The National Law Forum

The DOJ Throws Cold Water on the Frosties NFT Founders

The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York recently charged two individuals for allegedly participating in a scheme to defraud purchasers of “Frosties” non-fungible tokens (or “NFTs”) out of over $1 million. The two-count complaint charges Ethan Nguyen (aka “Frostie”) and Andre Llacuna (aka “heyandre”) with conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 and conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Each charge carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison.

The Defendants marketed “Frosties” as the entry point to a broader online community consisting of games, reward programs, and other benefits. In January 2022, their “Frosties” pre-sale raised approximately $1.1 million.

In a so-called “rug pull,” Frostie and heyandre transferred the funds raised through the pre-sale to a series of separate cryptocurrency wallets, eliminated Frosties’ online presence, and took down its website. The transaction, which was publicly recorded and viewable on the blockchain, triggered investors to sell Frosties at a considerable discount. Frostie and heyandre then allegedly proceeded to move the funds through a series of transactions intended to obfuscate the source and increase anonymity. The charges came as the Defendants were preparing for the March 26 pre-sale of their next NFT project, “Embers,” which law enforcement alleges would likely have followed the same course as “Frosties.”

In a public statement announcing the arrests, the DOJ explained how the emerging NFT market is a risk-laden environment that has attracted the attention of scam artists. Representatives from each of the federal agencies that participated in the investigation cautioned the public and put other potential fraudsters on notice of the government’s watchful eye towards cryptocurrency malfeasance.

This investigation comes on the heels of the FBI’s announcement last month of the Virtual Asset Exploitation Unit, a special task force dedicated to blockchain analysis and virtual asset seizure. The prosecution of the Defendants in this matter continues aggressive efforts by federal agencies to reign in bad actors participating in the cryptocurrency/digital assets/blockchain space.

Article By Matthew G. Lindenbaum, Robert L. Lindholm, and Daniel Curran of Nelson Mullins

For more crypto and cybersecurity legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

FDA and FTC Issue Warning Letters to CBD Companies

On March 28, 2022, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) jointly issued seven warning letters to companies marketing cannabidiol (CBD) products with COVID-19 related claims.
Specifically, the agencies warned the following companies regarding the promotion of their respective products with claims that they cure, mitigate, treat or prevent COVID-19: Cureganics, Heaven’s Organics LLC, Functional Remedies, LLC D/B/A Synchronicity Hemp Oil, Greenway Herbal Products LLC, CBD Social, UPSY LLC, and Nature’s Highway. Examples of claims include: “Our research suggest that CBD . . . can block SARS-Cov-2 infection at early and even later stages of infection. . .”, “Studies Show CBD Compounds Prevent COVID Cells From Replicating”, and “Can CBD Help with the Fight Against COVID? Some of the worst effects of COVID are caused by inflammation, and CBD is a potent anti-inflammatory.”
By way of background, under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), products intended to cure, treat, mitigate, or prevent disease are considered drugs and are subject to the requirements that apply to drugs. Therefore, the agencies classified the products as unapproved and misbranded drugs that may not be legally introduced or delivered for introduction into interstate commerce without prior approval from FDA.
The letters included a cease-and-desist demand from FTC, prohibiting the companies from making such COVID-19 related claims. The companies were provided with 48 hours to respond with specific steps that were taken to correct the violations.

Article By Food and Drug Law Practice Group at Keller and Heckman LLP

For more food and drug law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

EPA Will Propose to Ban Ongoing Uses of Asbestos

The U.S. Environmental Protection (EPA) announced on April 5, 2022, that it will propose to prohibit ongoing uses of chrysotile asbestos, the only known form of asbestos currently imported into the United States. EPA notes that the proposed rule will be “the first-ever risk management rule issued under the new process for evaluating and addressing the safety of existing chemicals under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) that was enacted in 2016.” EPA will propose to prohibit manufacture (including import), processing, distribution in commerce, and commercial use of chrysotile asbestos for all ongoing uses of chrysotile asbestos. EPA will also propose targeted disposal and recordkeeping requirements in line with industry standards, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirements, and the Asbestos National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP). EPA has posted a pre-publication version of the proposed rule. Publication of the proposed rule in the Federal Register will begin a 60-day comment period.

Background

As reported in our January 4, 2021, memorandum, EPA released on December 30, 2020, the final risk evaluation for asbestos, part 1: chrysotile asbestos (Asbestos RE Part 1). Of the six use categories evaluated (chlor-alkali diaphragms, sheet gaskets, other gaskets, oilfield brake blocks, aftermarket automotive brakes/linings, and other vehicle friction products), EPA found that there is unreasonable risk to workers, occupational non-users (ONU), consumers, and/or bystanders within each of the six chrysotile asbestos use categories. EPA found no unreasonable risk to the environment. According to the final risk evaluation, chrysotile is the prevailing form of asbestos currently mined worldwide, and “so it is assumed that a majority of commercially available products fabricated overseas that contain asbestos are made with chrysotile. Any asbestos being imported into the U.S. in articles is believed to be chrysotile.” The other five forms of asbestos are now subject to a significant new use rule (SNUR), as reported in our April 18, 2019, memorandum, “EPA Announces Final SNUR for Asbestos Will ‘Close Loophole and Protect Consumers.’”

Proposed Rule

EPA will propose a rule under TSCA Section 6(a) to prohibit manufacture (including import), processing, distribution in commerce, and commercial use of chrysotile asbestos in bulk or as part of chrysotile asbestos diaphragms used in the chlor-alkali industry and chrysotile asbestos-containing sheet gaskets used in chemical production. EPA will propose that these prohibitions take effect two years after the effective date of the final rule.

EPA will also propose pursuant to TSCA Section 6(a) to prohibit manufacture (including import), processing, distribution in commerce, and commercial use of chrysotile asbestos-containing brake blocks used in the oil industry, aftermarket automotive chrysotile asbestos-containing brakes/linings, other chrysotile asbestos-containing vehicle friction products (not including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Super Guppy Turbine aircraft use), and other chrysotile asbestos-containing gaskets. EPA will propose that these prohibitions take effect 180 days after the effective date of the final rule.

