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Death, Taxes, and Crypto Reporting – The Three Things You Cannot Escape

The IRS released a draft of Form 1099-DA “Digital Asset Proceeds from Broker Transactions” in April which will require anyone defined as a “broker” to report certain information related to the sale of digital assets. The new reporting requirements will be effective for transactions occurring in 2025 and beyond. The release of Form 1099-DA follows a change in the tax law.

In 2021, Congress amended code section 6045 to define “broker” to include any “person who (for consideration) is responsible for regularly providing any service effectuating transfers of digital assets on behalf of another person.” This is an expansion of the definition of a “broker.” The language ‘any service effectuating transfers of digital assets’ is oftentimes construed by many in the tax practitioner community as a catch-all term, in which the government could use to determine many people involved in digital asset platforms aa “brokers.”

The IRS proposed new regulations in August 2023 to further define and clarify the new reporting requirements. Under the proposed regulations, Form 1099-DA reporting would be required even for noncustodial transactions including facilitative services if the provider is in a “position to know” the identity of the seller and the nature of the transaction giving rise to gross proceeds. With apparently no discernible limits, facilitative services include “services that directly or indirectly effectuate a sale of digital assets.” Position to know means “the ability” to “request” a user’s identifying information and to determine whether a transaction gives rise to gross proceeds. Under these proposed regulations and the expanded definition of “broker,” a significant number of transactions that previously did not require 1099 reporting will now require reporting. There has been pushback against these proposed regulations, but the IRS appears determined to move forward with these additional reporting requirements.

The Psychology Behind Distracted Driving: Understanding the Urge to Multitask

There was a time when modern devices like smartphones, GPS devices, and infotainment systems in cars didn’t exist, but drivers still had to contend with other distractions. These included children in the back seat, beautiful scenery, and daydreaming, which are also leading causes of car accidents.

All forms of distractions are dangerous to some extent. But there may be nothing you can do to help in some cases, for example, getting lost in thought while at the wheel.

Activities like talking on the phone, texting, messing with the infotainment system, watching a video clip, etc., call for multitasking and are 100 percent avoidable, especially considering the dangers they pose. But it may not be as easy as it sounds, as it is part of human nature to want to multitask.

What Is Multitasking?

Psychology describes multitasking as the act of handling more than one task at a time. The complexity of multitasking and its effect on the brain depends on the types of activities a person is engaging in at once.

For example, it doesn’t take a lot in terms of brain faculties to listen to music while driving, so such a thing isn’t much of a big deal. However, being in a conference meeting while driving is difficult, as both activities require much more attention, making the chances of getting into a car accident much higher.

How Does Multitasking Affect the Brain?

People handle multitasking differently, but it doesn’t make it safe for anyone while at the wheel. The science behind how the brain functions shows that the human brain can handle one task at a time, so it’s right to say there is nothing like multitasking as far as the brain goes.

What looks like multitasking is actually the brain switching between different tasks at a relatively high speed, but it can only focus on one task at any given millisecond. Eventually, the switching back and forth affects focus, accuracy, and a person’s effectiveness.

The Psychology of Distracted Driving

Distracted driving at face value is a choice. However, if you dig deeper, you will realize it takes much more than making a choice to keep off because it also has something to do with most drivers’ psychology. Technology, especially communication technologies like social media, are built to be attention-grabbing, and the more time you stay on there, the more perceived satisfaction you get.

There is always the allure of knowing what has happened in the past few minutes, how your post is doing, who’s liking it, and stuff like that. This allure and the dopamine hits individuals get from the likes and comments make staying away a battle against the mind.

There is also social pressure, and this is especially true for younger drivers. Since everyone talks of doing it, or how good they are at it, the habit seems less and less risky.

Drives can be boring and too monotonous. For people who love mind-stimulating activities, their minds always crave something exciting that only a device can offer.

You Can Avoid Driving Distracted

It won’t be easy to break a bad habit. But understanding that multitasking is a myth and that it’s only a matter of time till you make a terrible mistake should make you want to think twice about it.

It is a matter of life and death, so the question is not if you like keeping off your devices but if you want to save lives. Be intentional, even when it means putting distractions out of reach until you reach your destination.

