Tag: Eleventh Circuit

U.S. Corporate Transparency Act: CTA is Declared Unconstitutional in U.S. District Court Case

The Corporate Transparency Act has been declared unconstitutional. On March 1, 2024, U.S. District Court Judge Liles C. Burke issued a 53-page opinion[1] granting summary judgment for the National Small Business Association and held that the Corporate Transparency Act “exceeds the Constitution’s limits on the legislative branch and lacks a sufficient nexus to any enumerated power to be a necessary or proper means of achieving Congress’ policy goals.”

As a result, Judge Burke found the CTA to be unconstitutional because it exceeds the Constitution’s limits on Congress’ power, without even reaching a decision on whether it violates the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. The Court then permanently enjoined the government from enforcing the CTA against the named plaintiffs and ordered a further hearing on the award of costs of litigation.

While it is likely that this litigation will continue to play out in the federal court system, the initial victory has gone to small business and importantly that means that compliance with this now unconstitutional regulatory regime can be set aside for the current time being.

[1] Nat’l Small Bus. United v. Yellen, No. 5:22-cv-01448-LCB (N.D. Ala. 2022)

Copyright ©2024 Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP
For more on the Corporate Transparency Act, visit the NLR Corporate & Business Organizations section.

Out with the Old? Not So Fast! A Quick Review of 2023 Highlights

2023 has brought many updates and changes to the legal landscape. Our blog posts have covered many of them, but you may not remember (or care to remember) them. Before moving on to 2024, let’s take a moment to review our top five blog posts from the year and the key takeaways from each.

VAX REQUIREMENT SACKED IN TN: MEDICARE PROVIDERS LOSE EXEMPTION FROM COVID-19 LAWS

Our most read blog of 2023 covered the federal COVID-19 vaccination requirement that applied to certain healthcare employers, which was lifted effective August 4, 2023. (Yes, in 2023 we were still talking about COVID-19). However, keep in mind that state laws may still apply. For example, Tennessee law generally prohibits employers from requiring employee vaccination, with an exception for entities subject to valid and enforceable Medicare or Medicaid requirements to the contrary (such as the federal vaccine requirement). However, now that the federal vaccine requirement is gone, there is no exception for these Medicare or Medicaid providers, and they are likely fully subject to Tennessee’s prohibition.

INTERPRETATION OF AN INTERPRETER REQUEST? 11TH CIRCUIT WEIGHS IN ON ACCOMMODATION OF DEAF EMPLOYEE

In this blog post, we covered a recent Eleventh Circuit case in which the court addressed ADA reasonable accommodation requests . The employee requested an accommodation, and the employer did not grant it—but the employee continued to work. Did the employee have a “failure to accommodate” claim? The Eleventh Circuit said yes, potentially. The court clarified that an employee still must suffer some harm—here, he needed to show that the failure to accommodate adversely impacted his hiring, firing, compensation, training, or other terms, conditions, and privileges of his employment. So, when you are considering an employee’s accommodation request, think about whether not granting it (or not providing any accommodation) could negatively impact the employee’s compensation, safety, training, or other aspects of the job. Always remember to engage in the interactive process with the employee to see if you can land on an agreeable accommodation.

POSTER ROLLERCOASTER: DOL CHANGES FLSA NOTICE REQUIRED AT WORKPLACES

If your business is subject to the FLSA (and almost everyone is), you probably know that you must provide an FLSA poster in your workplace. In this blog post, we reported that there is an updated FLSA “Employee Rights” poster that includes a “PUMP AT WORK” section, required under the Provide Urgent Material Protections (PUMP) for Nursing Mothers Act (more information on the PUMP Act here).

HOLIDAY ROAD! DOL WEIGHS IN ON TRACKING FMLA TIME AGAINST HOLIDAYS

In this now-timely blog post from June 2023, we discussed new guidance on tracking FMLA time during holidays. The DOL released Opinion Letter FMLA2023-2-A: Whether Holidays Count Against an Employee’s FMLA Leave Entitlement and Determination of the Amount of Leave. When employees take FMLA leave intermittently (e.g., an hour at a time, a reduced work schedule, etc.), their 12-week FMLA leave entitlement is reduced in proportion to the employee’s actual workweek. For example, if an employee who works 40 hours per week takes 8 hours of FMLA leave in a week, the employee has used one-fifth of a week of FMLA leave. However, if the same employee takes off 8 hours during a week that includes a holiday (and is therefore a 32-hour week), has the employee used one-fourth of a week of FMLA leave? Not surprisingly, the DOL said no. The one day off is still only one-fifth of a regular week. So, the employee has still only used one-fifth of a week of FMLA leave. Review the blog post for options to instead track leave by the hour, which could make things easier.

