Tag: Civil Procedure

The Increasing Role of Cybersecurity Experts in Complex Legal Disputes

The testimonies and guidance of expert witnesses have been known to play a significant role in high-stakes legal matters, whether it be the opinion of a clinical psychiatrist in a homicide case or that of a career IP analyst in a patent infringement trial. However, in today’s highly digital world—where cybercrimes like data breaches and theft of intellectual property are increasingly commonplace—cybersecurity professionals have become some of the most sought-after experts for a broadening range of legal disputes.

Below, we will explore the growing importance of cybersecurity experts to the litigation industry in more depth, including how their insights contribute to case strategies, the challenges of presenting technical and cybersecurity-related arguments in court, the specific qualifications that make an effective expert witness in the field of cybersecurity, and the best method for securing that expertise for your case.

How Cybersecurity Experts Help Shape Legal Strategies

Disputes involving highly complex cybercrimes typically require more technical expertise than most trial teams have on hand, and the contributions of a qualified cybersecurity expert can often be transformative to your ability to better understand the case, uncover critical evidence, and ultimately shape your overall strategy.

For example, in the case of a criminal data breach, defense counsel might seek an expert witness to analyze and evaluate the plaintiff’s existing cybersecurity policies and protective mechanisms at the time of the attack to determine their effectiveness and/or compliance with industry regulations or best practices. Similarly, an expert with in-depth knowledge of evolving data laws, standards, and disclosure requirements will be well-suited to determining a party’s liability in virtually any matter involving the unauthorized access of protected information. Cybersecurity experts are also beneficial during the discovery phase when their experience working with certain systems can assist in potentially uncovering evidence related to a specific attack or breach that may have been initially overlooked.

We have already seen many instances in which the testimony and involvement of cybersecurity experts have impacted the overall direction of a legal dispute. Consider the Coalition for Good Governance, for example, that recently rested its case(Opens an external site in a new window) as the plaintiffs in a six-year battle with the state of Georgia over the security of touchscreen voting machines. Throughout the process, the organization relied heavily on the testimony of multiple cybersecurity experts who claimed they identified vulnerabilities in the state’s voting technology. If these testimonies prove effective, it will not only sway the ruling in the favor of the plaintiffs but also lead to entirely new policies and impact the very way in which Georgia voters cast their ballots as early as this year.

The Challenges of Explaining Cybersecurity in the Courtroom

While there is no denying the growing importance of cybersecurity experts in modern-day disputes, it is also important to note that many challenges still exist in presenting highly technical arguments and/or evidence in a court of law.

Perhaps most notably, there remains a significant gap in both legal and technological language, as well as in the knowledge and understanding of cybersecurity professionals and judges, lawyers, and the juries tasked with parsing particularly dense information. In other words, today’s trial teams need to work carefully with cybersecurity experts to develop communication strategies that adequately illustrate their arguments but do not result in unnecessary confusion or a misunderstanding of the evidence being presented. Visuals are a particularly useful tool in helping both litigators and experts explain complex topics while also engaging decision-makers.

Depending on the nature of the data breach or cybercrime in question, you may be tasked with replicating a digital event to support your specific argument. In many cases, this can be incredibly challenging due to the evolving and multifaceted nature of modern cyberattacks, and it may require extensive resources within the time constraints of a given matter. Thus, it is wise to use every tool at your disposal to boost the power of your team—including custom expert witness sourcing and visual advocacy consultants.

What You Should Look for in a Cybersecurity Expert

Determining the qualifications of a cybersecurity expert is highly dependent on the details of each individual case, making it critical to identify an expert whose experience reflects your precise needs. For example, a digital forensics specialist will offer an entirely different skill set than someone with a background in data privacy regulations and compliance.

Making sure an expert has the relevant professional experience to assess your specific cybersecurity case is only one factor to consider. In addition to verifying education and professional history, you must also assess the expert’s experience in the courtroom and familiarity with relevant legal processes. Similarly, expert witnesses should be evaluated based on their individual personality and communication skills, as they will be tasked with conveying highly technical arguments to an audience that will likely have a difficult time understanding all relevant concepts in the absence of clear, simplified explanations.

Where to Find the Most Qualified Cybersecurity Experts

Safeguarding the success of your client or firm in the digital age starts with the right expertise. You need to be sure your cybersecurity expert is uniquely suited to your case and primed to share critical insights when the stakes are high.

© Copyright 2002-2024 IMS Legal Strategies, All Rights Reserved.
For more news on Cybersecurity Experts, visit the NLR Civil Procedure section.

