Structuring the Acquisition of an S Corporation

Introduction

S corporations, or S-corps, are one of the most popular entity choices for businesses. In contemplating the sale of an S-corp, it is important to plan how the transaction is structured from a tax perspective (ideally before an LOI is signed), both to maximize the gain on the sale and avoid pitfalls that can result in liabilities for the selling shareholders.

For corporate purposes, businesses are generally formed as limited liability companies, partnerships, or corporations. For tax purposes, however, entities are taxed as corporations, partnerships, or disregarded entities.[1] Corporations[2] are taxed as either a C corporation or an S corporation. C corporations are taxed at the corporate level and again at the shareholder level.[3] S corporations are corporations that, for federal tax purposes, elect to pass corporate income, losses, deductions, and credits through to their shareholders and are only taxed at the shareholder level.[4]

To qualify as an S corporation, the corporation must meet the requirements of Section 1361,[5] which provides that the corporation not have more than 100 shareholders, not have non-individual shareholders (with the exception of certain types of trusts, estates, and tax-exempt organizations), not have a nonresident alien as a shareholder, not have more than one class of stock, and not be an ineligible corporation (as defined in the Code).[6]

When sellers begin to explore the sale of their business, tax considerations are important to discuss at the outset so that the seller and buyer are on the same page – no one wants to attempt to renegotiate the terms of a deal in the middle of a transaction. For tax purposes, acquisitions of companies are categorized as either an asset purchase or stock purchase. In general, owners prefer to sell their stock (as opposed to the company’s assets) for a few reasons. First, a stock sale results in capital gain to the shareholders because their stock is a capital asset.[7] In an asset sale, however, noncorporate sellers (including S-corp shareholders) recognize ordinary income or capital gain, depending on the type of asset sold. Second, unlike in an asset sale, a stock sale may not require the seller to transfer company assets and licenses or obtain third party consents.

On the other hand, buyers usually want to engage in an asset sale to obtain a step-up in basis of the purchased assets. In a stock acquisition, the buyer gets a carryover basis in the acquired corporation’s assets, without any basis step-up. In an asset purchase, however, the buyer takes a cost basis in the assets, including in the target corporation’s goodwill (which otherwise will generally have a zero basis), and allows the buyer to take higher depreciation deductions to reduce the buyer’s annual tax liability.[8] Unless otherwise agreed, the buyer also does not assume corporate liabilities in an asset sale.

Sellers who agree to engage in an asset sale should negotiate with the buyer to be compensated for the additional tax that the seller may incur for engaging in an asset sale.

There are two additional ways for a buyer to obtain a basis step-up in the seller’s assets. The first is a 338(h)(10) election under Section 338 and the second is an F reorganization pursuant to Section 368(a)(1)(F) and consistent with Revenue Ruling 2008-18.[9]

Making the 338(h)(10) Election

A buyer and seller will sometimes make a 338(h)(10) election, which treats an acquisition of a corporation’s stock as a sale of assets for federal income tax purposes, but a sale of stock for legal purposes.[10] The sale is treated as if buyer and seller engaged in a regular asset sale for income tax purposes (so the buyer obtains a step-up in the tax basis of the assets), yet the seller does not need to re-title each asset.[11] Seller does not have capital gain on the sale of stock. Instead the parties must allocate the sales price among the assets based on each asset’s fair market value.[12] The price paid in excess of the fair market value of the tangible assets of the business is allocated to business intangibles and then to goodwill.[13]

The 338(h)(10) election is only available if a “qualified stock purchase” is made.[14] A “qualified stock purchase” is defined as any transaction (or series of transactions) in which a corporation purchases at least 80% of the stock (both voting and value) from a member of a consolidated group(as defined in 1.1502-1) or from shareholders of a S corporation during a 12 month period.[15] If during diligence it is revealed that the target corporation in fact failed to qualify as an S corporation, the 338 election will be invalid.[16] If the Section 338(h)(10) election is invalid, the transaction will be treated as a straight stock sale and buyer will not receive a basis step-up in the target’s assets.

A section 338(h)(10) election is made jointly by the purchaser and seller on Form 8023.[17] S corporation shareholders who do not sell their stock must also consent to the election. The election must be made not later than the 15th day of the 9th month beginning after the month in which the acquisition date occurs.[18]

If the target failed to qualify as an S corporation (thereby becoming a C corporation), an election can be made to treat the sale of the corporation’s stock as an asset sale under Section 336(e). The election can be made if target is owned by a parent corporation that sells at least 80% of target’s stock.[19] A 336(e) election closely resembles a 338(h)(10) election, but the purchaser does not have to be a corporation.[20] Note that a transaction that qualifies under both 336(e) and 338(h)(10) will be treated as 338(h)(10) transaction.[21]

Consequences of a 338(h)(10) Election

Under the Regulations, the target corporation is treated as making a deemed sale of its assets and liquidating following the deemed asset sale.[22] The transaction is treated as a taxable acquisition of 100% of the target’s assets for income tax purposes.[23] This means that the stock cannot be acquired in a tax free transaction or reorganization (such as a transfer to a controlled corporation, merger or spinoff) or a transaction where the seller does not recognize the entire amount of gain or loss realized on the transaction.[24]

Issues with a 338(h)(10) Election

While the 338 election can be a useful way for a buyer to achieve a basis step-up without burdening the seller to retitle and transfer assets, the following disadvantages of the election should be considered:

