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Be Careful What You Write: What a Heavily Redacted Antitrust Complaint Teaches Us About Creating Problematic Documents in Transactions

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas to stop Tempur Sealy’s proposed acquisition of Mattress Firm. See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Tempur Sealy Int’l, Inc. and Mattress Firm Group Inc., Case No. 4:24-cv-02508 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 2, 2024). On the same day, the FTC also commenced an administrative proceeding in its own court to block the transaction. See In re Tempur Sealy Int’l, Inc. and Mattress Firm Group Inc., Docket No. 9433 (FTC Jul. 2, 2024). According to the complaints, Tempur Sealy is the world’s largest mattress supplier and Mattress Firm is the largest mattress retailer in the United States. Vertical mergers between manufacturers and retailers can often produce procompetitive benefits, but this transaction struck the FTC as anticompetitive. The FTC’s principal concern appears to be that Tempur Sealy would shut off its rivals’ access to Mattress Firm.

Supporting the FTC’s decision to sue, Federal Trade Commissioner Melissa Holyoak said, “Despite the increased likelihood of procompetitive effects from vertical mergers, they may still result in harm in some circumstances. Consistent with these well-established economic principles, I vote in favor of filing this complaint based upon the substantial evidence generated by staff’s thorough investigation, especially the parties’ own ordinary-course documents. I have reason to believe that the effect of Tempur Sealy’s acquisition of Mattress Firm ‘may be to substantially lessen competition.’” (Emphasis added).

What exactly was in these ordinary course documents that caused Holyoak to believe this merger violates Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act? The short answer is we don’t know. The complaints, which extensively quote some documents, are heavily redacted and the documents themselves, even in redacted form, are not attached to the complaints. Nor would we expect the documents to be attached, as they likely contain competitively sensitive information that ordinarily would not be on the public record. Rather than speculate about the documents themselves, let’s use the allegations in the FTC’s complaints as a tool to remind ourselves how documents are used in antitrust investigations and how lawyers and clients can work together to reduce the likelihood that potentially problematic documents are created.

What’s an “ordinary course” document? As the name suggests, an ordinary course document is one that is created by the parties in the course of their ordinary business activities. It may be a routinely issued report, an email or text exchange by two employees, Slack messages, a slide deck, board minutes or any other form of written communication. Antitrust regulators routinely use these documents to gain insight into how the parties see themselves in relation to the competition, the rationale for a transaction, and how the parties view the likely competitive effects of a transaction. Often regulators will place more emphasis on communications from senior leadership in a corporation as those individuals may have greater knowledge of the transaction and have more authority to “speak” for an entity than lower-level employees. Regulators will use these documents not only to support their own theories and claims, but also to contradict the parties’ advocacy about the procompetitive aspects of a deal.
How does the government obtain these ordinary course documents? In the case of the Tempur Sealy/Mattress Firm transaction and other high dollar value transactions, the parties were required to file Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) premerger notification forms. When an HSR filing is required, the parties must produce documents that discuss the transaction in relation to certain specific topics, such as competition, competitors, markets, and market shares. These documents are usually not ordinary course documents as they were created specifically for the deal but are nevertheless critical in the regulators’ review of potential competitive issues. Documents routinely produced in the HSR process, such as Confidential Information Memoranda (CIM) and Management Presentations, may contain statements that could create potential antitrust concerns. Clients should recognize that even the smallest of things in a CIM or Management Presentation have the potential to create big problems, as government regulators will read every page of what is submitted to them. For example, assume that an HSR filing contains a 100-page deck intended to serve as a Management Presentation, and one page of that deck contains a sentence that says: “We [seller] are the dominant player in our industry and we face minimal competition.” The rest of the deck might be completely innocuous, but depending on the circumstances, that one sentence has the potential to ignite regulators’ interest.Some transactions, such as Tempur Sealy/Mattress Firm, undergo a Second Request process after HSR is filed. A Second Request is an extensive subpoena requesting documents and data from the parties that goes far beyond the HSR process. The Second Request process is what likely turned up the “ordinary course” documents mentioned in Holyoak’s statement. This included text messages. See, e.g., Paragraph 108 of the federal complaint and Paragraph 99 of the administrative complaint. Judging from the amount of redacted material referenced in the complaints, the FTC appears to believe there are many documents that portray this transaction in an anticompetitive light.
Clients should also be aware that the government’s authority to review and investigate transactions is not limited to only those transactions that require HSR filings; the government’s authority extends to any transaction that impacts competition in the United States. In addition to HSR filings, the government learns about deals through a variety of sources, such as press reports and third party complaints from customers or competitors. Accordingly, our views about document creation extend to all transactions, not just those requiring HSR premerger notification.
Document creation in transactions is a team sport. That means lawyers and clients should work together as a team to minimize the creation of potentially harmful documents. The team should also include investment bankers and other advisors who are generating documents that analyze the transaction. In ideal circumstances, clients will involve experienced antitrust lawyers early on to understand: 1) whether the transaction potentially raises substantive antitrust concerns, such as when two direct competitors combine; 2) if the transaction will require HSR notification; and 3) whether or not HSR is required, what are the guardrails or best practices the client should observe. Recognizing that we don’t always operate in ideal circumstances and lawyers may only become involved after certain documents are created, lawyers should nevertheless remain vigilant about documents from the time they become involved in a deal. Coaching clients and their advisors about document creation best practices is always critically important.
What are some best practices? Lawyers should proactively educate their clients on what to say (or not say) about the transaction and which words or phrases may be particularly susceptible to raising potential antitrust concerns. For example, words like “dominate” and “control” in relation to competition and competitors may create problems, as could market share statistics that overstate a seller’s prominence in a particular industry. Lawyers should also review drafts of documents such as CIMs, Management Presentations, and teasers to ensure that they are free of harmful verbiage.
Expect statements to be misunderstood or taken out of context: Reading the Tempur Sealy/Mattress Firm complaints, two things are clear: 1) the government relied on portions of documents to support its allegations; and 2) the context of many of the quoted statements is unknown. It may be the case that some of the statements the FTC found important become less important when the entire document is reviewed and the context of the statement is made clear. Relatedly, there may be other documents not referenced in the complaints that indicate the transaction has procompetitive benefits. Allegations in a complaint are just that – allegations – and the evidence that emerges as the case progresses may or may not support those allegations. That being said, parties are wise to follow the best practices above. Similarly, they are also wise to avoid making exaggerated statements or statements intended to be humorous. These statements may be misunderstood by government regulators who do not know the specific industry or its players as well as clients do.
Follow the general principle of “less is more” when it comes to document creation. Many transactions seem to move at lightning speed, but a moment of self-reflection can be very valuable. Ask yourself: do I need to write this, and if I do, what’s the best way to say it? Some organizations are more document-intensive than others, and there may be other reasons, unrelated to antitrust considerations, that require certain documentation. But in general, more documents are probably created than are truly necessary and more documents create the potential for more problems. Regardless, the key is to remember emails, texts, Slack messages, and slide decks may be read not only by their intended recipients but also by government antitrust regulators.