Diving Into SECURE 2.0: Changes for Small Employer Retirement Plans

International arbitration provides a binding, neutral, and consensual process for resolving contractual disputes between parties, often resulting in resolutions that are quicker, cheaper, more private, and more controllable than litigation in a court of law. Accordingly, arbitration for the resolution of international disputes between contracting parties from different legal jurisdictions has emerged as a fundamental method for resolving complex disputes in an ever-increasingly interconnected world. Multinational companies should make sure they stay up to date on the fundamentals of international arbitration, and it all starts with ensuring any arbitration clause included in an international agreement is drafted in a way that is enforceable and provides contracting parties a clear path toward the resolution of their dispute.

Why Should You Care about What Your Arbitration Clause Says?

An arbitration clause is the starting point for determining the parties’ intent in resolving their dispute outside a court of law. It is an independent agreement within the broader contract, likely enforceable even if the remainder of the contract is procured by fraud, and sits at the apex of what a court or arbitrator will look for to determine the parties’ intent with respect to how a dispute between contracting parties should be resolved.

A clear arbitration clause results in a meaningful, enforceable outcome, minimizes the intervention of U.S. or foreign judiciaries in what should be a private dispute resolution process, grants the third-party administrator and/or the arbitrator the powers necessary to resolve the dispute, and is conducted in accordance with procedures that help guarantee a fair, efficient proceeding.

In contrast, if an arbitration clause is ambiguous, there may be a finding that there is no dispute resolution agreement to enforce. This can result in challenges to the arbitration clause’s enforceability and potential litigation in unfavorable and less-than-ideal judicial systems. Of course, such ambiguity and challenges will create higher costs, longer windows of time to resolve disputes, greater risks that your claims in the dispute will be vulnerable to collateral attacks, and other unintended and unexpected consequences.

What Are the Hallmarks of a Clear Arbitration Clause?

For purposes of clarity, you should ensure your contract’s arbitration clause identifies:

  • Applicable Law. Which country’s (or state’s) law applies?
  • Forum and Rules. There are any number of arbitral forums, each with its own nuances in terms of procedure. Knowing the business and potential disputes that could arise will assist in selecting a good fit in terms of applicable rules.
  • Seat of Arbitration. The seat of the arbitration is more than just the place where the final hearing will take place. It provides a significant backbone to the proceeding and is as important as the selection of the forum and applicable rules.
  • Number of Arbitrators. The more arbitrators, the larger the cost, but a three-member tribunal has its place in certain disputes.
  • Language. Selecting the language (or languages) of the arbitration can greatly affect the cost of the proceeding.

Why Does Selecting the Seat of Arbitration Matter?

More than just the physical place where the arbitration will take place, the seat of arbitration is a legal construct that determines the lex arbitri — the procedural law of the arbitration.

Where the contract between the parties or the rules selected by the parties do not provide for certain procedures, the procedural laws of the seat of arbitration will be applied. Among the important aspects of a proceeding that the seat of the arbitration determines is:

  • Which courts will have supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration;
  • Definitions and form of an agreement to arbitrate;
  • The arbitrability of the dispute;
  • The constitution of the arbitral tribunal and any grounds for challenge;
  • The equality of treatment of the parties;
  • The freedom to agree on detailed rules of procedure;
  • Interim measures of protection and court assistance;
  • Default proceedings;
  • The validity of the arbitration award; and
  • The finality of the arbitration award, including which courts will hear challenges to the award.

If not clearly identified by the parties, the seat of arbitration — and the procedural laws of that seat — will be selected by the arbitral tribunal.

What Do the Rules You Picked Say About Interim Measures?

A major consideration in selecting the applicable arbitral rules is the availability of interim measures. These are measures of relief, which can include injunctive relief, obtained prior to the commencement of, or during, an arbitral proceeding.

One of the most interesting forms of interim measures is an award of security. An interim award of security in arbitration is a payment of an amount of monies (usually tied to damages) pre-hearing for the conservation of, and enforcement of, a judgment so as to not render a judgment in the future a Pyrrhic victory. These securities prevent the dissipation of assets before it is too late to reach those assets. As such, it is an extremely powerful tool, and determining whether the rules you select, and/or the seat of the arbitration, allows for such an interim award should be a key consideration in drafting your arbitration clause.

What Are the Abilities and Liabilities of Third Parties?

Depending on the circumstances, jurisdiction chosen, governing law, and seat of the arbitration, a third party (a non-signatory to the agreement) can compel arbitration and be compelled to arbitration, the latter being the rarer occurrence. Knowing if there is potential exposure to such parties, which can include directors, officers, employees, beneficiaries, and others, should be assessed prior to entering into an arbitration agreement.

On What Basis Are Arbitral Awards Enforceable?

