, but the court of appeals disagreed:

While we may agree with James that the default judgment granted relief against the entities for which it would be necessary for Texas courts to have jurisdiction over James in representative capacities, the family’s petition pleaded causes of action against James individually for breaches of fiduciary duties arising from his role as trustee of the Progeny Trust and his roles in NBR-C2, NBR-C3, and NBR-Needham. The family seeks exemplary damages against James for these alleged breaches of fiduciary duties. James does not make a specific argument why these claims are not pleaded against him personally. In Texas, generally an agent is personally liable for his own tortious conduct. For these reasons, we agree with the family that James was personally served with process in Texas, so the trial court has personal jurisdiction over him in that capacity.

Id.

The court of appeals then turned to whether the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the trustee in his capacity as trustee. The court noted that the citation was not issued to him in that capacity. The court held that this defect was dispositive and affirmed the special appearance for the trustee in his representative capacity:

We have held, “[t]he capacity in which a non-resident has contact with a forum state must be considered in the jurisdictional analysis.” James was not served with a citation directed to him in any representative capacity; only “JAMES HANSCHEN WHEREEVER HE MAY BE FOUND.” At oral argument, the family argued the listing of all the parties in the citation was sufficient to constitute service on James in each representative capacity he was listed as a defendant. We reject this contention and the family’s counsel acknowledged in oral argument a citation addressed to one defendant inadvertently served on a different, unrelated defendant would not constitute good service of process merely because all defendants’ names were in the list of defendants in the style of the lawsuit… In this case, James was not served with citations which were returned to the court clerk stating he had been served in his representative capacities. Any failure to comply with the rules regarding service of process renders the attempted service of process invalid, and the trial court acquires no personal jurisdiction over the defendant. A default judgment based on improper service is void. Accordingly, the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over James in his representative capacities.

Id.

© 2020 Winstead PC.

Texas Governor Announces $50 Million Loan Program for Texas Small Businesses through Goldman Sachs/LiftFund Partnership

As discussed in our previous alert on this issue, the CARES Act established a $349 billion U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) to provide immediate access to capital for small businesses who have been impacted by COVID-19. On April 13, 2020, Texas Governor Greg Abbott provided additional guidance to Texas employers when he announced that investment banking, securities and investment management firm, Goldman Sachs, will partner with San Antonio-based nonprofit organization, LiftFund, to provide $50 million in loans to small businesses. Specifically, Goldman Sachs will provide the capital, and LiftFund and other community development financial institutions will administer the funds. Texas business owners can now apply for a PPP loan and find more information about the program on the LiftFund website.

“What this capital will do [is] provide these companies the resources they need to keep employees on the payroll for the remaining few weeks or so until businesses can begin [the] process of opening back up,” Governor Abbott said. Notably, Governor Abbott indicated that he intends to issue an executive order that will outline strategies to begin the gradual process of reopening businesses in Texas.

This is a matter that is evolving regularly.

Copyright © 2020, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.

For more on small business loans for COVID-19-relief, see the National Law Review Coronavirus News section.

Court Holds That A Deceased Testamentary Trust Beneficiary Can Still Be A Beneficiary

In In the Estate of Mendoza, a decedent’s son’s children filed a petition claiming their entitlement to their father’s beneficial interest in a trust created under the decedent’s will. No. 04-19-00129-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 1845 (Tex. App.—San Antonio March 4, 2020, no pet. history). The son had predeceased the decedent. The decedent’s daughters moved for summary judgment on the sole ground that a dead person could not be a beneficiary of a trust. The trial court granted the daughters’ summary judgment motion. The son’s children appealed.

The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment, holding that the mere fact that the decedent’s son predeceased the decedent did not establish the son’s beneficial interest in the trust created under the decedent’s will lapsed as a matter of law. The daughters argued that a dead person cannot be a beneficiary of a trust and cited to Longoria v. Lasater, 292 S.W.3d 156, 167 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. denied) and Section 112, comment f of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts. However, the court of appeals held that the daughters ignored the difference between an inter vivos trust, which was the type of trust analyzed in Longoria, and a testamentary trust. The court cited to Section 112, comment f, of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts:

A person who has died prior to the creation of a trust cannot be a beneficiary of the trust. Thus, if property is transferred inter vivos [i.e., not by will] in trust for a named person who is dead at the time of the transfer, no trust is created… So also, if a testator devises property in trust for a person who predeceases him, the devise of the beneficial interest lapses, and the person named as trustee ordinarily holds the property upon a resulting trust for the estate of the testator. By statute, however, in many States a devise does not lapse under certain circumstances, as for example if the devisee leaves a child; and under similar circumstances a devise of the beneficial interest under a trust does not lapse.

Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 112 cmt. f (1959) (internal citation omitted); see also Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 44 reporter’s notes on cmt. d (2003) (citing authorities discussing the application of the lapse doctrine and anti-lapse statutes to persons taking under trusts created by a will and noting “[a] comprehensive discussion of the lapse doctrine and anti-lapse statutes is beyond the scope of this Restatement”)). Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded: “the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Daughters based on the mere fact that Eduardo predeceased Jose because that fact alone did not establish Eduardo’s beneficial interest lapsed as a matter of law.” Id. Further, the court refused to address an argument about Texas’s anti-lapse statutes because the arguments had not properly raised below. The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

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