How to Recover Attorneys’ Fees in a Schedule A Trademark Case in the Northern District of Illinois

In recent years, a substantial number of “Schedule A” trademark infringement cases have been filed in the Northern District of Illinois. In such a case, the trademark owner may file a trademark infringement complaint against a number of defendants, with the complaint identifying the defendants as “The Individuals, Corporations, Limited Liability Companies, Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A hereto.” [See, e.g., Opulent Complaint]

The trademark owner may file Schedule A separately from the complaint with a request to the Court that the schedule be placed under seal. Sometimes, trademark owners file the entire complaint under seal. After filing sealed pleadings that shield the defendants’ identities, the trademark owner may then file ex parte motions for temporary restraining orders (“TROs”) against the secretly-named defendants. Because the proceedings are ex parte, the alleged infringer is not given notice of the proceedings or an opportunity to appear. If the Court grants the TRO, the trademark owner may then present the TRO to online marketplaces with a demand that the marketplaces immediately stop selling the allegedly infringing goods. The result may be that an alleged infringer may find all of its activity frozen by the online marketplace, including a freeze on the alleged infringer’s cash held with the online marketplace. This may create cashflow problems for the alleged infringer and prevent the alleged infringer from making future sales. Because its identity is sealed by the court, an alleged infringer may first learn of the TRO after its accounts are frozen.

Schedule A cases appear to be concentrated in the Northern District of Illinois because judges in that district have been receptive to granting ex parte relief. See, A. Anteau, “The Northern District of Illinois v. the Internet: How Chicago Became the Center of Schedule A Trademark Infringement Litigation”; Law.Com, December 19, 2023. At least two judges in that district even provide templates for TROs, preliminary injunctions and default judgments in Schedule A cases. See Northern District of Illinois (uscourts.gov); Northern District of Illinois (uscourts.gov). The justification for the ex parte nature of these proceedings is that it, if notice was required, online counterfeiters (frequently from China) could hide their assets or move their counterfeit products to new sites as soon as an infringement case was filed.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, remedies and relief do exist if an entity is the subject of a wrongfully obtained ex parte TRO. Recently, Ya Ya Creations, a defendant in a Schedule A trademark case, obtained an attorneys’ fees award against a plaintiff that failed to conduct a proper investigation before naming two Ya Ya-affiliated entities as alleged infringers in a case filed in the Northern District of Illinois. [Award of Fees] The dispute began in August 2021, when the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Ya Ya for trademark infringement and a variety of other causes of action in the Eastern District of Texas. The Texas court transferred the case to the Central District of California in April of 2022. Four months after the transfer, the plaintiff filed a very similar lawsuit against Ya Ya in the Middle District of Florida. On May 26, 2023, the Florida court transferred the case to the Central District of California, and then the CD California consolidated the cases due to the similarity of the facts and claims. On September 26, 2023, the plaintiff filed yet another lawsuit. This time, the plaintiff filed a Schedule A trademark infringement case against a number of defendants in the Northern District of Illinois. In the Schedule A case, the plaintiff named two entities affiliated with Ya Ya as alleged infringers.

Notwithstanding the litigation history between the parties, the plaintiff obtained an ex parte TRO against Ya Ya in the Northern District of Illinois. Ya Ya first learned about the TRO after the court issued it and after an online marketplace froze Ya Ya’s accounts.

Ya Ya’s first step in seeking redress was to file an emergency motion asking the court to dissolve the ex parte TRO. [Ya Ya Motion to Dissolve TRO] Ya Ya argued that, because the parties were actively litigating against each other in California, the plaintiff had no basis to seek ex parte relief against Ya Ya or its affiliated entities without notifying Ya Ya of the proceedings. Ya Ya also argued that the plaintiff’s ex parte TRO was a transparent attempt to gain a litigation advantage in the California cases to either leverage a settlement, force Ya Ya into a position where it could not even pay its lawyers to mount a defense, or force Ya Ya to file for bankruptcy. In response to Ya Ya’s motion to dismiss, the plaintiff agreed to dismiss all of its claims against the Ya Ya-affiliated entities.

