Category: Administrative & Regulatory

OSHA Proposes More Changes to Recordkeeping Rules

Employers across numerous industries may soon face additional recordkeeping and reporting obligations based on a new rule proposed by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

In March 2022, OSHA proposed amendment of its injury and illness tracking rule, which requires certain employers to file illness and injury data with the agency each year.  The tracking rule was first implemented in 2016, and required reporting of fatalities, hospitalizations, and other serious injuries for all covered employers with 250 or more employees, and for employers with 20-249 employees in certain “high hazard industries.” The rule required most covered employers to submit their Form 300A  “Summary of Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses” annually.  It also required certain employer establishments with 250 or more employees to submit their complete Form 300 Logs of Work-Related Injury and Illnesses, and their Form 301 Injury and Illness Incident reports annually.  Finally, the rule called for creation of a public database of employer illness/injury data, including business names and illness/injury locations.

The rule generated immediate objections from the business community based on privacy concerns.  Both the Form 300 Logs and the Form 301s Incident Reports contain personal employee information related to their health status.  Employers worried that if OSHA required broad disclosure of these documents and created a public database based on their content, it would jeopardize employee privacy. Even though OSHA claimed it would not make personal identifying information available, employers were not confident the agency could prevent inadvertent disclosure. Also, employers saw myriad ways in which the information could be used against them that have nothing to do with worker safety.

In response to this criticism and after a change in the presidential administration, OSHA rolled back the tracking rule in 2019. The 2019 Rule rescinded the requirement for employers of 250 or more employees to electronically submit Form 300s and Form 301s, but continued to require them to submit Form 300A summaries each year.  Because the summaries did not contain personal information, the modified rule alleviated employee privacy worries.

Now, OSHA is poised to revive the original tracking rule, but expand the application of the most onerous requirements to smaller establishments.  On March 30, 2022, OSHA published its proposed rule in the Federal Register.  If the final rule mirrors the proposed rule, it would largely restore the 2016 rule, but apply the Form 300 and 301 reporting requirements to covered establishments with 100 or more employees instead of 250 employees. Those employers covered by the new 100+ rule are limited to the industries in Appendix B of the proposed rule.  The list is lengthy and includes many farming, manufacturing and packaging industry employers, healthcare employers as well as grocery, department and furniture stores.

OSHA received public comment on the proposed rule through June 30, 2022.  OSHA received 83 comments from a mix of private and public entities, citizens, and industry groups.  OSHA will review the comments and employers should expect the agency to issue a Final Rule by the end of the calendar year, which would become effective 30 days after publication.

If OSHA enacts its proposed rule, covered employers will face significant additional burdens.  Employers must ensure that their Form 300 and 301 Forms are maintained accurately and filed in time to comply with the rule.  They can expect that OSHA will scrutinize these forms and potentially use them for inspection purposes or to develop industry-specific enforcement programs.  Moreover, OSHA may impose redaction burdens on employers and force them to remove personal identifying information from the forms before submission, which can be an administrative burden with potentially significant privacy implications if not followed carefully.  Finally, with additional data publicly available, employers should expect enhanced media and interest group activity based on their injury and illness data.  Even if personal information is not disclosed, interest groups and labor organizations will certainly seize on the available data to criticize employers or push for regulations, without consideration of the fact that employer fault cannot be determined from the data alone.

Employers should take steps now to prepare for the proposed rule and continue to ensure their safety and health programs minimize employee illness/injury risk.  The new rule would greatly increase potential legislative and public relations risks associated with poor safety and health outcomes, and effective illness/injury prevention programs can help employers avoid such scrutiny before the enhanced disclosure requirements take effect.

Article By Susan F. Wiltsie and Reilly C. Moore of Hunton Andrews Kurth. Scott W. Burton also contributed to this article.

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Copyright © 2022, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.

U.S. Supreme Court Agrees with HHS Payment Methodology for Disproportionate Share Hospitals

The fight about how Medicare compensates disproportionate share hospitals (“DSH”) is one of the longest-running reimbursement disputes of recent years, and it has generated copious work for judges around the country.  In a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court settled one piece of the conflict:  the counting of “Medicare-entitled” patients in the Medicare fraction of the “disproportionate-patient percentage.”  Becerra v. Empire Health Found., 597 U.S. ___ (2022) (slip op.).  The Supreme Court concluded that the proper calculation, under the statute, counts “individuals ‘entitled to [Medicare] benefits[,]’ . . . regardless of whether they are receiving Medicare payments” for certain services.  Id. (slip op., at 18) (emphasis added).

DSH payments are made to hospitals with a large low-income patient mix.  “The mark-up reflects that low-income individuals are often more expensive to treat than higher income ones, even for the same medical conditions.”  Id. (slip op., at 3).  The federal government thus gives hospitals a financial boost for treating a “disproportionate share” of the indigent population.

The DHS payment depends on a hospital’s “disproportionate-patient percentage,” which is basically the sum of two fractions: the Medicare fraction, which reflects what portion of the Medicare patients were low-income; and the Medicaid fraction, which reflects what portion of the non-Medicare patients were on Medicaid.  Historically, HHS calculated the Medicare fraction by including only patients actually receiving certain Medicare benefits for their care.  In 2004, however, HHS changed course and issued a new rule.  It counted, in the Medicare fraction, all patients who were eligible for Medicare benefits generally (essentially, over 65 or disabled), even if particular benefits were not actually being paid.  For most providers, that change resulted in a pay cut.

The new rule sparked several lawsuits.  Hospitals challenged HHS’s policy based on the authorizing statutory language.  These hospitals essentially argued in favor of the old methodology.  Appeals led to a circuit split, with the Sixth and D.C. Circuits agreeing with HHS, and the Ninth Circuit ruling that HHS had misread the statute.

The Supreme Court has now resolved the issue.  The majority opinion, authored by Justice Kagan, sided with HHS.  The majority concluded that, based on the statutory language, “individuals ‘entitled to [Medicare] benefits’ are all those qualifying for the program, regardless of whether they are receiving Medicare payments for part or all of a hospital stay.”  Id. (slip op., at 18).  The majority also explained that if “entitlement to benefits” bore the meaning suggested by the hospital, “Medicare beneficiaries would lose important rights and protections . . . [and a] patient could lose his ability to enroll in other Medicare programs whenever he lacked a right to [certain] payments for hospital care.”  Id. (slip op., at 11).

Justice Kavanaugh dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Gorsuch and Alito.  The dissent argued that those lacking certain Medicare coverage should be excluded from HHS’s formula, based on “the most fundamental principle of statutory interpretation: Read the statute.”  Id. (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 2).  According to the dissent, the majority’s ruling will also restrict hospitals’ ability to provide care to underprivileged communities.  “HHS’s misreading of the statute has significant real-world effects: It financially harms hospitals that serve low-income patients, thereby hamstringing those hospitals’ ability to provide needed care to low-income communities.”  Id. (slip op., at 4).

