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Suing Attorneys In Texas For Participating in Fiduciary Breaches

It is not uncommon for an attorney to execute all or part of his or her client’s wishes, which may be in breach of a fiduciary duty owed by the client to a third party. The third party can certainly sue the client for breaching fiduciary duties. But can the third party also sue the attorney for participating in the client’s actions?

An officer or director of a company may set up a competing business and direct company business to the new competing business. If the officer or director uses an attorney to set up this business and the attorney knows that new business will be used to usurp opportunities, can the company sue the attorney for facilitating the creation of the new business? What if the attorney is an owner of the new company or works for the new company in a nonlegal position?

Certainly, Texas has legal theories that can hold a party liable for participating with a fiduciary in breaching duties owed by the fiduciary. There is a claim for knowing participation in a breach of fiduciary duty. See Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp., 138 Tex. 565, 160 S.W.2d 509, 514 (1942); Paschal v. Great W. Drilling, Ltd., 215 S.W.3d 437, 450 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, pet. denied) (holding wife liable for knowing participation in employee’s embezzlement where funds were placed in joint account and wife benefitted from stolen funds). See also Westech Capital Corp. v. Salamone, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143577, 2019 WL 4003093, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2019) (collecting cases that explain that “Texas appellate courts have routinely recognized the existence of a cause of action for knowing participation in the breach of fiduciary duty.”). The general elements for a knowing-participation claim are: 1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship; 2) the third party knew of the fiduciary relationship; and 3) the third party was aware it was participating in the breach of that fiduciary relationship. D’Onofrio v. Vacation Publ’ns, Inc., 888 F.3d 197, 216 (5th Cir. 2018); Meadows v. Harford Life Ins. Co., 492 F.3d 634, 639 (5th Cir. 2007). There is also a recognized civil conspiracy claim in Texas. The essential elements of a civil conspiracy are (1) two or more persons; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result. Juhl v. Airington, 936 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1996). Finally, there may be an aiding-and-abetting breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim. The Texas Supreme Court has stated that it has not expressly adopted a claim for aiding and abetting outside the context of a fraud claim. See First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 224 (Tex. 2017); Ernst & Young v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d 573, 583 n. 7 (Tex. 2001); West Fork Advisors v. Sungard Consulting, 437 S.W.3d 917 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.). Notwithstanding, some Texas courts have found such an action to exist. See Hendricks v. Thornton, 973 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1998, pet. denied); Floyd v. Hefner, 556 F.Supp.2d 617 (S.D. Tex. 2008). One court identified the elements for aiding and abetting as the defendant must act with unlawful intent and give substantial assistance and encouragement to a wrongdoer in a tortious act. West Fork Advisors, 437 S.W.3d at 921. Some courts have held that here is no aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claim. Hampton v. Equity Trust Co., No. 03-19-00401-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 5674 (Tex. App.—Austin July 23, 2020, no pet.). See also Midwestern Cattle Mktg., L.L.C. v. Legend Bank, N.A., 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 36966, 2019 WL 6834031, at *7 (5th Cir. Dec. 13, 2019); In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 888 F.3d 753, 782, 781 (5th Cir. 2018) For a discussion of these forms of joint liability for breach of fiduciary duty, please see E. Link Beck, Joint and Several Liability, STATE BAR OF TEXAS, 10TH ANNUAL FIDUCIARY LITIGATION COURSE (2015).

It is clear that at least under some theories, that third parties can be held liable for participating in fiduciary breaches with the party owing fiduciary duties. Can the third party be an attorney? Prior to Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. 2015), it was unclear in Texas whether a party could assert a claim against an attorney not representing the party, such as for negligent misrepresentation or aiding and abetting fraud or breaches of fiduciary duty. Some courts allowed the claim if the attorney was committing or participating in fraud. Others did not.

The plaintiff in Cantey Hanger alleged that the attorneys who represented her husband in a divorce proceeding had committed fraud by falsifying a bill of sale to shift tax liabilities from the sale of an airplane from her husband to her. Id. at 479-80. The Texas Supreme Court held that attorney immunity barred the claim because “[e]ven conduct that is ‘wrongful in the context of the underlying suit’ is not actionable if it is ‘part of the discharge of the lawyer’s duties in representing his or her client.’” Id. at 481. The following are key excerpts from the opinion:

Texas common law is well settled that an attorney does not owe a professional duty of care to third parties who are damaged by the attorney’s negligent representation of a client. Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575, 577 (Tex. 1996); see also McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex. 1999) (explaining that a lack of privity precludes attorneys’ liability to non-clients for legal malpractice). However, Texas courts have developed a more comprehensive affirmative defense protecting attorneys from liability to non-clients, stemming from the broad declaration over a century ago that “attorneys are authorized to practice their profession, to advise their clients and interpose any defense or supposed defense, without making themselves liable for damages.” Kruegel v. Murphy, 126 S.W. 343, 345 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ ref’d). This attorney-immunity defense is intended to ensure “loyal, faithful, and aggressive representation by attorneys employed as advocates.” Mitchell v. Chapman, 10 S.W.3d 810, 812 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied).

….

In accordance with this purpose, there is consensus among the courts of appeals that, as a general rule, attorneys are immune from civil liability to non-clients “for actions taken in connection with representing a client in litigation.” Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied); see also Toles v. Toles, 113 S.W.3d 899, 910 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.); Renfroe v. Jones & Assocs., 947 S.W.2d 285, 287-88 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied). Even conduct that is “wrongful in the context of the underlying suit” is not actionable if it is “part of the discharge of the lawyer’s duties in representing his or her client.” Toles, 113 S.W.3d at 910-11;

….

Conversely, attorneys are not protected from liability to non-clients for their actions when they do not qualify as “the kind of conduct in which an attorney engages when discharging his duties to his client.” Dixon Fin. Servs., 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2064, 2008 WL 746548, at *9; see also Chapman Children’s Trust v. Porter & Hedges, L.L.P., 32 S.W.3d 429, 442 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (noting that “it is the kind of conduct that is controlling, and not whether that conduct is meritorious or sanctionable”).

Because the focus in evaluating attorney liability to a non-client is “on the kind—not the nature—of the attorney’s conduct,” a general fraud exception would significantly undercut the defense. Dixon Fin. Servs., 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2064, 2008 WL 746548, at *8. Merely labeling an attorney’s conduct “fraudulent” does not and should not remove it from the scope of client representation or render it “foreign to the duties of an attorney.” Alpert, 178 S.W.3d at 406 (citing Poole, 58 Tex. at 137); see also Dixon Fin. Servs., 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2064, 2008 WL 746548, at *9 (“Characterizing an attorney’s action in advancing his client’s rights as fraudulent does not change the rule that an attorney cannot be held liable for discharging his duties to his client.”).

….

Fraud is not an exception to attorney immunity; rather, the defense does not extend to fraudulent conduct that is outside the scope of an attorney’s legal representation of his client, just as it does not extend to other wrongful conduct outside the scope of representation. An attorney who pleads the affirmative defense of attorney immunity has the burden to prove that his alleged wrongful conduct, regardless of whether it is labeled fraudulent, is part of the discharge of his duties to his client.

Id. at 481-484.

Based on the holding in Cantey Hanger, if an attorney is performing duties that a lawyer would typically perform, the attorney immunity defense would apply. This defense would likewise apply to aiding and abetting fraud and breaches of fiduciary duty. See Kastner v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 231 S.W.3d 571, 577-78 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007); Span Enters. v. Wood, 274 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008).

