Energy Tax Credits for a New World Part I: Overview of Energy Tax Credits under the IRA

Signed into law on August 16, 2022, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) is the most significant long-term commitment made by the U.S. government to encourage and support a clean energy future. The IRA works through the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in ways that fundamentally change the landscape on how clean energy tax credits and incentives are designed, awarded, and monetized.

The regulation, taxation, and financing of energy projects has been an integral aspect of my law practice for decades. These are exciting times now, as the structuring of energy tax credits under the IRA expands on a number of themes that I first covered in an energy and environmental project finance book I coauthored for Oxford University Press back in 2010. Then, as now, my perspective is shaped by my work for clients in the traditional and emerging clean energy sectors.

Why launch a series now about the energy tax credits that were extended, modified, or introduced by the IRA?

  • Many of the IRA energy credits run until 2032, so project developers still have ample opportunity to get their projects underway while credits remain available.
  • The Treasury and the IRS have yet to provide us with many important details on IRA implementation, with much of the guidance having been provided in Notices and proposed Treasury Regulations. But while the details are being ironed out, taxpayers still need to move forward with their projects, and tax returns need preparation. As project owners and funders continue to seek assistance, it remains critical to remain vigilant and stay on top of the large number of new developments.
  • Two important technology-specific credits expire at the end of 2024. They will be replaced in 2025 by two technology-neutral credits. The technology-neutral credits do not expire until 2032, or until certain greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) are reduced to specific levels set out in the Code (most likely, later).
  • Projects that seek to qualify for IRA energy tax credits and which begin construction in and after 2025 will need to meet statutory requirements not required for earlier projects.

Developers and investors would be well advised to consider the tax consequences to their energy projects during the second half of 2024, which I look at as a transition period.

In this Q&A with Andie, Energy Tax Credits For A New World, I aim to provide an overview of the IRA as it relates to many important energy credits. I will take deep dives into some of the requirements and mechanics of some of these credits, and I will look at the ways in which these credits can be monetized.

Through Summer and Fall 2024, Readers can look forward to reading this extended occasional series presented in the following parts:

Part I: Overview of Energy Tax Credits under the IRA

Part II: Production Tax Credits and Investment Tax Credits: The Old and The New

Part III: Overview of Bonus Credits

Part IV: Prevailing Wage and Apprenticeship Bonus Credits

Part V: Domestic Content Bonus Credits

Part VI: Energy Community Bonus Credits

Part VII: Low-Income Communities Bonus Credits

Part VIII: Monetizing Energy Tax Credits

Part XI: Changes to Traditional Tax Equity Financing

The IRA’s tax benefits are enormous. As a result, when a “qualifying energy project” is properly structured and timed, it can receive tax credits that reduce certain related costs by more than 50 percent.

As I launch this series, I would like to extend my gratitude to Nicholas C. Mowbray for his comments and exceptional assistance.

Part I: Overview of Energy Tax Credits under the IRA

“Dozens of countries are widening the gap between their economic growth and their greenhouse gas emissions. . . . If these trends continue, global emissions may actually start to decline,” observed Umair Irfan writing for Vox.[1]

What is the importance of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) to energy tax credits?

The IRA has strengthened the United States’ long-term commitment toward a clean energy economy. It is the most ambitious U.S. effort to date to incentivize the development of renewable energy technologies[2] that can help to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The IRA targets the enormous capital expenditures needed to create, commercialize, and broadly make available renewable energy technologies. The IRA’s goal is to lay out a path toward a net-zero GHG economy by 2050.[3]

How does the IRA affect energy project funding?

The IRA has brought about major changes in the ways in which energy projects are structured and funded. It provides for loans, grants, financial and technical assistance, rebates, and energy tax credits. About $400 billion has been allocated for clean energy innovation, technology, and manufacturing. Of this funding, about $260 billion applies to the extension and modification of existing tax credits and the introduction of new ones. In fact, more than 70 percent of the IRA’s benefits are delivered through tax incentives. Now, more than 20 tax credits allow for monetization that supports clean energy generation, develops related manufacturing capacity, incentivizes the increased use of clean vehicles and energy sources, and increases carbon capture programs.[4]

How does the IRA target GHG emission?

The IRA uses funding and financial incentives to support research, development, and commercialization of low- and zero-GHG emission technologies. It also seeks to steer project developers to locate their projects in “energy communities” or “low-income communities”; to pay prevailing wages and encourage the training of registered apprentices; and to increase the use of domestic content components in project-related manufacturing and construction processes.

Have the IRA initiatives been effective?

Initial IRA success stories are very positive, but we have a long way to go. In 2023, “more solar panels were installed in China […] than the US has installed in its entire history. More electric vehicles were sold worldwide than ever.”[5] As the United States seeks to become a global leader in decarbonization and to compete with other major economies like China, the IRA is creating “new opportunities for workers […] and lower costs for America’s families.”[6]

Congress also seeks to ensure that monies provided by the IRA strengthen domestic supply chains and ensure the nation’s energy security in its transportation modes. The IRA is boosting domestic manufacturing for critical renewable energy components, while partially funding the construction of renewable energy projects through its rigorous domestic sourcing requirements.

In 2023 the American Council on Renewable Energy found that, “One of the most notable impacts of the IRA is how quickly it helped to onshore new advanced green manufacturing. More than 83 new or expanded wind, solar, and battery manufacturing facilities have been announced since August 2022, including 52 plants for solar production, 17 for utility-scale wind production, and 14 for production of utility-scale battery storage.”[7]

Notwithstanding some initial successes, two years after passage of the IRA, there are some serious concerns that some of the credits are unworkable, and that the IRA’s domestic sourcing requirements have fallen short of expectations.[8]

Is it possible that the IRA could be dismantled by future Administrations?

Yes. It is possible. Perhaps, a better question might be should the IRA be dismantled? Is it in our best interests to shut down the onward innovation of a thriving high-growth, high-benefit fledgling U.S. industry segment, substantially underwritten by the government, and made available to the residents of a leading market economy?

What makes the IRA different from prior environmental and climate efforts?

