Six Tips for Selecting the Right CRM System

Before deciding on a new CRM, follow these steps to select the right CRM system that meets your requirements, enhances adoption, offers value to your users – and can provide a return on your investment.

Research estimates that up to 70% of CRM systems fail to meet expectations – and a failed CRM implementation can be extremely costly, not just in terms of the financial expense, but also because of the costs in lost time – and credibility. Even more impactful: you don’t often get a second chance at CRM success. This means that it’s critical to select the right CRM system the first time.

The good news is CRM success is more than possible. If you simply follow a few critical steps before and during the CRM selection process, you can ensure that the system you select will help you achieve your organization’s goals, enhance adoption and provide value to your users – and deliver a return on your technology investment.

Tip 1: Problems First, Then Products

When attempting to successfully select and implement CRM software, it’s essential to focus on people and processes first, products second. Too many people immediately rush out to find potential vendors, so they can set up demonstrations of the most popular CRM software.

While it’s easy to get caught up in the shiny bells and whistles of a good CRM demo, it’s important to resist the temptation to dive into features and functions too soon without first taking the time to gain a real understanding of your organizational and user needs.

Tip 2: Assess Your Needs

Organizations buy CRM software for a number of reasons – but each organization is unique. To provide real value and ROI, before making the purchase, you have to understand what you are trying to accomplish.

Start by putting together a list of the key reasons you think you need a CRM.

  • Are you trying to communicate more effectively with clients and prospects?
  • Manage and evaluate the ROI of events or sponsorships?
  • Track and enhance business development efforts?
  • Help the organization be more efficient?
  • Increase business and revenue?

After assessing your organization’s needs, you may discover that you have more goals than you first thought.

If this is the case, it will be important to prioritize the goals. Don’t try to boil the ocean. If you try to tackle too many things at once, especially during the initial rollout, you will be less likely to succeed. Instead, assign your goals to a timeline based on importance and value to users. For the initial implementation, set a few relevant goals, achieve those initial successes, communicate the successes – and repeat.

Making your users part of the process up front will also make them more likely to adopt the software later.

Once you understand your organization’s unique needs and requirements, it’s time to talk to your users. One of the biggest frustrations we hear from clients is a lack of CRM adoption. This isn’t surprising since, in many of these organizations, system users were not involved during the selection process. To get people to buy in and use software, it has to provide value not only to the organization, but to the users individually. The challenge is that different people define value differently, which means different groups or types of users will have their own unique needs and requirements. That’s why it’s so important to get them involved early. Making your users part of the process up front will also make them more likely to adopt the software later.

To gather user input, consider creating focus groups to provide feedback on product features and functions. You may even want to meet with some of the naysayers individually to start encouraging their participation and head off future roadblocks. Finally, be sure to involve key stakeholders in system demonstrations to help evaluate the software and solicit their feedback before proceeding with system selection. In fact, it’s beneficial to have users involved throughout the rollout to offer ideas on how to improve the CRM implementation for everyone.

Tip 3: Evaluate the Systems and Providers

After gathering all the relevant information, it’s important to fully document your requirements and make sure you are well-prepared before reaching out to providers. The best way to do this is with what I call a ‘demo roadmap.’ This is a comprehensive two- to three-page document that sets out all of the details for the demonstrations along with all the needs and requirements gathered during the needs assessment and the features and functionality that you want to see.

Your ‘roadmap’ will guide the CRM providers so that they show you the key system attributes that are critical to the success of your organization and users and also helps to prevent the demonstrations from becoming a ‘dog and pony show.’ Your roadmap should be shared with the CRM providers well in advance of the demonstrations to give them time to adequately prepare.

Some larger organizations may also find it beneficial to take an additional step and create a much more detailed, formal RFP document. This request for proposals would be sent to potential CRM providers to solicit answers to a number of questions before scheduling any demos. The formal responses allow you to evaluate and compare the vendors and their system features and pricing in advance of the demonstrations. Many organizations use the RFP to limit the demonstrations to only the potential providers who are able to meet the organization’s budget and other requirements.

Once you have identified a few CRM systems that meet your requirements, you can begin the vetting process to select the right CRM system for your organization.

Tip 4: Direct the Demonstrations

It’s essential that the CRM demonstrations allow you to make an informed decision and adequately and accurately compare systems, features and pricing. It’s also important at this phase to again involve your users. CRM systems have a reputation for being notoriously difficult to implement, and the last thing you want is to be responsible for unilaterally selecting a system that then doesn’t meet user expectations. This can also help to make them more invested in system success.

It’s also important to structure the participation and demonstrations so you maximize the benefits.

First, it can be helpful to thin the field of participating CRM providers to a manageable number.

Next, select a group of users to participate. It can be good to choose users from different groups such as professionals and administrative, so you get some different perspectives.

Participants selected must have the time and inclination to participate and must be willing to sit through all of the demonstrations so they can accurately compare all the systems.

Finally, you may want to prepare the users by sharing the requirements and/or roadmap with them and asking them to be prepared to ask any questions they may have.

You should also prepare the providers. First, let them know how much time they have. A typical CRM demonstration can take between one and two hours.

Also let them know who will be participating and what their needs and interests are. If you have professional or executive users who have limited time for demonstrations, it can be helpful to direct the providers to spend the first 30 minutes to an hour of the demo on the features that are most relevant to those users.

Then they can step out and the rest of the time can be spent showing you the more detailed back-end functionality. Finally, be sure to leave at least 15 minutes at the end of the demonstrations for questions.

Tip 5: Check References

CLIENTSFirst CRM References Checklist

Before making the final commitment to a CRM system, it’s important to make sure you go through a thorough vetting process. It’s important to make sure you get all the information you need before finalizing your purchase.

First, ask the CRM vendor for references you can speak with. But don’t stop there. Talk to other companies or organizations in your industry who have used the software. Be sure to ask open-ended questions that will help you learn not only about the software, but also about other important areas. A few good questions to ask include:

  • Would you recommend the software?
  • Has the system performed as expected?
  • What were the biggest challenges with the implementation?
  • Were there any unexpected costs or delays?
  • What do you wish you had done differently during the selection and implementation?
  • How was the service after the sale?

For a comprehensive list of good questions to ask before finalizing the sale, check out our CLIENTSFirst CRM Reference Checking Questions Document.

Tip 6: Final Selection Steps

Once you have selected the right CRM system for your organization, there are still a few additional important details that require attention. You will want to have a formal scoping call with the provider to be able to accurately gauge the actual cost. The final price can vary depending on a number of variables including:

  • The number and types of licenses
  • Additional modules or software needed
  • Professional services to implement
  • Ongoing annual subscription or maintenance costs
  • Any proposed integrations
  • The types of training and materials
  • Data conversion and/or quality

If the price is an issue with your system of choice, there are also options. First, there may be room for negotiation. Alternatively, you can do a phased rollout to spread the costs over time. Some organizations prefer to start the rollout with Marketing and power users and then roll out to a small pilot group. Then additional groups can be added in later phases over time.

Finally, remember that in any sale, you are not finished until the paperwork is done. After the price is agreed upon, you will need to review the contract or agreement. While these documents may look official and final, in fact they are often open to negotiation, so it can be beneficial to modify some of the contract terms.

For instance, if the software is new to the market, you may be able to get a discount or arrange a beta test at a reduced rate.

Additionally, instead of paying the entire invoice up front, you can often negotiate payment terms that are stepped over time based on the satisfactory completion of key deployment steps. This can enhance your chances of CRM success by aligning your CRM vendor’s success with yours.

One Last Tip: Don’t Do It Alone

Selecting the right CRM system can be a daunting process. Most firms have never been through the process before – and few want to repeat it.

© Copyright 2022 CLIENTSFirst Consulting

ERIC Files Amicus Brief Rebutting DOL Attempt to Create New Regulations in Lawsuit, Petitions US Supreme Court on Seattle Healthcare Case

Read on below for coverage of recent law firm news from McDermott Will & Emery.

