Ransomware Archives - The National Law Forum

Supply Chains are the Next Subject of Cyberattacks

The cyberthreat landscape is evolving as threat actors develop new tactics to keep up with increasingly sophisticated corporate IT environments. In particular, threat actors are increasingly exploiting supply chain vulnerabilities to reach downstream targets.

The effects of supply chain cyberattacks are far-reaching, and can affect downstream organizations. The effects can also last long after the attack was first deployed. According to an Identity Theft Resource Center report, “more than 10 million people were impacted by supply chain attacks targeting 1,743 entities that had access to multiple organizations’ data” in 2022. Based upon an IBM analysis, the cost of a data breach averaged $4.45 million in 2023.

What is a supply chain cyberattack?

Supply chain cyberattacks are a type of cyberattack in which a threat actor targets a business offering third-party services to other companies. The threat actor will then leverage its access to the target to reach and cause damage to the business’s customers. Supply chain cyberattacks may be perpetrated in different ways.

Software-Enabled Attack: This occurs when a threat actor uses an existing software vulnerability to compromise the systems and data of organizations running the software containing the vulnerability. For example, Apache Log4j is an open source code used by developers in software to add a function for maintaining records of system activity. In November 2021, there were public reports of a Log4j remote execution code vulnerability that allowed threat actors to infiltrate target software running on outdated Log4j code versions. As a result, threat actors gained access to the systems, networks, and data of many organizations in the public and private sectors that used software containing the vulnerable Log4j version. Although security upgrades (i.e., patches) have since been issued to address the Log4j vulnerability, many software and apps are still running with outdated (i.e., unpatched) versions of Log4j.
Software Supply Chain Attack: This is the most common type of supply chain cyberattack, and occurs when a threat actor infiltrates and compromises software with malicious code either before the software is provided to consumers or by deploying malicious software updates masquerading as legitimate patches. All users of the compromised software are affected by this type of attack. For example, Blackbaud, Inc., a software company providing cloud hosting services to for-profit and non-profit entities across multiple industries, was ground zero for a software supply chain cyberattack after a threat actor deployed ransomware in its systems that had downstream effects on Blackbaud’s customers, including 45,000 companies. Similarly in May 2023, Progress Software’s MOVEit file-transfer tool was targeted with a ransomware attack, which allowed threat actors to steal data from customers that used the MOVEit app, including government agencies and businesses worldwide.

Legal and Regulatory Risks

Cyberattacks can often expose personal data to unauthorized access and acquisition by a threat actor. When this occurs, companies’ notification obligations under the data breach laws of jurisdictions in which affected individuals reside are triggered. In general, data breach laws require affected companies to submit notice of the incident to affected individuals and, depending on the facts of the incident and the number of such individuals, also to regulators, the media, and consumer reporting agencies. Companies may also have an obligation to notify their customers, vendors, and other business partners based on their contracts with these parties. These reporting requirements increase the likelihood of follow-up inquiries, and in some cases, investigations by regulators. Reporting a data breach also increases a company’s risk of being targeted with private lawsuits, including class actions and lawsuits initiated by business customers, in which plaintiffs may seek different types of relief including injunctive relief, monetary damages, and civil penalties.

The legal and regulatory risks in the aftermath of a cyberattack can persist long after a company has addressed the immediate issues that caused the incident initially. For example, in the aftermath of the cyberattack, Blackbaud was investigated by multiple government authorities and targeted with private lawsuits. While the private suits remain ongoing, Blackbaud settled with state regulators ($49,500,000), the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, and the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) ($3,000,000) in 2023 and 2024, almost four years after it first experienced the cyberattack. Other companies that experienced high-profile cyberattacks have also been targeted with securities class action lawsuits by shareholders, and in at least one instance, regulators have named a company’s Chief Information Security Officer in an enforcement action, underscoring the professional risks cyberattacks pose to corporate security leaders.

What Steps Can Companies Take to Mitigate Risk?

First, threat actors will continue to refine their tactics and techniques. Thus, all organizations must adapt and stay current with all regulations and legislation surrounding cybersecurity. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) urges developer education for creating secure code and verifying third-party components.

