FTC Announces 2024 Increase in HSR Notification Thresholds and Filing Fees

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has announced the annual revisions to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act (HSR Act) thresholds and HSR filing fees, which will become effective on March 6, 2024. The revised thresholds will apply to any merger or acquisition closing on or after the effective date.

The FTC is required to adjust the HSR thresholds annually based upon the change in gross national product. This year, the change in the “size of transaction” threshold has increased from $111.4 million to $119.5 million.

Under the HSR Act, when a deal satisfies the “size of person” and “size of transaction” thresholds, and no exemption from reporting is available, the deal must be reported to the FTC and the US Department of Justice, and the parties must wait for a designated period of time before closing the transaction.

Size of Person. The revised size of person thresholds will generally be met if one party involved in the deal has assets or annual sales totaling $239 million or more and one other party involved in the deal has assets or annual sales of at least $23.9 million. Satisfaction of the size of person thresholds is not required, however, if the transaction is valued at more than $478 million.

Size of Transaction. The revised size of transaction threshold will be met if the buyer will hold an aggregate amount of stock, non-corporate interests and/or assets of the seller valued at more than $119.5 million as a result of the deal.

The notification thresholds applicable to purchases of voting securities will increase as follows:

February 1, 2001 Thresholds (Original) Current Thresholds as of February 27, 2023 New Thresholds Effective March 6, 2024
$50 million $111.4 million $119.5 million
$100 million $222.7 million $239 million
$500 million $1.1137 billion $1.195 billion
25% if worth more than
$1 billion
25% if worth more than $2.2274 billion 25% if worth more than $2.39 billion
50% if worth more than
$50 million
50% if worth more than $111.4 million 50% if worth more than $119.5 million

The thresholds applicable to many exemptions, including those governing foreign acquisitions, also will increase. However, the $500 million threshold applicable to acquisitions of producing oil and gas reserves and associated assets will not change.

The civil penalty for failing to comply with the notification and waiting period requirements of the HSR Act has also increased to up to $51,744 per day for each day a party is in violation.

HSR Filing Fees. Additionally, the HSR filing fee thresholds and filing fee amounts have increased as follows:

Original Filing Fee Original Applicable Size of Transaction 2024 Adjusted Filing Fee 2024 Adjusted Applicable Size of Transaction
$30,000 Less than $161.5 million $30,000 Less than $173.3 million
$100,000 Not less than $161.5 million but less than $500 million $105,000 Not less than $173.3 million but less than $536.5 million
$250,000 Not less than $500 million but less than $1 billion $260,000 Not less than $536.5 million but less than $1.073 billion
$400,000 Not less than $1 billion but less than $2 billion $415,000 Not less than $1.073 billion but less than $2.146 billion
$800,000 Not less than $2 billion but less than $5 billion $830,000 Not less than $2.146 billion but less than $5.365 billion
$2,250,000 $5 billion or more $2,335,000 $5.365 billion or more

The new fees also will become effective on March 6, 2024.

Tempur Sealy Acquisition of Mattress Firm: A Vertical Bridge Too Far for the FTC?

In a deal announced on May 9, Tempur Sealy International, Inc., the world’s largest mattress manufacturer, has agreed to acquire Houston-based Mattress Firm Group, Inc., the largest U.S. brick-and-mortar bedding retailer, with more than 2,300 locations and a robust e-commerce platform. The companies hope to finalize the $40 billion deal in the second half of 2024.

Following pre-merger notification of the deal last October, the FTC is reportedly taking a deep dive into the mattress industry to assess whether the transaction is likely to harm competition. The depth of the investigation itself signals a departure from the antitrust agencies’ traditional approach to “vertical” mergers in which firms in the same industry but in non-overlapping market segments (such as manufacturing and retailing the same product category) benefit from a soft presumption of legality. Customarily, vertical integration was perceived to be benign, if not somehow “efficiency enhancing.”

Whatever the merits of applying such leniency to traditional supply chains of widgets, it does not serve competition policy well in an economy dominated by technology-driven platforms that serve several enormous groups of customers at once. In today’s markets, non-overlapping vertical arrangements can severely affect whether rival firms can gain access to inputs, markets, or prospective customers.

Evidence of the FTC’s awareness of the potential for vertical mergers to cause competitive harm abounds. On September 15, 2021, the FTC withdrew the FTC/Department of Justice 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines and Commentary. The Commission’s majority said that the 2020 Guidelines included a “flawed discussion of the purported procompetitive benefits (i.e., efficiencies) of vertical mergers, especially its treatment of the elimination of double marginalization” and by failing to address “increasing levels of consolidation across the economy.”

Mattresses and Widgets

A course correction is borne out by the Commission’s recent challenges to several proposed vertical mergers, including Nvidia Corp.’s attempted acquisition of Arm Ltd., Lockheed Martin Corporation’s attempted acquisition of Aerojet Rocketdyne Holdings, Inc., Microsoft Corp.’s acquisition of Activision Blizzard Inc., and Illumina, Inc.’s acquisition of GRAIL, Inc. After the parties abandoned the Nvidia/Arm acquisition, the FTC’s press release was effusive: “This result is particularly significant because it represents the first abandonment of a litigated vertical merger in many years,” the Commission said.

Enter the Tempur Sealy/Mattress Firm transaction, a vertical acquisition in a product category whose markets resemble widgets more than online merchandising or payment networks. Tempur Sealy became the world’s largest mattress manufacturer in 2012, when Tempur-Pedic acquired Sealey Corp. for $1.3 billion. The company currently earns revenues of $5 billion a year, almost a third of the $17 billion U.S. mattress market. Mattress Firm, the largest mattress retailer in the U.S. with annual revenues of $2.5 billion a year, has been owned since 2016 by German retail holding company Steinhoff International Holdings NV. The firm filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in October 2018, but quickly emerged the following month after closing 700 stores.