  1. The rules under Section 338 require all S corporation shareholders (whether or not they sell their stock) to pay tax on all of the target’s assets, even if selling less than 100% of the target.[25] This effectively eliminates any structuring of a deal on a tax-deferred basis (i.e. where seller only pays tax on the consideration attributable to non-rollover equity). Sellers need to be aware that they will pay tax on all of the target company’s assets regardless of the percentage of assets sold.
  2. The election presents an issue for rollover transactions where the seller rolls over more than 20% of its equity on a pre-tax basis in a Section 721 or Section 351 transaction (in which seller receives equity in buyer, buyer’s parent, a holding company that holds target, or another form of equity). Rolling over more than 20% of equity will invalidate the 338(h)(10) election because it will not meet the “purchase” requirement under Section 338.[26]
  3. If the target company’s S corporation election turns out to be invalid (which happens frequently due to the ease with which S corporation status can be voided), the 338(h)(10) election will be invalid, thereby eliminating any advantage provided by the election.[27] Note that the seller will also be in breach of its representations and warranties under the purchase agreement.

F-Reorganization

An alternative to a 338(h)(10) election is an F reorganization, or F reorg., which allows sellers to avoid the potential issues that come with a 338 election. In an F reorg., the seller recognizes gain only with respect to the assets that it is deemed to have sold, allows the seller to roll over equity on a pre-tax basis, and avoids some of the risk that the target may have not properly qualified as an S-corp (thereby invalidating a Section 338(h)(10) election).

Engaging in an F-Reorganization

The first step in an F reorg. is to engage in a tax free reorganization of the S-corp.[28] Shareholders of the target S-corp (“T”) form a new corporation (“Holdco”) and transfer their shares in T to Holdco in exchange for Holdco shares. As a result of the transaction, T shareholders own all shares of Holdco, which in turn owns all shares of T, making T a fully owned subsidiary of Holdco. Holdco then elects to treat T as a Qualified Subchapter S Subsidiary (“QSub”) by making the election on form 8869. For federal tax purposes, T, as a QSub, becomes a disregarded entity and all assets and liabilities of T are treated as part of Holdco.[29] Note that the QSub election made by T also suffices as the S-corp election for Holdco.[30] After T becomes a QSub of Holdco, T converts into a limited liability company (“LLC”) under state law in a nontaxable transaction by converting from one disregarded entity to another.[31] Holdco will need to obtain its own EIN, but T retains its old EIN after the conversion.[32] Once the conversion to an LLC is complete, the shareholders of Holdco can sell some or all of the LLC interests of T; the sale is treated as an asset sale for tax purposes, thereby resulting in a step up in basis for the purchaser.[33] The seller recognizes gain from the deemed sale of each asset of T. If less than 100% of the LLC interests are sold to the buyer, the transaction is treated as the purchase of a proportionate interest in each of the LLC assets, followed by a contribution of the respective interests to a partnership in exchange for ownership interests in the partnership, resulting in a stepped up basis in the assets for buyer.[34] In this scenario, T is no longer a QSub and is converted to a partnership for tax purposes.[35]

Note that a straight conversion of the existing S corporation target from an S-corp to an LLC should not be done because it is treated as a taxable liquidation of the S corporation (i.e. a deemed sale of its assets) resulting in a fully taxable event to the shareholders.[36]

Alternatively, the S-corp could form a new LLC, contribute all its business assets and liabilities to the new LLC in exchange for the LLC interests, and sell the LLC interests to the buyer. However, the transfer of assets might require third party consents; the F reorg. achieves the same result without any potential assignment issues, and even preserves the historical EIN of the S-corp.

Advantages of an F-Reorganization

The F-reorganization is an effective way to avoid the issues that arise with a 338(h)(10) election:

  1. If the acquisition is for less than 100% of the target, the S-corp shareholders will only recognize gain on the portion of the LLC sold by the S-corp parent. Any portion of the LLC interests rolled over will be tax-deferred. Rollover transactions are perfectly suitable in a F reorg. and do not present the issues that come with a 338(h)(10) election.
  2. The converted LLC retains its old EIN number and is essentially the same entity for legal purposes. This can be useful for a target in a regulated industry (such as healthcare, food services, manufacturing, etc.) by possibly avoiding the need to reapply for new permits and licenses.
  3. An F reorg. can be useful for planning purposes under Section 1202 (Qualified Small Business Stock, or QSBS), which allows shareholders of a C corporation to exclude from their taxable income the greater of ten million dollars or ten times the adjusted basis of their stock upon a sale.[37] One requirement is that the stock must be stock of a C corporation, not an S corporation.[38] S corporation shareholders who want to qualify under 1202 can perform an F reorg. and contribute the LLC interests of their operating company to a newly formed C corporation in a tax free exchange under 351. The S corporation (which owns the C corporation which owns the LLC) is now an eligible shareholder of QSBS and will qualify for favorable treatment under Section 1202.[39]

Footnotes

[1] Reg. §301.7701-2. Entities may also be taxed as cooperatives or as tax-exempt organizations if the statutory requirements are met.

[2] For purposes of this article, a corporation includes a limited liability company (LLC) that has elected to be taxed as a corporation.

[3] IRC §11(a).

[4] IRC §1363. For state tax purposes, treatment of S corporation status varies – certain states either conform with the federal treatment or conform with certain limitations and adjustments, while others do not recognize the S election at all and tax S corporations as regular corporations. In particular, California imposes an entity level tax of the greater of $800 or 1.5% of net income.

[5] Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.

[6] See IRC §1361 (for example, an insurance company or certain financial institutions). In addition, Form 2553 must be filed to make the S corporation election.

[7] See IRC §1221(a).

[8] See IRC §1012(a) and §167.

[9] A 338(g) election also obtains a basis step-up, but results in two layers of tax and is not generally used for domestic transactions.