The IRA is fundamentally different from the carrot-and-stick approaches of many prior U.S. environmental and climate laws. It has an incentives-based focus: it does not rely on traditional regulation and enforcement to achieve its desired outcomes. It proactively seeks to encourage long-term commercial investments to decarbonize transportation, manufacturing, and construction. The IRA is popular among early adopters. Kimberly Clausing, the Eric M. Zolt Chair in Tax Law and Policy at the UCLA School of Law, noted in a 2023 interview, “There’s a lot of things to like about these tax credits […] they’re broad, they’re longer lived than prior tax credits, and they don’t phase out as quickly. They’re more flexible than prior tax credits. They’re more transferable and refundable, and that enables them to be ultimately more effective.”[9]

The IRA’s long-term focus on tax credits, financial incentives, and monetization may offer prospective project developers a degree of certainty in their planning; persuade investors to commit to clean energy undertakings; and broaden the pool of capital available to do so. So far, the facts speak for themselves: in the first year after the IRA’s enactment, 280 clean energy projects were announced across 44 states, representing $282 billion of investment.[10]

What deference will be given to Treasury Regulations addressing the IRA provisions?

Since passage of the IRA, the Treasury and the IRS have been carefully moving through the details of its rollout.[11] At the date of this writing, many critical questions remain unanswered. In addition, for many decades, the Treasury and the IRS have enjoyed broad latitude on the administration of the laws. But the legal landscape might be changing. On June 28, 2024, in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the U.S. Supreme Court effectively overturned the so-called Chevron doctrine. Chevron is a 40-year-old Supreme Court case that afforded federal agencies a degree of deference in the reasonable interpretation of a statute that fell within their areas of expertise.[12] As a result, many questions will be raised about many laws, along with the frameworks for their roll out and enforcement. Although the Treasury and the IRS will be able to claim broad expertise in some areas of the tax law, it is likely that there will be disputes and litigation over the deference to be given to climate-related tax regulations.[13]

What is the starting point for the IRA’s focus on tax credits?

Let’s take a walk down memory lane. Federal income tax credits for wind and solar energy were first enacted in The Energy Tax Act of 1978.[14] They were structured as refundable 10 percent tax credits for energy property and equipment that produced electricity using wind and solar sources. Later, The Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980 extended the expiration through 1985, increased the credit to 15 percent, and removed a taxpayer’s ability to get a tax refund based on the value of the credit.[15] The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced solar energy credits from 15 percent to 10 percent and extended them through December 31, 1988. Further energy credit extensions for solar property were enacted between 1988 and 1991.

With The Energy Policy Act of 1992,[16] Congress made solar energy credits “permanent” and named them “investment tax credits” (ITCs). The same legislation also enacted the “renewable electricity production tax credit,” or the PTC. When the PTC expired in 1999, it was subsequently extended and expanded to include additional energy technologies.

The Energy Policy Act of 2005 increased the ITC for solar energy from 10 percent to 30 percent, and it extended the credit to additional types of energy property.[17] It did not, however, extend the PTC for solar and refined coal facilities. This meant that from 2005 until enactment of the IRA, the PTC was not available for electricity that was produced from solar energy.

Does the IRA move away from technology-specific tax credits?

Yes. Before the IRA, the PTC at Section 45 and the ITC at Section 48 were the two principal energy tax credits. They were enacted to encourage the development of U.S. wind farms and solar arrays. Both the PTC and the ITC included technology-specific statutory provisions that had been amended over the years to include additional technologies identified by Congress.

The IRA modified and extended both the Section 45 PTC and the Section 48 ITC through the end of 2024 at which point they will be replaced by the next generation of technology-neutral credits: the Section 45Y Clean Electricity Production Tax Credits (CEPTC) and the Section 48E Clean Electricity ITC (CEITC).[18] The rest of the energy tax credits that the IRA modified or introduced took effect for projects beginning on or after January 1, 2023, with most of those credits expiring on December 31, 2032.

In the next part of this series, we will take a look at the production tax credit (PTC), the investment tax credit (ITC), and their progeny. Many of the IRA tax credits are modifications or expansions of the PTC and the ITC. It is an important next step to consider the underlying framework of the old credits and the new.

The firm extends gratitude to Nicholas C. Mowbray for his comments and exceptional assistance in the preparation of this article.

[1] “We Might Be Closer to Changing Course on Climate Change Than We Realized,” Umair Irfan, Vox, April 25, 2024.

[2] Ibid.

[3] The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-169, 136 Stat. 1818 (2022) (IRA), August 16, 2022.

[4] Treasury, Inflation Reduction Act, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/inflation-reduction-act#:~:text=The Inflation Reduction Act, enhanced, for clean energy and manufacturing. See also, “Elective Pay Overview,”
IRS Pub. 5817 (Rev. 4-2024) Number 941211. https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5817.pdf

[5] “We Might Be Closer to Changing Course on Climate Change Than We Realized,” Umair Irfan, Vox, April 25, 2024.

[6] “Inflation Reduction Act Tax Credit,” U.S. Department of Labor, Inflation Reduction Act Tax Credit | U.S. Department of Labor (dol.gov), accessed August 15, 2024.

[7] “Celebrating One Year of Progress: The Inflation Reduction Act’s Impact on Renewable Energy and the American Economy,” Greg Wetstone, American Council on Renewable Energy, August 14, 2023.

[8] Press release, www.manchin.senate.gov, June 4, 2024.

[9]  “Why the Inflation Reduction Act Can’t Be Repealed,” Evan George, Legal Planet, April 17, 2023.

[10] “The US Inflation Reduction Act is Driving Clean-Energy Investment One Year In,” Marco Willner,

Sebastiaan Reinders and Aviral Utkarsh, Goldman Sachs, October 31, 2023.

[11] “Here’s What the Court’s Chevron Ruling Could Mean in Everyday Terms,” By Coral Davenport et al., The New York Times, June 28, 2024.

[12] “The Supreme Court’s Elimination Of The Chevron Doctrine Will Undermine Corporate Accountability,” Michael Posner, Forbes, July 8, 2024.

[13] “Tax Pros Discuss Impact of Loper Bright on IRS Regs,” Tim Shaw, Thomas Reuters, July 29, 2024,
“The Supreme Court’s decision […] may have ripple effects on Treasury and IRS rulemaking, though to what extent remains unclear, tax professionals say.”

[14] Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (1978).

[15] Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (1980).

[16] Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992); H.R. 776, 102nd Congress (1991̵–1992).

