Tag: unconstitutional

The CTA Filing Deadline is Approaching. Is Your BOIR Filed Yet?

The clock is ticking—just 49 days remain until the one-year filing deadline for the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA)! Entities established before January 1, 2024, must submit a beneficial owner information report (BOIR) by December 31, 2024.

The CTA is a new reporting requirement that came into effect on January 1, 2024. The CTA requires any entity created by or registered to do business by the filing of a document with a secretary of state, or another similar office, to report its information and its beneficial owners to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which is a bureau of the United States Treasury. The goal is to decrease money laundering and fraud.

We previously published advisories on the general application of the CTA and its specific application to entities created for estate planning purposes. The rules and guidelines about which we previously reported are largely unchanged. A reporting company still needs to report its legal name, all trades and d/b/a names, address, and beneficial owners. Beneficial owners are those with substantial control or who own or control 25% or more of the reporting company, directly or indirectly. The reporting company needs to report each beneficial owner’s name, date of birth, residential address, and an identifying number and image from one of four acceptable identification documents.

Although the CTA was declared unconstitutional by a federal district court in Alabama, the ruling only prevents the CTA’s enforcement on the parties directly involved in the case. The court did not issue a nationwide ruling to prevent the law from being enforced. Thus, other companies are expected to continue filing BOIRs. The Alabama case is currently on appeal and oral arguments were held at the end of September 2024.

FinCEN has been periodically updating its Frequently Asked Questions to provide some clarification since the CTA became effective. We outline the most relevant guidance below:

General Updates:

  1. Entities that are created before January 1, 2024, even if dissolved sometime in 2024 before the December 31, 2024, deadline, must still report their information and beneficial owners by December 31, 2024.
  2. Entities that are created in 2024 have 90 days to file the BOIR. Entities created on or after January 1, 2025, will have 30 days to file the BOIR. Entities that are created in 2024 but are wound up, dissolved, or otherwise cease to exist must still file the BOIR with FinCEN.
  3. Beneficial ownership is determined in the aggregate. This means that companies need to analyze each beneficial owner to determine if he or she indirectly/directly substantially controls or owns 25% or more of a reporting company. For example, Individual X owns 10% of Company Y. Individual X is also trustee of a trust that owns 20% of Company Y. Individual X needs to be reported as a beneficial owner because he owns an aggregate 30% of the company.
  4. Beneficial owners may now apply for a FinCEN Identifier here. This allows the beneficial owners to report their information to FinCEN directly, obtain an Identifier number, and simply provide the Identifier to those reporting companies of which he or she is a beneficial owner. This prevents a beneficial owner from having to share personal and sensitive information with a company. This also streamlines the process for any change in the beneficial owner’s information. Each beneficial owner can log into FinCEN and simply update the information within 30 days of the change rather than first providing it to the reporting company and then the company filing a new BOIR to update the information.

a. In order to create a FinCEN Identifier, an individual will have to create a login.gov account. This is the account that the federal government is using to streamline many of its services, such as, global entry and applying for federal jobs.

5. Reporting companies may complete and submit a BOIR online here. A company could also submit a PDF of the report at the same link if it chose to complete a paper copy. There is no fee to submit online. There are also many vendors offering a service to assist with the process and submit the report for a fee.

Real Estate/Corporate Updates:

6.FinCEN clarified that the subsidiary exemption applies when a subsidiary’s ownership interests are entirely controlled or wholly owned, directly, or indirectly, by any of the following types of exempt entities: (1) Securities reporting issuer; (2) Governmental authority; (3) Bank; (4) Credit union; (5) Depository institution holding company; (6) Broker or dealer in securities; (7) Other Exchange Act registered entity; (8) Investment company or investment adviser; (9) Venture capital fund adviser; (10) Insurance company; (11) State-licensed insurance producer; (12) Commodity Exchange Act registered entity; (13) Accounting firm; (14) Public utility; (15) Financial market utility; (16) Tax-exempt entity; or (17) Large operating company. Further, if a reporting company’s ownership interests are controlled or wholly owned by more than one exempt entity, the reporting company may still qualify for the subsidiary exemption if the entities are unaffiliated; however, every controlling or owning entity must itself be an exempt entity in order for the reporting company to qualify for the subsidiary exemption.

Trusts and Estates Updates:

7.If there is a corporate trustee, the reporting company will be reporting those individual beneficial owners that indirectly own or control at least 25% of the ownership interests of the reporting company through the ownership in the corporate trustee. This will be determined by multiplying the percentage of ownership of the corporate trustee with the trust’s ownership/control of the reporting company. For example, if Individual A owns 70% of the corporate trustee of a trust, and that trust holds 30% of the reporting company, Individual A holds or controls 21% of the reporting company (70% x 30 = 21). If Individual A owned 90% of the corporate trustee, then it would own/control 27% of the reporting company (90% x 30 = 27) and the company must report Individual A as a beneficial owner. There may be other beneficial owners if someone else at the corporate trustee exercises substantial control over the reporting company.

A reporting company may submit the corporate trustee’s information in lieu of each beneficial owner’s information only if all of these conditions are met:

a. The corporate entity is an exempt entity from the reporting requirements.

b. The individual owns or controls 25% of the reporting company only through the corporate trustee.

c. The individual does not exercise substantial control over the reporting company.

A company can obtain its own FinCEN Identifier when it submits an initial BOIR for its beneficial owner(s). This way, such company may be reported as a beneficial owner, such as a corporate trustee that meets the above requirements. For example, when LLC A reports Individual A as its beneficial owner, LLC A has the option of clicking a button to obtain its own FinCEN Identifier.

8. An individual who has the power to remove a trustee, remove and replace a trustee, and/or appoint an additional trustee is deemed to have substantial control through the power to change the person who makes decisions for the trust, and thereby, the reporting company. While this is not explicit in the Frequently Asked Questions, it is consistent with FinCEN’s position that someone who has the power to remove a senior officer of a reporting company is a beneficial owner.

While this is an extensive list, it is by no means an exhaustive list, and various circumstances not discussed above may change how the CTA applies in a particular case.

Copyright 2024 Goulston & Storrs PC.
For more on the CTA, visit the NLR Corporate Business Organizations section

Unitary Executive Theory Surfaces in Court: District Court Rules Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act Unconstitutional

On September 30, 2024, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida ruled that filing claims on behalf of the government under qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act (FCA) is unconstitutional in United States of America ex rel. Clarissa Zafirov v. Florida Medical Associates, LLC, et al. The ruling, made by Judge Kathryn Mizelle, a 33-year-old Trump-appointee, declares that False Claims Act whistleblowers undermine executive power by filing qui tam lawsuits.

The Zafirov decision follows a recent dissent by Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas in which he questioned the constitutionality of the FCA’s qui tam provisions. It also follows a political movement pushing the Unitary Executive Theory in the United States judicial courts.

This controversial decision mischaracterizes the qui tam provisions of the FCA and will likely be appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. Should the ruling stand, however, it and other similar challenges to the constitutionality of the FCA’s qui tam provisions will cripple what has been America’s number 1 anti-fraud law. Since the False Claims Act was modernized in 1986, qui tam whistleblower cases have allowed the government to recover more than $52 billion from fraudsters, over $5 billion of which came in cases where the government chose not to intervene.

Applying the ‘Unitary Executive’ Theory to Paint Whistleblowers as ‘Self-Selected Private Bounty Hunters’

Originally passed during the Civil War, the False Claims Act contains qui tam provisions enabling whistleblowers, also known as ‘relators’, to report government contracting fraud and work directly with government investigators. Once the whistleblower brings forward the suit, the government may intervene and continue to prosecute the litigation as the plaintiff. However, in the interest of accountability, the qui tam provision of the FCA permits the whistleblower to pursue a case even if the United States declines prosecution. Whistleblowers who file successful qui tam lawsuits are eligible to receive up to 30% of recovered damages.