ERIC Files Amicus Brief Rebutting DOL Attempt to Create New Regulations in Lawsuit

McDermott Will & Emery’s Andrew C. LiazosMichael B. Kimberly and Charlie Seidell recently filed an amicus brief in the US Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit on behalf of the ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC). McDermott filed the brief in response to a US Department of Labor (DOL) amicus brief that advanced a novel interpretation of its regulations which, if adopted through litigation, would change longstanding procedures for benefit determinations under self-funded medical plans sponsored by large employers. The amicus brief focuses on key arguments against the DOL’s attempted regulatory reinterpretation, including that:

  • DOL may not rewrite its regulations outside of notice-and-comment rulemaking;
  • DOL’s interpretation of its own regulations is inconsistent with the plain text of the regulations;
  • There are good policy reasons underlying differential treatment of healthcare and disability benefits determinations; and
  • DOL’s interpretation of the regulations in its amicus brief is not entitled to deference under the Supreme Court decision in Kisor.

Read ERIC’s amicus brief here.

Read ERIC’s statement here.

ERIC Petitions US Supreme Court on Seattle Healthcare Case

McDermott Will & Emery’s Michael B. KimberlySarah P. Hogarth and Andrew C. Liazos, are co-counsel on a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court of the United States on behalf of the ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC). The petition calls for review of ERIC’s legal challenge to the City of Seattle’s hotel healthcare “play or pay” ordinance. The ordinance mandates hospitality employers make specified monthly healthcare expenditures for their covered local employees if their healthcare plans do not meet certain requirements. The petition demonstrates that Seattle’s ordinance is a clear attempt to control the benefits provided under medical plans in violation of the preemption provision under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (ERISA). This case is of significant national importance. Several other cities have proposed making similar changes, and complying with these types of ordinances will substantially constrain the ability of employers to control the terms of their medical plans on a uniform basis. ERIC’s petition is joined by several trade associations, including the US Chamber of Commerce, the American Benefits Council and the Retail Industry Leaders Association.

Read ERIC’s petition for writ of certiorari here.

Read ERIC’s statement here.

 

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Suing Attorneys In Texas For Participating in Fiduciary Breaches

It is not uncommon for an attorney to execute all or part of his or her client’s wishes, which may be in breach of a fiduciary duty owed by the client to a third party. The third party can certainly sue the client for breaching fiduciary duties. But can the third party also sue the attorney for participating in the client’s actions?

An officer or director of a company may set up a competing business and direct company business to the new competing business. If the officer or director uses an attorney to set up this business and the attorney knows that new business will be used to usurp opportunities, can the company sue the attorney for facilitating the creation of the new business? What if the attorney is an owner of the new company or works for the new company in a nonlegal position?

Certainly, Texas has legal theories that can hold a party liable for participating with a fiduciary in breaching duties owed by the fiduciary. There is a claim for knowing participation in a breach of fiduciary duty. See Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp., 138 Tex. 565, 160 S.W.2d 509, 514 (1942); Paschal v. Great W. Drilling, Ltd., 215 S.W.3d 437, 450 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, pet. denied) (holding wife liable for knowing participation in employee’s embezzlement where funds were placed in joint account and wife benefitted from stolen funds). See also Westech Capital Corp. v. Salamone, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143577, 2019 WL 4003093, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2019) (collecting cases that explain that “Texas appellate courts have routinely recognized the existence of a cause of action for knowing participation in the breach of fiduciary duty.”). The general elements for a knowing-participation claim are: 1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship; 2) the third party knew of the fiduciary relationship; and 3) the third party was aware it was participating in the breach of that fiduciary relationship. D’Onofrio v. Vacation Publ’ns, Inc., 888 F.3d 197, 216 (5th Cir. 2018); Meadows v. Harford Life Ins. Co., 492 F.3d 634, 639 (5th Cir. 2007). There is also a recognized civil conspiracy claim in Texas. The essential elements of a civil conspiracy are (1) two or more persons; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result. Juhl v. Airington, 936 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1996). Finally, there may be an aiding-and-abetting breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim. The Texas Supreme Court has stated that it has not expressly adopted a claim for aiding and abetting outside the context of a fraud claim. See First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 224 (Tex. 2017); Ernst & Young v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d 573, 583 n. 7 (Tex. 2001); West Fork Advisors v. Sungard Consulting, 437 S.W.3d 917 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.). Notwithstanding, some Texas courts have found such an action to exist. See Hendricks v. Thornton, 973 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1998, pet. denied); Floyd v. Hefner, 556 F.Supp.2d 617 (S.D. Tex. 2008). One court identified the elements for aiding and abetting as the defendant must act with unlawful intent and give substantial assistance and encouragement to a wrongdoer in a tortious act. West Fork Advisors, 437 S.W.3d at 921. Some courts have held that here is no aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claim. Hampton v. Equity Trust Co., No. 03-19-00401-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 5674 (Tex. App.—Austin July 23, 2020, no pet.). See also Midwestern Cattle Mktg., L.L.C. v. Legend Bank, N.A., 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 36966, 2019 WL 6834031, at *7 (5th Cir. Dec. 13, 2019); In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc.Pinnacle Hip Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 888 F.3d 753, 782, 781 (5th Cir. 2018)  For a discussion of these forms of joint liability for breach of fiduciary duty, please see E. Link Beck, Joint and Several Liability, STATE BAR OF TEXAS, 10TH ANNUAL FIDUCIARY LITIGATION COURSE (2015).

It is clear that at least under some theories, that third parties can be held liable for participating in fiduciary breaches with the party owing fiduciary duties. Can the third party be an attorney? Prior to Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. 2015), it was unclear in Texas whether a party could assert a claim against an attorney not representing the party, such as for negligent misrepresentation or aiding and abetting fraud or breaches of fiduciary duty. Some courts allowed the claim if the attorney was committing or participating in fraud. Others did not.

The plaintiff in Cantey Hanger alleged that the attorneys who represented her husband in a divorce proceeding had committed fraud by falsifying a bill of sale to shift tax liabilities from the sale of an airplane from her husband to her. Id. at 479-80. The Texas Supreme Court held that attorney immunity barred the claim because “[e]ven conduct that is ‘wrongful in the context of the underlying suit’ is not actionable if it is ‘part of the discharge of the lawyer’s duties in representing his or her client.’” Id. at 481. The following are key excerpts from the opinion:

Texas common law is well settled that an attorney does not owe a professional duty of care to third parties who are damaged by the attorney’s negligent representation of a client. Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575, 577 (Tex. 1996); see also McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex. 1999) (explaining that a lack of privity precludes attorneys’ liability to non-clients for legal malpractice). However, Texas courts have developed a more comprehensive affirmative defense protecting attorneys from liability to non-clients, stemming from the broad declaration over a century ago that “attorneys are authorized to practice their profession, to advise their clients and interpose any defense or supposed defense, without making themselves liable for damages.” Kruegel v. Murphy, 126 S.W. 343, 345 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ ref’d). This attorney-immunity defense is intended to ensure “loyal, faithful, and aggressive representation by attorneys employed as advocates.” Mitchell v. Chapman, 10 S.W.3d 810, 812 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied).

….

In accordance with this purpose, there is consensus among the courts of appeals that, as a general rule, attorneys are immune from civil liability to non-clients “for actions taken in connection with representing a client in litigation.” Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied); see also Toles v. Toles, 113 S.W.3d 899, 910 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.); Renfroe v. Jones & Assocs., 947 S.W.2d 285, 287-88 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied). Even conduct that is “wrongful in the context of the underlying suit” is not actionable if it is “part of the discharge of the lawyer’s duties in representing his or her client.” Toles, 113 S.W.3d at 910-11;

….

Conversely, attorneys are not protected from liability to non-clients for their actions when they do not qualify as “the kind of conduct in which an attorney engages when discharging his duties to his client.” Dixon Fin. Servs., 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2064, 2008 WL 746548, at *9; see also Chapman Children’s Trust v. Porter & Hedges, L.L.P., 32 S.W.3d 429, 442 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (noting that “it is the kind of conduct that is controlling, and not whether that conduct is meritorious or sanctionable”).

Because the focus in evaluating attorney liability to a non-client is “on the kind—not the nature—of the attorney’s conduct,” a general fraud exception would significantly undercut the defense. Dixon Fin. Servs., 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2064, 2008 WL 746548, at *8. Merely labeling an attorney’s conduct “fraudulent” does not and should not remove it from the scope of client representation or render it “foreign to the duties of an attorney.” Alpert, 178 S.W.3d at 406 (citing Poole, 58 Tex. at 137); see also Dixon Fin. Servs., 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2064, 2008 WL 746548, at *9 (“Characterizing an attorney’s action in advancing his client’s rights as fraudulent does not change the rule that an attorney cannot be held liable for discharging his duties to his client.”).