In Bethel v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C., the Court extended the Cantey Hanger holding to allegations of criminal conduct. 595 S.W.3d 651, 657-58 (Tex. 2020). There, the plaintiff had urged the Court “to recognize an exception” to attorney immunity “whe[n] a third party alleges that an attorney engaged in criminal conduct during the course of litigation.” Id. The Court rejected the invitation to adopt an exception or state a categorical rule because doing so would allow plaintiffs to avoid the attorney-immunity defense through artful pleading—”by merely alleging that an attorney’s conduct was ‘criminal.’” Id. The Court eschewed a categorical exception for criminal conduct because such an exception would defeat the purposes of the attorney-immunity defense. Instead, the Court held that conduct alleged to be criminal in nature “is not categorically excepted from the protections of attorney civil immunity when the conduct alleged is connected with representing a client in litigation.” Id. As we explained there, a lawyer who is doing his or her job is not more susceptible to civil liability just because a nonclient asserts that the lawyer’s actions are fraudulent, wrongful, or even criminal. Id.

In 2021, the Texas Supreme Court further clarified the holding in Cantey Hanger to state that “When an attorney personally participates ‘in a fraudulent business scheme with his client,’ as opposed to on his client’s behalf, the attorney ‘will not be heard to deny his liability’ because ‘such acts are entirely foreign to the duties of an attorney.’” Haynes & Boone, LLP v. NFTD, LLC, 631 S.W.3d 65, 77 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Poole v. Hous. & T.C. Ry. Co., 58 Tex. 134, 137 (1882)). The Court in Haynes & Boone, LLP, also expanded the Cantey Hanger holding to extend to transactional work that the attorney performs, in addition to litigation work covered in the Cantey Hanger opinion:

Today we confirm that attorney immunity applies to claims based on conduct outside the litigation context, so long as the conduct is the “kind” of conduct we have described above. We reach this conclusion because we see no meaningful distinction between the litigation context and the non-litigation context when it comes to the reasons we have recognized attorney immunity in the first place. We have recognized attorney immunity because attorneys are duty-bound to competently, diligently, and zealously represent their clients’ interests while avoiding any conflicting obligations or duties to themselves or others.

Id. at 79.

Most recently, in Taylor v. Tolbert, the Court reviewed whether there was an exception to immunity for private-party civil suits asserting that a lawyer has engaged in conduct criminalized by statute. No. 20-0727, 2022 Tex. LEXIS 385 (Tex. May 6, 2022). The court discussed the immunity defense as follows:

The common-law attorney-immunity defense applies to lawyerly work in “all adversarial contexts in which an attorney has a duty to zealously and loyally represent a client” but only when the claim against the attorney is based on “the kind of conduct” attorneys undertake while discharging their professional duties to a client. Stated inversely, if an attorney engages in conduct that is not “lawyerly work” or is “entirely foreign to the duties of a lawyer” or falls outside the scope of client representation, the attorney-immunity defense is inapplicable.

In determining whether conduct is “the kind” immunity protects, the inquiry focuses on the type of conduct at issue rather than the alleged wrongfulness of that conduct. But when the defense applies, counsel is shielded only from liability in a civil suit, not from “other mechanisms” that exist “to discourage and remedy” bad-faith or wrongful conduct, including sanctions, professional discipline, or criminal penalties, as appropriate.

Conduct is not the kind of conduct attorney immunity protects “simply because attorneys often engage in that activity” or because an attorney performed the activity on a client’s behalf. Rather, the conduct must involve “the uniquely lawyerly capacity” and the attorney’s skills as an attorney. For example, a lawyer who makes publicity statements to the press and on social media on a client’s behalf does “not partake of ‘the office, professional training, skill, and authority of an attorney’” because “[a]nyone—including press agents, spokespersons, or someone with no particular training or authority at all—can publicize a client’s allegations to the media.” Immunity attaches only if the attorney is discharging “lawyerly” duties to his or her client.

A corollary to this principle is that attorneys will not be entitled to civil immunity for conduct that is “entirely foreign to the duties of an attorney.” “Foreign to the duties” does not mean something a good attorney should not do; it means that the attorney is acting outside his or her capacity and function as an attorney. For that reason, whether counsel may claim the privilege turns on the task that was being performed, not whether the challenged conduct was meritorious.

This is so because the interests of clients demand that lawyers “competently, diligently, and zealously represent their clients’ interests while avoiding any conflicting obligations or duties to themselves or others.” To prevent chilling an attorney’s faithful discharge of this duty, lawyers must be able to pursue legal rights they deem necessary and proper for their clients without the menace of civil liability looming over them and influencing their actions. Attorney immunity furthers “loyal, faithful, and aggressive representation” by “essentially . . . removing the fear of personal liability,” thus “alleviating in the mind of [an] attorney any fear that he or she may be sued by or held liable to a non-client for providing . . . zealous representation.” In this way, the defense protects not only attorneys but also their clients, who can be assured that counsel is representing the client’s best interests, not the lawyer’s.

Id. The Court acknowledged that “there is a wide range of criminal conduct that is not within the ‘scope of client representation’ and [is] therefore ‘foreign to the duties of an attorney,’” and that “when that is the case, the circumstances do not give rise to an ‘exception’ to the immunity defense; rather, such conduct simply fails to satisfy the requirements for invoking the defense in the first instance.” Id. “[O]ur approach to applying the attorney-immunity defense remains functional, not qualitative, and leaves an attorney’s improper conduct addressable by public remedies.” Id.

The Court then held that the common-law defense of attorney immunity would still apply to state statutes (unless the statute specifically abrogated that defense). Id. The Court stated:

That does not mean that all conduct criminalized by the wiretap statute is immunized from civil liability or free of consequences. As we explained in Bethel, while criminal conduct is not categorically excepted from the attorney-immunity defense, neither is it categorically immunized by that defense. Criminal conduct may fall outside the scope of attorney immunity, and even when it does not, “nothing in our attorney-immunity jurisprudence affects an attorney’s potential criminal liability if the conduct constitutes a criminal offense.”

Id. However, regarding federal statutes, the Court concluded “that attorney immunity, as recognized and defined under Texas law, is not a defense under the federal wiretap statute because, quite simply, a state’s common-law defense does not apply to federal statutes.” Id.

In light of the foregoing authorities, it appears claims against attorneys merely doing work for a client (whether fraudulent, tortious, or even criminal) would be covered by attorney immunity and bar any participation in breach of fiduciary duty claim. However, if the misconduct relates to the attorney personally benefitting from the transaction, or having been a party to the transaction (as opposed to merely the attorney for a party), such an immunity would not apply. See, e.g., Olmos v. Giles, No. 3:22-CV-0077-D, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77134 (N.D. Tex. April 28, 2022) (refused to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claim and misrepresentation claim against attorneys where it was unclear whether the defendant attorneys were a part of the transaction).

Another issue that should be discussed is the impact on the attorney client privilege when an attorney participates in fraud or criminal activities. The attorney-client privilege cannot be enforced when “the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud.” Tex. R. Evid. 503 (d)(1). As one court describes:

The exception applies only when (1) a prima facie case is made of contemplated fraud, and (2) there is a relationship between the document at issue and the prima facie proof offered. A prima facie showing is sufficient if it sets forth evidence that, if believed by a trier of fact, would establish the elements of a fraud or crime that “was ongoing or about to be committed when the document was prepared.” A court may look to the document itself to determine whether a prima facie case has been established.…

We begin our analysis by examining the scope of the fraud portion of the crime/fraud exception. The Texas Rules of Evidence do not define what is intended in Rule 503(d)(1) by the phrase “to commit . . . [a] fraud.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines fraud as: “A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment.” The Texas common law tort of fraud also requires proof of misrepresentation, concealment, or non-disclosure. The legal concept of fraud therefore has at its core a misrepresentation or concealment. This definition also dovetails with the apparent reasoning behind inclusion of fraud in the exception: by keeping client communications confidential–pursuant to the attorney-client privilege –the attorney whose client intends to make a misrepresentation or concealment helps prevent the injured party from learning the truth about the misrepresentation or concealment. Thus, in that situation, the attorney’s silence affirmatively aids the client in committing the tort. This is not generally true of other torts (not based on misrepresentation or concealment) and explains why the exception is not the crime/tort exception.