Arbitral awards, because of the adherence by more than 160 countries to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”), are the most enforceable award anywhere in the world. Under the New York Convention:

  • A written agreement to arbitrate, including as contained in a contractual arbitration clause, is generally enforceable.
  • Subject to very narrow exceptions, an arbitral award may be recognized and enforced as a final judgment in each contracting country.

In contrast, no treaty requires that the judgments of a country’s court system be recognized; these enforcement decisions are made on an ad hoc basis according to principles of comity and public policy. The Hague Judgments Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, a treaty similar to the New York Convention, may become the relevant applicable framework in the future but is still in its infancy.

How Can Legal Counsel Help My Multinational Company Address International Arbitration Issues?

The best way to ensure a reliable and enforceable arbitration agreement is a careful examination of the structure and purpose of the contract as well as the company’s unique business profile based on how and where it does business.

Adequate legal counsel should provide clients with practical guidance in drafting and enforcing international arbitration agreements. Services provided should include:

  • Counseling: Counseling companies to understand how international arbitration clauses apply to their multinational operations, how they may benefit from such clauses, and/or how such clauses may not be in their best interest.
  • Drafting: Working with clients to ensure enforceable and clearly understood arbitration clauses are prepared for the specific contractual relationship, considering the myriad factors that go into preparing such a clause.
  • Risk Assessments: Working with companies to conduct risk assessments in the event of contract disputes with arbitration clauses.
  • Arbitration: Arbitrating before tribunals to secure interim securities and/or enforceable arbitral awards in the event of a contract dispute anywhere in the world.

© 2023 Foley & Lardner LLP

For more Litigation News, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Blunt Rejection of Attorney Fees in Stipulated Dismissal

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the rejection of attorney fees, finding that neither inequitable conduct nor a conflict of interest rendered the case exceptional given the limited factual record following a stipulated dismissal in a patent case. United Cannabis Corp. v. Pure Hemp Collective Inc., Case No. 22-1363 (Fed. Cir. May 8, 2023) (Lourie, Cunningham, Stark, JJ.).

United Cannabis Corporation (UCANN) sued Pure Hemp for patent infringement. After the litigation was stayed pending bankruptcy proceedings, the parties stipulated to the dismissal. Pure Hemp then sought attorney fees based on alleged inequitable conduct by UCANN during prosecution of the asserted patent due to nondisclosure of a prior art reference used in the patent’s specification and based on a purported conflict of interest by UCANN’s litigation counsel. The district court denied Pure Hemp’s request, finding that the case was not exceptional. Pure Hemp appealed.

Pure Hemp argued that the district court erred by (1) failing to find Pure Hemp to be the prevailing party in the litigation, (2) not concluding that the undisputed facts established inequitable conduct and (3) not recognizing that UCANN’s attorneys had a conflict of interest.

The Federal Circuit found that although the district court erred in not finding Pure Hemp to be the prevailing party, this was a harmless error. The Court explained that by fending off UCANN’s lawsuit with a stipulation dismissing UCANN’s claims with prejudice, Pure Hemp is a prevailing party under § 285. However, the Court concluded that this error was harmless because the district court ultimately concluded that this case was unexceptional.

The Federal Circuit found Pure Hemp’s arguments on inequitable conduct without merit. The Court explained that it had no findings to review because Pure Hemp voluntarily dismissed its inequitable conduct counterclaim and did not seek any post-dismissal inequitable conduct proceedings. Although Pure Hemp argued that it could prevail based on the undisputed facts in the record, the Court disagreed. It explained that even the limited record demonstrated at least a genuine dispute as to both the materiality and intent prongs of inequitable conduct and, therefore, the district court properly determined that Pure Hemp did not demonstrate that this case was exceptional.

The Federal Circuit also rejected Pure Hemp’s argument that copying and pasting portions from the prior art in the patent’s specification (but not disclosing the same prior art references) was inequitable conduct. The Court explained that unlike the nonbinding cases Pure Hemp relied on, the district court here did not find that the copied prior art was material, and the record gave no reason to disbelieve the explanation provided by UCANN’s prosecution counsel. The Court was also unpersuaded by Pure Hemp’s arguments to support inequitable conduct, explaining that the Court was not free to make its own findings on intent to deceive and materiality and, further, the district court was not required to provide its reasoning for its decision in attorney fee cases.

As to Pure Hemp’s argument that the case was exceptional because UCANN’s attorneys suffered from a conflict of interest, the Federal Circuit found that this argument was waived and, in any event, lacked merit because Pure Hemp presented no evidence to support the alleged conflict.

Finally, having sua sponte raised the issue of whether this was a frivolous appeal. The Federal Circuit determined that although it was “not pleased with how Pure Hemp has argued this appeal,” the appeal was nonetheless not frivolous because [Pure Hemp] properly argued that it was the prevailing party.