The merging parties are no strangers to one another, having engaged in a commercial relationship for the past 35 years. In 2017, Tempur Sealy sued Mattress Firm for selling mattresses that infringed on the Tempur-Pedic line-up, but in 2019, after its emergence from bankruptcy, Mattress Firm and Tempur Sealy struck a long-term partnership agreement. A merger of the two firms has been under discussion in one form or another for most of the past decade.

Public statements by the parties stress the complementarity of the deal, which they describe as combining “Tempur Sealy’s extensive product development and manufacturing capabilities with vertically integrated retail.” The merged entity will end up with about 3,000 retail stores, 30 e-commerce platforms, 71 manufacturing facilities, and 4 R&D facilities around the world. It is the kind of combination of complementary businesses that not long ago might not have even earned a Second Request from the antitrust agencies.

The FTC, which at least since last December has been investigating the potential effects on the mattress industry of a merger between the two market leaders, issued a Second Request earlier this month. By February, the Commission had already interviewed executives from the top 20 mattress manufacturers, according to a report in Furniture Today (February 2, 2023).

Disruptors and Goliaths

The FTC is likely to discover a large and growing global industry undergoing significant changes in how mattresses are designed, marketed, and sold in reaction to changing consumer preferences.

Several online mattress-in-a-box companies have disrupted the industry. Today, nearly half of all consumers purchases are online. They will also find fairly low barriers to entry into both brick-and-mortar and online retailing and mattress manufacturing. Their review of the Tempur Sealy/Mattress Firm transaction will also encounter two players in the market with a long history of cooperation.

With 20 manufacturers significant enough to interview, the Commission would appear to be faced with a fairly competitive market – one in which little or no foreclosure of rivals to the ability to obtain inputs or the availability of channels of distribution to reach consumers will result from the proposed transaction. Additional competitive pressure comes from Amazon, which began selling its own mattresses in 2018 as part of the Amazon Essentials line, and Walmart, which introduced its own mattress-in-box brand, Allswell, available online and in stores.

On balance, the acquisition of Mattress Firm by Tempur Sealy would not appear to raise significant antitrust issues. A challenge to this transaction by the FTC may be a vertical bridge too far. That is no doubt the assessment reached by Scott Thompson, chairman and CEO of Tempur Sealy, who expressed confidence in clearing the FTC’s antitrust review, “either in the traditional sense or through litigation.”

© MoginRubin LLP

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Structuring the Acquisition of an S Corporation

Introduction

S corporations, or S-corps, are one of the most popular entity choices for businesses. In contemplating the sale of an S-corp, it is important to plan how the transaction is structured from a tax perspective (ideally before an LOI is signed), both to maximize the gain on the sale and avoid pitfalls that can result in liabilities for the selling shareholders.

For corporate purposes, businesses are generally formed as limited liability companies, partnerships, or corporations. For tax purposes, however, entities are taxed as corporations, partnerships, or disregarded entities.[1] Corporations[2] are taxed as either a C corporation or an S corporation. C corporations are taxed at the corporate level and again at the shareholder level.[3] S corporations are corporations that, for federal tax purposes, elect to pass corporate income, losses, deductions, and credits through to their shareholders and are only taxed at the shareholder level.[4]

To qualify as an S corporation, the corporation must meet the requirements of Section 1361,[5] which provides that the corporation not have more than 100 shareholders, not have non-individual shareholders (with the exception of certain types of trusts, estates, and tax-exempt organizations), not have a nonresident alien as a shareholder, not have more than one class of stock, and not be an ineligible corporation (as defined in the Code).[6]

When sellers begin to explore the sale of their business, tax considerations are important to discuss at the outset so that the seller and buyer are on the same page – no one wants to attempt to renegotiate the terms of a deal in the middle of a transaction. For tax purposes, acquisitions of companies are categorized as either an asset purchase or stock purchase. In general, owners prefer to sell their stock (as opposed to the company’s assets) for a few reasons. First, a stock sale results in capital gain to the shareholders because their stock is a capital asset.[7] In an asset sale, however, noncorporate sellers (including S-corp shareholders) recognize ordinary income or capital gain, depending on the type of asset sold. Second, unlike in an asset sale, a stock sale may not require the seller to transfer company assets and licenses or obtain third party consents.

On the other hand, buyers usually want to engage in an asset sale to obtain a step-up in basis of the purchased assets. In a stock acquisition, the buyer gets a carryover basis in the acquired corporation’s assets, without any basis step-up. In an asset purchase, however, the buyer takes a cost basis in the assets, including in the target corporation’s goodwill (which otherwise will generally have a zero basis), and allows the buyer to take higher depreciation deductions to reduce the buyer’s annual tax liability.[8] Unless otherwise agreed, the buyer also does not assume corporate liabilities in an asset sale.

Sellers who agree to engage in an asset sale should negotiate with the buyer to be compensated for the additional tax that the seller may incur for engaging in an asset sale.

There are two additional ways for a buyer to obtain a basis step-up in the seller’s assets. The first is a 338(h)(10) election under Section 338 and the second is an F reorganization pursuant to Section 368(a)(1)(F) and consistent with Revenue Ruling 2008-18.[9]

Making the 338(h)(10) Election

A buyer and seller will sometimes make a 338(h)(10) election, which treats an acquisition of a corporation’s stock as a sale of assets for federal income tax purposes, but a sale of stock for legal purposes.[10] The sale is treated as if buyer and seller engaged in a regular asset sale for income tax purposes (so the buyer obtains a step-up in the tax basis of the assets), yet the seller does not need to re-title each asset.[11] Seller does not have capital gain on the sale of stock. Instead the parties must allocate the sales price among the assets based on each asset’s fair market value.[12] The price paid in excess of the fair market value of the tangible assets of the business is allocated to business intangibles and then to goodwill.[13]

The 338(h)(10) election is only available if a “qualified stock purchase” is made.[14] A “qualified stock purchase” is defined as any transaction (or series of transactions) in which a corporation purchases at least 80% of the stock (both voting and value) from a member of a consolidated group(as defined in 1.1502-1) or from shareholders of a S corporation during a 12 month period.[15] If during diligence it is revealed that the target corporation in fact failed to qualify as an S corporation, the 338 election will be invalid.[16] If the Section 338(h)(10) election is invalid, the transaction will be treated as a straight stock sale and buyer will not receive a basis step-up in the target’s assets.

