Tag: civil rights

Pregnant Workers Fairness Act Final Regulations Released

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) released the text of the final regulations and interpretative guidance implementing the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) on April 15, 2024. The final regulations are expected to be formally published in the April 19, 2024, Federal Register and will be effective 60 days later.

The EEOC received more than 100,000 public comments, including comments from Jackson Lewis, in response to the Commission’s notice of the proposed regulations issued on Aug. 11, 2023. Although largely unchanged from the proposed regulations, the final regulations provide important clarifications and insights into how the EEOC will enforce the law. Discussed below are some key points employers need to know about the final regulations.

Key PWFA Requirements

The PWFA, which went into effect on June 27, 2023, requires employers with at least 15 employees and other covered entities to provide reasonable accommodations to a qualified employee’s or applicant’s known limitations related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, unless the accommodation will cause undue hardship on the operation of the employer’s business.

Qualified Employee

Under the PWFA, an employee has two ways to establish they are a “qualified employee”:

  1. Like under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), “an employee or applicant who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position” is qualified.
  2. If an employee (or applicant) cannot perform all essential job functions even with reasonable accommodation, the employee can be qualified for accommodations under the PWFA if: (a) the inability to perform an essential job function is for a temporary period; (b) the essential job function(s) could be performed in the near future; and (c) the inability to perform the essential function(s) can be reasonably accommodated. The Act, however, does not define “temporary” or “in the near future.” Several commentors raised concerns about the EEOC’s definition of these terms in the proposed regulations.

Like the proposed regulations, the final regulations state that “temporary” means “lasting for a limited time, not permanent, and may extend beyond ‘in the near future.’” Unlike the proposed regulations, however, the final regulations state that assessing whether all essential job functions can be performed in the near future depends on the circumstances:

  • For a current pregnancy, “in the near future” is generally defined as 40 weeks from the start of the temporary suspension of an essential function.
  • For conditions other than a current pregnancy, “in the near future” is not defined as any particular length of time. However, the preamble to the final regulations explains that an employee who needs indefinite leave cannot perform essential job functions “in the near future.”

The final regulations explain that employers should consider whether an employee will be able to perform the essential functions “in the near future” each time an employee asks for an accommodation that requires suspension of an essential job function.

Ultimately, whether an employee is “qualified” involves a fact-sensitive evaluation whether the temporary suspension of essential job functions can be reasonably accommodated by the employer. This is significantly different from the ADA reasonable accommodation obligation and may involve, as the final regulations state, removing essential job functions and other arrangements including, but not limited to, requiring the employee perform the remaining job functions and other functions assigned by the employer, temporarily transferring the employee to another job or assigning the employee to light or modified duty, or allowing the employee to participate in an employer’s light or modified duty program.

Accommodations Only Required for Individual With Limitation

The EEOC explains that the regulations do not require employers to provide accommodations to an employee when an employee’s partner, spouse, or family member — not the employee themselves — has a physical or mental condition related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. For clarity, the EEOC revised the final regulations’ definition of “limited” to state the limitation must be the specific employee.

Known Limitations

Employers are only obligated under the PWFA to accommodate an individual’s “known limitation.”

A “limitation” is defined as a “physical or mental condition related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, of the specific employee in question.” The condition may be “modest, minor, and/or episodic, and does not need to meet the definition of “disability” under the ADA.

It becomes “known” to the employer when the employee or the employee’s representative has communicated the limitation to the employer. An employee’s representative may include a family member, friend, healthcare provider, union representative, or other representative.

The limitation may be communicated to a supervisor, a manager, someone who has supervisory authority for the employee or who regularly directs the employee’s tasks (or the equivalent in the case of an applicant), human resources personnel, or other appropriate official or by following the steps in the employer’s policy to request an accommodation.

This communication need not be in any specific format and may also be oral.

Pregnancy, Childbirth, Related Medical Conditions

Although the EEOC acknowledged receiving many comments on the scope of the proposed definition of “pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions,” it made no substantive changes to the definition in the final regulations.

“Pregnancy” and “childbirth” are still defined as including current pregnancy, past pregnancy, potential or intended pregnancy (which can include infertility, fertility treatments and the use of contraception), labor, and childbirth (including vaginal and cesarean delivery).

The term “related medical conditions” continues to be defined as conditions that are “related to, are affected by, or arise out of pregnancy or childbirth.” The regulations provide the following non-exhaustive list of examples: termination of pregnancy, including by miscarriage, stillbirth, or abortion; lactation and conditions related to lactation; menstruation; postpartum depression, anxiety or psychosis; vaginal bleeding; preeclampsia; pelvic prolapse; preterm labor; ectopic pregnancy; gestational diabetes; cesarean or perineal wound infection; maternal cardiometabolic disease; endometriosis; changes in hormone levels; and many other conditions.

The final regulations also reference related medical conditions that are not unique to pregnancy or childbirth, such as chronic migraine headaches, nausea or vomiting, high blood pressure, incontinence, carpal tunnel syndrome, and many other medical conditions. These conditions are covered by the PWFA only if the condition relates to pregnancy or childbirth or are exacerbated by pregnancy or childbirth, although the ADA or other civil rights statutes may apply.

Documentation

The final PWFA regulations continue to provide for a “reasonableness” standard in evaluating the circumstances under which an employer may request documentation from an employee. The final regulations, however, modify the definition of “reasonable documentation.” An employer may only request the “minimum documentation” necessary to confirm the employee has a physical or mental condition related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions (a limitation) and describe the adjustment or change at work due to the limitation.

In addition to stating when an employer can ask for documentation, the PWFA regulations add a paragraph regarding an employee’s self-confirmation of their pregnancy status. It provides that an employer must accept as sufficient an employee’s self-confirmation when: (1) the pregnancy is obvious; or (2) an employee seeks one of the “predictable assessment” accommodation requests set forth in the regulations (discussed below).

The final PWFA regulations make clear the circumstances where it is not reasonable to seek supporting documentation. These circumstances include when: (1) the limitation and adjustment or change needed is obvious and the employee provides self-confirmation; (2) the employer has sufficient information to determine whether the employee has a qualifying limitation and needs an adjustment or change due to the limitation; (3) when the employee is pregnant a “predictable assessment”; (4) the reasonable accommodation relates to a time and/or place to pump or to nurse during work hours, and the employee provides self-confirmation; or (5) the requested accommodation is available to employees without known limitations under the PWFA pursuant to a policy or practice without submitting supporting documentation.

Importantly, the same prohibitions on disability-related inquiries and medical examinations as well as the protection of medical information enforced under the ADA apply with equal force to documentation collected under the PWFA. Employers should ensure they continue to limit inquiries to only those that are job-related and consistent with business necessity. Employers should also treat all documentation relating to a PWFA accommodation request like they treat ADA documentation — maintain it confidentially and separate from an employee’s personnel file.