© 2023 McDermott Will & Emery
For more Intellectual Property Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review.

How To Help a Jury Understand Complex Litigation

We hear this quite a bit from our clients. An attorney, when introducing us to his pending complex litigation matter, tells us up front, “This is a complicated case.” It’s code for, “I don’t think jurors will understand this case.”

We hear it again in opening statements: “This is a complicated case.” So now, the attorney knows it’s a complicated case; the consultants know it’s a complicated case; the jurors know it’s a complicated case. Great. What now?

Here are a few ideas to help you connect your complex litigation to the jurors and make them more comfortable hearing it.

Change the Question

Instead of asking, “How can I make jurors understand my complex case?”, how about asking, “How can I simplify my case for the jurors (and the judge and the witnesses)?” This basic reframing can change your focus—instead of concentrating on the complexity, you and your team begin to think about simplification. There’s a big difference.

Don’t Tell the Jury It’s a Complicated Case

When you tell a juror the case is complicated, they hear one of two things: “They think I’m too stupid to understand this” or “This is going to be way above my head.” The first can cause them to feel offended and the second tends to stop them from listening. Finding ways to explain the unfamiliar in familiar terms helps them understand the concepts underlying your case. Characterizing the case does no good for anyone.

Tell the Jury a Story

 

 

 

Try thinking about your case as a story: What tale do you want to tell? Or think of it this way: If someone at a dinner party asked about your case, what would your side of the story sound like?

We all think in stories, especially from the jury box. Jurors want to know what happened between these opposing parties that landed them in court, not a list of evidence and intricate facts. Instead, tell a story that answers jurors’ questions about motives for the lawsuit and the significance of your case, which should (again) simplify the details. Talking in stories makes your complex litigation more jury-friendly.

There’s a saying that goes, “What you focus on expands.” Ultimately, the key to helping jurors understand your complicated case lies in focusing not on its complexity, but on its simplicity.

Article By Robert Gerchen of IMS Consulting & Expert Services

For more litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© Copyright 2002-2022 IMS Consulting & Expert Services, All Rights Reserved.

Patent Infringement Verdict Nixed over Judge’s Stock Ownership

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s opinions and orders and remanded the case for further proceedings before a different district court judge because the original judge had failed to divest all financial interests in the case. Centripetal Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., Case No. 21-1888 (Fed. Cir. June 23, 2022) (Dyk, Taranto, Cunningham, JJ.)

Centripetal sued Cisco for patent infringement. The original district court judge presided over a 22-day bench trial, which included a more than 3,500-page record, 26 witnesses and more than 300 exhibits. The court heard final arguments on June 25, 2020. While the case was still pending before the district court, the judge learned that his wife owned Cisco stock, valued at $4,687.99. The district court judge notified the parties on August 12, 2020, that he had discovered that his wife owned 100 shares of Cisco stock. He stated that his wife purchased the stock in October 2019 and had no independent recollection of the purchase. He explained that at the time he learned of the stock, he had already drafted a 130-page draft of his opinion on the bench trial, and virtually every issue had been decided. He further stated that the stock did not—and could not have—influenced his opinion on any of the issues in the case. Instead of selling the stock, which might have implied insider trading given his knowledge of the forthcoming order, the judge placed it in a blind trust. Under the terms of the trust, the judge was to be notified when the trust assets had been completely disposed of or when their value became less than $1,000.

Centripetal had no objections. Cisco, however, filed a motion for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b)(4). The judge ordered Centripetal to file a response. On October 2, 2020, the court denied Cisco’s motion for recusal. On October 5, 2020, the court issued a 167-page opinion and order containing the judge’s findings that Cisco willfully infringed the asserted claims of the patents-at-issue and awarded Centripetal damages of more than $755 million, pre-judgment interest of more than $13 million and a running royalty of 10%. Cisco moved for amended findings and judgment under Rule 52(b) or a new trial under Rule 59(a)(2). The court denied both motions. Cisco appealed the district court’s findings and asserted that the judge was required to recuse himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) absent divestiture under § 455(f) (the only exception to the bright line rule that a federal judge is disqualified based on a known financial interest in a party).

On appeal, the Federal Circuit addressed two issues: whether the district court judge was relieved of his duty to recuse under § 455(b)(4) because his wife had divested herself of her interest in Cisco under § 455(f), and, if the requirements of § 455(f) were not satisfied, a determination as to the proper remedy.

