Tag: attorney fees

How to Recover Attorneys’ Fees in a Schedule A Trademark Case in the Northern District of Illinois

In recent years, a substantial number of “Schedule A” trademark infringement cases have been filed in the Northern District of Illinois. In such a case, the trademark owner may file a trademark infringement complaint against a number of defendants, with the complaint identifying the defendants as “The Individuals, Corporations, Limited Liability Companies, Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A hereto.” [See, e.g., Opulent Complaint]

The trademark owner may file Schedule A separately from the complaint with a request to the Court that the schedule be placed under seal. Sometimes, trademark owners file the entire complaint under seal. After filing sealed pleadings that shield the defendants’ identities, the trademark owner may then file ex parte motions for temporary restraining orders (“TROs”) against the secretly-named defendants. Because the proceedings are ex parte, the alleged infringer is not given notice of the proceedings or an opportunity to appear. If the Court grants the TRO, the trademark owner may then present the TRO to online marketplaces with a demand that the marketplaces immediately stop selling the allegedly infringing goods. The result may be that an alleged infringer may find all of its activity frozen by the online marketplace, including a freeze on the alleged infringer’s cash held with the online marketplace. This may create cashflow problems for the alleged infringer and prevent the alleged infringer from making future sales. Because its identity is sealed by the court, an alleged infringer may first learn of the TRO after its accounts are frozen.

Schedule A cases appear to be concentrated in the Northern District of Illinois because judges in that district have been receptive to granting ex parte relief. See, A. Anteau, “The Northern District of Illinois v. the Internet: How Chicago Became the Center of Schedule A Trademark Infringement Litigation”; Law.Com, December 19, 2023. At least two judges in that district even provide templates for TROs, preliminary injunctions and default judgments in Schedule A cases. See Northern District of Illinois (uscourts.gov); Northern District of Illinois (uscourts.gov). The justification for the ex parte nature of these proceedings is that it, if notice was required, online counterfeiters (frequently from China) could hide their assets or move their counterfeit products to new sites as soon as an infringement case was filed.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, remedies and relief do exist if an entity is the subject of a wrongfully obtained ex parte TRO. Recently, Ya Ya Creations, a defendant in a Schedule A trademark case, obtained an attorneys’ fees award against a plaintiff that failed to conduct a proper investigation before naming two Ya Ya-affiliated entities as alleged infringers in a case filed in the Northern District of Illinois. [Award of Fees] The dispute began in August 2021, when the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Ya Ya for trademark infringement and a variety of other causes of action in the Eastern District of Texas. The Texas court transferred the case to the Central District of California in April of 2022. Four months after the transfer, the plaintiff filed a very similar lawsuit against Ya Ya in the Middle District of Florida. On May 26, 2023, the Florida court transferred the case to the Central District of California, and then the CD California consolidated the cases due to the similarity of the facts and claims. On September 26, 2023, the plaintiff filed yet another lawsuit. This time, the plaintiff filed a Schedule A trademark infringement case against a number of defendants in the Northern District of Illinois. In the Schedule A case, the plaintiff named two entities affiliated with Ya Ya as alleged infringers.

Notwithstanding the litigation history between the parties, the plaintiff obtained an ex parte TRO against Ya Ya in the Northern District of Illinois. Ya Ya first learned about the TRO after the court issued it and after an online marketplace froze Ya Ya’s accounts.

Ya Ya’s first step in seeking redress was to file an emergency motion asking the court to dissolve the ex parte TRO. [Ya Ya Motion to Dissolve TRO] Ya Ya argued that, because the parties were actively litigating against each other in California, the plaintiff had no basis to seek ex parte relief against Ya Ya or its affiliated entities without notifying Ya Ya of the proceedings. Ya Ya also argued that the plaintiff’s ex parte TRO was a transparent attempt to gain a litigation advantage in the California cases to either leverage a settlement, force Ya Ya into a position where it could not even pay its lawyers to mount a defense, or force Ya Ya to file for bankruptcy. In response to Ya Ya’s motion to dismiss, the plaintiff agreed to dismiss all of its claims against the Ya Ya-affiliated entities.