In re Gen. Agents Ins. Co. of Am., Inc., 224 S.W.3d 806, 819 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, orig. proceeding). Moreover, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that this exception includes the work-product in the proper circumstances. Woodruff v. State, 330 S.W.3d 709, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 9569 (Tex. App. Texarkana Dec. 3, 2010), pet. ref’d No. PD-1807-10, 2011 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 749 (Tex. Crim. App. May 25, 2011), pet. ref’d No. PD-1807-10, 2011 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 770 (Tex. Crim. App. June 1, 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 977, 132 S. Ct. 502, 181 L. Ed. 2d 347, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7788 (U.S. 2011).

So, though an attorney may be immune from civil liability, the crime/fraud exception may open up attorney/client communications to the light of day. Regarding crimes involving breaches of fiduciary duty, in addition to theft crimes, the Texas Legislature has created the following crimes: (1) Financial Abuse of Elderly Individual in Texas Penal Code Section 32.55; 2) Financial Exploitation of Vulnerable Individuals in Texas Penal Code Section 32.53; (3) Misapplication of Fiduciary Property in Texas Penal Code Section 32.45; and (4) Failure to Report of the Exploitation of the Elderly or Disabled Individuals in the Texas Human Resources Code Section 48.051.

Article By David Fowler Johnson of Winstead

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Protection for Voice Actors is Artificial in Today’s Artificial Intelligence World

As we all know, social media has taken the world by storm. Unsurprisingly, it’s had an impact on trademark and copyright law, as the related right of publicity. A recent case involving an actor’s voice being used on the popular app TikTok is emblematic of the time. The actor, Bev Standing, sued TikTok for using her voice, simulated via artificial intelligence (AI) without her permission, to serve as “the female computer-generated voice of TikTok.” The case, which was settled last year, illustrates how the law is being adapted to protect artists’ rights in the face of exploitation through AI, as well as the limits of current law in protecting AI-created works.

Standing explained that she thinks of her voice “as a business,” and she is looking to protect her “product.” Apps like TikTok are taking these “products” and feeding them into an algorithm without the original speaker’s permission, thus impairing creative professionals’ ability to profit in an age of widespread use of the Internet and social media platforms.

Someone’s voice (and aspects of their persona such as their photo, image, or other likeness) can be protected by what’s called the “right of publicity.” That right prevents others from appropriation of one’s persona – but only when appropriation is for commercial purposes. In the TikTok case, there was commercial use, as TikTok was benefiting from use of Standing’s voice to “narrate” its users’ videos (with some user videos apparently involving “foul and offensive language”). In her Complaint, Standing alleged TikTok had violated her right of publicity in using her voice to create the AI voice used by TikTok, and relied upon two other claims: false designation of origin under the Lanham Act and copyright infringement, as well as related state law claims. The false designation of origin claim turned on whether Standing’s voice was so recognizable that another party’s misappropriation of it could confuse consumers as to whether Standing authorized the Tik Tok use. The copyright infringement claim was possible because Standing created the original voice files for a company that hired her to record Chinese language translations. TikTok subsequently acquired the files but failed to get a license from Standing to use them, as TikTok was legally obligated to do because Standing was the original creator (and therefore copyright owner) of the voice files.

As with other historical technological innovations (one of the earliest being the printing press), the law often plays catch-up, but has proven surprisingly adaptable to new technology. Here, Standing was able to plead three legal theories (six if you count the state statutory and common law unfair competition claims), so it seems artists are well-protected by existing law, at least if they are alleging AI was used to copy their work or persona.

On the other hand, the case for protecting creative expression produced in whole or in part by AI is much more difficult. Some believe AI deserves its own form of copyright, since innovative technology has increasingly made its own music and sounds. Currently, protection for these sounds is limited, since only humans can be identified as authors for the purposes of copyright. Ryan Abott, a professor of law and health science at the University of Surrey in Britain, is attempting to bring a legal case against the U.S. Copyright Office to register a digital artwork made by a computer with AI as its author. The fear, says Abott, is that without rights over these sounds, innovation will be stifled — individuals will not have incentive to create AI works if they cannot protect them from unauthorized exploitation.

Article By Jeanne Hamburg of Norris McLaughlin P.A.

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The Unredeemable Debtor

The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of the moral development of the race.

– Oliver Wendell Holmes

Bankruptcy law decisions are replete with references to the “worthy debtor.” In re Carp, 340 F.3d 15, 25 (1st Cir. 2003); In re BankVest Capital Corp., 360 F.3d 291 (1st Cir.2004); In re Institute of Business and Professional Educ., Inc., 79 B.R. 948 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); In re Nickerson, 40 B.R. 693 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984); In re Marble, (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1984); In re Doherty, 219 B.R. 665 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1998).

These decisions typically employ the “worthy debtor” nomenclature in the context of the entitlements that are afforded by the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. It is always the “worthy debtor” that is entitled to a discharge of debts, a “fresh start”, or to reject cumbersome contracts. This usage bespeaks a universe that also contains the “unworthy debtor,” a party whose behavior does not merit the statutory benedictions of the Bankruptcy Code. The identity of these parties is most often examined in the context of the discharge of debts and the behavior or actions that merit a denial of discharge or the finding that a particular debt is non-dischargeable.

There is a larger and more amorphous question though that also merits consideration, namely are their industries, companies, enterprises whose function and purpose is so odious and inconsistent with the precepts of good citizenship and the “moral development of the race”, to quote Justice Holmes, that they should be denied the benefits of reorganization afforded by the Bankruptcy Code.

If there is an argument to be made to prevent such enterprises from receiving the benefits of the Bankruptcy Code, to deny them the colloquial label of “worthy debtor”, that recourse likely lies within the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that require that a plan of reorganization be “proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law.” 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3). The “not forbidden by law” requirement is of limited utility in situations where the behavior is recognizable as immoral or intrinsically evil to most but has not yet been sanctioned by any legislative authority. Notably, and perhaps inversely, enterprises engaged in the sale and growing of cannabis are without access to the Bankruptcy Code because they act in contravention of the federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq., which has been found to take precedence over state laws allowing the sale of cannabis. See, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 12 (2005). As a result, bankruptcy being a creature of federal law, cannabis cases are generally being dismissed at the outset for cause in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) and not making it as far as the confirmation standard. See, In re Way To Grow, Inc., 597 B.R. 111 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2018).

If “forbidden by law” is unavailable as a source of relief, the last best hope to prevent the sanctioned reorganization of the unworthy debtor lies within the requirement that a plan be proposed in “good faith.”

“Good faith” is not defined by the Bankruptcy Code, a fact that makes it more likely that our understanding of good faith may be transitory and that as the ‘moral development of the race’ proceeds, so might our understanding of ‘good faith.’ In other words, what was good faith yesterday might not, in light of our communal experience and growth as citizens, be good faith today.

In the first instance, we can understand from the ordering of the words within section 1129(a)(3) that the good faith standard exists independently of the ‘forbidden by law’ standard. A plan of reorganization may describe a course of action not forbidden by law, but may still not meet the ‘good faith’ standard.

The good faith standard as used within section 1129(a)(3) is most commonly described as proposing a plan that fulfills the purposes and objectives of the Bankruptcy Code. Those purposes and objectives within the context of Chapter 11 are most commonly understood as being “to prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs and possible misuse of economic resources.” NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1983); see also, Bank of Am. Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 452 (1999) (“[T]he two recognized policies underlying Chapter 11 [are] preserving going concerns and maximizing property available to satisfy creditors”)

This case law, which is by far the most consistent usage of the term, emphasizes paying back creditors and preserving an ongoing enterprise. It does not suggest the existence of anything more amorphous beyond those standards and it supports the idea that the ‘good faith’ standard is not meant to be an existential inquiry into the moral worth of a particular industry.