The question of the constitutionality of the False Claims Act’s qui tam provisions was notably raised in a dissent by Justice Clarence Thomas in the 2023 Supreme Court case U.S., ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources. While Polansky discussed the issue of a relator pursuing a lawsuit after the government declines to intervene, Thomas raised a separate issue of constitutionality in his dissent. He stated that “there are substantial arguments that the qui tam device is inconsistent with Article II and that private relators may not represent the interests of the United States in litigation.” In a one-paragraph concurrence, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, invited challenges to the constitutionality of the FCA’s qui tam provisions, writing that “In my view, the Court should consider the competing arguments on the Article II issue in an appropriate case.”

Judge Mizelle, a former clerk of Justice Thomas, drew heavily upon Justice Thomas’ dissent in her decision. Echoing Thomas’ dissent in Polansky, JudgeMizelle concluded that the qui tam provision “directly defies the Appointments Clause by permitting unaccountable, unsworn, private actors to exercise core executive power [litigating on behalf of the government] with substantial consequences to members of the public.” The District Court thus agreed with the defendants that the FCA’s qui tam provisions indeed violates the Appointments Clause of Article II of the Constitution.

The Zafirov ruling relies upon the ‘unitary executive theory,’ a constitutional law theory that states the President of the United States has sole authority over the executive branch and that power cannot be limited by Congress.

According to then-Assistant Attorney General William Barr’s 1989 Memo Constitutionality of the Qui TamProvision of the False Claims Act, which repeatedly cited by both the judgment and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce amicus brief, the move to enable private citizens to file on behalf of the government represents a breach of the separation of powers allowing “Congress to circumvent the Executive’s check.” Barr rebrands whistleblowers as “private bounty hunters” and claims that the 1986 amendments which reincorporated the FCA’s qui tam provisions was a tactic by Congress to override presidential powers. Barr maintains that “only a unitary executive” that is, “only the President” can “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”

In a dissent in the 1988 Supreme Court case Morrison v Olsen, Justice Antonin Scalia interpreted the ‘Unitary Executive’ to have unchecked authority to appoint and remove executive officials, claiming that the firing of an independent counsel without cause falls within the limitless power of the President over the executive.

The Middle District of Florida ruling draws on Scalia’s rationale arguing that the right to pursue a qui tam case denies the President the executive authority of appointment of the relator. Under the FCA, however, whistleblowers are granted certain rights. For example, the executive must guarantee a whistleblower the “right to continue as a party” with or without the United States intervening and wait for the relator’s approval before settling the action.

The court agrees with the defendants’ argument that the FCA therefore “den[ies] the President necessary removal authority and sufficient supervisory control over [the relator].”

The court contends that the physician-turned-whistleblower Zafirov was “an improperly appointed officer” in violation of the Appointments Clause and the Take Care and Vest Clause of the Article. According to the ruling, by filing a qui tam against Medicare fraud, Zafirov was granted “core executive power” without any “proper appointment under the Constitution.”

A Mischaracterization of Qui Tam Whistleblowing

Judge Mizelle’s decision in United States ex rel. Zafirov v. Fla. Med. Assocs. first mischaracterizes the FCA’s qui tam as a breach of presidential power instead of as a provision that strengthens checks and balances. Second, the court ignores case law outlining government prerogatives over relators such that they are not menacing to the core Executive powers.