The Federal Circuit analyzed whether placement of the stock in a blind trust satisfied the divesture requirement of § 455(f). The Court explained that a blind trust is “an arrangement whereby a person, in an effort to avoid conflicts of interest, places certain personal assets under the control of an independent trustee with the provision that the person is to have no knowledge of how those assets are managed.” Centripetal admitted that there are no cases holding that placement of stock in a blind trust constitutes divestment. The Court next turned to the intent of Congress when it drafted the statute. The Court reasoned that to “divest” was understood at the time to mean “dispossess or deprive,” which is only possible when an interest is sold or given away. The Court also noted that Congress used the present tense—that a judge should not sit when he or she has a financial interest in a party. The Court concluded that while placing the stock in a blind trust removed the judge’s wife from control over the stock, it did not eliminate her beneficial interest in Cisco. The Court also found that the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Codes of Conduct had previously ruled that a judge’s use of a blind trust does not obviate the judge’s recusal obligations. Accordingly, the Court found that placing assets in a blind trust is not divestment under § 455(f) and, thus, the district court judge was disqualified from further proceedings in the case.

As for the appropriate remedy, the Federal Circuit considered whether rulings made after August 11, 2020, when the district court judge became aware of his wife’s financial interest in Cisco, should be vacated as a remedy for his failure to recuse. The Court determined that the risk of injustice to the parties weighed against a finding of harmless error and in favor of vacatur. The Court reversed the district court’s opinion and order denying Cisco’s motion for recusal; vacated the opinion and order regarding infringement, damages and post-judgment motions and remanded for further proceedings before a new judge.

Article By Jodi Benassi of McDermott Will & Emery

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 McDermott Will & Emery

A Rule 37 Refresher – As Applied to a Ransomware Attack

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) (“Rule 37”) was completely rewritten in the 2015 amendments.  Before the 2015 amendments, the standard was that a party could not generally be sanctioned for data loss as a result of the routine, good faith operation of its system. That rule didn’t really capture the reality of all of the potential scenarios related to data issues nor did it provide the requisite guidance to attorneys and parties.

The new rule added a dimension of reasonableness to preservation and a roadmap for analysis.  The first guidepost is whether the information should have been preserved. This rule is based upon the common law duty to preserve when litigation is likely. The next guidepost is whether the data loss resulted from a failure to take reasonable steps to preserve. The final guidepost is whether or not the lost data can be restored or replaced through additional discovery.  If there is data that should have been preserved, that was lost because of failure to preserve, and that can’t be replicated, then the court has two additional decisions to make: (1) was there prejudice to another party from the loss OR (2) was there an intent to deprive another party of the information.  If the former, the court may only impose measures “no greater than necessary” to cure the prejudice.  If the latter, the court may take a variety of extreme measures, including dismissal of the action. An important distinction was created in the rule between negligence and intention.

So how does a ransomware attack fit into the new analytical framework? A Special Master in MasterObjects, Inc. v. Amazon.com (U.S. Dist. Court, Northern District of California, March 13, 2022) analyzed Rule 37 in the context of a ransomware attack. MasterObjects was the victim of a well-documented ransomware attack, which precluded the companies access to data prior to 2016. The Special Master considered the declaration from MasterObjects which explained that, despite using state of the art cybersecurity protections, the firm was attacked by hackers in December 2020.  The hack rendered all the files/mailboxes inaccessible without a recovery key set by the attackers.  The hackers demanded a ransom and the company contacted the FBI.  Both the FBI and insurer advised them not to pay the ransom. Despite spending hundreds of hours attempting to restore the data, everything prior to 2016 was inaccessible.

Applying Rule 37, the Special Master stated that, at the outset, there is no evidence that any electronically stored information was “lost.”  The data still exists and, while access has been blocked, it can be accessed in the future if a key is provided or a technological work-around is discovered.

Even if a denial of access is construed to be a “loss,” the Special Master found no evidence in this record that the loss occurred because MasterObjects failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it. This step of the analysis, “failure to take reasonable steps to preserve,” is a “critical, basic element” to prove spoliation.

On the issue of prejudice, Amazon argued that “we can’t know what we don’t know” (related to missing documents).  The Special Master did not find Amazon’s argument persuasive. The Special Master concluded that Amazon’s argument cannot survive the adoption of Rule 37(e). “The rule requires affirmative proof of prejudice in the specific destruction at issue.”

Takeaways:

  1. If you are in a spoliation dispute, make sure you have the experts and evidence to prove or defend your case.

  2. When you are trying to prove spoliation, know the new test and apply it in your analysis (the Special Master noted that Amazon did not reference Rule 37 in its briefing).

  3. As a business owner, when it comes to cybersecurity, you must take reasonable and defensible efforts to protect your data.