[17] Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005). I will discuss the term “energy property” in a future article.

[18] The PTC, ITC, CEPTC, and CEITC are discussed in Part V: Domestic Content Bonus Credits of this series.

by: Andie Kramer of ASKramer Law

For more news on Energy Tax Credits under the IRA, visit the NLR Tax section.

Selection of Gov. Walz as VP Candidate Implicates SEC Pay-To-Play Rule

Kamala Harris’ selection of Tim Walz as running mate for her presidential campaign has implications under the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Rule 206(4)-5 under the Investment Advisers Act (SEC Pay-to-Play Rule). In particular, certain political contributions to vice presidential candidate Tim Walz, who serves as Chair of the Minnesota State Board of Investment (SBI), and other actions by investment advisers and certain of their personnel could trigger a two-year “time-out” that would prevent an investment adviser from collecting fees from any of the statewide retirement systems or other investment programs or state cash accounts managed by the SBI. As a result, all investment advisers should consider reviewing their existing policies and procedures relating to pay-to-play and political contributions, and they should remind employees of these policies in connection with the 2024 election cycle.

A few key takeaways in this regard

  • The SEC Pay-to-Play Rule prohibits investment advisers, including exempt advisers and exempt reporting advisers,1 from receiving compensation for providing advisory services to a government entity client for two years after the investment adviser or certain personnel, including executive officers and employees soliciting government entities,2 has made a contribution to an “official”3 of the government entity.
    • Governor Walz is an “official” of the SBI under the SEC Pay-to-Play Rule because he serves on the board of the SBI.
    • An investment adviser was recently fined by the SEC for violations of the SEC Pay-to-Play Rule following a contribution by a covered associate to a candidate who served as a member of the SBI.4
  • As a result of Governor Walz’s role with regard to the SBI, any contributions by a covered adviser (or any PAC controlled by the adviser) or any contributions by its covered associates above the de minimis amount of US$3505 to the Harris/Walz campaign will trigger a two-year “time-out.” This may have implications for investment advisers that are not currently seeking to do business with the SBI but may in the future, as the “time out” period applies for the entirety of the two-year period, even if Governor Walz ceases to be an “official” of the SBI after the election.
  • Contributions by family members of covered associates and contributions to super PACs or multicandidate PACs (so long as contributions are not earmarked for the benefit of the Harris/Walz campaign) generally are not restricted under the SEC Pay-to-Play Rule, if not done in a manner designed to circumvent the rule.
  • In addition to the SEC Pay-to-Play Rule, financial services firms should be mindful of other restrictions under Municipal Securities Rule Making Board Rule G-37, Commodity Futures Trading Commission Regulation 23.451, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority Rule 2030, and SEC Rule 15Fh-6.
  • Similar concerns were implicated when then-Governor Mike Pence of Indiana was the Republican vice presidential nominee in 20166; however, former President Donald Trump and current U.S. Senator J.D. Vance (R-OH) are not “officials” for purposes of the SEC Pay-to-Play Rule or other applicable pay-to-play rules, and contributions to the Trump/Vance campaign will not be restricted under these rules.

In addition to the SEC Pay-to-Play Rule and other federal pay-to-play rules noted above, many states and localities have also adopted pay-to-play rules that are applicable to persons who contract with their governmental agencies. Campaign contributions to other candidates may trigger disclosure obligations or certain restrictions under such rules. As political contributions can lead to unintended violations of the SEC Pay-to-Play Rule or other applicable pay-to-play rules, advisers should assess whether any of these rules present a business risk in the 2024 election cycle and take appropriate steps to protect themselves.

From a compliance standpoint, some investment advisers have implemented pre-clearance procedures for all employees, which can permit an investment adviser’s compliance team to confirm that political contributions by employees will not lead to unintended consequences. Compliance teams may also consider periodic checks of publicly available campaign contribution data to confirm contributions by employees are being disclosed pursuant to applicable internal policies.

Should you have any questions regarding the content of this alert, please do not hesitate to contact one of the authors or our other lawyers.

Footnotes

1 The rule applies to “covered advisers,” a term that includes investment advisers registered or required to be registered with the SEC, “foreign private advisers” not registered in reliance on Section 203(b)(3) of the Investment Advisers Act, and “exempt reporting advisers.”

2 The rule applies to “covered associates,” which are defined for this purpose as: (i) any general partner, managing member, executive officer, or other individual with a similar status or function; (ii) any employee who solicits a government entity for the investment adviser and any person who supervises, directly or indirectly, such employee; and (iii) any political action committee (PAC) controlled by the investment adviser or by any person described in parts (i) or (ii).

3 An “official” means any individual (including any election committee of the individual) who was, at the time of a contribution, a candidate (whether or not successful) for elective office or holds the office of a government entity, if the office (i) is directly or indirectly responsible for, or can influence the outcome of, the hiring of an investment adviser by a government entity; or (ii) has authority to appoint any person who is directly or indirectly responsible for, or can influence the outcome of, the hiring of an investment adviser by a government entity.

4 Wayzata Investment Partners LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 6590 (Apr. 15, 2024).

5 Under the SEC Pay-to-Play Rule, covered associates (but not covered advisers) are permitted to make a de minimis contribution up to a US$350 amount in an election in which they are able to vote without triggering the two-year “time-out.”

6 Clifford J. Alexander, Ruth E. Delaney & Sonia R. Gioseffi, Impact of Pay-to-Play Rules in the 2016 Election Cycle, K&L GATES (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.klgates.com/Impact-of-Pay-to-Play-Rules-in-the-2016-Election-Cycle-08-18-2016.

Copyright 2024 K & L Gates
by: Ruth E. Delaney, Richard F. Kerr of K&L Gates
For more news on the SEC Pay-to-Play Rule, visit the NLR Securities SEC section.

FTC Releases Controversial Interim Staff Report on PBMs’ Purported Impact on Drug Prices

At an Open Commission Meeting on August 1, 2024, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) presented a report prepared by its staff entitled Pharmacy Benefit Managers: The Powerful Middlemen Inflating Drug Costs and Squeezing Main Street Pharmacies.