There was one point of agreement among the majority and dissenting justices: the complexity of the statutory language for DSH payments.  Echoing the thoughts often held by healthcare advisors, Justice Kagan found the statutory formula to be “a mouthful” and “a lot to digest.”  Id. (majority opinion) (slip op., at 4).  And in his dissent, Justice Kavanaugh called the statute “mind-numbingly complex,” and resorted to an interpretation that he found “straightforward and commonsensical”: that patients cannot be “simultaneously entitled and disentitled” to Medicare benefits.  Id. (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 1, 3).

Article By Jeffrey DeBeer and Keith Bradley of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

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© Copyright 2022 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

Five Administrative Law Takeaways From Recent Supreme Court Decisions

The US Supreme Court’s decisions of late have been consequential. While headline-grabbing decisions deal with religious liberties, privacy, and gun control, the Court’s impact on administrative law will have major consequences as well. Administrative law decisions stemmed from cases involving how the executive shaped policy related to climate change, health care, immigration, and public health. Administrative actions are tied together by procedural rules derived from the constitutional separation of powers and the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

Below, we discuss five major trends derived from this term’s decisions related to administrative law and the separation of powers:

  1. The “major questions doctrine,” and how it can limit executive-branch authority;
  2. How spending can be used to shape behavior in situations where executive-branch authority might otherwise be limited;
  3. The fate of “Chevron deference” – i.e., the judiciary’s willingness to defer to the executive branch’s interpretations of statutes agencies are tasked to administer;
  4. What discretion executive agencies have to change policies, and what steps they need to defend such changes; and
  5. When the Supreme Court will intervene in cases that are moot or which otherwise lower court decision-making might simplify the Court’s resolution of involved issues.

Major Questions Doctrine

The facts that would support a “major questions” analysis of executive actions became clearer with this term’s decisions. The doctrine drove decisions in major cases related to climate change and public health – NFIB v. OSHA, dealing with the federal vaccine mandate, and West Virginia v. EPA, which addressed greenhouse gas regulations. In sum, the Court says that administrative actions with significant economic and political impact require a close look at authorizing legislation to determine if Congress has authorized the action taken.

Some background on these cases. NFIB v. OSHA – decided first – grappled with whether OSHA exceeded its authority when it sought to require certain employers and their employees to receive a COVID-19 vaccine or be subject to frequent testing requirements. (We discussed this case individually in-depth here.) OSHA based its mandate on its authority to relate workplace hazards. Because the vaccine mandate for businesses with over 100 employees would impact roughly 84 million Americans, the Supreme Court accepted that it was a “major question” that involved “great economic and political significance” and therefore was subject to the major questions doctrine. Accordingly, the executive branch was required to point to specific authority supporting the mandate. Because the executive branch could not point to where Congress gave them the power to enforce a vaccine mandate, the Court overturned it.

This decision either reaffirmed the importance of checks and balances or demonstrated that the “major questions doctrine” could be used to prevent the executive branch from flexibly using “old” public health law to address novel issues associated with an airborne pandemic.

The “major questions doctrine” appeared next in West Virginia v. EPA, which we discussed here. To address the issue of climate change, US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) developed the Clean Power Plan to address carbon dioxide emissions from power plants that relied on owners shifting from fossil fuels to zero-emitting fuels in 2015. This required closures of fossil fuel generating stations and significant investments from the electric generation sector. After the Supreme Court stayed the Clean Power Plan, the Trump Administration proposed a different rule that mandated actions solely at the fossil fuel-fired units and, simultaneously, declared that the Clean Air Act did not authorize the far-reaching legal rationale of the Clean Power Plan.

After addressing some unique procedural issues, which we will discuss below, the Court characterized the Clean Power Plan as effectively remaking the national energy markets. Applying the major questions doctrine, the Court held that such a broad change to the energy sector required a clear congressional mandate, which was not present in the Clean Air Act. In a concurrence, Justice Gorsuch argued that deferring to agencies on matters of great economic or political significance would amount to “Permitting Congress to divest its legislative power to the Executive Branch. . .”

How Spending Can Be Used to Shape Behavior

Whereas the two decisions above illustrate limits on executive power, in Biden v. Missouri, the Supreme Court allowed the executive branch to use spending to compel COVID vaccinations of employees in certain medical establishments. A vaccine mandate in this context was consistent with past policies because Medicare and Medicaid facilities are routinely forced to follow protocols to receive funding.

Clearly, one takeaway from Biden v. Missouri is that the executive is not without power to influence private behavior, so long as spending is involved. The Court found that in the healthcare space, it would be counterintuitive for effective administration of a “facility that is supposed to make people well to make them sick with COVID-19.”

The Fate of the Chevron Doctrine

A third issue worth discussing is the fate of the “Chevron doctrine.” Our takeaway is that the “Chevron” doctrine may have little force at the Supreme Court level, even if parts of its analysis live on. We base this conclusion on the fact that both American Hospital Association v. Becerra and West Virginia v. EPA feature limited deference to the executive vis-à-vis the courts. But, neither case discusses Chevron at all. Why?

The “Chevron doctrine” has been fundamental to modern administrative law while existing in a policy-wonk backwater. The Chevron doctrine was born in the 1984 Supreme Court decision Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council. It provides federal agencies with the ability to interpret the statutes they are tasked to administer without heavy-handed court intervention. Under the traditional Chevron analysis, courts will defer to the federal agency when the relevant statute is ambiguous, and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.

Two major cases seemed to ignore the doctrine, however:

  • In Becerra, the Court signaled some unwillingness to find statutes “ambiguous.” Becerra involved the US Department of Health and Human Services’ interpretation of the Medicare statute governing hospital reimbursement rates. While the DC Circuit Court of Appeals below found significant ambiguity in the highly technical statute, a unanimous Supreme Court disagreed and held that the plain language of the statute clearly precluded the agency’s interpretation. The fact that the Supreme Court found clarity where the DC Circuit saw ambiguity suggests that the Court has significantly raised the bar for the level of ambiguity necessary for it to adopt an agency’s interpretation.
  • Where Becerra limited the impact of Chevron based on the text of the statute, West Virginia v. EPA established an entire class of cases where Chevron will not apply based on the practical impact of the regulation. By embracing the “major questions doctrine” discussed above, the Court signaled that it will not defer to federal agencies on novel issues unless Congress clearly stated an intent to delegate to the agency. The Court focused on the sweeping impact of EPA’s proposed emissions regulations, in stark contrast to the DC Circuit’s textual analysis of the statutes at issue (and also to the Court’s own textual analysis in Becerra).

While it appears that the Chevron doctrine may currently be gathering cobwebs at the Supreme Court level, it remains to be seen what will happen at the district and appellate levels. Maybe the Chevron doctrine will continue to exist as a sorting mechanism below — scholars have noted that Chevron was far more likely to determine outcomes in the lower courts. But at the very least, the Supreme Court has given federal judges powerful tools to avoid deferring to agency interpretations where they are so inclined.