A section 338(h)(10) election is made jointly by the purchaser and seller on Form 8023.[17] S corporation shareholders who do not sell their stock must also consent to the election. The election must be made not later than the 15th day of the 9th month beginning after the month in which the acquisition date occurs.[18]

If the target failed to qualify as an S corporation (thereby becoming a C corporation), an election can be made to treat the sale of the corporation’s stock as an asset sale under Section 336(e). The election can be made if target is owned by a parent corporation that sells at least 80% of target’s stock.[19] A 336(e) election closely resembles a 338(h)(10) election, but the purchaser does not have to be a corporation.[20] Note that a transaction that qualifies under both 336(e) and 338(h)(10) will be treated as 338(h)(10) transaction.[21]

Consequences of a 338(h)(10) Election

Under the Regulations, the target corporation is treated as making a deemed sale of its assets and liquidating following the deemed asset sale.[22] The transaction is treated as a taxable acquisition of 100% of the target’s assets for income tax purposes.[23] This means that the stock cannot be acquired in a tax free transaction or reorganization (such as a transfer to a controlled corporation, merger or spinoff) or a transaction where the seller does not recognize the entire amount of gain or loss realized on the transaction.[24]

Issues with a 338(h)(10) Election

While the 338 election can be a useful way for a buyer to achieve a basis step-up without burdening the seller to retitle and transfer assets, the following disadvantages of the election should be considered:

  1. The rules under Section 338 require all S corporation shareholders (whether or not they sell their stock) to pay tax on all of the target’s assets, even if selling less than 100% of the target.[25] This effectively eliminates any structuring of a deal on a tax-deferred basis (i.e. where seller only pays tax on the consideration attributable to non-rollover equity). Sellers need to be aware that they will pay tax on all of the target company’s assets regardless of the percentage of assets sold.
  2. The election presents an issue for rollover transactions where the seller rolls over more than 20% of its equity on a pre-tax basis in a Section 721 or Section 351 transaction (in which seller receives equity in buyer, buyer’s parent, a holding company that holds target, or another form of equity). Rolling over more than 20% of equity will invalidate the 338(h)(10) election because it will not meet the “purchase” requirement under Section 338.[26]
  3. If the target company’s S corporation election turns out to be invalid (which happens frequently due to the ease with which S corporation status can be voided), the 338(h)(10) election will be invalid, thereby eliminating any advantage provided by the election.[27] Note that the seller will also be in breach of its representations and warranties under the purchase agreement.

F-Reorganization

An alternative to a 338(h)(10) election is an F reorganization, or F reorg., which allows sellers to avoid the potential issues that come with a 338 election. In an F reorg., the seller recognizes gain only with respect to the assets that it is deemed to have sold, allows the seller to roll over equity on a pre-tax basis, and avoids some of the risk that the target may have not properly qualified as an S-corp (thereby invalidating a Section 338(h)(10) election).

Engaging in an F-Reorganization

The first step in an F reorg. is to engage in a tax free reorganization of the S-corp.[28] Shareholders of the target S-corp (“T”) form a new corporation (“Holdco”) and transfer their shares in T to Holdco in exchange for Holdco shares. As a result of the transaction, T shareholders own all shares of Holdco, which in turn owns all shares of T, making T a fully owned subsidiary of Holdco. Holdco then elects to treat T as a Qualified Subchapter S Subsidiary (“QSub”) by making the election on form 8869. For federal tax purposes, T, as a QSub, becomes a disregarded entity and all assets and liabilities of T are treated as part of Holdco.[29] Note that the QSub election made by T also suffices as the S-corp election for Holdco.[30] After T becomes a QSub of Holdco, T converts into a limited liability company (“LLC”) under state law in a nontaxable transaction by converting from one disregarded entity to another.[31] Holdco will need to obtain its own EIN, but T retains its old EIN after the conversion.[32] Once the conversion to an LLC is complete, the shareholders of Holdco can sell some or all of the LLC interests of T; the sale is treated as an asset sale for tax purposes, thereby resulting in a step up in basis for the purchaser.[33] The seller recognizes gain from the deemed sale of each asset of T. If less than 100% of the LLC interests are sold to the buyer, the transaction is treated as the purchase of a proportionate interest in each of the LLC assets, followed by a contribution of the respective interests to a partnership in exchange for ownership interests in the partnership, resulting in a stepped up basis in the assets for buyer.[34] In this scenario, T is no longer a QSub and is converted to a partnership for tax purposes.[35]

Note that a straight conversion of the existing S corporation target from an S-corp to an LLC should not be done because it is treated as a taxable liquidation of the S corporation (i.e. a deemed sale of its assets) resulting in a fully taxable event to the shareholders.[36]

Alternatively, the S-corp could form a new LLC, contribute all its business assets and liabilities to the new LLC in exchange for the LLC interests, and sell the LLC interests to the buyer. However, the transfer of assets might require third party consents; the F reorg. achieves the same result without any potential assignment issues, and even preserves the historical EIN of the S-corp.