The revived qui tam provision of 1986 was a legislative move to improve government accountability over fraud—neither expanding Congressional oversight nor the size of government—by mobilizing private citizens rather than public agents. The Florida court wrongfully elevates the status of a relator to an ‘officer’ responsible to the government. A citizen pursuing a claim on behalf of the government is not and does not pretend to be an extension of the Executive Office and, therefore not subject to administrative appointment procedure. Rather the relator is a private person, and the government is a third party to the case. The Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens majority opinion also written by Justice Scalia discussing whether relators have judicial standing under Article III, qualifies that the relator is on “partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim.” A ‘partial assignee’—to which only some rights are transferred—may “assert the injury suffered by the assignor” (the U.S.) so long as the harm done is sufficient. Scalia reiterates the ‘representational standing’ of relators and makes no remarks on its challenge to the Unitary Executive. Judge Mizelle’s reliance on Morrison v Olsen to claim that like an independent counsel, a relator should also qualify as an officer ignores the Stevens Supreme Court ruling distinguishing relators as a type of assignee.

Mizelle also raises that relators seem to enjoy unbridled authority over the Executive by initiating a qui tam suit without government intervention. While Mizelle points to 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (c) to demonstrate the unchecked power of the relator, she neglects the numerous limitations specified in § 3730 (c)(2), including the broad power of the government to dismiss the qui tam action after intervening notwithstanding any objections from the relator. She frames the government intervention as “the government’s ability to pursue a parallel action and to exert limited control [which] does not lessen a relator’s unchecked civil enforcement authority to initiate.” In truth, the statute and years of judicial history maintain the government’s absolute discretion over whether to intervene in or completely stop the case by dismissing the action.

Contrary to Judge Mizelle’s belief, relators are not free from potential government intervention even when independently pursuing the case. On the contrary, relators are not able to independently pursue any binding action on the government unimpeded by the government. While Zafirov independently pursued the claim for five years, the government could have intervened and then dismissed the claim at any time. If the government intervenes, underlined in 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (c)(2), the government is empowered to settle the action with the defendant notwithstanding any objections from the relator and to restrict their participation in the course of the litigation. The fact that the government may choose not to intervene at one point does not divest them of their ability to intervene later and exercise significant authority over the relator.

Implications: Crippling the False Claims Act

Judge Mizelle’s decision seeks to end the historic success of the qui tam provision of the FCA by declaring the government’s most effective mechanism of detecting fraud as unconstitutional. While the decision does not invalidate the FCA nationally, this case could be the first step in a series of appeals that may elevate the issue to the Supreme Court.

The government’s largest obstacle to fighting white-collar crime such as fraud is detection. The diffuse and indirect nature of fraud requires those with insider knowledge to assist the government in pursuing corruption. In terms of the effectiveness of the qui tam provision, between 1987 and 2022, the Department of Justice Civil Fraud Division recovered $22.1 billion without the help of whistleblowers versus $50.3 billion with the help of whistleblower lawsuits. Since the 1986 amendments to the FCA, whistleblowers have been the direct source of approximately 70% of civil fraud recoveries by the federal government. From the Medicare billing fraud committed in Florida Medical Associates to Russian money laundering, the United States may lose its most effective tool to fight fraud fraud if the qui tam provisions of the FCA are ruled unconstitutional.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2024. All Rights Reserved.
For more on Whistleblowers, visit the NLR Criminal Law Business Crimes section.

U.S. Corporate Transparency Act: CTA is Declared Unconstitutional in U.S. District Court Case

The Corporate Transparency Act has been declared unconstitutional. On March 1, 2024, U.S. District Court Judge Liles C. Burke issued a 53-page opinion[1] granting summary judgment for the National Small Business Association and held that the Corporate Transparency Act “exceeds the Constitution’s limits on the legislative branch and lacks a sufficient nexus to any enumerated power to be a necessary or proper means of achieving Congress’ policy goals.”

As a result, Judge Burke found the CTA to be unconstitutional because it exceeds the Constitution’s limits on Congress’ power, without even reaching a decision on whether it violates the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. The Court then permanently enjoined the government from enforcing the CTA against the named plaintiffs and ordered a further hearing on the award of costs of litigation.

While it is likely that this litigation will continue to play out in the federal court system, the initial victory has gone to small business and importantly that means that compliance with this now unconstitutional regulatory regime can be set aside for the current time being.