Ya Ya’s next step was to file a motion for recovery of the attorneys’ fees it expended in the Northern District of Illinois proceedings. [Ya Ya Request for Reimbursement of Attorneys’ Fees]. In response, the plaintiff argued that it was not obligated to pay Ya Ya’s attorneys’ fees, because it did not know the entities it named in the Northern District of Illinois lawsuit were affiliated with Ya Ya. But the court rejected that argument. The court concluded that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, a court may award attorneys’ fees incurred while defending an ex parte TRO when (1) the TRO caused “needless delay” and unnecessarily “increased the cost of litigation,” or (2) the TRO was obtained by pleadings that were not “well grounded in fact” or made after “reasonable inquiry.” The Court determined that plaintiff could have avoided increasing the costs of litigation if it had conducted a reasonable inquiry to determine if the two entities were affiliated with Ya Ya, but it failed to do so. As a result, the Court awarded Plaintiff to pay Ya-Ya almost $100,000 in attorneys’ fees.

Trademark litigators should be aware that judges in the Northern District of Illinois have been receptive to granting ex parte TROs in trademark cases. If you represent a client that is the subject of an improperly granted ex parte TRO, be prepared to move quickly to dissolve the TRO and consider whether you have a basis to move for an award of attorneys’ fees.

CFTC Releases Artificial Intelligence Report

On 2 May 2024, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s (CFTC) Technology Advisory Committee (Committee) released a report entitled Responsible AI in Financial Markets: Opportunities, Risks & Recommendations. The report discusses the impact and future implications of artificial intelligence (AI) on financial markets and further illustrates the CFTC’s desire to oversee the AI space.

In the accompanying press release, Commissioner Goldsmith Romero highlighted the significance of the Committee’s recommendations, acknowledging decades of AI use in financial markets and proposing that new challenges will arise with the development of generative AI. Importantly, the report proposes that the CFTC develop a sector-specific AI Risk Management Framework addressing AI-associated risks.

The Committee opined that, without proper industry engagement and regulatory guardrails, the use of AI could “erode public trust in financial markets.” The report outlines potential risks associated with AI in financial markets such as the lack of transparency in AI decision processes, data handling errors, and the potential reinforcement of existing biases.

The report recommends that the CFTC host public roundtable discussions to foster a deeper understanding of AI’s role in financial markets and develop an AI Risk Management Framework for CTFC-registered entities aligned with the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s AI Risk Management Framework. This approach aims to enhance the transparency and reliability of AI systems in financial settings.

The report also calls for continued collaboration across federal agencies and stresses the importance of developing internal AI expertise within the CFTC. It advocates for responsible and transparent AI usage that adheres to ethical standards to ensure the stability and integrity of financial markets.

Buy American and Buy European

The Buy American Act was originally passed by Congress in 1933 and has undergone numerous changes across several presidential administrations. While the core of the Act has essentially remained the same, requiring the U.S. government to purchase goods produced in the U.S. in certain circumstances, the domestic preference requirements have changed over the years. While the Buy American Act applies to direct government purchases, the separate (but similarly named) Buy America Act passed in 1982 imposes similar U.S. content requirements for certain federally funded infrastructure projects. Generally, the Buy American Act’s “produced in the U.S.” requirement ensures that federal government purchases of goods valued at more than $10,000 are 100% manufactured in the U.S. with a set percentage of the cost of components coming from the U.S. As of 2024, that set percentage has been increased to 65%. Therefore, the cost of domestic components must be at least 65% of the total cost of components to comply with the rule. Under the existing rules, the threshold will increase to 75% in 2029. These planned changes are consistent with the trend of increasing preferences for domestic goods over time (a trend that has continued across administrations from both sides of the political spectrum).