How and When Agencies Can Change Preexisting Policies

A fourth issue worth highlighting may be found in Biden v. Texas, which involves the Biden Administration’s rescission of the Trump Administration’s Remain in Mexico policy.

First, some policy background: Government agencies have broad discretion in setting and changing policies so long as they follow the appropriate procedures. Generally, these procedures are set forth in the APA, a statute that we discuss with great regularity. Under the APA, the executive’s decisions can only be justified or challenged based on the agency’s administrative record. The regulated community can sometimes request that the Court look beyond the administrative record by showing that the agency acted in bad faith or in a procedurally improper manner. The Court’s last significant decision in this area – Department of Commerce v. New York, which we summarized here – evaluated the Commerce Secretary’s attempts to add a citizenship question to the 2020 census. In Department of Commerce, extra-record discovery revealed that the Secretary planned to add the question all along and had, in fact, solicited the request for the question from the US Department of Justice (DOJ). The Supreme Court determined that the Voting Rights Act rationale was “contrived” and affirmed the lower court’s decision to bar the US Department of Commerce from asking the question.

Regarding this case: Biden v. Texas, which involved the Biden Administration’s rescission of the Trump Administration’s “Remain in Mexico” immigration program – also called the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) – evaluated whether the Biden Administration acted appropriately when it rescinded the program. Some background on Biden v. Texas:

  • In January 2019, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began to implement MPP. Under MPP, certain non-Mexican persons arriving by land from Mexico were returned to Mexico to await the results of their immigration cases. After it took office, the Biden Administration first suspended the program and later terminated it.
  • Texas and Missouri challenged the rescission on the grounds that it violated federal immigration law as well as the APA. A Texas federal court accepted the states’ arguments on the grounds that immigration law required DHS to either detain arrivals in the US or in contiguous territory – as MPP did – and that DHS lacked the resources necessary to house arrivals in the US, so a program like MPP was required by statute. The district court entered an injunction requiring the government to “enforce and implement MPP in good faith until such a time as it has been lawfully rescinded in compliance with the APA and until such a time as the federal government has sufficient detention capacity to detain all aliens subject to mandatory detention under [immigration law] without releasing any aliens because of a lack of detention resources.”
  • On appeal, the Secretary of DHS released a second explanation for terminating MPP and sought to vacate the injunction. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s analysis that the injunction was required and rejected DHS’s second explanation for why the program should be terminated on the grounds that it did not constitute a new or separately reviewable “final agency action,” which triggers APA review.

The Court upheld the rescission of MPP on two grounds: first, because federal immigration law used the word “may” in defining what DHS may do regarding confining persons arriving over land from Mexico. “May” gives the government discretion and establishes contiguous-territory return such as was required by MPP as a tool that the agency “has the authority, but not the duty” to use. Congress could have – but did not – construct the immigration provisions to require MPP.

Additionally, upholding the program required the Court’s consideration of DHS’s during-litigation explanation for why the program should be terminated. The Court accepted the during-litigation explanation because it constituted a wholly new explanation of why the MPP should be terminated. The during-litigation explanation explained that it “superseded” and “rescinded” the earlier termination and then offered “new reasons” that had not been included in the prior rescission. Both the pre-litigation and during-litigation memoranda were separate “final agency actions.”

Finally, because DHS did not rest on its pre-litigation MPP termination, it was permitted to provide additional justifications for its actions, so long as the agency complied with APA-imposed requirements for taking “new” actions. The Court rejected the states’ charge that there was a “significant mismatch between” the rescission and DHS’s explanation for it. DHS’s “ex-ante preference for terminating MPP – like any other feature of an administration’s policy agenda – should not be held against” its actions. Accordingly, DHS’s rescission of MPP was upheld.

An Increase in Procedurally Irregular Case Resolutions? 

A final trend we wanted to highlight is that the Supreme Court appears increasingly willing to wade into disputes at earlier procedural phases than would be typical. Historically, nearly every Supreme Court case has made it to the Court having been fully and finally resolved in lower federal courts. (To be sure, there are some exceptions – most notably the limited class of cases for which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction, which involve mainly disputes between the states or disputes between ambassadors.) This term, the Court was increasingly willing to wade into disputes which were either arguably moot or have not yet completed their run through lower courts. Three examples:

  • Mootness. In West Virginia v. EPA, during the pendency of litigation, the Biden Administration indicated it would not enforce the regulations at issue and instead would pursue a new rulemaking. The Court found that EPA’s representation that “voluntary cessation does not moot a case” unless it is “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not be expected to recur.” For the government to moot the case, it would have to suggest that it would not re-impose limitations based on generation shifting – something that it did not do.
  • No lower court finding regarding jurisdiction. In Biden v. Texas, four of the nine justices signed a dissent indicating that lower courts should review whether federal courts had “jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of” certain immigration laws in light of the Court’s recent decision in Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, which addressed similar issues. While a majority of the court favored reaching a merits decision, four members of the Court favored remanding the case to lower courts for an evaluation of how Aleman Gonzalez might alter jurisdictional issues in the case.
  • The Court’s Use of its “Shadow Docket.” In Ardoin v. Robinson, the Supreme Court, in an unsigned order with no explanation, reinstated a district voting map in Louisiana that has previously been deemed discriminatory and harmful to minority voting rights. This case was decided under what has been coined the Supreme Court’s “shadow docket” because it refers to cases decided outside normal procedural regularity: off the regular docket, without oral arguments or written briefs, and before lower courts have fully and finally decided the issue. The Court’s use of its “shadow docket” appears to be occurring with increasing frequency. As the Court is likely to remain polarized next term, we may see additional consequential decisions at the “shadow docket” phase then.

This was clearly a major term with significant decisions in many areas, including administrative law. The Court’s next arguments begin in October. We will keep an eye out for new cases relevant to administrative law.

Article By J. Michael Showalter, Samuel A. Rasche, and Rachael A. Bryan of ArentFox Schiff LLP

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© 2022 ArentFox Schiff LLP

EPA’s Spring 2022 Unified Agenda Includes Proposed and Final TSCA and TRI Rules

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) spring 2022 Unified Agenda, published on June 21, 2022, includes the following rulemakings under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) or the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI).

Proposed Rule Stage

  • Tiered Data Reporting to Inform Prioritization, Risk Evaluation, and Risk Management under TSCA (2070-AK62): EPA is developing a rulemaking under TSCA Sections 8(a) and (d) to establish reporting requirements based upon a chemical’s status in the Risk Evaluation/Risk Management (RE/RM) Lifecycle and update the reporting requirements under the 40 C.F.R. Part 711 Chemical Data Reporting (CDR) regulation. Specifically, EPA is seeking occupational, environmental, and consumer exposure information. EPA is developing this rule to obtain information about potential hazards and exposure pathways related to certain chemicals, particularly occupational, environmental, and consumer exposure information. According to the Unified Agenda item, EPA needs this information to inform prioritization, risk evaluation, and risk management of chemical substances under TSCA Section 6. EPA intends to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in May 2023 and a final rule in September 2024. More information on EPA’s July 27, 2021, webinar on development of the proposed rule is available in our July 29, 2021, memorandum.
  • Revisions to the TSCA Fees Rule (2070-AK64): In January 2021, EPA proposed updates and adjustments to the 2018 TSCA fees rule. EPA proposed modifications to the TSCA fees and fee categories for fiscal years (FY) 2022, 2023, and 2024 and explained the methodology by which the proposed TSCA fees were determined. EPA proposed to add three new fee categories: A Bona Fide Intent to Manufacture or Import Notice, a Notice of Commencement of Manufacture or Import, and an additional fee associated with test orders. In addition, EPA proposed exemptions for entities subject to certain fee-triggering activities, including an exemption for research and development (R&D) activities; an exemption for entities manufacturing less than 2,500 pounds of a chemical subject to an EPA-initiated risk evaluation fee; an exemption for manufacturers of chemical substances produced as a non-isolated intermediate; and exemptions for manufacturers of a chemical substance subject to an EPA-initiated risk evaluation if the chemical substance is imported in an article, produced as a byproduct, or produced or imported as an impurity. EPA updated its cost estimates for administering TSCA, relevant information management activities, and individual fee calculation methodologies. EPA proposed a volume-based fee allocation for EPA-initiated risk evaluation fees in any scenario where a consortium is not formed and is proposing to require export-only manufacturers to pay fees for EPA-initiated risk evaluations. EPA also proposed various changes to the timing of certain activities required throughout the fee payment process. In light of public comments, EPA states that it has decided to issue a supplemental NPRM in October 2022 and seek additional public comment on changes to the January 2021 proposal. More information on the proposed rule is available in our December 30, 2020, memorandum.
  • New Chemicals Procedural Regulations to Reflect the 2016 Amendments to TSCA (2070-AK65): On June 22, 2016, the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act (Lautenberg Act) was signed into law, amending TSCA and impacting how EPA reviews and makes determinations on new chemical notices under TSCA Section 5. EPA states that as a result of these increased responsibilities, it has become more challenging to complete reviews within 90 days. This rulemaking seeks to revise the new chemicals procedural regulations in 40 C.F.R. Part 720 to improve the efficiency of EPA’s review process and to align its processes and procedures with the new statutory requirements. This rulemaking seeks to increase the quality of information initially submitted in new chemicals notices and improve EPA’s processes to reduce unnecessary rework in the risk assessment and, ultimately, the length of time that new chemicals are under review. EPA intends to publish an NPRM in February 2023.
  • Confidential Business Information (CBI) Claims under TSCA (2070-AK68): EPA is considering proposing new and amended rules concerning the assertion and maintenance of claims of CBI under TSCA. Amendments to TSCA in 2016 included several new provisions concerning the assertion and EPA review and treatment of confidentiality claims. EPA states that it is considering procedures for submitting and supporting such claims in TSCA submissions, including substantiation requirements, exemptions, electronic reporting enhancements, and maintenance or withdrawal of confidentiality claims. EPA is also considering whether the proposed rule should also elaborate on EPA’s procedures for reviewing and communicating with TSCA submitters about confidentiality claims. EPA expects the proposed rule to include new provisions, as well as revisions to existing rules on asserting confidentiality claims to conform to the 2016 amendments to TSCA. As reported in our May 17 and May 18, 2022, memoranda, EPA issued a proposed rule on May 12, 2022. EPA intends to issue a final rule in May 2023.
  • Chemical-Specific Rulemakings under TSCA Section 6(a): TSCA Section 6 requires EPA to address unreasonable risks of injury to health or the environment that the Administrator has determined are presented by a chemical substance under the conditions of use. Following risk evaluations for the following chemicals carried out under the authority of TSCA Section 6, EPA initiated rulemakings to address unreasonable risks of injury to health identified in the final risk evaluations:
    • Methylene Chloride (2070-AK70): EPA’s risk evaluation for methylene chloride, describing the conditions of use and presenting EPA’s determinations of unreasonable risk, is in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2019-0437, with additional information in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2016-0742. EPA intends to issue an NPRM in February 2023 and a final rule in August 2024. More information on EPA’s draft revision to its risk determination for methylene chloride will be available in a forthcoming memorandum;
    • 1-Bromopropane (2070-AK73): EPA’s risk evaluation for 1-bromopropane, describing the conditions of use and presenting EPA’s determinations of unreasonable risk, is in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2019-0235, with additional information in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2016-0741. EPA intends to publish an NPRM in May 2023 and a final rule in August 2024;
    • Carbon Tetrachloride (2070-AK82): EPA’s risk evaluation, describing the conditions of use and presenting EPA’s determinations of unreasonable risk, is in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2019-0499, with additional information in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2016-0733. EPA intends to publish an NPRM in April 2023 and a final rule in August 2024;
    • Trichloroethylene (TCE) (2070-AK83): EPA’s risk evaluation for TCE, describing the conditions of use and presenting EPA’s determinations of unreasonable risk, is in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2019-0500, with additional information in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2016-0737. EPA intends to publish an NPRM in March 2023 and a final rule in August 2024. More information on EPA’s draft revision to its risk determination for TCE will be available in a forthcoming memorandum;
    • Perchloroethylene (PCE) (2070-AK84): EPA’s risk evaluation for PCE, describing the conditions of use and presenting EPA’s determinations of unreasonable risk, is in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2019-0502, with additional information in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2016-0732. EPA intends to publish an NPRM in February 2023 and a final rule in August 2024. More information on EPA’s draft revision to its risk determination for PCE will be available in a forthcoming memorandum;
    • N-Methylpyrrolidone (NMP) (2070-AK85): EPA’s risk evaluation for NMP, describing the conditions of use and presenting EPA’s determinations of unreasonable risk, is in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2019-0236, with additional information in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2016-0743. EPA intends to publish an NPRM in May 2023 and a final rule in August 2024. More information on EPA’s draft revision to its risk determination for NMP will be available in a forthcoming memorandum; and
    • Asbestos (Part 1: Chrysotile Asbestos) (2070-AK86): EPA’s risk evaluation for chrysotile asbestos, describing the conditions of use and presenting EPA’s determinations of unreasonable risk, is in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2019-0501, with additional information in docket EPA-HQ-OPPT-2016-0736. More information on EPA’s proposed rule to prohibit ongoing uses of chrysotile asbestos is available in our April 7, 2022, memorandum. EPA intends to publish a final rule in November 2023.
  • Procedures for Chemical Risk Evaluation under TSCA (2070-AK90): As required under TSCA Section 6(b)(4), EPA published a final rule on July 20, 2017, that established a process for conducting risk evaluations to determine whether a chemical substance presents an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment, without consideration of costs or other non-risk factors, including an unreasonable risk to a potentially exposed or susceptible subpopulation, under the conditions of use. This process incorporates the science requirements of the amended statute, including best available science and weight of the scientific evidence. The final rule established the steps of a risk evaluation process, including: scope, hazard assessment, exposure assessment, risk characterization, and risk determination. EPA states that it is now considering revisions to that final rule and will solicit public comment through an NPRM. EPA intends to publish the NPRM in September 2022. More information on EPA’s 2017 rule is available in our June 26, 2017, memorandum.
  • Asbestos; Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements under TSCA (2070-AK99): This rulemaking, under the authority of TSCA Section 8(a), would require certain persons that manufactured (including imported) or processed asbestos and asbestos-containing articles (including as an impurity) to report certain exposure-related information, including quantities of asbestos and asbestos-containing articles manufactured (including imported) or processed, types of asbestos used, and employee data. Reported information would be used by EPA and other federal agencies in considering the regulation of asbestos. EPA notes that this rulemaking is the result of a settlement agreement stemming from litigation pursuant to TSCA Section 21. See Asbestos Disease Awareness Organization v. EPA, No. 19-CV-00871; State of California et al. v. EPA, No. 19-CV-03807. More information on EPA’s proposed reporting and recordkeeping requirements is available in our May 6, 2022, memorandum. EPA intends to publish a final rule in November 2022.
  • Other Chemical Substances Undergoing TSCA Section 6 Risk Evaluation; Significant New Use Rule (SNUR) for Certain Non-Ongoing Uses (2070-AL05): EPA is developing TSCA Section 5(a)(2) SNURs on conditions of use identified as not currently ongoing in the final scope documents for the high-priority substances undergoing TSCA Section 6 risk evaluations. EPA states that it will use the SNURs to require notice to EPA before chemical substances and mixtures are used in new ways that might create concerns. Persons subject to a SNUR who intend to manufacture (including import) or process the chemical substance for the significant new use must notify EPA at least 90 days prior to initiating activities via a significant new use notice (SNUN). EPA intends to publish an NPRM in December 2022 and a final rule in May 2024.
  • The Unified Agenda includes the following chemical-specific SNURs for certain non-ongoing uses:
    • Phthalates; SNUR for Certain Non-Ongoing Uses (2070-AL06): EPA intends to publish an NPRM in November 2022 and a final rule in May 2024;
    • Flame Retardants; SNUR for Certain Non-Ongoing Uses (2070-AL07): EPA intends to publish an NPRM in December 2022 and a final rule in November 2023; and
    • Certain Solvents; SNUR for Certain Non-Ongoing Uses (2070-AL08): EPA intends to publish an NPRM in December 2022 and a final rule in May 2024.
  • Inactive Inventory Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) SNUR (2070-AL10): EPA is developing a SNUR under TSCA Section 5(a)(2) for certain uses of Inactive Inventory PFAS. Persons subject to the Inactive Inventory PFAS SNUR would be required to notify EPA at least 90 days before commencing manufacture or processing for any use that EPA has determined is a significant new use. The required notifications would initiate EPA’s evaluation of the intended use within the applicable review period. Manufacture and processing for the significant new use would be unable to commence until EPA has conducted a review of the notice, made an appropriate determination on the notice, and taken such actions as are required in association with that determination. EPA intends to publish an NPRM in September 2022 and a final rule in June 2023.
  • TRI; Response to Petition to Add Diisononyl Phthalate (DINP) to the TRI List of Toxic Chemicals (2025-AA17): According to EPA, this action arises from a petition received by EPA to add DINP to the list of toxic chemicals reportable under Section 313 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA). In response to the petition, EPA initiated a rulemaking on September 5, 2000, proposing to add DINP to the TRI list. On June 14, 2005, EPA issued a notice of data availability seeking comments on EPA’s revised hazard assessment for DINP in further support of EPA’s proposal to add DINP to the TRI list. EPA states that the addition of DINP to the TRI list would make it subject to all the reporting requirements under the Toxic Chemical Release Reporting Rule. EPA intends to publish a supplemental NPRM in July 2022 and a final rule in May 2023;
  • Changes to Reporting Requirements for PFAS; Community Right-to-Know Toxic Chemical Release Reporting (2070-AK97): EPA is developing a proposal to add PFAS subject to reporting under EPCRA Section 313 and Section 6607 of the Pollution Prevention Act (PPA) to the list of Lower Thresholds for Chemicals of Special Concern (Chemicals of Special Concern). EPA states that the addition of the PFAS to the Chemicals of Special Concern list will eliminate the use of the de minimis exemption, eliminate the option to use Form A, and limit the use of range reporting. In addition, EPA is proposing to eliminate the use of the de minimis exemption under the Supplier Notification Requirements for facilities that manufacture or process all chemicals included on the Chemicals of Special Concern list. According to EPA, Chemicals of Special Concern may be found in products below de minimis levels; this is especially true for PFAS that are used at low concentrations in many products. Because of the widespread use of PFAS and their (or their degradants) persistence in the environment, however, even concentrations below de minimis levels can contribute significantly to environmental loading. The elimination of the de minimis exemption for supplier notification purposes will help facilities to identify potential sources of PFAS and other Chemicals of Special Concern. EPA believes that the elimination of the de minimis exemption under the Supplier Notification Requirements for PFAS and other Chemicals of Special Concern will result in a more complete picture of the releases and waste management quantities for these chemicals. EPA intends to publish an NPRM in September 2022 and a final rule in November 2023.
  • Addition of Certain PFAS to the TRI (2070-AL03): EPA is developing a rulemaking to add certain PFAS to the list of chemicals reportable under EPCRA Section 313. EPA states that the addition of these PFAS is in direct response to a statutory mandate under Section 7321(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (NDAA). Under Section 7321(d), EPA was required to evaluate whether certain specific PFAS meet the EPCRA Section 313 listing criteria by December 2021 and is required to add any PFAS that EPA determines meet the listing criteria by December 2023. EPA intends to publish an NPRM in February 2023 and a final rule in November 2023.
  • Community Right-to-Know; Adopting 2022 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) Codes for TRI Reporting (2070-AL09): EPA is developing a proposed rule to incorporate the revised 2022 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes for TRI reporting purposes. According to EPA, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) updates the NAICS codes every five years. OMB approved the 2022 NAICS codes on December 21, 2021 (86 Fed. Reg. 72277), with an effective date of January 1, 2022. EPA currently uses 2017 NAICS codes, and with this proposed rule would implement the 2022 codes for TRI Reporting Year 2022. Facilities reporting to the TRI would be required to use 2022 NAICS codes on reports that are due to EPA by July 1, 2023. This rule also proposed to update the C.F.R. to clarify the scope of facilities required to report to the TRI. According to EPA, the actual data required by a TRI form would not change as a result of this rulemaking, nor would the rule affect the universe of TRI reporting facilities that are required to submit reports to EPA under EPCRA Section 313. EPA intended to publish an NPRM in June 2022 and a final rule in November 2022.