Although characterized as “interim,” the report posits the following observations about pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs):

  • “PBMs have gained significant power over prescription drug access and prices through increased concentration and vertical integration.”
  • “Increased concentration and vertical integration may have enabled PBMs to lessen competition, disadvantage rivals, and inflate drug costs.”
  • “The largest PBMs’ outsized bargaining leverage may operate to the disadvantage of smaller unaffiliated pharmacies.”
  • “PBM and brand drug manufacturer rebate contracts may impair or block less expensive competing products, including generic and biosimilar drugs.”
  • “PBMs lead to higher prices” (a conclusion based on only two case studies).

Commissioner Melissa Holyoak, in dissenting from the release of the report, stated that “the Report was plagued by process irregularities and concerns over the substance—or lack thereof—of the original order. In fact, the politicized nature of the process appears to have led to the departure of at least one senior leader at the Commission.” Commissioner Holyoak added that “[e]ven if the Report’s assertions of increasing concentration are accurate, increased concentration ‘does not prove that competition in that market has declined.’ Though the Report baldly asserts that PBMs ‘have gained significant power over prescription drug access and prices,’ the Report does not present empirical evidence that demonstrates PBMs have market power—i.e., ‘the ability to raise price profitably by restricting output.”’

Commissioner Andrew N. Ferguson, although concurring in the release of the report, was likewise critical of the process and its findings. In particular, Commissioner Ferguson found the report to be “especially unusual” in that it “relies, throughout, in large part on public information that was not collected from the PBMs or their affiliates during the 6(b) process.” Furthermore, Commissioner Ferguson was critical of the finding, based on only two case-study drugs, that PBMs lead to higher prices and pleaded with the FTC “to determine whether these findings are representative of market dynamics for other drugs.” He added that “[w]e need to understand whether any anticompetitive or unfair or deceptive acts or practices on the part of PBMs or any other market participants are contributing to these prices.”

©2024 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.
For more on PBMs, visit the NLR Biotech Food Drug section

Filing Requirements Under the Corporate Transparency Act: Stealth Beneficial Owners

The Corporate Transparency Act (“CTA”) requires most entities to file with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN,” a Bureau of the U.S. Department of the Treasury) Beneficial Ownership Information (“BOI”) about the individual persons who own and/or control the entities, unless an entity is exempt under the CTA from the filing requirement. There are civil and criminal penalties for failing to comply with this requirement.

A key issue: WHO are the Beneficial Owners?

FinCEN has issued a series of Frequently Asked Questions along with responses providing guidance on the issue of who the beneficial owners are.

Question A-1, issued on March 24, 2023, states that “[BOI] refers to identifying information about the individuals who directly or indirectly own or control a company.”

Question A-2, issued on Sept. 18, 2023: Why do companies have to report beneficial ownership information to the U.S Department of the Treasury? defines the CTA as “…part of the U.S. government’s efforts to make it harder for bad actors to hide or benefit from their ill-gotten gains through shell companies or other opaque ownership structures.”

Question D-1, updated April 18, 2024: Who is a beneficial owner of a reporting company? states that “A beneficial owner is an individual who either directly or indirectly (i) exercises substantial control over a reporting company” and, in referring to Question D-2 (What is substantial control?), “owns or controls at least 25 percent of a reporting company’s ownership interests.”

Question D-1 goes on to note that beneficial owners must be individuals, i.e., natural persons. This guidance is extended by Question D-2 on Substantial Control, where control includes the power of an individual who is an “important decision-maker.” Question D-3 (What are important decisions?) identifies “important decisions” with a pictorial chart of subject matters that FinCEN considers important, such as the type of business, the design of necessary financings, and the structure of the entity. Question D-4 explores ownership interests (again with a pictorial) including equity interests, profit interests, convertible securities, options, or “any other instrument, contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship, or mechanism used to establish ownership.”

Who, in FinCEN’s view, has “substantial control”?

Question D-2 lists four categories of those who have substantial control:

  1. A senior officer, including both executive officers and anyone “who performs a similar function;”
  2. An individual with “authority to appoint or remove certain officers or directors;”
  3. An individual who is an important decision-maker; or
  4. An individual with “any other form of substantial control.”

“Silent partners” and/or other undisclosed principals, including some who may be using the reporting company for nefarious purposes, might be discussed here, but that is not the intended subject of this writing. Rather, this piece is intended to warn businesspersons and their advisers of potential “stealth beneficial owners” – those whose status as beneficial owners is not immediately obvious.

First, consider the typical limited liability company Operating Agreement for an LLC with enough members and distribution of ownership interests so that no member owns over 25% of the LLC’s equity. If the LLC is manager-managed, then the manager(s) is/are Beneficial Owners, but the other members are not. But what if the Operating Agreement requires a majority or super-majority vote to approve certain transactions? Assuming that those transactions are “important” (as discussed in Question D-3), then possessing a potential veto power makes EACH member a beneficial owner. Such contractual limitations on executive power necessarily raise the issue of “beneficial ownership” in corporations, in limited liability companies, and even in limited partnerships where the Limited Partners have power to constrain the general partner (who clearly is a beneficial owner).

Second, consider the very recent amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) in response to the Delaware Chancery Court’s holding in West Palm Beach Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Moelis & Co (“Moelis”) Feb. 23, 2024. In Moelis, the CEO had a contract with the Company that materially limited the power of the Board of Directors to act in a significant number of matters. Vice Chancellor Travis Laster issued a 133-page opinion finding the agreement was invalid, as it violated the Delaware Law that placed management and governance responsibilities in the Board. Because such arrangements are frequently used in venture capital arrangements as part of raising capital for new enterprises, the Delaware Legislature and the State’s Governor enacted amendments to the DGCL that expressly authorize such contracts. In the Moelis situation itself, Ken Moelis was a major owner and CEO so he would have had to be disclosed as a Beneficial Owner if Moelis & Co. had not been exempt from the filing requirements of the CTA because it is a registered investment bank.

But what of a start-up venture entity where a wealthy venture investor owns a 10% interest in the entity, but has a stockholder agreement that gives him substantial governance rights including the ability to veto or even overrule board decisions? Is that venture investor not a “beneficial owner”? Somewhat even more Baroque, what about the private equity fund controlled by a dominant investor, say William Ackman or Nelson Peltz? If that fund invests in the same start-up entity and holds a 10% interest, but also has a stockholder agreement giving the fund substantial governance rights, isn’t the controlling owner of the fund a “beneficial owner” of the start-up?

