U.S. Government Pursues More Aggressive Action to Curb Espionage at Universities

The U.S. Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) thinks the FBI and other agencies are not doing enough to address the espionage threat on U.S. university campuses. It issued a report, “Enforcement Agencies Should Better Leverage Information to Target Efforts Involving U.S. Universities” on June 14, 2022, urging the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Commerce to step up their outreach efforts to address the threat. Commerce, DHS, and FBI have all concurred with GAO’s recommendations. As a result, U.S. colleges and universities to face yet another organizational risk: an increase in campuses visits by export control and law enforcement agents.

The threat: U.S. export control laws consider the disclosure to non-U.S. persons of technology, software, or technical data to be exports, even if the disclosure occurs in the United States.

The overwhelming majority of non-U.S. persons studying and working at U.S. universities are not security risks and are valued members of their academic organizations. But U.S. intelligence agencies have long warned that foreign state actors actively acquire sensitive national security data and proprietary technology from U.S. universities.

A lot of the technology flow abroad from U.S. universities is perfectly legal, for two reasons: First, most university research, even in cutting-edge technology, is exempt from export controls under an exemption known as “fundamental research.” Second, even in cases where the fundamental research exemption does not apply, it takes time for the U.S. government agencies to add new items to the export control lists they enforce; namely the U.S. Munitions List, administered by the U.S. Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls; and the Commerce Control List, administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security.

But at the same time, either through inadvertence or outright espionage, unlawful transfers of technology to foreign nationals take place. A 2006 report by the U.S. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive found that a significant quantity of export controlled U.S. technology is released to foreign nationals in the United States unlawfully each year.

Clash of values: One important issue for higher education in addressing trade controls compliance is cultural in nature. U.S. universities value open, collaborative environments which drive and accelerate innovation. For those institutions, the idea of cutting off information flows conflicts with those cultural norms. By contrast, U.S. export controls aim to protect U.S. national security by hindering the flow of sensitive information to potential adversaries.

GAO’s recommendations: The GAO report recommends that U.S. trade control agencies take more aggressive steps to curb foreign access to sensitive technologies at U.S. universities. The recommendations include steps to enhance risk assessment and ranking of universities by risk, and steps to increase agency cooperation in planning and conducting outreach visits to universities. As a direct result of this report, U.S. universities are going to receive more visits from U.S. government agents.

Practical takeaways:

  • Universities: Consider reevaluating your risk. The threat has evolved, and the U.S. government response is also evolving. A risk evaluation using modern tools such as a premortem can help you know where to dedicate resources to update your export control policies, procedures, and training. Any unlawful escape of technology or technical data are much more likely to be detected and punished under the new regime, in part based on the GAO report. Organizations have to evolve with the threat.
  • Students, faculty, and administrators: Consider how to jealously guard your academic freedom, but be wary of the national security risks of sensitive technology falling into the wrong hands.
  • Research sponsors: More and more U.S. university research is sponsored by U.S. companies and government agencies. Research sponsorship agreements play a major role in striving for both national security and academic goals of the U.S. university system. Sponsors need to be sensitive to how these agreements are drafted. Sponsors must be aware of the espionage threat to their technology. But imposing too many restrictions in the contract may undermine the applicability of the fundamental research exemption and hinder the success of the project.

Conclusion: In the face of organizational threats, institutions do best when they heed their values. In the realm of protecting sensitive technology, we must constantly evolve with the threat. But we must also continue to carefully balance national security considerations with our bedrock values of academic freedom and openness.