[10] IRC 338(a).

[11] Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1(d)(9).

[12] In accordance with the allocation provisions set forth in IRC 1060 and Reg. 1.338-6 and 1.338-7.

[13] Reg. 1.338-6(b)(vi) and (vii).

[14] IRC 338(a).

[15] IRC 338(d)(3) and Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1(c). For the purposes of this article, we assume that target is a standalone S-corp.

[16] Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1(c)(5). However, the transaction may still qualify under Section 336(e). See below.

[17] Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1(c)(3). Form 8883 also needs to be filed. If an F reorg is done, form 8594 will need to be filed.

[18] Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1(c)(3).

[19] Reg. 1.336-2(a). The election is made unilaterally by seller and target. See Reg. 1.336-2(h).

[20] Reg. 1.336-1(b)(2). See Reg. 1.336-1 – Reg. 1.336-5 for the mechanics of making the 336(e) election and what qualifies as a “qualified disposition” under 336.

[21] Reg. 1.336-1(b)(6)(ii)(A).

[22] See Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1 for the tax aspects of the deemed asset sale and liquidation.

[23] A deemed asset sale under Section 338 does not give rise to California sales tax. Cal. Code of Regs. 1595(a)(6).

[24] IRC 338(h)(3). See below for rollover transactions.

[25] Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1(d)(5).

[26] IRC 338(h)(3)(A)(ii). Beware of situations where the acquiror appears to “purchase” at least 80% of target’s stock (and target rolls over 20% or less of its stock in a 351 transaction), but the acquiror in fact does (or might be deemed to) “purchase” less than 80% of target’s stock, thereby invalidating a 338, 338(h)(10), or 336(e) election. This most commonly occurs where purchaser is a newly formed corporation and target rolls over 20% (or less) of its shares. See Ginsburg, Levin & Rocap, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Buyouts, § 4.06.1.2.2 (relating to redemption of stock held by target’s shareholders and recharacterizing a 351 transaction and cash sale as a single 351 exchange with boot).

[27] See footnote 16.

[28] In accordance with Rev. Rul. 2008-18.

[29] IRC 1361(b)(3).

[30] Rev. Rul. 2008-18. Obviously, Holdco must meet all the requirements of an S-corp. In many cases, the parties will file Form 2553 to treat Holdco as an S corporation as a “belt and suspenders” step.

[31] Upon conversion, T is no longer treated as a QSub per 1361(b)(3). The conversion has no tax consequences; see Reg. 1.1361-5(b)(3), example 2, where the merger of two disregarded entities owned by the same entity is a disregarded transaction for tax purposes because the assets continue to be held by the same entity. The same should apply when one disregarded entity converts to another. The QSub can also merge with a newly formed LLC subsidiary of Holdco to achieve the same result.

[32] Rev. Rul. 2008-18.

[33] Rev. Rul. 99-5; Reg. 1.1361-5(b)(3), example 2.

[34] Rev. Rul. 99-5; see also Rev. Rul. 99-6.

[35] Id. Although not required, a Section 754 election is often required by the Buyer.

[36] IRC 336(a).

[37] IRC 1202(b). See Section 1202 for the requirements to qualify for QSBS.

[38] IRC 1202(c).

[39] The S corporation shares do not qualify as QSBS. The new shares of the C corporation issued after the reorganization qualify as QSBS to begin the 5 year holding period.

© Copyright 2023 Stubbs Alderton & Markiles, LLP

New York HERO Act Enhanced Workplace Safety Committee Enforcement Provisions Enacted

On December 28, 2022, New York Governor Kathy Hochul signed into law Senate Bill 9450, which added new enforcement provisions to the New York Health And Essential Rights Act’s (NY HERO Act) workplace safety committee requirements. The new law went into effect immediately upon the Governor’s signature.

As a reminder, the NY HERO Act was enacted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Section 1 of the NY HERO Act required employers to adopt and distribute an infectious disease exposure prevention plan (“safety plan”) and activate such safety plan upon the designation of an airborne infectious disease as a highly contagious communicable disease that presents a serious risk of harm to the public health. While no current designation is in effect (the designation of COVID-19 ended on March 17, 2022), employers should be prepared to activate their safety plan in the event of a designation, and should review their existing safety plan periodically for any updates as required by the NY HERO Act.

Section 2, the often-overlooked portion of the NY HERO Act, provides employees the right to establish and administer a joint labor-management workplace safety committee. The recent law adds new enforcement provisions, and serves as an amendment to this section of the NY HERO Act. It requires employers to recognize workplace safety committees formed by employees pursuant to the NY HERO Act within five business days of receiving a request from employees for committee recognition. Failure to do so will result in penalties of $50 a day until the violation is remedied. Previously, there was no explicit timeframe required for employers to recognize a workplace safety committee and no related specific civil penalties.

While the New York Department of Labor has issued FAQ guidance related to Section 1 of the NY HERO Act, the new law is the first development or update regarding Section 2 since the NY HERO Act was enacted and subsequently amended.

The new law serves as a reminder that the NY HERO Act, and, relatedly, COVID-19’s impact on the workplace, are not completely in the rearview mirror. Employers should confirm their compliance with the NY HERO Act by:

  • evaluating their existing safety plans and revising or updating them as needed;
  • distributing their safety plans to all new hires;
  • including their safety plans in all updated handbooks;
  • ensuring their safety plans are posted in a visible and prominent location in the workplace; and
  • reviewing the workplace safety committee obligations and requirements, especially in light of the added enforcement provisions.
©2023 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.