Finally, consider financing with a “bankruptcy remote entity” where the Board of that entity includes a contingent director chosen by the finance source. The contingent director does not participate in any part of the governance of the entity unless the entity finds itself in financial distress. The organizational documents of the entity provide that at that point, the contingent director can veto any decision to file for bankruptcy protection. At that point, the contingent director apparently becomes a “beneficial owner” of the entity, with the CTA filing requirements applicable. A more interesting question is whether the contingency arrangement in the organizational documents makes the contingent director a “beneficial owner” from the inception of the financing. Further, with respect to bankruptcy, key questions remain unanswered, such as whether the trustee in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding or a liquidating trustee in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding has a reporting obligation under the CTA.

This piece is not intended to identify all the situations that may give rise to “Stealth Beneficial Owners.” Rather, its intent is to raise awareness of the complexities involved in answering the initial question – WHO is a “beneficial owner”?

©2024 Norris McLaughlin P.A., All Rights Reserved

FTC Announces Final Rule Imposing Civil Penalties for Fake Consumer Reviews and Testimonials

On August 14, 2024, the Federal Trade Commission announced a Final Rule combatting bogus consumer reviews and testimonials by prohibiting their sale or purchase. The Rule allows the FTC to strengthen enforcement, seek civil penalties against violators and deter AI-generated fake reviews.

“Fake reviews not only waste people’s time and money, but also pollute the marketplace and divert business away from honest competitors,” said FTC attorney Chair Lina M. Khan. “By strengthening the FTC’s toolkit to fight deceptive advertising, the final rule will protect Americans from getting cheated, put businesses that unlawfully game the system on notice, and promote markets that are fair, honest, and competitive.”

The Rule announced on August 14, 2024 follows an advance notice of proposed rulemaking and a notice of proposed rulemaking announced in November 2022 and June 2023, respectively. The FTC also held an informal hearing on the proposed rule in February 2024. In response to public comments, the Commission made numerous clarifications and adjustments to its previous proposal.

What Does the FTC Final on the Use of Consumer Reviews and Testimonials Prohibit?

The FTC Final Rule on the Use of Consumer Reviews and Testimonials prohibits:

Writing, selling, or buying fake or false consumer reviews. 

The Rule prohibits businesses from writing or selling consumer reviews that misrepresent they are by someone who does not exist or who did not have actual experience with the business or its products or services, or that misrepresent the reviewers’ experience. It also prohibits businesses from buying consumer reviews that they knew or should have known made such a misrepresentation. Businesses are also prohibited from procuring from certain company insiders such reviews about the business or its products or services for posting on third-party sites, when the businesses knew or should have known about the misrepresentation. The prohibitions on buying or procuring reviews do not cover generalized review solicitations to past customers or simply hosting reviews on the business’s website. Neither will a retailer or other entity be liable for sharing consumer reviews unless it would have been liable for displaying those same reviews on its own website.

Writing, selling, or disseminating fake or false testimonials. 

Businesses are similarly prohibited from writing or selling consumer or celebrity testimonials that make the same kinds of misrepresentations. The are also prohibited from disseminating or causing the dissemination of such testimonials when they knew or should have known about the misrepresentation. The prohibition on disseminating testimonials does not cover the type of generalized solicitations to past customers discussed above with respect to reviews.

Buying positive or negative reviews.

Businesses are prohibited from providing compensation or other incentives contingent on the writing of consumer reviews expressing a particular sentiment, either positive or negative. Violations here include situations in which such a contingency is express or implied. So, for example, while it prohibits offering $25 for a 5-star review, it also prohibits offering $25 for a review “telling everyone how much you love our product.”

Failing to make disclosures about insider reviews and testimonials.

The Rule prohibits a company’s officers and managers from writing reviews or testimonials about the business or its products or services without clearly disclosing their relationship. Businesses are also prohibited from disseminating testimonials by company insiders without clear disclosures, if the businesses knew or should have known of the relationship. A similar prohibition exists for officer or manager solicitations of reviews from their immediate relatives or from employees or agents of the business, and when officers or managers ask employees or agents to seek such reviews from relatives. For these various solicitations, the Rule is violated only if: (i) the officers or managers did not give instructions about making clear disclosures; (ii) the resulting reviews – either by the employees, agents, or the immediate relatives of the officers, managers, employees, or agents – appear without clear disclosures; and (iii) the officers or managers knew or should have known that such reviews appeared and failed to take steps to have those reviews either removed or amended to include clear disclosures. All of these prohibitions hinge on the undisclosed relationship being material to consumers. These disclosure provisions also clarify that they do not cover mere review hosting or generalized solicitations to past customers.

Deceptively claiming that company-controlled review websites are independent.

Businesses are prohibited from misrepresenting that websites or entities they control or operate are providing independent reviews or opinions, other than consumer reviews, about a category of businesses, products, or services that includes their own business, product, or service.

Illegally suppressing negative reviews.

The Rule prohibits using unfounded or groundless legal threats, physical threats, intimidation or public false accusations (when the accusation is made with knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity) to prevent the posting or cause the removal of all or part of a consumer review. Legal threats are “unfounded or groundless” if they are unwarranted by existing law or based on allegations that have no evidentiary support, according to the FTC. Also, if reviews on a marketer’s website have been suppressed based on their rating or negative sentiment, the Rule prohibits that business from misrepresenting that the reviews on a portion of its website dedicated to receiving and displaying such reviews represent most or all submitted reviews.

Selling and buying fake social media indicators.

The Rule prohibits the sale or distribution of fake indicators of social media influence, like fake followers or views. A “fake” indicator means one generated by a bot, a hijacked account, or that otherwise does not reflect a real individual’s or entity’s activities or opinions, according to the FTC. The Rule also bars anyone from buying or procuring such fake indicators. These prohibitions are limited to situations in which the violator knew or should have known that the indicators were fake and which involved misrepresentations of a person’s or company’s influence or importance for a commercial purpose.

The Rule does not specifically refer to AI. However, according to the FTC, these prohibitions cover situations when someone uses an AI tool to generate the deceptive content at issue.

