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Could the Crypto Downturn Lead to a Spike in M&A?

In 2021, we saw a cryptocurrency boom with record highs and a flurry of activity. However, this year, the cryptocurrency downturn has been significant. We have seen drops in various cryptocurrencies ranging from 20 to 70 percent, with an estimated $2 trillion in losses in the past few months.

Industry watchers had already predicted a spike in crypto M&A from the beginning of 2022, and in a recent interview with Barron’s, John Todaro, a senior crypto and blockchain researcher at Needham & Company, said he believes this downturn could lead to a wave of mergers and acquisitions in the crypto space for the second half of this year and even into 2023.

Valuations have dropped across the board this year as the market has faced incredible volatility, and Todaro told Barron’s, “The valuations for public crypto companies have fallen by about 70% this year.” These lower valuations could make these companies increasingly attractive targets for acquisition, and this activity has already started to pick up.

According recent coverage from CNBC, some larger crypto companies are already looking for acquisition targets in order to drive industry growth and to help them acquire more users. Todaro feels most of the M&A activity we will see will be this kind of crypto to crypto acquisition as opposed to traditional buyers, although there is still opportunity for non-crypto companies to capitalize on these lower valuations and some are already doing so.

With more government regulation coming for the crypto sector this year, it could also impact the activity level as well. Achieving some legal and regulatory clarity could have implications for this uptick in M&A for crypto companies. Our analysis of the SEC’s recent proposed regulations, other government activity in this area, and their potential implications can be found here.

We could of course see a growing number of acquisitions across industries as valuations remain lower than a year ago, but as the crypto sector continues to see this kind of a downturn, the level of activity in this area could be much greater than it has previously seen. With that said, both the target company and the acquirer should be looking at any transactions with the same level of due diligence instead of rushing into any deal fueled by panic or haste.

Article By Louis Lehot of Foley & Lardner LLP

For more mergers and acquisitions legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

FTC Takes First Actions Under New Made in USA Labeling Rule, Fining Battery Companies for Violations

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently cracked down on Lithionics Battery, LLC, and Lions Not Sheep Products, LLC, for violating the FTC’s Made in USA Labeling Rule. These are some of the first enforcement actions after the FTC codified its longstanding informal Made in USA guidance, which makes it easier for the FTC to seek damages and levy fines. Under the proposed settlement, Lithionics will pay a $100,000 fine for falsely labeling batteries as US-made, while Lions Not Sheep will be required to pay $211,335 for falsely labeling clothing as US-made.

The Made in USA Labeling Rule

Under the Made in USA Labeling Rule, marketers suspected of making unqualified Made in USA claims must prove that their products:

are all or virtually all made in the US;
that all significant processing occurred in the US; and
that the final assembly occurred in the US.

Although Congress enacted legislation authorizing the FTC to seek relief for Made in USA fraud almost thirty years ago, the FTC long remained silent on enforcement due to a general consensus that this specific type of fraud should not be penalized. The 2021 Made in USA Labeling Rule alters this perspective, codifying the FTC’s enforcement policy. With the Commission now being allowed to levy fines, seek damages, penalties, and/or redress on marketers who deceptively and fraudulently represent that their products are made in the US, the FTC has stepped up its enforcement efforts.

The FTC’s Recent Allegations with Lithionics and Lions Not Sheep

Lithionics

Lithionics is a Florida-based company best known for its battery products. The company has become a regular brand throughout American households. It designs and sells products for vehicles, as well as amusement parks.

The FTC alleged that Lithionics has been in violation of the Made in USA Labeling Rule since at least 2018 by intentionally misrepresenting the origin of Lithionics products. According to the Complaint, Lithionics’ products are labeled “Proudly Designed and Built in the USA” and feature an American flag. The claims were also featured across company websites, social media platforms, videos, and printed catalogs. However, according to the FTC, “all Lithionics battery and battery module products contain imported lithium ion cells” and “other significant imported components,” which, if true, would render Lithionics’ Made in USA claims false or unsubstantiated under the Made in USA Labeling Rule.”

Under the proposed order, Lithionics and its owner must stop making these claims unless they can prove their statements are true. As noted above, the company must also pay $100,000 for the alleged activity.

Lions Not Sheep

Lions Not Sheep is a self-proclaimed lifestyle brand that sells sweatshirts, hats, and shirts online.