Copyright © 2022, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

GAO Publishes Report on Technologies for PFAS Assessment, Detection, and Treatment

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report on July 28, 2022, entitled Persistent Chemicals: Technologies for PFAS Assessment, Detection, and Treatment. GAO was asked to conduct a technology assessment on per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) assessment, detection, and treatment. The report examines the technologies for more efficient assessments of the adverse health effects of PFAS and alternative substances; the benefits and challenges of current and emerging technologies for PFAS detection and treatment; and policy options that could help enhance benefits and mitigate challenges associated with these technologies. GAO assessed relevant technologies; surveyed PFAS subject matter experts; interviewed stakeholder groups, including government, non-governmental organizations (NGO), industry, and academia; and reviewed key reports. GAO identified three challenges associated with PFAS assessment, detection, and treatment technologies:

  • PFAS chemical structures are diverse and difficult to analyze for health risks, and machine learning requires extensive training data that may not be available;
  • Researchers lack analytical standards for many PFAS, limiting the development of effective detection methods; and
  • The effectiveness and availability of disposal and destruction options for PFAS are uncertain because of a lack of data, monitoring, and guidance.

GAO developed the following three policy options that could help mitigate these challenges:

  • Promote research: Policymakers could support development of technologies and methods to more efficiently research PFAS health risks. This policy option could help address the challenge of limited information on the large number and diversity of PFAS, as well as a lack of standardized data sets for machine learning;
  • Expand method development: Policymakers could collaborate to improve access to standard reference samples of PFAS and increase the pace of method and reference sample development for PFAS detection. This policy option could help address the challenges of a lack of validated methods in media other than water, lack of analytical standards, and cost, which all affect researchers’ ability to develop new detection technologies; and
  • Support full-scale treatment: Policymakers could encourage the development and evaluation of full-scale technologies and methods to dispose of or destroy PFAS. This policy option could help address the challenges of cost and efficiency of disposal and destruction technologies and a lack of guidance from regulators.

GAO notes that these policy options involve possible actions by policymakers, which may include Congress, federal agencies, state and local governments, academia, and industry.

©2022 Bergeson & Campbell, P.C.

Whistleblower Law Firm Files Amici Curiae Brief in DC Whistleblower Protection Act Case

An amici curiae brief  was filed recently in Tucker v. DC on behalf of the Metropolitan Washington Employment Lawyers Association and the Government Accountability Project. The brief urges the DC Court of Appeals to apply the correct burden-shifting framework in DC Whistleblower Protection Act cases.  In Tucker, the trial court gave pretext and business judgment instructions, both of which are contrary to the plain meaning and intent of the DC WPA.

The amici curiae brief argues that the DC Court of Appeals should correct the following three errors in the jury instructions:

  • First, the trial court erred when it instructed the jury to resolve the employee’s claim by performing a McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting analysis.  Applying the McDonnell-Douglas analysis alongside the DC WPA’s standards creates a confusing and contradictory task for the jury. In the second phase of the McDonnell-Douglasanalysis the employer need only argue a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action. In contrast, the DC WPA’s statutory text explicitly mandates that the employer must prove its explanation by clear and convincing evidence, a much higher standard than the preponderance of the evidence. DC Code § 1-615.54(b). Because of this difference, the standards are fundamentally incompatible.

  • Second, the trial court erred by requiring the jury to reach a decision on the plaintiff’s showing that the employer’s alleged business reasons were pretext, when the DC WPA does not require such a showing.

  • Third, the trial court erred by instructing the jury to weigh the employer’s evidence of its “business judgment” against the employee’s showing by preponderance of the evidence standard rather than applying the higher, clear and convincing evidence standard to the employer’s evidence. The DC WPA applies different burdens of persuasion to the employee’s and employer’s showings. See DC Code § 1-615.54(b). A whistleblower’s initial showing is weighed under the “preponderance of the evidence.”  This means necessarily that the employer’s evidence of a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for the employer’s action – which must be proven by the far more burdensome “clear and convincing” standard – should not be weighed against a whistleblower’s initial showing.

The brief also argues that the standard for causation should track the statutory language – an employee must show that her protected disclosure was a “contributing factor” in a personnel decision, and then DC can prevail if it establishes by “clear and convincing” evidence that it would have made the same decision for independent, legitimate reasons absent the protected disclosure.

© 2014 Zuckerman Law