FTC Issues Report to Congress Highlighting Collaboration with State Attorneys General

On April 10, 2024, the Federal Trade Commission issued a report to Congress on the agency’s collaboration with state attorneys general highlighting current cooperative law enforcement efforts, best practices to ensure continued collaboration and legislative recommendations to enhance such efforts.

The report, directed by the FTC Collaboration Act of 2021, “Working Together to Protect Consumers: A Study and Recommendations on FTC Collaboration with the State Attorneys General” makes legislative recommendations that would enhance these efforts, including reinstating the Commission’s authority to seek money for defrauded consumers and providing it with the independent authority to seek civil penalties.

“Today’s consumer protection challenges require an all-hands-on-deck response, and our report details how the FTC is working closely with state enforcers to share information, stop fraud, and ensure fairness in the marketplace,” said FTC attorney Samuel Levine, Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection. “We look forward to seeking new opportunities to strengthen these ties and confront the challenges of the future.”

In June 2023, the Commission announced a request for public information (RFI) seeking public comments and suggestions on ways it can work more effectively with state AGs to help educate consumers about, and protect them from, potential fraud. After reviewing and analyzing the comments received, the agency developed the report to Congress issued today. The report is divided into three sections: 1) The FTC’s Existing Collaborative Efforts with State
Attorneys General to Prevent, Publicize, and Penalize Frauds and Scams; 2) Recommended Best Practices to Enhance Collaboration; and 3) Legislative Recommendations to Enhance Collaboration Efforts.

The first section lays out the roles and responsibilities of the FTC and state AGs in protecting consumers from frauds and scams, provides an overview of their respective law enforcement authority, and discusses how federal and state enforcers share their information and expertise to facilitate effective communication and cooperation. It also provides a breakdown of the FTC’s
structure and a description of the Consumer Sentinel consumer complaint database, the largest such information-sharing network in the United States.

The second section details best practices used to enhance strong information-sharing between the FTC and its state law enforcement partners, discusses how the Commission coordinates joint and parallel enforcement actions with state AGs and other state consumer protection agencies, and presents ideas on expanding the sharing of expertise and technical resources between agencies.

Finally, the third section stresses the legislative need to restore the FTC’s Section 13(b) authority to seek equitable monetary refunds for injured consumers, presents ways to enhance collaboration and conserve resources by providing the FTC with the independent authority to seek civil penalties, and describes the agency’s need for clear authority to pursue legal actions against those who assist and facilitate unfair or deceptive acts or practices.

The Commission vote approving the report to Congress was 3-0-2, with Commissioners Melissa Holyoak and Andrew N. Ferguson not participating. Chair Lina M. Khan issued a separate statement, in which she was joined by Commissioners Rebecca Kelly Slaughter and Alvaro M. Bedoya. Commissioner Slaughter also issued a separate statement.

Regeneron v Novartis and Vetter: Walker Process Client Update

In an appeal that attracted a dozen amici, including the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, five states, and the District of Columbia, the Second Circuit gave the Walker Process antitrust doctrine a shot in the arm in a patent dispute related to pre-filled syringes (“PFSs”) used for injection of anti-VEGF biologic medicines into patients’ eyeballs (i.e., intravitreal injections).¹ Under Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965), patentees who obtain patents through fraudulent behavior or inequitable conduct can be liable under the Sherman Antitrust Act. In a complaint filed in the Northern District of New York, Regeneron alleged Novartis and Vetter committed a Walker Process violation by obtaining and asserting patents for PFSs. The Second Circuit held that the district court made a mistake by dismissing Regeneron’s suit because it focused on the functional similarities in the markets for anti-VEGF medicines in PFSs and vials. In reversing, the Second Circuit held that the correct approach must focus on an economic market analysis rather than a functional market analysis, and that Regeneron’s complaint plausibly alleged that anti-VEGF PFSs constituted their own economic product market. As the amicus interest signals, the decision may have significant implications, both for the blockbuster market for anti-VEGF medicines and, more broadly, for defining the markets for different pharmaceutical methods of administration.

In its complaint, Regeneron alleges that in 2005, it had contracted with Vetter, a company providing pharmaceutical filling services, to collaborate on a PFS for its blockbuster anti-VEGF product, EYLEA.² It alleges that its agreement with Vetter granted Regeneron ownership in any patent related to EYLEA PFSs. Id. Notwithstanding its agreement with Regeneron, Vetter later entered into a confidential agreement with Novartis to develop a PFS for anti-VEGF biologics, which are used to treat macular degeneration and other retinal conditions. Id. Indeed, both parties agree on the benefits of PFSs for patients and providers of anti-VEGF medicines—ease in administration, improved safety, and greater efficiency—compared to vials, which must be used to fill a separate syringe.³ Novartis has an anti-VEGF biologic, LUCENTIS, which Genentech markets in the United States.

Regeneron alleges that Vetter contributed to Novartis’s invention of U.S. Patent No. 9,220,631 (the “’631 Patent”) and that Novartis concealed Vetter’s contribution to inventorship from the PTO to avoid alerting Regeneron to its contractual violations. Id. Concealing inventorship from the PTO can constitute inequitable conduct and form the basis for a Walker Process claim. (Regeneron also alleges Novartis improperly withheld key prior art references from the PTO during prosecution.) Novartis’s resulting ’631 Patent specifically claims EYLEA’s active ingredient as a treatment for use in Novartis’s patented syringe.⁴ Regeneron contends that the defendants’ pattern of conduct delayed its entry into the PFS market, resulting in significant damages.⁵ Regeneron also alleges that, after the ’631 Patent issued, Vetter leaned on it in contract negotiations to enter a long-term deal and to agree not to challenge the validity of the ’631 Patent.⁶ Novartis sued Regeneron on the ’631 Patent in the ITC and the Northern District of New York in 2020, and there is a pending Federal Circuit appeal regarding the validity of the patent.⁷

The Second Circuit held that “the district court improperly concluded that Regeneron failed to plead adequately the existence of a distinct anti-VEGF PFS market because it… placed improper weight on the functional, rather than economic, similarities between anti-VEGF PFSs and vials.”⁸ Rather than look to the functional similarities in the markets for PFSs and vials (i.e., same drug, same medical condition), the Second Circuit held that the proper analysis was economic. That is, whether products are “reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes,” as assessed by examining “sufficient cross-elasticity of demand.”⁹ Regeneron’s complaint alleges that physicians transferred 80% of patients from vials to PFSs when they were offered for LUCENTIS. The Second Circuit found Regeneron’s allegation adequately pled a hypothetical monopoly market by pleading that the physicians’ switching behavior showed that a “small, but significant, price increase in the PFS version would not cause physicians to substitute the vial version for PFS.”¹⁰

Second, the Second Circuit held that the district court was wrong to decide that an antitrust market cannot be coextensive with a patent’s scope. Instead, “once an antitrust plaintiff has demonstrated that [1] a patent was obtained through fraud, it must [2] separately explain how the fraudulently obtained patent enabled the defendants to achieve market power within the relevant market.”¹¹ Regeneron’s allegations regarding inventorship and improperly withheld prior art satisfied the “fraudulently obtained” prong of the test.¹² Next, the Second Circuit found that Regeneron’s complaint adequately pled the “market power” prong, crediting Regenoron’s allegation that Novartis and Vetter attempted to use the ’631 patent to coerce Regeneron into a long-term exclusive PFS filling relationship and demanding other modifications to Regeneron and Vetter’s 2005 agreement.¹³