EPA will further propose pursuant to TSCA Section 6(a) to prohibit manufacture (including import), processing, and distribution in commerce of: aftermarket automotive chrysotile asbestos-containing brakes/linings for consumer use, and commercial use of other chrysotile asbestos-containing gaskets for consumer use. EPA will propose that these prohibitions take effect 180 days after the effective date of the final rule.

EPA will also propose disposal and recordkeeping requirements under which regulated parties would document compliance with certain proposed prohibitions. EPA states that it does not intend the proposed prohibitions on processing or distribution in commerce to prohibit any processing or distribution in commerce incidental to disposal of the chrysotile asbestos waste in accordance with the proposed requirements.

According to EPA, because a determination has been made that chrysotile asbestos presents an unreasonable risk to health within the United States or to the environment of the United States, pursuant to TSCA Section 12(a)(2), the proposed rule would apply to chrysotile asbestos even if being manufactured, processed, or distributed in commerce solely for export from the United States.

Commentary

Bergeson & Campbell, P.C. (B&C^®) commends EPA on this historical achievement. Unsurprisingly, there are aspects of this precedent-setting proposed rule that invite discussion and warrant comment from affected parties. Key among these issues is a potential significant legal vulnerability in the underlying risk evaluation (i.e., Asbestos RE Part 1) for the proposed rule, an issue that may overshadow this historic achievement in a manner reminiscent of EPA’s failed ban of asbestos in 1991 (Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir., 1991)).

EPA proposed that the prohibition on specific conditions of use (e.g., chrysotile asbestos diaphragms used in the chlor-alkali industry) would take effect two years after the effective date of the final rule. EPA stated that it “believes an aggressive transition away from chrysotile asbestos will spur adoption of superior technology [e.g., membrane cells with increased concentrations of per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS)].” The clear need to consider EPA’s intended action on asbestos in the context of its ongoing actions on PFAS is of course not lost on the Agency. EPA acknowledged that “the transition away from asbestos-containing diaphragms could result in greater usage and release of PFAS.”

B&C notes that innovative new technologies, such as alternative membrane cells, may be available in the future, but those technologies must be proven to be economically and technically viable. Once proven effective, the underlying chemical substances must be reviewed as new chemicals if so classified under TSCA. The development, review, and approval are all on indeterminate timelines, so it is speculative when novel, non-PFAS-based technologies will be commercially available and, of course, whether that time will be prior to the effective date of EPA’s proposed ban on asbestos.

EPA requested comment on specific aspects of the proposed rule that B&C encourages potentially impacted parties to consider. For example, EPA discussed its authority under TSCA Section 6(g) to grant a time-limited exemption for a specific condition of use, such as the chlor-alkali industry, where EPA finds “that compliance with the proposed requirement would significantly disrupt the national economy, national security, or critical infrastructure.”

EPA also requested comment on a primary alternative regulatory option that EPA discussed for the chlor-alkali diaphragm and sheet gasket categories that would allow a prohibition to take effect five years after the effective date of the final rule. As part of this option, EPA would include establishment of a risk-based performance standard known as an existing chemical exposure limit (ECEL). EPA developed an eight-hour time-weighted average (8-hr TWA) ECEL of 0.005 fibers/cubic centimeter (f/cc) for inhalation exposures to chrysotile asbestos as an eight-hr TWA ECEL-action level of 0.0025 f/cc, with associated requirements for initial and periodic monitoring and respirator usage/type if exceedances are found.

As part of the monitoring requirements, EPA stated that it would “require use of appropriate sampling and analytical methods to determine asbestos exposure, including: … Compliance with the Good Laboratory Practice Standards at 40 CFR Part 792,” despite the fact that EPA acknowledges that other standards, such as Industrial Hygiene Laboratory Accreditation Program (IHLAP), are more appropriate for industrial hygiene monitoring. EPA’s TSCA Section 5(e) order template states the following under Section III.D:

Compliance with TSCA GLPS, however, is not required under this New Chemical Exposure Limit Section where the analytical method is verified by a laboratory accredited by either: the American Industrial Hygiene Association (“AIHA”) Industrial Hygiene Laboratory Accreditation Program (“IHLAP”) or another comparable program approved in advance in writing by EPA.

EPA devoted one paragraph in the proposed rule to “TSCA section 26(h) considerations.” EPA stated, in part, that its unreasonable risk determination “was based on a risk evaluation, which was subject to peer review and public comment, was developed in a manner consistent with the best available science and based on the weight of the scientific evidence as required by TSCA sections 26(h) [and 26(i)] and 40 CFR 702.43 and 702.45.”

B&C notes that EPA stated in the Asbestos RE Part 1 the following:

TSCA § 26(h) and (i) require EPA, when conducting Risk Evaluations, to use scientific information, technical procedures, measures, methods, protocols, methodologies and models consistent with the best available science and base its decisions on the weight of the scientific evidence. To meet these TSCA § 26 science standards, EPA used the TSCA systematic review process described in the [2018] Application of Systematic Review in TSCA Risk Evaluations document [citation omitted] [2018 SR Document].

Prior to completing Asbestos RE Part 1, EPA requested the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) to review the 2018 SR Document. In February 2021, NASEM released its consensus study report on EPA’s 2018 SR Document and concluded that it did not meet the criteria of “comprehensive, workable, objective, and transparent” and that “The OPPT approach to systematic review does not adequately meet the state-of-practice.”

NASEM recommended that “With regard to hazard assessment for human and ecological receptors, OPPT should step back from the approach that it has taken and consider components of the OHAT, IRIS, and Navigation Guide methods that could be incorporated directly and specifically into hazard assessment.”

In response to the NASEM review, EPA revised its systematic review method. On December 20, 2021, EPA released the “Draft Systematic Review Protocol Supporting TSCA Risk Evaluations for Chemical Substances” (2021 Draft Protocol) for public comment. EPA acknowledged in the 2021 Draft Protocol that:

Previously [in the 2018 SR Document], EPA did not have a complete clear and documented TSCA systematic review (SR) Protocol. EPA is addressing this lack of a priori protocol by releasing [the 2021 Draft Protocol].