Bankruptcy courts have, however, recognized that the absence of a definition of good faith leaves courts without “any precise formulae or measurements to be deployed in a mechanical good faith equation.” Metro Emps. Credit Union v. Okoreeh–Baah (In re Okoreeh–Baah), 836 F.2d 1030, 1033–34 (6th Cir.1988) (interpreting good faith in context of Chapter 13).

Any successful collateral attack under section 1129(a)(3) on the ‘good faith’ of the immoral enterprise must likely follow the path of connecting the good faith standard to the “public good.” Bankruptcy Courts have invoked the ‘public good’ in refusing to enforce certain contracts and have followed the dictates of some courts that “while violations of public policy must be determined through “definite indications in the law of the sovereignty,” courts must not be timid in voiding agreements which tend to injure the public good or contravene some established interest of society. Stamford Bd. of Educ. v. Stamford Educ. Ass’n., 697 F.2d 70, 73 (2d Cir.1982).

The concept of the ‘public good’ is not a foreign one in bankruptcy courts. Seeking relief for debtors that are the only providers of a service within their geographic area is an immensely easier task, no court, and no bankruptcy judge, likes to see a business fail and when the business is important to the community, support for reorganization from the bench often works to make reorganization easier. Bankruptcy courts, although restrained by a statutory scheme, are as a matter of practice courts of equity. Employing those equitable arguments to support a reorganization is both achievable and a reality of present practice.

Whether equitable arguments can be inversely employed to graft a sense of the ‘public good’ onto the good faith requirement within section 1129(a)(3) is decidedly uncertain and is not directly supported by the case law as it exists.

Somewhere out there though in one of those small border towns between the places of unelected legislators and the judicious and novel application of historical precedent lies the “moral development of the race” and the bankruptcy court that finds that incumbent within the concept of good faith is fair consideration of the public good.

Article By Peter J. Haley of Nelson Mullins

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McDonald’s ESG Board Battle Ends…For Now

Last week, McDonald’s scored a victory in a months long battle over the makeup of its Board of Directors that brought McDonald’s environmental, social and governance (ESG) practices directly into the spotlight. At issue was McDonald’s alleged mistreatment of pigs in its supply chain, with private equity financier Carl Icahn bringing to light the alleged mistreatment to light in an effort to have two Icahn-backed Board of Directors nominees elected to the Board of the company. McDonald’s ESG practices and claims were brought front and center during the battle, which ultimately resulted in Icahn’s nominees losing their bid for Board seats. Nevertheless, the battle for control of the Board clearly demonstrates the increasing interplay between ESG and Board composition, which both publicly traded and privately held companies must pay close attention to.

McDonald’s ESG Practices Called Into Question

In February 2022, Icahn launches a proxy fight against McDonald’s, specifically citing the company’s alleged mistreatment of pigs when he lobbied for two new Board members who Icahn felt would strengthen McDonald’s ESG practices focused on animal welfare and sustainability. In April, Icahn directly targeted McDonald’s ESG practices when he stated that the company’s ESG promises were “hollow” when compared to corporate practices. Icahn focused attention on the use of gestational crates for pigs that were part of the McDonald’s supply chain, which he stated amounted to torture since allegations surfaced that the pigs were not able to move at all for six weeks due to the crate conditions.

In response, McDonald’s stood by its ESG related practices and commitments to fulfilling its ESG goals, while at the same time noting that Icahn’s call for having all pigs in the supply chain was unrealistic and virtually impossible to achieve.

Icahn’s two nominees were unsuccessful in obtaining Board seats as a result of the elections.

ESG Lessons For All Companies

McDonald’s is not the first, nor will it be the last, company to face criticism during Board elections over ESG practices. With the media, SEC, and citizens alike focused so much on ESG related issues, companies must understand that there are risks in overstating ESG related efforts, goals, and metrics. Similarly, having Board members of others in leadership positions who are not properly equipped to understand or make educated decisions on ESG related issues will draw undesired attention on companies of all sizes. Any statements, disclosures, prospectus materials, or even marketing materials must be scrutinized closely for accuracy, while sound and reasonable marketing statements that touch on ESG factors must be the standard for companies to follow.

Article By John Gardella of CMBG3 Law

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SEC Commissioner Signals Need to Fulfill Mandate of Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Develop “Minimum Standards” for Lawyers Practicing Before the Commission

In remarks on March 5, 2022, on PLI’s Corporate Governance webcast, Commissioner Allison Herren Lee of the Securities and Exchange Commission stated that 20 years after its enactment, it is time to revisit the “unfulfilled mandate” of Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and establish minimum standards for lawyers practicing before the Commission.¹ Commissioner Lee, who announced that she will not seek a second term when her current one ends this month, took issue with what she called the “goal-directed reasoning” of some securities lawyers—that is, focusing primarily on the outcome sought by executives, rather than the impact on investors and the market as a whole. Such lawyering, Commissioner Lee observed, has a host of negative consequences, including encouraging non-disclosure of material information, harming investors and market integrity, and stymying deterrence. The solution, Commissioner Lee opined, is to fulfill the mandate of Section 307, which empowered the Commission to “issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers.”²

Over the last 20 years, the Commission has declined to adopt enhanced rules of professional conduct for lawyers appearing before the Commission. There are good reasons for the Commission’s inaction, including the attorney-client privilege, the goal of zealous advocacy, the fact-specific nature of materiality determinations, and the traditionally state-law basis for the regulation of attorney conduct. Commissioner Lee, moreover, did not propose specific new rules and recognized that the task was difficult and should be informed by the views of the securities bar and other stakeholders. Nor did she say that action by the Commission was imminent; it is unclear whether the Commission has authority to promulgate new rules under Section 307 given a 180-day sunset under the statute that occurred in 2003. Indeed, neither Commissioner Lee nor any of the other SEC commissioners have issued statements on this topic since the PLI webcast. SEC Enforcement Director Gurbir Grewal has, however, indicated an increased emphasis on gatekeeper accountability in order to restore public trust in the market.³ Nonetheless, given the Commission’s existing authority to impose discipline under its Rules of Practice, practitioners should be mindful of the potential for increased scrutiny moving forward.

Background

In the wake of corporate accounting scandals involving Enron, Worldcom, and other companies, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 “[t]o safeguard investors in public companies and restore trust in the financial markets.”⁴ The Act was aimed at “combating fraud, improving the reliability of financial reporting, and restoring investor confidence,”⁵ including by empowering the SEC with increased regulatory authority and enforcement power.⁶ To that end, the Act includes provisions to fortify auditor independence, promote corporate responsibility, enhance financial disclosures, and enhance corporate fraud accountability.⁷

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed just six months after the collapse of Enron in December 2001, and neither the House nor Senate bills originally contained professional responsibility language.⁸ Hours before the Senate passed its version of the Act, however, the Senate amended the bill to include language that would eventually become Section 307.⁹ Around the same time, 40 law professors sent a letter to the SEC requesting the inclusion of a professional conduct rule governing corporate lawyers practicing before the Commission.¹⁰ The letter picked up on a 1996 article by Professor Richard Painter, then of the University of Illinois College of Law, which recommended corporate fraud disclosure obligations for attorneys similar to those imposed on accountants by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.¹¹ Senator John Edwards, one of the sponsors of the Senate floor amendment of the bill, emphasized the importance of including professional conduct rules for attorneys in such a significant piece of legislation, stating that “[o]ne of the problems we have seen occurring with this sort of crisis in corporate misconduct is that some lawyers have forgotten their responsibility” is to the companies and shareholders they represent, not corporate executives.¹²

In its final form, Section 307 imposed a professional responsibility requirement for attorneys that represent issuers appearing before the Commission. Specifically, Section 307 directed the Commission, within 180 days of enactment of the law, to “issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers,”¹³ and, at minimum, promulgate “a rule requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities laws or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the issuer or any agent thereof to appropriate officers within the issuer and, thereafter, to the highest authority within the issuer, if the initial report does not result in an appropriate response.”¹⁴

Since the enactment of Section 307, however, the Commission has promulgated only one rule pursuant to its authority, commonly known as the “up-the-ladder” rule.¹⁵ The up-the-ladder rule imposes a duty on attorneys representing an issuer before the Commission to report evidence of material violations of the securities laws. When an attorney learns of evidence of a material violation, the attorney has a duty to report it to the issuer’s chief legal officer (“CLO”) and/or the CEO.¹⁶ If the attorney believes the CLO or CEO did not take appropriate action within a reasonable time to address the violation, the attorney has a duty to report the evidence to the audit committee, another committee of independent directors, or the full board of directors until the attorney receives “an appropriate response.”¹⁷ Alternatively, attorneys can satisfy their duty by reporting the violation to a qualified legal compliance committee.¹⁸ To date, the SEC has never brought a case alleging a violation of the up-the-ladder rule.