In its allegations against Lions Not Sheep, the FTC alleged that the company has violated the Made in USA Labeling Rule since May 2021. According to the Complaint, the company intentionally removed tags disclosing that items were made in a foreign country. Instead of leaving the original tags, the FTC alleged that the company replaced them with Made in USA tags despite the products being “wholly imported with limited finishing work performed in the United States.” To make matters worse, the FTC found a video posted on the internet featuring the company’s owner blatantly claiming he could hide the fact that his shirts were made in China.

In addition to charging the company with violating the Made in the USA Labeling Rule, the FTC charged the company with violating mandatory country-of-origin labeling rules, which require all products covered by the Textile Act to include labels disclosing the manufacturer or marketer name and country where the product was manufactured. The company will be prohibited from making these claims and forced to pay $211,335.

Primary Takeaway

With the FTC now levying significant fines under the new Made in USA rule, the potential cost of non-compliance has also significantly increased. Companies should provide notice to their marketing teams and carefully review any existing claims to ensure that Made in USA claims are adequately substantiated and that marketing materials are not conveying unintended implied claims.

Article By Anthony V. Lupo, Dan Jasnow, and Destiny Planter of ArentFox Schiff LLP

For more antitrust legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Patent Infringement Verdict Nixed over Judge’s Stock Ownership

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s opinions and orders and remanded the case for further proceedings before a different district court judge because the original judge had failed to divest all financial interests in the case. Centripetal Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., Case No. 21-1888 (Fed. Cir. June 23, 2022) (Dyk, Taranto, Cunningham, JJ.)

Centripetal sued Cisco for patent infringement. The original district court judge presided over a 22-day bench trial, which included a more than 3,500-page record, 26 witnesses and more than 300 exhibits. The court heard final arguments on June 25, 2020. While the case was still pending before the district court, the judge learned that his wife owned Cisco stock, valued at $4,687.99. The district court judge notified the parties on August 12, 2020, that he had discovered that his wife owned 100 shares of Cisco stock. He stated that his wife purchased the stock in October 2019 and had no independent recollection of the purchase. He explained that at the time he learned of the stock, he had already drafted a 130-page draft of his opinion on the bench trial, and virtually every issue had been decided. He further stated that the stock did not—and could not have—influenced his opinion on any of the issues in the case. Instead of selling the stock, which might have implied insider trading given his knowledge of the forthcoming order, the judge placed it in a blind trust. Under the terms of the trust, the judge was to be notified when the trust assets had been completely disposed of or when their value became less than $1,000.

Centripetal had no objections. Cisco, however, filed a motion for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b)(4). The judge ordered Centripetal to file a response. On October 2, 2020, the court denied Cisco’s motion for recusal. On October 5, 2020, the court issued a 167-page opinion and order containing the judge’s findings that Cisco willfully infringed the asserted claims of the patents-at-issue and awarded Centripetal damages of more than $755 million, pre-judgment interest of more than $13 million and a running royalty of 10%. Cisco moved for amended findings and judgment under Rule 52(b) or a new trial under Rule 59(a)(2). The court denied both motions. Cisco appealed the district court’s findings and asserted that the judge was required to recuse himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) absent divestiture under § 455(f) (the only exception to the bright line rule that a federal judge is disqualified based on a known financial interest in a party).

On appeal, the Federal Circuit addressed two issues: whether the district court judge was relieved of his duty to recuse under § 455(b)(4) because his wife had divested herself of her interest in Cisco under § 455(f), and, if the requirements of § 455(f) were not satisfied, a determination as to the proper remedy.

The Federal Circuit analyzed whether placement of the stock in a blind trust satisfied the divesture requirement of § 455(f). The Court explained that a blind trust is “an arrangement whereby a person, in an effort to avoid conflicts of interest, places certain personal assets under the control of an independent trustee with the provision that the person is to have no knowledge of how those assets are managed.” Centripetal admitted that there are no cases holding that placement of stock in a blind trust constitutes divestment. The Court next turned to the intent of Congress when it drafted the statute. The Court reasoned that to “divest” was understood at the time to mean “dispossess or deprive,” which is only possible when an interest is sold or given away. The Court also noted that Congress used the present tense—that a judge should not sit when he or she has a financial interest in a party. The Court concluded that while placing the stock in a blind trust removed the judge’s wife from control over the stock, it did not eliminate her beneficial interest in Cisco. The Court also found that the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Codes of Conduct had previously ruled that a judge’s use of a blind trust does not obviate the judge’s recusal obligations. Accordingly, the Court found that placing assets in a blind trust is not divestment under § 455(f) and, thus, the district court judge was disqualified from further proceedings in the case.