Reasonable Accommodations

The PFWA requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations, which the final regulations define to be generally consistently with the ADA except for temporarily excusing or eliminating the performance of an essential job function. Otherwise, the rule provides that a reasonable accommodation is a modification or adjustment that is “reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases” if it appears to be “feasible” or “plausible.” An accommodation also must be effective in meeting the qualified employee’s needs to remove a work-related barrier and provide an employee with equal employment opportunity to benefit from all privileges of employment.

The final regulations include examples of requests that may be reasonable. These include schedule changes due to morning sickness or to treat medical issues following delivery, adjustments to accommodate restrictions for lifting or requests for light duty, time and/or space to pump or nurse during work hours, or time off to recover from childbirth.

Lactation Accommodations

The EEOC’s final regulations require reasonable accommodation for lactation beyond what may be required under the Providing Urgent Maternal Protection for Nursing Mothers Act (PUMP Act). The PUMP Act generally requires reasonable break time and space shielded from view and free from intrusion for a nursing mother to express breast milk. The final PWFA regulations provide a non-exhaustive list of examples of accommodations relating to lactation, including space for pumping that is in reasonable proximity to a sink, running water, and refrigeration for storing milk.

The final regulations add nursing during working hours (as distinct from pumping) to the list of potentially reasonable accommodations. In the comments explaining this addition, the EEOC cautioned that accommodations for nursing mothers during work hours address situations where the employee and child are in close proximity in the normal course of business, such as where the employee works from home or where the employer offers on-site daycare. The EEOC stated this is not intended to create a right to proximity to nurse because of an employee’s preference.

Predictable Assessments

Like the proposed regulations, the final regulations recognize four “predictable assessments” that will not impose an undue hardship in “virtually all cases”:

  1. Allowing an employee to carry or keep water near to enable them to drink;
  2. Permitting an employee to take additional restroom breaks as needed;
  3. Allowing an employee whose work requires standing to sit and whose work requires sitting to stand as needed; and
  4. Allowing an employee to take breaks to eat and drink as needed.

Despite stating the predictable assessments above will not “in virtually all cases” impose an undue hardship, the EEOC clarified this does not mean such requests are reasonable per se. The EEOC recognized that in certain industries, these predictable assessments may cause an undue hardship. Accordingly, employers may still conduct an individualized assessment of a predictable assessment accommodation request. However, the final regulations make clear that any such individualized assessment should be particularly simple and straightforward.

Many individuals and organizations that submitted comments on the proposed regulations suggested the addition of other types of predictable assessment accommodations, including dress code modifications, minor workstation modifications, proximity to a restroom, permitting eating and drinking at a workstation, rest breaks, and personal protective equipment. Although noting agreement with the commenters and stating that employers should be able to provide such requests with “little difficulty,” the EEOC declined to expand the list of predictable assessments beyond the four originally listed that in “virtually all cases” will be considered reasonable and will not pose an undue hardship. In response to comments objecting to predictable assessments based on different challenges by industry, the EEOC guidance recognizes that an employer in certain industries may assert an accommodation request otherwise deemed to be a predictable assessment causes the employer an undue hardship and may deny the request.

Undue Hardship

The EEOC adopted the same standard for undue hardship in the final regulations as was in the proposed regulations. When an employee can perform all their essential job functions, the EEOC stated that undue hardship has the same meaning as under the ADA and generally means significant difficulty or expense for the employer’s operation. If an employee cannot perform all essential functions and the accommodation is temporary suspension of an essential job function, the employer needs to consider the ADA definition of undue hardship and the following relevant factors: (1) the length of time the employee or applicant will be unable to perform the essential function(s); (2) whether there is work for the employee to accomplish by allowing the employee to perform all the other functions of the job, transferring the employee to a different position, or otherwise; (3) the nature of the essential function, including its frequency; (4) whether the covered entity has temporarily suspended the performance of essential job functions for other employees in similar positions; (5) whether there are other employees, temporary employees, or third parties who can perform or be temporarily hired to perform the essential function(s); and (6) whether the essential function(s) can be postponed or remain unperformed for any length of time and for how long.

EEOC Interpretative Guidance

The EEOC’s final regulations include an appendix entitled “Appendix A to Part 1636—Interpretative Guidance on the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act” (Interpretative Guidance). The Interpretative Guidance, which becomes part of the final regulations, has the same force and effect as the final regulations.

The Interpretative Guidance addresses the major provisions of the PWFA and its regulations and explains the main concepts pertaining to an employer’s legal requirements under the PWFA to make reasonable accommodations for known limitations (physical or mental conditions related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions). It represents the EEOC’s interpretation of the PWFA and, as stated in comments to the final regulations, the EEOC will be guided by the Interpretive Guidance when enforcing the PWFA. The Interpretative Guidance includes many examples and other practical guidance illustrating common workplace scenarios and how the PWFA applies.

Remedies, Enforcement

The final regulations’ remedies and enforcement are the same as proposed. Remedies under the PWFA mirror those under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and include injunctive and other equitable relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. Employers that demonstrate good faith efforts to work with employees to identify and make reasonable accommodations have an affirmative defense to money damages.

PWFA’s Relationship to Other Federal, State, Local Laws

The final regulations provide that the PWFA does not invalidate or limit the powers, remedies, or procedures available under any federal, state, or local law that provides greater or equal protection for individuals affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. About 40 states and cities have laws protecting employees and applicants from discrimination due to pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions. Accordingly, employers should evaluate whether state and/or local law may provide greater rights and obligations than the PWFA. To the extent such laws provide greater obligations, the PWFA final regulations require employers to comply with both the PWFA and analogous state and local law.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2024
For more news on the PWFA, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

It’s Protected: NLRB Finds “Black Lives Matter” Insignia on Employee Uniform Constitutes Protected Activity Under Circumstances

The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), in a 3-1 decision, held that an employee’s display on their work uniform of “BLM,” an acronym for Black Lives Matter, constituted protected concerted activity under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“Act”). Accordingly, the NLRB reversed an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) decision, and found that the employer (Home Depot) violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by directing the employee to remove the BLM insignia because it violated the company’s uniform policy. The employee resigned instead of removing the insignia from their uniform.

Procedural History

In June 2022, an ALJ found that the employer did not violate the Act by requiring the employee to remove the BLM messaging, because the insignia lacked “an objective, and sufficiently direct, relationship to terms and conditions of employment.” The ALJ concluded that the BLM messaging was “primarily used, and generally understood, to address the unjustified killings of Black individuals by law enforcement and vigilantes … [and] while a matter of profound societal importance, is not directly relevant to the terms, conditions, or lot of Home Depot’s employees as employees.” (emphasis in original).