Second, stay proactive. Organizations must re-examine not only their own security practices but also those of their vendors and third-party suppliers. If third and fourth parties have access to an organization’s data, it is imperative to ensure that those parties have good data protection practices.

Third, companies should adopt guidelines for suppliers around data and cybersecurity at the outset of a relationship since it may be difficult to get suppliers to adhere to policies after the contract has been signed. For example, some entities have detailed processes requiring suppliers to inform of attacks and conduct impact assessments after the fact. In addition, some entities expect suppliers to follow specific sequences of steps after a cyberattack. At the same time, some entities may also apply the same threat intelligence that it uses for its own defense to its critical suppliers, and may require suppliers to implement proactive security controls, such as incident response plans, ahead of an attack.

Finally, all companies should strive to minimize threats to their software supply by establishing strong security strategies at the ground level.

40 Countries Including US Vow Not to Pay Ransomware

The United States joined 39 other countries this week in the International Counter Ransomware Initiative, an effort to stem the flow of ransom payments to cybercriminals. The initiative aims to eliminate criminals’ funding through better information sharing about ransom payment accounts. Member states will develop two information-sharing platforms, one created by Lithuania and another jointly by Israel and the United Arab Emirates. Members of the initiative will share a “black list” through the U.S. Department of Treasury, including information on digital wallets being used to move ransomware payments. Finally (in an interesting coming together of the last two oversized ticket items in technology), the initiative will utilize AI to analyze cryptocurrency blockchains to identify criminal transactions.

While government officials near-unanimously counsel against paying ransoms, organizations caught in a ransomware attack often pay to avoid embarrassment and to lower the cost of incident response and mitigation. However, in the macro, paying ransoms leads to ballooning ransom demands and escalating ransomware activity. This initiative may address these long-term trends.

Blair Robinson (Law Clerk – Not yet admitted to practice) authored this article.

How a Zero-Day Flaw in MOVEit Led to a Global Ransomware Attack

In an era where our lives are ever more intertwined with technology, the security of digital platforms is a matter of national concern. A recent large-scale cyberattack affecting several U.S. federal agencies and numerous other commercial organizations emphasizes the criticality of robust cybersecurity measures.

The Intrusion

On June 7, 2023, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) identified an exploit by “Threat Actor 505” (TA505), namely, a previously unidentified (zero-day) vulnerability in a data transfer software called MOVEit. MOVEit is a file transfer software used by a broad range of companies to securely transfer files between organizations. Darin Bielby, the managing director at Cypfer, explained that the number of affected companies could be in the thousands: “The Cl0p ransomware group has become adept at compromising file transfer tools. The latest being MOVEit on the heels of past incidents at GoAnywhere. Upwards of 3000 companies could be affected. Cypfer has already been engaged by many companies to assist with threat actor negotiations and recovery.”

CISA, along with the FBI, advised that “[d]ue to the speed and ease TA505 has exploited this vulnerability, and based on their past campaigns, FBI and CISA expect to see widespread exploitation of unpatched software services in both private and public networks.”

Although CISA did not comment on the perpetrator behind the attack, there are suspicions about a Russian-speaking ransomware group known as Cl0p. Much like in the SolarWinds case, they ingeniously exploited vulnerabilities in widely utilized software, managing to infiltrate an array of networks.

Wider Implications

The Department of Energy was among the many federal agencies compromised, with records from two of its entities being affected. A spokesperson for the department confirmed they “took immediate steps” to alleviate the impact and notified Congress, law enforcement, CISA, and the affected entities.

This attack has ramifications beyond federal agencies. Johns Hopkins University’s health system reported a possible breach of sensitive personal and financial information, including health billing records. Georgia’s statewide university system is investigating the scope and severity of the hack affecting them.

Internationally, the likes of BBC, British Airways, and Shell have also been victims of this hacking campaign. This highlights the global nature of cyber threats and the necessity of international collaboration in cybersecurity.

The group claimed credit for some of the hacks in a hacking campaign that began two weeks ago. Interestingly, Cl0p took an unusual step, stating that they erased the data from government entities and have “no interest in exposing such information.” Instead, their primary focus remains extorting victims for financial gains.