Ya Ya’s next step was to file a motion for recovery of the attorneys’ fees it expended in the Northern District of Illinois proceedings. [Ya Ya Request for Reimbursement of Attorneys’ Fees]. In response, the plaintiff argued that it was not obligated to pay Ya Ya’s attorneys’ fees, because it did not know the entities it named in the Northern District of Illinois lawsuit were affiliated with Ya Ya. But the court rejected that argument. The court concluded that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, a court may award attorneys’ fees incurred while defending an ex parte TRO when (1) the TRO caused “needless delay” and unnecessarily “increased the cost of litigation,” or (2) the TRO was obtained by pleadings that were not “well grounded in fact” or made after “reasonable inquiry.” The Court determined that plaintiff could have avoided increasing the costs of litigation if it had conducted a reasonable inquiry to determine if the two entities were affiliated with Ya Ya, but it failed to do so. As a result, the Court awarded Plaintiff to pay Ya-Ya almost $100,000 in attorneys’ fees.

Trademark litigators should be aware that judges in the Northern District of Illinois have been receptive to granting ex parte TROs in trademark cases. If you represent a client that is the subject of an improperly granted ex parte TRO, be prepared to move quickly to dissolve the TRO and consider whether you have a basis to move for an award of attorneys’ fees.

Copyright © 2024, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.
For more news on Recovering Trademark Infringement Attorney’s Fees, visit the NLR Intellectual Property section.

Texas Supreme Court Rules to Foreclose Attorney’s Fees in First Party Appraisal Context

The Supreme Court of Texas has issued its much-anticipated opinion on an open attorney’s fees question in the area of First Party Property appraisals.

The issue came to the Texas Supreme Court on a certified question from the 5th Circuit and considers the practical effect of the Texas Legislature’s 2017 amendments to the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act, Chapter 542, Insurance Code. In short, Texas Insurance Code Chapter 542A, among other reforms, sets forth a statutory formula to determine the amount of an attorney’s fees awarded for a prevailing insured in a weather-related first party property case against an insurer. Under the statute, the amount of reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees a prevailing insured can recover is reduced when the “amount to be awarded in the judgment” is less than the amount the insured claims is owed. In the appraisal context, insurers have paid the appraisal award, along with an amount sufficient to cover any potential statutory interest under Chapter 542A, then made the argument there can be no “amount to be awarded in the judgment” such that there is no liability for attorney’s fees.

In the recent ruling, the Texas Supreme Court agreed with this argument, noting that when a carrier pays the appraisal amount plus any possible statutory interest, it has “complied with its obligations under the policy.” In doing so, there is no remaining “amount to be awarded in the judgment,” and attorney’s fees are not available.

Going forward, this ruling should return the appraisal process to its intended function – an inexpensive and prompt resolution of claims, without the need for litigation – and avoid late invocation of appraisal as gamesmanship.

© 2024 Dinsmore & Shohl LLP. All rights reserved.
by: Sarah R. Smith of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP
For more news on Attorneys’ Fees in Texas, visit the NLR Litigation / Trial Practice section.

Blunt Rejection of Attorney Fees in Stipulated Dismissal

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the rejection of attorney fees, finding that neither inequitable conduct nor a conflict of interest rendered the case exceptional given the limited factual record following a stipulated dismissal in a patent case. United Cannabis Corp. v. Pure Hemp Collective Inc., Case No. 22-1363 (Fed. Cir. May 8, 2023) (Lourie, Cunningham, Stark, JJ.).

United Cannabis Corporation (UCANN) sued Pure Hemp for patent infringement. After the litigation was stayed pending bankruptcy proceedings, the parties stipulated to the dismissal. Pure Hemp then sought attorney fees based on alleged inequitable conduct by UCANN during prosecution of the asserted patent due to nondisclosure of a prior art reference used in the patent’s specification and based on a purported conflict of interest by UCANN’s litigation counsel. The district court denied Pure Hemp’s request, finding that the case was not exceptional. Pure Hemp appealed.