Article By Gretchen E. Moore of Strassburger McKenna Gutnick & Gefsky

For more cybersecurity and media legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Strassburger McKenna Gutnick & Gefsky

Ninth Circuit Reverses Class Certification Order Because Liability Issues, Not Merely Damages, Were Individualized

The Ninth Circuit recently addressed an issue that tends to arise frequently in class certification motion practice: how trial courts should apply the predominance requirement where appellate decisions have said that the need to calculate individualized damages generally is not sufficient on its own to defeat class certification, but some putative class members likely have no damages. On these types of issues, plaintiffs often try to characterize defendants’ arguments in opposition to class certification as raising mere “damages issues” that can be addressed individually at the end of a class case, and defendants often respond that the issues they raise go to liability, not merely damages, and in any event the damages trials would be too complicated and impractical. The Ninth Circuit recently clarified that if determining liability requires highly individualized inquiries, a class should not be certified, and any individualized damages trials would have to be feasible.

In Bowerman v. Field Asset Services, Inc., Nos. 18-16303, 18-17275, — F.4th –, 2022 WL 2433971 (9th Cir. July 5, 2022), the plaintiffs contracted with the defendant to perform preservation services on properties being foreclosed on. They claimed that they should have been classified as employees rather than independent contractors under California law, and therefore should have been paid overtime and reimbursed for business expenses. The district court certified a class, decided certain issues on partial summary judgment in favor of the class, and left for a later damages trial whether a class member worked overtime (and to what extent) and whether the class member was entitled to reimbursement for business expenses (and the amount thereof).

The Ninth Circuit reversed the class certification order. It explained that “We need not decide whether common evidence can prove that [defendant] has a uniform policy of misclassifying its vendors” because “[defendant’s] liability to any class member for failing to pay them overtime wages or to reimburse their business expenses would require highly individualized inquiries on whether that particular class member ever worked overtime or ever incurred any ‘necessary’ business expenses.” (Emphasis in original.) The plaintiffs had “mischaracterize[d] an issue of individualized liability as an issue of individualized damages.” (Emphasis in original.) The Ninth Circuit explained that if the question involves the existence of damages, that is a liability issue, not a damages issue.

The Ninth Circuit also concluded that, under its interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013), the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that damages were “capable of measurement on a classwide basis” because they could not “show that the whole class suffered damages traceable to their alleged misclassification as independent contractors,” even if the amounts of those damages would need to be proven individually. In addition, determining damages would require “excessive difficulty” because there was little documentary evidence, and “using the individual testimony of self-interested class members to calculate the overtime hours they worked and the business expenses they incurred isn’t easy.” In a bellwether trial conducted by the district court, eight trial days had been required to determine damages for a sample of only eleven class members.

This decision helpfully clarifies the perennial debate between what constitutes a “damages” issue versus a “liability” issue. As I’ve often written on this blog, it can be helpful to think about the class certification analysis by analyzing how the named plaintiffs’ or putative class members’ claims would be tried in an ordinary individual case, and what evidence the defendant would be entitled to introduce. Here, the bellwether trial helped the Ninth Circuit determine that this case could not be litigated on a class basis.

Article By Wystan M. Ackerman of Robinson & Cole LLP

For more litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022 Robinson & Cole LLP. All rights reserved.

Court of Appeals Rules That Oil and Gas Company Has Ongoing Obligation to Restore Property Despite General Release of Damages in Surface Use Agreement

On April 11, 2022, the Fourth District Court of Appeals issued a significant decision in Zimmerview Dairy Farms, LLC v. Protégé Energy III LLC establishing that a general release of damages signed in connection with a pad site surface use agreement did not release the oil and gas company from its ongoing obligations to remediate and restore damage to a landowner’s property.

In the Zimmerview case, Plaintiff Zimmerview Dairy Farms (“ZDF”) signed a surface use agreement with Defendant Protégé Energy III LLC (“Protégé”) permitting Protégé to construct and operate a pad-site for Utica Shale wells on a portion of the ZDF farm. The agreement consisted of three documents: a recorded surface use agreement (favorable to Protégé); a confidential supplemental agreement (with terms favorable to ZDF); and a damage release under which ZDF released Protégé from the anticipated damages already paid for by Protégé. This three-document structure is typical, especially for pipelines easements, and one which many oil and gas companies insist on. Often, the damage release is explained by landmen as an unimportant formality and that the company is still going to fix the land as required under the unrecorded agreement. However, what a landman says, what an agreement says and what a company does can differ dramatically.