Commissioner Lee’s Remarks

In her remarks, Commissioner Lee stated that it is time to revisit the “unfulfilled mandate” of Section 307 and consider whether the Commission should adopt and enforce minimum standards for lawyers who practice before the Commission. Commissioner Lee criticized “goal-directed reasoning” employed by sophisticated counsel in securities matters, and cited as an example Bandera Master Fund v. Boardwalk Pipeline,¹⁹ a recent decision in which the Delaware Court of Chancery rebuked the attorneys involved for their efforts to satisfy the aims of a general partner instead of their duty to the partnership-client as a whole. The Court, specifically, stated that counsel “knowingly made unrealistic and counterfactual assumptions, knowingly relied on an artificial factual predicate, and consistently engaged in goal-directed reasoning to get to the result that [the general partner] wanted.”²⁰ Bandera and cases like it, according to Commissioner Lee, are emblematic of a “race to the bottom” caused by pressure on securities lawyers to compete with each other for clients, while failing to give due consideration to the potential impact on investors, market integrity, and the public interest.

In Commissioner Lee’s view, “goal-directed” lawyering not only falls short of ethical standards but causes harm to the market and reduces deterrence. Commissioner Lee expressed concern that, in an effort to give management the answer it wants, lawyers may downplay or obscure material information.²¹ Although recognizing that materiality determinations are fact-intensive, Commissioner Lee said that should not provide blanket cover for legal advice aimed at concealing material information from the public. Non-disclosure has a host of negative consequences, including distorting market-moving information, interfering with price discovery, misallocating capital, impairing investor decision-making, and eroding confidence in the financial markets and regulatory system. Further, such lawyering diminishes deterrence by creating a legal cover for inadequate disclosure, making it more difficult for regulators to hold responsible individuals accountable. This type of legal counsel, in Commissioner Lee’s view, “is merely rent-seeking masquerading as legal advice, while providing a shield against liability.”

Commissioner Lee stated that the existing framework governing professional conduct is not adequate to hold lawyers accountable for such “reckless” advice. According to Commissioner Lee, state bars—the principal source for lawyer discipline nationwide—are not up to the task because they lack resources, expertise in securities matters, and the ability to impose adequate monetary sanctions. Additionally, Commissioner Lee noted that state law standards focused mostly on the behavior of individual lawyers, assigning few responsibilities to the firm for quality assurance. Indeed, state law standards are mostly drafted in a “one-size-fits-all fashion” according to Commissioner Lee, and do not take into account the different issues faced at large firms that represent public companies, which are quite different from a solo practitioner handling personal injury or estate law matters. Likewise, although the SEC has the power under Rule 102(e) of its Rules of Practice to suspend or bar attorneys whose conduct falls below “generally recognized norms of professional conduct,” there has been little effort to define or enforce that standard.²² Nor has the SEC rigorously enforced standards of attorney conduct under the one rule it has issued under Section 307, the “up-the-ladder” rule.

Commissioner Lee stated that it was time for the Commission to fulfill its mandate under Section 307. Although not proposing any specific rules, Commissioner Lee offered the following concepts as a starting point:

Greater detail on lawyers’ obligations to a corporate client, including how advice must reflect “the interests of the corporation and its shareholders rather than the executives who hire them”;
Requirements of “competence and expertise” (as an example, disclosure lawyers should not opine on materiality “without sufficient focus or understanding of the views of ‘reasonable’ investors”);
Continuing education for securities lawyers advising public companies (similar to requirements set by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board for minimum hours of qualifying continuing professional education for audit firm personnel);
Oversight at the firm level (similar to quality-control measures implemented at audit firms);
Emphasis on the need for independence in rendering advice (similar to substantive and disclosure requirements implemented in Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X for auditors);
Obligations to investigate red flags and ensure accurate predicates for legal opinions (similar to the obligations that an auditor must perform to certify to the accuracy of their client’s financial statements); and
Retention of contemporaneous records to support the reasonableness of legal advice.

Commissioner Lee noted that the content of any specific rules or standards will require “careful thought,” as well as assistance from the securities bar, experts on professional responsibility, and other interested parties and market participants. She invited input from the legal community and other stakeholders and noted that she appreciated the complexity of the task and concerns of the American Bar Association and others regarding protection of the attorney-client privilege. Indeed, outside auditors are generally regarded as “public watchdogs” and such communications between the corporation and an auditor are not entitled to the affirmative attorney-client privilege afforded to legal counsel. Accordingly, regulating the legal profession using a similar framework to that applied to the accounting profession has sparked more controversy. Nonetheless, in Commissioner Lee’s view, those concerns should be weighed against “the costs of there being few, if any, consequences for contrived or tortured advice.”

Implications

The Commission has declined to adopt enhanced rules of professional conduct for lawyers appearing before it in the 20 years since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Commissioner Lee’s call for minimum standards, however, potentially signals increased scrutiny by the SEC with respect to lawyers who “practice before the Commission.” As Commissioner Lee noted, that means “counsel involved in the formulation and review of issuers’ public disclosure, including those who address the many legal questions that often arise in that context.”²³ Nonetheless, Commissioner Lee cautioned that she did “not intend with these comments to address the conduct of attorneys serving as litigators or otherwise representing their client(s) in an advocacy role in an adversarial proceeding or other similar context, such as in an enforcement investigation.”²⁴

Although framing her call for standards in terms of Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it is not clear that the Commission will—or even can—promulgate any further rules under that authority. Commissioner Lee did not state that she was speaking on behalf of the Commission or indicate that the Commission would be taking concrete, imminent steps to adopt such standards. The Commission has not put its imprimatur on the remarks by incorporating them into a formal release or statement of policy. Moreover, the text of Section 307 appears to foreclose the possibility of further rulemaking, as it provides that the Commission shall issue any such rules “[n]ot later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this act,” i.e., January 27, 2003. Consistent with that constraint, the SEC proposed the up-the-ladder requirements on November 21, 2002, in Release No. 33-8150, and the rule became final on January 29, 2003.²⁵ But the SEC has not issued any other rule under Section 307 to date.

Even if official action under Section 307 may not be forthcoming, Commissioner Lee’s call for action should not be discounted. Setting aside the up-the-ladder requirements, the SEC has authority under Rule 102(e) of the SEC’s Rules of Practice to censure or bar a lawyer from appearing or practicing before the Commission if found, among other things, “[t]o be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged and unethical or improper professional conduct.”²⁶ Commissioner Lee cited prior SEC guidance to indicate that Rule 102(e) may apply to attorney conduct that falls below “generally recognized norms of professional conduct,”²⁷ a standard that has been left undefined to date.²⁸ In practice, the SEC “will hold attorneys who practice before it to the standards to which they are already subject, including state bar rules.”²⁹ At a minimum, then, Commissioner Lee’s objective of greater accountability may be achieved through a more aggressive application of Rule 102(e), which, as she noted, has generally only been applied as a follow-on penalty for primary violations of the securities laws by lawyers.