Why the Decision Matters

The Second Circuit’s decision stands out for two reasons. First, anti-VEGF biologics are a big business for innovator companies, biosimilar makers, and government payers. EYLEA’s total revenue for 2023 was nearly $5.9 billion.¹⁴ Roche, which through its subsidiary Genentech commercializes LUCENTIS in the US, reported $460 million CHF in 2023 revenue, down from approximately $1 billion CHF in 2022 after entry from two biosimilars, with more pending.¹⁵ Biosimilars referencing EYLEA are also pending FDA approval or in clinical trials.¹⁶ Government payers are naturally interested in age-related macular degeneration (AMD) medications: among Americans over 65, the CDC estimates that approximately 1.3 million have vision-threatening AMD, with another 10.9 million having milder AMD.¹⁷ Indeed, the state amici’s brief supporting Regeneron noted the states’ interest in the markets for AMD drugs.¹⁸

Second, and more broadly, a product’s presentation or method of administration—pill vs. liquid; standard vs. extended release; IV vs. subcutaneous injection—has major implications for patients, providers, and product lifecycle. Different methods of administration may expand a product’s commercial reach and, as this case shows, provide additional patent protection (and possibly market exclusivity). Antitrust scrutiny directed to narrowly defined markets for methods of administration—here PFSs—is noteworthy. The amicus brief from the DoJ and FTC makes clear that it is supporting neither side and “take[s] no position as to whether the complaint adequately pleads a relevant antitrust market or states an antitrust claim.”¹⁹ However, the Federal government’s amicus brief also stated that the district court erred in its decision, and the brief’s analysis of the proper market definition parallels the reasoning ultimately adopted by the Second Circuit^.20

This decision relates to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), where the court only looks for a plausible, well-pled complaint. Novartis will have its day in court at the summary judgment and trial stages, where Regeneron will owe a higher burden of proof. However, antitrust claims are powerful tools because they carry the monetary risk of treble damages as well as the possibility of scrutiny from regulators. These risks must be weighed, not just by outside counsel and CLOs, but by CEOs and boards of directors.

Footnotes

[1] See Regeneron Pharm., Inc. v. Novartis Pharma AG et al., No. 22-427, slip op. at 1 (March 18, 2024). As the Second Circuit explains, “[t]he products in question are prescription medications used to treat the overproduction of vascular endothelial growth factor (‘VEGF’), a naturally occurring protein that, if overproduced, can lead to various eye disorders and, in some cases, to permanent blindness.”

[2] Slip op. at 9

[3] Id. at 8-9

[4] See ’631 Patent at Claim 12

[5] See slip op. at 10-11.

[6] Id. at 13-14.

[7] Id. at 15-16.

[8] Id. at 19.

[9] Id. at 20-21 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) and United States v. Am. Express. Co., 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016)).

[10] Slip op. at 26; see, e.g., Am. Express, 838 F.3d at 199 (small but significant non-transitory increase in price (“SSNIP”) may demonstrate that the proposed market is relevant market).

[11] Slip op. at 30(citing Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177).

[12] Id. at 30-31.

[13] Id. at 31-32. In addition to reversing the district court’s decision on the antitrust claim, the Second Circuit reversed the court’s dismissal of Regeneron’s claim for tortious interference with contract as time barred, crediting Regeneron’s equitable estoppel arguments.

[14] “Regeneron Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2023 Financial and Operating Results,” Feb. 2, 2024, https://investor.regeneron.com/news-releases/news-release-details/regeneron-reports-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2023-financial (last visited March 20, 2024).

[15] “Roche Finance Report 2023,” at 16, https://assets.roche.com/f/176343/x/3b1fb647e2/fb23e.pdf (last visited March 20, 2024).

[16] See, e.g., “New and Upcoming biosimilar launches,” at 6 https://www.cardinalhealth.com/content/dam/corp/web/documents/Report/cardinal-health-biosimilar-launches.pdf (last visited March 20, 2024).

[17] See “Prevalence of Age-Related Macular Degeneration (AMD), at Table 1, https://www.cdc.gov/visionhealth/vehss/estimates/amd-prevalence.html (last visited March 20, 2024).

[18] See Brief of Amici Curiae Nevada, District of Columbia, Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, and New Mexico as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant, Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Case 22-427, Dkt. 106 at 2.

[19] See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Case 22-427, Dkt. 90 at 1.

[20] Id. at 12.

The Antitrust Investigator Will See You Now: What Healthcare And Pharma Should Expect In A World Of Enhanced Antitrust Scrutiny

Highlights

Healthcare entities should expect heightened government scrutiny of mergers, acquisitions, and business behaviors that could be construed as restricting competition in healthcare and pharma
The FTC, DOJ, and HHS have advanced a “whole-of-government approach,” including data sharing, cooperative enforcement, and enhanced antitrust training
Businesses should take note of practices that are likely to trigger investigatory and enforcement actions

According to media reports, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has opened an antitrust investigation into UnitedHealth Group, which is the owner of the United States’ largest health insurer, UnitedHealthcare. The focus of the inquiry appears to be the relationship between the UnitedHealthcare insurance plan and one of its health services divisions, Optum, and the potential impact on rivals and consumers.

While tech giants have grabbed most of the headlines when it comes to enhanced antitrust scrutiny, this new matter is the DOJ’s second antitrust investigation into UnitedHealth Group in recent years, giving teeth to the administration’s claim that it has an aggressive antitrust policy in the healthcare sector.

In another example of increased antitrust scrutiny, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently announced a new initiative in partnership with the DOJ and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to address what they consider to be the effects of anticompetitive behavior in the healthcare and pharmaceutical spaces. According to the government, these new efforts are aimed at lowering consumer costs and will include “partnering on new initiatives which include a joint Request for Information to seek input on how private-equity and other corporations’ control of health care is impacting Americans.”

Although interagency cooperation is the focus of the recent push to ramp up antitrust investigations and enforcement, each agency will still spearheaded their own regulatory activity.

Federal Trade Commission

FTC Chair Lina Khan has made it clear that her agency will devote more resources to enforcement in the healthcare industry, and emphasized that “safeguarding fair competition and rooting out unlawful business practices in health care markets is a top priority for the FTC.” In furtherance of these priorities, the commission has recently taken the following actions:

Orange Book Policy: The FTC challenged more than 100 patents held by pharmaceutical companies that they claim are inaccurately or improperly listed in the FDA’s Orange Book. The commission also released a policy statement explaining its renewed focus on Orange Book infractions.
Proposed Non-compete Rule: The FTC presented a new rule that would place a ban on non-compete clauses in employee contracts.