Pure Hemp argued that the district court erred by (1) failing to find Pure Hemp to be the prevailing party in the litigation, (2) not concluding that the undisputed facts established inequitable conduct and (3) not recognizing that UCANN’s attorneys had a conflict of interest.

The Federal Circuit found that although the district court erred in not finding Pure Hemp to be the prevailing party, this was a harmless error. The Court explained that by fending off UCANN’s lawsuit with a stipulation dismissing UCANN’s claims with prejudice, Pure Hemp is a prevailing party under § 285. However, the Court concluded that this error was harmless because the district court ultimately concluded that this case was unexceptional.

The Federal Circuit found Pure Hemp’s arguments on inequitable conduct without merit. The Court explained that it had no findings to review because Pure Hemp voluntarily dismissed its inequitable conduct counterclaim and did not seek any post-dismissal inequitable conduct proceedings. Although Pure Hemp argued that it could prevail based on the undisputed facts in the record, the Court disagreed. It explained that even the limited record demonstrated at least a genuine dispute as to both the materiality and intent prongs of inequitable conduct and, therefore, the district court properly determined that Pure Hemp did not demonstrate that this case was exceptional.

The Federal Circuit also rejected Pure Hemp’s argument that copying and pasting portions from the prior art in the patent’s specification (but not disclosing the same prior art references) was inequitable conduct. The Court explained that unlike the nonbinding cases Pure Hemp relied on, the district court here did not find that the copied prior art was material, and the record gave no reason to disbelieve the explanation provided by UCANN’s prosecution counsel. The Court was also unpersuaded by Pure Hemp’s arguments to support inequitable conduct, explaining that the Court was not free to make its own findings on intent to deceive and materiality and, further, the district court was not required to provide its reasoning for its decision in attorney fee cases.

As to Pure Hemp’s argument that the case was exceptional because UCANN’s attorneys suffered from a conflict of interest, the Federal Circuit found that this argument was waived and, in any event, lacked merit because Pure Hemp presented no evidence to support the alleged conflict.

Finally, having sua sponte raised the issue of whether this was a frivolous appeal. The Federal Circuit determined that although it was “not pleased with how Pure Hemp has argued this appeal,” the appeal was nonetheless not frivolous because [Pure Hemp] properly argued that it was the prevailing party.

© 2023 McDermott Will & Emery
For more Intellectual Property Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Counsel Fee Award When Contesting A Will

In general, the party tasked with defending a decedent’s Will during a Will contest, which is typically the executor, is entitled to the reimbursement of counsel fees that they incur in defending the Will on behalf of the Estate. At times, however, a party who has filed an action to contest a Last Will and Testament may also be entitled to an award of counsel fees provided there was a reasonable and legitimate basis to contest the decedent’s Last Will and Testament. In a recent appellate division case, the court affirmed an award of counsel fees to the contestant of a decedent’s Will for these very reasons.

In this matter, the defendant executor had been awarded counsel fees by the court, as the defendant was responsible for defending the decedent’s Last Will and Testament against the challenges levied by the plaintiff. In addition, the trial court also awarded counsel fees to the plaintiff, as it found that plaintiff’s challenge to the decedent’s Will was made in good faith and was reasonable. Moreover, the court found that plaintiff’s fees for which it sought reimbursement were fair and reasonable. In response, the defendant argued that the award of counsel fees was contrary to the applicable New Jersey court rules, and therefore, objected to the award. The appellate division reviewed the applicable rule of professional conduct, RPC 1.5(a), and concluded that the plaintiff had reasonable cause to contest the validity of the decedent’s Will, and moreover, that the fees the plaintiff sought were reasonable. As such, the appellate division concluded that the trial court correctly awarded counsel fees to the contestant of the decedent’s Will.

This appellate division decision reaffirmed a well-accepted standard as to an award of counsel fees in the context of probate litigation. When you are either taxed with defending a Last Will and Testament or intending to contest a Last Will and Testament, this factor should be considered when deciding whether settlement makes sense. Since there is no guarantee to either side that the counsel fees will be awarded, it is an issue that should be considered in the context of any settlement discussions before trial.