Commissioner Lee’s term expires on June 5, and she has announced that she intends to step down from the Commission once a successor has been confirmed.³⁰ Should the Commission nonetheless take up her call to action in the future, it will be no easy task to adopt clear standards that can be implemented in a predictable manner. In particular, Commissioner Lee’s focus on the role of lawyers in advising issuers on determinations of materiality and disclosure does not lend itself well to oversight or enforcement. The well-established standard for materiality—whether “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote”—is far from clear-cut.³¹ The Supreme Court, moreover, long has recognized that materiality “depends on the facts and thus is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.”³² As such, and as evidenced by the sundry cases concerning disclosure issues reversed on appeal, disagreement between litigants—as well as jurists—on matters of materiality and disclosure are par for the course. If that is so, how can a lawyer’s advice on such matters (which will inevitably turn on the facts and the lawyer’s judgment and experience) be subject to oversight in any objective sense?

Even if lawyers’ materiality advice could be evaluated under objective standards, there are other difficulties. First and foremost is that oversight of legal advice implicates the attorney-client privilege and the underlying benefit of candid advice from securities disclosure and corporate counsel. As the Supreme Court has observed, the attorney-client privilege “is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.”³³ Aside from situations in which the client has voluntarily waived privilege (as sometimes occurs in SEC investigations) or where another exception to the privilege applies, it is unclear how the SEC could evaluate legal advice without invading privilege. Such attempts could have led to an increase in corporate wrongdoing as corporate executives could be more reluctant to seek expert legal advice. In addition, it is unclear how regulators assessing materiality advice would—or could—balance an assessment of whether a lawyer has given the “correct” advice with a lawyer’s ethical obligations of zealous representation of the client.³⁴ The divide between overreaching “goal-directed” reasoning and permissible zealous advocacy for the client is often murky, and reasonable minds can differ depending on the circumstances. Moreover, it is already well-accepted that a corporate lawyer’s obligation is to the corporation as its client, not to any individual officer or director.³⁵ That obligation carries with it ethical duties to “proceed as is reasonably necessary for the best interest” of the corporation, including when the lawyer is aware of violations of the law or other misconduct by senior management.³⁶ In that sense, Commissioner Lee’s proposal could be viewed as a call for the SEC to take on enforcement of existing ethical rules, rather than for the development of novel “minimum standards.”

Ultimately, there are good reasons for the Commission’s reluctance to date to formally adopt minimum standards of professional conduct for lawyers appearing before it, including the attorney-client privilege, the goal of zealous advocacy, and the fact-specific nature of materiality inquiries. The manipulation of facts and bad reasoning targeted by Commissioner Lee are not only the exception, and difficult if not impossible to eliminate completely, but are largely covered by existing rules and practices. Nonetheless, Commissioner Lee’s call for lawyers to strive for higher legal and ethical standards in their counsel should be welcomed. Sound legal advice is not only important for issuer clients, but also for the financial well-being of investors, the integrity of the markets, and public confidence in the regulatory system and capital markets. Enhancements in ethical standards for the legal profession could also lead to reputational benefits and greater integrity in the profession. It remains to be seen whether Commissioner Lee’s remarks will serve as an aspirational goal for securities lawyers, or translate into concrete action by the Commission.

1 Commissioner Allison Herren Lee, Send Lawyers, Guns and Money: (Over-) Zealous Representation by Corporate Lawyers Remarks at PLI’s Corporate Governance – A Master Class 2022 (Mar. 4, 2022), [hereinafter “Commissioner Lee Remarks”].

2 See Sarbanes‑Oxley Act, § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).

3 Gurbir Grewal, Director, Division of Enforcement, Remarks at SEC Speaks 2021 (Oct. 13, 2021).

4 Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 432 (2014).

5 Stephen Wagner and Lee Dittmar, The Unexpected Benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley, Harvard Bus. Rev. (Apr. 2006).

6 See Sarbanes–Oxley Act, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 7202 (2002).

7 See Sarbanes–Oxley Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2002).

8 Jennifer Wheeler, Securities Law: Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Irreconcilable Conflict with the ABA’s Model Rules and the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct?, 56 Okla. L. Rev. 461, 464 (2003).

9 Id.

10 Id. at 468-69.

11 See generally Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate Fraud: Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. Rev. 225 (1996).

12 Wheeler, supra note 8, at 465 (quoting 148 Cong. Rec. S6551 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards)).

13 See Sarbanes‑Oxley Act, § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).

14 Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Rel. No. 8185 (Sept. 26, 2003).

15 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.7.

16 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1).

17 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.3(b)(3), (b)(4).

18 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c).

19 Bandera Master Fund LP v. Boardwalk Pipeline Partners, LP, No. CV 2018-0372-JTL, 2021 WL 5267734, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 2021). In Bandera, plaintiffs brought suit against a general partner for breach of a partnership agreement stemming from the general partner’s exercise of a call right without satisfying two requisite preconditions. The court held for the plaintiffs and found the general partner had engaged in willful misconduct. Id. at *51. Contributing to the misconduct was the general partner’s outside counsel, who drafted an opinion letter justifying the general partner’s exercise of the call right. Id. Throughout the drafting process, the court found, that the outside counsel manipulated the facts in order to achieve the general partner’s desired conclusion. Id. at *18-*47.

20 Id. at *51.

21 Commissioner Lee specifically cited, among other matters, environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) disclosures. The Commission is currently considering additional climate change-related disclosures to Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X. See Jason Halper et al., SEC Proposes Climate-Related Changes to Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP (Mar. 23, 2022); see also Paul Kiernan, SEC Proposes More Disclosure Requirements for ESG Funds, The Wall Street Journal (May 25, 2022, 6:26 pm ET).

22 Rule 102(e) states, in relevant part:

(1) Generally. The Commission may censure a person or deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by the Commission after notice and opportunity for hearing in the matter:

(i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others; or

(ii) to be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct; or

(iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws or the rules and regulations thereunder.

17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1).

23 Commissioner Lee Remarks, supra note 1.

24 Id.

25 Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Rel. No. 8150 (Nov. 21, 2002); Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Rel. No. 8185 (Sept. 26, 2003); see also 2 Legal Malpractice § 14:114 (2022 ed.).

26 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e). The Rules of Practice generally “govern proceedings before the Commission under the statutes that it administers.” 17 C.F.R. § 201.100. The SEC has the authority to administer and enforce such rules pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et. seq. See Comment to Rule 100, SEC Rules of Practice (July 2003).

27 In the Matter of William R. Carter Charles J. Johnson, 47 S.E.C. 471 (Feb. 28, 1981) (“elemental notions of fairness dictate that the Commission should not establish new rules of conduct and impose them retroactively upon professionals who acted at the time without reason to believe that their conduct was unethical or improper. At the same time, however, we perceive no unfairness whatsoever in holding those professionals who practice before us to generally recognized norms of professional conduct, whether or not such norms had previously been explicitly adopted or endorsed by the Commission. To do so upsets no justifiable expectations, since the professional is already subject to those norms.”).

28 In the past, the Commission has sought to discipline lawyers for violating securities laws with scienter, rendering misleading opinions used in disclosures and engaged in otherwise liable conduct, but not for giving negligent legal advice to issuers. See In the Matter of Scott G. Monson, Release No. 28323 (June 30, 2008) (collecting cases).

29 In the Matter of Steven Altman, Esq., Release No. 63306 (Nov. 10, 2010).

30 Statement of Planned Departure from the Commission (Mar. 15, 2022).

31 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).

32 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988).

33 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888)).

34 Rule 1.3: Diligence, American Bar Association, (last visited Mar. 18, 2022) (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”); Rule 1.3 Diligence – Comment 1, American Bar Association, (last visited Mar. 18, 2022) (“A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”).