Advantages of an F-Reorganization

The F-reorganization is an effective way to avoid the issues that arise with a 338(h)(10) election:

  1. If the acquisition is for less than 100% of the target, the S-corp shareholders will only recognize gain on the portion of the LLC sold by the S-corp parent. Any portion of the LLC interests rolled over will be tax-deferred. Rollover transactions are perfectly suitable in a F reorg. and do not present the issues that come with a 338(h)(10) election.
  2. The converted LLC retains its old EIN number and is essentially the same entity for legal purposes. This can be useful for a target in a regulated industry (such as healthcare, food services, manufacturing, etc.) by possibly avoiding the need to reapply for new permits and licenses.
  3. An F reorg. can be useful for planning purposes under Section 1202 (Qualified Small Business Stock, or QSBS), which allows shareholders of a C corporation to exclude from their taxable income the greater of ten million dollars or ten times the adjusted basis of their stock upon a sale.[37] One requirement is that the stock must be stock of a C corporation, not an S corporation.[38] S corporation shareholders who want to qualify under 1202 can perform an F reorg. and contribute the LLC interests of their operating company to a newly formed C corporation in a tax free exchange under 351. The S corporation (which owns the C corporation which owns the LLC) is now an eligible shareholder of QSBS and will qualify for favorable treatment under Section 1202.[39]

Footnotes

[1] Reg. §301.7701-2. Entities may also be taxed as cooperatives or as tax-exempt organizations if the statutory requirements are met.

[2] For purposes of this article, a corporation includes a limited liability company (LLC) that has elected to be taxed as a corporation.

[3] IRC §11(a).

[4] IRC §1363. For state tax purposes, treatment of S corporation status varies – certain states either conform with the federal treatment or conform with certain limitations and adjustments, while others do not recognize the S election at all and tax S corporations as regular corporations. In particular, California imposes an entity level tax of the greater of $800 or 1.5% of net income.

[5] Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.

[6] See IRC §1361 (for example, an insurance company or certain financial institutions). In addition, Form 2553 must be filed to make the S corporation election.

[7] See IRC §1221(a).

[8] See IRC §1012(a) and §167.

[9] A 338(g) election also obtains a basis step-up, but results in two layers of tax and is not generally used for domestic transactions.

[10] IRC 338(a).

[11] Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1(d)(9).

[12] In accordance with the allocation provisions set forth in IRC 1060 and Reg. 1.338-6 and 1.338-7.

[13] Reg. 1.338-6(b)(vi) and (vii).

[14] IRC 338(a).

[15] IRC 338(d)(3) and Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1(c). For the purposes of this article, we assume that target is a standalone S-corp.

[16] Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1(c)(5). However, the transaction may still qualify under Section 336(e). See below.

[17] Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1(c)(3). Form 8883 also needs to be filed. If an F reorg is done, form 8594 will need to be filed.

[18] Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1(c)(3).

[19] Reg. 1.336-2(a). The election is made unilaterally by seller and target. See Reg. 1.336-2(h).

[20] Reg. 1.336-1(b)(2). See Reg. 1.336-1 – Reg. 1.336-5 for the mechanics of making the 336(e) election and what qualifies as a “qualified disposition” under 336.

[21] Reg. 1.336-1(b)(6)(ii)(A).

[22] See Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1 for the tax aspects of the deemed asset sale and liquidation.

[23] A deemed asset sale under Section 338 does not give rise to California sales tax. Cal. Code of Regs. 1595(a)(6).

[24] IRC 338(h)(3). See below for rollover transactions.

[25] Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1(d)(5).

[26] IRC 338(h)(3)(A)(ii). Beware of situations where the acquiror appears to “purchase” at least 80% of target’s stock (and target rolls over 20% or less of its stock in a 351 transaction), but the acquiror in fact does (or might be deemed to) “purchase” less than 80% of target’s stock, thereby invalidating a 338, 338(h)(10), or 336(e) election. This most commonly occurs where purchaser is a newly formed corporation and target rolls over 20% (or less) of its shares. See Ginsburg, Levin & Rocap, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Buyouts, § 4.06.1.2.2 (relating to redemption of stock held by target’s shareholders and recharacterizing a 351 transaction and cash sale as a single 351 exchange with boot).

[27] See footnote 16.

[28] In accordance with Rev. Rul. 2008-18.

[29] IRC 1361(b)(3).

[30] Rev. Rul. 2008-18. Obviously, Holdco must meet all the requirements of an S-corp. In many cases, the parties will file Form 2553 to treat Holdco as an S corporation as a “belt and suspenders” step.

[31] Upon conversion, T is no longer treated as a QSub per 1361(b)(3). The conversion has no tax consequences; see Reg. 1.1361-5(b)(3), example 2, where the merger of two disregarded entities owned by the same entity is a disregarded transaction for tax purposes because the assets continue to be held by the same entity. The same should apply when one disregarded entity converts to another. The QSub can also merge with a newly formed LLC subsidiary of Holdco to achieve the same result.

[32] Rev. Rul. 2008-18.

[33] Rev. Rul. 99-5; Reg. 1.1361-5(b)(3), example 2.

[34] Rev. Rul. 99-5; see also Rev. Rul. 99-6.

[35] Id. Although not required, a Section 754 election is often required by the Buyer.

[36] IRC 336(a).

[37] IRC 1202(b). See Section 1202 for the requirements to qualify for QSBS.

[38] IRC 1202(c).

[39] The S corporation shares do not qualify as QSBS. The new shares of the C corporation issued after the reorganization qualify as QSBS to begin the 5 year holding period.

© Copyright 2023 Stubbs Alderton & Markiles, LLP

Could the Crypto Downturn Lead to a Spike in M&A?

In 2021, we saw a cryptocurrency boom with record highs and a flurry of activity. However, this year, the cryptocurrency downturn has been significant.  We have seen drops in various cryptocurrencies ranging from 20 to 70 percent, with an estimated $2 trillion in losses in the past few months.

Industry watchers had already predicted a spike in crypto M&A from the beginning of 2022, and in a recent interview with Barron’s, John Todaro, a senior crypto and blockchain researcher at Needham & Company, said he believes this downturn could lead to a wave of mergers and acquisitions in the crypto space for the second half of this year and even into 2023.

Valuations have dropped across the board this year as the market has faced incredible volatility, and Todaro told Barron’s, “The valuations for public crypto companies have fallen by about 70% this year.”  These lower valuations could make these companies increasingly attractive targets for acquisition, and this activity has already started to pick up.