Unsurprisingly, protectionist policies favoring American production can produce similar protectionist measures enacted by foreign countries. The European Union’s (EU) European Green Deal Industrial Plan (sometimes referred to as the Buy European Act), which includes the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) and the Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA), were both formally adopted within the last few months. The NZIA, which was agreed upon in February, is aimed at the manufacture of clean technologies in Europe and sets two benchmarks for such manufacturing in the EU: (1) that 40% of the production needed to cover the EU will be domestic by 2030; and (2) that the EU’s production will account for at least 15% of the world’s production by 2040. The NZIA contains a list of net-zero technologies, including wind and heat pumps, battery and energy storage, hydropower, and solar technologies. The CRMA, adopted on March 18, sets forth objectives for the EU’s consumption of raw materials by 2030: that 10% come from local extractions; 40% to be processed in the EU; and 25% come from recycled materials. The CRMA also provides that “not more than 65% of the Union’s annual consumption of each strategic raw material at any relevant stage of processing from a single third country.”[1] While Europe’s new acts are perhaps more geared towards raw materials and clean technology, the U.S. and Europe’s concerted efforts to focus on domestic production will be something to watch for years to come. In particular, it is worth watching whether the recent EU measures generate a response from U.S. lawmakers. If so, it could accelerate the already increasing stringency of Buy American and Buy America requirements.

[1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-industrial-policy/

by: Kevin P. Daly, Jeffrey J. White , Sabrina M. Galli of Robinson & Cole LLP

For more news on the Buy American Act and the European Green Deal Industrial Plan, visit the NLR Antitrust & Trade Regulation section.

A Guide for All Medicare Whistleblowers

Becoming a whistleblower and notifying federal authorities of Medicare fraud is a big public service and can even lead to a lucrative whistleblower award. Furthermore, the chief concern for interested whistleblowers is whether they could get reprimanded at their job for blowing the whistle on healthcare fraud or even fired, but any form of whistleblower retaliation is unlawful under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act.

If you think that you have uncovered evidence of Medicare fraud and want to learn more about what could happen next, here are four things to know.

There are Lots of Known Ways to Defraud Medicare

Medicare is an $800 billion federal program, but estimates are that tens of billions, if not nearly $100 billion of that is lost to fraud every year – and that estimate is widely regarded as a conservative one.

A lot of this type of health care fraud can be categorized into one of the following types of schemes, many of them having to do with fraudulent billing tactics:

Phantom billing, where medical goods or services are billed against Medicare even though they were never provided or the purported patient does not exist
Double billing for the same goods or services
Providing medically unnecessary healthcare
Buying prescription drugs with Medicare drug plan money and then reselling them
Upcoding, or providing a healthcare service to a patient, but then billing Medicare for a similar but more expensive one
Unbundling, or billing for each service independently even though they are normally charged in a discounted package because they are often performed together
Paying or taking financial kickbacks for referring patients to a certain healthcare provider, or to a provider that the referring party has a financial stake in

However, these are just the types of Medicare fraud that have been discovered. There are likely other ways of defrauding the program that have yet to be detected. Therefore, even if the evidence that you have uncovered does not fit squarely into one of these types of Medicare fraud does not necessarily mean that it is not a problem.

What Happens After Deciding the Blow the Whistle on Medicare Fraud

Most people are not completely familiar with how other civil or criminal cases move forward in the justice system. Because whistleblower cases are different and even more nuanced and complex, even fewer people understand the process – and those that presume that they are just like other cases find themselves misinformed.

Whistleblower cases are nearly unique in that they have three parties to them:

The whistleblower
The government
The defendant

After you have found evidence of Medicare fraud and abuse, decided to report suspected fraud and become a whistleblower, and hired a law firm well versed in federal laws to represent you, you will continue to gather evidence to support your allegations. This is a sensitive endeavor, as most whistleblowers only have access to the incriminating evidence through their employment, and their employer may be actively trying to cover up the fraudulent activity.

Being represented by an experienced whistleblower lawyer is essential for this stage of the process. They will have gone through it before and will see how to gather evidence to support your case without exposing yourself to the risk of being detected for reporting fraud.

Once you have a strong case, the next step is to present it to the law enforcement agency that would have jurisdiction over your case. Typically you would present information to the Health and Human Services Office or Office of the Inspector General (OIG) hotline. For Medicare fraud, reports are often made to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, or CMS. The goal is typically to persuade agents there to intervene in your case, conduct the investigation that you started, and prosecute the fraudsters.

If the agency declines to intervene, you can still pursue the case on the government’s behalf.

You Can Receive a Financial Award

One of the main incentives for whistleblowers is the award that they can receive for bringing the evidence to the attention of federal law enforcement. That award can be substantial.

Because Medicare is a federal program, most claims of Medicare fraud advance under the False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 et seq.). This federal law provides an avenue for whistleblowers who have evidence of fraud against the government.