COPYRIGHT © 2021, STARK & STARK
Article by Paul W. Norris with Stark & Stark.
For more articles on estates and trusts, visit the NLR Family, Estates & Trusts section.

Three Ways Litigation Finance Can Help Corporate Legal Departments

Corporate legal departments are generally measured by their ability to control legal costs, manage risk, and deputize external litigation resources, especially when their company is involved in litigation. Although a common feature of modern business, litigation is an increasingly costly proposition that is fraught with risk. In recent years, commercial litigation finance has emerged as an effective means of shouldering case costs and redistributing risk. While the number of law firms that have seized the advantages of this type of financing has grown exponentially, general counsels (“GCs”) and corporate legal departments have been slower to recognize the many benefits that it can offer, which has handicapped their companies by keeping a potent tool needlessly out of reach. Here are three things every GC should know about litigation finance.

Litigation Finance Offsets Risk

Litigation costs and other financial risks inherent to the legal process pose a daunting challenge to GCs. As a result, companies often forgo bringing lawsuits due to their impact on financial performance. Yet even when legal departments decide to forge ahead with legal claims, their outcome is often far from certain. The decision to bring a lawsuit, therefore, has the power to make or break entire companies. This risk is even more acute for smaller companies and those facing financial headwinds. A victory could revive a company’s fortunes, while a poorly conceived effort might precipitate the firm’s demise. Litigation finance mitigates that risk through funding “without recourse,” which allows a company to shift costs to a third party and only share an agreed-upon portion of proceeds with the funder at the successful conclusion of the claim. If a case is lost and no proceeds are recovered, the company is under no obligation to repay the funding amount.

Consider the following example: Suppose a small tech startup sues an industry giant for theft of its trade secrets relating to a revolutionary new product. The startup’s case against its unscrupulous competitor is seemingly strong as the brazen theft greatly damaged the fledgling company. Unfortunately, the lawsuit comes with a steep price tag, forcing the startup to spend more than $100,000 each month on attorneys’ fees and associated costs. Small and vulnerable, the startup is quickly exhausting its cash reserves as its better-capitalized opponent employs a panoply of defensive tactics designed to delay and frustrate plaintiff’s efforts at all stages of litigation. As legal bills continue to mount, the startup may need to abandon its lawsuit or accept a paltry settlement far below the actual value of its claim.

Faced with an existential threat, what the startup really needs is a cash injection from a litigation finance provider to pay for the escalating litigation costs while also providing a much-needed insurance policy against unforeseen financial difficulties that can result from litigation. The startup’s GC is surprised to learn that this type of funding is an increasingly common financing option that is available to companies large and small. In a typical transaction, a third-party funder can finance most, or all of the legal expenses associated with the lawsuit in return for a portion of any recovery. The funds may be used to hire top legal talent or procure additional expert resources. Essentially a corporate finance transaction, this type of funding can even be used to supplement the company’s working capital or clean up arrears to legal service providers.

The example above is just one of the ways that litigation finance can be used to hedge litigation risk. More creative GCs have been able to offset their institution’s litigation costs entirely by using a portfolio-based approach to finance all of their legal claims.  This type of structure typically provides a much larger financing commitment but requires cross-collateralization of several litigation matters. Where portfolio financing is utilized, it may provide a greater degree of certainty about long-term future litigation spend.  If the funding amount is substantial enough, GCs may no longer need to allocate for litigation budgets on an annual basis and take a longer-term approach instead.

Litigation Finance Can Transform Legal Departments into Profit Centers Through Balance Sheet Management

Under GAAP, litigation costs are reflected as expenses, which can negatively impact a company’s financials and quarterly performance. This is especially troublesome for public companies that are valued on earnings or cash flow or require certain financial criteria to be met to comply with credit covenants. For such companies, litigation costs paid from company funds must be recorded as expenses immediately when incurred, thereby diminishing reportable earnings. Worse yet, recoveries from successful legal matters may not offset the adverse impact of lawsuit-related costs because such recoveries are generally treated as below-the-line items that do not increase earnings. Moreover, some actions may result in favorable judgments which then take months or years to enforce, leaving a temporary hole in a company’s cash flows despite a successful ruling.