According recent coverage from CNBC, some larger crypto companies are already looking for acquisition targets in order to drive industry growth and to help them acquire more users. Todaro feels most of the M&A activity we will see will be this kind of crypto to crypto acquisition as opposed to traditional buyers, although there is still opportunity for non-crypto companies to capitalize on these lower valuations and some are already doing so.

With more government regulation coming for the crypto sector this year, it could also impact the activity level as well.  Achieving some legal and regulatory clarity could have implications for this uptick in M&A for crypto companies. Our analysis of the SEC’s recent proposed regulations, other government activity in this area, and their potential implications can be found here.

We could of course see a growing number of acquisitions across industries as valuations remain lower than a year ago, but as the crypto sector continues to see this kind of a downturn, the level of activity in this area could be much greater than it has previously seen.  With that said, both the target company and the acquirer should be looking at any transactions with the same level of due diligence instead of rushing into any deal fueled by panic or haste.

© 2022 Foley & Lardner LLP

Spurned by HP Board of Directors, Xerox Gets Hostile, and is Spurned Again

Case raises a unique antitrust question.

Copy equipment giant HP Inc. turned down the much smaller Xerox Holdings Corp.’s acquisition overtures twice in one week as the exchange of statements between corporate leadership grows increasingly hostile. From an anticompetition perspective, the case raises the interesting question of how the “failing firm” defense could come into play.

A deal would bring together the world’s second largest copier company, HP, a company whose leadership position was once so strong that its very brand name, derived from the word “xerographic” in 1938, became a verb used more often than the word “copy” itself. Xerox is also credited with innovations that brought us tools like the mouse and ethernet networks.

But Xerox, which has long since fallen from the top of the copier industry, was met with a flat-out rejection of its offer to get its mojo back by acquiring HP. Xerox offered HP $17.00 in cash and 0.137 Xerox shares for each HP share or $22 per share, or $27 billion overall. Skeptics wondered whether Xerox could execute such a deal, given it is “only” a $9.2 billion business, a third the size of HP. The skeptics were right. On Nov. 17 the HP Board of Directors informed Xerox that its offer was not in the best interests of shareholders as it “significantly undervalues” the HP business.

In its letter to Xerox Vice Chairman and CEO John Visentin, HP wrote that its board was concerned about the “potential impact of outsized debt levels on the combined company’s stock.” While saying it remained “ready to engage” with Xerox to better understand its business and its thinking around a merger, the HP board rejected the bid unanimously.

“We recognize the potential benefits of consolidation, and we are open to exploring whether there is value to be created for HP shareholders through a potential combination with Xerox. However,” the HP letter to Visentin continued, “… we have fundamental questions that need to be addressed in our diligence of Xerox. We note the decline of Xerox’s revenue from $10.2 billion to $9.2 billion (on a trailing 12-month basis) since June 2018, which raises significant questions for us regarding the trajectory of your business and future prospects. In addition, we believe it is critical to engage in a rigorous analysis of the achievable synergies from a potential combination. With substantive engagement from Xerox management and access to diligence information on Xerox, we believe that we can quickly evaluate the merits of a potential transaction.”

Xerox had said it could generate $2.3 billion by selling its 25% share in the joint venture, Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd., to FUJIFILM Holdings Corp. In a Nov. 8, 2019, statement, Xerox also said it was selling to a Fuji Xerox affiliate Xerox’s 51% stake in Xerox International Partners, a joint original-equipment-manufacturer venture between Xerox and Fuji Xerox. The companies also agreed to end the $1 billion lawsuit FUJIFILM filed against Xerox after last year’s terminated merger. “Total after-tax proceeds to Xerox from the transactions, which included accrued but unpaid dividends through closing, are approximately $2.3 billion. Xerox expects to use the proceeds opportunistically to pursue accretive M&A in core and adjacent industries, return capital to shareholders and pay down its $554 million December 2019 debt maturity,” according to Xerox.

Xerox did not take HP’s rejection well.

“We were very surprised that HP’s Board of Directors summarily rejected our compelling proposal ….” Xerox CEO Visentin responded, “claiming our offer ‘significantly undervalues’ HP. Frankly, we are confused by this reasoning in that your own financial advisor, Goldman Sachs & Co., set a $14 price target with a ‘sell’ rating for HP’s stock after you announced your restructuring plan on October 3, 2019. Our offer represents a 57% premium to Goldman’s price target and a 29% premium to HP’s 30-day volume weighted average trading price of $17.” Visentin added that the offer was not, as HP said, “highly conditional” or “uncertain.” “There will be NO financing condition to the completion of our acquisition of HP,” the Xerox CEO said.

Xerox gave HP until today (Monday, Nov. 25) to accept the offer, otherwise it would take the case directly to HP’s shareholders. “The overwhelming support our offer will receive from HP shareholders should resolve any further doubts you have regarding the wisdom of swiftly moving forward to complete the transaction,” Visentin said.

But HP didn’t need the whole weekend. Yesterday, on Sunday, Nov. 24, it rejected Xerox again via a letter signed by HP Chairman and CEO Enrique Lores and HP Board Chair Chip Bergh. They repeated that Xerox is undervaluing the company, adding that Xerox did not address HP’s concerns about Xerox’s ability to raise the cash or handle such a substantial debt burden. Lores and Bergh didn’t seem to appreciate Visentin’s attitude, either.

“It is clear in your aggressive words and actions that Xerox is intent on forcing a potential combination on opportunistic terms and without providing adequate information,” the HP leaders wrote. “When we were in private discussions with you in August and September, we repeatedly raised our questions; you failed to address them and instead walked away, choosing to pursue a hostile approach rather than continue down a more productive path. But these fundamental issues have not gone away, and your now-public urgency to accelerate toward a deal, still without addressing these questions, only heightens our concern about your business and prospects. Accordingly, we must have due diligence to determine whether a Xerox combination has any merit.”