According to the FTC, case-by-case enforcement without civil penalty authority might not be enough to deter clearly deceptive review and testimonial practices. The Supreme Court’s decision in AMG Capital Management LLC v. FTC has hindered the FTC’s ability to seek monetary relief for consumers under the FTC Act. The Rule is intended to enhance deterrence and strengthen FTC enforcement actions.

The Rule will become effective 60 days after the date it’s published in the Federal Register.

Takeaway: The FTC will aggressively enforce the new Rule. The agency has challenged illegal practices regarding bogus reviews and testimonials for quite some time. In addition to investigations and enforcement actions, the FTC has also issued guidance to help businesses to comply. According to the agency, online marketplaces and social media companies could and should do more when it comes to policing their platforms.

© 2024 Hinch Newman LLP
For more news on FTC’s Final Rule on Fake Reviews, visit the NLR Consumer Protection section.

AI Regulation Continues to Grow as Illinois Amends its Human Rights Act

Following laws enacted in jurisdictions such as Colorado, New York City, Tennessee, and the state’s own Artificial Intelligence Video Interview Act, on August 9, 2024, Illinois’ Governor signed House Bill (HB) 3773, also known as the “Limit Predictive Analytics Use” bill. The bill amends the Illinois Human Rights Act (Act) by adding certain uses of artificial intelligence (AI), including generative AI, to the long list of actions by covered employers that could constitute civil rights violations.

The amendments made by HB3773 take effect January 1, 2026, and add two new definitions to the law.

“Artificial intelligence” – which according to the amendments means:

a machine-based system that, for explicit or implicit objectives, infers, from the input it receives, how to generate outputs such as predictions, content, recommendations, or decisions that can influence physical or virtual environments.

The definition of AI includes “generative AI,” which has its own definition:

an automated computing system that, when prompted with human prompts, descriptions, or queries, can produce outputs that simulate human-produced content, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) textual outputs, such as short answers, essays, poetry, or longer compositions or answers; (2) image outputs, such as fine art, photographs, conceptual art, diagrams, and other images; (3) multimedia outputs, such as audio or video in the form of compositions, songs, or short-form or long-form audio or video; and (4) other content that would be otherwise produced by human means.

The plethora of AI tools available for use in the workplace continues unabated as HR professionals and managers vie to adopt effective and efficient solutions for finding the best candidates, assessing their performance, and otherwise improving decision making concerning human capital. In addition to understanding whether an organization is covered by a regulation of AI, such as HB3773, it also is important to determine whether the technology being deployed also falls within the law’s scope. Assuming the tool or application is not being developed inhouse, this analysis will require, among other things, working closely with the third-party vendor providing the tool or application to understand its capabilities and risks.

According to the amendments, covered employers can violate the Act in two ways. First, an employer that uses AI with respect to – recruitment, hiring, promotion, renewal of employment, selection for training or apprenticeship, discharge, discipline, tenure, or the terms, privileges, or conditions of employment – and which has the effect of subjecting employees to discrimination on the basis of protected classes under the Act may constitute a violation. The same may be true for employers that use zip codes as a proxy for protected classes under the Act.

Second, a covered employer that fails to provide notice to an employee that the employer is using AI for the purposes described above may be found to have violated the Act.

Unlike the Colorado or New York City laws, the amendments to the Act do not require a impact assessment or bias audit. They also do not provide any specifics concerning the notice requirement. However, the amendments require the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR) to adopt regulations necessary for implementation and enforcement. These regulations will include rules concerning the notice, such as the time period and means for providing same.

We are sure to see more regulation in this space. While it is expected that some common threads will exist among the various rules and regulations concerning AI and generative AI, organizations leveraging these technologies will need to be aware of the differences and assess what additional compliance steps may be needed.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2024

FCC’s New Notice of Inquiry – Is This Big Brother’s Origin Story?

The FCC’s recent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry was released on August 8, 2024. While the proposed Rule is, deservedly, getting the most press, it’s important to pay attention to the Notice of Inquiry.

The part which is concerning to me is the FCC’s interest in “development and availability of technologies on either the device or network level that can: 1) detect incoming calls that are potentially fraudulent and/or AI-generated based on real-time analysis of voice call content; 2) alert consumers to the potential that such voice calls are fraudulent and/or AI-generated; and 3) potentially block future voice calls that can be identified as similar AI-generated or otherwise fraudulent voice calls based on analytics.” (emphasis mine)

The FCC also wants to know “what steps can the Commission take to encourage the development and deployment of these technologies…”

The FCC does note there are “significant privacy risks, insofar as they appear to rely on analysis and processing of the content of calls.” The FCC also wants comments on “what protections exist for non-malicious callers who have a legitimate privacy interest in not having the contents of their calls collected and processed by unknown third parties?”

So, the Federal Communications Commission wants to monitor the CONTENT of voice calls. In real-time. On your device.

That’s not a problem for anyone else?

Sure, robocalls are bad. There are scams on robocalls.

But, are robocalls so bad that we need real-time monitoring of voice call content?

At what point, did we throw the Fourth Amendment out of the window and to prevent what? Phone calls??

The basic premise of the Fourth Amendment is “to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” I’m not sure how we get more arbitrary than “this incoming call is a fraud” versus “this incoming call is not a fraud”.

So, maybe you consent to this real-time monitoring. Sure, ok. But, can you actually give informed consent to what would happen with this monitoring?

Let me give you three examples of “pre-recorded calls” that the real-time monitoring could overhear to determine if the “voice calls are fraudulent and/or AI-generated”:

  1. Your phone rings. It’s a prerecorded call from Planned Parenthood confirming your appointment for tomorrow.
  2. Your phone rings. It’s an artificial voice recording from your lawyer’s office telling you that your criminal trial is tomorrow.
  3. Your phone rings. It’s the local jewelry store saying your ring is repaired and ready to be picked up.

Those are basic examples, but for them to someone to “detect incoming calls that are potentially fraudulent and/or AI-generated based on real-time analysis of voice call content”, those calls have to be monitored in real-time. And stored somewhere. Maybe on your device. Maybe by a third-party in their cloud.

Maybe you trust Apple with that info. But, do you trust someone who comes up with fraudulent monitoring software that would harvest that data? How do you know you should trust that party?

Or you trust Google. Surely, Google wouldn’t use your personal data. Surely, they would not use your phone call history to sell ads.

And that becomes data a third-party can use. For ads. For political messaging. For profiling.