[1] Nat’l Small Bus. United v. Yellen, No. 5:22-cv-01448-LCB (N.D. Ala. 2022)

Copyright ©2024 Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP
For more on the Corporate Transparency Act, visit the NLR Corporate & Business Organizations section.

Illinois Trust Taxation Deemed Unconstitutional

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In Linn v. Department of Revenue, the Illinois Fourth District Appellate Court reviewed the state’s statutory framework for taxing trusts. Linn v. Department of Revenue, 2013 Il App (4th) 121055.  On constitutional grounds, the court limited Illinois’ power to impose taxes under its “once subject to tax, forever subject to tax” regime.

This case creates planning opportunities to minimize Illinois income taxes.  However, it should be noted that the Linn case applies to trusts that pay Illinois income tax on trust dividends, interest, capital gains or other income retained by the trust and not distributed to a beneficiary.  This case does not apply to income distributed to an Illinois beneficiary; that income clearly can be taxed by Illinois.

Illinois Trusts

Illinois trusts are subject to a 5 percent income tax plus a 1.5 percent personal property replacement tax.  A nonresident trust is subject to taxation only on income generated within Illinois or apportioned to the state.  Resident trusts, on the other hand, are subject to tax on all income, regardless of the source of that income.  For an individual, state income taxation on a resident basis generally requires domicile or residence within the taxing state.  With respect to a trust, one or more of the grantor, trustees and beneficiaries may have contacts with a state sufficient to uphold as constitutional a tax on all of the trust income.

Illinois defines a resident trust based solely on the domicile of the grantor. 35 ILCS 5/1501(a)(20).  A resident trust means:

  • A trust created by a will of a decedent who at death was domiciled in Illinois or
  • An irrevocable trust, the grantor of which was domiciled in Illinois at the time the trust became irrevocable.  For purposes of the statute, a trust is irrevocable when it’s no longer treated as a grantor trust under Sections 671 through 678 of the Internal Revenue Code.

The Illinois statute would forever tax the income generated by the trust property, regardless of the trust’s continuing connection to Illinois.  One can analogize the Illinois statute to a hypothetical statute providing that any person born in Illinois to resident parents is deemed an Illinois resident and subject to Illinois taxation no matter where that person eventually resides or earns income.  Many lawyers believe that the Illinois statute is unconstitutional.

Linn

Linn involved a trust established in 1961 by A.N. Pritzker, an Illinois resident.  The trust was initially administered under Illinois law by trustees who lived in Illinois.  In 2002, the trustee exercised a power granted in the trust instrument to distribute the trust property to a new trust (the Texas Trust).  Although the Texas Trust generally provided for administration under Texas law, certain provisions of the trust instrument continued to be interpreted under Illinois law.  The Texas Trust was subsequently modified by a Texas court to eliminate all references to Illinois law, and the trustee filed the Texas Trust’s 2006 Illinois tax return as a nonresident.  At that time:

  • No current trust beneficiary resided in Illinois;
  • No trustee or other trust officeholder resided in Illinois;
  • All trust assets were located outside Illinois; and
  • Illinois law wasn’t referred to in the modified trust instrument

The Illinois Department of Revenue (the IDR) asserted that the trust was a resident trust for 2006 and that, as such, the trust pay Illinois income tax on all income.  The trustee countered that the imposition of Illinois tax under these circumstances was unconstitutional as a violation of the due process clause and the commerce clause.  The court held the statute was unconstitutional based on due process grounds (not reaching the commerce clause arguments), and stated that the following are the requirements for a statute to sustain a due process challenge:  (1) a minimum connection must exist between the state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax during the period in issue and (2) the income attributed to the state for tax purposes must be rationally related to values with the taxing state. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992).