And yet, things had seemed to be going so well. In June, Xerox and HP announced they were expanding their relationship. Xerox was to begin sourcing certain products from HP, many of which used Xerox software, and supplying toner for HP for these and other products. These printers use laser printing technology HP acquired from Samsung in 2017. Xerox and HP also agreed to partner in the Device as a Service (DaaS) market. Xerox said it would sell HP PCs and peripherals to its commercial customers under a DaaS model, and HP would make Xerox cloud-based content management available to its commercial PC customers in the United States.

As the HP leaders said, the relationship started to sour at least as early as August.

HP questions Xerox’s resources and innovation.

HP offered additional specifics as to why it didn’t find the deal attractive:

  • Xerox has missed consensus revenue estimates in four of the last five quarters.
  • Xerox’s revenue has fallen from $10.2 billion to $9.2 billion (on a trailing 12-month basis) since June 2018, and this is expected to continue. Xerox management projects revenue declines of 6% in fiscal 2019.
  • Given how much of the Xerox business is based on contractual revenue, HP is concerned about the decline in customer Total Contract Value (TCV) in excess of revenue declines, which suggests Xerox’s revenues may decline even faster in future years. HP noted that the TCV of enterprise signings (including renewals) in 2018 was down 13.9% in constant currency and Xerox’s churn for 2018 was 18%, both data points which Xerox has stopped providing publicly since the end of 2018.
  • After a review of synergies based on public information and the “limited information” Xerox provided, HP said it does not agree with the value of potential synergies. “[I]t appears that your assumptions include significant savings that are already included in each company’s independently announced cost reduction plans,” HP wrote.
  • When Xerox exited the Fujifilm joint venture, Xerox essentially “mortgaged its future for a short-term cash infusion.” HP feels this has “left a sizeable strategic hole” in the Xerox portfolio.
  • HP also took a shot that has to sting the once-heralded leader of innovation. “[W]e have concerns as to the state of Xerox’s technology resources, research and development pipeline, future product programs, and supply continuity and capability.
  • HP said Xerox has not accessed the great potential of the Asia Pacific market.

The ‘failing firm’ defense

What’s intriguing from an antitrust perspective is how the parties might use the “failing firm” defense in a hostile takeover scenario. The failing firm defense argues that a merger that substantially lessens competition is less harmful to competition than one party’s failure and exit from the market. The defense requires a showing that the acquired company cannot meet its financial obligations, would not be able to successfully reorganize in bankruptcy, has been unsuccessful efforts to elicit other reasonable offers, and is succumbing to the only available purchaser.

We would expect to see that defense raised here given the high post-merger market share and years-long decline of both parties. But how will Xerox make the required showing without the cooperation of HP management? And, in this case the acquirer is arguably the greater “failure” risk of the two firms, making this use of a “failing firm” case a rarity, if not a first.

Copier industry landscape.

Xerox’s global annual revenue was at $20.64 billion in 2011, $19.54 billion in 2014, and $9.83 billion in 2018. It’s now a $9.2 billion company, with revenues generated from a combination of services and equipment. In 2016, Xerox services accounted for roughly a third of the company’s global revenue. From 2012 to 2014 services generated more revenue than technology. That flipped in 2015 when service revenue dropped to a third of prior years.

HP’s net revenue from its printing business was at a high of $29.6 billion in 2008. It fell to $18.26 in 2016 and bounced up to $20.8 billion in 2018.

Worldwide, Canon is the market leader, with 24% of the market. HP is close behind with more than 21% of the market. Xerox has been in the low single digits for the past two years. After Canon and HP, market leaders are Brother (11%), Epson (10%), Kyocera (7%), NEC (5.6%), Ricoh (2.5%). Some 18.5% of the market is attributed to “other” companies.

Statistics provided by Statista based on data from IT Candor. Additional statistics from HP and Xerox.


© MoginRubin LLP

ARTICLE BY Dan Mogin and Jennifer M. Oliver of MoginRubin, edited by Tom Hagy.

Five Tips to Mitigate Risk in Cryptocurrency Mergers and Acquisitions

Congratulations!

Your client just closed on the purchase of a cutting-edge, blockchainbased payment processing startup. Before this deal, you had heard of bitcoin and blockchain. But, you had never seen a company that actually accepted payment in bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. You were a little confused by the whole idea. However, your client liked the prospect of purchasing a company that had dealt in digital assets, so you didn’t think much about it.

Arriving to the office the day after the closing, you open up your computer to learn news of a hack at one of the big bitcoin exchanges. The article explains that hackers had accessed the hot wallets on the exchange and made off with over $150 million in digital assets. News of the hack sent the price of bitcoin tumbling 15% in the four hours following the incident. Other digital assets had plunged even further. The headline jumped out at you because the company that your client just purchased used custodial wallets on the exchange to store a lot of its digital assets.

Five minutes after you finish reading the article, you get a call from your client. Sure enough, a good chunk of the digital assets that your client had just purchased were lost in the hack. To make matters worse, the new company had just lost 5 percent of its book value because of the crashing cryptocurrency market.

Volatility of Digital Assets Means Risk

The world of cryptocurrencies has matured somewhat. But, scenarios like the previous hypothetical above remain a real possibility. Indeed, 15 percent price swings in a matter of hours are still common for cryptocurrencies, also known as digital assets, especially for less established currencies. In addition to big price swings, the digital asset industry continues to face regulatory uncertainty, especially in the United States with the SEC, CFTC, FINRA and other regulators undecided about how exactly to regulate digital assets. Despite the volatility and regulatory ambiguity, for risk hungry participants, the potential for large gains has helped drive an increase in merger activity in the digital asset world during the past two years.

Acquiring or selling a company that deals heavily in digital assets presents a litigation risk. Many of the factors that increase the risk of litigation in mergers or acquisitions in the digital asset industry are outside the control of the parties to a transaction. Deal lawyers try to control for these externalities but, in the new and vibrant realm of companies who deal in cryptocurrencies, those controls can be elusive, which in turn enhances the risk of litigation.