As for the appropriate remedy, the Federal Circuit considered whether rulings made after August 11, 2020, when the district court judge became aware of his wife’s financial interest in Cisco, should be vacated as a remedy for his failure to recuse. The Court determined that the risk of injustice to the parties weighed against a finding of harmless error and in favor of vacatur. The Court reversed the district court’s opinion and order denying Cisco’s motion for recusal; vacated the opinion and order regarding infringement, damages and post-judgment motions and remanded for further proceedings before a new judge.

Article By Jodi Benassi of McDermott Will & Emery

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

A Rule 37 Refresher – As Applied to a Ransomware Attack

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) (“Rule 37”) was completely rewritten in the 2015 amendments. Before the 2015 amendments, the standard was that a party could not generally be sanctioned for data loss as a result of the routine, good faith operation of its system. That rule didn’t really capture the reality of all of the potential scenarios related to data issues nor did it provide the requisite guidance to attorneys and parties.

The new rule added a dimension of reasonableness to preservation and a roadmap for analysis. The first guidepost is whether the information should have been preserved. This rule is based upon the common law duty to preserve when litigation is likely. The next guidepost is whether the data loss resulted from a failure to take reasonable steps to preserve. The final guidepost is whether or not the lost data can be restored or replaced through additional discovery. If there is data that should have been preserved, that was lost because of failure to preserve, and that can’t be replicated, then the court has two additional decisions to make: (1) was there prejudice to another party from the loss OR (2) was there an intent to deprive another party of the information. If the former, the court may only impose measures “no greater than necessary” to cure the prejudice. If the latter, the court may take a variety of extreme measures, including dismissal of the action. An important distinction was created in the rule between negligence and intention.

So how does a ransomware attack fit into the new analytical framework? A Special Master in MasterObjects, Inc. v. Amazon.com (U.S. Dist. Court, Northern District of California, March 13, 2022) analyzed Rule 37 in the context of a ransomware attack. MasterObjects was the victim of a well-documented ransomware attack, which precluded the companies access to data prior to 2016. The Special Master considered the declaration from MasterObjects which explained that, despite using state of the art cybersecurity protections, the firm was attacked by hackers in December 2020. The hack rendered all the files/mailboxes inaccessible without a recovery key set by the attackers. The hackers demanded a ransom and the company contacted the FBI. Both the FBI and insurer advised them not to pay the ransom. Despite spending hundreds of hours attempting to restore the data, everything prior to 2016 was inaccessible.

Applying Rule 37, the Special Master stated that, at the outset, there is no evidence that any electronically stored information was “lost.” The data still exists and, while access has been blocked, it can be accessed in the future if a key is provided or a technological work-around is discovered.

Even if a denial of access is construed to be a “loss,” the Special Master found no evidence in this record that the loss occurred because MasterObjects failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it. This step of the analysis, “failure to take reasonable steps to preserve,” is a “critical, basic element” to prove spoliation.

On the issue of prejudice, Amazon argued that “we can’t know what we don’t know” (related to missing documents). The Special Master did not find Amazon’s argument persuasive. The Special Master concluded that Amazon’s argument cannot survive the adoption of Rule 37(e). “The rule requires affirmative proof of prejudice in the specific destruction at issue.”

Takeaways:

If you are in a spoliation dispute, make sure you have the experts and evidence to prove or defend your case.
When you are trying to prove spoliation, know the new test and apply it in your analysis (the Special Master noted that Amazon did not reference Rule 37 in its briefing).
As a business owner, when it comes to cybersecurity, you must take reasonable and defensible efforts to protect your data.