Further, the ALJ determined that the employee’s motivation for displaying the BLM message (i.e., their dissatisfaction with their treatment as employees) was not relevant. The petitioner sought review before the NLRB.

NLRB Finds Wearing BLM Insignia at Work Constitutes Protected Activity

On review, the NLRB concluded that the employee’s refusal to remove the BLM insignia was protected concerted activity under Section 7 of the Act because the activity was for “mutual aid or protection,” as it was a “logical outgrowth” of the employee’s and other employees’ complaints about race discrimination in the workplace that allegedly occurred over the preceding months.

According to the NLRB, an individual employee’s actions are a “logical outgrowth” of the concerns expressed by the group where “the record shows the existence of a group complaint,” even though “the employees acted individually and without coordination.” In this case, the fact that the group complaints post-dated the employee’s initial display of the BLM insignia was not dispositive. Instead, and contrary to the ALJ’s conclusion, the NLRB focused on whether the employee’s subsequent refusal to remove the BLM insignia was a “logical outgrowth” of the prior protected concerted activity.

Additionally, the NLRB found that no special circumstances existed, such that there was a sufficient justification for the company to preclude their employees from wearing such insignia. For instance, this was not a situation where display of the insignia might jeopardize employee safety, exacerbate employee dissention, or unreasonably interfere with the company’s public image. In this regard, the NLRB concluded that the company’s public image was not at issue because it encourages employees to customize their uniforms. Likewise, the NLRB held that the company failed to put forth evidence of any non-speculative imminent risks to employee safety from the public and/or any violent or disruptive acts or threats thereof by other employees connected to the BLM insignia.

The NLRB ordered the employer to, among other things, (1) cease and desist from prohibiting employees from taking part in “protected concerted activities,” such as displaying “Black Lives Matter” insignia on their uniform aprons; (2) reinstate the employee without prejudice and compensate him for lost back pay and any adverse tax consequences; and (3) post notice of the decision for 60 days at the store where the dispute arose. The company may still appeal the Board’s decision to a federal appeals court.

Significantly, the NLRB declined to adopt a broader objective advanced by the NLRB General Counsel that protesting civil rights issues on the job is “inherently concerted” activity that is protected by Section 7 of the Act. The fact-intensive reasoning behind the NLRB’s decision here reflects that the underlying circumstances in each situation will play a significant role in the legal outcome as to whether the conduct at issue is protected, and it is not advisable to adopt a broad, one-size fits all rule from this decision.

© 2024 Proskauer Rose LLP.
For more news on Protected Concerted Activity under the NLRA, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

Do Federal Civil Rights Laws Prohibit Discrimination Based on Sex and Age?

Harvard Business Review’s recent survey, “Women in Leadership Face Ageism at Every Age,” shines a bright light on the bleak reality of age discrimination against women in the workplace.  The survey of 913 women leaders from across the United States in the higher education, faith-based nonprofit, legal, and health care industries found that supervisors and colleagues find women of every age unfit for leadership roles based on their age.  Young women leaders are subjected to head pats and pet names and are often mistaken for students, interns, or support staff.  Middle aged women leaders are discounted as having too many family responsibilities or being on the runway to menopause.  Older women are largely erased from the work environment, facing assumptions that they are on their way out.  This stands in stark contrast to older men, whom employers tend to regard as “wells of wisdom.”  In short, when it comes to the workplace, age-related bias perpetually stands between women and recognition as leaders.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), which prohibits discrimination in employment, identifies certain “protected classes” upon which bases employers may not discriminate: race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.  A separate statute, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“the ADEA”), outlaws age discrimination in the workplace.  Plaintiffs filing a lawsuit challenging employment discrimination typically must articulate a specific statute their employer has violated.  In the case of sex-plus-age discrimination—that is, mistreatment based on the intersection of sex and age—neither statute standing alone captures the plaintiff’s experience.[1]  This raises the question of how women facing uniquely gendered age bias in the workplace—like that outlined in the Harvard Business Review survey—can state legal claims a court will consider viable.

For the most part, federal courts have been skeptical of such claims.

A recent case, however, brought a new perspective to the question of sex-plus-age discrimination under federal law.  On July 21, 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the appellate court that covers Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming, addressed the question “whether sex-plus-age claims are cognizable under Title VII.”[2]  In Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk LLC, nine female plaintiffs brought (among other claims) sex-plus-age claims for disparate impact and disparate treatment under Title VII, alleging they were terminated because Affinity discriminated against women over forty.[3]  The older women, who had worked at the Golden Mardi Gras Casino, were laid off after the defendant purchased the casino in 2012.  The terminations were largely unexplained.  After the lower court dismissed their claims, the plaintiffs appealed.

The Tenth Circuit ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor, affirming the validity of sex-plus-age claims under Title VII alone.  The court noted that it had allowed claims based on a combination of race and sex discrimination in Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co.[4]In Hicks, the court considered the combined effect of racial slurs and sexual harassment in a hostile work environment case.  In Frappied, however, the court had to decide a novel question—whether an intersectional discrimination claim could be based on a second characteristic that is not protected by Title VII: age.  Most courts that have considered such claims have refused to decide whether a plaintiff can challenge discrimination under an intersectional theory that the combination of the two protected characteristics led to the adverse action, or they have decided the plaintiff can prevail under one statute so the court does not have to decide whether the intersectional claim is viable. For instance, both the Second and Sixth Circuits have sidestepped the issue, making dispositive rulings based on other claims in plaintiffs’ complaints.[5]

In Frappied, the Tenth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court had long held that Title VII prohibits “sex-plus” discrimination where the “plus” factor is not protected under the statute.[6]  In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.[7]the Supreme Court held that a policy against hiring women with preschool-age children violated Title VII, because men with preschool-age children were not subject to that policy.  Even though “people with preschool-age children” is not a protected class, the Supreme Court recognized this to be a form of sex discrimination.  The Tenth Circuit used the same reasoning to hold that if sex—which is protected under Title VII—“play[ed] a role in the employment action,” then the termination was impermissible even though the “plus” factor, age, is in another statute.[8]  Borrowing from the Supreme Court’s analysis in Bostock,[9] which held that Title VII’s sex discrimination provision prohibits sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination in employment, the Tenth Circuit held that “if a female plaintiff shows that she would not have been terminated if she had been a man—in other words, if she would not have been terminated but for her sex—this showing is sufficient to establish liability under Title VII.[10]

While the outcome in Frappied is a positive development for civil rights in employment, in most jurisdictions there is no clear protection under federal law against sex-plus-age discrimination.  The EEOC has long acknowledged the availability of such intersectional claims, but as mentioned, other sex-plus-age claims have made their way through the courts on occasion without success.  The Tenth Circuit is the first and only federal appellate court to formally recognize these claims as viable under federal law.