EPA further stated that the:

[2021 Draft Protocol] is significantly different [from the 2018 SR Document] in that it includes descrition [sic] of the Evidence Integration process…, which was not previously included in the [2018 SR Document].

B&C recognizes that the scientific methods used to inform systematic review are not static and that updates will be required as the science evolves. In this instance, however, many of the documents cited as supporting information for updating the 2021 Draft Protocol (e.g., Office of Health Assessment and Translation (OHAT), 2015) were available prior to EPA issuing the 2018 SR Document. Rather than utilizing these documents at the time, EPA developed the 2018 SR Document de novo. In other words, EPA chose to develop its own methodology in 2018 rather than incorporating and adapting existing methodologies that represented the best available science at the time.

These issues raise interesting procedural questions and issues around whether EPA demonstrated that Asbestos RE Part 1 was based on the best available science and weight of scientific evidence, as required under TSCA Sections 26(h) and 26(i) and the implementing regulation under 40 C.F.R. Part 702.

B&C encourages stakeholders to review EPA’s proposed risk management rule on chrysotile asbestos, even for entities that do not manufacture, process, distribute, or use this substance. We urge this review because of the precedential nature of EPA’s decisions. B&C also encourages interested parties to provide public comments on the proposed rule, given that risk management decisions in the proposed rule will likely serve as a basis from which EPA regulates other chemical substances EPA is evaluating under TSCA Section 6.

Article By: the Government Regulation practice at Bergeson & Campbell, P.C.

For more environmental legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Vehicle Sales Continue Their Depression

Anyone want to buy a vehicle? A better question might be: anyone got a vehicle for sale? Whether because of supply side issues, demand side issues, other issues, or all of the above, the fact remains that the first quarter of 2022 was not a good quarter for vehicle sales. Just ask the manufactures who saw double digit drops in new light-vehicle sales: 23% for Honda; 20% for GM; 17% for Ford; 15% for Toyota; and 14% for Stellantis. While the numbers sound like doom and gloom, the manufacturers were not dour. Honda was quite positive about its numbers, noting that demand was strong and they just could not make enough vehicles to sell more, “we’re riding a bit of a roller coaster due to fluctuating parts supply issues, but strong March sales for Honda and Acura speak to the fact that demand remains strong and our retail deliveries are based primarily on what we can supply to our dealers.”

Some other interesting tidbits from sales data:

Electrified vehicles accounted for almost 26 percent of Toyota’s total sales for the first quarter;
Edmunds reported that the average monthly payment for new vehicles is expected to climb to $648 — the highest level ever; and
Semiconductor chips continue to be the holy grail for auto makers to the point that GM credited managing that portion of its supply chain with leading to market share gains in truck sales.

As a result, LMC Automotive and Cox Automotive each reduced their full-year U.S. light-vehicle sales forecast to 15.3 million units, citing a slower pace to recovery from market constraints. LMC referred to inventory levels as “critically low.” Cox led its report by noting that not only are inventories low, but prices are high and sales incentives have vanished (note – this is how that entire supply/demand thing works). Cox laid it all at the feet of supply: “Auto sales will basically be stuck at the current level until more supply arrives.”

Globally, the pandemic is not over. This continues to have the potential to drastically impact global vehicle volumes, especially in China. Global vehicle production could lose up to 1.5 million units this year if China’s COVID-Zero policy is maintained, according to estimates from Fitch Solutions quoted in Bloomberg. Most recently, phased lockdowns in Shanghai in response to COVID-19 outbreaks disrupted production for several major automakers and suppliers.

Add to that, the ongoing microchip shortage (for which no end appears in sight) is causing production downtime at various plants: Jeep production at Stellantis’ Mack Assembly plant in Detroit and Belvidere Assembly plant in Illinois; Chevrolet Silverado 1500 and GMC Sierra 1500 production at GM’s Fort Wayne Assembly plant; and Mustang production at Ford’s Flat Rock Assembly plant. Let’s not forget the war in Ukraine, leading to German automakers potentially losing up to 150,000 units of production in March due to supply disruptions.

Oddly, the industry feels both healthy (revenue, profits, margins, etc.) and stressed with an unceratin future (see above) all at the same time. Also oddly, but strangely not so oddly, nothing about this situation feels new. Is this the new normal?

Article By Jeffrey A. Soble of Foley & Lardner LLP

For more transportation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson Confirmed to U.S. Supreme Court

Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson will become the first Black woman and the third Black Justice to serve on the U.S. Supreme Court.

With support of only a handful of Republican senators, a Senate majority voted to confirm Judge Jackson’s nomination to the Supreme Court, 53-47, on April 7, 2022. Judge Jackson will fill the vacancy left by Justice Stephen Breyer, who will retire at the end of the Court’s current term.

During Judge Jackson’s distinguished legal career, she served as a federal district judge from 2013 to 2021, a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit from 2021 to 2022, assistant special counsel and then vice chair on the U.S. Sentencing Commission, a federal public defender, and a private practice attorney.

Despite bringing a new perspective to the bench, Judge Jackson is unlikely to affect the current composition of the Court. Her decisions as a district and appellate judge suggest that, like Justice Breyer, she takes a pragmatic approach to the law.

Judge Jackson’s legal methodology will become apparent shortly after she takes her seat for the 2022-2023 term, which begins on October 3, 2022. The Court is scheduled to hear oral arguments on three cases touching on contentious issues during Judge Jackson’s first term. Judge Jackson, who serves on Harvard University’s board of overseers, has stated she will recuse herself from hearing Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard, a case involving the use of race in college admissions. However, she will participate in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, which asks the Court to decide on the constitutionality of a Colorado state law that prohibits business owners from refusing to provide service to people on the basis of sex, including sexual orientation and gender identity. Judge Jackson also will participate in the Court’s hearing of Merrill v. Millgan, which asks the Court to weigh in on whether Alabama’s proposed congressional district plan violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

Judge Jackson is expected to be sworn in before the start of the 2022-2023 term.

Article By Stephanie L. Adler-Paindiris and Stephanie E. Lewis of Jackson Lewis P.C.