Importantly, the False Claims Act offers quite generous whistleblower awards, even when compared to other whistleblower statutes. The amount that you receive depends on several factors, the most important of which is whether the government intervened in your case or not. If it did, you can receive between 15 and 25 percent of the proceeds of the case. If it did not and you prosecuted the case on behalf of the government, you can recover up to 30 percent of the case’s proceeds.

Other factors include:

Whether there are other whistleblowers who played a role in the case
How important the evidence was that you brought to the table
Whether you played a part in the Medicare fraud

Your Job is Protected

Because workplace retaliation is such a foreseeable outcome of becoming a whistleblower, and because the federal government relies so heavily on whistleblowers, it should come as no surprise that the False Claims Act and other whistleblower statutes provide legal protections in the workplace for those who engage in lawful whistleblower activities.

For Medicare fraud whistleblowers, the False Claims Act’s anti-retaliation provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), is particularly strong. Not only does it protect you from retaliatory conduct that falls short of termination, like workplace harassment and threats to fire you, it also entitles you to significant remedies if your employer breaks the law and commits an act of reprisal.

Eleventh Circuit Affirms Dismissal of FCRA Claims Since Alleged Inaccurate Information Was Not Objectively and Readily Verifiable

In Holden v. Holiday Inn Club Vacations Inc., No. 22-11014, No. 22-11734, 2024 WL 1759143 (11th Cir. 2024), which was a consolidated appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (“Eleventh Circuit” or “Court”) held that the purchasers of a timeshare did not have actionable FCRA claims since the alleged inaccurate information reported to one of the consumer reporting agencies (“CRAs”) was not objectively and readily verifiable. In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed two decisions issued by United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida (“District Court”) granting of summary judgment in favor of the timeshare company in the respective cases.

Summary of Facts and Background

Two consumers, Mark Mayer (“Mayer”) and Tanethia Holden (“Holden”), entered into two separate purchase agreements with Holiday Inn Club Vacations Incorporated (“Holiday”) to acquire timeshare interests in Cape Canaveral and Las Vegas, respectively. Holiday is a timeshare company that allows customers to purchase one or more of its vacation properties in weekly increments that can be used annually during the designated period. As part of the transaction, Holiday’s customers typically elect to finance their timeshare purchases through Holiday, which results in the execution of a promissory note and mortgage.

Mayer’s Purchase, Default, and Dispute

On September 15, 2014, Mayer entered into his purchase agreement with Holiday, which contained a title and closing provision stating the transaction would not close until Mayer made the first three monthly payments, and Holiday recorded a deed in Mayer’s name. The purchase agreement also included a purchaser’s default provision stating that upon Mayer’s default or breach of any of the terms or conditions of the agreement, all sums paid by Mayer would be retained by Holiday as liquidated damages and the parties to the purchase agreement would be relieved from all obligations thereunder. Further, the purchase agreement provided that any payments made under a related promissory note prior to the closing would be subject to the purchaser’s default provision. On the same day, Mayer executed a promissory note to finance his timeshare purchase, which was for a term of 120 months. On July 13, 2015, Holiday recorded a deed in Mayer’s name, and he proceeded to tender timely monthly payments until May 2017. As a result of Mayer’s failure to tender subsequent payments, Holiday reported Mayer’s delinquency to the CRA.

Approximately two years later, Mayer obtained a copy of his credit report and discovered Holiday had reported a past-due balance. Thereafter, Mayer sent multiple letters to the CRA disputing the debt, as he believed the purchase agreement was terminated under the purchaser’s default provision. Each dispute was communicated to Holiday, who in turn certified that the information was accurately reported. Mayer sued Holiday for an alleged violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) of the FCRA based on the furnishing of inaccurate information and failure to “fully and properly re-investigate” the disputes. Holiday eventually moved for partial summary judgment, which the District Court granted. The District Court reasoned that the underlying issue of whether the default provision excused Mayer’s obligation to keep paying was a legal dispute rather than a factual inaccuracy and, in turn, made Mayer’s claim not actionable under the FCRA. Mayer timely appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.