It is no surprise then that corporate legal departments are frequently perceived by management as cost centers, necessary to put out fires or navigate the laws applicable to a particular industry, but not as potential revenue generators. Traditionally, GCs who have identified a roster of affirmative litigation likely to yield significant recoveries will still need to convince their c-suite to take on the risk and immediate financial burden of funding lawsuits from the company’s own balance sheet. Enter litigation finance. When both the risk and burden are shifted to litigation finance providers in exchange for a portion of any recoveries, a company’s legal department can focus on unlocking the hidden value of its legal matters without the risk of negatively impacting its financials, becoming a potential profit generator for the company.

An Experienced Litigation Funder Can Help Optimize Litigation Outcomes

The quality and breadth of resources that litigants are able to deploy can greatly impact outcomes in legal disputes.  For example, the skill of the legal team, the quality of expert witnesses and other litigation consultants are important drivers of how courts and juries perceive the merits of legal claims. With litigation financing mitigating the burden of paying for legal costs, GCs have greater flexibility in assembling a first-rate litigation team. A legal department buttressed by litigation finance can focus on the skill and effectiveness of its team without worrying about negotiating for the lowest possible fees. Access to the support of top-quality counsel and litigation consultants can improve a company’s overall likelihood of success and the magnitude of any recovery.

Experienced litigation funders can provide access to these top litigation support channels by leveraging their network.  In addition, they can provide an invaluable outside perspective on the merits of a case during the due diligence process and throughout the pendency of the claim. When choosing a litigation funder, consider the expertise of the funder’s team and if there are any practice areas which they target in their investment strategy.

A trusted litigation finance firm should demonstrate the highest professionalism, abide by the explicit understanding that a third-party funder should have no involvement in the litigation or strategy, and should protect attorney-client privilege and confidentiality at all times.  When these essential confidences are met, engaging with a third-party funder can be enormously helpful in assessing the merits and risk of a case, budgeting litigation spend, and providing access to first-rate litigation support.

Conclusion

As litigation finance continues to gain popularity among law firms, GCs should also take notice. As businesses continuously seek to gain a competitive advantage over their peers, the ability to mitigate the risks associated with litigation should be an important consideration, especially since poorly conceived strategies can often carry existential consequences.  GCs, therefore, should recognize litigation finance as an indispensable asset that has the potential to offset the risk of litigation, provide effective balance sheet management while unlocking the hidden value of prospective legal claims, and improve outcomes for meritorious cases.

 

© 2019 LexShares, Inc. All rights reserved.

ARTICLE BY Matthew Oxman of LexShares.

Professional Liability: Punishing Effect of Rule 11 in Keister v. PPL Corp.

professional liabilityFederal courts correct bad litigation behavior, eventually.

People take being sued personally, and lawsuits can take an emotional toll on defendants, whether as an individual or as a representative of an employer. Anger and frustration always lead to the same questions: Can we sanction them for lying? Can I get my fees (or my insurance deductible) back? Won’t the court do something?

Federal courts can and do sanction attorneys for lying, failing to investigate claims and “posturing” a case to get a settlement. But sanctions are reserved for the worst offenders, and it often takes multiple violations before attorneys’ fees, costs or other monetary fines are imposed.

A Case in Point

In Keister v. PPL Corp., U.S. District Court Judge Matthew W. Brann of the Middle District of Pennsylvania directed Attorney X to pay opposing counsel’s fees and costs in excess of $103,000.

What did Attorney X, a solo practitioner in a rural Pennsylvania county, do to potentially warrant more than $100,000 in sanctions? In a 55-page Opinion (which supplemented a 48-page summary judgment opinion), the court explained that  Attorney X:

  • Engaged in “litigious necromancy” by “conjuring” facts to support the age discrimination claim of his client, Ernest Keister, a 34-year employee of PPL and a union member, who worked in a unique position (i.e., his job could not be compared with others) and who was neither fired nor replaced by a younger worker.