In Zimmerview, Protégé proceeded to construct and operate its pad-site without adequately remediating, restoring and reseeding the areas disturbed during construction, including the slopes of the pad-site. Over several years, Protégé’s failure to remediate resulted in significant topsoil damage, invasive weed infestations and ongoing erosion, which rendered large portions of the ZDF farm unusable. Protégé refused to pay or fix the ZDF farm, claiming that the damage release signed by ZDF released Protégé from any obligation to remediate or pay for damages caused to the ZDF farm. When ZDF filed suit and won at trial, Protégé appealed.

On appeal, Protégé once again argued that ZDF had released Protégé from all damages resulting from construction and operation of the pad-site including damages from not remediating the ZDF farm. Despite the broad language of the release, however, the Court of Appeals rejected Protégé’s argument on the basis that the damage release, signed when the surface use agreement was executed, could not have been intended to release Protégé from damages that resulted from the ongoing obligations and requirements Protégé had just agreed to under the surface use agreement. Accordingly, the Fourth District affirmed the trial court judgment (and $800,000 verdict for damages) against Protégé. Given the common use (and abuse) of similar damage releases by both operators and pipeline companies, this decision is a welcome addition to Ohio caselaw and should assist (and hopefully encourage) Ohio landowners to insist on producers and pipeline companies meeting their construction and remediation obligations.

©2022 Roetzel & Andress
For more articles about court cases, visit the NLR Litigation section.

Court Reversed Order Appointing Temporary Administrator Due To A Lack Of A Bond

In In re Robinett, a party filed a petition for writ of mandamus, challenging a trial court’s order appointing a temporary administrator. No. 03-21-00649-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 926 (Tex. App.—Austin February 9, 2022, original proc.). The petitioner complained that the trial court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing and also appointed a temporary administrator without a bond. Regarding the hearing complaint, the court of appeals disagreed:

Under Section 55.001 of the Texas Estates Code, “[a] person interested in an estate may, at any time before the court decides an issue in a proceeding, file written opposition regarding the issue.” Relators are correct that such interested persons are entitled “to process for witness and evidence, and to be heard on the opposition.” Id. But, based on the record before us, they did not file any “written opposition” to the appointment until they filed their motion to reconsider three days after the appointment had already been decided. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by appointing the temporary administrator without first conducting a hearing pursuant to Section 55.001 because there was no requirement for the trial court to hold a hearing under that statute.

Id. The court, however, agreed that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing the temporary administrator without bond:

The Estates Code expressly requires that the order appointing a temporary administrator “set the amount of bond to be given by the appointee.” Moreover, the Estates Code requires that a party must enter into a bond unless they meet one of a limited number of exceptions: (1) a will directs that no bond be required; (2) all the relevant parties consent to not requiring bond; or (3) the appointee is a corporate fiduciary. And other statutory provisions require a hearing and evidence before “setting the amount of a bond.” Based on the record before us, there is no evidence that the temporary administrator met any of the exceptions to the bonding requirement, nor is there any indication that the trial court undertook any evidentiary hearing regarding the bond amount. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to follow the statutory requirements for setting bonds as part of a temporary administrator appointment.

Id.

© 2022 Winstead PC.
For more articles about civil procedures in litigation, visit the NLR Civil Procedure section.

Look at Me, Not Through Me: Supreme Court Limits Federal Jurisdiction for Post-arbitration Award Petitions

On 31 March 2022, the United States Supreme Court in Badgerow v. Walters limited federal subject matter jurisdiction over post-arbitration award petitions under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) §§ 9 and 10. After years of widening disagreement between circuit courts regarding when a federal court may exercise jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an award, the Supreme Court weighed in and held that federal courts may only exercise jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an award if the face of the application supports diversity or federal-question jurisdiction. One of the implications of this ruling is that many more post-arbitration proceedings to confirm or vacate an arbitration award may be channeled into state courts.

BACKDROP: FAA SECTIONS AT ISSUE

Section 4 states that a party seeking to compel arbitration can file suit in any court that, “save for” the arbitration agreement, would have federal jurisdiction over the underlying dispute.1

Section 9 provides that parties may apply to confirm an arbitration award in the United States court “in and for the district” where the award was made.2

Section 10 provides that parties may apply to vacate an arbitration award in the United States court “in and for the district” where the award was made.3

PRELUDE: VADEN

In its 2009 decision in Vaden v. Discover Bank, the Supreme Court found that federal-question jurisdiction could exist under a “look-through” approach in a § 4 petition to compel arbitration.4 In that case, two questions were presented: (1) whether a district court, when asked to compel arbitration, should “look through” the petition and compel arbitration if the court originally would have had federal jurisdiction; and (2) if so, may the court exercise jurisdiction over the § 4 petition when the original complaint rests on state law but the counterclaim rests on federal law?