Article By Gretchen E. Moore of Strassburger McKenna Gutnick & Gefsky

For more cybersecurity and media legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Gerber Argues FDA Preemption in Baby Food Lawsuit

In February 2021, the U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee on Economic and Consumer Policy released a report on the levels of heavy metals found in baby foods and the respective manufacturers. The report findings described “significant levels of toxic heavy metals” based on internal documents and test results submitted by baby food companies. Lawsuits quickly followed, including many actions against Gerber Products Co., that allege Gerber falsely and deceptively failed to disclose the presence of unsafe levels of heavy metals in their baby foods.
Gerber argues in a recent motion to dismiss that the primary jurisdiction doctrine should control. For background, the primary jurisdiction doctrine is a judicial doctrine used when courts and an agency have concurrent jurisdiction, but the court favors administrative discretion and expertise in deciding the issue. In this case, Gerber argues that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is in a better position to decide “acceptable levels of heavy metals in baby foods” because of the need for expertise in issues of infant nutrition.
Gerber further alleges that Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). Gerber argues that Plaintiff’s demand for mandatory disclosures on packaging is preempted by FDA because it is the Agency’s role to establish national policy on food safety and labeling. Finally, Gerber says the Plaintiffs fail to plead deception, pointing to a lack of misleading statements on their packaging and no legal requirement to disclose heavy metals on a product label.
Keller and Heckman will continue to monitor and report on this litigation and any responsive regulatory actions or developments.

Article By Food and Drug Law Practice Group at Keller and Heckman LLP

For more biotech, food, and drug law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

OSHA Proposes More Changes to Recordkeeping Rules

Employers across numerous industries may soon face additional recordkeeping and reporting obligations based on a new rule proposed by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

In March 2022, OSHA proposed amendment of its injury and illness tracking rule, which requires certain employers to file illness and injury data with the agency each year. The tracking rule was first implemented in 2016, and required reporting of fatalities, hospitalizations, and other serious injuries for all covered employers with 250 or more employees, and for employers with 20-249 employees in certain “high hazard industries.” The rule required most covered employers to submit their Form 300A “Summary of Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses” annually. It also required certain employer establishments with 250 or more employees to submit their complete Form 300 Logs of Work-Related Injury and Illnesses, and their Form 301 Injury and Illness Incident reports annually. Finally, the rule called for creation of a public database of employer illness/injury data, including business names and illness/injury locations.

The rule generated immediate objections from the business community based on privacy concerns. Both the Form 300 Logs and the Form 301s Incident Reports contain personal employee information related to their health status. Employers worried that if OSHA required broad disclosure of these documents and created a public database based on their content, it would jeopardize employee privacy. Even though OSHA claimed it would not make personal identifying information available, employers were not confident the agency could prevent inadvertent disclosure. Also, employers saw myriad ways in which the information could be used against them that have nothing to do with worker safety.

In response to this criticism and after a change in the presidential administration, OSHA rolled back the tracking rule in 2019. The 2019 Rule rescinded the requirement for employers of 250 or more employees to electronically submit Form 300s and Form 301s, but continued to require them to submit Form 300A summaries each year. Because the summaries did not contain personal information, the modified rule alleviated employee privacy worries.

Now, OSHA is poised to revive the original tracking rule, but expand the application of the most onerous requirements to smaller establishments. On March 30, 2022, OSHA published its proposed rule in the Federal Register. If the final rule mirrors the proposed rule, it would largely restore the 2016 rule, but apply the Form 300 and 301 reporting requirements to covered establishments with 100 or more employees instead of 250 employees. Those employers covered by the new 100+ rule are limited to the industries in Appendix B of the proposed rule. The list is lengthy and includes many farming, manufacturing and packaging industry employers, healthcare employers as well as grocery, department and furniture stores.

OSHA received public comment on the proposed rule through June 30, 2022. OSHA received 83 comments from a mix of private and public entities, citizens, and industry groups. OSHA will review the comments and employers should expect the agency to issue a Final Rule by the end of the calendar year, which would become effective 30 days after publication.

If OSHA enacts its proposed rule, covered employers will face significant additional burdens. Employers must ensure that their Form 300 and 301 Forms are maintained accurately and filed in time to comply with the rule. They can expect that OSHA will scrutinize these forms and potentially use them for inspection purposes or to develop industry-specific enforcement programs. Moreover, OSHA may impose redaction burdens on employers and force them to remove personal identifying information from the forms before submission, which can be an administrative burden with potentially significant privacy implications if not followed carefully. Finally, with additional data publicly available, employers should expect enhanced media and interest group activity based on their injury and illness data. Even if personal information is not disclosed, interest groups and labor organizations will certainly seize on the available data to criticize employers or push for regulations, without consideration of the fact that employer fault cannot be determined from the data alone.

Employers should take steps now to prepare for the proposed rule and continue to ensure their safety and health programs minimize employee illness/injury risk. The new rule would greatly increase potential legislative and public relations risks associated with poor safety and health outcomes, and effective illness/injury prevention programs can help employers avoid such scrutiny before the enhanced disclosure requirements take effect.