EPA and Army Corps Issue New “WOTUS” Rule While Supreme Court Considers Jurisdiction Over Adjacent Wetlands

Yesterday, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the US Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) (together, the Agencies) published a final rule revising the definition of “waters of the United States” (WOTUS) subject to federal regulation and permitting requirements under the Clean Water Act (CWA).  This rule is the latest attempt by the Agencies to craft a durable rule defining WOTUS.  The new rule, which largely mirrors the 2021 proposal, asserts a broader geographic scope of federal jurisdiction than the 2020 Navigable Waters Protection Rule (NWPR).  In particular, the Agencies adopt the broadest possible interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rapanos (through incorporation of both the plurality’s “relatively permanent” test and Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test).  The final rule would, for the first time, codify aspects of the Agencies’ 2008 Rapanos Guidance and would rely on the significant nexus test’s case-by-case approach for evaluating jurisdiction for tributaries, wetlands, and other waters.  The Agencies released the final rule while the Supreme Court considers the scope of CWA authority over a major category of WOTUS, “adjacent wetlands,” in Sackett v. EPA, and the Supreme Court could hand down a decision in the coming months that could require changes to the rule.

For project proponents, the new rule would likely mean more features would be subject to regulation under the CWA, and projects that might have previously qualified for nationwide permits may no longer meet the acreage limits and would instead require an individual permit.  Also, case-by-case significant nexus determinations could result in lengthy reviews with uncertain and inconsistent results.

The final rule will go into effect on March 20.  While the Agencies previously characterized this rule as Phase 1 of a two-step process to enact a new WOTUS definition, EPA recently indicated that it is not currently planning a major second phase.

Summary of Final Rule

The rule defines WOTUS to include:

  1. Traditional navigable waters (TNWs), the territorial seas, and interstate waters.  TNWs include large rivers and lakes and tidally influenced waterbodies used in interstate or foreign commerce.  Interstate waters are rivers, lakes, and other waters that flow across, or form part of, State boundaries.  The TNW definition (i.e., all waters currently used, or were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide) is consistent with the text of the 1986 regulations and the NWPR.  However, the preamble indicates that the Agencies plan to include “waters currently being used for … commercial waterborne recreation (for example, boat rentals, guided fishing trips, or water ski tournaments),” which appears to broaden the scope of TNW waters.
  2. Impoundments of WOTUS.  The final rule retains the provision in the 1986 regulations that defines WOTUS to include impoundments of WOTUS.  The preamble defines impoundments as “created by discrete structures (often human-built) like dams or levees that typically have the effect of raising the water surface elevation, creating or expanding the area of open water, or both.”  88 Fed. Reg. at 3,066.
  3. Tributaries.  The final rule extends jurisdiction to tributaries of categories 1 and 2 waters if the tributary meets either the Agencies’ new formulation of the relatively permanent or the significant nexus standards from Rapanos (discussed in more detail below).  Ephemeral streams that meet the significant nexus test would be jurisdictional tributaries.  In this respect, the rule is much broader than the NWPR, which categorically excluded ephemeral tributaries from jurisdiction.
  4. Adjacent wetlands.  The rule retains the definition of “adjacent” from the 1986 regulations meaning “bordering, contiguous, or neighboring” and adds language that adjacent wetlands are considered WOTUSifthey meet the relatively permanent or significant nexus standards.  The NWPR had narrowed the definition of adjacent wetlands to include only those wetlands that abutted or otherwise had a direct surface connection to other jurisdictional waters in a typical year.  The final rule creates a broader category of adjacent wetlands, leading to additional regulatory requirements for activities that cross or impact such features.
  5. Other waters.  The rule asserts jurisdiction over “other waters” under the relatively permanent and significant nexus standards from Rapanos.  Under this provision, which essentially serves as a “catch-all” category, “intrastate lakes and ponds, streams, or wetlands” not identified in categories 1-4 can be assessed for jurisdiction under the relatively permanent standard or significant nexus standard.  This list is intended to be exclusive, 88 Fed. Reg. at 3,100, but broad enough to include a large variety of water types (e.g., prairie potholes, sloughs, playa lakes, etc.).  This category is a clear departure from the 2008 Rapanos Guidance, which did not assert jurisdiction over “other waters” based on the relatively permanent waters or significant nexus standards.

Exclusions.  The final rule provides a list of features that are excluded even where they would otherwise qualify as jurisdictional impoundments, tributaries, adjacent wetlands, or other waters.  Importantly, features that qualify as category 1 waters (TNWs, territorial seas, and interstate waters) cannot be excluded even if they meet the criteria of the exclusions provided.  Key non-jurisdictional waters or exclusions include waste treatment systems, ditches, prior converted cropland, artificially irrigated areas, artificial lakes or ponds, and swales and erosional features.  The list of exclusions is similar to the list provided in the 2015 WOTUS Rule and 2020 NWPR, although it does not provide the clear definitions that were included in the NWPR and in some instances changes the exemption based on preamble interpretations.

Key Definitions. The rule also includes a number of important definitions.