Holden’s Purchase, Default, and Dispute

On June 25, 2016, Holden entered into her purchase agreement with Holiday, which contained a nearly identical title and closing provision to that of Mayer’s purchase agreement. Additionally, Holden’s purchase agreement incorporated a similar purchaser’s default provision. Similarly, Holden executed a promissory note to finance her timeshare purchase, which was for a term of 120 months, and entered into a mortgage to secure the payments under the note. After making her third payment, Holden defaulted and hired an attorney to cancel the purchase agreement pursuant to the closing and title provision and purchaser’s default provision. However, Holiday disputed the purchase agreement was canceled and, on June 19, 2017, recorded a timeshare deed in Holden’s name. More importantly, Holiday reported Holden’s delinquent debt to the CRA.

In response, Holden’s attorney sent three dispute letters to Holiday, which resulted in Holiday investigating the dispute and determining the reporting was accurate since Holden was still obligated under the note. Eventually, Holden sued Holiday for various violations of Florida State law and the FCRA. Holden claimed Holiday reported inaccurate information to the CRA, failed to conduct an appropriate investigation, and failed to correct the inaccuracies. The parties filed competing motions for partial summary judgment, which ended with the District Court granting Holiday’s motion and denying Holden’s motion. Specifically, the District Court held that Holden’s FCRA claim failed because contract disputes regarding whether Holden still owed the underlying debt are legal disputes and not factual inaccuracies. Holden timely appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.

The Fair Credit Reporting Act

As the Eleventh Circuit reiterated in Holden, when a furnisher is notified of a consumer’s dispute, the furnisher must undertake the following three actions: (1) conduct an investigation surrounding the disputed information; (2) review all relevant information provided by the CRA; and (3) report the results of the investigation to the CRA. When a furnisher determines an item of information disputed by a consumer is incomplete, inaccurate, or cannot be verified, the furnisher is required to modify, delete, or permanently block reporting of the disputed information. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(E). Additionally, any disputed information that a furnisher determines is inaccurate or incomplete must be reported to all other CRAs. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(D). Despite the foregoing, consumers have no private right of action against furnishers merely for reporting inaccurate information to the CRAs. The only private right of action a consumer may assert against a furnisher is for a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) for failure to conduct a reasonable investigation upon receiving notice of a dispute from a CRA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(c)(1)).

To successfully prove an FCRA claim, the consumer must demonstrate the following: (1) the consumer identified inaccurate or incomplete information that the furnisher provided to the CRA; and (2) the ensuing investigation was unreasonable based on some facts the furnisher could have uncovered that establish the reported information was inaccurate or incomplete.

The Eleventh Circuit’s Decision

In affirming the District Court’s decisions granting summary judgment and dismissing the FCRA claims, the Eleventh Circuit clarified that whether the alleged inaccuracy was factual or legal was “beside the point. Instead, what matters is whether the alleged inaccuracy was objectively and readily verifiable.” Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit cited to Erickson v. First Advantage Background Servs. Corp., 981 F. 3d 1246, 1251-52 (11th Cir. 2020), which defined “accuracy” as “freedom from mistake or error.” The Eleventh Circuit continued by reiterating that “when evaluating whether a report is accurate under the [FCRA], we look to the objectively reasonable interpretations of the report.” As such, “a report must be factually incorrect, objectively likely to mislead its intended user, or both to violate the maximal accuracy standards of the [FCRA].”

Based on this standard, the Eleventh Circuit held that the alleged inaccurate information on which Mayer and Holden based their FCRA claims was not objectively and readily verifiable since the information stemmed from contractual disputes without simple answers. As such, the Eleventh Circuit found that Holiday took appropriate action upon receiving Mayer and Holden’s disputes by assessing the issues and determining whether the respective debts were due and/or collectible, which thereby satisfied its obligation under the FCRA. While Mayer and Holden argued to the contrary, the Eleventh Circuit held that the resolutions of these contract disputes were not straightforward applications of the law to facts. In support of its decision, the Eleventh Circuit cited to the fact that Florida State courts have reviewed similar timeshare purchase agreements and reached conflicting conclusions about whether the default provisions excused a consumer’s obligation to pay the underlying debt.