Final Rule Stage

  • Significant New Uses of Chemical Substances; Updates to the Hazard Communication Program and Regulatory Framework; Minor Amendments to Reporting Requirements for Premanufacture Notices (PMN) (2070-AJ94): In 2016, EPA proposed changes to the existing regulations governing significant new uses of chemical substances under TSCA (40 C.F.R. Part 721, specifically “Protection in the Workplace” (40 C.F.R. Section 721.63) and “Hazard Communication Program” (40 C.F.R. Section 721.72)) to align these regulations with revisions to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) Hazard Communications Standard (HCS) (29 C.F.R. Section 1910.1200), which are proposed to be cross referenced, and with changes to the OSHA Respiratory Protection Standard and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) respirator certification requirements pertaining to respiratory protection of workers from exposure to chemicals. EPA also proposed changes to the significant new uses of chemical substance regulations based on issues that have been identified by EPA and issues raised by public commenters for SNURs previously proposed and issued under these regulations. Additionally, EPA proposed a minor change to reporting requirements for PMNs and other TSCA Section 5 notices. EPA states that it expects these changes to have minimal impacts on the costs and burdens of complying, while updating the significant new use reporting requirements to assist in addressing any potential effects to human health and the environment. EPA is reviewing the comments received and is planning to issue a final rule. EPA intends to issue a final rule in October 2022. More information on the proposed rule is available in our July 29, 2016, memorandum.
  • Reporting and Recordkeeping for PFAS under TSCA Section 8(a)(7) (2070-AK67): EPA published a proposed rule on June 28, 2021, addressing reporting and recordkeeping requirements for PFAS under TSCA Section 8(a)(7). In accordance with obligations under TSCA Section 8(a), as amended by NDAA Section 7351, persons that manufacture (including import) or have manufactured these chemical substances in any year since January 1, 2011, would be subject to the reporting and recordkeeping requirements. In addition to fulfilling statutory obligations under TSCA, EPA states that it expects that the proposed rule would enable it to characterize better the sources and quantities of manufactured PFAS in the United States. EPA intends to publish a final rule in December 2022. More information on EPA’s proposed rule is available in our June 11, 2021, memorandum.
  • TRI; Response to Petition from the Toxics Use Reduction Institute (TURI) to Add 25 Chemicals (2070-AK26): The Toxics Use Reduction Institute (TURI) submitted a petition under EPCRA Section 313(e)(1) to add 25 chemicals to the EPCRA Section 313 list of toxic chemicals subject to reporting under the TRI. Three of the 25 chemicals were added to the EPCRA Section 313 list through actions unrelated to the petition. EPA states that it evaluated the remaining 22 chemicals to determine if they met the listing criteria of EPCRA Section 313(d)(2). EPA proposed the addition of 12 of the 22 chemicals that were determined to meet the EPCRA Section 313(d)(2) criteria and for which reports were expected to be filed. EPA is reviewing the comments received and is planning to issue a final rule. EPA intends to issue a final rule in November 2022.
  • Parent Company Definition for TRI Reporting (2070-AK42): In 2021, EPA proposed to codify the definition of “parent company” for purposes of reporting to the TRI. Although the existing regulation requires facilities reporting to the TRI to identify their parent company in annual reporting forms, no codified definition of this data element exists. Among the facilities reporting to the TRI are those with complicated corporate ownership structures. As such, effort is required each year by reporting facilities and EPA to clarify how the parent company data element should be represented on the form. According to EPA, a codified definition of parent company would allow EPA to address various corporate ownership scenarios explicitly and reduce the reporting burden caused by regulatory uncertainty. EPA states that the proposed rule would clarify existing regulations to reporting facilities and add a foreign parent company data element, if applicable, while improving EPA’s data quality. EPA is reviewing the comments received and is determining next steps. EPA intends to publish a final rule in October 2022.
  • NDAA Mandated Addition of Certain PFAS to the TRI for Reporting Year 2022 (2070-AL04): According to EPA, NDAA Section 7321 provides a framework for PFAS to be added automatically to the TRI list on January 1 of the year following certain EPA actions. In December 2021, EPA announced the statutory addition of the PFAS chemicals covered by the NDAA to the list of chemical substances subject to reporting for the TRI. This regulatory action amends the EPCRA regulations in 40 C.F.R. Part 372 to reflect this statutory addition. EPA intended to publish a final rule in June 2022.

Article By Lynn L. Bergeson and Carla N. Hutton of Bergeson & Campbell, P.C.

For more environmental law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Bergeson & Campbell, P.C.

EEOC Sanctions Employer for GINA Violations Relating to Collection of Employees’ Family Members’ COVID Test Results

On July 6, 2022, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) announced it has entered into a conciliation agreement with a Florida-based medical practice for violations of the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act (GINA) arising out of the practice’s collection of employees’ family members’ COVID-19 testing results.

In a press release announcing the agreement, the EEOC stated that, following an investigation, it found that the medical practice – Brandon Dermatology – violated GINA by requesting the test results of employees’ family members and that “[s]uch conduct violates the GINA, which prohibits employers from requesting, requiring or purchasing genetic information about applicants or employees and their family members, except in very narrow circumstances which do not apply in this matter.”  GINA defines “genetic information” to include “the manifestation of a disease or disorder in an employee’s family members.”

While the press release includes limited details on the matter, the EEOC noted that “[i]n addition to compensating affected employees through restoration of leave time or back pay, as well as compensatory damages, the conciliation agreement resolving the charge requires Brandon Dermatology to review its COVID-19 policies; conduct training on EEO laws as they pertain to COVID-19; and post a notice.”

In its technical assistance guidance relating to COVID-19, the EEOC states that GINA “prohibits employers from asking employees medical questions about family members” including asking an employee who is physically coming into the workplace whether they have family members who have COVID-19 or symptoms associated with COVID-19.  However, the guidance goes on to state that “GINA . . . does not prohibit an employer from asking employees whether they have had contact with anyone diagnosed with COVID-19 or who may have symptoms associated with the disease.”  It also notes that “from a public health perspective, only asking about an employee’s contact with family members would unnecessarily limit the information obtained about an employee’s potential exposure to COVID-19.”

Article By Evandro C Gigante and Laura M. Fant of Proskauer Rose LLP

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Proskauer Rose LLP.

USCIS and Its Massive Case Backlog: What Comes Next?

The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has an ambitious goal this year. Its primary objective is to reduce the backlog of cases and its impact on Immigration Services. This past year, USCIS has felt the harmful effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic turned what were already significant processing delays into unprecedented backlogs across the entire system. In fact, as of 2022, numbers are very high, with a backlog nearing 5.2 million cases and approximately 8.5 million pending cases.

This is a stark contrast from July 2019, when the backlog was only around 2.7 million. With the increase of millions of cases in only a few years and the inevitable delays it has caused in immigration processing, this new development could bring long-anticipated good news to many applicants who have been waiting for prolonged periods.