Still, although every file transfer service based on MOVEit could have been affected, that does not mean that every file transfer service based on MOVEit was affected. Threat actors exploiting the vulnerability would likely have had to independently target each file transfer service that employs the MOVEit platform. Thus, companies should determine whether their secure file transfer services rely on the MOVEit platform and whether any indicators exist that a threat actor exploited the vulnerability.

A Flaw Too Many

The attackers exploited a zero-day vulnerability that likely exposed the data that companies uploaded to MOVEit servers for seemingly secure transfers. This highlights how a single software vulnerability can have far-reaching consequences if manipulated by adept criminals. Progress, the U.S. firm that owns MOVEit, has urged users to update their software and issued security advice.

Notification Requirements

This exploitation likely creates notification requirements for the myriad affected companies under the various state data breach notification laws and some industry-specific regulations. Companies that own consumer data and share that data with service providers are not absolved of notification requirements merely because the breach occurred in the service provider’s environment. Organizations should engage counsel to determine whether their notification requirements are triggered.

A Call to Action

This cyberattack serves as a reminder of the sophistication and evolution of cyber threats. Organizations using the MOVEit software should analyze whether this vulnerability has affected any of their or their vendors’ operations.

With the increasing dependency on digital platforms, cybersecurity is no longer an option but a necessity in a world where the next cyberattack is not a matter of “if” but “when;” it’s time for a proactive approach to securing our digital realms. Organizations across sectors must prioritize cybersecurity. This involves staying updated with the latest security patches and ensuring adequate protective measures and response plans are in place.

For cybersecurity legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Clop Claims Zero-Day Attacks Against 130 Organizations

Russia-linked ransomware gang Clop has claimed that it has attacked over 130 organizations since late January, using a zero-day vulnerability in the GoAnywhere MFT secure file transfer tool, and was successful in stealing data from those organizations. The vulnerability is CVE-2023-0669, which allows attackers to execute remote code execution.

The manufacturer of GoAnywhere MFT notified customers of the vulnerability on February 1, 2023, and issued a patch for the vulnerability on February 7, 2023.

HC3 issued an alert on February 22, 2023, warning the health care sector about Clop targeting healthcare organizations and recommended:

Educate and train staff to reduce the risk of social engineering attacks via email and network access.
Assess enterprise risk against all potential vulnerabilities and prioritize implementing the security plan with the necessary budget, staff, and tools.
Develop a cybersecurity roadmap that everyone in the healthcare organization understands.

Security professionals are recommending that information technology professionals update machines to the latest GoAnywhere version and “stop exposing port 8000 (the internet location of the GoAnywhere MFT admin panel).”

Article By Linn F. Freedman of Robinson & Cole LLP

For more cybersecurity legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act

On September 12, 2022, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (“CISA”) released a Request for Information (“RFI”) seeking public input regarding the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (“CIRCIA”). The public comment period will close on November 14th, 2022. The RFI provides a “non-exhaustive” list of topics on which CISA seeks public input, including:

Definitions and criteria of various terms, such as “covered entity,” “covered cyber incident,” “substantial cyber incident,” “ransom payment,” “ransom attack,” “supply chain compromise” and “reasonable belief;”
Content of reports on covered cyber incidents and the submission process (e.g., how entities should submit reports, report timing requirements, and which federal entities should receive reports;
Any conflict with existing or proposed federal or state cyber incident reporting requirements;
The expected time and costs associated with reporting requirements; and
Common best practices governing the sharing of information related to security vulnerabilities in the U.S. and internationally.

In March 2022, President Biden signed CIRCIA into law. CIRCIA creates legal protections and provides guidance to companies that operate in critical infrastructure sectors, including a requirement to report cyber incidents within 72 hours, and report ransom payments within 24 hours. The CISA website features more information about the law, the RFI, and a list of public listening sessions with CISA to provide input.

Article By Privacy and Cybersecurity Practice Group at Hunton Andrews Kurth

For more privacy and cybersecurity legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Acronis Reports Ransomware Damages Will Exceed $30B by 2023

In its Mid-Year Cyberthreat Report published on August 24, 2022, cybersecurity firm Acronis reports that ransomware continues to plague businesses and governmental agencies, primarily through phishing campaigns.