  • The “relatively permanent standard” asserts jurisdiction over relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing waters connected to category 1 waters, and waters with a continuous surface connection to such relatively permanent waters or to category 1 waters.  88 Fed. Reg. at 3,006.  The final rule does not define or quantify what constitutes “relatively permanent” flow.  The preamble states that the relatively permanent standard encompasses surface waters that have flowing or standing water year-round or continuously during certain times of the year.  88 Fed. Reg. at 3,084.
  • The significant nexus standard asserts jurisdiction over waters that, either alone or in combination with similarly situated waters in the region, significantly affectthe chemical, physical, or biological integrity of category 1 waters.  In a change from the proposal, the final rule defines “significantly affect” to mean “a material influence on the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of [category 1] waters.”  To determine whether waters, either alone or in combination with similarly situated waters in the region, have a material influence on the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of category 1 waters, the Agencies will assess the  list of functions and factors, including, for example contribution of flow, distance from a category 1 water, and hydrologic connections.  The preamble states distance from a category 1 water and hydrology—will generally be given the greatest weight in the assessment.  88 Fed. Reg. at 3,120.  The new significant nexus standard will likely allow for broader assertions of jurisdiction because it allows the Agencies to aggregate all tributaries and adjacent wetlands within a particular geographic area and evaluate whether they have a “material influence” on category 1 waters based on a case-by-case application of the enumerated factors and functions.  This type of case-by-case significant nexus analysis has resulted in lengthy review times as well as unpredictable and inconsistent results.

Existing Jurisdictional Determinations

Landowners may obtain a jurisdictional determination in the form of either: (1) an approved jurisdictional determination (AJD), which is a Corps document identifying the limits of WOTUS on a parcel; or (2) a preliminary jurisdictional determination (PJD), which is a non-binding document in which an applicant can assume all waters will be treated as jurisdictional without making a formal determination.

The Agencies take the position that AJDs issued pursuant to the NWPR may not be relied upon in making new permit decisions.  According to the preamble, because the NWPR was vacated by two district courts, NWPR AJDs “may not reliably state the presence, absence, or limits of [WOTUS] on a parcel and will not be relied upon by the Corps in making new permit decisions.”  88 Fed. Reg. at 3,136.  The Agencies take the position that AJDs issued under earlier WOTUS definitions—except those AJDs issued under the NWPR—remain valid until the AJD’s expiration date.  Also, the new rule will govern any pending requests for AJDs, if the AJD is issued on or after the effective date of the rule (March 20, 2023).

In contrast to AJDs, PJDs are advisory in nature and have no expiration date.  The preamble clarifies that the new WOTUS rule has no impact on existing PJDs.

Potential Litigation and the Sackett Case

Multiple challenges to the new rule are likely to be filed in district courts across the country.  The state of Texas and an industry coalition immediately filed suits in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, and other suits are likely.  At the same time, the Supreme Court’s pending decision in Sackett may have implications for the durability of provisions of the rule.

Many commenters recommended that the Agencies defer issuing a final rule until the Supreme Court issues a decision in Sackett—a case in which the issue before the Court is “the proper test for determining whether wetlands are [WOTUS] under the [CWA].”  A decision in the Sackett case is expected in the next few months.  Perhaps trying to insulate the rule from a potentially unfavorable Supreme Court decision, the Agencies assert in the preamble the severability of the individual provisions of the rule.  The preamble states, “if a court were to determine that a wetland cannot be treated as adjacent if it is separated from a jurisdictional water by road or other barrier, the agencies intend that other categories of wetlands within the rule’s definition of ‘adjacent’ would remain subject to jurisdiction.”  88 Fed. Reg. at 3,135.  Although it is not clear how the Supreme Court will rule in Sackett, it is possible that the decision could require the Agencies to make changes to the new WOTUS definition or face legal challenges.

Copyright © 2023, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.

University of Texas at Austin Permanently Blocks TikTok on Network

On Tuesday, January 17, 2023, the University of Texas at Austin announced that it has blocked TikTok access across the university’s networks. According to the announcement to its users, “You are no longer able to access TikTok on any device if you are connected to the university via its wired or WIFI networks.” The measure was in response to Governor Greg Abbott’s December 7, 2022, directive to all state agencies to eliminate TikTok from state networks. Following the directive, the University removed TikTok from university-issued devices, including cell phones, laptops and work stations.

Copyright © 2023 Robinson & Cole LLP. All rights reserved.

For  more Cybersecurity Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review.

First Major Overhaul of Cosmetics Regulation Since FDR Administration

As part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, President Biden signed into law the Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (“MoCRA”). This is the first major reform of cosmetics regulation since the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) became law in 1938.[1] MoCRA implements new compliance requirements on the cosmetics industry and also significantly expands the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) authority to oversee and regulate cosmetics.

New Obligations for Cosmetics Industry

MoCRA imposes the following new requirements on “responsible persons”[2] and “facilities.”[3] We note that certain of these regulatory requirements may differ for entities considered small businesses under MoCRA.

  • Facility Registration and Product Disclosure. All facilitates (domestic or foreign) that manufacture or process cosmetic products for distribution in the United States must register with FDA by December 29, 2023. Registration is biennial. Further, responsible persons must annually submit cosmetic product listings to FDA and disclose key product information, such as ingredients.
  • Adverse Event Recording and Serious Adverse Event Reporting. Generally, responsible persons must keep records of any adverse events related to products used in the United States for six years and submit any “serious adverse events” to FDA within 15 days of the responsible person’s receipt of the report. MoCRA broadly defines what constitutes a serious adverse event, when compared to other FDA regulatory product categories (e.g., dietary supplements).[4]
  • Labeling Requirements. To improve the reporting of adverse events, responsible persons must include contact information on product labels. Additionally, product labels must identify any fragrance allergens in the product. Labels for products intended for use only by licensed professionals must also indicate that only licensed professionals may use the product.
  • Safety Substantiation Requirement. Responsible persons must ensure that a product is “safe” and keep records “adequately substantiating” the product’s safety.[5] Products without adequate safety substantiation may be considered adulterated under the FDCA. MoCRA also contains a provision stating that it is the sense of Congress that animal testing should not be used for safety testing on cosmetic products and should be phased out with the exception of appropriate allowances.