Yes, this is extremely conspiratorial. But, that doesn’t mean your data is not valuable. And where there is valuable data, there are people willing to exploit it.

Robocalls are a problem. And there are some legitimate businesses doing great things with fraud detection monitoring. But, a real-time monitoring edict from the government is not the solution. As an industry, we can be smarter on how we handle this.

© 2024 Troutman Amin, LLP
For more on the FCC, visit the NLR Communications Media Internet section

DOJ Implements New Whistleblower Reward Program

Companies who submit healthcare claims to private payors, provide financial services to customers, interact with domestic or foreign public officials, or otherwise operate in highly regulated industries should take note that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has taken another significant step in its ongoing effort to encourage new whistleblowers with information about potential corporate criminal malfeasance to report that information to the government. On August 1, 2024, the DOJ announced its long awaited Corporate Whistleblower Awards Program. The program seeks to fill “gaps” in existing whistleblower programs by providing awards of up to 30% of forfeited proceeds for reporting criminal conduct that is not otherwise covered by an existing system for awarding whistleblowers. The silver lining for companies is that the program incentivizes the whistleblowers to cooperate with the company’s internal compliance function. DOJ also provides for a presumptive declination of criminal charges for companies that self-report to DOJ within 120 days of the time the issue is first raised internally by the whistleblower, providing strong incentives for companies to investigate issues quickly.

The program represents the DOJ’s latest effort to increase the number of voluntary self-disclosures of corporate criminal activity. In January 2023, the DOJ announced its revised Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self Disclosure Policy, which sought to expand the incentives for companies to voluntarily self-disclose misconduct, cooperate with DOJ investigations, and take prompt and full remedial measures. The policy’s primary incentive was the prospect of a presumed declination for companies who followed its mandates.

As we discussed in a previous post, efforts to increase voluntary self-disclosures continued in April 2024 when the DOJ launched a Pilot Program on Voluntary Self Disclosures for Individuals. That initiative expanded the scope of potential whistleblowers by including those complicit in wrongdoing, granting them eligibility for immunity from prosecution in return for reporting the activity. In substance, that structure incentivized both individual wrongdoers and the corporations for whom they worked to be the first to report criminal activity. By pitting the would-be whistleblowers and the companies against each other, the DOJ effectively constructed a prisoners’ dilemma where the government stood to benefit regardless of which party acted first.

The program is a different verse from the same hymnal. It offers a different (but more traditional) incentive for whistleblowers – the opportunity for financial reward – while maintaining the goal of increasing the number of voluntary self-disclosures. The program seeks to achieve that objective by motivating those who are aware of misconduct, but perhaps are otherwise unable to qualify for a bounty under the current framework or otherwise uninterested in reporting the activity without a personal benefit.

The Basic Framework

Under the program, eligible individuals who voluntarily provide original information to the government in certain areas of focus and cooperate with the resulting investigation stand to receive 30% of any criminal or civil forfeitures over $1 million in accordance with a defined payment priority. The program lays out a basic structure for determining whether an individual is entitled to an award, but also affords the DOJ substantial discretion in deciding whether to make such awards, and in what amount. The key elements are:

  • Areas of focus – The program identifies four subject matter areas: 1) violations by financial institutions, their insiders and agents involving money laundering, fraud, and fraud against or non-compliance with regulators; 2) foreign corruption and bribery and violations of money laundering statutes; 3) domestic corruption violations including bribes and kickbacks paid to domestic public officials; and 4) healthcare offenses involving private or non-public healthcare benefit programs and fraud against patients, investors or other non-governmental entities in the healthcare industry, or other violations of federal law not covered by the federal False Claims Act (FCA).
  • Eligible individuals – The program excludes several categories of individuals, including those eligible to report under other whistleblower programs and those who “meaningfully participated” in the criminal activity reported (although those who played a “minimal role” can still participate).
  • “Original information” – Essentially, independent non-public knowledge or analysis in the individual’s possession is considered “original” information. Notably, information can be deemed “original” if it “materially adds to the information that the Department already possesses.” Information that the individual has already reported through the company’s internal whistleblower, legal or compliance procedures can still be deemed “original,” provided the individual also reports that information to the government within 120 days of reporting internally. Privileged information is not considered “original” unless the crime, fraud or other exception to state attorney conduct rules apply.
  • “Voluntary” submission – The information must be reported before the DOJ or any federal law enforcement or civil enforcement agency initiates any inquiry relating to the subject matter.
  • “Cooperation” – Individuals who report must also cooperate fully with the DOJ’s investigation, including by participating in interviews, testifying before a grand jury or at trial, producing documents and, if requested, working in a “proactive manner” with federal law enforcement. This could include clandestine activities to gather evidence, such as recording phone calls or wearing a wire.
  • Criteria for determining amount of award – The program lists several factors that could militate in favor of increasing or decreasing the whistleblower’s financial award. Increases may be justified by the significance of the information provided, by the nature and extent of assistance provided, and, notably, by participation in internal compliance programs. Decreases may be appropriate where the reporting individual was a minimal participant in the underlying activity, or where the individual unreasonably delayed reporting, interfered with the company’s internal compliance and reporting systems, or had management or oversight responsibilities over the offices or personnel involved in the conduct.
  • Payment priority – When the victim is an individual, he or she must first be compensated “to the fullest extent possible” before a whistleblower can recover. When the victim is a corporate entity or government agency, the whistleblower jumps the line and is compensated first.
  • Relationship to the Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self Disclosure Policy – While the program incentivizes whistleblower reports to the DOJ, a simultaneous amendment to the self-disclosure policy provides that “if a whistleblower makes both an internal report to a company and a whistleblower submission” to the DOJ, companies who self-report that conduct within 120 days of the internal report “will still qualify for a presumption of a declination[.]” This amendment underscores the DOJ’s focus on increasing self-disclosures, inasmuch as it effectively removes the need for them to be truly “voluntary.” A company that receives a complaint through its whistleblower program may still be eligible under the self-disclosure policy even if the individual has already reported the conduct to the DOJ, but it has a limited time to investigate and decide whether to self-report the conduct.

Key Takeaways

Reading the tea leaves, we see several potentially significant takeaways for companies evaluating the program’s likely impact.