For more litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Supreme Court’s New Arbitration Ruling: Limits Federal Jurisdiction For Confirming or Challenging Arbitration Awards Under the FAA

On March 31, 2022, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a decision in Badgerow v. Walters, No 20-1143, addressing when federal courts have jurisdiction to rule on motions to confirm, modify, or vacate arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). In an 8-1 decision, the Court narrowed the circumstances in which federal courts have such jurisdiction. Under the Court’s new decision, employers (and employees) will now more often be required to file their motions to confirm, modify, or vacate arbitration awards in state rather than federal court.

The Court’s Decision

The Court’s decision addresses a number of arcane questions of civil procedure and federal jurisdiction that could make for a nightmarish law school exam.

The decision starts from the well-accepted premise that the FAA does not grant federal courts jurisdiction. The FAA does, however, give parties to arbitration agreements certain rights, including the right to move a court to compel arbitration and the right to move a court to vacate, modify, or confirm an arbitration award. So the question that follows is: When can parties file these FAA motions in federal court and when must they file them in state court?

Under Badgerow, we now know that the answer is not the same for motions to compel arbitration and motions to vacate, modify, or confirm arbitration awards.

Under the Court’s prior case law, Vaden v. Discover Bank (2009), an employer can file a motion to compel arbitration in federal court so long as the underlying dispute to be arbitrated involves a question under federal law. For example, if an employee is alleging claims under a federal statute, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Family and Medical Leave Act, or any of the myriad other federal employment laws, a federal court would have jurisdiction to rule on a motion to compel arbitration of those claims. In addition to this “federal question” jurisdiction, the federal court might also have jurisdiction based on the diversity of the parties. Under a federal court’s diversity jurisdiction, a court also has jurisdiction to hear disputes between parties that are citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

In Badgerow, the Court held that a different analysis applies to motions to vacate, modify, or confirm arbitration awards, which are governed by different sections of the FAA. Unlike motions to compel arbitration, federal courts are not permitted to “look through” a motion to vacate, modify, or confirm to see whether there is a federal question involved in the underlying arbitration matter. Instead, a federal court must determine whether it has jurisdiction based on the motion itself.

Asking a court to vacate, modify, or confirm an arbitration award will usually raise questions about contract interpretation and enforcement. Contract law is usually state law. Thus, a motion to vacate, modify, or confirm arbitration awards will generally present questions of state law rather than federal law.

Since motions to vacate, modify, or confirm arbitration awards will rarely present federal questions on their face, federal courts will rarely have “federal question” jurisdiction over such motions. Federal courts may still have diversity jurisdiction if the parties on opposite sides of the motion to vacate, modify, or confirm arbitration awards are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. It is also theoretically possible that a federal court could still have federal question jurisdiction on some other grounds, but the Badgerow decision did not delve into that subject.

Key Takeaways

Under the Supreme Court’s new decision, employers will more often need to turn to state courts for motions to confirm, modify, or vacate arbitration awards under the FAA.

State courts historically have been more hostile to arbitration than federal courts. In losing the option of going to federal court to confirm some arbitration awards, arbitration may become marginally less reliable. However, this new decision should not affect the overall benefits that many employers conclude they receive from using employment arbitration.

In addition, the new decision will likely affect employers’ strategies in moving to compel arbitration, because the scope of federal jurisdiction is broader for such motions. In seeking to compel arbitration, employers may now more frequently ask the federal court to retain jurisdiction pending the outcome of the arbitration so that the parties may return to that federal court to address any subsequent motion to vacate, modify, or confirm the resulting arbitration award.

Finally, by forcing employers (and other parties to arbitration agreements) more frequently to go to state court to vacate, modify, and confirm arbitration awards, the Badgerow decision will likely bring to the fore another question that has been looming on the horizon: do the FAA’s provisions permitting motions to vacate, modify, and confirm arbitration awards even apply in state court? Several courts around the country have suggested that they do not, meaning that employers (and other parties to arbitration agreements) will need to rely on state arbitration statutes for such motions in some jurisdictions. But that is another topic for another day.

Article By Christopher C. Murray and Hera S. Arsen with Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart P.C.

For more articles about arbitration, please visit the NLR ADR/Arbitration/Mediation type of law page.

The SEC’s Proposed Rules on Climate-Related Disclosures – What to Do Now: A Guide for In-House Counsel Facing the Proposed Rules

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s recently proposed rules governing climate-related disclosures, if adopted as proposed, would represent a sea change to the existing public-company disclosure regime. The rules would require that public companies include the following, among other disclosures, in reports and registration statements filed with the SEC:

disclosure of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions data covering Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions for all companies and Scope 3 emissions for companies¹ (other than those that qualify as “smaller reporting companies”) for which Scope 3 emissions are material or that have set emissions reduction targets that include Scope 3 emissions, with third-party attestation being required for Scope 1 and Scope 2 data for companies that qualify as “large accelerated filers” or “accelerated filers”;
extensive and detailed disclosures regarding climate-related risks, including physical risks and transition-related risks, to a company’s financial statements, business operations or value chain (i.e., upstream and downstream activities of third parties related to the company’s operations);
disclosure in the notes to audited financial statements of quantitative and qualitative information regarding financial impacts of climate-related risk, including disaggregated quantitative information with respect to impacts of physical risks or transition activities on specific financial statement line items if the impact is 1% or more of the line item;
extensive and detailed disclosures regarding climate-related governance, strategy and risk management; and
to the extent relevant to a particular company, disclosures regarding the company’s transition plan, climate-related targets or goals, use of scenario analyses or other analytical tools in evaluating climate-related risk and use of an internal carbon price.

For many companies, the rules would require enterprise-wide changes to how the company collects, assesses and reports climate-related data and other information, as well as changes to their governance structures and systems of controls. Changes may be driven both by the need to comply with the disclosure requirements and by a company’s view of how its disclosures will be received by investors or the public generally.