….

Fraud is not an exception to attorney immunity; rather, the defense does not extend to fraudulent conduct that is outside the scope of an attorney’s legal representation of his client, just as it does not extend to other wrongful conduct outside the scope of representation. An attorney who pleads the affirmative defense of attorney immunity has the burden to prove that his alleged wrongful conduct, regardless of whether it is labeled fraudulent, is part of the discharge of his duties to his client.

Id. at 481-484.

Based on the holding in Cantey Hanger, if an attorney is performing duties that a lawyer would typically perform, the attorney immunity defense would apply. This defense would likewise apply to aiding and abetting fraud and breaches of fiduciary duty. See Kastner v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 231 S.W.3d 571, 577-78 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007); Span Enters. v. Wood, 274 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008).

In Bethel v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C., the Court extended the Cantey Hanger holding to allegations of criminal conduct. 595 S.W.3d 651, 657-58 (Tex. 2020). There, the plaintiff had urged the Court “to recognize an exception” to attorney immunity “whe[n] a third party alleges that an attorney engaged in criminal conduct during the course of litigation.” Id. The Court rejected the invitation to adopt an exception or state a categorical rule because doing so would allow plaintiffs to avoid the attorney-immunity defense through artful pleading—”by merely alleging that an attorney’s conduct was ‘criminal.’” Id. The Court eschewed a categorical exception for criminal conduct because such an exception would defeat the purposes of the attorney-immunity defense. Instead, the Court held that conduct alleged to be criminal in nature “is not categorically excepted from the protections of attorney civil immunity when the conduct alleged is connected with representing a client in litigation.” Id. As we explained there, a lawyer who is doing his or her job is not more susceptible to civil liability just because a nonclient asserts that the lawyer’s actions are fraudulent, wrongful, or even criminal. Id.

In 2021, the Texas Supreme Court further clarified the holding in Cantey Hanger to state that “When an attorney personally participates ‘in a fraudulent business scheme with his client,’ as opposed to on his client’s behalf, the attorney ‘will not be heard to deny his liability’ because ‘such acts are entirely foreign to the duties of an attorney.’” Haynes & Boone, LLP v. NFTD, LLC, 631 S.W.3d 65, 77 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Poole v. Hous. & T.C. Ry. Co., 58 Tex. 134, 137 (1882)). The Court in Haynes & Boone, LLP, also expanded the Cantey Hanger holding to extend to transactional work that the attorney performs, in addition to litigation work covered in the Cantey Hanger opinion:

Today we confirm that attorney immunity applies to claims based on conduct outside the litigation context, so long as the conduct is the “kind” of conduct we have described above. We reach this conclusion because we see no meaningful distinction between the litigation context and the non-litigation context when it comes to the reasons we have recognized attorney immunity in the first place. We have recognized attorney immunity because attorneys are duty-bound to competently, diligently, and zealously represent their clients’ interests while avoiding any conflicting obligations or duties to themselves or others.

Id. at 79.

Most recently, in Taylor v. Tolbert, the Court reviewed whether there was an exception to immunity for private-party civil suits asserting that a lawyer has engaged in conduct criminalized by statute. No. 20-0727, 2022 Tex. LEXIS 385 (Tex. May 6, 2022). The court discussed the immunity defense as follows:

The common-law attorney-immunity defense applies to lawyerly work in “all adversarial contexts in which an attorney has a duty to zealously and loyally represent a client” but only when the claim against the attorney is based on “the kind of conduct” attorneys undertake while discharging their professional duties to a client. Stated inversely, if an attorney engages in conduct that is not “lawyerly work” or is “entirely foreign to the duties of a lawyer” or falls outside the scope of client representation, the attorney-immunity defense is inapplicable.

In determining whether conduct is “the kind” immunity protects, the inquiry focuses on the type of conduct at issue rather than the alleged wrongfulness of that conduct. But when the defense applies, counsel is shielded only from liability in a civil suit, not from “other mechanisms” that exist “to discourage and remedy” bad-faith or wrongful conduct, including sanctions, professional discipline, or criminal penalties, as appropriate.

Conduct is not the kind of conduct attorney immunity protects “simply because attorneys often engage in that activity” or because an attorney performed the activity on a client’s behalf. Rather, the conduct must involve “the uniquely lawyerly capacity” and the attorney’s skills as an attorney. For example, a lawyer who makes publicity statements to the press and on social media on a client’s behalf does “not partake of ‘the office, professional training, skill, and authority of an attorney’” because “[a]nyone—including press agents, spokespersons, or someone with no particular training or authority at all—can publicize a client’s allegations to the media.” Immunity attaches only if the attorney is discharging “lawyerly” duties to his or her client.

A corollary to this principle is that attorneys will not be entitled to civil immunity for conduct that is “entirely foreign to the duties of an attorney.” “Foreign to the duties” does not mean something a good attorney should not do; it means that the attorney is acting outside his or her capacity and function as an attorney. For that reason, whether counsel may claim the privilege turns on the task that was being performed, not whether the challenged conduct was meritorious.

This is so because the interests of clients demand that lawyers “competently, diligently, and zealously represent their clients’ interests while avoiding any conflicting obligations or duties to themselves or others.” To prevent chilling an attorney’s faithful discharge of this duty, lawyers must be able to pursue legal rights they deem necessary and proper for their clients without the menace of civil liability looming over them and influencing their actions. Attorney immunity furthers “loyal, faithful, and aggressive representation” by “essentially . . . removing the fear of personal liability,” thus “alleviating in the mind of [an] attorney any fear that he or she may be sued by or held liable to a non-client for providing . . . zealous representation.” In this way, the defense protects not only attorneys but also their clients, who can be assured that counsel is representing the client’s best interests, not the lawyer’s.

Id. The Court acknowledged that “there is a wide range of criminal conduct that is not within the ‘scope of client representation’ and [is] therefore ‘foreign to the duties of an attorney,’” and that “when that is the case, the circumstances do not give rise to an ‘exception’ to the immunity defense; rather, such conduct simply fails to satisfy the requirements for invoking the defense in the first instance.” Id. “[O]ur approach to applying the attorney-immunity defense remains functional, not qualitative, and leaves an attorney’s improper conduct addressable by public remedies.” Id.

The Court then held that the common-law defense of attorney immunity would still apply to state statutes (unless the statute specifically abrogated that defense). Id. The Court stated:

That does not mean that all conduct criminalized by the wiretap statute is immunized from civil liability or free of consequences. As we explained in Bethel, while criminal conduct is not categorically excepted from the attorney-immunity defense, neither is it categorically immunized by that defense. Criminal conduct may fall outside the scope of attorney immunity, and even when it does not, “nothing in our attorney-immunity jurisprudence affects an attorney’s potential criminal liability if the conduct constitutes a criminal offense.”

Id. However, regarding federal statutes, the Court concluded “that attorney immunity, as recognized and defined under Texas law, is not a defense under the federal wiretap statute because, quite simply, a state’s common-law defense does not apply to federal statutes.” Id.

In light of the foregoing authorities, it appears claims against attorneys merely doing work for a client (whether fraudulent, tortious, or even criminal) would be covered by attorney immunity and bar any participation in breach of fiduciary duty claim. However, if the misconduct relates to the attorney personally benefitting from the transaction, or having been a party to the transaction (as opposed to merely the attorney for a party), such an immunity would not apply. See, e.g., Olmos v. Giles, No. 3:22-CV-0077-D, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77134 (N.D. Tex. April 28, 2022) (refused to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claim and misrepresentation claim against attorneys where it was unclear whether the defendant attorneys were a part of the transaction).