  1. As a starting point, companies should evaluate whether and to what extent their operations create new reporting opportunities under the program, and thus necessitate action. That process should involve answering the following questions:
    • Does the company operate in one of the areas of focus? If so, the program creates new opportunities and incentives for whistleblowers, and the company must assess whether it is prepared to address an increase in reports and to recognize that a reporter may have already disclosed information to the DOJ.
    • Is the company publicly traded? If so, the company is already subject to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which should mean that systems are already in place to receive, investigate and determine whether to take action, including potentially making a voluntary self-disclosure. The program provides an opportunity to reassess the efficacy of those systems but should not necessarily require the creation of new ones. Note that even those companies with existing whistleblower programs should consider the need to expand those systems to cover new areas of focus. For example, a company with a SOX whistleblower policy should consider the need to expand its scope to cover domestic corruption violations, which may not otherwise be covered.
    • Does the company submit claims to government payors? If so, it is already subject to the FCA and should already have a system in place to analyze internal compliance concerns. If that system focuses on or prioritizes issues regarding government payors, the company should expand its focus to include claims and conduct regarding private payors, which may now be subject to whistleblower bounties under the program.
  2. For privately held companies operating in the areas of focus that are not subject to the FCA, the program necessitates a thorough and candid assessment of the risk the program creates. Depending on the extent of that danger, companies should consider the following measures:
    • Create, or enhance as necessary, internal reporting mechanisms to receive and evaluate whistleblower reports.
    • Publicize the company’s expectation that employees should promptly report concerns internally about potential violations of law or company policy, making clear that no retaliation will result from reports made in good faith.
    • Design a process for investigating whistleblower reports based on their nature and seriousness. Establish criteria for identifying those that can be investigated by HR, those that require the involvement of in-house counsel, and those that must be handled by outside counsel. If there is any possibility of criminal exposure, ensure an appropriate investigation is conducted and concluded in time to allow the company to determine whether to self-report in the 120-window for a presumptive declination.
  3. All companies should have in place a system for quickly and accurately evaluating whether to voluntarily self-disclose violations. This process is a multi-factor calculus that considers a range of factors, including primarily the merits of the underlying information and the amount of financial loss or gain that resulted. While decision-making in this context varies by situation, one essential element remains constant: the need for accurate information regarding the nature, scope and effect of the underlying conduct.

Only time will tell exactly how the program will impact the number and nature of whistleblower reports. But companies can take practical steps now to gauge whether and to what extent they are likely to be affected and begin installing the measures necessary to minimize the risk that might otherwise result.

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© 2024 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP
For more on Whistleblowers, visit the NLR Criminal Law Business Crimes section

It’s Official – BIPA’s “Per-Scan” Damages Are Out; Electronic Signatures Are In

If you heard a collective sigh of relief last week, it was probably businesses reacting as Illinois Governor Pritzker finally signed Senate Bill 2979, officially reforming BIPA for the first time since 2008. As a reminder, SB 2979 was passed back in May, but has been awaiting the Governor’s signature.

This development is significant for two reasons. First, the new law prohibits the recovery of “per-scan” damages. This means that if a business collects or discloses an individual’s biometric data without consent, then that business is only liable for one BIPA violation as to that individual. In 2023, the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Cothron v. White Castle Systems decided that violations were accrued on a “per-scan” basis, leading to an outpouring of claims. This law effectively overrules that decision. Second, the bill permits businesses to fulfill the “written release” requirement for consent via “electronic signature.” This will make it easier for businesses to collect – and individuals to provide – consent for the collection and retention of biometric information.

Putting it into Practice: These amendments became effective on August 2, 2024. Businesses that anticipated costly litigation from a “per-scan” BIPA demand may have cause for relief. However, the prohibition on “per-scan” damages may not apply retroactively to pending BIPA actions. Additionally, businesses can reconfigure their consent flows to enable electronic signatures.

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by: David M. Poell , Kathryn Smith of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

For more news on the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), visit the NLR Consumer Protection section.

OSHA Proposes New, Far-Reaching Workplace Heat Safety Rule

In July 2024, the Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) announced a proposed rule (the “Proposed Rule” or “Rule”) aimed at regulating and mitigating heat-related hazards in the workplace. If enacted, the long-anticipated Rule will have far-reaching impacts on businesses with employees who work in warm climates or who are otherwise exposed to heat-related hazards.

According to OSHA, out of all hazardous weather conditions, heat is the leading cause of death in the U.S. The Proposed Rule seeks to protect employees from hazards associated with high heat in the workplace and would apply to both indoor and outdoor work settings. Among other requirements, the Proposed Rule would mandate that employers evaluate heat-related workplace hazards and implement a Heat Illness and Injury Prevention Plan (HIIPP) to address heat hazards through methods which include rest breaks, shade requirements, the provision of drinking water, acclimatization procedures, heat monitoring, and other tactics to protect workers. The proposed HIIPP requirement takes cues from state-level occupational safety and health agencies — like Cal/OSHA (California) and Oregon OSHA — which have already implemented heat safety and HIIPP requirements.

One provision of the Proposed Rule that has garnered significant attention is the paid rest break provision. As currently drafted, the Proposed Rule would require employers to provide one paid15-minute rest break every two hours on days where the heat index reaches 90° F or higher. The paid rest break provision implicates questions about the concurrent application of the Fair Labor Standards Act. For example, does this 15-minute break period count toward an employee’s “hours worked” for the purposes of calculating overtime?

Moreover, in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo — in which the court overturned the longstanding principle of deference to agency interpretations previously set out under the 1984 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. case — significant questions remain about whether far-reaching mandates (like the paid rest break provision) are within OSHA’s authority. Given this new administrative landscape, if the Proposed Rule is enacted, we can expect challenges stemming from Loper Bright.

The Proposed Rule has not yet been published in the Federal Register. However, when such publication occurs, the Rule will be open to commentary from the public before becoming final. When OSHA announced the Proposed Rule, it simultaneously “encourage[d] the public to participate by submitting comments when the proposed standard is officially published in the Federal Register[,]” in order to “develop a final rule that adequately protects workers, is feasible for employers, and is based on the best available evidence.”

For more information regarding how to provide comments on this Proposed Rule, visit https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/rulemakingprocess#v-nav-tab2.

© 2024 Foley & Lardner LLP
For more on OSHA, visit the NLR Labor Employment section