The tasks of understanding the implications of the proposed rules for a particular company and preparing for eventually complying with the rules are monumental, and, unfortunately, public companies currently find themselves in the difficult position of possibly needing to act with some urgency in order to be prepared to comply with rules of uncertain substance on an uncertain timeline. At this point, the proposed rules are just that – proposed and not final. The period for public comment on the proposed rules will run until May 20 at the earliest and could be extended by the SEC, and public comments are likely to reflect the controversial nature of the proposed rules and strong opinions by both supporters and detractors. After the comment period, whether and when the SEC releases final rules, and the extent to which any final rules largely follow or reflect significant changes from the proposed rules, will remain to be seen. Like the proposed rules, any final rules should provide for phase-in periods for compliance. Further, any final rules are almost certain to face legal challenges that could delay implementation of the rules even if such challenges ultimately are unsuccessful. It is therefore very difficult to predict when companies will need to comply with new rules and precisely what information they will be required to disclose under new rules.

Despite that uncertainty, it appears very likely that the SEC will adopt final climate-related disclosure rules in the not-too-distant future and that those rules will include in some form most, if not all, of the big buckets of disclosure requirements reflected in the proposed rules. Because of the significant effort and degree of organizational change that compliance with the rules likely will require, companies may not be able to wait until final rules are released to begin assessing the impacts of the proposed rules on their organizations. And, if the SEC were to adopt final rules later this year in the proposed form, companies that are large accelerated filers with a calendar fiscal year would be required to include information for 2023, including Scope 1 and 2 emissions data, in their annual reports filed in early 2024, meaning that they would need to have the systems in place to track and record the relevant information by the end of this year.

Assessing the potential impact of the proposed rules on a company and preparing the company for eventually complying with the rules will require participation from many different parts of the organization, but we expect that, at many companies, the task of setting the company on a course to do those things will fall on the general counsel and other in-house counsel with responsibility for relevant substantive areas. With that in mind, we have prepared the following guide for in-house counsel with respect to near-term actions their companies should be taking or should consider taking, depending on their circumstances. Bracewell will expand on a number of the topics noted below in future alerts, webinars or other similar communications.

1. Engage senior management, the board of directors and relevant board committees and begin assessing governance, oversight and management of climate-related risks.

In-house counsel likely will be hearing from their CEOs and board members, if they haven’t already, asking what the proposed rules mean for their company. In any case, in-house counsel should ensure that top-level management and board members understand the potential challenges and changes their companies may face with the proposed rules and encourage the level of board and senior management oversight and engagement that is appropriate for their situation. The proposed rules would require companies to provide detailed disclosures concerning their boards’ oversight of climate-related risks and management’s role in assessing and managing those risks. Although many companies already have robust board oversight of ESG matters and include related disclosures in their SEC filings, the proposed rules are far more granular in dictating the type of information that would need to be disclosed.

In that regard, in-house counsel may be asked what changes, if any, should be made to board or committee composition and structure in light of the proposed new disclosure requirements. Among other matters, consideration should be given to whether the creation of a new ESG committee – or a purely climate-focused committee – is appropriate or whether responsibility reasonably can be shouldered by an existing committee, such as the audit committee.

2. Establish organizational responsibility for assessing the implications of the proposed rules for your company.

As noted above, this is a huge task that will require input from a multidisciplinary team, including legal, accounting, operations and possibly other personnel. Identifying the right team and setting clear responsibilities and timelines are critical near-term tasks.

3. Understand the potential timeline for compliance with the proposed rules as it relates to your organization.

As noted above, there is considerable uncertainty regarding, among other matters, whether final rules will require compliance on the timelines contemplated in the proposed rules, which would have the compliance requirements phased in over several years based on a company’s status as a large accelerated filer, an accelerated filer, a non-accelerated filer or a smaller reporting company. This fact sheet on the proposed rules published by the SEC provides helpful tables (on page 3) detailing the phase-in periods contemplated by the proposed rules for companies with a calendar fiscal year, assuming the proposed rules were adopted as final with an effective date in December 2022.

Despite the uncertainty, it is certainly possible that the SEC could adopt final rules later this year with compliance dates as contemplated by the proposed rules, and companies therefore would be ill-advised to assume that they will have a longer ramp-up period than they would under the proposed rules and the assumption of a December 2022 effective date.

4. Understand the proposed rules and the disclosures they will require for your company based on its specific circumstances, including with regard to differences between what the company is disclosing now and what would be required by the proposed rules.

The proposed rules are highly prescriptive and are intended to produce consistent and comparable disclosures across the public-company spectrum. With limited exceptions (e.g., that smaller reporting companies would be exempted from the requirement to disclose Scope 3 emissions), all public companies will need to assess required disclosure under all provisions of the rules. That assessment, however, will need to be made in light of the company’s specific circumstances, and there will be categories of required disclosures that are very relevant to some industries or companies but of no or limited relevance to other industries or companies. Additionally, many companies have been voluntarily disclosing information that is similar to some of the information that may be required to be provided under the proposes rules, but there may be gaps between or differences in required disclosures and a company’s current practices.

As companies begin to digest the proposed rules, it will make sense for them to drill down on the specific types of disclosures they would need to make if the proposed rules were adopted as proposed. Questions that companies might ask themselves include the following:

Will we need to disclose Scope 3 emissions data based on materiality or having set targets or goals including Scope 3 emissions?
What, if anything, have we done with respect to the following topics such that disclosure regarding those topics would be required?
- Adoption of a transition plan
- Setting of climate-related goals or targets
- Use of carbon offsets or renewable energy credits in setting goals or targets
- Use of scenario analyses or other analytical tools in evaluating climate risk
- Use of an internal carbon price
  - Note that, with respect to goals or targets, the proposed rules refer to a company’s having “set” such goals or targets and not to its having publicly disclosed them. Similarly, with respect to all of these topics, it is not clear that the related disclosure would be triggered only by some level of formality or organizational scope in the adoption, setting or use of the applicable item. Companies therefore should assess the relevance of these topics broadly, including informal use or discussion within the organization.
What information that we are not currently disclosing would the proposed rules require us to disclose?
For information that we are currently disclosing, would the proposed rules require that information to be established, assembled or disclosed differently, or disclosed more expansively or granularly, from how we are doing it now? If so, how?
Which required disclosures might be particularly challenging for our company, such that they might merit special or prioritized focus?

5. Begin to evaluate existing systems and resources related to climate-related information and identify changes that will need to be made.