Another issue that should be discussed is the impact on the attorney client privilege when an attorney participates in fraud or criminal activities. The attorney-client privilege cannot be enforced when “the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud.” Tex. R. Evid. 503 (d)(1). As one court describes:

The exception applies only when (1) a prima facie case is made of contemplated fraud, and (2) there is a relationship between the document at issue and the prima facie proof offered. A prima facie showing is sufficient if it sets forth evidence that, if believed by a trier of fact, would establish the elements of a fraud or crime that “was ongoing or about to be committed when the document was prepared.” A court may look to the document itself to determine whether a prima facie case has been established.…

We begin our analysis by examining the scope of the fraud portion of the crime/fraud exception. The Texas Rules of Evidence do not define what is intended in Rule 503(d)(1) by the phrase “to commit . . . [a] fraud.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines fraud as: “A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment.” The Texas common law tort of fraud also requires proof of misrepresentation, concealment, or non-disclosure. The legal concept of fraud therefore has at its core a misrepresentation or concealment. This definition also dovetails with the apparent reasoning behind inclusion of fraud in the exception: by keeping client communications confidential–pursuant to the attorney-client privilege –the attorney whose client intends to make a misrepresentation or concealment helps prevent the injured party from learning the truth about the misrepresentation or concealment. Thus, in that situation, the attorney’s silence affirmatively aids the client in committing the tort. This is not generally true of other torts (not based on misrepresentation or concealment) and explains why the exception is not the crime/tort exception.

In re Gen. Agents Ins. Co. of Am., Inc., 224 S.W.3d 806, 819 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, orig. proceeding). Moreover, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that this exception includes the work-product in the proper circumstances. Woodruff v. State, 330 S.W.3d 709, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 9569 (Tex. App. Texarkana Dec. 3, 2010), pet. ref’d No. PD-1807-10, 2011 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 749 (Tex. Crim. App. May 25, 2011), pet. ref’d No. PD-1807-10, 2011 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 770 (Tex. Crim. App. June 1, 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 977, 132 S. Ct. 502, 181 L. Ed. 2d 347, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7788 (U.S. 2011).

So, though an attorney may be immune from civil liability, the crime/fraud exception may open up attorney/client communications to the light of day. Regarding crimes involving breaches of fiduciary duty, in addition to theft crimes, the Texas Legislature has created the following crimes: (1) Financial Abuse of Elderly Individual in Texas Penal Code Section 32.55; 2) Financial Exploitation of Vulnerable Individuals in Texas Penal Code Section 32.53; (3) Misapplication of Fiduciary Property in Texas Penal Code Section 32.45; and (4) Failure to Report of the Exploitation of the Elderly or Disabled Individuals in the Texas Human Resources Code Section 48.051.

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SEC Commissioner Signals Need to Fulfill Mandate of Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Develop “Minimum Standards” for Lawyers Practicing Before the Commission

In remarks on March 5, 2022, on PLI’s Corporate Governance webcast, Commissioner Allison Herren Lee of the Securities and Exchange Commission stated that 20 years after its enactment, it is time to revisit the “unfulfilled mandate” of Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and establish minimum standards for lawyers practicing before the Commission.1  Commissioner Lee, who announced that she will not seek a second term when her current one ends this month, took issue with what she called the “goal-directed reasoning” of some securities lawyers—that is, focusing primarily on the outcome sought by executives, rather than the impact on investors and the market as a whole.  Such lawyering, Commissioner Lee observed, has a host of negative consequences, including encouraging non-disclosure of material information, harming investors and market integrity, and stymying deterrence.  The solution, Commissioner Lee opined, is to fulfill the mandate of Section 307, which empowered the Commission to “issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers.”2

Over the last 20 years, the Commission has declined to adopt enhanced rules of professional conduct for lawyers appearing before the Commission.  There are good reasons for the Commission’s inaction, including the attorney-client privilege, the goal of zealous advocacy, the fact-specific nature of materiality determinations, and the traditionally state-law basis for the regulation of attorney conduct.  Commissioner Lee, moreover, did not propose specific new rules and recognized that the task was difficult and should be informed by the views of the securities bar and other stakeholders.  Nor did she say that action by the Commission was imminent; it is unclear whether the Commission has authority to promulgate new rules under Section 307 given a 180-day sunset under the statute that occurred in 2003.  Indeed, neither Commissioner Lee nor any of the other SEC commissioners have issued statements on this topic since the PLI webcast.  SEC Enforcement Director Gurbir Grewal has, however, indicated an increased emphasis on gatekeeper accountability in order to restore public trust in the market.3  Nonetheless, given the Commission’s existing authority to impose discipline under its Rules of Practice, practitioners should be mindful of the potential for increased scrutiny moving forward.

Background

In the wake of corporate accounting scandals involving Enron, Worldcom, and other companies, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 “[t]o safeguard investors in public companies and restore trust in the financial markets.”4  The Act was aimed at “combating fraud, improving the reliability of financial reporting, and restoring investor confidence,”5 including by empowering the SEC with increased regulatory authority and enforcement power.6  To that end, the Act includes provisions to fortify auditor independence, promote corporate responsibility, enhance financial disclosures, and enhance corporate fraud accountability.7

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed just six months after the collapse of Enron in December 2001, and neither the House nor Senate bills originally contained professional responsibility language.8  Hours before the Senate passed its version of the Act, however, the Senate amended the bill to include language that would eventually become Section 307.9  Around the same time, 40 law professors sent a letter to the SEC requesting the inclusion of a professional conduct rule governing corporate lawyers practicing before the Commission.10  The letter picked up on a 1996 article by Professor Richard Painter, then of the University of Illinois College of Law, which recommended corporate fraud disclosure obligations for attorneys similar to those imposed on accountants by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.11  Senator John Edwards, one of the sponsors of the Senate floor amendment of the bill, emphasized the importance of including professional conduct rules for attorneys in such a significant piece of legislation, stating that “[o]ne of the problems we have seen occurring with this sort of crisis in corporate misconduct is that some lawyers have forgotten their responsibility” is to the companies and shareholders they represent, not corporate executives.12

In its final form, Section 307 imposed a professional responsibility requirement for attorneys that represent issuers appearing before the Commission.  Specifically, Section 307 directed the Commission, within 180 days of enactment of the law, to “issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers,”13 and, at minimum, promulgate “a rule requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities laws or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the issuer or any agent thereof to appropriate officers within the issuer and, thereafter, to the highest authority within the issuer, if the initial report does not result in an appropriate response.”14

Since the enactment of Section 307, however, the Commission has promulgated only one rule pursuant to its authority, commonly known as the “up-the-ladder” rule.15  The up-the-ladder rule imposes a duty on attorneys representing an issuer before the Commission to report evidence of material violations of the securities laws.  When an attorney learns of evidence of a material violation, the attorney has a duty to report it to the issuer’s chief legal officer (“CLO”) and/or the CEO.16  If the attorney believes the CLO or CEO did not take appropriate action within a reasonable time to address the violation, the attorney has a duty to report the evidence to the audit committee, another committee of independent directors, or the full board of directors until the attorney receives “an appropriate response.”17  Alternatively, attorneys can satisfy their duty by reporting the violation to a qualified legal compliance committee.18  To date, the SEC has never brought a case alleging a violation of the up-the-ladder rule.

Commissioner Lee’s Remarks

In her remarks, Commissioner Lee stated that it is time to revisit the “unfulfilled mandate” of Section 307 and consider whether the Commission should adopt and enforce minimum standards for lawyers who practice before the Commission.  Commissioner Lee criticized “goal-directed reasoning” employed by sophisticated counsel in securities matters, and cited as an example Bandera Master Fund v. Boardwalk Pipeline,19 a recent decision in which the Delaware Court of Chancery rebuked the attorneys involved for their efforts to satisfy the aims of a general partner instead of their duty to the partnership-client as a whole.  The Court, specifically, stated that counsel “knowingly made unrealistic and counterfactual assumptions, knowingly relied on an artificial factual predicate, and consistently engaged in goal-directed reasoning to get to the result that [the general partner] wanted.”20  Bandera and cases like it, according to Commissioner Lee, are emblematic of a “race to the bottom” caused by pressure on securities lawyers to compete with each other for clients, while failing to give due consideration to the potential impact on investors, market integrity, and the public interest.

In Commissioner Lee’s view, “goal-directed” lawyering not only falls short of ethical standards but causes harm to the market and reduces deterrence.  Commissioner Lee expressed concern that, in an effort to give management the answer it wants, lawyers may downplay or obscure material information.21  Although recognizing that materiality determinations are fact-intensive, Commissioner Lee said that should not provide blanket cover for legal advice aimed at concealing material information from the public.  Non-disclosure has a host of negative consequences, including distorting market-moving information, interfering with price discovery, misallocating capital, impairing investor decision-making, and eroding confidence in the financial markets and regulatory system.  Further, such lawyering diminishes deterrence by creating a legal cover for inadequate disclosure, making it more difficult for regulators to hold responsible individuals accountable.  This type of legal counsel, in Commissioner Lee’s view, “is merely rent-seeking masquerading as legal advice, while providing a shield against liability.”