The Supreme Court answered the first question affirmatively. In doing so, it emphasized that a “federal court may ‘look through’ a § 4 petition to determine whether it is predicated on an action that ‘arises under’ federal law; in keeping with the well-pleaded complaint rule.”5 However, the Court found that the district court could not exercise jurisdiction over the petition presented in that case, because the complaint was “entirely state-based” and “federal-court jurisdiction cannot be invoked on the basis of a defense or counterclaim.”6

Since Vaden, circuit courts have been divided over whether the “look-through” approach also applies to applications to confirm or vacate awards under FAA §§ 9 and 10. For example, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the circuit split in Quezada v. Bechtel OG & C Constr. Servs., Inc., noting that the Third and Seventh Circuits decline to apply the look-through approach for confirmation, vacatur, or modification of arbitration awards, but the First, Second, and Fourth Circuits permit the look-through approach.7

Ultimately, a divided Fifth-Circuit panel in Quezada agreed with the majority and held that the Vaden look-through approach applies to applications to confirm or vacate arbitration awards.

OPENING ACTS: BADGEROW V. WALTERS IN THE LOWER COURTS

Badgerow v. Walters followed, implicating the Supreme Court’s Vaden decision and the Fifth Circuit’s Quezada decision on the issue of whether a federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction to review an application to confirm or vacate an arbitration award when the underlying dispute presents a federal question.

The plaintiff in Badgerow initiated arbitration against her former employer’s principals, alleging violation of federal employment law. The arbitration panel dismissed all of her claims, so she filed an action in state court to vacate the arbitration award. The defendants removed the action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and filed a motion to confirm the award. Plaintiff moved for remand to state court, arguing that the district court did not have jurisdiction over the award; however, the district court denied remand and granted defendant’s motion to confirm the award.8

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that it was bound by its precedent in Quezada and applied the look-through approach.9 The Fifth Circuit thus affirmed the district court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction over the dispute.

Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted on 17 May 2021.10

FEATURE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION

In an 8-1 decision,11 the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that FAA §§ 9 and 10 lack § 4’s “distinctive language directing a look-through” approach. Thus, without statutory language directing otherwise, “a court may look only to the application actually submitted to it in assessing its jurisdiction.”12 Noting that Congress could have replicated § 4’s look-through language in §§ 9 and 10 but chose not to, the Court held that a federal court only has jurisdiction over an application to confirm or vacate an arbitration award when the face of the application demonstrates diversity or federal-question jurisdiction.

Applying the new rule to the facts of plaintiff’s appeal, the Court explained that the parties were not contesting the federal employment dispute at this stage; rather, the parties were contesting enforcement of the arbitration award. Therefore, the Court held that federal jurisdiction was not appropriate because enforcement of the award, which was “no more than a contractual resolution of the parties’ dispute,” did not amount to federal-question jurisdiction and the parties were not diverse.

SOUVENIR: THE KEY TAKEAWAYS

Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Badgerow limiting federal subject matter jurisdiction over arbitration awards, counsel and parties seeking to confirm or vacate arbitration awards must analyze whether their application, on its face, supports an independent basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction if they wish to bring their application in federal court. Without the “look-through” approach for §§ 9 and 10 petitions, and in particular where the parties to arbitration provisions are citizens of the same state (and thus lack diversity jurisdiction), state courts will more likely be the primary venue for post-award petitions.

FOOTNOTES

1 9 U.S.C. § 4.

2 9 U.S.C. § 9.

3 9 U.S.C. § 10.

4 Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262, 1268 (2009) (“A federal court may ‘look through’ a § 4 petition and order arbitration if,” notwithstanding the arbitration agreement, “the court would have jurisdiction over ‘the [substantive] controversy between the parties.’” (citations omitted)).

5 Id. at 1273.

6 Id. at 1269.

7 Quezada v. Bechtel OG & C Constr. Servs., Inc., 946 F.3d 837, 841 (5th Cir. 2020) (“After Vaden, a circuit split developed regarding whether the same look-through approach also applies to applications to confirm an arbitration award under section 9, to vacate under section 10, or to modify under section 11.”).

8 Badgerow v. Walters, — S. Ct. —-, 2022 WL 959675, at *3 (2022).

9 Badgerow v. Walters, 975 F.3d 469, 472–74 (5th Cir. 2020).

10 Badgerow v. Walters, 141 S. Ct. 2620 (2021).

11 Justice Breyer in dissent wrote that although the Court’s decision “may be consistent with the statute’s text,” practical application would create curious consequences, artificial distinctions, and results that are “overly complex and impractical.” Badgerow, 2022 WL 959675, at *10 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

12 Badgerow, 2022 WL 959675, at *3.

Copyright 2022 K & L Gates
For more articles about Supreme Court cases, visit the NLR Litigation section.