However, there are state laws that prohibit sex and age discrimination in the same provision,[11] so the federal courts’ unwillingness to combine the effects of discrimination prohibited by two separate statutes is not always a concern.  Given the Harvard Business Review’s exposure of the dire state of workplace age bias against women, and the Tenth Circuit’s groundbreaking decision in Frappied, more women experiencing workplace age discrimination may want to consider challenging their employers’ decisions.  Because of the variations in protections in different jurisdictions, employees should consider seeking legal advice.  If you or someone you know has experienced sex-plus-age bias, contact the experienced lawyers at Katz Banks Kumin today.

[1] The legal standards, particularly the causation standards, also differ under the two statutes.  Under Title VII, it is sufficient to prove that sex was a “motivating factor” in an employment decision.  Under the ADEA, however, age must be the but-for cause, Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009).  Many courts have interpreted this but-for causation standard to mean that if any other reason—even sex, which is a protected class under Title VII—played a role in the employment decision, then the age claims fail.  The Supreme Court recently clarified that “but-for cause” does not mean “sole cause,” Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), but the idea has yet to trickle down through the federal courts—and into ADEA claims.

[2] Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, 966 F.3d 1038, 1045 (10th Cir. 2020).

[3] Id.

[4] 833 F.2d 1406, 1416-17 (10th Cir. 1987)

[5] Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Having determined that Gorzynski has provided sufficient evidence of age discrimination to reach a jury, there is no need for us to create an age-plus-sex claim independent from Gorzynski’s viable ADEA claim.”); Schatzman v. Cty. Of Clermont, Ohio, No. 99-4066, 2000 WL 1562819, at *9 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e decline the invitation to decide the ‘sex plus [age]’ charge partly because it is unnecessary for us to do so.”).

[6] 966 F.3d at 1046.

[7] 400 U.S. 542 (1971).

[8] Id. at 1046.

[9] 140 S. Ct. 1731.

[10] Id. at 1047.

[11] See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1401.1.

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For more articles on workplace discrimination, visit the NLR Civil Rights section.

Newly Enacted Federal “Speak Out Act” Limits Use of Some Sexual Harassment NDAs

President Biden has signed into law the federal “Speak Out Act” limiting the enforceability of pre–dispute non-disclosure and non-disparagement clauses covering sexual assault and sexual harassment disputes.  The Act takes effect immediately.

The Act places restrictions on the enforceability of pre-dispute:

  • “non-disclosure clauses,” meaning “a provision in a contract or agreement that requires the parties to the contract or agreement not to disclose or discuss conduct, the existence of a settlement involving conduct, or information covered by the terms and conditions of the contract or agreement.”
  •  “non-disparagement clauses,” defined as “a provision in a contract or agreement that requires 1 or more parties to the contract or agreement not to make a negative statement about another party that relates to the contract, agreement, claim, or case.”

Such clauses entered into before a sexual assault or sexual harassment dispute arises are rendered unenforceable.  The Act defines covered “sexual assault disputes” as disputes “involving a nonconsensual sexual act or sexual contact, as such terms are defined in section 2246 of title 18, United States Code, or similar applicable Tribal or State law, including when the victim lacks capacity to consent.” Covered “sexual harassment disputes” are defined as disputes “relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law.”

A few notes about the Act’s scope and implications:

  • Critically, the Act may have limited implications for many employers for one key reason – the Act only applies to non-disclosure and non-disparagement clauses in pre-dispute agreements, meaning that any non-disclosure/non-disparagement clauses in agreements entered into by employers/employees concerning sexual assault or sexual harassment issues after a dispute has arisen are not impacted by the Act.  Because of this, the Act’s protections would not apply to non-disclosure/non-disparagement clauses in separation or settlement agreements executed after sexual harassment or sexual assault allegations are made, but may be subject, of course, to any applicable state or local laws.
  • The Act explicitly excludes from coverage any efforts by employers to protect trade secrets and proprietary information via non-disclosure or non-disparagement provisions.
  • While the Act does apply to non-disclosure/non-disparagement clauses in agreements entered into before December 7, 2022 (the Effective Date), it would not impact clauses entered into before a dispute arose, but where that dispute was active before the Act’s December 7th effective date.
  • Given the above, employers utilizing non-disclosure/non-disparagement agreements at the outset of employment or during the employment lifecycle should consider creating proper carve-outs for sexual assault and sexual harassment issues given the new Act.

Employers should also be aware of other recent developments in this area.  The Speak Out Act also follows the enactment of the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act, which took effect earlier this year (our post on the law can be found here).  That federal law prohibits employers from compelling arbitration of sexual harassment or sexual assault claims and provides employees the option to pursue those claims in other forums.  Employers should also remain aware that, despite the seemingly narrow implications of this new federal law, several states – including California, Illinois, New Jersey, and New York – have enacted laws in recent years that grant employees broader protections when it comes to certain sexual harassment and discrimination claims, enhancing employees’ abilities to speak out about alleged misconduct.

Article By Corbin Carter and Michael S. Arnold of Mintz

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White House Office of Science and Technology Policy Releases “Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights”

On October 4, 2022, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (“OSTP”) unveiled its Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights, a non-binding set of guidelines for the design, development, and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) systems.

The Blueprint comprises of five key principles:

  1. The first Principle is to protect individuals from unsafe or ineffective AI systems, and encourages consultation with diverse communities, stakeholders and experts in developing and deploying AI systems, as well as rigorous pre-deployment testing, risk identification and mitigation, and ongoing monitoring of AI systems.

  2. The second Principle seeks to establish safeguards against discriminative results stemming from the use of algorithmic decision-making, and encourages developers of AI systems to take proactive measures to protect individuals and communities from discrimination, including through equity assessments and algorithmic impact assessments in the design and deployment stages.

  3.  The third Principle advocates for building privacy protections into AI systems by default, and encourages AI systems to respect individuals’ decisions regarding the collection, use, access, transfer and deletion of personal information where possible (and where not possible, use default privacy by design safeguards).

  4. The fourth Principle emphasizes the importance of notice and transparency, and encourages developers of AI systems to provide a plain language description of how the system functions and the role of automation in the system, as well as when an algorithmic system is used to make a decision impacting an individual (including when the automated system is not the sole input determining the decision).

  5. The fifth Principle encourages the development of opt-out mechanisms that provide individuals with the option to access a human decisionmaker as an alternative to the use of an AI system.