This was the first case in Illinois on this issue so the court cited cases from other jurisdictions, including Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gavin, 733 A. 2d 782 (Conn. 1999), McCulloch v. Franchise Tax Board, 390 P.2d 412 (Cal. 1964), Blue v. Department of Treasury, 462 N.W.2d 762 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) and Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Murphy, 242 N.Y.S.2d 26 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963).  Gavin, which upheld the application of the Connecticut income tax on the undistributed income of a lifetime trust created by a Connecticut grantor, was cited at length by the court.  A critical fact in that case was that the beneficiary resided within the state for the year in question and the court assumed that the beneficiary would receive all trust property shortly.  In Linn, the court noted, there were no Illinois beneficiaries.  Relying on Blue and Mercantile, the court found that a grantor’s residence within a state isn’t itself enough to satisfy due process.

The IDR argued that significant connections with Illinois existed, maintaining that the trust owed its existence to Illinois law and listing legal benefits Illinois provides to the trustees and beneficiaries. The IDR cited some cases that involved trusts created by a will (i.e.,testamentary trusts).  The Illinois court disagreed with the testamentary trust cases the IDR relied on, finding that a lifetime trust’s connections with a state are more attenuated than in the case of a testamentary trust.  Further, the court found that the Texas Trust wasn’t created under Illinois law, but rather by a power granted to the trustees under the original trust instrument.  The court proceeded to dismiss the trust’s historical connections to Illinois and focused on contemporaneous connections, finding that “what happened historically with the trust in Illinois courts and under Illinois law has no bearing on the 2006 tax year.”  Linn at ¶30.  For 2006, the court concluded that the trust received the benefits and protections of Texas law, not Illinois law.

Steps to Consider

The IDR did not appeal the Linn decision to the Illinois Supreme Court.  We anticipate that additional cases will test and define the boundaries of the Linn decision.  Of course, Illinois might change its statute. For the time being, however, the Linn decision is binding authority for trustees of trusts that can eliminate all contact with Illinois.

Trustees of resident trusts with limited contacts to Illinois (in particular, those trusts without trustees, assets or non-contingent beneficiaries in Illinois) should consider the following issues.

  • Review state taxation:  The trustee should review connections to Illinois and consider whether actions could be taken to fall within theLinn holding.  Contacts with other states and those states’ rules for taxing trusts should also be reviewed.
  • File Illinois return with no tax due:  Pending guidance from the IDR, the trustee could consider filing an IL Form 1041, referencing theLinn case and reporting no tax due.  For each tax year, a tax return must be filed in order to commence the running of the statute of limitations.  An Illinois appellate court decision that supports the taxpayer’s position will ordinarily provide a basis for the abatement of tax penalties. 86 Ill. Admin Code Section 700.400(e)(8). However, if the facts are not exactly like those in Linn, a penalty cold be imposed on the trustee.  A safer method for trusts when the facts are not the same as in Linn would be to file and pay the Illinois tax in full but then file a claim for refund.  This should eliminate penalties but likely will result in a dispute with the IDR.
  • Amend prior tax returns:  The trustee could consider filing amended tax returns for prior years and claim a refund.  A trustee that has timely filed prior year tax returns may file an amended tax return at any time prior to the third anniversary of the due date of the tax return, including extensions.  For example, the 2010 tax year return may be amended at any time prior to October 15, 2014.

Other Considerations

Given the holding in Linn and uncertainty regarding trust tax law, trusts that offer flexibility and can adapt to changing circumstances may have a distinct advantage.