Article By Susan F. Wiltsie and Reilly C. Moore of Hunton Andrews Kurth. Scott W. Burton also contributed to this article.

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Wegmans Settles With NYAG for $400,000 Over Data Incident

The New York Attorney General recently announced a data security-related settlement with Wegmans Food Markets. The issue arose in April 2021 regarding a cloud-based incident. At that time a security researcher notified Wegmans that the company had an Azure cloud storage container that was unsecured. Upon investigation, the company determined that the container had been misconfigured and that three million customer records had been publicly accessible since 2018. The records included email addresses and account passwords.

Of concern for the AG, among other things, were that the passwords were salted and hashed using SHA-1 hashing, rather than PBKDF2. Similarly, the AG found concerning the fact that the company did not have an asset inventory of what it maintained in the cloud. As a result, no security assessments were conducted of its cloud-based databases. The NYAG also took issue with the company’s lack of long-term logging: logs for its Azure assets were kept for only 30 days. Finally, the company kept checksums derived from customer driver’s license information, something for which the NYAG did not feel the company had a “reasonable business purpose” to collect or maintain.

The NYAG argued that these practices were both deceptive and unlawful in light of the promises Wegman’s made in its privacy policy. It also felt that the practices were a violation of the state’s data security law. As part of the settlement, Wegmans agreed to pay $400,000. It also agreed to implement a written information security program that addresses, among other things:

asset management that covers cloud assets and identifies several items about the asset, including its owner, version, location, and criticality;

access controls for all cloud assets;

penetration testing that takes into account cloud assets, and includes at least one annual test of the cloud environment;

central logging and monitoring for cloud assets, including keeping cloud logs readily accessible for 90 days (and further stored for a year from logged activity);

customer password management that includes hashing algorithms and a salting policy that is at least commensurate with NIST standards and “reasonably anticipated security risks;” and

policies and procedures around data collection and deletion.

Wegmans agreed to have the program assessed within a year of the settlement, with a written report by the third-party assessor provided to the NYAG. It will also conduct at-least-annual reviews of the program. As part of that review it will determine if any changes are needed to better protect and secure personal data.

Putting It Into Practice: This case is a reminder for companies to think not only about assets on its network, but its cloud assets, when designing a security program. Part of these efforts include clearly identifying locations that house personal information (as defined under security and breach laws) and evaluating the security practices and controls in place to protect that information. The security program elements the NYAG has asked for in this settlement signal its expectations of what constitutes a reasonable information security program.

Article By Kari M. Rollins and Liisa M. Thomas of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

For more data privacy legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

U.S. Supreme Court Agrees with HHS Payment Methodology for Disproportionate Share Hospitals

The fight about how Medicare compensates disproportionate share hospitals (“DSH”) is one of the longest-running reimbursement disputes of recent years, and it has generated copious work for judges around the country. In a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court settled one piece of the conflict: the counting of “Medicare-entitled” patients in the Medicare fraction of the “disproportionate-patient percentage.” Becerra v. Empire Health Found., 597 U.S. ___ (2022) (slip op.). The Supreme Court concluded that the proper calculation, under the statute, counts “individuals ‘entitled to [Medicare] benefits[,]’ . . . regardless of whether they are receiving Medicare payments” for certain services. Id. (slip op., at 18) (emphasis added).

DSH payments are made to hospitals with a large low-income patient mix. “The mark-up reflects that low-income individuals are often more expensive to treat than higher income ones, even for the same medical conditions.” Id. (slip op., at 3). The federal government thus gives hospitals a financial boost for treating a “disproportionate share” of the indigent population.

The DHS payment depends on a hospital’s “disproportionate-patient percentage,” which is basically the sum of two fractions: the Medicare fraction, which reflects what portion of the Medicare patients were low-income; and the Medicaid fraction, which reflects what portion of the non-Medicare patients were on Medicaid. Historically, HHS calculated the Medicare fraction by including only patients actually receiving certain Medicare benefits for their care. In 2004, however, HHS changed course and issued a new rule. It counted, in the Medicare fraction, all patients who were eligible for Medicare benefits generally (essentially, over 65 or disabled), even if particular benefits were not actually being paid. For most providers, that change resulted in a pay cut.