Phyllis A. Coven, the seventh Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman (in that role, she identifies issues in the immigration system and makes recommendations to USCIS on how to address these problems), said the worst backlog of all is USCIS’s affirmative asylum backlog, which stands at over 430,000 cases.

Asylum: Defensive vs Affirmative

An asylum is a form of protection that allows an individual to remain in the United States instead of being removed to a country of feared persecution. There are two paths to asylum in the U.S.: the affirmative asylum process for individuals who are not in removal proceedings, and the defensive asylum process for individuals who are in removal proceedings. 8 USC 1158.

What is Affirmative Asylum?

A person who is not in removal proceedings may proactively apply for asylum with the USCIS. An applicant may file an affirmative application for asylum if he or she currently holds a valid immigration status (such as a visitor or student visa or Temporary Protected Status), his or her status has lapsed or expired (except for Visa Waiver Program entrants), or even if he or she holds no immigration status (for example, if he or she entered the country without inspection).

To obtain asylum through the affirmative asylum process, the applicant must be physically present in the United States and apply for asylum within one year of their last arrival in the United States.

USCIS Affirmative Asylum’s Current Backlog

As mentioned, USCIS’ existing asylum system cannot significantly reduce its backlog, let alone keep pace with incoming applications. This delay is having a devastating impact on asylum seekers and their family members. They are losing valuable time in their immigration journey, their jobs, livelihoods, etc.

Therefore, the agency is considering approaches to improve the quality and efficiency of asylum adjudications, leading to a more effective and efficient system.

USCIS proposes the following solutions:

  • Hire more than 4,000 employees by the end of this calendar year and set new, more aggressive “cycle time” goals for fiscal 2023.
  • Identify and group cases to increase efficiencies in interviews and adjudications, prioritize asylum applicants needing immediate protection, and deprioritize non-priority applicants, such as those with other forms of relief available.
  • Consider specialization, interview waivers, and simplifying final decisions to increase case completions while supporting the welfare of officers and applicants.

While hopefully these recommendations will expedite immigration processes and lighten the backlog, asylum is still incredibly challenging.

Article By Raymond G. Lahoud of Norris McLaughlin P.A.

For more immigration legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Norris McLaughlin P.A., All Rights Reserved

For A Limited Time Only – California Is Giving Away Corporations, LLCs And More!

As a result of the recent enactment of California’s 2022-2023 Budget Bill, the California Secretary of State’s office has announced a temporary waiver of many business entity filing fees.   This waiver will last until June 30, 2023, the end of the state’s current fiscal year.

Here is the Secretary of State’s list of filings for which no filing fee is currently being imposed:

  • Articles of Organization – CA LLC

  • Registration – Out-of-State LLC

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – Benefit

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – Close

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – General Stock

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – Insurer

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – Professional

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – Social Purpose

  • Registration – Out-of-State Corporation – Accountancy or Law (Professional)

  • Registration – Out-of-State Corporation – Insurer

  • Registration – Out-of-State Corporation – Stock

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Nonprofit Corporation – Mutual Benefit

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Nonprofit Corporation – Mutual Benefit – Common Interest Development

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Nonprofit Corporation – Mutual Benefit – Credit Union

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Nonprofit Corporation – Public Benefit

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Nonprofit Corporation – Public Benefit – Common Interest Development

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Nonprofit Corporation – Religious

  • Registration – Out-of-State Corporation – Nonprofit

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – Agricultural Cooperative Association

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – Cannabis Cooperative Association

  • Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – General Cooperative

  • Certificate of Limited Partnership – CA LP

  • Registration – Out-of-State LP

Note that the Secretary of State will continue to impose other fees not listed above.

It is unlikely that this temporary suspension of fees will have any significant impact on the number of business entities being formed under California law.  Historically, these fees have been relatively modest.  For example, the fee for filing articles of incorporation is $100.  Cal. Gov’t Code § 12186(c).  The real costs are the ongoing costs associated with the crushing tax and regulatory burdens placed on businesses by the state.  According to the Tax Foundation, California ranks 48th in business tax climate (just ahead of New York and New Jersey).

Article By Keith Paul Bishop of Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

For more corporate law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2010-2022 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

Key Takeaways from U.S. Supreme Court Decision in West Virginia v. EPA

On June 30, 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. __, 2022 WL 2347278 (June 30, 2022), a case involving the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan (CPP) and the Trump Administration’s Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule. Applying the “major questions” doctrine, the Court held that EPA exceeded its statutory authority when promulgating the CPP. This decision has implications for the Biden Administration’s planned re-work and reissuance of the CPP and other options for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the electric power and other sectors. It also carries implications outside the environmental realm, providing litigants a powerful new administrative law precedent to challenge agency rules.

Key Takeaways and Issues to Watch

1. “Major questions” doctrine. The most significant takeaway of the opinion is the Court’s elaboration and application of the “major questions” doctrine, as a limit on federal agency regulatory authority. Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion held that in “certain extraordinary cases” where an agency asserts broad authority of “economic and political significance,” courts should look for a clear statement of congressional authorization before green-lighting the action. Based on the “major questions” doctrine, the Court rejected the CPP’s partial reliance on generation shifting (from coal-fired power plants to natural gas or renewable electricity generation) as a component of the “best system of emission reduction” (BSER) for reducing carbon dioxide from coal-fired power plants. The Court held that Clean Air Act Section 111(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d), a rarely-used statutory provision, was not sufficient to support a rulemaking that “restructure[ed] the Nation’s overall mix of electricity generation….” Because the Court determined this result would carry consequences of economic and political significance, the Court found the rule triggered the “major questions” doctrine. The Court reiterated that although Section 111(d) authorizes EPA to establish emission guidelines for existing major sources of air pollution based on BSER, the Agency could not do so using such transformative measures.

This decision represents the Supreme Court’s first formal assertion of the “major questions” doctrine, applicable when an agency claims broad authority based on new interpretations of older statutes or statutes in which the grant of authority is not explicitly stated. Although this was not the first Supreme Court case employing this logic, this was the first case where the Court formally used the phrase “major questions” doctrine. Other cases the Court pointed to include a 2000 case rejecting the asserted authority of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate tobacco products, like cigarettes, as drug-delivery “devices,” and more recent cases from this Supreme Court term concerning the authority of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to apply long-extant legal authorities in the context of COVID-19.

2. Chevron deference doctrine. The Court does not strike down Chevron as some parties had predicted or sought. That doctrine—requiring courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable construction of an ambiguous statute it is charged with administering—survives for now. Indeed, the majority opinion did not even cite Chevron deference.