U.S. Department of Justice

Jonathan Kanter, Assistant Attorney General of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, highlighted the division’s emphasis on the healthcare space when he said, “we are committed to weeding out anticompetitive practices and market consolidation that hinder Americans’ access to quality care at affordable rates, or deprive health care workers of fair wages and opportunity.” The following are just a few examples of how the DOJ has implemented this renewed focus:

Criminal Penalties: Recently, the DOJ’s Antitrust Division successfully secured a deferred prosecution agreement against Teva Pharmaceuticals, obtaining the largest monetary penalty ever (over $200 million) against a purely domestic producer that was allegedly operating an antitrust cartel.
Blocked Mergers: The Antitrust Division filed a suit to stop Aon plc’s $30 billion proposal to acquire Willis Towers Watson, two of the three largest brokers of health insurance and retirement benefits consulting. The companies later ceased their pursuit of the merger.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

HHS Secretary Xavier Becerra made his agency’s priorities clear when he recently stated that “the Biden-Harris Administration remains laser-focused on increasing access to high-quality, affordable health care for all Americans, like by making hearing aids available for sale over the counter and lowering prescription drug costs through the Inflation Reduction Act.” The department’s initiatives have included:

Ownership Transparency: For the first time, HHS, via the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, made ownership data available on federal qualified health centers and rural health clinics on data.cms.gov. HHS hopes the release of this data will help catalyze enforcement actions by identifying common ownership.
Medicare Advantage Marketing: HHS also announced new efforts to crack down on what it considers “predatory marketing” that seeks to steer patients towards Medicare Advantage plans that “may not best meet their needs.”

Takeaways

In light of the government’s renewed focus on increased competition, expanded enforcement actions, access to quality care, more affordable services and products, and transparency of ownership in the healthcare and pharmaceutical industries, legal and compliance departments should consider being proactive about conducting thorough reviews of current practices. This is particularly true for mergers and acquisitions, competitive strategies, and pricing decisions, which are the business activities most likely to conflict with these recently energized regulatory bodies. Even healthcare providers with stellar compliance programs should expect to receive more frequent and targeted requests for information from enforcement authorities about their business partners, payors, and marketing practices.

Year in Review: Criminal Enforcement by the DOJ Antitrust Division in 2023

Introduction

When it comes to antitrust criminal enforcement, 2023 will be remembered as the year when the US Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Antitrust Division redefined and tested the outer boundaries of its authority. Here is a look back at the key events that defined the DOJ’s year in criminal antitrust enforcement.

Losses in Labor Markets

The DOJ continued its focus on labor markets in 2023 by pursuing per se no-poach and wage-fixing prosecutions despite resounding resistance by fact finders. In these cases, the DOJ alleged that companies and executives restrained trade in labor markets in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act through agreements that restricted movement and suppressed the wages of workers.

Courts have allowed these per se no-poach and wage-fixing cases to survive the motion to dismiss stage of litigation, but the DOJ’s success has routinely ended there. In 2022, the DOJ tried its first criminal no-poach case in US v. DaVita, which was successfully defended by McDermott and resulted in a complete acquittal of both corporate and individual defendants. In 2023, the DOJ fared no better:

In US v. Manahe (D. Maine), the DOJ charged four business managers in an alleged conspiracy to fix the wages and restrict the hiring of personal support specialist workers for two months during the pandemic. The government presented evidence such as text messages discussing hourly wages and recordings of meetings between the defendants, while the defendants countered by showing that the discussed prices were not implemented, and a draft agreement went unsigned. The jury acquitted all four defendants following a two-week trial in March 2023.
As we previously reported, the DOJ suffered a blow in US v. Patel (D. Connecticut) in April 2023. During a four-week trial, the government alleged that defendants conspired to restrict the hiring and recruiting of skilled workers and engineers in the aerospace industry. The defense moved for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, an extreme lever that judges rarely pull to end a trial before it reaches the jury. Judge Victor A. Bolden granted the motion and acquitted all the defendants. He found that the engineers’ freedom to switch companies and the number of exceptions to the agreements could not support finding market allocation as a matter of law.
In November 2023, the DOJ stunningly moved to dismiss its own case alleging a conspiracy by outpatient medical care competitors not to solicit senior-level employees. The case was three years into litigation; in its motion, the DOJ simply stated that dismissal would conserve court time and resources. This was the DOJ’s last pending no-poach case against a corporation.

If the DOJ’s labor markets cases have a theme, it is this: If at first you don’t succeed, try, try again. Despite four straight losses and a voluntary dismissal, the DOJ remains undeterred in bringing additional criminal wage-fixing and no-poach suits. The Biden administration’s “whole of government” approach to enforcement means that shared resources and collaboration among agencies, including the DOJ and the National Labor Relations Board, will continue into 2024. Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter left no doubt that the DOJ is doubling down on its executive authority despite a losing track record in court: “Let me confirm: We are just as committed as ever to, when appropriate, using our congressionally given authority to prosecute criminal violations of the Sherman Act in labor markets.” Addressing the Women’s White Collar Defense Association in December 2023, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Doha Mekki echoed, “We look forward to charging more no-poach and wage-fixing cases.”

Per Se Problems

The DOJ stumbled in a different per se setting in December 2023, when a three-judge panel on the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed fraud charges but reversed the per se bid-rigging conviction of a steel and aluminum manufacturing sales manager turned executive. In US v. Brewbaker, the appellate panel found that “caselaw and economics show that the indictment failed to state a per se antitrust offense as it purported to do.”

In its 2020 indictment, the DOJ alleged that Brent Brewbaker of Contech Engineered Solutions conspired with a North Carolina distributor and exclusive dealer, Pomona Pipe Products, to share total bid pricing information on North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) aluminum projects and use that information to purposefully submit losing bids. This allegedly appeased Pomona and maintained Contech’s status on NCDOT’s “emergency bid list.” Contech pled guilty, but Brewbaker continued to trial. A jury found him guilty of bid rigging and other fraud charges; he appealed.

The Fourth Circuit held that the DOJ’s indictment implicated Contech and Pomona as horizontal competitors in NCDOT aluminum projects and as vertical competitors through their manufacturer-dealer relationship, resulting in a “hybrid” restraint. The DOJ sought to isolate Contech’s role as a manufacturer and competing bidder for NCDOT aluminum projects, focusing solely on the horizontal nature of the restraint and subsequently arguing for per se treatment.

The panel did not accept the DOJ’s argument that the conspiracy itself involved only horizontal conduct and instead considered the parties’ competitive relationship, which involved both horizontal and vertical aspects. The panel found that “agreements that look otherwise identical in form produce different economic effects based on how the parties relate to one another,” and stated that the DOJ’s theory would “force . . . arbitrary and likely impossible line-drawing” to determine which “part” of the entity to consider. The court continued, “The Sherman Act doesn’t ignore reality; it treats the entire business entity as the single party it is. . . . Antitrust law does not turn on such artificial mental gymnastics.”

Under this premise, the court moved through an analysis of case law and economic rationale to determine appropriate scrutiny. Although there is no direct guidance on hybrid restraints in the bid rigging context, the panel contrasted the present case with Leegin Creative Leather Products, 551 U.S. 877 (2007), where the Supreme Court of the United States applied per se scrutiny to a price fixing case despite both horizontal and vertical elements. In Brewbaker, the court found instead that the restraint in the indictment should not have been subject to the per se standard based on precedent, nor would it invariably lead to anticompetitive effects upon economic analysis—all making per se scrutiny inappropriate. As a result, and in a blow to the DOJ, the court reversed Brewbaker’s Sherman Act conviction.

In Full (Strike) Force

The DOJ’s Procurement Collusion Strike Force (PCSF) succeeded in securing several guilty pleas and stiff penalties in 2023. The PCSF is tasked with training government personnel and enforcing antitrust and fraud laws related to government contract bidding, grants and program funding.

PCSF Director Daniel Glad spoke to the National Association of State Procurement Officials in November 2023, highlighting the state and agency partnerships that comprise the PCSF. He pushed for even greater collaboration with state officials in 2024 and coming years, noting the recent influx of funds from the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, which authorized billions of dollars in transportation and infrastructure programs. Later that month, the PCSF held its first summit to discuss strategies, priorities and resources. As reported by the DOJ, attendees included 11 “law enforcement partners” from across the country and 22 US Attorneys’ Offices.

These partnerships have surely strengthened the PCSF, and it has an extensive track record of successful convictions and guilty pleas. Among them are the following:

In January 2023, military contractor Aaron Stephens pleaded guilty to rigging bids related to the maintenance and repair of military tactical vehicles, following his alleged co-conspirator Mark Leveritt’s guilty plea July 2022. In August 2023, Stephens received an 18-month prison sentence and a $50,000 criminal fine. Leveritt received a six-month sentence and a $300,000 fine.
Also in January 2023, a construction company owner received a 27-month sentence and was ordered to pay a $1.75 million fine for fraudulently securing government contracts meant for service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses.
A Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) employee out of New York pleaded guilty to engaging in wire fraud related to MTA excess vehicle auctions. Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter described the conduct as “stealing from the public” and promised that the DOJ would continue to “detect and punish” those who abuse the public trust. Two additional guilty pleas by fellow MTA employees followed.
An insulation contractor out of Connecticut was the seventh person sentenced in a bid rigging and contract fraud investigation, resulting in a 15-month prison sentence and a restitution fine of more than $1 million. The alleged scheme related to insulation contracting at both public and private institutions, including universities and hospitals.
In March 2023, a Georgia jury found three military contractors guilty of conspiring to defraud the United States and two counts of major fraud related to two years of conduct.
A construction company owner faced a 78-month prison sentence and an almost $1 million restitution fine for bid rigging and bribery involving the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans). Defendant Bill Miller previously pled guilty to recruiting others to submit sham bids and to paying almost $1 million in cash bribes to a Caltrans contract manager. The manager himself received a 49-month prison sentence and a similar restitution fine, and a co-conspirator who submitted false bids received 45 months in jail and a $797,940 restitution fine.
A Texas judge ordered corporate defendant J&J Korea to pay almost $9 million for wire fraud and conspiracy to restrain trade related to subcontract work for US military hospitals in South Korea. A grand jury indicted two corporate officers for the same conduct in 2022.
Three military contractors received their sentences in December 2023 following a jury trial related to their alleged procurement fraud scheme. The defendants’ sentences included prison, supervised release and fines ranging from $50,000 to $250,000.

In December 2023, the PCSF also secured a seven-count indictment using wiretap evidence to charge two forest firefighting services executives with bid rigging, allocating markets and fraud. Wiretap evidence is rarely used in cartel investigations and marks a meaningful step in PCSF’s investigative approach. PCSF likely has already begun obtaining wiretap evidence in other cases and, based on its success in 2023, will continue pursuing aggressive investigative and litigation strategies moving forward.

Partnerships and Collaboration

Taking the PCSF to the global stage, the DOJ announced a joint initiative with Mexico’s Federal Economic Competition Commission and the Canadian Competition Bureau to collaborate on “outreach to the public and business community about anti-competitive conduct, as well as on investigations, using intelligence sharing and existing international cooperation tools” in the run-up to the 2026 FIFA World Cup to be hosted across the three countries.

In addition to its international partnerships for the World Cup, the DOJ is tackling technology with global efforts. In November 2023, DOJ leaders met with G7 competition authorities in Tokyo to discuss competition in digital markets and enforcement priorities. This was one in a series of meetings among authorities that have taken place since 2019 with a goal of setting and issuing guidance on shared priorities for regulating competition in tech. Following the summit, the group published a “communique” grounded in concern around emerging technologies, including risks in the criminal realm. The leaders noted, “As firms increasingly rely on AI to set prices to consumers, there is risk that such tools could facilitate collusion or unfairly raise prices.”

This sentiment is consistent with statements made earlier in the year by DOJ leadership. For example, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Doha Mekki highlighted the role of technology in information exchanges. She described the current “inflection point” of algorithms, data and cloud computing as creating new market realties. Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter stated that artificial intelligence’s “boundless potential” comes with “risks [that] transcend borders.” The consistency of rhetoric and global dedication to tackling the risks of emerging technology signals a potentially busy 2024 in this space.

The DOJ also continued its practice of partnering with fellow domestic law enforcement agencies. For example, the DOJ secured three guilty pleas in August 2023 for bid rigging asphalt paving services contracts in Michigan from 2013 to 2021. The DOJ worked with the Offices of Inspector General for the US Department of Transportation and the US Postal Service, and highlighted the partnership in public statements on the pleas. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Manish Kumar said, “Along with our law enforcement partners, the division will continue to seek justice when corporations and their leaders deprive customers of fair and open competition.” Cross-agency collaboration is a hallmark of the DOJ’s criminal enforcement and there is no reason to believe this practice will change in 2024.

Anything but Generic Remedies

In August 2023, the DOJ announced that it had entered into two unprecedented deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) to resolve price fixing charges in the generic drug industry against Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., and Glenmark Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Teva and Glenmark agreed to pay $250 million and $30 million, respectively, in criminal penalties and compliance monitoring, with Teva also obligated to donate $50 million worth of drugs to aid organizations. These agreements included divestitures of the companies’ product lines for the cholesterol drug pravastatin, alleged as central to the alleged price fixing conspiracy underlying the agreements. These arrangements are unusual for two reasons.

DPAs

First, DPAs are typically unfavored by the government and used as incentives for cooperation early in investigations. It is striking that the DOJ entered into these agreements in such an advanced stage of litigation, where five other corporations and three individuals had already admitted to the implicated conspiracy. DPAs are agreements between the government and defendants in which the defendants accept certain penalties in exchange for prosecutors stopping their pursuit of the underlying charges. Prosecutions are “deferred” indefinitely while defendants fulfill their end of the bargain. Although both DPAs and plea agreements involve admitting wrongdoing, DPAs allow defendants resolution without admission of legal guilt. In the event defendants fail to meet the terms of the agreement, the government resumes its prosecution and seeks convictions.

“Extraordinary” Remedial Measures

Second, both DPAs involved unheard of divestitures of product interests in the cholesterol drug pravastatin, with Teva’s DPA requiring an additional measure of $50 million in donated clotrimazole and tobramycin to humanitarian organizations. All three generic drugs were impacted by the charged conspiracy. This remedy is first of its kind—criminal antitrust enforcers historically have sought monetary and prison sentences only. However, DOJ criminal enforcers driving outside of their historic lane is not necessarily inconsistent or surprising. The current administration has repeatedly committed to “using the whole legislative toolbox” in litigation.

Deputy Assistant Attorney General Manish Kumar stated in October 2023 that these divestitures were appropriate in the “heavily regulated” context of generic pharmaceuticals, where a corporate conviction could have precluded Teva and Glenmark’s participation in federal drug programs to such an extent that the companies would have gone out of business. Of course, these are not the first defendants to face corporate convictions in heavily regulated industries, and they are not even the first to do so in this specific alleged conspiracy.

Whether this specific tool will build or break down competition, whether criminal enforcers are equipped to evaluate the impact of divestiture, and whether it is appropriate to test this novel approach in an industry with an alleged prolific conspiracy among major players and thus among potential buyers remains to be seen. For better or worse there will be more data points to answer these and other uncertainties: Kumar noted that the DOJ hopes to implement divestitures as criminal remedies “in other contexts” moving forward.

Investigation Nearing Its End

On November 16, 2023, in a surprising turn of events shortly after the DOJ announced the resolutions with Teva and Glenmark, the DOJ moved to dismiss a February 2020 indictment against Ara Aprahamian, a former senior executive of Taro Pharmaceutical Industries charged with fixing prices, rigging bids and allocating markets for generic drugs. The district court granted the motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice. Prior to filing the motion, the DOJ had been preparing for a February 2024 criminal trial against Aprahamian. As a result of these recent actions, the DOJ has no remaining public proceedings in connection with its investigation of pricing in the generic drug industry. And, in December 2023, a district court overseeing the multidistrict civil litigation against generic drug manufacturers for the same alleged conduct terminated the DOJ’s intervenor status in the case. Thus, the DOJ’s nearly decade-long investigation of the generic drug industry appears to be ending.

Monaco on Mergers and Corporate Compliance

In a speech at the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics’ Annual Compliance & Ethics Institute, Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco emphasized the importance of compliance programs and announced a safe harbor policy for voluntary self-disclosures of antitrust wrongdoing by companies engaged in mergers and acquisitions.

Compliance

Deputy Attorney General Monaco focused her remarks on the increased importance of, and scrutiny on, corporate compliance programs. She noted that under a new initiative, every resolution by the Criminal Division requires companies to add compliance-promoting criteria to compensation systems. She also shared that the Division is enacting “clawback credits” to incentivize tying executive compensation to compliance. Remaining focused on bottom lines, she warned: “Invest in compliance now or your company may pay the price—a significant price—later.” These sharp words are consistent with the DOJ’s increased rhetoric on and policy prioritization of compliance programs throughout 2023.

Mergers & Acquisitions Safe Harbor Policy

Deputy Attorney General Monaco also commented on the recently unveiled DOJ-wide safe harbor allowing companies to report misconduct by the companies they seek to acquire or merge with. The covered conduct must be discovered through the M&A process. Conduct that should have otherwise been disclosed or which could have been publicly known does not count. Conduct already known to the DOJ is not entitled to safe harbor protection either.

Monaco stated, “Going forward, acquiring companies that promptly and voluntarily disclose criminal misconduct within the Safe Harbor period [six months from date of closing], and that cooperate with the ensuing investigation, and engage in requisite, timely and appropriate remediation, restitution, and disgorgement [within one year of closing]—they will receive the presumption of a declination.” In line with remarks by enforcers earlier in the year, Monaco specifically highlighted cybersecurity, tech and national security as areas of heightened risk and thus heightened scrutiny. Corporations in these markets should take heed of the DOJ’s emphasis on corporate compliance in 2024.

Looking Ahead

In 2023, criminal antitrust authorities used novel approaches at every stage of enforcement—from charging decisions to partnerships, to litigation, to remedies— and they show no sign of slowing down in 2024. The emergence of new technologies and a policy promise to forego old guideposts takes the DOJ further from the familiar, and perhaps further from its expertise.

In a high-stakes election year and with an influx of federal funds in infrastructure and defense spaces, the DOJ will likely hit the accelerator sooner than it hits the breaks. Markets that impact maximum voters, including employment, tax-funded government contracts, national security and healthcare, are likely focuses. All considered, it is more important than ever for businesses and individuals to stay up to date on policy priorities, revamp and champion internal compliance programs, and seek agile counsel in the ever-changing landscape of criminal enforcement to avoid costly investigations.

FTC Announces 2024 Increase in HSR Notification Thresholds and Filing Fees

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has announced the annual revisions to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act (HSR Act) thresholds and HSR filing fees, which will become effective on March 6, 2024. The revised thresholds will apply to any merger or acquisition closing on or after the effective date.

The FTC is required to adjust the HSR thresholds annually based upon the change in gross national product. This year, the change in the “size of transaction” threshold has increased from $111.4 million to $119.5 million.

Under the HSR Act, when a deal satisfies the “size of person” and “size of transaction” thresholds, and no exemption from reporting is available, the deal must be reported to the FTC and the US Department of Justice, and the parties must wait for a designated period of time before closing the transaction.

Size of Person. The revised size of person thresholds will generally be met if one party involved in the deal has assets or annual sales totaling $239 million or more and one other party involved in the deal has assets or annual sales of at least $23.9 million. Satisfaction of the size of person thresholds is not required, however, if the transaction is valued at more than $478 million.

Size of Transaction. The revised size of transaction threshold will be met if the buyer will hold an aggregate amount of stock, non-corporate interests and/or assets of the seller valued at more than $119.5 million as a result of the deal.

The notification thresholds applicable to purchases of voting securities will increase as follows:

February 1, 2001 Thresholds (Original)	Current Thresholds as of February 27, 2023	New Thresholds Effective March 6, 2024
$50 million	$111.4 million	$119.5 million
$100 million	$222.7 million	$239 million
$500 million	$1.1137 billion	$1.195 billion
25% if worth more than $1 billion	25% if worth more than $2.2274 billion	25% if worth more than $2.39 billion
50% if worth more than $50 million	50% if worth more than $111.4 million	50% if worth more than $119.5 million

The thresholds applicable to many exemptions, including those governing foreign acquisitions, also will increase. However, the $500 million threshold applicable to acquisitions of producing oil and gas reserves and associated assets will not change.

The civil penalty for failing to comply with the notification and waiting period requirements of the HSR Act has also increased to up to $51,744 per day for each day a party is in violation.

HSR Filing Fees. Additionally, the HSR filing fee thresholds and filing fee amounts have increased as follows:

Original Filing Fee	Original Applicable Size of Transaction	2024 Adjusted Filing Fee	2024 Adjusted Applicable Size of Transaction
$30,000	Less than $161.5 million	$30,000	Less than $173.3 million
$100,000	Not less than $161.5 million but less than $500 million	$105,000	Not less than $173.3 million but less than $536.5 million
$250,000	Not less than $500 million but less than $1 billion	$260,000	Not less than $536.5 million but less than $1.073 billion
$400,000	Not less than $1 billion but less than $2 billion	$415,000	Not less than $1.073 billion but less than $2.146 billion
$800,000	Not less than $2 billion but less than $5 billion	$830,000	Not less than $2.146 billion but less than $5.365 billion
$2,250,000	$5 billion or more	$2,335,000	$5.365 billion or more

The new fees also will become effective on March 6, 2024.

Becoming Antitrust Aware in 2024: Top Five Recommendations for the New Year

A new year means resolutions which are often centered around self-improvement measures like weight loss, exercise plans, and other health improvement measures. Companies can also benefit from resolutions. Increasing antitrust awareness is not usually on the resolution list but here we offer some ideas for companies as they embark on a new year.

Treat antitrust as a priority in 2024.

As antitrust lawyers, our viewpoint may be biased, and we certainly appreciate that most companies already have a lengthy list of priorities for their in-house and outside legal teams. Given that all companies, regardless of their size, are subject to the antitrust laws, and given the high stakes involved (including criminal penalties and treble damages awards), antitrust certainly deserves to be on the priority list. One relatively easy way to get the ball rolling is to put fresh eyes on your company’s antitrust policy. When was the last time it was updated? What type of trainings does your company use to teach the concepts contained in the policy? The training doesn’t need to be – and shouldn’t be – boring or esoteric. Instead, trainings should be engaging and tailored to the specific antitrust risks that workgroups may face. For example, the sales team will need different antitrust training than those working on supply chain or environmental, social, and governance (ESG) initiatives. Ask your antitrust lawyer to create easy-to-follow, lively online trainings that can be viewed on demand. And if your company doesn’t have an antitrust policy, we suggest that creating one be moved to the top (or near top) of the legal department’s to-do list in 2024.

Understand the current antitrust enforcement priorities.

2024 will be a significant year for antitrust. It’s an election year, which means 2024 may be the Biden Administration’s last year to execute on plans that have been in the works since President Biden issued Executive Order 14036, “Promoting Competition in the American Economy,” in July 2021. Some of the Administration’s more dramatic plans include significant revisions to the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) premerger notification process. While we don’t expect all the FTC and DOJ’s sweeping proposals to make it into the HSR final rule, we do expect some changes to be made, and they will likely mean significant additional burdens for filing parties. We also expect to see the FTC’s new rule on non-compete agreements. The FTC’s proposal would ban most non-compete agreements, and some states have already enacted their own prohibitions on non-compete agreements.

If your company engages in M&A, be aware of the new Merger Guidelines.

The newest Merger Guidelines, addressing both horizontal and vertical mergers, were unveiled in December 2023 . One of the most significant changes announced in the 2023 Merger Guidelines are the decreased levels of concentration that will trigger a rebuttable presumption of illegality. Under the new Guidelines, a market share of greater than 30% and a concentration increase of 100 points will be enough to trigger that rebuttable presumption. That is not to say the presumption is the death knell for a transaction, but it does mean that the government enforcement will be aggressive. Also be aware that the 2023 Guidelines introduce new topics, such as labor markets. Early analysis and planning will be critical, requiring involvement of skilled antitrust counsel.

Understand that application of the antitrust laws is constantly evolving.

The language of the core U.S. antitrust laws – the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the FTC Act, hasn’t changed, but the application of these laws is always evolving. For example, the antitrust enforcers and private plaintiffs are increasingly focused on labor issues, such as “no poach” agreements and wage fixing. Antitrust enforcers are also focused on private equity, as evidenced by the FTC’s recent lawsuit against Welsh, Carson, Anderson, and Stowe and some of the changes contained in the proposed revisions to the HSR Rules. Technology is also a significant factor that provokes interesting questions that don’t have answers, at least not currently. For example, do pricing algorithms lead to price fixing? How will antitrust enforcers deal with artificial intelligence?

Pay attention to state antitrust enforcers.

The federal regulators at the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission may get most of the attention, but we must never forget that states have their own antitrust laws and their own antitrust enforcers, who have the power to investigate and bring legal action. Often, the state regulators work collaboratively with their federal counterparts, but the state regulators are free to go their own way, such as those targeting various ESG initiatives. Also bear in mind that states are increasingly blazing new trails, such as bans on non-competes. Thirteen states have also enacted “mini” HSR premerger notification statutes for health care deals. It’s always prudent to check the laws of the state or states where business is conducted to determine if there are any state-specific antitrust considerations.

Tempur Sealy Acquisition of Mattress Firm: A Vertical Bridge Too Far for the FTC?

In a deal announced on May 9, Tempur Sealy International, Inc., the world’s largest mattress manufacturer, has agreed to acquire Houston-based Mattress Firm Group, Inc., the largest U.S. brick-and-mortar bedding retailer, with more than 2,300 locations and a robust e-commerce platform. The companies hope to finalize the $40 billion deal in the second half of 2024.

Following pre-merger notification of the deal last October, the FTC is reportedly taking a deep dive into the mattress industry to assess whether the transaction is likely to harm competition. The depth of the investigation itself signals a departure from the antitrust agencies’ traditional approach to “vertical” mergers in which firms in the same industry but in non-overlapping market segments (such as manufacturing and retailing the same product category) benefit from a soft presumption of legality. Customarily, vertical integration was perceived to be benign, if not somehow “efficiency enhancing.”

Whatever the merits of applying such leniency to traditional supply chains of widgets, it does not serve competition policy well in an economy dominated by technology-driven platforms that serve several enormous groups of customers at once. In today’s markets, non-overlapping vertical arrangements can severely affect whether rival firms can gain access to inputs, markets, or prospective customers.

Evidence of the FTC’s awareness of the potential for vertical mergers to cause competitive harm abounds. On September 15, 2021, the FTC withdrew the FTC/Department of Justice 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines and Commentary. The Commission’s majority said that the 2020 Guidelines included a “flawed discussion of the purported procompetitive benefits (i.e., efficiencies) of vertical mergers, especially its treatment of the elimination of double marginalization” and by failing to address “increasing levels of consolidation across the economy.”

Mattresses and Widgets

A course correction is borne out by the Commission’s recent challenges to several proposed vertical mergers, including Nvidia Corp.’s attempted acquisition of Arm Ltd., Lockheed Martin Corporation’s attempted acquisition of Aerojet Rocketdyne Holdings, Inc., Microsoft Corp.’s acquisition of Activision Blizzard Inc., and Illumina, Inc.’s acquisition of GRAIL, Inc. After the parties abandoned the Nvidia/Arm acquisition, the FTC’s press release was effusive: “This result is particularly significant because it represents the first abandonment of a litigated vertical merger in many years,” the Commission said.