In 2019, the European Commission published a similar set of automated systems governance principles, called the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI. The European Parliament currently is in the process of drafting the EU Artificial Intelligence Act, a legally enforceable adaptation of the Commission’s Ethics Guidelines. The current draft of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act requires developers of open-source AI systems to adhere to detailed guidelines on cybersecurity, accuracy, transparency, and data governance, and provides for a private right of action.

For more Technology Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review.
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Transforming Business: Exploring Pathways for Women to Join and Impact Corporate Boards

Womble Bond Dickinson hosted a “Transforming Business: Exploring Pathways for Women to Join and Impact Corporate Boards” panel discussion at the Post Oak Hotel in Houston. WBD Chair & CEO Betty Temple joined 50/50 Women on Boards Houston Founder & Chair Susan Knight (moderator), TechnipFMC Executive VP, Chief Legal Officer & Secretary Victoria Lazar and Duy-Loan Le, a Board of Directors member for Wolfspeed, National Instruments, Ballard Power Systems and Atomera and a retired Senior Fellow at Texas Instruments. The panelists also offered insights into how women can make a lasting impact on corporate boards, and this article is based on that discussion.

The issue of women on corporate boards is a classic glass-half-full/glass-half-empty conundrum.

On one hand, the percentage of women on corporate boards reached an all-time high in 2021, and female board representation has grown substantially in the past decade alone. On the other hand, women still make up only 27 percent of Russell 3000 company boards of directors, according to a recent report by 50/50 Women on Boards. Only nine percent of those companies have gender-balanced boards.

Women Representation on Corporate Boards

Percentage of Female Directors on S&P 500 Boards

2021: 30 percent
2020: 28 percent
2011: 16 percent

Percentage of Boards with Two or More Women Directors

2021: 96 percent
2011: 58 percent

Source: 2021 U.S. Spencer Stuart Board Index

Le said, “In the field of technology, especially in the boardroom, often I’m the only woman.” This was particularly true when she joined her first public board 20 years ago, she said, and while Le sees more women in corporate leadership today, she still feels as if she is in a predominantly male world.

Getting appointed to a corporate board—or even a civic or non-profit board—isn’t easy, particularly for women. But the pathway to board membership is clearer than ever for women, thanks in large part to the work of women who have blazed that trail.

Self-Assessment Key to Finding the Right Board

To those outside the boardroom, a board of directors may seem like a closed, secret society. But the panelists said that joining a corporate board actually is much more akin to applying for a job, albeit a job that isn’t publicly advertised.

“The first step on a board journey is to show interest in leadership,” Lazar said.

“It is a journey – it’s not something you can do overnight,” Temple said. Looking back, she said she would have changed her initial approach to board service, even though she was actively counseling public company boards as an attorney at the time.

“I would try to build a resume for a board with the strengths I have to be a fiduciary to a company. They want you to be strategic—to think about the business and where it is going. So you need to be thoughtful about how you can help,” Temple said. For example, if candidates have proven experience in finance, legal, human resources, communications or policy matters, they should showcase those skills.

Temple said, “Boards are looking for specific skillsets so you can be an asset on day one. It’s difficult to be a director-in-training.”

But first, she recommends candidates do a self-assessment of their areas of strength and experience, so they can find corporate boards that are the best fit.

“The key is not to spread the net too wide but focus on where you can have a real impact,” Temple said.

“The key is not to spread the net too wide but focus on where you can have a real impact.”

BETTY TEMPLE, CHAIR & CEO OF WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON

Knight said that board opportunities can include non-profit, advisory, private equity and private company boards, too. “The common thread is that you have a fiduciary responsibility,” she said.

While board members come from a variety of professional backgrounds, many are attorneys or have legal experience.

“There is a large population of potentially qualified board members who are attorneys. It’s a good time to be an attorney looking to serve on a board,” Lazar said. However, she cautioned that companies neither want nor need a “Second General Counsel” on the board. Attorneys have the skills and background to guide companies strategically and help them spot potential problems before they arise. This background is particularly valuable during a corporate restructuring, Lazar said. But lawyers on the board shouldn’t try to micromanage or second-guess the company’s in-house legal team.

She also said attorneys need to bring more than legal experience to the board room. Other skills and experiences are invaluable to board service and should not be ignored.

Finally, Le said building strong relationships is critical to being considered for board service. Candidates who demonstrate a selfless desire to help others are best positioned to earn the type of trust necessary to be selected.

“In all of my experiences, boards came to me – not because I’m better than anyone else, but because they know me,” she said. “Reach out, spread your wings and help other people without expecting anything in return. That’s how people come to know you and want you to be part of their team.”

“There is a large population of potentially qualified board members who are attorneys. It’s a good time to be an attorney looking to serve on a board.”

VICTORIA LAZAR, EXECUTIVE VP, CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER & SECRETARY OF TECHNIPFMC

Finding the Board that Fits

Women absolutely need to assess their personal skills, strengths and experience when they decide to pursue board membership. They also need to pay close attention to the companies they wish to serve and the other board members they would be serving with. The panelists said the first opportunity for board service may not always be the right opportunity.

“I needed to meet the people I was going to be serving with in person. Do we share the same values? Can I collaborate with them? The chemistry was very important,” Le said.

Lazar said networking is a great way to build the types of relationships that lead to board service.

“There are hundreds of ways to meet people who are in position to recommend you for a board,” she said. These include professional organizations, community and civic groups, economic development organizations, bar associations (for attorneys) and more. Getting involved in such organizations can offer valuable leadership opportunities, as well as the chance to get to know corporate board members.

“Work your network and work your resume, so when you have the opportunity, you have demonstrated leadership. Be ready when they tap you on the shoulder,” Temple said.

“Work your network and work your resume, so when you have the opportunity, you have demonstrated leadership. Be ready when they tap you on the shoulder.”

BETTY TEMPLE

What to Know about Board Service

Finding the right fit and getting on a corporate, civic or non-profit board is just the beginning. The panelists all have extensive experience with board service and shared some of their recommendations for finding success as a board member.

For example, Le said board members need to protect themselves from legal liability when they agree to become a board member.

“I’d never serve on a public board without directors and officers (D&O) insurance,” she said, noting that if board members exercise their best judgment and put the company’s interests first, they generally have nothing to worry about.

Temple also noted that board members need to be prepared to serve on committees. Public companies are required to have Audit, Compensation, and Corporate Governance/Nominating & Governance committees. Women who want to serve on boards should consider how their skillsets and experience can benefit those committees. For example, having a background in human resources or corporate compensation is great experience for serving on a compensation committee. Likewise, candidates with experience in ESG or diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) may be a good fit for a corporate governance committee.