Commissioner Lee stated that the existing framework governing professional conduct is not adequate to hold lawyers accountable for such “reckless” advice.  According to Commissioner Lee, state bars—the principal source for lawyer discipline nationwide—are not up to the task because they lack resources, expertise in securities matters, and the ability to impose adequate monetary sanctions.  Additionally, Commissioner Lee noted that state law standards focused mostly on the behavior of individual lawyers, assigning few responsibilities to the firm for quality assurance.  Indeed, state law standards are mostly drafted in a “one-size-fits-all fashion” according to Commissioner Lee, and do not take into account the different issues faced at large firms that represent public companies, which are quite different from a solo practitioner handling personal injury or estate law matters.  Likewise, although the SEC has the power under Rule 102(e) of its Rules of Practice to suspend or bar attorneys whose conduct falls below “generally recognized norms of professional conduct,” there has been little effort to define or enforce that standard.22  Nor has the SEC rigorously enforced standards of attorney conduct under the one rule it has issued under Section 307, the “up-the-ladder” rule.

Commissioner Lee stated that it was time for the Commission to fulfill its mandate under Section 307.  Although not proposing any specific rules, Commissioner Lee offered the following concepts as a starting point:

  • Greater detail on lawyers’ obligations to a corporate client, including how advice must reflect “the interests of the corporation and its shareholders rather than the executives who hire them”;
  • Requirements of “competence and expertise” (as an example, disclosure lawyers should not opine on materiality “without sufficient focus or understanding of the views of ‘reasonable’ investors”);
  • Continuing education for securities lawyers advising public companies (similar to requirements set by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board for minimum hours of qualifying continuing professional education for audit firm personnel);
  • Oversight at the firm level (similar to quality-control measures implemented at audit firms);
  • Emphasis on the need for independence in rendering advice (similar to substantive and disclosure requirements implemented in Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X for auditors);
  • Obligations to investigate red flags and ensure accurate predicates for legal opinions (similar to the obligations that an auditor must perform to certify to the accuracy of their client’s financial statements); and
  • Retention of contemporaneous records to support the reasonableness of legal advice.

Commissioner Lee noted that the content of any specific rules or standards will require “careful thought,” as well as assistance from the securities bar, experts on professional responsibility, and other interested parties and market participants.  She invited input from the legal community and other stakeholders and noted that she appreciated the complexity of the task and concerns of the American Bar Association and others regarding protection of the attorney-client privilege.  Indeed, outside auditors are generally regarded as “public watchdogs” and such communications between the corporation and an auditor are not entitled to the affirmative attorney-client privilege afforded to legal counsel.  Accordingly, regulating the legal profession using a similar framework to that applied to the accounting profession has sparked more controversy.  Nonetheless, in Commissioner Lee’s view, those concerns should be weighed against “the costs of there being few, if any, consequences for contrived or tortured advice.”

Implications

The Commission has declined to adopt enhanced rules of professional conduct for lawyers appearing before it in the 20 years since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Commissioner Lee’s call for minimum standards, however, potentially signals increased scrutiny by the SEC with respect to lawyers who “practice before the Commission.”  As Commissioner Lee noted, that means “counsel involved in the formulation and review of issuers’ public disclosure, including those who address the many legal questions that often arise in that context.”23  Nonetheless, Commissioner Lee cautioned that she did “not intend with these comments to address the conduct of attorneys serving as litigators or otherwise representing their client(s) in an advocacy role in an adversarial proceeding or other similar context, such as in an enforcement investigation.”24

Although framing her call for standards in terms of Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it is not clear that the Commission will—or even can—promulgate any further rules under that authority.  Commissioner Lee did not state that she was speaking on behalf of the Commission or indicate that the Commission would be taking concrete, imminent steps to adopt such standards.  The Commission has not put its imprimatur on the remarks by incorporating them into a formal release or statement of policy.  Moreover, the text of Section 307 appears to foreclose the possibility of further rulemaking, as it provides that the Commission shall issue any such rules “[n]ot later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this act,” i.e., January 27, 2003.  Consistent with that constraint, the SEC proposed the up-the-ladder requirements on November 21, 2002, in Release No. 33-8150, and the rule became final on January 29, 2003.25  But the SEC has not issued any other rule under Section 307 to date.

Even if official action under Section 307 may not be forthcoming, Commissioner Lee’s call for action should not be discounted.  Setting aside the up-the-ladder requirements, the SEC has authority under Rule 102(e) of the SEC’s Rules of Practice to censure or bar a lawyer from appearing or practicing before the Commission if found, among other things, “[t]o be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged and unethical or improper professional conduct.”26  Commissioner Lee cited prior SEC guidance to indicate that Rule 102(e) may apply to attorney conduct that falls below “generally recognized norms of professional conduct,”27 a standard that has been left undefined to date.28  In practice, the SEC “will hold attorneys who practice before it to the standards to which they are already subject, including state bar rules.”29  At a minimum, then, Commissioner Lee’s objective of greater accountability may be achieved through a more aggressive application of Rule 102(e), which, as she noted, has generally only been applied as a follow-on penalty for primary violations of the securities laws by lawyers.

Commissioner Lee’s term expires on June 5, and she has announced that she intends to step down from the Commission once a successor has been confirmed.30  Should the Commission nonetheless take up her call to action in the future, it will be no easy task to adopt clear standards that can be implemented in a predictable manner.  In particular, Commissioner Lee’s focus on the role of lawyers in advising issuers on determinations of materiality and disclosure does not lend itself well to oversight or enforcement.  The well-established standard for materiality—whether “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote”—is far from clear-cut.31  The Supreme Court, moreover, long has recognized that materiality “depends on the facts and thus is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.”32  As such, and as evidenced by the sundry cases concerning disclosure issues reversed on appeal, disagreement between litigants—as well as jurists—on matters of materiality and disclosure are par for the course.  If that is so, how can a lawyer’s advice on such matters (which will inevitably turn on the facts and the lawyer’s judgment and experience) be subject to oversight in any objective sense?

Even if lawyers’ materiality advice could be evaluated under objective standards, there are other difficulties.  First and foremost is that oversight of legal advice implicates the attorney-client privilege and the underlying benefit of candid advice from securities disclosure and corporate counsel.  As the Supreme Court has observed, the attorney-client privilege “is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.”33  Aside from situations in which the client has voluntarily waived privilege (as sometimes occurs in SEC investigations) or where another exception to the privilege applies, it is unclear how the SEC could evaluate legal advice without invading privilege.  Such attempts could have led to an increase in corporate wrongdoing as corporate executives could be more reluctant to seek expert legal advice.  In addition, it is unclear how regulators assessing materiality advice would—or could—balance an assessment of whether a lawyer has given the “correct” advice with a lawyer’s ethical obligations of zealous representation of the client.34  The divide between overreaching “goal-directed” reasoning and permissible zealous advocacy for the client is often murky, and reasonable minds can differ depending on the circumstances.  Moreover, it is already well-accepted that a corporate lawyer’s obligation is to the corporation as its client, not to any individual officer or director.35  That obligation carries with it ethical duties to “proceed as is reasonably necessary for the best interest” of the corporation, including when the lawyer is aware of violations of the law or other misconduct by senior management.36  In that sense, Commissioner Lee’s proposal could be viewed as a call for the SEC to take on enforcement of existing ethical rules, rather than for the development of novel “minimum standards.”

Ultimately, there are good reasons for the Commission’s reluctance to date to formally adopt minimum standards of professional conduct for lawyers appearing before it, including the attorney-client privilege, the goal of zealous advocacy, and the fact-specific nature of materiality inquiries.  The manipulation of facts and bad reasoning targeted by Commissioner Lee are not only the exception, and difficult if not impossible to eliminate completely, but are largely covered by existing rules and practices.  Nonetheless, Commissioner Lee’s call for lawyers to strive for higher legal and ethical standards in their counsel should be welcomed.  Sound legal advice is not only important for issuer clients, but also for the financial well-being of investors, the integrity of the markets, and public confidence in the regulatory system and capital markets.  Enhancements in ethical standards for the legal profession could also lead to reputational benefits and greater integrity in the profession.  It remains to be seen whether Commissioner Lee’s remarks will serve as an aspirational goal for securities lawyers, or translate into concrete action by the Commission.


1 Commissioner Allison Herren Lee, Send Lawyers, Guns and Money: (Over-) Zealous Representation by Corporate Lawyers Remarks at PLI’s Corporate Governance – A Master Class 2022 (Mar. 4, 2022), [hereinafter “Commissioner Lee Remarks”].

See Sarbanes‑Oxley Act, § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).

3 Gurbir Grewal, Director, Division of Enforcement, Remarks at SEC Speaks 2021 (Oct. 13, 2021).

Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 432 (2014).

5 Stephen Wagner and Lee Dittmar, The Unexpected Benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley, Harvard Bus. Rev. (Apr. 2006).

See Sarbanes–Oxley Act, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 7202 (2002).

See Sarbanes–Oxley Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2002).

8 Jennifer Wheeler, Securities Law: Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Irreconcilable Conflict with the ABA’s Model Rules and the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct?, 56 Okla. L. Rev. 461, 464 (2003).

Id.

10 Id. at 468-69.

11 See generally Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate Fraud: Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. Rev. 225 (1996).

12 Wheeler, supra note 8, at 465 (quoting 148 Cong. Rec. S6551 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards)).

13 See Sarbanes‑Oxley Act, § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).

14 Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Rel. No. 8185 (Sept. 26, 2003).

15 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.7.

16 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1).

17 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.3(b)(3), (b)(4).

18 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c).

19 Bandera Master Fund LP v. Boardwalk Pipeline Partners, LP, No. CV 2018-0372-JTL, 2021 WL 5267734, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 2021).  In Bandera, plaintiffs brought suit against a general partner for breach of a partnership agreement stemming from the general partner’s exercise of a call right without satisfying two requisite preconditions.  The court held for the plaintiffs and found the general partner had engaged in willful misconduct.  Id. at *51.  Contributing to the misconduct was the general partner’s outside counsel, who drafted an opinion letter justifying the general partner’s exercise of the call right.  Id.  Throughout the drafting process, the court found, that the outside counsel manipulated the facts in order to achieve the general partner’s desired conclusion.  Id. at *18-*47.

20 Id. at *51.

21 Commissioner Lee specifically cited, among other matters, environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) disclosures.  The Commission is currently considering additional climate change-related disclosures to Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X.  See Jason Halper et al., SEC Proposes Climate-Related Changes to Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP (Mar. 23, 2022); see also Paul Kiernan, SEC Proposes More Disclosure Requirements for ESG Funds, The Wall Street Journal (May 25, 2022, 6:26 pm ET).

22 Rule 102(e) states, in relevant part:

(1) Generally. The Commission may censure a person or deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by the Commission after notice and opportunity for hearing in the matter:

(i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others; or

(ii) to be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct; or

(iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws or the rules and regulations thereunder.

17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1).

23 Commissioner Lee Remarks, supra note 1.

24 Id.

25 Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Rel. No. 8150 (Nov. 21, 2002); Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Rel. No. 8185 (Sept. 26, 2003); see also 2 Legal Malpractice § 14:114 (2022 ed.).

26 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e).  The Rules of Practice generally “govern proceedings before the Commission under the statutes that it administers.” 17 C.F.R. § 201.100.  The SEC has the authority to administer and enforce such rules pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et. seq. See Comment to Rule 100, SEC Rules of Practice (July 2003).

27 In the Matter of William R. Carter Charles J. Johnson, 47 S.E.C. 471 (Feb. 28, 1981) (“elemental notions of fairness dictate that the Commission should not establish new rules of conduct and impose them retroactively upon professionals who acted at the time without reason to believe that their conduct was unethical or improper.  At the same time, however, we perceive no unfairness whatsoever in holding those professionals who practice before us to generally recognized norms of professional conduct, whether or not such norms had previously been explicitly adopted or endorsed by the Commission.  To do so upsets no justifiable expectations, since the professional is already subject to those norms.”).

28 In the past, the Commission has sought to discipline lawyers for violating securities laws with scienter, rendering misleading opinions used in disclosures and engaged in otherwise liable conduct, but not for giving negligent legal advice to issuers. See In the Matter of Scott G. Monson, Release No. 28323 (June 30, 2008) (collecting cases).

29 In the Matter of Steven Altman, Esq., Release No. 63306 (Nov. 10, 2010).

30 Statement of Planned Departure from the Commission (Mar. 15, 2022).

31 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).

32 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988).

33 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888)).

34 Rule 1.3: Diligence, American Bar Association, (last visited Mar. 18, 2022) (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”); Rule 1.3 Diligence – Comment 1, American Bar Association,  (last visited Mar. 18, 2022) (“A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”).

35 See, e.g.Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.

36 Rule 1.13: Organization As Client, American Bar Association, cmt. 2  (last visited April 19, 2022).

© Copyright 2022 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

How to Create an Impactful and Authentic Pride Month Social Media Campaign for Your Company

June is Pride Month, which offers companies of all kinds a unique opportunity to celebrate, show support and raise awareness for LGBTQIA+ rights on their social media channels.

Businesses of all kinds and sizes can get involved, raise awareness and give back for Pride Month regardless of their budget or reach.

While Pride is most definitely a celebration, an impactful Pride campaign should include education, awareness, and center around people.

Celebrating Pride and showing your support for the LGBTQIA+ community is not a trend— and it shouldn’t be treated as such.

Here’s how to create and implement an impactful and genuine Pride Month social media campaign at your company.

The Do’s and Don’ts of Pride Month social media planning

Before you dive head-first into planning your corporate Pride initiatives, it’s important to get a wide range of employees involved in the planning process.

If your company has an LGBTQIA+ affinity group or diversity committee, collaborate with them or if you don’t have a group, consider convening a committee of employee volunteers of diverse backgrounds to serve as a sounding board and provide their input as your plans begin to take shape.

Please note: these volunteers should be compensated for their time and efforts in some meaningful way (vacation time, bonuses, gift cards, etc.). While it may be too late to do this for this year’s campaign, activate or assemble the group now for your 2023 initiative.

Don’t: Exploit social initiatives and conversations as a means to reach business goals.

Celebrating Pride and showing your support for the LGBTQIA+ community is not a trend— and it shouldn’t be treated as such.

If you’re simply posting rainbow-branded imagery (rainbow washing) during the month or posting about your commitment to the cause without having any real initiatives or actions to back it up, you’re just paying lip service to and perhaps exploiting yet another social initiative. Make sure your company can really walk the walk before you talk the talk. Performative allyship can backfire, alienating your employees, your clients, recruits, and others.

Remember that everyone (employees, clients, and the general public) is watching what you post online, even if they don’t actually like or comment on it.

Do: Ask yourself why you’re supporting this initiative and have a clear purpose.

Before publishing Pride-related content, ask yourself, are we actually adding value to this conversation? What are we hoping to gain from inserting ourselves into this conversation? What are our motivations? Is our company an actual safe space or inclusive environment that includes active and engaged allies?

Remember, Pride Month should not be about your business goals. You also don’t have to have accomplished all of your LGBTQIA+ related inclusion goals to commemorate Pride, but your efforts should be more than surface level.

Do: Support LGBTQIA+ initiatives year-round.

If you don’t already take steps to support the LGBTQIA+ community year-round, take the opportunity to discuss doing so with management and staff before Pride. June is only one month out of the year, a month where it’s arguably the “most acceptable” to show support for the LGBTQIA+ community. To be a true ally, it’s important to show this level of support year-round. Work to ensure that your company’s policies and practices are inclusive and address the needs of your LGBTQIA+ employees.

In addition to internally focused actions, consider how your true commitment can be reflected externally. There are many organizations to which you can donate and volunteer. Solicit voluntary feedback from your LGBTQIA+ employees and clients to ensure that they feel involved and included in the process.

Do: Educate yourself and those around you on the origins and history of Pride Month.

Pride Month has a rich, political history that companies often fail to understand and recognize as they participate in Pride Month. Pride Month is celebrated in June to honor the 1969 Stonewall Uprising in Manhattan — a tipping point for the Gay Liberation Movement in the United States.

Not only is Pride a time to recognize the progress that’s been made since the Stonewall Riots, but it’s just as important to acknowledge how far we still must go as a society, particularly considering recent efforts to overturn or narrow the progress that has been made. A successful Pride campaign should have education and awareness at its core.

Do: Make education and awareness the core of your campaign.

Ideas for content for your Pride Campaign can include educating your followers on the meaning behind the Pride flag, using posts to tell the history of the Pride flag, and what Pride means to your employees, and run their answers in Q&A posts.

Another idea is to create posts to help followers better understand Pride Month and provide resources to help people better educate themselves on the cause and support those of the LGBTQIA+ community.

In addition, spotlighting members of the LGBTQIA+ community is a helpful way to educate your followers and amplify the contributions of individuals.

No matter what you choose, create a campaign that is rooted in improving awareness and education amongst your community.

Do: Let inclusivity be at the core of your all campaigns.

Inclusivity should be an active mission as part of your Pride campaign, and for your future marketing efforts too. Aim to have better representation on social media for your community — that means including people of all marginalized or otherwise underrepresented voices.

If you really want to reach, represent, and support your diverse community, it’s time to make active shifts towards better inclusive marketing year-round. It’s less about what you need to do for Pride today and instead, how are you supporting LGBTQIA+ folks year-round?

Do: Put your money (and time) where your mouth is.

Instead of treating Pride like a marketing campaign, put your efforts toward an activity that will positively impact the LGBTQIA+ community.

While monetary donations can be helpful, volunteering at community events or spending time with LGBTQIA+ advocacy organizations can be more impactful for your employees.

Consider hosting or taking part in LGBTQIA+ programming and donating to local charities doing work in your community to support LGBTQIA+ initiatives.

Do: Use the right hashtags to be discovered

  • #lgbtqia
  • #lgbtqpride
  • #lgbtqhumanrights
  • #equality
  • #pridemonth
  • #loveislove
  • #pride

Every organization that wants to support Pride on social media can find a way to do so, we challenge you to do it in a way that is authentic, genuine, and impactful to your brand and most importantly, to your employees and your clients. The world is watching you, so challenge yourself by doing the right thing.

This article was authored by Stefanie Marrone of Stefanie Marrone Consulting, and Paula T. Edgar, Esq, the CEO of PGE Consulting Group LLC, a firm that provides training and education solutions at the intersection of professional development and diversity, equity and inclusion. 

For more legal marketing and law office management news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022, Stefanie M. Marrone. All Rights Reserved.

“My Lawyer Made Me Do It” is Not an Absolute Defense to Bankruptcy Court Sanctions

Last year, we offered a lesson and a moral from a North Carolina district court decision reversing a $115,000 sanctions order by a North Carolina bankruptcy court.

The lesson from the case was that the bankruptcy court cannot sanction a creditor if there is an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor’s conduct is lawful.

The moral was that a creditor can avoid the time, expense, and risk associated with litigating contempt and sanctions issues by taking basic steps to ensure that confirmed Chapter 11 plans are clear and precise.  The moral is even more glaring now because a recent decision from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reveals that the parties continue to fight in court over the easily-avoidable sanctions order.  The decision also clarifies when and why a bankruptcy court can sanction a creditor.

Factual Background

In 2009, the Beckharts filed Chapter 11.  At the time, they were almost a year behind on a loan secured by the property at Kure Beach.  The loan servicer objected to planning confirmation because it did not specify how post-petition mortgage payments would be applied to principal and interest.  The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan without clarifying the issue, but the servicer did not ask the court to reconsider its order, nor did it appeal.

The Beckharts paid for five years.  Shellpoint acquired the loan from the original servicer and treated it as in default based on unpaid accrued arrearages.  Periodically, Shellpoint sent default letters to the Beckharts, who disputed the default.  Counsel for Shellpoint advised that the confirmation order had not changed the loan contract terms and that the loan remained in default.  The matter escalated with the Beckharts filing complaints with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.  Shellpoint commenced foreclosure, then represented to the Beckharts that it was ceasing foreclosure, but then posted a foreclosure hearing notice on the Beckharts’ door (allegedly due to error).

Litigation

In January 2020, the Beckharts moved the bankruptcy court to find Shellpoint in contempt and award them monetary sanctions.  The court held a hearing in June and, in September 2020, found Shellpoint in contempt.  The court tagged Shellpoint with $115,000 in sanctions for lost wages, “loss of a fresh start,” attorney’s fees, and travel expenses.

Bankruptcy courts have the power to hold a party in civil contempt and to impose sanctions for violation of a confirmed plan.  The test for liability is based on a recent United States Supreme Court decision — Taggart v. Lorenzen.  The Taggart test prohibits sanctions if there was an “objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor’s conduct might be lawful.” There can be contempt for violating the discharge injunction only “if there is no fair ground of doubt as to whether the order barred the creditor’s conduct.”

In reversing the bankruptcy court, the district court noted that the plan and confirmation order did not state how much the debtors would owe on confirmation, did not say how the $23,000 in arrears would be paid, and did not set the amount of the first payment.  Confusingly, the confirmation order also said that the original loan terms would remain in effect, except as modified.  Finally, the district court pointed out that Shellpoint was repeatedly advised by counsel that their behavior was authorized, and reliance on the advice of outside counsel is a sufficient defense to civil sanctions.  Based on all these facts, the district court found that Shellpoint acted in good faith and interpreted the confirmation order in a manner consistent with the contractual terms of the loan, and that was objectively reasonable.

Taggart was a Chapter 7 case involving a discharge violation, but the Fourth Circuit held that the “no fair ground of doubt” test applied broadly in bankruptcy – including in Chapter 11 cases.

But the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s decision to reverse the bankruptcy court because the creditor had requested and received legal advice from outside counsel.  The Fourth Circuit held that advice of counsel is not an absolute defense in civil contempt.   The Court suggested that, under the Taggart test, advice of counsel “may still be considered in appropriate circumstances as a relevant factor” and “a party’s reliance on guidance from outside counsel may be instructive, at least in part, when determining whether that party’s belief that she was complying with the order was objectively unreasonable.”

The Fourth Circuit held that both lower courts had made mistakes and sent the case back to the bankruptcy court to “reconsider the contempt motion under the correct legal standard, including any additional fact-finding that may be necessary.”

Creditors can take some comfort in the “no fair ground of doubt” test, which is more forgiving than a strict liability standard.  But creditors can’t blame their lawyer for perilous conduct and expect the court to exonerate them.

But the most important takeaway hasn’t changed:  Creditors should insist on clear and specific plan terms.  After over two years of litigation, Shellpoint remains in peril of sanctions.  All of this could have been avoided had the loan servicer insisted the plan specify how the Beckharts’ payments would be applied to satisfy the arrearage.

© 2022 Ward and Smith, P.A.. All Rights Reserved.

USCIS to Implement Premium Processing for Certain Previously Filed Form I-140 Petitions

On May 24, 2022, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) announced that it would begin implementing premium processing for certain petitioners who have a pending Form I-140 under the EB-1 and EB-2 classifications.

As explained in our previous alert, USCIS had announced that it will expand its premium processing service to include additional immigration benefit case types, pursuant to a final rule issued by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The rule is intended to implement the Emergency Stopgap USCIS Stabilization Act passed by Congress and is part of USCIS’s efforts to reduce existing backlogs and provide needed relief to Employment Authorization Document (EAD) cardholders.

While the rule will become effective on May 31, 2022, it will be implemented in a phased approach over a three-year period. USCIS has now begun implementing these changes to premium processing, starting with certain Form I-140 classifications: EB-1C (classification as a multinational executive or manager) and EB-2 (classification as a member of professions with advanced degrees or exceptional ability seeking a national interest waiver (NIW)).

This expansion will occur in the following phases:

  • Beginning June 1, 2022, USCIS will accept premium processing requests for EB-1C multinational executive and manager petitions received on or before January 1, 2021.
  • Beginning July 1, 2022, USCIS will accept premium processing requests for EB-2 NIW petitions received on or before June 1, 2021, and EB-1C multinational executive and manager petitions received on or before March 1, 2021.

USCIS will only accept premium processing requests for currently pending cases based on their date of filing, as noted above. USCIS is not accepting new Form I-140 petitions in these categories with a premium processing request at this time. We anticipate that USCIS will expand premium processing requests for more recently filed EB-1 and EB-2 petitions in the future.