Increased FDA Oversight of Cosmetics

MoCRA significantly expands FDA’s enforcement authority over the cosmetics industry.

  • Issue Mandatory Recalls. FDA now has mandatory recall authority if the agency concludes there is a reasonable probability that a cosmetic is adulterated or misbranded and the use of the cosmetic will cause serious adverse health consequences or death.
  • Access Records. If FDA has a reasonable belief that a cosmetic product (or one of its ingredients) is adulterated and presents a threat of serious adverse health consequences or death, the agency has authority to access records relating to that product.
  • Suspend Facilities. FDA may suspend a facility’s registration if the agency determines that a cosmetic product manufactured or processed by that facility has a reasonable probability of causing serious adverse health consequences or death and there is a reasonable belief that other products from the same facility may be similarly affected.
  • Federal Preemption. MoCRA explicitly preempts any state or local laws that differ from the federal cosmetics framework regarding facility registration and product listing, good manufacturing practices (“GMPs”), records, recalls, adverse event reporting, or safety substantiation.

Forthcoming FDA Rulemakings and Reports

MoCRA directs FDA to promulgate rules regarding the following three issues. Importantly, the cosmetics industry will have opportunities to provide comment on the proposed rules.

  • GMPs. FDA must establish GMP regulations consistent with national and international standards. Cosmetic products manufactured or processed under conditions that do not meet FDA’s forthcoming GMP regulations may be considered adulterated. The agency must issue a proposed rule by December 29, 2024 and a final rule by December 29, 2025.
  • Fragrance Allergens. FDA must publish regulations to identify fragrance allergens. Cosmetic product labels that do not include fragrance allergen disclosures required by such regulations may be considered misbranded under the FDCA. The agency must issue a proposed rule by June 29, 2024 and a final rule no later than 180 days after the public comment period.
  • Talc. FDA must issue regulations to establish required standardized testing methods for detecting and identifying asbestos in talc-containing cosmetic products.

In addition to the above rulemakings, FDA must issue a report within the next three years on the use of per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (“PFAS”) in cosmetic products.


Footnotes

  1. MoCRA amends Chapter VI of the FDCA.
  2. A “responsible person” is defined as a manufacturer, packer, or distributor of a cosmetic product whose name appears on the label of that product.
  3. “Facilities” are defined as any establishment (including an establishment of an importer) that manufactures or processes cosmetic products distributed in the United States. MoCRA specifically exempts from registration certain facilities, such as those that (i) only label, relabel, package, hold, or distribute cosmetics products; and (ii) manufacture or process products solely for use in research and evaluation.
  4. “Serious adverse events” are defined as adverse events that result in (i) death; (ii) a life-threatening experience; (iii) inpatient hospitalization; (iv) a persistent or significant disability or incapacity; (v) a congenital anomaly or birth defect; (vi) infection; or (vii) significant disfigurement (including serious and persistent rashes, second- or third-degree burns, significant hair loss, or persistent or significant alteration of appearance); or that require – based on reasonable medical judgment – a medical or surgical intervention to prevent one of the outcomes described above.
  5. “Safe” is defined as a cosmetic product (and its ingredients) that is not injurious to users under the labeling or customary/usual usage. A cosmetic product (or its ingredients) should not be considered injurious solely because it can cause minor and transient reactions or minor and transient skin irritations in some users. Further, “adequate substantiation” of safety means tests or studies, research, analyses, or other evidence or information that is considered, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety of cosmetic products and their ingredients, sufficient to support the product’s safety to a reasonable certainty.

Article By Christopher Hanson of Nelson Mullins. Paul Clowes, Law Clerk in the Greenville office, contributed to the drafting of this post.

For more biotech, food, and drug legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright ©2023 Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP

Future of Non-Competes Up in the Air

Future of Non-Competes Up in the Air

The FTC recently announced its proposal to ban non-compete clauses in employment agreements. That proposal is currently in a 60-day period of public comment, and employers are (understandably) nervous. While many employers rely on these provisions to manage competition and protect their IP and confidential information, companies across the country may soon find themselves in the shoes of California employers, having to work around restrictions on non-competes to maximize protection within the increasingly narrow confines of the law.

Employers are not without options in responding to the potential changes should they become law–more aggressive retention incentives, intelligent data security, and stricter confidentiality agreements should all be part of the conversation. Even deferred compensation could be on the table, as noted in the article, though beware of the tax implications. Employers should also keep in mind that the FTC proposal, should it become law, will doubtless be subject to legal challenges and could be tied up in the courts for a while before becoming effective.

Observers on both sides say that limitations on the clauses will compel employers to get more creative about how they retain talent, using everything from compensation to career advancement to keep workers engaged and loyal to the company. Some companies use deferred compensation—such as retention bonuses or rolling stock options that vest after, say, three years—to give people incentives to stay.”

©1994-2023 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

Environmental Justice Update: EPA Announces $100 Million in EJ Grants to Local Groups and Issues Guidance Outlining Potential Federal ‘Cumulative Impact’ Claims

“Environmental justice” (EJ) continues as the primary leitmotif of Biden Administration environmental policy in the first weeks of 2023.

Below, we unpack two recently announced EJ efforts: a grant program for groups in environmentally overburdened communities and guidance on legal resources to address “cumulative impacts” issued by the US Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Office of Legal Counsel and outline what these mean for the regulated community taken together in the context of other recent EJ developments.

EPA Announces $100 Million in Grants to Community Groups

This week, EPA announced the availability of approximately $100 million in grants for projects that “advance EJ in underserved and overburdened communities.” The grant programs are part of funding allocated by the Inflation Reduction Act programs discussed here.