There are, however, ways to minimize the chance of a dispute. The following are a few practical tips for transactional lawyers and litigators to help contain the risks inherent in digital asset M&As.

    • Valuation Methodology: Transaction and litigation counsel should pay close attention to valuation methods used in a digital asset transaction. Cryptocurrencies and digital tokens are new and the methods used to value them may be untested. Different digital assets have different applications, e.g., utility tokens versus value storage tokens, and valuation theories should be tailored to the transaction and assets involved. In light of these unique issues and the attendant risks, transactional lawyers should give particular scrutiny to the valuation formulas to avoid a dispute. Litigators, too, should take note of the valuation methods used since they may be fodder for a dispute. And, of course, litigators should also be aware of the possibility for a Daubert-type challenge of any expert valuation witness that may arise in a subsequent dispute.
    • Earn-Outs/Purchase Price Adjustments: Transactional lawyers should pay special attention to earn-out or purchase price adjustment provisions in a digital asset M&A deal. Valuating digital assets is difficult; thus, inclusion of an earn-out or purchase price adjustment clause might help the parties reach a deal more easily. Given the volatility of digital assets, there is a higher than typical likelihood that the value of the earn-out or purchase price adjustment will also fluctuate substantially. Litigators, in turn, should also be especially cognizant of earn-out and purchase price adjustment provisions. Earn-out provisions can be especially ripe for dispute since the earn-out periods often extend for years after closing. While long earn-out periods might not present problems in more traditional fields, the fast pace of change and high levels of volatility in the digital asset industry mean that long earn-out periods are particularly susceptible to disagreement.
    • Reverse Break Up Fees: Transactional lawyers should consider including a reverse breakup fee or a reverse termination fee. These are fees paid by the buyer if the buyer breaches the governing agreements or is unable to close the transaction. For example, imagine you represent the seller in a deal set to close in three days when news breaks about a lawsuit filed by a state attorney general against a new cryptocurrency company. The enforcement action sends the price of all digital assets plummeting by 20 percent in a matter of hours. Your client still meets all of the closing conditions, but the client’s value, which consists largely of digital assets, has just taken a huge hit and the buyer’s counsel is telling you that her client is going to walk away from the deal unless your client drops the price. A reverse breakup fee will help to lessen the buyer’s willingness to run from the transaction and may also help your client recoup costs incurred in the event the buyer does walk away. Litigators representing a buyer or seller should also pay particular attention to whether the conditions in a breakup fee or reverse breakup fee clause have been satisfied.
  • Heightened Importance of Stock Terms: Transactional lawyers should give extra consideration to the applicable law and venue selection provisions in the deal documents. Some states, e.g., Wyoming, among others, have adopted more crypto-friendly regulatory regimes than other states. Consequently, transaction lawyers should consider the pros and cons of each viable state law. And, corporate attorneys should consider obtaining review of deal documents by experienced cryptocurrency litigators who can help position the transaction as best as possible in case of future litigation.
  • Last, transaction lawyers should consider the appropriateness of a mandatory arbitration provision. Arbitration has its drawbacks, e.g., the cost of the arbitrator, absence of clear rules for discovery, restricted appeal rights, etc., but the benefits of arbitration may be particularly helpful when dealing with a digital asset M&A dispute. For example, the parties can make their proceedings confidential, which can avoid the disclosure of trade secrets or other proprietary information in public court proceedings. Further, in the highly technical field of cryptocurrencies, the parties have greater latitude to ensure that the proceeding is adjudicated by an arbitrator with pertinent knowledge of and/or experience in digital assets or blockchain technology.

Of course, the foregoing is not an exhaustive list of the ways to reduce risk in digital asset M&A deals. Other terms and conditions in the transaction contracts for a digital asset M&A deal should not escape scrutiny. Representations and warranties, contract exhibits and schedules should be tailored to the deal and the nature of digital assets in play. Due diligence is also an especially important component of risk mitigation since the nature of digital assets makes for a more difficult diligence process than a traditional transaction. Regardless of which contractual provisions are used, litigators and transactional lawyers should both be aware of and understand the heightened risk of a dispute in the volatile world of cryptocurrencies and digital assets.


© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California

For more on cryptocurrency, see the Financial Institutions & Banking law page on the National Law Review.

2016 Year In Review: Corporate Governance Litigation and Regulation

2016 year in review2016 saw many notable developments in corporate governance litigation and related regulatory developments.  In this article, we discuss significant judicial and regulatory developments in the following areas:

  • Mergers and Acquisitions (“M&A”): 2016 was a particularly significant year in M&A litigation.  In Delaware, courts issued important decisions that impose enhanced scrutiny on disclosure-only M&A settlements; confirm the application of the business judgment rule to mergers approved by a fully informed, disinterested, non-coerced shareholder vote; inform the proper composition of special litigation committees; define financial advisors’ liability for breaches of fiduciary duty by their clients; and offer additional guidance for calculating fair value in appraisal proceedings.

  • Controlling Shareholders: Delaware courts issued important decisions clarifying when a person with less than majority stock ownership qualifies as a controller, when a shareholder may bring a quasi-appraisal action in a controlling shareholder going-private merger, and when the business judgment rule applies to controlling shareholder transactions. In New York, the Court of Appeals followed Delaware’s guidance as to when the business judgment rule applies to a controlling shareholder squeeze-out merger.

  • Indemnification and Jurisdiction: Delaware courts issued decisions clarifying which employees qualify as officers for the purpose of indemnification and articulating an updated standard for exercising jurisdiction in Delaware over actions based on conduct undertaken by foreign corporations outside of the state.

  • Shareholder Activism and Proxy Access: Shareholder activists remained busy in 2016, including mounting successful campaigns to replace CEOs and board members at Chipotle and Hertz. Additionally, the SEC’s new interpretation of Rule 14a-8 has limited the ability of management to exclude a shareholder proposal from a proxy statement on the grounds that it conflicts with a management proposal.  Also, some companies have adopted “proxy rights” bylaws, which codify a shareholder’s right to directly nominate board members.

I.  M&A

A.Enhanced Scrutiny of Disclosure-Only Settlements

In January 2016, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued an important decision, In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation,1 making clear the court’s renewed scrutiny of—and skepticism towards—so-called disclosure-only settlements of shareholder class actions. In Trulia, shareholders sought to block the merger of real estate websites Zillow and Trulia.  After litigation was commenced, the parties agreed to a settlement in which Trulia would make additional disclosures in proxy materials seeking shareholder approval of the transaction in exchange for a broad release of present and future claims by the class and fees for plaintiffs’ counsel.

Chancellor Bouchard rejected the proposed settlement and criticized disclosure-only settlements as generally unfair to shareholders.  Chancellor Bouchard noted that the Court of Chancery had previously expressed concerns regarding the incentives of plaintiff counsel to settle class action claims in which broad releases were granted in exchange “for a peppercorn and a fee”—i.e., for fees and immaterial disclosures that provided little benefit to shareholders.2  According to the Court, “these settlements rarely yield genuine benefits for stockholders and threaten the loss of potentially valuable claims that have not been investigated with vigor.”3

Continue reading at the National Law Review…

What Is The FTC Looking at When It Reviews Merger Agreements?

In our last post, we spoke about a proposed merger between office supply chains Office Depot and Staples. As we noted, Office Depot shareholders recently voted to go forward with the acquisition, but the Federal Trade Agreement still has to review the agreement and make a decision, which could make or break the process.

FTC_FederalTradeCommission-SealIn reviewing any merger agreement the Federal Trade Commission—or the Department of Justice, depending on which agency reviews the agreement—an important consideration is the impact the transaction will have on the market. Speaking generally, federal law prohibits mergers that would potentially harm market competition by creating a monopoly on goods or services.

According to the FTC, competitive harm often stems not from the agreement as a whole, but from how the deal will impact certain areas of business. Problems can arise when a proposed merger has too much of a limiting effect based on the type of products or services being sold and the geographic area in which the company is doing business.

With that having been said, most mergers—95 percent, according to the FTC—present no issues in terms of market competition. Those that do present issues are often resolved by tweaking the agreement so as to address any competitive threats. In cases where the reviewing agency and the businesses cannot agree on a solution, litigation may be necessary, but it often isn’t.

Any company that plans on going forward with a merger or acquisition needs to have a clear understanding of the law and the review process. This is especially the case if issues come up regarding competitive threats.

© 2015 by McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie & Kirkland, PLLC. All rights reserved.

Mergers and Acquisitions and the Affordable Care Act

Giordano Halleran Ciesla Logo

As most employers already know, the Affordable Care Act (a/k/a ObamaCare or the ACA) now imposes health care insurance coverage requirements upon certain employers which have a certain number of full time and full time equivalent employees (“FTEs”).  Therefore, it is imperative that consideration be given to whether parties involved in any merger or other acquisition transaction are currently subject to the requirements of the ACA (and if so, whether they are in compliance with such requirements), or will otherwise be subject to the requirements of the ACA following the consummation of the transaction.

If the buyer or seller company is a “small business,” meaning the company has less than 50 FTEs, it should not be subject to the ACA.   However, a determination has to be made as to whether or not individuals who are treated as independent contractors are, for the purposes of the ACA, truly independent contractors, or rather are deemed to be employees.  While the ACA makes reference to certain federal statutes with respect to this determination, it is clear that the Obama administration has uniquely and aggressively interpreted the ACA to accomplish its objectives.  In those circumstances where the seller or buyer company is below 100 FTEs for the year 2015, the company will be exempt from the requirements of the ACA for the year 2015, but subject to the ACA thereafter.  Even in those circumstances where companies clearly are subject to the ACA, the question then becomes whether or not all of the individuals who provide services to that company are classified appropriately (employees v. independent contractors), and whether the requirements of the ACA have been complied with regarding those individuals.

A new level of complexity has been added in this area by a relatively recent interpretation of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in a franchise case dealing with the classification issue, in which the NLRB found that the various employees of the franchisees were also employees of the franchisor.  This could automatically create, for any national franchise, a situation where the local franchisee meets the large employer threshold of the ACA, and therefore would be liable to comply with the requirements of the ACA.  Obviously, the position taken by the NLRB will be contested and is a long way off from being established as binding law upon all employers.  Notably, this very issue has already been addressed in various state courts.  For instance, in contrast to the NLRB decision, the California State Supreme Court recently determined in a 4 to 3 decision that the employees of a franchisee are also not employees of the franchisor.

While the ACA references certain federal statutes for determining whether or not an individual is an employee, in the recent case of Sam Hargrove, et al. v. Sleepy’s, LLC , the New Jersey Supreme Court has advised the Third Circuit that for the purposes of the wage and hour laws, the interpretation should follow New Jersey case law, which provides a much stricter definition for independent contractors than the federal law.  Only time and litigation will tell what interpretation will be made under the ACA for the purposes of determining whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor with respect to the determination as to whether the employer is a small business subject to the ACA and whether or not an individual is entitled to health care coverage.

In summary, careful consideration must be made in any merger or acquisition transaction as to whether the seller company in an asset purchase or equity purchase is, or the combined company in any merger, consolidation or similar combination will be, subject to the onerous requirements of the ACA based on the number of FTEs of the company.   In order to make such a determination, further consideration will need to be made into applicable case law as to whether or not individuals who are designated as independent contractors of the company are truly independent contractors, or rather should be deemed to be employees of the company for purposes of the ACA.  However, because the law in this area is not entirely settled and continues to evolve, companies involved in merger or acquisition transactions and companies contemplating merger or acquisition transactions will need to stay informed on these issues.

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