35 See, e.g., Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.

36 Rule 1.13: Organization As Client, American Bar Association, cmt. 2 (last visited April 19, 2022).

Article By Jason M. Halper, William P. Mills, Erica Hogan, Adam Magid, James Orth, and Jayshree Balakrishnan of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

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Supreme Court Holds That Judges Can’t Invent Rules Governing Arbitration Waiver

Litigators who defend cases brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), particularly ‘collective actions” alleging wage-and-hour violations, often have been able to counter, or even sometimes support, allegations that arbitration agreements have been waived where the conduct of a party has caused prejudice to the other side. In the case of Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., a unanimous Supreme Court has now held that the determinant of waiver is solely dependent upon the nature and magnitude of the actions of the party that might be inconsistent with arbitration, without respect to alleged prejudice.

Morgan thus is an important case for any civil litigator, but it is especially significant for those who deal with employment disputes potentially governed by arbitration agreements, and for those who draw up such agreements in the first place. As is well known, the Court has, in recent years, frequently upheld the primacy of arbitration agreements pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). In the Morgan case, a unanimous Court does it again. Ms. Morgan was an hourly employee at a Taco Bell franchise who had signed an arbitration agreement intended to govern employment disputes. Notwithstanding the arbitration agreement, Morgan went to federal court to bring a nationwide “collective action” arguing that her employer had violated the Fair Labor Standards Act. Sundance, a franchisee of Taco Bell, initially defended against the lawsuit as if the arbitration agreement didn’t exist—filing a motion to dismiss (which the District Court denied) and engaging in mediation (which was unsuccessful). Next, Sundance moved to stay the litigation and compel arbitration under the FAA—almost eight months after Morgan filed the suit. Morgan then expectedly opposed on grounds of waiver of the right to arbitrate.

The governing precedent in the Eighth Circuit, where the case was litigated below, conditioned a finding of waiver of an arbitration agreement on whether the party knew of the right, “acted inconsistently with that right,” and—critical here– “prejudiced the other party by its inconsistent actions.” In deciding that issue, the Court below, as had eight other circuits, invoked “the strong federal policy favoring arbitration” to decide the matter of waiver. Two circuits rejected that rule, and the Supreme Court granted cert. to resolve that split. Justice Kagan, writing for all of the Justices, agreed with those two circuits.

Holding that “the FAA’s ‘policy favoring arbitration’ does not authorize federal courts to invent special, arbitration-preferring procedural rules,” and deciding no other issue with respect to the merits, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings that focus on the whether the employer relinquished its right to arbitrate by its actions that were inconsistent with it. Whatever an employer might otherwise have preferred (given the prior law in most courts of appeals), given the Supreme Court’s holding that any presumption of arbitration and the fact of prejudice are irrelevant, the Morgan case gives clear guidance in several regards, particularly demanding arbitration, if applicable, at the outset of a formal dispute, and resisting any discovery, to the extent possible, until the issue of arbitrability is decided. A defense against waiver simply based on prejudice is not going to fly.

Article By Stuart M. Gerson of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

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“My Lawyer Made Me Do It” is Not an Absolute Defense to Bankruptcy Court Sanctions

Last year, we offered a lesson and a moral from a North Carolina district court decision reversing a $115,000 sanctions order by a North Carolina bankruptcy court.

The lesson from the case was that the bankruptcy court cannot sanction a creditor if there is an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor’s conduct is lawful.

The moral was that a creditor can avoid the time, expense, and risk associated with litigating contempt and sanctions issues by taking basic steps to ensure that confirmed Chapter 11 plans are clear and precise. The moral is even more glaring now because a recent decision from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reveals that the parties continue to fight in court over the easily-avoidable sanctions order. The decision also clarifies when and why a bankruptcy court can sanction a creditor.

Factual Background

In 2009, the Beckharts filed Chapter 11. At the time, they were almost a year behind on a loan secured by the property at Kure Beach. The loan servicer objected to planning confirmation because it did not specify how post-petition mortgage payments would be applied to principal and interest. The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan without clarifying the issue, but the servicer did not ask the court to reconsider its order, nor did it appeal.

The Beckharts paid for five years. Shellpoint acquired the loan from the original servicer and treated it as in default based on unpaid accrued arrearages. Periodically, Shellpoint sent default letters to the Beckharts, who disputed the default. Counsel for Shellpoint advised that the confirmation order had not changed the loan contract terms and that the loan remained in default. The matter escalated with the Beckharts filing complaints with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Shellpoint commenced foreclosure, then represented to the Beckharts that it was ceasing foreclosure, but then posted a foreclosure hearing notice on the Beckharts’ door (allegedly due to error).

Litigation

In January 2020, the Beckharts moved the bankruptcy court to find Shellpoint in contempt and award them monetary sanctions. The court held a hearing in June and, in September 2020, found Shellpoint in contempt. The court tagged Shellpoint with $115,000 in sanctions for lost wages, “loss of a fresh start,” attorney’s fees, and travel expenses.

Bankruptcy courts have the power to hold a party in civil contempt and to impose sanctions for violation of a confirmed plan. The test for liability is based on a recent United States Supreme Court decision — Taggart v. Lorenzen. The Taggart test prohibits sanctions if there was an “objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor’s conduct might be lawful.” There can be contempt for violating the discharge injunction only “if there is no fair ground of doubt as to whether the order barred the creditor’s conduct.”

In reversing the bankruptcy court, the district court noted that the plan and confirmation order did not state how much the debtors would owe on confirmation, did not say how the $23,000 in arrears would be paid, and did not set the amount of the first payment. Confusingly, the confirmation order also said that the original loan terms would remain in effect, except as modified. Finally, the district court pointed out that Shellpoint was repeatedly advised by counsel that their behavior was authorized, and reliance on the advice of outside counsel is a sufficient defense to civil sanctions. Based on all these facts, the district court found that Shellpoint acted in good faith and interpreted the confirmation order in a manner consistent with the contractual terms of the loan, and that was objectively reasonable.

Taggart was a Chapter 7 case involving a discharge violation, but the Fourth Circuit held that the “no fair ground of doubt” test applied broadly in bankruptcy – including in Chapter 11 cases.

But the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s decision to reverse the bankruptcy court because the creditor had requested and received legal advice from outside counsel. The Fourth Circuit held that advice of counsel is not an absolute defense in civil contempt. The Court suggested that, under the Taggart test, advice of counsel “may still be considered in appropriate circumstances as a relevant factor” and “a party’s reliance on guidance from outside counsel may be instructive, at least in part, when determining whether that party’s belief that she was complying with the order was objectively unreasonable.”

The Fourth Circuit held that both lower courts had made mistakes and sent the case back to the bankruptcy court to “reconsider the contempt motion under the correct legal standard, including any additional fact-finding that may be necessary.”

Creditors can take some comfort in the “no fair ground of doubt” test, which is more forgiving than a strict liability standard. But creditors can’t blame their lawyer for perilous conduct and expect the court to exonerate them.

But the most important takeaway hasn’t changed: Creditors should insist on clear and specific plan terms. After over two years of litigation, Shellpoint remains in peril of sanctions. All of this could have been avoided had the loan servicer insisted the plan specify how the Beckharts’ payments would be applied to satisfy the arrearage.

Article By Lance P. Martin of Ward and Smith, P.A.

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Employers Beware: Take-Home COVID Cases are on the Rise (US)

You’ve just been informed that an employee who apparently contracted COVID-19 from exposure in your workplace brought the virus home, and now his spouse, who is in a high-risk category, has contracted the virus and is in the hospital. Do you as the employer face potential liability for the spouse’s illness?

More than two dozen so-called “take-home” COVID-19 lawsuits have been filed across the country, including against some of the largest employers in the US. This alarming pattern has prompted trade groups to warn employers of the potential for lawsuits stemming from COVID infections filed not only by workers’ family and friends but by anyone infected by that circle of people, creating a seemingly endless chain of liability for employers. Some states have enacted laws shielding employers from such suits, but where that is not the case, the legal theories and procedural paths under which these suits have proceeded vary – including some being brought in state courts, some in federal courts, and others brought under claims within the worker’s compensation system.