Summaries of the two programs:

  • The Environmental Justice Collaborative Problem-Solving Program (EJCPS) Cooperative Agreement Program. The EJCPS program provides $30 million in funding directly to community-based non-profit organizations for projects focused on addressing local environmental or public health issues in their communities. Five million of the funding is reserved for small community-based nonprofit organizations with five or fewer full-time employees. EPA anticipates funding approximately 50 awards of $500,000 and 30 awards of $150,000.

  • Environmental Justice Government-to-Government (EJG2G) Program. EJG2G will provide an estimated $70 million in funding for state, tribal, and local projects completed in conjunction with community-based organizations. In total the agency anticipates funding approximately 70 projects of up to $1 million each for a 3-year project.

Interested applicants must submit proposal packages on or before April 10, 2023, for projects to begin on October 1, 2023.

EPA’s efforts to fund local groups are part of its broader strategic goal of enhancing equitable apportionment of resources and the benefits of environmental policies. EPA’s Equity Action Plan, discussed here, prioritizes building capacity in environmentally underserved communities to lead projects. Projects like these would lead to increased community engagement, which in turn could lead to more equitable outcomes in the environmental space. The strategy of building up local capacity to engage on environmental issues, mirrors private-sector efforts like Bloomberg Philanthropies $85 million “Beyond Petrochemicals” campaign, discussed here.

Federal Cumulative Impact Guidance

EPA’s Office of General Counsel released its Cumulative Impacts Addendum this week. This addendum builds on EPA’s Legal Tools to Advance Environmental Justice, which was released in May 2022. Taken together, these encyclopedia-like documents were created with the purpose of “identifying and making appropriate use of every authority and tool available to EPA under the law to incorporate environmental and climate justice considerations in our work,” in the words of EPA Administrator Michael Regan. The addendum itself indicates that it “is not intended to prescribe when and how [EPA] should undertake specific actions, nor does it provide methodologies for how to conduct a cumulative impacts assessment.” (Note: EPA’s Office of Research and Development has advanced a definition of “cumulative impacts,” summarized here, and is researching methodologies to deploy the concept.)

Structurally, the addendum breaks EPA’s authorities to address cumulative impacts into six subject-matter focused chapters:

  • Clean Air Act Programs

  • Water Programs

  • Waste Management and Emergency Response Programs (i.e. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; Oil Pollution Act; the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act; and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act)

  • Pesticides and Toxics Programs (i.e. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act; the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; and the Toxic Substances Control Act); and

  • Environmental Review Programs (i.e. National Environmental Policy Act and Clean Air Act Section 309 Reviews).

EPA’s intent with the addendum was to outline legal resources for federal, state, and local regulators to consult situationally outlining potential tools that could be used to address cumulative impacts. These legal tools, used in conjunction with EJ-focused screening tools like EJSCREEN (discussed here) and newly developed and (increasingly available) data (see our discussions here and here), are part of EPA’s high prioritization of EJ issues.

Takeaways for the Regulated Community

We offer two takeaways from these developments:

First, EPA’s commitment to a “whole of government” approach to address EJ issues continues unabated. Over time, the Biden Administration has exhibited a willingness to allocate money to address EJ issues; reorient EPA and DOJ to better address them; develop new tools; and indeed, build capacity to engage local communities in an effort to benefit more Americans regardless of their race, language or socioeconomic status.

Second, taken collectively, these efforts will necessitate changes in process for regulated entities because governmental and community engagement in the EJ space is altering the policymaking process at a rapid rate. Relevant here, we expect that a secondary effect of EPA and private parties “building capacity” in local communities will be an increase in community involvement — and potentially opposition — to businesses operating in their communities. These groups are likely to deploy all available resources — including those outlined in the addendum — to address their concerns.

© 2023 ArentFox Schiff LLP
For more Environmental Policy Legal News, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Another Lesson for Higher Education Institutions about the Importance of Cybersecurity Investment

Key Takeaway

A Massachusetts class action claim underscores that institutions of higher education will continue to be targets for cybercriminals – and class action plaintiffs know it.

Background

On January 4, 2023, in Jackson v. Suffolk University, No. 23-cv-10019, Jackson (Plaintiff) filed a proposed class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against her alma matter, Suffolk University (Suffolk), arising from a data breach affecting thousands of current and former Suffolk students.

The complaint alleges that an unauthorized party gained access to Suffolk’s computer network on or about July 9, 2022.  After learning of the unauthorized access, Suffolk engaged cybersecurity experts to assist in an investigation. Suffolk completed the investigation on November 14, 2022.  The investigation concluded that an unauthorized third party gained access to and/or exfiltrated files containing personally identifiable information (PII) for students who enrolled after 2002.

The complaint further alleges that the PII exposed in the data breach included students’ full names, Social Security Numbers, Driver License numbers, state identification numbers, financial account information, and Protected Health Information.  While Suffolk did not release the total number of students affected by the data breach, the complaint alleges that approximately 36,000 Massachusetts residents were affected.  No information was provided about affected out-of-state residents.

Colleges and Universities are Prime Targets for Cybercriminals

Unfortunately, Suffolk’s data breach is not an outlier.  Colleges and universities present a wealth of opportunities for cyber criminals because they house massive amounts of sensitive data, including employee and student personal and financial information, medical records, and confidential and proprietary data.  Given how stolen data can be sold through open and anonymous forums on the Dark Web, colleges and universities will continue to remain prime targets for cybercriminals.