The new rule sparked several lawsuits. Hospitals challenged HHS’s policy based on the authorizing statutory language. These hospitals essentially argued in favor of the old methodology. Appeals led to a circuit split, with the Sixth and D.C. Circuits agreeing with HHS, and the Ninth Circuit ruling that HHS had misread the statute.

The Supreme Court has now resolved the issue. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Kagan, sided with HHS. The majority concluded that, based on the statutory language, “individuals ‘entitled to [Medicare] benefits’ are all those qualifying for the program, regardless of whether they are receiving Medicare payments for part or all of a hospital stay.” Id. (slip op., at 18). The majority also explained that if “entitlement to benefits” bore the meaning suggested by the hospital, “Medicare beneficiaries would lose important rights and protections . . . [and a] patient could lose his ability to enroll in other Medicare programs whenever he lacked a right to [certain] payments for hospital care.” Id. (slip op., at 11).

Justice Kavanaugh dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Gorsuch and Alito. The dissent argued that those lacking certain Medicare coverage should be excluded from HHS’s formula, based on “the most fundamental principle of statutory interpretation: Read the statute.” Id. (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 2). According to the dissent, the majority’s ruling will also restrict hospitals’ ability to provide care to underprivileged communities. “HHS’s misreading of the statute has significant real-world effects: It financially harms hospitals that serve low-income patients, thereby hamstringing those hospitals’ ability to provide needed care to low-income communities.” Id. (slip op., at 4).

There was one point of agreement among the majority and dissenting justices: the complexity of the statutory language for DSH payments. Echoing the thoughts often held by healthcare advisors, Justice Kagan found the statutory formula to be “a mouthful” and “a lot to digest.” Id. (majority opinion) (slip op., at 4). And in his dissent, Justice Kavanaugh called the statute “mind-numbingly complex,” and resorted to an interpretation that he found “straightforward and commonsensical”: that patients cannot be “simultaneously entitled and disentitled” to Medicare benefits. Id. (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 1, 3).

Article By Jeffrey DeBeer and Keith Bradley of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

For more Supreme Court and litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Federal District Court Says Pre-Shift COVID Screening Time Not Compensable

In the first reported decision we’ve seen addressing the issue head on, a federal district court in California dismissed a putative collective action claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) seeking payment for time spent in pre-shift COVID screening.

Prior to clocking in each day, the plaintiff—a non-exempt truck driver whose job duties included loading and transporting automobile parts from a central distribution center to stores throughout southern California—was required to submit to COVID-related health screening conducted on his employer’s premises. During the screening process, a company employee asked the plaintiff a series of questions and took the plaintiff’s temperature. The total time spent in the screening process often exceeded five minutes, which included waiting time.

The plaintiff filed a collective action claim, contending that the time spent by him and other employees participating in the daily screening was compensable under the FLSA.

Starting with the premise that time spent in pre-shift activities is only compensable under the FLSA if it is “integral and indispensable” to the employee’s “principal activities or activities which [the] employee is employed to perform,” the district court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss the FLSA claims, noting:

A pre-shift COVID screening is not the “principal activity or activities which [the] employee is employed to perform.” 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1). O’Reilly did not hire the employees to undergo health screenings, but instead to load and transport products to stores…. [T]he pre-shift COVID screenings were not “integral and indispensable” to the employees’ duties because the screening was not an intrinsic element of the loading and transporting of products to the stores. The screenings were not indispensable to the employees’ duties because O’Reilly could eliminate them completely without hindering the employees’ ability to perform their duties…. A pre-shift COVID temperature check and short questions regarding exposure do not share the required nexus with Plaintiff’s duties of retrieving automotive parts and delivering them to auto part stores to make the screening a compensable activity that is integral and indispensable to those activities.

Notably, the court referenced—and then distinguished—the U.S. Department of Labor’s COVID-19 and the Fair Labor Standards Act Questions and Answers, which were issued during the height of the pandemic and which many employers felt were ambiguous on the issue of which COVID-related activities were and weren’t considered “hours worked” under the FLSA:

Unlike the nurse in the DOL example whose principal job duty is to keep patients healthy and has direct patient contact, Plaintiff’s principal activities consisted of manual labor and transportation of auto parts to stores.

We examined those agency Q&As—and the broader issues around compensability of time spent in vaccination, testing, and screening activities—in an earlier blog.

The decision is Pipich v. O’Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC (S.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2022).