  • Officeholders:  Carefully consider the residency of trustees and other trust officeholders (such as investment advisers) and provisions regarding the appointment and removal of those officeholders.
  • Decanting provision:  Consider providing the trustee with broad authority to distribute trust property in further trust.
  • Lifetime trusts:  While the legal basis for the continued income taxation of a testamentary trust may also be questionable, testamentary trusts can be avoided by creating lifetime trusts.
  • Situs and administration:  Consider establishing and administering the trust in a state that doesn’t assess an income tax against trust income.
  • Governing law:  Consider including trust provisions that allow the trustee to elect the laws of another state to govern the trust.
  • Discretionary dispositive provisions:  Consider including discretionary rather than mandatory trust distribution provisions, as some states may tax a trust based on the residence of beneficiaries with non-contingent trust interests.
  • Division provisions:  Consider including provisions authorizing a trustee to divide a trust without altering trust dispositive provisions.  This type of provision may allow a trustee to divide a trust into separate trusts and isolate the elements of a trust attracting state taxation.  For example, a trust may simply be divided into two separate trusts, one trust for the benefit of a child and his descendants that live in Illinois and a second trust that might not be subject to Illinois taxation, for a child and his descendants that don’t live in Illinois.
Article By:

James H. Cundiff
L. Timothy Halleron
Of: 
McDermott Will & Emery

 

U.S. Supreme Court Finds Aggregate Limits on Federal Campaign Contribution are Unconstitutional

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On April 2, 2014, the United States Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that aggregate contribution limits, those limits placed on an individual’s overall direct contributions during a two-year election cycle, were unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment. The case, McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, No. 12-536 (U.S. April 2, 2014), is the latest case in which the Supreme Court has loosened federal regulation of campaign contributions.

In a fractured decision, Chief Justice John Roberts authored a plurality opinion that struck down the aggregate limit as a “mismatch” between the government’s goal of curbing corruption and its chosen means of imposing an aggregate limit. Although the government has a valid interest in limiting quid pro quo corruption between contributors and elected officials, the Court explained, an aggregate limit imposed across all candidates does not limit the risk of corruption enough to justify the way it significantly limits the right to support candidates in an election. In the face of core First Amendment guarantees, the aggregate limit could not survive because it was not “closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.” Slip opinion at 30 (citation omitted).

The Chief Justice was joined by three of his colleagues: Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Samuel Alito. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote separately to say that he would both strike down aggregate limits and overturn key Supreme Court precedent sanctioning a wide array of campaign finance restrictions.

The Dissent

Writing for the four Justices in dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer argued that aggregate campaign contribution limits had been previously held to be constitutional and that the reversal of existing precedent will come at a grave cost to the U.S. political system. In his view, the decision of the plurality “undermines, perhaps devastates, what remains of campaign finance reform.” Slip opinion at 30 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan.

Unchanged Rules

Prior to today’s decision in McCutcheon, campaign contributions were subject to two key limitations. The first limit, which remains intact, is the base limit on individual contributions to a single campaign, party committee, or political action committee. That limit remains unchanged, thus there is still a limit of $2,600 that an individual may contribute to a candidate for each election in the two year election cycle. As a result, one may contribute $2,600 for a primary election, $2,600 for a general election, and an additional $2,600 if there is a runoff election. Limits on contributions to other committees may be seen on the below chart.

In addition, the decision has no impact on the operation of a Super PAC, otherwise known as an “independent expenditure-only committee.” Nor does the decision permit corporations to make contributions to federal candidate committees.

New Rule

The limit that was struck down today restricted the overall amount individuals can contribute to election campaigns during a given two-year election cycle. Those aggregate limits were most recently set at $48,600 for federal candidates and $74,600 for other political committees, including national and state party committees, for an overall limit of $123,200 per two-year cycle. As such, prior to this decision a person could give the maximum base contribution of $5,200, for both a primary and a general election, to a maximum of nine federal candidates, whereas now a person can contribute to all federal candidates if she so desires. Similarly, an individual may now contribute to as many PACs as desired, including state and federal committees, such as the Democratic National Committee and the Republican National Committee, as long as each contribution is within the base limit currently set at $32,400 for the national party committees.

In viewing the below chart from the Federal Election Commission, the box in the upper right corner, under Special Limits, has been eliminated. All the other listed limits continue to be the federal legal limits.

Kedar Bhatia contributed to this article.

Article By:

Laurence A. Levy
Of:
Bracewell & Giuliani LLP