Companies in some industries, such as energy or manufacturing, likely already have systems in place to collect much of the data called for by the proposed rules, and many public companies have been publishing voluntary disclosures in the form of ESG reports for years. However, smaller companies in such industries may not currently have the resources necessary to devote to compliance with the new rules. Likewise, companies in non-GHG intensive industries, such as financial services, previously may not have had the need, or a more limited need, for such systems. And even those companies that are experienced in collecting and disclosing climate-related data and other information likely would, under the proposed rules, need to expand their systems to cover a much broader universe of information and ensure that controls and procedures meet standards for disclosures in SEC-filed documents and are appropriate for enhanced scrutiny and potential liability that will come with including such disclosures in SEC-filed documents. Companies may need to invest significantly in new personnel with appropriate expertise and in new technology, and they will need to expand their disclosure controls and procedures and internal control over financial reporting to cover new sets of information that are wide-ranging, voluminous and highly detailed. Accordingly, public companies should begin to assess their existing capabilities and identify the changes they would need to make to comply with proposed rules to ensure that the changes can be effected in time to comply with new rules.

Additionally, the climate-related risk disclosures contemplated by the proposed rules may require that companies devote significant resources to expanding the process by which they identify and assess climate-related risk. Further, the need for companies to evaluate climate-related risks to upstream and downstream – value chain – activities, and potentially to disclose Scope 3 emissions associated with those activities, may pose significant challenges and likely will require many companies to develop new processes to address disclosure requirements that relate to matters that are largely outside of the company’s control and access. These are areas that companies may want to focus on in the near term.

6. Evaluate needs and strategy for retaining third parties to assist with disclosures, including for attestation of GHG emissions data.

As noted above, for large accelerated filers and accelerated filers, the proposed rules would require attestation regarding Scope 1 and Scope 2 GHG emissions data by an independent third party meeting certain minimum qualifications, which may be a public accounting firm if it meets the minimum qualifications but need not be an accounting firm. The market for providing these attestation services is evolving and will continue to evolve as accounting firms and others develop their ability to provide these services. Some observers have raised concerns that the supply of emission-attestation services may not initially meet the demand for such services that the proposed rules would create. Companies may wish to begin thinking about their options for third-parties to handle the attestation, particularly large accelerated filers who could be subject to the attestation requirements as soon as in their 2024 annual reports filed in early 2025. Additionally, it is important for companies to have conversations around attestation ahead of their information gathering efforts to ensure that the disclosure information being developed and gathered will be sufficient for attestors to provide the required assurance.

In addition to attestation services, companies should consider their potential need for and access to other third-party advisors with the necessary expertise and experience, including attorneys, accountants/auditors and firms providing consulting and other services to assist companies with climate-related disclosures.

7. Consider whether the disclosures contemplated by the proposed rules warrant any changes to your current, planned or contemplated climate-related activities, such as setting or disclosing of climate-related goals or targets.

As noted above, the proposed rules contemplate detailed disclosures regarding several matters that may or may not be relevant to a particular company depending on things that the company may or may not have done in advance of the initial compliance date for the proposed rules. These include whether a company has:

adopted a climate transition plan,
set climate-related goals or targets,
included Scope 3 emissions in its goals or targets,
used carbon offsets or renewable energy credits in setting its goals or targets,
used scenario analyses or other analytical tools in assessing climate-related risk, or
used an internal carbon price.

Companies may wish to reassess their existing, planned or contemplated activities in these areas in view of the proposed rules. It may be the case that a company would want to modify its activities in one or more of these areas when viewed through the lens of what the company’s disclosures regarding such activities would look like under the proposed rules. For example, if your company is planning to set or announce new GHG emissions goals, should the company modify the goals as they relate to Scope 3 emissions or otherwise before doing so, or would it be preferable for the company to delay any such setting or announcement of goals until there is clarity on the content of final rules?

8. Determine whether to submit comments on the proposed rules.

The proposed rule release includes over 200 requests for comment. Comments are due by the later of 30 days after the date the proposing release is published in the Federal Register (which had not happened as of the date of this update) or May 20, 2022. (As noted above, it is possible that the comment period could be extended beyond that date, but, unless and until the SEC actually does that, parties desiring to submit comments should proceed with the expectation that they will need to submit them by the applicable current deadline.) Although the SEC will not agree with all comments received and may adopt final rules despite strong and widely-held opposing views reflected in the comments, the SEC and its staff will consider the comments received in adopting final rules and likely will make at least some changes to the proposed rules based on comments. If your company would like to have its voice heard on the proposed rules, you may consider doing so by submitting comments directly or through an industry association or similar group.

9. Monitor developments.

As noted above, we are in the early stages of the process through which the proposed rules could, in their current form or with changes, become final rules with which public companies actually would need to comply. In-house lawyers should continue to monitor developments and advise others in their organizations of such developments as appropriate so that preparations for compliance with new climate-related disclosure rules can be adjusted as necessary.

10. Don’t forget that climate-related disclosures may be required under existing SEC rules and interpretations.

With the anticipation of a massive new disclosure regime for climate-related matters and preparation for compliance with that regime, it might be easy to overlook that fact the existing SEC rules and interpretations may require climate-related disclosures in SEC filings, and the SEC staff may issue comments on climate-related disclosures, or the absence thereof, in a company’s SEC filings, as they did for a number companies in the fall of 2021 with respect to the companies’ 2020 annual reports on Form 10-K. Pending the adoption and implementation of final new rules, companies should continue to assess their disclosures in view of the SEC’s 2010 guidance on climate-related disclosures.

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1. Scope 1 emissions are direct GHG emissions from operations that are owned or controlled by a company. Scope 2 emissions are indirect GHG emissions from the generation of purchased or acquired energy that is consumed by a company’s operations. Scope 3 emissions are all indirect GHG emissions not otherwise included in a company’s Scope 2 emissions, which occur in the upstream and downstream activities of a company’s value chain.

Article By Charles H. Still Jr., Troy L. Harder, Travis L. Counts, Chase V. Edmunds.

For more about SEC disclosures, please visit the NLR Financial, Securities & Banking section.

HIPAA Enforcement Continues Under Right of Access Initiative

On March 28, 2022, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office for Civil Rights (OCR) announced the resolution of two additional cases as part of OCR’s HIPAA Right of Access Initiative.

The Right of Access Initiative was launched by OCR in 2019 “to support individuals’ right to timely access their health records at a reasonable cost under the HIPAA Privacy Rule” as explained by OCR. In the March 28 announcement, OCR indicated its continuing commitment to enforce compliance with the HIPAA Rules, including the “foundational” Right of Access provision. With the two most recent cases, there have now been 27 investigations and settlements under the Right of Access Initiative (see full chart below).

Nearly all of the investigations in the Right of Access Initiative involve a single individual unable to obtain a copy of some or all of their protected health information from a health care provider or to do so within the timeframe required or in accordance with fees permitted by the HIPAA Privacy Rule. In some cases, additional issues found during the investigation, such as failure to have conducted a HIPAA risk assessment or lack of HIPAA policies, are part of the settlement. In all cases, in addition to the monetary penalty, the settlement has included a Corrective Action Plan imposing various obligations, such as policy development, training, and mandatory reporting to OCR.

The Right of Access Initiative remains one of the most active areas of HIPAA enforcement. In its most recent Annual Report to Congress on HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Breach Notification Rule Compliance, OCR noted that right of access was the third most common issue of complaints resolved. Moreover, the Right of Access Initiative coordinates with the ONC 2020-2025 Federal HIT Strategic Plan and the goal of “Providing patients and caregivers with more robust health information.” It is a core tenant of the Federal HIT Strategic Plan that access to health information will “better support person-centered care and patient empowerment.”

Article By Allen R. Killworth and Zeina Abu-Hijleh of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

For more health law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Ohio Court of Appeals Affirms $30 Million Libel Verdict Against Oberlin College

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment in excess of $30,000,000 against Oberlin College, holding that Oberlin was responsible for libelous statements made during the course of a student protest. Gibson Bros., Inc. v. Oberlin College, 2022 WL 970347 (Ohio Ct. App. March 31, 2022). The court’s rationale, if followed elsewhere, could lead to significantly broader institutional and corporate liability for statements by students and employees.

The case arose out of an incident in which an employee of the Gibson Brothers Bakery and Food Mart accused a black student of shoplifting, and then pursued and held the student until police arrived. Over the next few days, large groups of student protestors gathered outside the bakery and among other things handed out a flyer describing the incident as an “assault,” and stating that the bakery had a “long account of racial profiling and discrimination.” The day following the incident, the student senate passed a resolution calling for a boycott. It likewise described the incident as an assault on the student and stated that the bakery had a “history of racial profiling and discriminatory treatment of students….” The resolution was emailed to the entire campus and posted on the senate bulletin board, where it remained for over a year. The court found the statements to be factually untrue, because the student pled guilty to the shoplifting charge and admitted racial profiling did not occur, and the College presented no evidence of any past racial profiling or instances of discrimination at the bakery.

The court acknowledged that there was no evidence that Oberlin participated in drafting the flyer or the student senate resolution. Instead, the court found Oberlin liable on the theory that one who republishes a libel, or who aids and abets the publication of a libelous statement, can be liable along with the original publisher. As to the flyer, the court cited the following as evidence sufficient to support a jury finding that Oberlin had either republished or aided and abetted its publication:

Oberlin’s Dean of Students attended the protests as part of her job responsibilities;
the Dean of Students handed a copy of the flyer to a journalist who had not yet seen it and told students they could use a college copier to make more copies of the flyer;
the associate director of a multicultural resource center was seen carrying a large number of flyers, which he appeared to be distributing to others to redistribute to the public; and
the College provided a warming room with coffee and pizza at a site near the protests.

As to the student senate resolution, the court cited:

the senate was an approved organization;
the College created the senate’s authority to adopt and circulate the resolution;
the senate faculty moderator was the Dean of Students; and
despite having knowledge of the content of the resolution, neither the President nor the Dean of Students took any steps to require or encourage the student senate to revoke the resolution or to remove it from the bulletin board.

The court then held that despite the publicity the bakery received once the dispute arose, at the time of the protests and resolution the bakery and its owners were private persons, not public figures. Thus, the bakery only had to show that Oberlin had been negligent, rather than that it acted with reckless indifference as to the truth or falsity of the statements published.

Particularly in these polarized times, university administrators should be aware of and take steps to manage legal risks when external disputes become the subject of campus discussion and activism. Student organizations, faculty and administrators should be reminded that, to the extent they participate in protests or other public commentary outside their official roles, they should make clear they are acting for themselves and not the institution. Institutional responses to causes espoused by students or faculty need to be carefully vetted to assure that any factual assertions about third parties are accurate.

Article By Barry P. Kaltenbach and Robert T. Zielinski of Miller Canfield

For more litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

SCOTUS Cert Recap: Copyright Act’s Fair Use Defense, ‘Dormant’ Commerce Clause, And Independent And Adequate State Ground Doctrine

On March 28, the Supreme Court agreed to consider the following three questions:

Is a work of art that copies from a prior work but that conveys a different meaning than the prior work necessarily “transformative” for the purpose of the Copyright Act’s fair use defense?

Does California’s Proposition 12 – which requires all pork sold in California to come from pigs housed in compliance with the state’s animal-confinement rules, even pigs raised entirely in other states – violate the Constitution’s Commerce Clause?

Is Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g), which requires a state prisoner seeking post-conviction relief to identify a “significant change in the law” that would probably have produced a different result in the prisoner’s case, an adequate and independent state-law ground to support a state-court judgment denying post-conviction relief?

On March 28, the U.S. Supreme Court added three cases to its docket for next term: one about when a work of art “transforms” a prior work for the purpose of the Copyright Act’s fair use defense, another involving a “dormant” Commerce Clause challenge to a California law that prohibits selling any pork in the state unless the pork comes from pigs housed in compliance with California’s animal-confinement rules, and a third concerning whether the independent and adequate state ground doctrine bars the Court from reviewing an Arizona state-court decision denying a request for post-conviction relief.

The copyright and Commerce Clause cases – which drew four and five cert-stage amicus briefs, respectively – will capture significant attention from businesses and civil litigators and could each produce landmark decisions in their respective areas of law. The case concerning the independent and adequate state ground doctrine will be of greater interest to those who practice in the post-conviction area – where such issues arise with some frequency – but all lawyers who practice before the Supreme Court should watch that case carefully as well, as the doctrine applies to all state-court decisions whatever the subject matter.

When Works Are ‘Transformative’ Under the Copyright Act’s Fair Use Defense

In Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts v. Goldsmith, the Court will return to a question it confronted last year in Google v. Oracle: When does copying a portion of a copyrighted work constitute protected “fair use” under the Copyright Act?

The notion of “fair use” in the copyright context initially developed as a common-law doctrine to allow borrowing in some situations in order to further the Copyright Act’s general purpose of fostering creativity and innovation. Congress codified that doctrine in 1976, and the Copyright Act now expressly recognizes fair use as a defense and lists four non-exclusive factors courts should consider in determining whether a use is “fair”: 1) the purpose and character of the use, 2) the nature of the copyrighted work, 3) the amount used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and 4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for the copyrighted work.

As the Court explained in Google, the first of these factors – the purpose and character of the use – asks “whether the copier’s use adds something new … altering the copyrighted work with new expression, meaning or message,” and the Court has “used the word ‘transformative’ to describe a copying use that adds something new and important.” This case offers the Court an opportunity to provide further detail on what it means for a work of art to be “transformative” in this sense. It concerns a series of silkscreen prints and pencil illustrations created by Andy Warhol – whose foundation is the petitioner here – based on a 1981 portrait photograph of Prince taken by the respondent, Lynn Goldsmith. The foundation argues that the works are necessarily transformative because they convey a new meaning: namely, that they portray Prince as an “iconic” figure rather than the “vulnerable human being” depicted in Goldsmith’s photograph.

In its decision below, however, the Second Circuit rejected the notion that imbuing a work with a new meaning is necessarily “transformative.” It observed that such a rule would seem to expand fair use to make copyright licensing unnecessary in the “paradigmatically derivative” context of film adaptations – since many movies transform the message of the underlying literary work – and it noted that ascertaining the meaning of artistic works is a subjective endeavor to which judges are typically unsuited. Instead, it held that Warhol’s work is not transformative on the ground that it is “both recognizably deriving from, and retaining the essential elements of, its source material.”

The Supreme Court is now set to review this decision and thereby give litigants and lower courts further guidance on what makes a work that borrows from another sufficiently “transformative.” Copyright practitioners around the country will be closely following what the Court says.

Commerce Clause Limits on States’ Authority to Regulate Commerce

In National Pork Producers Council v. Ross, the Court will consider a challenge to California’s Proposition 12, a law that sets minimum size requirements for pig pens – and that extends those requirements to farmers across the country by making compliance with them a condition of selling pork in California.

The challengers contend that the out-of-state application of these pen-size rules violates the Commerce Clause. They note that, while the Commerce Clause is expressly framed as a grant of authority to Congress, the Supreme Court has long read the Commerce Clause to also implicitly limit states’ regulatory authority. This doctrine, often called the “dormant” Commerce Clause, has a handful of different components, and two are at issue in this case.

The first, known as the extraterritoriality doctrine, has been invoked in a number of Supreme Court decisions but is most prominently associated with the 1980s decisions Brown-Foreman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority and Healy v. Beer Institute. The challengers here argue that under these decisions, a state law per se violates the Commerce Clause if its practical effect is to control conduct beyond the state’s boundaries, and they contend Proposition 12 does so by effectively requiring out-of-state farmers to follow California’s pen-size rules on pain of exclusion from the California market. And California responds that Proposition 12 merely regulates in-state sales, and that any indirect, upstream effects it has on farmers is insufficient to run afoul of the extraterritoriality doctrine.

The second issue concerns the balancing test the Supreme Court articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church, which bars state laws that impose a burden on interstate commerce that “is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Here the parties dispute the significance of Proposition 12’s economic effects and the strength of the interests underlying the law – issues that could become complicated by the motion-to-dismiss posture of the case.

The Court has now agreed to address both of these issues, and whatever the Court decides, its decision will carry implications for the validity of state commercial regulations in a wide variety of industries across the country.

The Scope of the Independent and Adequate State Ground Doctrine

In Cruz v. Arizona, the Court will take up a criminal-law case that presents a recurring issue that arises in both criminal and civil cases alike: When does a state-court decision rest on an independent and adequate state ground such that the U.S. Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review the decision?

The case arises from the Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in Simmons v. South Carolina, which held that where a capital defendant’s “future dangerousness is at issue, and state law prohibits the defendant’s release on parole, due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible.” The Arizona Supreme Court later concluded that Simmons was inapplicable in Arizona – on the theory that Arizona law did not universally prohibit capital defendants’ release on parole – but the U.S. Supreme Court overturned that conclusion in Lynch v. Arizona.

Shortly thereafter, Cruz – a capital defendant whose trial and sentencing occurred after Simmons but before Lynch – filed a petition for post-conviction relief in Arizona state court. Because this was not Cruz’s first petition, he sought relief under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g), which at the time provided that relief would be available even for successive petitions where there “has been a significant change in the law that if determined to apply to defendant’s case would probably overturn the defendant’s conviction or sentence.”

Cruz argued that Lynch constituted a significant change in the law and that it applied retroactively to render his sentence unlawful. And after the Arizona Supreme Court rejected his claim, he filed a cert. petition arguing that federal law requires applying Lynch retroactively in state post-conviction proceedings. Arizona, meanwhile, countered that the Court would lack jurisdiction under the independent and adequate state ground doctrine: The Arizona Supreme Court’s decision, the state argued, simply concluded that Cruz failed to meet the state-law requirements of Rule 32.1(g).

While the U.S. Supreme Court granted Cruz’s cert. petition, it has limited its consideration to only the question concerning the independent and adequate state ground doctrine. And because its answer to that question could affect jurisdictional rulings in all manner of cases, the case will be of interest to anyone who practices before the Court.

Article By Kian Hudson of Barnes & Thornburg LLP

For more litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

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