Article By Allan S Bloom of Proskauer Rose LLP

For more coronavirus legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Medical Marijuana, Workers’ Compensation, and the CSA: Hazy Outlook for Employers As States Wrestle With Cannabis Reimbursement as a Reasonable Medical Expense

While each state has its own unique workers’ compensation program, workers’ compensation generally requires employers to reimburse the reasonable medical expenses of employees who are injured at work. Depending on the injury, these expenses can include hospital visits, follow-up appointments, physical therapy, surgeries, and medication, among other medical care. In recent years, medical cannabis has become increasingly common to treat a myriad of ailments—as of February 2022, 37 states, the District of Columbia, and three territories now allow the use of medical cannabis.

While that is good news for patients seeking treatment for issues like chronic pain, medical cannabis laws can cause a major headache for employers. The federal law known as the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) classifies cannabis as a Schedule I substance, meaning that under federal law, it is not currently authorized for medical treatment anywhere in the United States and is not considered safe for use even under medical supervision. So, what happens when an employee is injured at work, is eligible for workers’ compensation, and is prescribed medical cannabis to treat their work-related injury in a state that authorizes medical cannabis?

Employers are faced with a tricky dilemma: They can reimburse the employee’s medical cannabis as a reasonable medical expense and risk violating the federal prohibition against aiding and abetting the possession of cannabis. Or, they can refuse to reimburse the otherwise reasonable medical expense and risk violating the state’s workers’ compensation law.

Usually, where it is impossible for an employer to comply with both state and federal law, federal law wins—a legal concept called conflict preemption. Unfortunately for employers, however, clarity on this issue will have to wait—the U.S. Supreme Court recently declined two requests to review state supreme court cases on this issue and definitively decide whether the CSA preempts state workers’ compensation laws that require reimbursement of medical cannabis. In the absence of federal guidance, national employers with workers in different states must follow the decisions of the handful of state courts that have taken up the question. The state courts who have decided the issue have come to inconsistent conclusions—thus, whether an employer should reimburse medical cannabis will vary depending on the state where the employee is injured.

For example, in Maine and Minnesota, both states’ highest courts have concluded that employers are not required to pay for their injured employees’ medical cannabis. These courts reasoned that employers would face liability under the CSA for aiding and abetting the purchase of a controlled substance. The employer, if reimbursing employees for using medical cannabis, would knowingly subsidize the employee’s purchase of marijuana in direct violation of federal law. However, in such a case, the employer would also violate state law for refusing to reimburse the employee’s reasonable medical expenses. Deeming it impossible for the employer to comply with both laws, these states’ courts concluded that the federal prohibition on cannabis preempts the state workers’ compensation laws.

States such as New Jersey have gone the other way, requiring employers to reimburse employee’s medical cannabis. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that there was no conflict between the prohibitions of the CSA and the demands of the New Jersey workers’ compensation law. Thus, the federal law did not preempt New Jersey’s state law, and employers were required to comply by reimbursing medical cannabis as a reasonable reimbursement.

Meanwhile, Massachusetts followed Maine and Minnesota’s approach, but did so based on its own medical marijuana statute, not the CSA. The Massachusetts law explicitly exempts health insurance providers or any government agency or authority from the reimbursement requirement because doing so violates federal law.

Given this patchwork of state decisions, employers should be cautious in determining whether to approve or deny medical cannabis as a reasonable medical expense under state workers’ compensation laws. While the answer is relatively clear (for now) in the states discussed above, there are still over 30 states with medical cannabis programs that have not addressed this issue. It is important to note that many state medical cannabis laws include provisions like Massachusetts that exempt employers from reimbursing employees for cannabis—a clear indicator that these laws were designed with federal prohibitions in mind. But these provisions are not necessarily determinative—New Jersey’s medical cannabis law has a similar provision, yet New Jersey employers are still required to reimburse for medical cannabis.

The bottom line is that federal CSA violations can be hefty, including a mandatory $1,000 fine, possible incarceration of up to one year, and possibly more if “aggravating factors” are found, such as prior convictions. Employers should therefore pay careful attention to their respective state medical cannabis laws, workers’ compensation laws, as well as the CSA and consult with counsel to determine the best approach in their particular jurisdiction. It is likely that more of these cases will be brought in the future, so be sure to check back for further developments in this evolving area of law.

Article By Amanda C. Hibbler of Foley & Lardner LLP. This article was prepared with the assistance of 2022 summer associate Zack Sikora.

For more cannabis legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Tag: legal

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