According to the report over 600 malicious email campaigns were launched in the first half of 2022, with the goal of stealing credentials to launch ransomware attacks. Other attack vectors included vulnerabilities to cloud-based networks, targeting unpatched or software vulnerabilities, and cryptocurrency and decentralized finance systems.

According to Acronis, “ransomware is worsening, even more so than we predicted.” It estimates that global damages related to ransomware attacks will top $30 billion by 2023.

Article By Linn F. Freedman of Robinson & Cole LLP

For more cybersecurity legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Federal Bill Would Broaden FTC’s Role in Cybersecurity and Data Breach Disclosures

Last week, the House Energy and Commerce Committee advanced H.R. 4551, the “Reporting Attacks from Nations Selected for Oversight and Monitoring Web Attacks and Ransomware from Enemies Act” (“RANSOMWARE Act”). H.R. 4551 was introduced by Consumer Protection and Commerce Ranking Member Gus Bilirakis (R-FL).

If it becomes law, H.R. 4551 would amend Section 14 of the U.S. SAFE WEB Act of 2006 to require not later than one year after its enactment, and every two years thereafter, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to transmit to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report (the “FTC Report”). The FTC Report would be focused on cross-border complaints received that involve ransomware or other cyber-related attacks committed by (i) Russia, China, North Korea, or Iran; or (ii) individuals or companies that are located in or have ties (direct or indirect) to those countries (collectively, the “Specified Entities”).

Among other matters, the FTC Report would include:

The number and details of cross-border complaints received by the FTC (including which such complaints were acted upon and which such complaints were not acted upon) that involve ransomware or other cyber-related attacks that were committed by the Specified Entities;
A description of trends in the number of cross-border complaints received by the FTC that relate to incidents that were committed by the Specified Entities;
Identification and details of foreign agencies, including foreign law enforcement agencies, located in Russia, China, North Korea, or Iran with which the FTC has cooperated and the results of such cooperation, including any foreign agency enforcement action or lack thereof;
A description of FTC litigation, in relation to cross-border complaints, brought in foreign courts and the results of such litigation;
Any recommendations for legislation that may advance the security of the United States and United States companies against ransomware and other cyber-related attacks; and
Any recommendations for United States citizens and United States businesses to implement best practices on mitigating ransomware and other cyber-related attacks

Cybersecurity is an area of recent federal government focus, with other measures recently taken by President Biden, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Food and Drug Administration, and other stakeholders.

Additionally, H.R. 4551 is also consistent with the FTC’s focus on data privacy and cybersecurity. The FTC has increasingly taken enforcement action against entities that failed to timely notify consumers and other relevant parties after data breaches and warned that it would continue to apply heightened scrutiny to unfair data security practices.

In May 2022, in a blog post titled “Security Beyond Prevention: The Importance of Effective Breach Disclosures,” the FTC’s Division of Privacy and Identity Protection had cautioned that “[t]he FTC has long stressed the importance of good incident response and breach disclosure as part of a reasonable information security program, and that, “[i]n some instances, the FTC Act creates a de facto breach disclosure requirement because the failure to disclose will, for example, increase the likelihood that affected parties will suffer harm.”

As readers of CPW know, state breach notification laws and sector-specific federal breach notification laws may require disclosure of some breaches. However, as of May 2022 it is now expressly the position of the FTC that “[r]egardless of whether a breach notification law applies, a breached entity that fails to disclose information to help parties mitigate reasonably foreseeable harm may violate Section 5 of the FTC Act.” This is a significant development, as notwithstanding the absence of a uniform federal data breach statute, the FTC is anticipated to continue exercise its enforcement discretion under Section 5 concerning unfair and deceptive practices in the cybersecurity context.

Article By Kristin L. Bryan and Jeffrey L. Turner of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

For more privacy and cybersecurity legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

A Rule 37 Refresher – As Applied to a Ransomware Attack

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) (“Rule 37”) was completely rewritten in the 2015 amendments. Before the 2015 amendments, the standard was that a party could not generally be sanctioned for data loss as a result of the routine, good faith operation of its system. That rule didn’t really capture the reality of all of the potential scenarios related to data issues nor did it provide the requisite guidance to attorneys and parties.