“Committees are a big part of board service, and it is a lot of work – and it’s not just the meetings. Before the meetings, we get hundreds of pages to review,” Le said. “The decisions you make are consequential. Your decisions impact individuals and their lives.”

Lazar also noted that private company boards can be far different from those at public companies. At public companies, the separation between the board of directors and corporate leadership is established by federal law. But at a privately held company, the barriers between board members and corporate leadership may be blurred. Board candidates at a private company need to investigate the boardroom dynamic up front before they agree to join.

Hiring a CEO

Hiring (and firing) a CEO is perhaps the most basic, fundamental role of a governing board. At the very least, it is one of the three core functions of the board, along with strategy and compliance.

Leadership transition can be smooth—such as when a well-liked CEO decides to retire, and the board has ample time to find a replacement and no shortage of good candidates.  But there are instances where the board and CEO part ways on contentious terms—Carly Fiorina’s 2005 ouster from Hewlett-Packard is one high-profile example of when a board and its corporate leader were completely unable to co-exist.

No matter the circumstances, board members must be prepared to deal with leadership transition at any time.

When somebody says, ‘We need to make a move,’ you have to be ready to voice an opinion and be an active participant in the process. It’s one of the most important and difficult decisions a board can make,” Lazar said.

“Sometimes, leadership isn’t about expertise—it’s about dealing with people.”

DUY-LOAN LE, BOARD OF DIRECTORS MEMBER FOR WOLFSPEED, NATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, BALLARD POWER SYSTEMS AND ATOMERA

Le has been in the boardroom during those difficult meetings. She said she experienced a situation where the board had to replace the CEO, who also was the company’s founder and largest shareholder and who initially did not want to leave.

This situation required interpersonal skills, not cold business logic. The CEO/Founder had given so much to the company, and he needed an exit strategy that wouldn’t humiliate him. Le was able to navigate that difficult path during their long, emotional phone call.

“It can be intense. If that situation hadn’t been navigated properly, it would’ve blown up in our face,” she said. “Sometimes, leadership isn’t about expertise—it’s about dealing with people.”

Whether women are looking to serve or are already in the boardroom, the panelists encouraged them to believe in themselves.

“Why wouldn’t you be qualified? Everyone has to do it for the first time,” Lazar said. “Focus on what you have and what you bring.”

“If you’ve been appointed to a public company board, then you’re there – you’ve got it. Just be a great board member and keep doing the right things,” Temple said.

“I remember the feeling the first time I walked into a board room. It was all white men, a generation older than me. But I thought, ‘I have an advantage.’ Because none of these men have lived the life I’ve lived. And what’s the worst that can happen – that they kick me off the board?” Le said. “From there, just do what Betty said and carry yourself with confidence. You are just as good as anyone in that room.”

For additional research and resources, go to the 50/50 Women on Boards website. 50/50 Women on Boards is dedicated to promoting gender balance and diversity on corporate boards.

Article By Elizabeth O. Temple of Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP

For more corporate and business legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022 Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP All Rights Reserved.

Between the Legal Lines — Jessica Pfisterer [PODCAST]

With big dreams of helping people, Jessica Pfisterer began her career in public interest law, though she soon realized she wasn’t going to see the change she hoped for at the pace she wanted. Where Jessica truly found her passion was in People Operations and HR, thanks to her GC at the time. In this episode of Between the Legal Lines, Jessica shares with Andrea Bricca the story of how that pivotal role shaped the future of her career and what she has learned as a human resources leader who is also a trained lawyer.

Jessica Pfisterer is an HR leader and dancer, with a background in civil rights law and social justice work. She currently heads the People team at Lively, and dances with Duniya Dance and Drum Company. She is also on the board of TurnOut, a nonprofit that supports LGBTQ+ organizations, support for LGBTQ+ organizations, ensuring they are positioned to succeed and to continue serving the community. She is a Bay Area local and spends her free time traveling and exploring the great outdoors.

Between the Legal Lines · An Interview with Jessica Pfisterer
©2022 Major, Lindsey & Africa, an Allegis Group Company. All rights reserved.

District Court Rules Most Plaintiffs in Case Do Not Have Standing to Block Florida Stop W.O.K.E. Act

There are two key cases pending before the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida on Florida’s “Stop W.O.K.E. Act”: the Falls, et al. v. DeSantis, et al., matter (No. 4:22-cv-00166) and the Honeyfund.com, et al. v. DeSantis, et al., matter (No. 4:22-cv-00227). The Northern District of Florida has issued its first order on the Act, which went into effect on July 1, 2022.

In an Order Denying Preliminary Injunction, in Part, in the Falls matter, the court concluded that the K-12 teachers, the soon-to-be kindergartner, and the diversity and inclusion consultant who sued Governor Ron DeSantis and other officials to block the Stop W.O.K.E. Act did not have standing to pursue preliminary injunctive relief. The court reserved ruling pending additional briefing on the question of whether the college professor, who also sued, has standing.

Stop W.O.K.E. Act

The Stop W.O.K.E. Act expands an employer’s civil liability for discriminatory employment practices under the Florida Civil Rights Act if the employer endorses certain concepts in a “nonobjective manner” during training or other required activity that is a condition of employment.

Court Order

In the Falls case, a diverse group of plaintiffs claiming they were regulated by the Stop W.O.K.E. Act filed a lawsuit challenging the Act on the grounds that it violates their First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights to free expression, academic freedom, and to access information.

The court, however, did not reach the question of constitutionality. It also did not determine whether the case can move forward, an issue that will be decided when the court rules on the defendants’ pending motion to dismiss.

Instead, the court denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction on the threshold question of standing. It found the plaintiffs (other than the college professor) did not show they have suffered an injury-in-fact that is traceable to DeSantis or another defendant that can likely be redressed by a favorable ruling.

The court found the consultant is not an employer as defined by the Florida Civil Rights Act. Therefore, she could not assert standing on that basis. Instead, she argued she has third-party standing to assert the rights of the employers who would otherwise hire her, and she is harmed by the Act because employers will no longer hire her. The court rejected both theories, finding the consultant-employer relationship is not sufficiently “close” to create standing; employers are not hindered in raising their First Amendment rights on their own; and, based on the evidence presented, the court could not reasonably infer that the consultant has lost or will lose business because of the Act.

Importantly, the court specifically held that it was not ruling on the legality of the Act, whether it was moral, or whether it constituted good policy.