Recognizing this, the FBI issued a warning for higher education institutions in March 2021, informing them that cybercriminals have been targeting institutions of higher education with ransomware attacks.  In May 2022, the FBI issued a second alert, warning that cyber bad actors continue to conduct attacks against colleges and universities.

Suffolk Allegedly Breached Data Protection Duty

In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Suffolk did not follow industry and government guidelines to protect student PII.  In particular, Plaintiff alleges that Suffolk’s failure to protect student PII is prohibited by the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 and that Suffolk failed to comply with the Financial Privacy Rule of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA),  15 U.S.C.A. § 6801.  Further, the suit alleges that Suffolk violated the Massachusetts Right to Privacy Law, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 214, § 1B, as well as its common law duties.

How Much Cybersecurity is Enough?

To mitigate cyber risk, colleges and university must not only follow applicable government guidelines but also  consider following industry best practices to protect student PII.

In particular, GLBA requires a covered organization to designate a qualified individual to oversee its information security program and conduct risk assessments that continually assess internal and external risks to the security, confidentiality and integrity of personal information.  After the risk assessment, the organization must address the identified risks and document the specific safeguards intended to address those risks.  See 16 CFR § 314.4.  

Suffolk, as well as other colleges and universities, may also want to look to Massachusetts law for guidance about how to further invest in its cybersecurity program.  Massachusetts was an early leader among U.S. states when, in 2007, it enacted the “Regulations to safeguard personal information of commonwealth residents” (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93H § 2) (Data Security Law).  The Data Security Law – still among the most prescriptive general data security state law – sets forth a list of minimum requirements that, while not specific to colleges and universities, serves as a good cybersecurity checklist for all organizations:

  1. Designation of one or more employees responsible for the WISP.
  2. Assessments of risks to the security, confidentiality and/or integrity of organizational Information and the effectiveness of the current safeguards for limiting those risks, including ongoing employee and independent contractor training, compliance with the WISP and tools for detecting and preventing security system failures.
  3. Employee security policies relating to protection of organizational Information outside of business premises.
  4. Disciplinary measures for violations of the WISP and related policies.
  5. Access control measures that prevent terminated employees from accessing organizational Information.
  6. Management of service providers that access organizational Information as part of providing services directly to the organization, including retaining service providers capable of protecting organizational Information consistent with the Data Security Regulations and other applicable laws and requiring service providers by contract to implement and maintain appropriate measures to protect organizational Information.
  7. Physical access restrictions for records containing organizational Information and storage of those records in locked facilities, storage areas or containers.
  8. Regular monitoring of the WISP to ensure that it is preventing unauthorized access to or use of organizational Information and upgrading the WISP as necessary to limit risks.
  9. Review the WISP at least annually or more often if business practices that relate to the protection of organizational Information materially change.
  10. Documentation of responsive actions taken in connection with any “breach of security” and mandatory post-incident review of those actions to evaluate the need for changes to business practices relating to protection of organizational Information.

An organization not implementing any of these controls should consider documenting the decision-making process as a defensive measure.  In implementing these requirements and recommendations, colleges and universities can best position themselves to thwart cybercriminals and plaintiffs alike.

© Copyright 2023 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

B.S.ing with Bob Major [PODCAST]

When Bob Major founded Major, Lindsey & Africa in 1982, he could not have envisioned what the organization would become and the impact it would have on the legal profession. In this episode of B.S.: Beyond Stereotypes, Bob shares his journey with Merle Vaughn, including his childhood in Texas and Oklahoma, his Stanford education, and how both influenced his outlook on life personally and professionally.

Bob Major, founder and Partner at Major, Lindsey & Africa, grew up in Texas and Oklahoma. He received his undergraduate degree from Stanford University and attended The University of Texas at Austin where he received a J.D. degree. Bob spent five years at the Washington, D.C., firm of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering (now WilmerHale) practicing in its federal administrative practice. Prior to founding his own legal recruiting firm, he spent a year in-house as securities counsel at Saga Corporation (Menlo Park, California).

©2023 Major, Lindsey & Africa, an Allegis Group Company. All rights reserved.

The Scope of Attorney-Client Privilege Over Dual-Purpose Communications

The Supreme Court will evaluate the scope of attorney-client privilege when applied to communications shared between counsel and client that involve both legal and non-legal advice (“dual-purpose communications”). The decision of the highest court will have long-lasting implications for both business organizations and their retained counsels. The potential outcome of this case cannot be understated.

In this matter, the grand jury issued subpoenas to an anonymous law firm seeking documents related to the government’s investigation of the firm’s client. The law firm had provided both legal and business services to the client by advising on tax-related legal issues and preparing the client’s annual tax returns. When the law firm and client (“Petitioners”) withheld certain correspondence on the grounds that they were protected by attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine, the government moved to compel the production of those documents. The district court held that, while the correspondence contained a “dual-purpose,” they were not protected by attorney-client privilege because the primary purpose of the correspondence was to obtain business tax advice and not legal advice.

On appeal, Petitioners argued that the appellate court should apply the “because of” test rather than the “primary purpose” test. The “because of” test asks whether the dual-purpose correspondence was made because of a need for legal advice. The application of this test would expand the scope of attorney-client privilege and protect the correspondence at issue. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, rejected Petitioners’ argument and affirmed the district court’s decision. Petitioners appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 3, 2022.

The Supreme Court’s decision in In re Grand Jury 21-1397 will be of particular significance for in-house counsels who regularly provide both business and legal advice to their employers. For outside counsels, the outcome of this case will shed light on the standard to be applied for asserting privilege over dual-purpose communications. Oral argument occurred on January 9, 2023 at the Supreme Court.

For more litigation news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California