Conclusion

Holden is a limited victory for furnishers, as the Eleventh Circuit declined to impose a bright-line rule that only purely factual or transcription errors are actionable under the FCRA and held a court must determine whether the alleged inaccurate information is “objectively and readily verifiable.” Accordingly, there are situations when furnishers are required by the FCRA to accurately report information derived from the readily verifiable and straightforward application of the law to facts. One example of such a situation is misreporting the clear effect of a bankruptcy discharge order on certain types of debt. Thus, furnishers should revisit their investigation and verification procedures so they do not run afoul of the FCRA. Furnishers should also continue to monitor for developing case law as other circuit courts confront these issues.

A New Day for “Natural” Claims?

On May 2, the Second Circuit upheld summary judgment in favor of KIND in a nine year old lawsuit challenging “All Natural” claims. In Re KIND LLC, No. 22-2684-cv (2d Cir. May 2, 2024). Although only time will tell, this Circuit decision, in favor of the defense, may finally change plaintiffs’ appetite for “natural” cases.

Over the many years of litigation, the lawsuit consolidated several class action filings from New York, Florida, and California into a single, multi-district litigation with several, different lead plaintiffs. All plaintiffs alleged that “All Natural” claims for 39 KIND granola bars and other snacks were deceptive. Id. at 3. Plaintiff had alleged that the following ingredients rendered the KIND bars not natural: soy lecithin, soy protein isolate, citrus pectin, glucose syrup/”non-GMO” glucose, vegetable glycerine, palm kernel oil, canola oil, ascorbic acid, vitamin A acetate, d-alpha tocopheryl acetate/vitamin E, and annatto.

The Second Circuit found that, in such cases, the relevant state laws followed a “reasonable consumer standard” of deception. Id. at 10. Further, according to the Second Circuit, the “Ninth Circuit has helpfully explained” that the reasonable consumer standard requires “‘more than a mere possibility that the label might conceivably be misunderstood by some few consumers viewing it in an unreasonable manner.’” Id. (quoting McGinity v. Procter & Gamble Co., 69 F.4^th 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2023)). Rather, there must be “‘a probability that a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.’” Id. To defeat summary judgement, the plaintiffs would need to present admissible evidence showing how “All Natural” tends to mislead under this standard.

The Second Circuit agreed with the lower court that plaintiffs’ deposition testimony failed to provide such evidence where it failed to “establish an objective definition” representing reasonable consumer understanding of “All Natural.” Id. at 28. While one plaintiff believed the claim meant “not synthetic,” another thought it meant “made from whole grains, nuts, and fruit,” while yet another believed it meant “literally plucked from the ground.” Id. The court observed that plaintiffs “fail[ed] to explain how a trier of fact could apply these shifting definitions.” Id. The court next rejected as useful evidence a dictionary definition of “natural,” which stated, “existing or caused by nature; not made or caused by humankind.” Id. at 29. The court reasoned that the dictionary definition was “not useful when applied to a mass-produced snack bar wrapped in plastic” – something “clearly made by humans.” Id.

The court, finally, upheld the lower court’s decision to exclude two other pieces of evidence the plaintiffs offered. First, the Second Circuit agreed that a consumer survey was subject to exclusion where leading questions biased the results. Id. at 21-22. The Second Circuit also agreed that an expert report by a chemist lacked relevance where it assessed “typical” sourcing of ingredients, not necessarily how KIND’s ingredients were manufactured or sourced. Id. at 22-24.

For more news on Food Advertising Litigation, visit the NLR Biotech, Food, Drug section.

My Safe Florida Condo Pilot Program: Frequently Asked Questions

On April 24, 2024, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis signed House Bill 1029 into law, marking a pivotal moment in bolstering condominium resilience against hurricane damage. This significant milestone is important for Florida’s condominium owners’ associations to recognize in furtherance of efforts to protect Florida’s infrastructure.

House Bill 1029, also known as the My Safe Florida Condominium Pilot Program, aims to provide condominium associations with a mechanism similar to the My Safe Florida Home Program that was previously made available to single family homes. This initiative establishes the My Safe Florida Condominium Pilot Program, enabling eligible condominiums to apply for various grants to fortify their buildings and minimize the impact of hurricanes.

Who is eligible?