Private Employer

The court highlighted that the sister case pending in the Northern District of Florida (Honeyfund.com) involves a private employer under the Florida Civil Rights Act. In that case, the plaintiffs allege the Stop W.O.K.E. Act violates their right to free speech by restricting training topics and their due process rights by being unconstitutionally vague. Honeyfund.com, Inc. and its co-plaintiffs request that the court enjoin enforcement of the law. The case has been transferred to District Court Judge Mark Walker. The Honeyfund.com case will likely have the largest effect on Florida employers and questions surrounding the enforceability of the Act as to diversity and inclusion training.

***

Since the Stop W.O.K.E. Act took effect, employers are understandably unclear how to proceed with training. Employers should continue to train their employees, but review their training programs on diversity, inclusion, bias, equal employment opportunity, and harassment prevention through the lens of the new law. Employers should also ensure they train the trainers who are conducting these important programs. Finally, employers should understand potential risks associated with disciplining or discharging employees who refuse to participate in mandatory training programs, even if employers do not consider the programs to violate the new law.

Article By Stephanie L. Adler-Paindiris, Samia M. Kirmani, Amanda Simpson, and Lindsay Dennis Swiger of Jackson Lewis P.C.

For more litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2022

Five Administrative Law Takeaways From Recent Supreme Court Decisions

The US Supreme Court’s decisions of late have been consequential. While headline-grabbing decisions deal with religious liberties, privacy, and gun control, the Court’s impact on administrative law will have major consequences as well. Administrative law decisions stemmed from cases involving how the executive shaped policy related to climate change, health care, immigration, and public health. Administrative actions are tied together by procedural rules derived from the constitutional separation of powers and the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

Below, we discuss five major trends derived from this term’s decisions related to administrative law and the separation of powers:

  1. The “major questions doctrine,” and how it can limit executive-branch authority;
  2. How spending can be used to shape behavior in situations where executive-branch authority might otherwise be limited;
  3. The fate of “Chevron deference” – i.e., the judiciary’s willingness to defer to the executive branch’s interpretations of statutes agencies are tasked to administer;
  4. What discretion executive agencies have to change policies, and what steps they need to defend such changes; and
  5. When the Supreme Court will intervene in cases that are moot or which otherwise lower court decision-making might simplify the Court’s resolution of involved issues.

Major Questions Doctrine

The facts that would support a “major questions” analysis of executive actions became clearer with this term’s decisions. The doctrine drove decisions in major cases related to climate change and public health – NFIB v. OSHA, dealing with the federal vaccine mandate, and West Virginia v. EPA, which addressed greenhouse gas regulations. In sum, the Court says that administrative actions with significant economic and political impact require a close look at authorizing legislation to determine if Congress has authorized the action taken.

Some background on these cases. NFIB v. OSHA – decided first – grappled with whether OSHA exceeded its authority when it sought to require certain employers and their employees to receive a COVID-19 vaccine or be subject to frequent testing requirements. (We discussed this case individually in-depth here.) OSHA based its mandate on its authority to relate workplace hazards. Because the vaccine mandate for businesses with over 100 employees would impact roughly 84 million Americans, the Supreme Court accepted that it was a “major question” that involved “great economic and political significance” and therefore was subject to the major questions doctrine. Accordingly, the executive branch was required to point to specific authority supporting the mandate. Because the executive branch could not point to where Congress gave them the power to enforce a vaccine mandate, the Court overturned it.

This decision either reaffirmed the importance of checks and balances or demonstrated that the “major questions doctrine” could be used to prevent the executive branch from flexibly using “old” public health law to address novel issues associated with an airborne pandemic.

The “major questions doctrine” appeared next in West Virginia v. EPA, which we discussed here. To address the issue of climate change, US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) developed the Clean Power Plan to address carbon dioxide emissions from power plants that relied on owners shifting from fossil fuels to zero-emitting fuels in 2015. This required closures of fossil fuel generating stations and significant investments from the electric generation sector. After the Supreme Court stayed the Clean Power Plan, the Trump Administration proposed a different rule that mandated actions solely at the fossil fuel-fired units and, simultaneously, declared that the Clean Air Act did not authorize the far-reaching legal rationale of the Clean Power Plan.

After addressing some unique procedural issues, which we will discuss below, the Court characterized the Clean Power Plan as effectively remaking the national energy markets. Applying the major questions doctrine, the Court held that such a broad change to the energy sector required a clear congressional mandate, which was not present in the Clean Air Act. In a concurrence, Justice Gorsuch argued that deferring to agencies on matters of great economic or political significance would amount to “Permitting Congress to divest its legislative power to the Executive Branch. . .”

How Spending Can Be Used to Shape Behavior

Whereas the two decisions above illustrate limits on executive power, in Biden v. Missouri, the Supreme Court allowed the executive branch to use spending to compel COVID vaccinations of employees in certain medical establishments. A vaccine mandate in this context was consistent with past policies because Medicare and Medicaid facilities are routinely forced to follow protocols to receive funding.

Clearly, one takeaway from Biden v. Missouri is that the executive is not without power to influence private behavior, so long as spending is involved. The Court found that in the healthcare space, it would be counterintuitive for effective administration of a “facility that is supposed to make people well to make them sick with COVID-19.”

The Fate of the Chevron Doctrine

A third issue worth discussing is the fate of the “Chevron doctrine.” Our takeaway is that the “Chevron” doctrine may have little force at the Supreme Court level, even if parts of its analysis live on. We base this conclusion on the fact that both American Hospital Association v. Becerra and West Virginia v. EPA feature limited deference to the executive vis-à-vis the courts. But, neither case discusses Chevron at all. Why?

The “Chevron doctrine” has been fundamental to modern administrative law while existing in a policy-wonk backwater. The Chevron doctrine was born in the 1984 Supreme Court decision Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council. It provides federal agencies with the ability to interpret the statutes they are tasked to administer without heavy-handed court intervention. Under the traditional Chevron analysis, courts will defer to the federal agency when the relevant statute is ambiguous, and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.

Two major cases seemed to ignore the doctrine, however:

  • In Becerra, the Court signaled some unwillingness to find statutes “ambiguous.” Becerra involved the US Department of Health and Human Services’ interpretation of the Medicare statute governing hospital reimbursement rates. While the DC Circuit Court of Appeals below found significant ambiguity in the highly technical statute, a unanimous Supreme Court disagreed and held that the plain language of the statute clearly precluded the agency’s interpretation. The fact that the Supreme Court found clarity where the DC Circuit saw ambiguity suggests that the Court has significantly raised the bar for the level of ambiguity necessary for it to adopt an agency’s interpretation.
  • Where Becerra limited the impact of Chevron based on the text of the statute, West Virginia v. EPA established an entire class of cases where Chevron will not apply based on the practical impact of the regulation. By embracing the “major questions doctrine” discussed above, the Court signaled that it will not defer to federal agencies on novel issues unless Congress clearly stated an intent to delegate to the agency. The Court focused on the sweeping impact of EPA’s proposed emissions regulations, in stark contrast to the DC Circuit’s textual analysis of the statutes at issue (and also to the Court’s own textual analysis in Becerra).