3. Biden EPA. This decision immediately affects the scope of the Biden Administration’s approach to regulating power sector GHG emissions. The Administration has said that it wants to start these rules from a clean slate.

a. On-site measures. As noted in the decision, the Administration may be more likely to consider on-site measures as the BSER. Such options might include partial carbon capture and storage (CCS) or natural gas co-firing. The Obama EPA had declined to use those options for existing sources because it believed generation shifting was a less expensive way for industry to comply. But EPA had used partial carbon capture to set the limits for new sources, so it may review that issue now. Since the CPP’s issuance, the IRS Section 45Q tax credit for CCS and commercialization of CCS technologies that did not exist when the CPP was drafted may also affect the EPA’s approach now.

b. Generation shifting off the table. At least for setting the stringency of BSER, EPA will not be able to rely on generation-shifting measures. Advances in CCS technologies and the Section 45Q tax credit may also affect how EPA defines BSER for coal-fired plants in particular.

c. Seeking GHG reductions as “co-benefits” of other power sector rules. The Biden EPA may also consider other power plant emission rules under other CAA programs to achieve GHG reductions as “co-benefits.” Programs for regional haze, interstate air pollution, and hazardous air pollutants regulate other emissions, but often have the effect of reducing GHGs as well.

d. Other climate authorities will likely get a more intense look. The decision may also likely cause the Biden EPA to consider other, more clearly established GHG sources or authorities to seek additional GHG emissions reductions (e.g., mobile sources, HFCs).

4. Congressional action remains key. The Court’s decision underscores that certain rulemakings will need to rely on clear legislative authority to withstand legal challenges. Notably, the decision does not divest Congress from the ability to delegate “major questions” like this to federal agencies; it only requires that such delegations be clearly stated. Congress retains authority to act in any number of ways on climate change—including with economy-wide emissions programs (as it considered during the first Obama term), or by drafting clearer EPA authority—but with a narrowly-divided House and Senate, these actions seem unlikely.

5. Power sector practical effects. The practical outcome for the power sector is limited. That sector, in many respects, has already decarbonized at a rate faster than provided for by the CPP, largely for economic reasons.

6. States. This decision will likely encourage some states to use their authority to regulate GHG emissions, given the narrowed scope of EPA’s authority.

7. Future challenges. Expect litigants to rely heavily on the West Virginia decision in other rulemaking challenges going forward, whenever agencies act under existing authorities in a way that, in the Chief Justice’s words, “raises an eyebrow.” This may include not only EPA regulatory efforts to address modern environmental challenges, but actions of other federal agencies such as efforts by the Federal Communications Commission to regulate internet service providers to impose net neutrality, or efforts by the Securities and Exchange Commission to establish ESG disclosure requirements. Litigants will have a powerful tool to challenge those rules if they can persuasively phrase the question in “major question” terms.

Article By Eric L. Christensen, Brook J. Detterman, David M. Friedland, Jennifer J. Leech, and Zachary B. Pilchen of Beveridge & Diamond PC

For more environmental law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Beveridge & Diamond PC

Looking into Our (Slightly Hazy) Crystal Ball: What Will the Mississippi Cannabis Market Look Like?

When you do what we do, you get a lot of calls and a lot of questions. Many of the calls and questions are not fruitful. Quite honestly, some of the calls are from folks whose interest in and experience with cannabis is, we suspect, on a purely personal and leisurely level. In the words of Hyman Roth, this is the business we’ve chosen.

But one legitimate question we’re often asked is what we think the cannabis market will look like in Mississippi. And, more specifically, whether Mississippi’s new medical cannabis regime will be similar to the one in Oklahoma.

It’s a loaded question, and one we suspect many questioners don’t fully appreciate. On the one hand, Oklahoma’s medical cannabis program has been compared to the Wild West. At last count, there were more medical cannabis dispensaries than liquor stores or supermarkets in the state. Many have concluded that this is a bad thing and/or that the program is a failure. Others have deemed the program a triumph of capitalism, a survival-of-the-fittest trial where only the “best” will survive.

As is often the case, we think the answer is probably somewhere in the middle.

On the one hand, the obvious and primary similarity between the programs is the absence of an expressed cap on the number of licenses available. While most states limit the number of licenses available, neither Oklahoma nor Mississippi does so. Many believe this feature will lead to Mississippi following the lead of Oklahoma in terms of the proliferation of dispensaries throughout the Magnolia State.

On the other hand, there are a number of differences between the two states and their statutes that indicate to us that Mississippi’s regime will differ in several important ways – ways we are seeing play out now. First, while the license fee for a dispensary in Oklahoma is $2,500, the fee in Mississippi is $25,000, 10 times the amount. And that amount is owed annually and is in addition to the initial $15,000 application fee. As a practical matter, and for better or worse, this feature alone should significantly cull the number of dispensaries because it provides a substantial barrier to entry into the industry.

Second, there may be significantly fewer locations available to open a dispensary in Mississippi than one would expect due to several geographic-limiting features of the law. Initially, localities have until May 3 to opt out of the medical cannabis regime, and several cities have already done so. Also, dispensaries cannot be located within 1,000 feet of any church, school, or daycare facility. For those unfamiliar with Mississippi, it may be tough to find anywhere in the state that isn’t within 1,000 feet of a church. Even more, the law forbids one dispensary from being within 1,500 feet from another dispensary, and dispensaries are only permissible in commercially zoned areas.

Third, the cannabis industry examining the Mississippi market will have the benefit of having lived through the Oklahoma experience. This is likely to minimize the “goldrush” mentality seen in Oklahoma’s early days. Instead, look for larger players to let the dust settle and come in looking to acquire operators who proved successful breaking out of the initial melee.

Conclusion

It seems possible that, at least in the early years, the Mississippi medical cannabis regime may more closely resemble Oklahoma than a state like Florida with strict limitations on the number of licenses. But our prediction is that certain aspects of Mississippi law and culture will lead to less of a free-for-all at the outset, hopefully leading to a more efficient and more orderly transition to a rational cannabis market in Mississippi.

Article By Whitt Steineker and Slates C. Veazey of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP

For more cannabis legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP

Italian Garante Bans Google Analytics

On June 23, 2022, Italy’s data protection authority (the “Garante”) determined that a website’s use of the audience measurement tool Google Analytics is not compliant with the EU General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), as the tool transfers personal data to the United States, which does not offer an adequate level of data protection. In making this determination, the Garante joins other EU data protection authorities, including the French and Austrian regulators, that also have found use of the tool to be unlawful.

The Garante determined that websites using Google Analytics collected via cookies personal data including user interactions with the website, pages visited, browser information, operating system, screen resolution, selected language, date and time of page views and user device IP address. This information was transferred to the United States without the additional safeguards for personal data required under the GDPR following the Schrems II determination, and therefore faced the possibility of governmental access. In the Garante’s ruling, website operator Caffeina Media S.r.l. was ordered to bring its processing into compliance with the GDPR within 90 days, but the ruling has wider implications as the Garante commented that it had received many “alerts and queries” relating to Google Analytics. It also stated that it called upon “all controllers to verify that the use of cookies and other tracking tools on their websites is compliant with data protection law; this applies in particular to Google Analytics and similar services.”

Article By the Privacy and Cybersecurity Practice Group at Hunton Andrews Kurth

For more data privacy and cybersecurity legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.