  • Proceeded with the claim, in the absence of any evidence that Keister’s age was a factor in (1) his employer’s 2011 denial of a request to reevaluate his job title, duties, salary and management role or (2) the union’s decision not to support moving Keister’s position from the collective bargaining unit.

  • Alleged that Keister faced “ongoing” discrimination in order to avoid dismissal of his client’s lawsuit, despite the complete absence of evidence that anyone insulted or otherwise mistreated Keister.

  • Intentionally asserted claims that were directly contradicted by Keister’s testimony, failed to comply with local motion practice by failing to admit undisputed facts, and submitted documents that were “calculated” to confuse the court and opposing counsel.

  • Failed to investigate the facts and observe procedural requirements, including following the union’s grievance process and filing the federal action within the applicable limitations period (as established by the EEOC’s denial of a claim filed by Attorney X).

  • Amended the complaint for the sole purpose of forcing a mediation to settle a valueless case.

  • Engaged in this conduct after receiving two (non-monetary) Rule 11 sanctions in other cases as well as a public reprimand by the Pennsylvania Disciplinary Board.

Judge Brann repeatedly stated that Rule 11 sanctions are not a “general fee-shifting device” and are not available merely because one side was successful. Sanctions were imposed because Attorney X “is simply not getting the message,” despite prior federal court and state bar disciplinary reprimands. The court held that the “least severe sanctions adequate to serve the purpose” of punishing Attorney X’s conduct and deterring it in the future was to award all costs and fees to the defendants.

Summary

The Keister ruling suggests that a Rule 11 motion should only be filed when it can be proven that opposing counsel did not have the facts to back up a client’s claims and made an effort to hide the absence of a factual dispute. However, even when such proof can be found, federal courts will first award non-monetary sanctions for an attorney’s first and even second offense, as happened here with Attorney X.

When facing a litigation opponent who lies to the court, it is best to prove the lie, document it, and then decide the most appropriate way to bring it to the attention of opposing counsel and, if appropriate, the court or disciplinary authorities. The work might not yield monetary sanctions in the first instance, but the federal courts may not act to stop abusive litigators until presented with multiple examples of bad conduct.

In the short run, it may seem more cost-effective to ignore an opponent’s abusive actions because a judicial reprimand does not return money to the client. But in the long run, the federal courts will not protect a client from future bad acts or additional lawsuits until an attorney’s repeated pattern of deception is established.

ARTICLE BY William F. McDevitt of Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP

© 2016 Wilson Elser

Supreme Court Makes Landmark Rulings on Attorney Fees in Patent Cases

Andrews Kurth

On April 29th,  the U.S. Supreme Court made it much easier to recover attorney fees in patent lawsuits, issuing two unanimous landmark decisions overruling Federal Circuit precedent. The statute at issue, 35 U.S.C. §285, allows for the court to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in “exceptional cases.” Since its decision in Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F. 3d 1378, 1381 (2005), the  Federal Circuit has held that exceptional cases are those cases which are proven by clear and convincing evidence to be both “objectively baseless” and “brought in subjective bad faith.” Also, in the past several years, the Federal Circuit has reviewed the objectively baseless element of its test for exceptional cases de novo without deference to the district courts. Today’s decisions have rejected all these principles. In doing so, the two decisions continue the Supreme Court’s series of cases overturning Federal Circuit principles in patent cases that may be viewed as at odds with principles applied in analogous circumstances in non-patent cases. These decisions also undoubtedly will compel litigants to re-consider their exposure to fee awards and how to approach requests for fee awards.