OT ON THE QT? BAMA’S TAX EXEMPTION FOR OVERTIME

Alabama interestingly passed a law, effective January 1, 2024, that exempts employees’ overtime pay from the 5% Alabama income tax. In this blog post, we discussed the new exemption. It is an effort to incentivize hourly employees to work overtime, especially in light of recent staffing shortages and shift coverage issues. The bill currently places no cap on how much overtime pay is eligible for the exemption, but it allows the Legislature to extend and/or revise the exemption during the Spring 2025 regular session. If you have employees in Alabama, be sure to contact your payroll department or vendor to ensure compliance with this exemption.

As always, consult your legal counsel with any questions about these topics or other legal issues. See you in 2024!

© 2023 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP
For more news on 2023 Legal Landscape Updates, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

Needless Gamble: Eleventh Circuit Uses Exceedingly Broad Language to Address Narrow Issue of Arbitration in TCPA Text Suit

In Gamble v. New Eng. Auto Fin., Inc., No. 17-15343, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 14608 (11th Cir. May 31, 2018) the Eleventh Circuit upheld denial of arbitration of a TCPA claim involving text messages offering a consumer a new auto finance contract. While the Eleventh Circuit used unnecessarily broad language–discussed below– the holding is actually quite narrow; calls made to offer a consumer a second finance agreement do not arise out of a first finance agreement for arbitration purposes. The panel’s decision to reach this narrow conclusion through the vehicle of broadly-worded analysis might mean trouble for defendants seeking to compel future TCPA cases to arbitration in the Eleventh Circuit, however.

The arbitration clause at issue  in Gamble required arbitration of any “claim, dispute or controversy whether preexisting, present or future, that in any way arises from or relates to this Agreement or the Motor Vehicle securing this Agreement.”  The contract also contained a separate provision with a separate signature line appearing below the signature line for the auto loan agreement relating to consent to receive texts.  This separate provision was not signed by Plaintiff.

Defendant apparently emphasized the unsigned text message consent provision as the crux of its legal position. By offering Plaintiff the right to opt-in to text messages in the contract–the argument goes–the resulting text messages must have arose out of that contract. That’s a terrible argument, of course, and the Eleventh Circuit made short work of it concluding roughly that “no agreement regarding text messages exists between the parties.”

Unfortunately the Court did not stop there–although it could have–and used unnecessarily broad language in passing on the dispute before it. For instance, the Court made the express finding that the Plaintiff’s claim “does not arise from any right implicated by the Loan Agreement nor from the parties contractual relationship.”  While that is undoubtedly true, the reason that is the case is because the texts at issue were unrelated to this contract and pitched a wholly different contract. Yet the Court’s failure to emphasize this critical fact makes it seem as if TCPA cases–which almost never arise from a right implicated in a loan agreement–are per se non-arbitrable.

Complicating matters further, the Court also emphasized, in seemingly gratuitous fashion, that TCPA claims arise “from post-agreement conduct that allegedly violates a separate, distinct federal law.”  Again, this is undoubtedly true, but that is not a predicate basis for denying arbitration–claims related to purported statutory violations are commonly compelled to arbitration, including by the Eleventh Circuit. See generally Walthour v. Chipio Windshield Repair, LLC, 745 F. 3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2014). And texts often arise out of contracts–such as where a consumer goes into default under the terms of a loan agreement resulting in text messages from a servicer seeking to collect. The loose language in Gamble needlessly implies, therefore, that claims related to such text messages are not subject to arbitration merely because the underlying right being enforced is a federal statutory right, rather than a contractual right. That’s an unnecessary–if not dangerous–implication, and surely not one that comports with the Congressionally-mandated policy favoring arbitration.

It remains to be seen exactly what district courts in the Eleventh Circuit do with Gamble, but one thing is for sure– Gamble just made defense efforts to compel arbitration of TCPA cases there a whole lot less certain. Care to roll the dice?

 

Copyright © 2018 Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP All Rights Reserved.
This post was written by Eric Troutman of Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP.