Tag: Antitrust

Clash Of Titans over Biosimilars at Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Workshop

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On Tuesday, February 4, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) conducted an all-day public workshop at its headquarters in Washington, D.C. on competition issues involving biologics and biosimilars.1 During highly informative presentations and roundtable discussions, the FTC and various stakeholders, including top-level representatives from originators of biologics (Pfizer and Amgen), biosimilars developers (Sandoz, Momenta and Hospira), payors (Aetna), prescribers (CVS and Express Scripts) and academia (Harvard Medical School), analyzed the likely impact of recent state substitution laws and naming conventions on biosimilars.

No one denied nor debated that the future of the drug industry lies in the robust and dynamic area of biologics. In 2010, 4 of the top 10 drugs were biologics and it is anticipated that in 2016 biologics will account for 7 of the top 10 drugs worldwide.2 At the same time, all panelists were concerned that the costs associated with biologics are rising at a staggering rate and are therefore not sustainable for patients nor payors, and that many patients will be unable to afford biologics if competition is not introduced.

According to Harry Travis, Vice President at Aetna, patients currently spend about $1 a day on non-specialty medication (traditional drugs) whereas they spend roughly $100 a day for specialty medication (biologics).3 He stated that only 1% of Aetna’s customers use specialty products, which account for 50% of Aetna’s total drug spending. This trend was confirmed by Steve Miller, Chief Medical Officer at Express Scripts, who underlined that specialty products (biologics) currently account for 30% of total drug spending, but this number will rise to 50% in 5 years.

It is thus not surprising that all participants urged for FDA-approved biosimilars in order to improve access to biologics while at the same time protecting public health and safety. Participants were also virtually unanimous in their recommendations that fostering public confidence in biosimilars will be crucial to their success and that unnecessary obstacles to substitution may restrict competition.4

The following points were discussed, relying on a large amount of data and comparative studies between countries:

  • Competition between originators of biologics and biosimilars developers: Panelists agreed that competition is not expected to have the same effects on the biologics industry as it has had in the small-molecule drugs space when generics penetrated the latter. Because the dynamics are completely different, the entry of biosimilars is unlikely to result in either steep price discounting or rapid acquisition of market share by manufacturers of biosimilars.5
  • Premature state biosimilar substitution laws: 18 states have already decided to introduce bills to regulate biosimilars, and 4 of them have enacted laws, all of which may seem slightly premature given that the FDA has yet to approve a biosimilar. Certain provisions of these substitution laws appear controversial as they place onerous requirements on the substitution of biosimilars for branded biologics. Of particular concern are certain substitutions laws requiring pharmacists to promptly notify patients and/or prescribers when dispensing a biosimilar, and to keep special records. These state-level restrictions not only deter substitution by imposing on pharmacists burdensome recordkeeping and additional communications with the physician, they also contradict federal law, namely the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA), which expressly provides for substitution.6 These state laws are arguably inconsistent with the BPCIA and could undermine the attractiveness and access to more affordable biologics.
  • Impact of naming on biosimilars: There was debate as to whether biosimilars should bear different non-proprietary names and whether such a requirement would have anticompetitive effects. Some argued that requiring distinct non-proprietary names is simply an effort to cause doubt and distrust among physicians and patients by making biosimilars appear different from biologics. As noted by Bruce Leicher, General Counsel at Momenta, the Biotechnology Industry Organization opposes GMO labelling on genetically modified foods precisely for the same reason – requiring a different name for biosimilars would communicate a different (and perhaps suspicious) product and would therefore grant a competitive advantage to branded biologics. Other panelists argued that names and other types of identifiers were justified by the need for an effective pharmacovigilance system, while some speakers expressed the need for distinguishable naming or other identifiers for purposes of linking a responsible product to a specific adverse event in the event of product liability.

The FTC did not express its own views on the effect of state-level restrictions and naming conventions on competition in the biosimilars market, but did note that securing more prescribing physicians on the panel might have added to the debate.

We will continue to monitor federal and state activities in the regulation of biosimilars.

1 The Food and Drug Administration defines biologics as medical products made from a variety of natural sources (human, animal or microorganism).  Moreover, a biological product may be demonstrated to be “biosimilar” if data show that, among other things, the product is “highly similar” to an already-approved biological product.

2 As presented by Steve Miller, Senior Vice President and Chief Medical Officer at Express Scripts.

3 More alarming to Mr. Travis is that the cost of biologics increased by approximately 15% annually, as compared to the approximately 5% increase in the cost of small molecule drugs.

4 Substitution, by allowing the pharmacist to automatically substitute an interchangeable biosimilar for the branded biologic without the intervention of the physician, provides a strong incentive to use biosimilars.

5 According to Dr. Sumant Ramachandra, Hospira’s Senior Vice President and Chief Scientific Officer, it takes approximately $5 million and 2-3 years for a generic manufacturer to bring a small molecule drug to market, whereas it takes over $100 million and 8-10 years for a biosimilar manufacturer to bring a biosimilar to market.

6 The BPCI provides that “the [interchangeable] biological product may be substituted for the reference product without the intervention of the health care provider who prescribed the reference product.”

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Call Waiting: Department of Justice (DOJ) to Maintain Scrutiny of Wireless Industry Consolidation

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The wireless industry has seen steady consolidation since the late 1980s.  Recently, in late 2013, reports began circulating about a potential merger between Sprint and T-Mobile, the nation’s third and fourth-largest wireless carriers, respectively.  Last week, however, in an interview with the Wall Street Journal, William Baer, the assistant attorney general for the antitrust division at the Department of Justice (DOJ), cautioned that it would be difficult for the Agency to approve a merger between any of the nation’s top four wireless providers.

T-Mobile’s CEO, John Legere, stated that a merger between his company and Sprint “would provide significant scale and capability.”  Baer, on the other hand, warned that “It’s going to be hard for someone to make a persuasive case that reducing four firms to three is actually going to improve competition for the benefit of American consumers,”  As a result, any future consolidation in the wireless industry is likely to face a huge hurdle in the form of DOJ’s careful scrutiny of any proposed transaction.

Much of the DOJ’s interest in the wireless industry stems from the Agency’s successful challenge of a proposed merger between T-Mobile and AT&T in 2011.  Since then, Baer believes consumers have benefitted from “much more favorable competitive conditions.”  In fact, T-Mobile gained 4.4 million customers in 2013, bringing optimism to the company’s financial outlook after years of losses.  In the final two quarters of 2013, T-Mobile’s growth bested that of both Sprint and AT&T.  The low-cost carrier attracted customers and shook up the competition by upending many of the terms consumers had come to expect from wireless carriers, as well as investing in network modernization and spectrum acquisition.  This flurry of activity has pushed the competition to respond with its own deals, resulting in “tangible consumer benefits of antitrust enforcement,” according to Baer.

The DOJ’s antitrust division has kept careful watch over the wireless industry the past few years. That scrutiny will remain, as the Agency persists to advocate that four wireless carriers are required for healthy market competition.  The cards are beginning to play out from the Agency’s decision, and as Baer stated, “competition today is driving enormous benefits in the direction of the American consumer.”

Article by:

Lisa A. Peterson

Of:

McDermott Will & Emery

Judge Rules in Favor of DOJ Finding Bazaarvoice / PowerReviews Merger Anticompetitive (Department of Justice)

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On January 8, 2014, Judge Orrick of the Northern District of California ruled that Bazaarvoice’s acquisition of competitor PowerReviews violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act.  The ruling was in favor of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).  The public version of the opinion was made available on January 10.  In its self-described “necessarily lengthy opinion,” which spans 141 pages, the court ultimately found that the facts overwhelmingly showed the acquisition will have anticompetitive effects and that Bazaarvoice did not overcome the government’s prima facie case.  The case included 40 witnesses at trial, more than 100 depositions and 980 exhibits.  Dr. Carl Shapiro testified as DOJ’s economist and Dr. Ramsey Shehadeh testified on behalf of Bazaarvoice/PowerReviews.  The court noted that the case presented some difficult issues, including that there were no generally accepted “market share statistics covering the sales of R&R solutions or social commerce solutions and no perfect way to measure market shares.”  And while neither side presented flawless analyses, the court found Dr. Shapiro’s approaches more persuasive than those of Dr. Shehadeh.

Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews each offered sophisticated “R&R platforms.”  R&R platforms provide a user interface and review form for the collection and display of user-generated content (i.e., user reviews) on the product page of a commercial website where the product can be purchased.  Often these are in the form of star ratings and open-ended reviews in a text box.  R&R platforms increase sales for the retailer and have a variety of different features.  The court noted that many on-ine retailers view an R&R platform as “necessary.”  Before the merger, Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews offered similar products and features and targeted similar customers.

The court found that the relevant product market was the narrow “R&R platforms,” rather than the broader “social commerce tools” or “eCommerce platforms.”  The court went through many popular social media platforms such as Facebook, Google+, Twitter, Instagram, and Pinterest, explaining why each was not a substitute for these R&R platforms.  In this relevant market, the court found that PowerReviews was Bazaarvoice’s only real competitor, and thus the merger “would eliminate Bazaarvoice’s only meaningful commercial competitor.”

At the end of the opinion, the court commented on the role of antitrust “in rapidly changing high-tech markets.”  It noted that there is a debate as to whether antitrust is properly suited to assess competitive effects in these markets.  The court declined to take sides and stated that its “mission is to assess the alleged antitrust violations presented, irrespective of the dynamism of the market at issue.”

The case now moves to the remedy phase.  In its complaint, the DOJ requested that the court order Bazaarvoice to divest assets originally possessed by either Bazaarvoice and/or PowerReviews to create a viable, competing business.   However, as Judge Orrick noted, 18 months after the merger, it may not be so simple to divest assets.  The judge scheduled a conference for January 22 with the parties to discuss a possible remedy.

There are several lessons to be gathered from this case.  First, the Bazaarvoice litigation is further evidence that the antitrust agencies are not shy about litigating mergers they feel are anticompetitive.  The DOJ invested significant resources and time – including three full weeks at trial in California – into litigating the case, beginning with its investigation that it launched two days after the firms closed their transaction on June 12, 2012.  It has established a significant record of bringing, and winning, merger cases.

Second, this is a significant event, having a federal district court evaluate a consummated merger transaction.  While the agencies have challenged many non-reportable transactions, almost all have been resolved by consent order, or litigated through the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC’s) in-house administrative hearing process (where, not surprisingly, the FTC essentially always wins).  Accordingly, parties to a non-reportable transaction that raises significant antitrust risks should expect the agencies to investigate and, if warranted, litigate.

Third, the Court heavily discounted Bazaarvoice’s arguments regarding lack of any actual anticompetitive effect, because the companies knew the DOJ was reviewing the deal and could moderate their behavior.  The court discounted Bazaarvoice’s arguments that none of the 104 customers who were deposed complained that the merger has hurt them.  The court stated “it would be a mistake to rely on customer testimony about effects of the merger for several reasons.”  Among the reasons the court included was “Bazaarvoice’s business conduct after the merger was likely tempered by the government’s immediate investigation; the customers were not privy to most of the evidence presented to the Court, including that of the economic experts; many of the customers had paid little or no attention to the merger; and each had an idiosyncratic understanding of R&R based on the priorities of their company and their different levels of knowledge, sophistication, and experience.”  Thus, while raising prices after a transaction provides strong evidence to support the government’s case, the lack of a price increase does not necessarily support the merging parties’ defense.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the case shows the need to be circumspect in preparing ordinary course documents.  Aside from the fact that in reportable transactions, the DOJ and FTC are entitled to “4(c)” and “4(d)” documents about the transaction, once a second request is issued or discovery begins, documents created in the ordinary course of business are discoverable.  This includes Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analyses, board meeting minutes, business and strategic plans, market and market share analyses, and competitive assessments.  In this case, the court found the ordinary course documents, and particularly those made by the companies’ executives, some of the most persuasive evidence.  The court quoted extensively from the documents and cited numerous documents from Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews that showed that the parties viewed each other as their primary competitor, that there were no other strong competitors in this market, that the two companies operated in essentially a duopoly, and that the intent of the merger was to eliminate a primary competitor.  Despite the parties’ efforts to explain away these documents, the court was not persuaded.  Thus, it is important that companies carefully consider what to include in documents and e-mails, and assume that any non-privileged material may be discovered.

The agencies’ aggressive pursuit of perceived anticompetitive, non-reportable transactions places a premium on parties’ evaluating the antitrust risk.

The public version of the court’s opinion can be found here:http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f302900/302948.pdf

Article by:

Carrie G. Amezcua

Of:

McDermott Will & Emery

Supreme Court Holds That Reverse Payment Patent Settlements Are Subject to Antitrust Scrutiny

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For over a decade, the antitrust enforcers at the Federal Trade Commission have challenged the type of patent settlement where a brand-name drug manufacturer pays a prospective generic manufacturer to settle patent challenges, and the generic manufacturer agrees not to bring its generic to market for a specified number of years. The lower federal courts have over the years rejected the challenges. However, on June 17, 2013, the Supreme Court addressed the issue in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, and in a 5-3 decision held that such settlements are subject to rule of reason antitrust scrutiny. However, beyond that conclusion, the Court left the questions of how to structure and resolve the rule of reason issue to the lower courts and future cases.

As Justice Breyer’s majority opinion summarized the issue and its holding:

Company A sues Company B for patent infringement. The two companies settle under terms that require (1) Company B, the claimed infringer, not to produce the patented product until the patent’s term expires, and (2) Company A, the patentee, to pay B many millions of dollars. Because the settlement requires the patentee to pay the alleged infringer, rather than the other way around, this kind of settlement agreement is often called a ‘reverse payment’ settlement agreement. And the basic question here is whether such an agreement can sometimes unreasonably diminish competition in violation of the antitrust laws.

In this case, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) complaint claiming that a particular reverse payment settlement agreement violated the antitrust laws. In doing so, the Circuit stated that a reverse payment settlement agreement generally is ‘immune from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.’ And since the alleged infringer’s promise not to enter the patentee’s market expired before the patent’s term ended, the Circuit found the agreement legal and dismissed the FTC complaint. In our view, however, reverse payment settlement such as the agreement alleged in the complaint before us can sometimes violate the antitrust laws. We consequently hold that the Eleventh Circuit should have allowed the FTC’s lawsuit to proceed. (Citations omitted.)

The Court reasoned that even if the settlement agreement’s anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent, that fact or characterization cannot immunize the agreement from antitrust attack. Justice Breyer found that “it would be incongruous to determine antitrust legality by measuring the settlement’s anticompetitive effects solely against patent law policy, rather than by measuring them against procompetitive antitrust policies as well” and that “patent and antitrust policies are both relevant in determining the ‘scope of the patent monopoly’ — and consequently antitrust law immunity — that is conferred by a patent.”

Justice Breyer acknowledged that a conclusion of antitrust immunity would find some degree of support in a general legal policy favoring the settlement of dispute. However, he concludes that this factor should not “determine the result here” but is offset by five sets of considerations:

First, the specific restraint at issue has the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition. To the Court, even though the settlement permitted the challenger to enter the market before the patent expired, the settlement also entrenched the patent holder for the period the challenger agrees to stay out of the market in exchange for a payment, delaying the potential for lower prices. As the Court put it, “The patentee and the challenger gain; the consumer loses.”

Second, these anticompetitive consequences will at least sometimes prove unjustified. To be sure, in some circumstances, the reverse payment may amount to no more than a rough approximation of the litigation expenses saved through the settlement, or compensation for other services the generic has promised to perform. In such circumstances, a patentee is not using its monopoly profits to avoid the risk of patent invalidation or a finding of no infringement. In the antitrust proceeding, the Court concludes, the patentee should have to show that such legitimate justifications are present.

Third, where a reverse payment threatens to inflict unjustified anticompetitive harm, the patentee likely possesses the power to bring that harm about.

Fourth, the majority believes that an antitrust action would be administratively feasible. The majority did not believe that it would be necessary to litigate patent validity to normally answer the antitrust question — an unexplained large reverse payment itself would normally suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about the patent’s survival. “In a word, the size of the unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a detailed exploration of the validity of the patent itself.”

Fifth, the fact that a large, unjustified reverse payment risks antitrust liability does not prevent litigating parties from settling in some other way, without the potential to maintain and share patent-generated monopoly profits.

The FTC advocated that the Court adopt a rule that reverse payments are “presumptively unlawful” and that they be analyzed under a “quick look” approach, requiring the patentee to show empirical evidence of procompetitive effects. The Court rejected this position, instead instructing the issue undergo a full rule of reason analysis. In doing so, it left to the lower court the structuring of this and other rule of reason antitrust litigation on the issue.

In practical terms, the decision leaves many difficult issues to be grappled with, and the majority’s apparent confidence that the antitrust question is answerable without getting into the patent issues themselves may prove more aspirational than practical. Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent exposes one flaw:

The majority seems to think that even if the patent is valid, a patent holder violates the antitrust laws merely because the settlement took away some chance that his patent would be declared invalid by a court. …This is flawed for several reasons.

First, a patent is either valid or invalid. The parties of course don’t know the answer with certainty at the outset of litigation; hence the litigation. But the same is true of any hard legal question that is yet to be adjudicated. Just because people don’t know the answer doesn’t mean that there is no answer until a court declares one. Yet the majority would impose antitrust liability based on the parties’ subjective uncertainty about that legal conclusion.

The Court does so on the assumption that offering a ‘large’ sum is reliable evidence that the patent holder has serious doubts about the patent. Not true. A patent holder may be 95% sure about the validity of its patent, but particularly risk averse or litigation averse, and willing to pay a good deal of money to rid itself of the 5% chance of a finding of invalidity. What is actually motivating a patent holder is apparently a question district courts will have to resolve on a case-by-case basis. The task of trying to discern whether a patent holder is motivated by uncertainty about its patent, or other legitimate factors like risk aversion, will be made all the more difficult by the fact that much of the evidence about the party’s motivation may be embedded in legal advice from its attorney, which would presumably be shielded from discovery.

The FTC has hailed the decision:

The Supreme Court’s decision is a significant victory for American consumers, American taxpayers, and free markets. The Court has made it clear that [reverse payment] agreements between brand and generic drug companies are subject to antitrust scrutiny, and it has rejected the attempt by branded and generic companies to effectively immunize these agreements from the antitrust laws. With this finding, the Court has taken a big step toward addressing a problem that has cost Americans $3.5 billion a year in higher drug prices.

The FTC’s “victory lap” is probably premature. To be sure, we now know that blanket antitrust immunity for reverse payment settlements does not exist. However, everything else remains up for grabs. Until there are additional decisions grappling with the actual issue of liability issued, and reviewed, the extent and circumstances of antitrust liability is unclear. The risk-averse patent holder to whom Justice Roberts alluded might well be motivated to avoid utilizing reverse payments in structuring settlements in the future. In addition, the Competition Office of the European Union actively continues to examine reverse payments settlements, and there have been renewed calls for federal legislation banning such settlements.

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State Law Resale Price Maintenance: We’re not in Kansas anymore

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I recently participated in a roundtable discussion on state law resale price maintenance actions presented by the ABA Section of Antitrust Law.

The discussion focused on the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in O’Brien v. Leegin, in which the court determined that vertical price fixing was still per se illegal under Kansas antitrust laws despite the fact that such conduct is analyzed under the rule of reasons under federal antitrust law.  One of the participants suggested that the if the logic of the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision was extended, then all types of vertical restraints (i.e. geographic restrictions, non-compete agreements) which are typically analyzed under a reasonableness standard, may be subject to attack under the per se rule.  Other participants dismissed such concerns, but noted that state antitrust law can be (and often is) more restrictive than federal antitrust law.

A Deputy Attorney General for the State of California described several post-Leegin developments in state prosecutions of RPM and MAP agrements, including New York’s action against Tempur-Pedic.  The takeaway from that discussion seemed to be that, regardless of the outcome of those cases (which were resolved in favor of the manufacturer), state enforcers may still consider certain RPM and MAP agreements as per se antitrust violations.  Additionally, state enforcers may take an especially narrow view of the Colgate doctrine, which allows a business to unilaterally announce the terms and conditions upon which it will do business with its retailers/resellers.

At the conclusion of the program, one participant suggested that attorneys practicing in this area should give advice to their clients as if Leegin were never decided.  In other words, sometimes state law trumps federal law.  That is exactly what we have been saying on this blog ever since the Leegindecision was announced.

Copyright © 2013 Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC

Supreme Court to Hear Arguments on Contours of “State Action” Exemption to Antitrust Laws

The National Law Review recently published an article by Steven J. Cernak of Schiff Hardin LLP regarding an upcoming Supreme Court Hearing:

 

On November 26, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear arguments in the only case this term to squarely raise antitrust issues. The case, FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., raises several issues related to the “state action” exemption to the federal antitrust laws. This case, along with another Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) matter involving a North Carolina dental board on appeal in the 4th Circuit, should provide clearer antitrust guidance to doctors, dentists, lawyers, accountants and others arguably acting under the authority of a state, such as through licensure boards.

Since 1941, Georgia law has allowed counties to create hospital authorities to acquire and run hospitals. The Hospital Authority of Albany-Dougherty County was established immediately after the law’s passage and shortly thereafter acquired Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital. The Authority has run the hospital ever since, the last several years through two wholly-owned subsidiaries. In 2010, the Authority gave permission for one of the subsidiaries to negotiate the purchase of the other hospital in the county, Palmyra Medical Center, from a private entity. The negotiations were successful and the Authority approved the transaction late in 2010.

In April 2011, the FTC initiated an administrative challenge to the acquisition as an anti-competitive merger and sought a preliminary injunction in district court. Both the district court and 11th Circuit denied the injunction request under the “state action” exemption to the antitrust laws. In particular, both courts found that the Georgia law’s delegation of powers to hospital authorities, including the power to acquire other hospitals, was a “clear articulation” of a policy to displace competition because such mergers were a “foreseeable result” of the legislation. Neither court thought that having the acquisition made through the Authority’s private subsidiaries precluded application of the exemption.

The Supreme Court has held that actions by a state as a sovereign trump the federal antitrust laws. Subdivisions of a state such as the Authority, however, are not sovereign and their actions are immune from prosecution under the antitrust laws only if the state legislature “clearly articulated” a policy to displace competition. If private parties are implementing that policy, they must be “actively supervised” by the state itself.

In this case, the FTC objects to a finding of a “clear articulation” where the action being challenged is just a “foreseeable result” of the state action. Instead, the FTC urges the Court to require that the clear articulation be made explicitly and clearly by the legislature or that the anti-competitive effect be a “necessary” or “inherent” effect of the state action. The FTC also believes that these private hospital parties were not “actively supervised”. The Authority and Phoebe parties respond that the lower courts’ “foreseeable results” standard was correct and correctly applied. In addition, the Authority and Phoebe parties argue that the “active supervision” prong is not necessary here because either 1) the Authority, not the hospitals, was taking the action; or, if rejected, 2) the hospitals were agents of the state-created Authority.

The case has attracted several amicus briefs. Perhaps the most important comes from the American Medical Association urging the Court not to rule in this case in such a way that the state action doctrine would not be available to state or local medical licensure boards that contained competitors. Here, the AMA is referring to another current FTC challenge to allegedly anti-competitive actions by a state-sponsored health care agency, this one involving a North Carolina dental licensure board with private dentist members. That case has been fully briefed for the 4th Circuit but oral argument has not yet been scheduled. These two cases are the latest examples of a decade-long effort by the FTC to obtain clear guidance from the courts on the limits of the state action exemption.

Clients acting at the behest of a governmental entity — such as serving on the local licensure board for insurance, real estate or other professionals — need to be aware of the current limits to the state action doctrine and the possibility that those limits might be further explained by the Court in this case.

© 2012 Schiff Hardin LLP

Here We Go Again: Another Attempt at Recovery for Ratepayers Resulting from KeySpan-Morgan Stanley Swap

Found recently in the National Law Reviewwas an article by Daniel E. Hemli and Jacqueline R. Java of Bracewell & Giuliani LLP regarding KeySpan-Morgan Stanley:

 

 

Another class action lawsuit has been filed against KeySpan Corporation (KeySpan) and Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. (Morgan Stanley), claiming damages for antitrust violations resulting from an allegedly illegal swap agreement that allowed KeySpan to manipulate energy prices in the New York City electric generating capacity market (NYC Capacity Market), see Konefsky et al. v. KeySpan Corp., et al., Case No. 1:12-cv-00017.  The complaint was filed on January 6, 2012 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York on behalf of electric customers of National Grid, which purchased electric energy and capacity in the NYC Capacity Market from 2006 through 2009.  The plaintiffs, two law professors, are seeking on behalf of the class millions in damages and disgorgement of unlawfully obtained profits for alleged violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as well as analogous New York state laws.

As described in previous blog entries in February 2010 and February 2011, the underlying actions that led to this complaint involve a 2006 financial swap agreement between KeySpan and Morgan Stanley, which gave KeySpan an indirect financial interest in the sale of generating capacity by its largest competitor, Astoria Generating Company, in the NYC Capacity Market.  At that time, approximately 1000 MW of new generation was poised to come online in that market.  Previously, due to tight supply conditions, KeySpan, as the largest seller of installed capacity in the market, had been able to bid at or near the applicable bid cap without risking loss of sales.  The anticipated addition of new generating capacity threatened to upset the status quo and put downward pressure on prices.

In February 2010, the Department of Justice (DOJ) brought an action against KeySpan alleging that the swap resulted in a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  The DOJ claimed that KeySpan’s financial interest in Astoria’s capacity reduced KeySpan’s incentive to  competitively bid its capacity, enabling KeySpan to profitably bid capacity at the price cap, despite the addition of significant new generating capacity that otherwise likely would have caused prices to drop.  According to the DOJ, this arrangement led to higher capacity prices in New York City and, in turn, higher electricity prices for consumers than would have prevailed otherwise, thereby violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  KeySpan agreed to pay $12 million in disgorgement of profits to the U.S. Treasury to settle the matter.  The DOJ subsequently also took action against Morgan Stanley, simultaneously filing a complaint and proposed settlement on September 30, 2011 pursuant to which Morgan Stanley agreed to pay $4.8 million in disgorgement.

The latest class action complaint is similar to another class action brought against KeySpan and Morgan Stanley, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, see Simon v. KeySpan Corp., et al., Case No. 1:10-cv-05437.  That attempt to obtain a judgment on behalf of ratepayers was rejected by the district court in March 2011.  In dismissing the Simon complaint, the court explained in its opinion that (i) because the class members were indirect purchasers of electric generation capacity, they had not suffered antitrust injury and therefore lacked antitrust standing to bring the case; (ii) the filed rate doctrine, which bars private actions where a rate has been previously approved by FERC, applied in that case; and (iii) plaintiff’s state law claims were barred by the doctrine of federal preemption.  That case is currently being appealed to the Second Circuit.

© 2012 Bracewell & Giuliani LLP

Surprise! You Just Starred In Our Movie

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by Matthew J. Kreutzer of Armstrong Teasdale regarding a lawsuit by actor Jesse Eisenberg’s small role in a movie although the DVD cover has his face prominently featured:

One of my all-time favorite comedies is the movie Bowfinger, in which a down-and-out movie producer named Bobby Bowfinger (played by Steve Martin) makes a movie starring a well-known A-list actor named Kit Ramsey (played by Eddie Murphy) without Ramsey’s knowing participation.  Some of the best scenes in the movie occur when Bowfinger and his “crew” create situations around the increasingly-unhinged Ramsey, secretly filming his hilarious reactions to the ridiculous set-ups.  Apparently, life has (sort of) imitated art: in a recently-filed $3 million lawsuit, actor Jesse Eisenberg (star of The Social Network and Zombieland) claims that he was exploited in a similar manner by the producers of the direct-to-DVD movie, Camp Hell.

According to the lawsuit, in 2007 Eisenberg agreed to appear in Camp Hell as a favor to his friends.  He was on set for only one day of filming, and logged only a few minutes of total screen time.  Because he was only minimally involved in the movie, he was surprised to see that his face was prominently featured on the cover of the DVD, implying that he starred in the film.  His lawsuit asserts various California law causes of action, including claims for unfair business practices and publicity rights.  But, according to Hollywood law blogger Eriq Gardner, the lawsuit reads more like “a consumer class action, saying that the producers are ‘continuing to perpetrate a fraud on the public.’”

Camp-Hell-Poster
Overselling a famous actor’s involvement in a film is a common practice in the industry, although the Camp Hell example may be one of the worst offenders.  But, while there are agreements and rules among various creative unions in Hollywood relating to attribution and credit, there apparently aren’t any that specifically state the number of minutes of screen time that are necessary in a movie before an actor can be marketed as a film’s “star.”

Fortunately, the franchising world has more explicit rules regarding how a franchise can be marketed and sold to potential franchisees.  Generally, the FTC Franchise Rule and a number of state laws require a franchise company to provide to a prospect certain types of disclosures regarding the business being marketed.  Through a legally compliant Franchise Disclosure Document, a possible franchise buyer will obtain a great deal of information about the franchise being sold, which information should support the marketing claims the franchisor makes generally.  Further, several states have specific restrictions on the types of statements that franchisors can make in advertising pieces, which restrictions are further designed to protect against misinformation to franchise buyers.  These laws work together to attempt to ensure that members of the public are not lured into buying a franchise based on puffery or overblown claims of success.

It will be interesting to see how the Court handles Mr. Eisenberg’s lawsuit.  I wonder if the movie industry will, in the face of the Camp Hell situation, consider adopting more stringent rules about marketing actors?

I would love to hear from you — have you ever watched a movie based on the claim that a movie was “starring” a certain actor, only to find out that the actor’s involvement was minimal?

© Copyright 2011 Armstrong Teasdale LLP. All rights reserved

Italian Competition Authority Finds Abusive Conduct in Withholding Data and Internal Communications Praising Company Strategy

Posted on August 25th in the National Law Review an article by Veronica Pinotti and Martino Sforza of McDermott Will & Emery which highlights the dangers faced by a dominant market player that owns intellectual property rights or data that are essential for other companies to compete. 

On 5 July 2011, the Italian Competition Authority imposed fines of €5.1 million on a multinational crop protection company for having abused its dominant position on the market for fosetyl-based systemic fungicides in breach of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  In addition, the Authority issued an injunction restraining the company from such conduct in the future.

The Authority considered that the multinational was able to increase its prices for finished products on the downstream market while increasing the volume of its own sales, showing a high degree of pricing policy independence.

In making its decision, the Authority also took into account the fact that, in addition to its high market share, the multinational was the only vertically integrated manufacturer with significant financial capability and it owned certain research data required for the commercialisation of fosetyl-based products.  According to the Authority, these data are vital for accessing the market, given that they are indispensable for competitors seeking to renew marketing authorisations, because the current legislation restricts the repetition of tests on vertebrate animals.  The Authority noted that certain competitors that had joined a task force for the purpose of negotiating access to the multinational’s data were disqualified from renewal of their marketing authorisations and had to leave the market.  Refusal by the multinational to grant access to the data was therefore found to be abusive.

The Authority reviewed a number of the multinational’s internal communications that praised the results obtained in the fosetyl-based business in Italy, thanks to the strategy adopted by the company.  According to the Authority, these communications proved that the company was aware of the anti-competitive character of their conduct.

In the Authority’s view, the company’s conduct constituted a serious infringement and therefore deserved a very high fine.

Comment

The case highlights the dangers faced by a dominant market player that owns intellectual property rights or data that are essential for other companies to compete.  The case also illustrates the importance of the language used by businesses in their internal communications, given that internal communications are often used by the Authority when reaching a decision on potential infringements. Refusals to licence or grant access to market-essential data can only be made if there are objective grounds for doing so.  This is a difficult issue on which dominant companies should seek legal advice.

© 2011 McDermott Will & Emery