Article By Shannon N. Parker of Mintz

For more immigration legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©1994-2022 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

If You Can’t Stand the Heat, Don’t Build the Kitchen: Construction Company Settles Allegations of Small Business Subcontracting Fraud for $2.8 Million

For knowingly hiring a company that was not a service-disabled, veteran-owned small business to fulfill a set aside contract, a construction contractor settled allegations of small business subcontracting fraud for $2.8 million.  A corporate whistleblower, Fox Unlimited Enterprises, brought this misconduct to light.  We previously reported on the record-setting small business fraud settlement with TriMark USA LLC, to which this settlement is related.  For reporting government contracts fraud, the whistleblower will receive $630,925 of the settlement.

According to the allegations, the general contractor and construction company Hensel Phelps was awarded a General Services Administration (GSA) contract to build the Armed Forces Retirement Home’s New Commons/Health Care Building in Washington, D.C.  Part of the contract entailed sharing the work with small businesses, including service-disabled, veteran-owned small businesses (SDVOSB).  The construction contractor negotiated all aspects of the contract with an unidentified subcontractor and then hired an SDVOSB, which, according to the settlement agreement, Hensel Phelps knew was “merely a passthrough” for the larger subcontractor, thus creating the appearance of an SDVOSB performing the work on the contract to meet the set-aside requirements.  The supposedly SDVOSB subcontractor was hired to provide food service equipment for the Armed Forces Retirement Home building.

“Set aside” contracts are government contracts intended to provide opportunities to SDVOSB, women-owned small businesses, and other economically disadvantaged companies to do work they might not otherwise access.  Large businesses performing work on government contracts are often required to subcontract part of their work to these types of small businesses.  “Taking advantage of contracts intended for companies owned and operated by service-disabled veterans demonstrates a shocking disregard for fair competition and integrity in government contracting,” said the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Washington, as well as a shocking disregard for proper stewardship of taxpayer funds.

Whistleblowers can help fight fraud and protect taxpayers by reporting government contracts fraud.  A whistleblower can report government contracts fraud under the False Claims Act and become a relator in a qui tam lawsuit, from which they may be entitled to a share of the funds the government recovers from fraudsters.

© 2022 by Tycko & Zavareei LLP

Adding Impact to Your Next Cross Examination: 5 Things to Consider When Presenting Witness Testimony

As every trial attorney knows, there are many strategies for cross examining a witness. Among the most effective is confronting a witness with their previous deposition testimony. Nothing beats an opportunity to use their own words against them.

In order to get the most impact from this practice, a savvy litigator will read transcript passages or play audio/video excerpts from the witness’s deposition. An alternate technique—most effective when there is a lot of testimony—is showing a witness’s testimony on-screen using slides. Of course, as with any PowerPoint presentation, there are several things to consider when using this tool to cross examine a witness.

Tips for Witness Testimony Presentation

1. FORMAT THE TRANSCRIPT TEXT

Rather than importing an image of the transcript page, consider copy/pasting or retyping the testimony into a slide. This will give you control over how large you make the text and can even allow you to emphasize certain words or statements that align with your case themes. In addition, most jurors sit 20-40 feet from the projection screen in the courtroom. A good rule of thumb is to use 20-point font type or larger.

2. USE BOLD FONT TYPE

By bolding questions within the transcript, jurors will more easily distinguish them from the witness’s answers to each question. Another tip is to stay away from unique fonts. While “French Script” might be a nice touch on a party invitation, it can be hard to read from the jury box.

3. ANIMATE EACH QUESTION AND ANSWER

If you are using PowerPoint or Key Note, consider adding animation to each question-and-answer text block. It’s natural for people to read ahead if there is more on the screen; by revealing each question and answer one-by-one, you will have a much better chance of holding the jurors’ attention. Effects like “appear,” “wipe,” or “fade” are all good options for this, but stay away from more flamboyant effects like “fly-in” or “zoom” since those are too distracting (and most judges will not allow that to go on for more than a few slides).

4. USE A PHOTO OF THE WITNESS

A photo of the witness will allow the jury to connect the testimony with the witness. If you didn’t videotape the witness, look for a picture on their company website or social media profiles. Obvious caveats apply here; you generally know what the court will allow and to what opposing counsel will object.

5. BE FLEXIBLE

Even though you have prepared all your testimony slides for the unexpected, consider having the entire transcript loaded in a trial presentation software (e.g., TrialDirector or Sanction) that allows you or your trial presentation consultant to jump to any portion of the transcript on the fly. It’s very possible that opposing counsel will argue that an answer is not complete, and the court might instruct you to continue on for several more lines of testimony.

In Conclusion

Visually displaying a witness’s deposition testimony during cross examination allows you to drive home the points most relevant to your arguments and case themes, and most salient to jurors you hope to influence. Following these five simple rules above will make that tactic even more effective in court.

© Copyright 2002-2022 IMS Consulting & Expert Services, All Rights Reserved.

Beware OFAC in a Time of Sanctions

On Monday, April 25, 2022, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (“OFAC”) announced a settlement with Toll Holdings Limited (“Toll”), an Australian freight forwarding and logistics company, with respect to Toll’s originations and/or receipt “of payments through the U.S. financial system involving sanctioned jurisdictions and persons.” Toll, which is not an American entity, and is neither owned by Americans nor located in the U.S. or any of its territories, was involved in almost 3000 transactions where payments were made in connection with sea, air, and rail shipments to, from, or through North Korea, Iran, or Syria, AND/OR involving the property of a person on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List. OFAC did not have direct jurisdiction over Toll, BUT because the payments for Toll’s freight forwarding and logistics services flowed through U.S. financial institutions, Toll “caused the U.S. financial institutions to be engaged in prohibited activities with … sanctioned persons or jurisdictions.”

Each OFAC violation can be the basis of civil sanctions. Here the 2853 violation would have supported the imposition of civil sanctions totaling over $826 million. Toll was “happy” to settle OFAC’s enforcement action for $6 million. OFAC found that the Toll violations were “non-egregious,” in part due to the rapid growth of Toll after 2007 through acquisitions of smaller freight forwarding companies. OFAC noted that by 2017 Toll had almost 600 invoicing, data, payment, and other systems spread across its various units. OFAC also noted that Toll did not have adequate compliance procedures and procedures in place and did not attend to those issues until an unnamed bank threatened to cease doing business with Toll because Toll was using its U.S. dollar account to transact business with sanctioned jurisdictions and/or persons. OFAC took note of Toll’s voluntary self-disclosure, well-organized internal investigation, and extensive remedial measures.

OFAC traces its origins to the War of 1812, when the then Secretary of the Treasury imposed sanctions on the United Kingdom in retaliation for the impressment of American sailors. The Treasury Department has had a special office dealing with foreign assets since 1940 (and the outbreak of World War II), with statutory authority found in the Trading With The Enemy Act of 1917 (as World War I raged), and a series of federal laws involving embargoes and economic sanctions. OFAC received its current name as part of a Treasury Department order on October 15, 1962 (contemporaneous with the Cuban missile crisis).

The Toll settlement reflects the growing use by OFAC of public enforcement against foreign businesses for “causing” violations by involving U.S. payment systems. The use of U.S. dollars in any part of a transaction will typically involve the U.S. financial system, directly or indirectly – that subjects the entirety of the transaction to U.S regulatory jurisdiction, including that of OFAC. The Toll settlement evidences OFAC’s increasing willingness to exercise its expansive jurisdiction over foreign businesses, even those involving primarily extraterritorial transactions — for example, the increase in OFAC sanctions of foreign businesses seen as facilitating the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Foreign businesses must give serious and continuing attention to having substantial policies and procedures in place to insure compliance with U.S. sanctions and, thereby, to avoid OFAC enforcement actions. Companies can start by reviewing OFAC’s Framework for Compliance Commitments and implementing the recommendations there. In addition, all parties to a transaction should be screened against sanction lists (OFAC’s, and also those of the U.K. and E.U.). Companies should consider adopting preventive measures, not only to deter violations, but also to demonstrate a vigorous compliance program.  Similarly, these issues MUST be considered as part of any merger or acquisition (as the Toll experience suggests).Finally, all counterparties, including financial intermediaries, should be evaluated for potential sanction list issues. Otherwise, a foreign business may have to “pay the Toll” for its shortcomings.

Experienced American business lawyers may prove helpful in designing and/or evaluating the compliance programs of non-U.S. companies.

©2022 Norris McLaughlin P.A., All Rights Reserved