The issue is currently being tested in California, where the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently certified questions to the California Supreme Court seeking guidance on the state’s laws. The case, Kuciemba v. Victory Woodworks, Inc., arose after Mr. Kuciemba allegedly was exposed to COVID-19 through his work at one of his employer’s job sites. According to the Kuciembas, Victory knowingly transferred workers from an infected construction site to the job site where Mr. Kuciemba was assigned without following the safety procedures required by the San Francisco Health Order. He was forced to work in close contact with these employees, and soon developed COVID-19, which he brought back home. His wife is over 65 years old and was at high risk from COVID-19, and the family had been careful to limit their exposure to the virus, with the exception of Mr. Kuciemba going to work. Mrs. Kuciemba subsequently tested positive for the disease and was hospitalized for over a month after developing severe symptoms. The Kuciembas filed suit, alleging that Victory caused Mrs. Kuciemba’s injuries by violating the Health Orders, and negligently allowed COVID-19 to spread from its worksite into their household.

The lower court dismissed the case, which was then appealed to the federal appeals court. After hearing the argument, the court asked the California Supreme Court to answer two questions of state law. First, whether Mrs. Kuciemba’s illness was an “injury” that was “derivative” of Mr. Kuciemba’s work-related injury, and therefore, Mrs. Kuciemba’s claims would be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Worker’s Compensation Act (“WCA”); and second, assuming that the WCA is not the exclusive remedy, whether the employer owed a duty to the households of its employees to exercise ordinary care to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Neither question has been squarely answered by the California Supreme Court, although, as noted by the federal appeals court, in a somewhat analogous situation, California courts have allowed suits against employers who negligently allowed their employees to carry asbestos fibers home to their families.

While the Kuciemba case was pending, a California Court of Appeal in another case, See’s Candies v. Superior Court, ruled that the derivative injury doctrine does not bar third-party COVID-related claims. Under a similar fact pattern, the court allowed the negligence case to go forward while noting that the plaintiff would still need to prove that the employer owed a duty of care to non-employees infected with COVID-19 due to an employee contracting the virus at work. Acknowledging that an analysis of this duty “appear[s] worthy of exploration,” the state appellate court said the analysis would include an assessment of “public policy concerns that might support excluding certain kinds of plaintiffs or injuries from relief.” The California Supreme Court declined to review the See’s case, meaning that it’s holding still stands.

The California Supreme Court has not yet announced whether it will use its discretion to respond to the Ninth Circuit’s certified questions in the Kuciembas’ case. In the meantime, California employers cannot automatically rely on the exclusive remedial scheme provided under the worker’s compensation system to cover these claims and are not necessarily shielded from COVID-19 lawsuits brought by employees’ family members (and perhaps others). That said, even if employers owe their employees’ families a duty of care, affected employees will still have to prove that it was the employer’s negligence that caused the illness and that the virus was not contracted from another source – a tall order for a highly transmissible virus like COVID-19. In the meantime, however, it behooves all California employers to continue maintaining health and safety measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19, and react quickly and appropriately in the event of an outbreak of COVID-19 in the workplace.

Article By Karen E. Wentzel and Cristen R. Hintze of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

For more Coronavirus news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

If You Can’t Stand the Heat, Don’t Build the Kitchen: Construction Company Settles Allegations of Small Business Subcontracting Fraud for $2.8 Million

For knowingly hiring a company that was not a service-disabled, veteran-owned small business to fulfill a set aside contract, a construction contractor settled allegations of small business subcontracting fraud for $2.8 million. A corporate whistleblower, Fox Unlimited Enterprises, brought this misconduct to light. We previously reported on the record-setting small business fraud settlement with TriMark USA LLC, to which this settlement is related. For reporting government contracts fraud, the whistleblower will receive $630,925 of the settlement.

According to the allegations, the general contractor and construction company Hensel Phelps was awarded a General Services Administration (GSA) contract to build the Armed Forces Retirement Home’s New Commons/Health Care Building in Washington, D.C. Part of the contract entailed sharing the work with small businesses, including service-disabled, veteran-owned small businesses (SDVOSB). The construction contractor negotiated all aspects of the contract with an unidentified subcontractor and then hired an SDVOSB, which, according to the settlement agreement, Hensel Phelps knew was “merely a passthrough” for the larger subcontractor, thus creating the appearance of an SDVOSB performing the work on the contract to meet the set-aside requirements. The supposedly SDVOSB subcontractor was hired to provide food service equipment for the Armed Forces Retirement Home building.

“Set aside” contracts are government contracts intended to provide opportunities to SDVOSB, women-owned small businesses, and other economically disadvantaged companies to do work they might not otherwise access. Large businesses performing work on government contracts are often required to subcontract part of their work to these types of small businesses. “Taking advantage of contracts intended for companies owned and operated by service-disabled veterans demonstrates a shocking disregard for fair competition and integrity in government contracting,” said the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Washington, as well as a shocking disregard for proper stewardship of taxpayer funds.

Whistleblowers can help fight fraud and protect taxpayers by reporting government contracts fraud. A whistleblower can report government contracts fraud under the False Claims Act and become a relator in a qui tam lawsuit, from which they may be entitled to a share of the funds the government recovers from fraudsters.

Article By Eva Gunasekera and Renée Brooker at Tycko & Zavareei LLP

For more whistleblower legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Adding Impact to Your Next Cross Examination: 5 Things to Consider When Presenting Witness Testimony

As every trial attorney knows, there are many strategies for cross examining a witness. Among the most effective is confronting a witness with their previous deposition testimony. Nothing beats an opportunity to use their own words against them.

In order to get the most impact from this practice, a savvy litigator will read transcript passages or play audio/video excerpts from the witness’s deposition. An alternate technique—most effective when there is a lot of testimony—is showing a witness’s testimony on-screen using slides. Of course, as with any PowerPoint presentation, there are several things to consider when using this tool to cross examine a witness.

Tips for Witness Testimony Presentation

1. FORMAT THE TRANSCRIPT TEXT

Rather than importing an image of the transcript page, consider copy/pasting or retyping the testimony into a slide. This will give you control over how large you make the text and can even allow you to emphasize certain words or statements that align with your case themes. In addition, most jurors sit 20-40 feet from the projection screen in the courtroom. A good rule of thumb is to use 20-point font type or larger.

2. USE BOLD FONT TYPE

By bolding questions within the transcript, jurors will more easily distinguish them from the witness’s answers to each question. Another tip is to stay away from unique fonts. While “French Script” might be a nice touch on a party invitation, it can be hard to read from the jury box.

3. ANIMATE EACH QUESTION AND ANSWER

If you are using PowerPoint or Key Note, consider adding animation to each question-and-answer text block. It’s natural for people to read ahead if there is more on the screen; by revealing each question and answer one-by-one, you will have a much better chance of holding the jurors’ attention. Effects like “appear,” “wipe,” or “fade” are all good options for this, but stay away from more flamboyant effects like “fly-in” or “zoom” since those are too distracting (and most judges will not allow that to go on for more than a few slides).

4. USE A PHOTO OF THE WITNESS

A photo of the witness will allow the jury to connect the testimony with the witness. If you didn’t videotape the witness, look for a picture on their company website or social media profiles. Obvious caveats apply here; you generally know what the court will allow and to what opposing counsel will object.

5. BE FLEXIBLE

Even though you have prepared all your testimony slides for the unexpected, consider having the entire transcript loaded in a trial presentation software (e.g., TrialDirector or Sanction) that allows you or your trial presentation consultant to jump to any portion of the transcript on the fly. It’s very possible that opposing counsel will argue that an answer is not complete, and the court might instruct you to continue on for several more lines of testimony.

In Conclusion

Visually displaying a witness’s deposition testimony during cross examination allows you to drive home the points most relevant to your arguments and case themes, and most salient to jurors you hope to influence. Following these five simple rules above will make that tactic even more effective in court.

Article By Adam Bloomberg of IMS Consulting & Expert Services

For more business of law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Category: Litigation

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