Condominium associations that meet specified criteria can apply for mitigation grants under the program.

What are the voting requirements for Condominium Associations?

Associations must obtain approval through a majority vote of the board of directors or a majority vote of the total voting interests of the association to apply for an inspection. Additionally, a unanimous vote of all unit owners within the structure or building subject to the grant is required prior to apply for a grant.

What information needs to be disclosed?

Prior to conducting the vote of unit owners, associations are required to provide clear disclosure of the program using a form that will be created by the Florida Department of Financial Services. The president and treasurer of the board of directors must sign the disclosure form, which will be kept as part of the association’s official records.

Do Condominium Associations need to provide notice?

Yes, condominium associations are required to provide written notice within 14 days of an affirmative vote to participate in the Program to all unit owners, in accordance with the statutory requirements of Section 718.112(2)(d), Florida Statutes.

How much can a Condominium Association apply for in grants?

The grant is capped at $175,000 per condominium association and can be utilized for various improvements, including opening protection, reinforcing roof-to-wall connections, enhancing roof-deck attachments, and implementing secondary water resistance for the roof.

Can individual units participate?

Mitigation grants are awarded to condominium associations collectively, and individual unit owners may not participate in the Program.

House Bill 1029 creates Section 215.5587, Florida Statutes, further solidifying its significance in the state’s efforts to bolster the tens of thousands of condominiums throughout the state. These legislative enhancements are anticipated to enhance community associations in safeguarding their properties and residents against natural disasters.

Bidding Farewell, For Now: Google’s Ad Auction Class Certification Victory

A federal judge in the Northern District of California delivered a blow to a potential class action lawsuit against Google over its ad auction practices. The lawsuit, which allegedly involved tens of millions of Google account holders, claimed Google’s practices in its real-time bidding (RTB) auctions violated users’ privacy rights. But U.S. District Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers declined to certify the class of consumers, pointing to deficiencies in the plaintiffs’ proposed class definition.

According to plaintiffs, Google’s RTB auctions share highly specific personal information about individuals with auction participants, including device identifiers, location data, IP addresses, and unique demographic and biometric data, including age and gender. This, the plaintiffs argued, directly contradicted Google’s promises to protect users’ data. The plaintiffs therefore proposed a class definition that included all Google account holders subject to the company’s U.S. terms of service whose personal information was allegedly sold or shared by Google in its ad auctions after June 28, 2016.

But Google challenged this definition on the basis that it “embed[ded] the concept of personal information” and therefore subsumed a dispositive issue on the merits, i.e., whether Google actually shared account holders’ personal information. Google argued that the definition amounted to a fail-safe class since it would include even uninjured members. The Court agreed. As noted by Judge Gonzalez Rogers, Plaintiffs’ broad class definition included a significant number of potentially uninjured class members, thus warranting the denial of their certification motion.

Google further argued that merely striking the reference to “personal information,” as proposed by plaintiffs, would not fix this problem. While the Court acknowledged this point, it concluded that it did not yet have enough information to make that determination. Because the Court denied plaintiffs’ certification motion with leave to amend, it encouraged the parties to address these concerns in any subsequent rounds of briefing.

In addition, Judge Gonzalez raised that plaintiffs would need to demonstrate that the RTB data produced in the matter thus far was representative of the class as a whole. While the Court agreed with plaintiffs’ argument and supporting evidence that Google “share[d] so much information about named plaintiffs that its RTB data constitute[d] ‘personal information,” Judge Gonzalez was not persuaded by their assertion that the collected RTB data would necessarily also provide common evidence for the rest of the class. The Court thus determined that plaintiffs needed to affirmatively demonstrate through additional evidence that the RTB data was representative of all putative class members, and noted for Google that it could not refuse to provide such and assert that plaintiffs had not met their burden as a result.

This decision underscores the growing complexity of litigating privacy issues in the digital age, and previews new challenges plaintiffs may face in demonstrating commonality and typicality among a proposed class in privacy litigation. The decision is also instructive for modern companies that amass various kinds of data insofar as it demonstrates that seemingly harmless pieces of that data may, in the aggregate, still be traceable to specific persons and thus qualify as personally identifying information mandating compliance with the patchwork of privacy laws throughout the U.S.

Tag: government

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