The new rule added a dimension of reasonableness to preservation and a roadmap for analysis. The first guidepost is whether the information should have been preserved. This rule is based upon the common law duty to preserve when litigation is likely. The next guidepost is whether the data loss resulted from a failure to take reasonable steps to preserve. The final guidepost is whether or not the lost data can be restored or replaced through additional discovery. If there is data that should have been preserved, that was lost because of failure to preserve, and that can’t be replicated, then the court has two additional decisions to make: (1) was there prejudice to another party from the loss OR (2) was there an intent to deprive another party of the information. If the former, the court may only impose measures “no greater than necessary” to cure the prejudice. If the latter, the court may take a variety of extreme measures, including dismissal of the action. An important distinction was created in the rule between negligence and intention.

So how does a ransomware attack fit into the new analytical framework? A Special Master in MasterObjects, Inc. v. Amazon.com (U.S. Dist. Court, Northern District of California, March 13, 2022) analyzed Rule 37 in the context of a ransomware attack. MasterObjects was the victim of a well-documented ransomware attack, which precluded the companies access to data prior to 2016. The Special Master considered the declaration from MasterObjects which explained that, despite using state of the art cybersecurity protections, the firm was attacked by hackers in December 2020. The hack rendered all the files/mailboxes inaccessible without a recovery key set by the attackers. The hackers demanded a ransom and the company contacted the FBI. Both the FBI and insurer advised them not to pay the ransom. Despite spending hundreds of hours attempting to restore the data, everything prior to 2016 was inaccessible.

Applying Rule 37, the Special Master stated that, at the outset, there is no evidence that any electronically stored information was “lost.” The data still exists and, while access has been blocked, it can be accessed in the future if a key is provided or a technological work-around is discovered.

Even if a denial of access is construed to be a “loss,” the Special Master found no evidence in this record that the loss occurred because MasterObjects failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it. This step of the analysis, “failure to take reasonable steps to preserve,” is a “critical, basic element” to prove spoliation.

On the issue of prejudice, Amazon argued that “we can’t know what we don’t know” (related to missing documents). The Special Master did not find Amazon’s argument persuasive. The Special Master concluded that Amazon’s argument cannot survive the adoption of Rule 37(e). “The rule requires affirmative proof of prejudice in the specific destruction at issue.”

Takeaways:

If you are in a spoliation dispute, make sure you have the experts and evidence to prove or defend your case.
When you are trying to prove spoliation, know the new test and apply it in your analysis (the Special Master noted that Amazon did not reference Rule 37 in its briefing).
As a business owner, when it comes to cybersecurity, you must take reasonable and defensible efforts to protect your data.

Article By Gretchen E. Moore of Strassburger McKenna Gutnick & Gefsky

For more cybersecurity and media legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Privacy Tip #335 – Health Care Sector Continues to Be Hit with Ransomware

According to the 2022 State of Ransomware Report issued recently by Sophos, it surveyed 5,600 IT professionals from 31 countries, including professionals in the health care sector. Those professionals in the health care sector shared that 66 percent of them had experienced a ransomware attack in 2021, which was an increase of 69 percent over 2020. This was the largest increase of all sectors surveyed.

If you look at the Office for Civil Rights data breach portal, you will see that a vast majority of breaches reported by health care providers and business associates are related to “Hacking/IT incident.” This confirms that the health care sector continues to be attacked by threat actors seeking to steal protected health information of patients.

If you are a patient who receives a breach notification letter from a health care provider or business associate, the letter will provide guidance on how to protect yourself following a data breach and may offer some protection guidance, including credit monitoring or fraud resolution. Such a letter has been sent to patients to comply with the breach notification requirements of HIPAA and state law. Part of those requirements includes that the patients be provided mitigation steps following the breach to protect themselves from fraud. Avail yourself of these protections in the event your information is compromised. Take the time to sign up for the mitigation offered. It is clear that these attacks will not subside any time soon.

Article By Linn F. Freedman of Robinson & Cole LLP

For more cybersecurity and media legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Ransom Demands: To Pay or Not to Pay?

As the threat of ransomware attacks against companies has skyrocketed, so has the burden on companies forced to decide whether to pay cybercriminals a ransom demand. Corporate management increasingly is faced with balancing myriad legal and business factors in making real-time, high-stakes “bet the company” decisions with little or no precedent to follow. In a recent advisory, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) has once again discouraged companies from making ransom payments or risk potential sanctions.

OFAC Ransom Advisory

On September 21, 2021, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued an Advisory that updates and supersedes OFAC’s Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments, issued on October 1, 2020. This updated OFAC Advisory follows on the heels of the Biden Administration’s heightened interest in combating the growing risk and reality of cyber threats that may adversely impact national security and the economy.

According to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) statistics from 2019 to 2020 on ransomware attacks, there was a 21 percent increase in reported ransomware attacks and a 225 percent increase in associated losses. All organizations across all industry sectors in the private and public arenas are potential targets of such attacks. As noted by OFAC, cybercriminals often target particularly vulnerable entities, such as schools and hospitals, among others.

While some cybercriminals are linked to foreign state actors primarily motivated by political interests, many threat actors are simply in it “for the money.” Every day cybercriminals launch ransomware attacks to wreak havoc on vulnerable organizations, disrupting their business operations by encrypting and potentially stealing their data. These cybercriminals often demand ransom payments in the millions of dollars in exchange for a “decryptor” key to unlock encrypted files and/or a “promise” not to use or publish stolen data on the Dark Web.

The recent OFAC Advisory states in no uncertain terms that the “U.S. government strongly discourages all private companies and citizens from paying ransom or extortion demands.” OFAC notes that such ransomware payments could be “used to fund activities adverse to the national security and foreign policy objectives of the United States.” The Advisory further states that ransom payments may perpetuate future cyber-attacks by incentivizing cybercriminals. In addition, OFAC cautions that in exchange for payments to cybercriminals “there is no guarantee that companies will regain access to their data or be free from further attacks.”

The OFAC Advisory also underscores the potential risk of violating sanctions associated with ransom payments by organizations. As a reminder, various U.S. federal laws, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the Trading with the Enemy Act, prohibit U.S. persons or entities from engaging in financial or other transactions with certain blacklisted individuals, organizations or countries – including those listed on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blacked Persons List or countries subject to embargoes (such as Cuba, the Crimea region of the Ukraine, North Korea and Syria).

Penalties & Mitigating Factors

If a ransom payment is deemed to have been made to a cybercriminal with a nexus to a blacklisted organization or country, OFAC may impose civil monetary penalties for violations of sanctions based on strict liability, even if a person or organization did not know it was engaging in a prohibited transaction.

However, OFAC will consider various mitigating factors in deciding whether to impose penalties against organizations for sanctioned transactions, including if the organizations adopted enhanced cybersecurity practices to reduce the risk of cyber-attacks, or promptly reported ransomware attacks to law enforcement and regulatory authorities (including the FBI, U.S. Secret Service and/or Treasury’s Office of Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection).

“OFAC also will consider a company’s full and ongoing cooperation with law enforcement both during and after a ransomware attack” as a “significant” mitigating factor. In encouraging organizations to self-report ransomware attacks to federal authorities, OFAC notes that information shared with law enforcement may aid in tracking cybercriminals and disrupting or preventing future attacks.

Conclusion

In short, payment of a ransom is not illegal per se, so long as the transaction does not involve a sanctioned party on OFAC’s blacklist. Moreover, the recent ransomware Advisory “is explanatory only and does not have the force of law.” Nonetheless, organizations should consider carefully OFAC’s advice and guidance in deciding whether to pay a ransom demand.

In addition to the OFAC Advisory, management should consider the following:

Ability to restore systems from viable (unencrypted) backups
Marginal time savings in restoring systems with a decryptor versus backups
Preservation of infected systems in order to conduct a forensics investigation
Ability to determine whether data was accessed or exfiltrated (stolen)
Reputational harm if data is published by the threat actor
Likelihood that the organization will be legally required to notify individuals of the attack regardless of whether their data is published on the Dark Web.

Should an organization decide it has no choice other than to make a ransom payment, it should facilitate the transaction through a reputable company that first performs and documents an OFAC sanctions check.

Article By Anjali C. Das with Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP.

For more articles about ransomware attacks, visit the NLR Cybersecurity, Media & FCC section.

Tag: Ransomware

Supply Chains are the Next Subject of Cyberattacks

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40 Countries Including US Vow Not to Pay Ransomware

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