In Octane Fitness LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness Inc., case number 12-1184, the Court overruled Federal Circuit precedent that “[a] case may be deemed exceptional” under §285 only in two limited circumstances: “when there has been some material inappropriate conduct,” or when the litigation is both “brought in subjective bad faith” and “objectively baseless.”  Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc., v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F. 3d 1378, 1381 (2005). The Supreme Court pointed out that, in the five decades following the adoption of §285, both before and after the creation of the Federal Circuit, the courts had applied the statute “in a discretionary manner, assessing various factors to determine whether a given case was sufficiently “exceptional” to warrant a fee award.” It found that since the Brooks Furniture case in 2005, the Federal Circuit “abandoned that holistic, equitable approach in favor of a more rigid and mechanical formulation.” Continuing its tradition of mining copyright cases for analogous principles (and mining patent cases similarly in copyright cases), the Supreme Court pointed to its decision in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 114 S.Ct. 1023 (1994) and to dictionary definitions of the word “exceptional,” the Supreme Court held that:

an “exceptional” case is simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated. District courts may determine whether a case is “exceptional” in the case-by-case exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances. As in the comparable context of the Copyright Act, “[t]here is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations,’ but instead equitable discretion should be exercised ‘in light of the considerations we have identified.” (quoting Fogerty).

The Supreme Court also rejected the “clear and convincing” evidentiary hurdle established by the Federal Circuit to recovering fees under §285. In doing so, the Court stated:

We have not interpreted comparable fee-shifting statutes to require proof of entitlement to fees by clear and convincing evidence.…And nothing in § 285 justifies such a high standard of proof. Section 285 demands a simple discretionary inquiry; it imposes no specific evidentiary burden, much less such a high one. Indeed, patent-infringement litigation has always been governed by a preponderance of the evidence standard….

In the companion case of Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management Systems Inc., case number 12-1163, the Court also dealt with attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. §285. Again, the Court rejected Federal Circuit precedent and held that decisions to award attorneys’ fees are not reviewed de novo by the Federal Circuit. In doing so, the Court stated “that an appellate court should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a district court’s §285 determination.” Here again, the Supreme Court pointed to principles that other non-patent cases had applied in similar situations:

Traditionally, decisions on “questions of law” are “reviewable de novo,” decisions on “questions of fact” are “reviewable for clear error,” and decisions on “matters of discretion” are “reviewable for abuse of discretion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988). For reasons we explain inOctane, the determination whether a case is “exceptional” under § 285 is a matter of discretion. And as in our prior cases involving similar determinations, the exceptional-case determination is to be reviewed only for abuse of discretion…As in Pierce, the text of the statute “emphasizes the fact that the determination is for the district court,” which “suggests some deference to the district court upon appeal,”….As in Pierce, “as a matter of the sound administration of justice,” the district court “is better positioned” to decide whether a case is exceptional…because it lives with the case over a prolonged period of time. And as in Pierce, the question is “multifarious and novel,” not susceptible to “useful generalization” of the sort that de novo review provides, and “likely to profit from the experience that an abuse-of-discretion rule will permit to develop.

Over the past several years, the Supreme Court has overturned Federal Circuit precedent that applied idiosyncratic rules in patent cases when other non-patent cases dealing with similar matters have generally applied other rules. These two cases continue in the same vein, sending a clear message that patent cases are not so exceptional, at least as to common procedural matters, as to warrant special rules.

It is uncertain what impact these decisions will have on the number of patent cases being brought or on the types of patent cases brought. It is also uncertain how many more cases will be the subject of attorney fee awards. Nonetheless, today’s decisions should provide district court judges with confidence that fees awarded in the proper circumstances will be upheld on appeal.

It also remains to be seen what impact these decisions will have on legislation aimed squarely at non-practicing entities (“NPEs”) that is currently making its way through Congress. The Innovation Act, which has been passed by the House, specifically provides for fee shifting through which a court may force the losing party to pay the winning party’s attorney’s fees and/or costs. Such a change would represent a fundamental shift in the U.S. litigation principle that each side ordinarily pays its own fees and costs. Perhaps the Senate, which is debating a reduced version of the Innovation Act, will consider the Supreme Court’s decisions as sufficiently empowering the district courts to address abusive patent-litigation practices and will drop fee shifting from the Innovation Act. Click here for more information about the Innovation Act.

Article By:

Jeff C. Dodd
Gregory L. Porter
Sean S. Wooden
Of:
Andrews Kurth