While it appears that the Chevron doctrine may currently be gathering cobwebs at the Supreme Court level, it remains to be seen what will happen at the district and appellate levels. Maybe the Chevron doctrine will continue to exist as a sorting mechanism below — scholars have noted that Chevron was far more likely to determine outcomes in the lower courts. But at the very least, the Supreme Court has given federal judges powerful tools to avoid deferring to agency interpretations where they are so inclined.

How and When Agencies Can Change Preexisting Policies

A fourth issue worth highlighting may be found in Biden v. Texas, which involves the Biden Administration’s rescission of the Trump Administration’s Remain in Mexico policy.

First, some policy background: Government agencies have broad discretion in setting and changing policies so long as they follow the appropriate procedures. Generally, these procedures are set forth in the APA, a statute that we discuss with great regularity. Under the APA, the executive’s decisions can only be justified or challenged based on the agency’s administrative record. The regulated community can sometimes request that the Court look beyond the administrative record by showing that the agency acted in bad faith or in a procedurally improper manner. The Court’s last significant decision in this area – Department of Commerce v. New York, which we summarized here – evaluated the Commerce Secretary’s attempts to add a citizenship question to the 2020 census. In Department of Commerce, extra-record discovery revealed that the Secretary planned to add the question all along and had, in fact, solicited the request for the question from the US Department of Justice (DOJ). The Supreme Court determined that the Voting Rights Act rationale was “contrived” and affirmed the lower court’s decision to bar the US Department of Commerce from asking the question.

Regarding this case: Biden v. Texas, which involved the Biden Administration’s rescission of the Trump Administration’s “Remain in Mexico” immigration program – also called the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) – evaluated whether the Biden Administration acted appropriately when it rescinded the program. Some background on Biden v. Texas:

  • In January 2019, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began to implement MPP. Under MPP, certain non-Mexican persons arriving by land from Mexico were returned to Mexico to await the results of their immigration cases. After it took office, the Biden Administration first suspended the program and later terminated it.
  • Texas and Missouri challenged the rescission on the grounds that it violated federal immigration law as well as the APA. A Texas federal court accepted the states’ arguments on the grounds that immigration law required DHS to either detain arrivals in the US or in contiguous territory – as MPP did – and that DHS lacked the resources necessary to house arrivals in the US, so a program like MPP was required by statute. The district court entered an injunction requiring the government to “enforce and implement MPP in good faith until such a time as it has been lawfully rescinded in compliance with the APA and until such a time as the federal government has sufficient detention capacity to detain all aliens subject to mandatory detention under [immigration law] without releasing any aliens because of a lack of detention resources.”
  • On appeal, the Secretary of DHS released a second explanation for terminating MPP and sought to vacate the injunction. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s analysis that the injunction was required and rejected DHS’s second explanation for why the program should be terminated on the grounds that it did not constitute a new or separately reviewable “final agency action,” which triggers APA review.

The Court upheld the rescission of MPP on two grounds: first, because federal immigration law used the word “may” in defining what DHS may do regarding confining persons arriving over land from Mexico. “May” gives the government discretion and establishes contiguous-territory return such as was required by MPP as a tool that the agency “has the authority, but not the duty” to use. Congress could have – but did not – construct the immigration provisions to require MPP.

Additionally, upholding the program required the Court’s consideration of DHS’s during-litigation explanation for why the program should be terminated. The Court accepted the during-litigation explanation because it constituted a wholly new explanation of why the MPP should be terminated. The during-litigation explanation explained that it “superseded” and “rescinded” the earlier termination and then offered “new reasons” that had not been included in the prior rescission. Both the pre-litigation and during-litigation memoranda were separate “final agency actions.”

Finally, because DHS did not rest on its pre-litigation MPP termination, it was permitted to provide additional justifications for its actions, so long as the agency complied with APA-imposed requirements for taking “new” actions. The Court rejected the states’ charge that there was a “significant mismatch between” the rescission and DHS’s explanation for it. DHS’s “ex-ante preference for terminating MPP – like any other feature of an administration’s policy agenda – should not be held against” its actions. Accordingly, DHS’s rescission of MPP was upheld.

An Increase in Procedurally Irregular Case Resolutions? 

A final trend we wanted to highlight is that the Supreme Court appears increasingly willing to wade into disputes at earlier procedural phases than would be typical. Historically, nearly every Supreme Court case has made it to the Court having been fully and finally resolved in lower federal courts. (To be sure, there are some exceptions – most notably the limited class of cases for which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction, which involve mainly disputes between the states or disputes between ambassadors.) This term, the Court was increasingly willing to wade into disputes which were either arguably moot or have not yet completed their run through lower courts. Three examples:

  • Mootness. In West Virginia v. EPA, during the pendency of litigation, the Biden Administration indicated it would not enforce the regulations at issue and instead would pursue a new rulemaking. The Court found that EPA’s representation that “voluntary cessation does not moot a case” unless it is “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not be expected to recur.” For the government to moot the case, it would have to suggest that it would not re-impose limitations based on generation shifting – something that it did not do.
  • No lower court finding regarding jurisdiction. In Biden v. Texas, four of the nine justices signed a dissent indicating that lower courts should review whether federal courts had “jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of” certain immigration laws in light of the Court’s recent decision in Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, which addressed similar issues. While a majority of the court favored reaching a merits decision, four members of the Court favored remanding the case to lower courts for an evaluation of how Aleman Gonzalez might alter jurisdictional issues in the case.
  • The Court’s Use of its “Shadow Docket.” In Ardoin v. Robinson, the Supreme Court, in an unsigned order with no explanation, reinstated a district voting map in Louisiana that has previously been deemed discriminatory and harmful to minority voting rights. This case was decided under what has been coined the Supreme Court’s “shadow docket” because it refers to cases decided outside normal procedural regularity: off the regular docket, without oral arguments or written briefs, and before lower courts have fully and finally decided the issue. The Court’s use of its “shadow docket” appears to be occurring with increasing frequency. As the Court is likely to remain polarized next term, we may see additional consequential decisions at the “shadow docket” phase then.

This was clearly a major term with significant decisions in many areas, including administrative law. The Court’s next arguments begin in October. We will keep an eye out for new cases relevant to administrative law.

Article By J. Michael Showalter, Samuel A. Rasche, and Rachael A. Bryan of ArentFox Schiff LLP

For more litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 ArentFox Schiff LLP