Enter the Tempur Sealy/Mattress Firm transaction, a vertical acquisition in a product category whose markets resemble widgets more than online merchandising or payment networks. Tempur Sealy became the world’s largest mattress manufacturer in 2012, when Tempur-Pedic acquired Sealey Corp. for $1.3 billion. The company currently earns revenues of $5 billion a year, almost a third of the $17 billion U.S. mattress market. Mattress Firm, the largest mattress retailer in the U.S. with annual revenues of $2.5 billion a year, has been owned since 2016 by German retail holding company Steinhoff International Holdings NV. The firm filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in October 2018, but quickly emerged the following month after closing 700 stores.

The merging parties are no strangers to one another, having engaged in a commercial relationship for the past 35 years. In 2017, Tempur Sealy sued Mattress Firm for selling mattresses that infringed on the Tempur-Pedic line-up, but in 2019, after its emergence from bankruptcy, Mattress Firm and Tempur Sealy struck a long-term partnership agreement. A merger of the two firms has been under discussion in one form or another for most of the past decade.

Public statements by the parties stress the complementarity of the deal, which they describe as combining “Tempur Sealy’s extensive product development and manufacturing capabilities with vertically integrated retail.” The merged entity will end up with about 3,000 retail stores, 30 e-commerce platforms, 71 manufacturing facilities, and 4 R&D facilities around the world. It is the kind of combination of complementary businesses that not long ago might not have even earned a Second Request from the antitrust agencies.

The FTC, which at least since last December has been investigating the potential effects on the mattress industry of a merger between the two market leaders, issued a Second Request earlier this month. By February, the Commission had already interviewed executives from the top 20 mattress manufacturers, according to a report in Furniture Today (February 2, 2023).

Disruptors and Goliaths

The FTC is likely to discover a large and growing global industry undergoing significant changes in how mattresses are designed, marketed, and sold in reaction to changing consumer preferences.

Several online mattress-in-a-box companies have disrupted the industry. Today, nearly half of all consumers purchases are online. They will also find fairly low barriers to entry into both brick-and-mortar and online retailing and mattress manufacturing. Their review of the Tempur Sealy/Mattress Firm transaction will also encounter two players in the market with a long history of cooperation.

With 20 manufacturers significant enough to interview, the Commission would appear to be faced with a fairly competitive market – one in which little or no foreclosure of rivals to the ability to obtain inputs or the availability of channels of distribution to reach consumers will result from the proposed transaction. Additional competitive pressure comes from Amazon, which began selling its own mattresses in 2018 as part of the Amazon Essentials line, and Walmart, which introduced its own mattress-in-box brand, Allswell, available online and in stores.

On balance, the acquisition of Mattress Firm by Tempur Sealy would not appear to raise significant antitrust issues. A challenge to this transaction by the FTC may be a vertical bridge too far. That is no doubt the assessment reached by Scott Thompson, chairman and CEO of Tempur Sealy, who expressed confidence in clearing the FTC’s antitrust review, “either in the traditional sense or through litigation.”

For more Antitrust and FTC news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

DOJ Fighting for E-Sports Player Compensation

The Biden administration continues its campaign against wage suppression as a source of harm to workers, competitive markets, and the economy. In its latest move, the Department of Justice is supporting players in professional e-sports leagues with a suit to stop Overwatch and Call of Duty developer, Activision Blizzard, Inc., from capping player compensation. Unlike salary restrictions in traditional sports leagues, those implemented by Activision were not produced through collective bargaining and, therefore, are not exempt from antitrust scrutiny.

Complaint and Consent Decree

The DOJ filed suit to challenge Activision’s wage restrictions on April 3^rd, alleging Activision and independently-owned teams in two e-sports leagues agreed to implement certain wage restrictions, including a “Competitive Balance Tax.” The tax penalizes teams in the Overwatch and Call of Duty leagues if player compensation exceeds a threshold set by Activision. According to the complaint, this agreement violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

The DOJ concurrently filed a consent decree to address the competition issues. If approved by the court, the consent decree would prohibit Activision from implementing any restriction that would limit player compensation directly or indirectly. It would also require Activision to, among other things, certify it has terminated competitive balance taxes and implement antitrust compliance and whistleblower policies.

Ongoing Antitrust Issues Concerning Activision-Microsoft Merger

While Activision was negotiating the consent decree with the DOJ, its potential parent company, Microsoft, was continuing to defend its proposed $69 billion acquisition of Activision. In December 2022, the FTC sued to block the merger, claiming “the largest ever [acquisition] in the video gaming industry” would enable Microsoft to suppress competitors of Xbox and its rapidly growing subscription content and cloud-gaming business. This case remains pending.

[Read Jonathan Rubin’s Dec. 12, 2022, commentary on the FTC’s challenge, titled, “An Unstoppable Force Meets an Immovable Object: Microsoft to Fight FTC Over Activision Deal.”]

Microsoft has had more success with antitrust agencies overseas. While the European Commission initially put the deal on hold in December 2022, Reuters and Polygon.com reported the Commission’s concerns have been mollified by Microsoft’s commitment to offer licenses to rival gaming companies. Polygon has also reported that the U.K. Competition and Markets Authority has “set aside some of its main concerns” about the merger. It quotes the CMA as stating that “the cost to Microsoft of withholding Call of Duty from PlayStation would outweigh any gains from taking such action.” The deal has also been approved in Japan, Chile, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and Serbia, Polygon reports.

Non-Statutory Exemption Inapplicable to E-Sports Salary Restrictions

Readers may be wondering why salary caps are commonplace in traditional sports leagues like the NFL, NBA and NHL but not permitted in e-sports leagues. The key distinction is that the salary caps in traditional sports leagues are negotiated and agreed to by player unions as part of the collective bargaining process. As a result, these salary caps (and the agreements containing them) fall under the “non-statutory antitrust exemption,” which was created by the Supreme Court to resolve the inherent conflict between the underlying goals of antitrust laws and labor laws.

Specifically, the non-statutory exemption relieves parties to an agreement restraining trade from antitrust liability where (1) the restraint primarily affects the parties to the agreement and no one else, (2) the agreement concerns wages, hours, or conditions of employment that are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, and (3) the agreement is produced from bona fide, arm’s-length collective bargaining. The restraints at issue here do not satisfy either the first or third prongs because they affect the e-sports players, who were not parties to the agreement, and were not produced through collective bargaining. Therefore, unlike salary restrictions in other professional sports leagues, those agreed to by Activision and the independent teams are subject to the antitrust laws.

For more Antitrust legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review

FTC Launches New Office of Technology

On February 17, 2023, the Federal Trade Commission announced the launch of their new Office of Technology. The Office of Technology will assist the FTC by strengthening and supporting law enforcement investigations and actions, advising and engaging with staff and the Commission on policy and research initiatives, and engaging with the public and relevant experts to identify market trends, emerging technologies and best practices. The Office will have dedicated staff and resources and be headed by Chief Technology Officer Stephanie T. Nguyen.

Article By Hunton Andrews Kurth’s Privacy and Cybersecurity Practice Group

For more privacy and cybersecurity legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Tag: Antitrust

Be Careful What You Write: What a Heavily Redacted Antitrust Complaint Teaches Us About Creating Problematic Documents in Transactions

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FTC Issues Report to Congress Highlighting Collaboration with State Attorneys General

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