Category: Labor & Employment

DOJ Begins Its Own DEI Enforcement Efforts

Wednesday evening, February 5, 2025, Attorney General Pam Bondi issued a series of memos to various divisions of the Department of Justice (DOJ). One memo asserted that the DOJ will take action to enforce President Trump’s efforts to eliminate illegal diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives, as outlined in Executive Order 14173 (“Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity”).

This memo, titled “Ending Illegal DEI And DEIA Discrimination And Preferences,” tasks the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division with investigating, eliminating, and penalizing illegal DEI “preferences, mandates, policies, programs, and activities in the private sector and in educational institutions that receive federal funds.” By March 1, 2025, the Civil Rights Division and the Office of Legal Policy are to submit a report containing recommendations to “encourage the private sector to end illegal discrimination and preferences” related to DEI. That report is also supposed to identify the most “egregious and discriminatory DEI and DEIA practitioners in each sector of concern.” One big takeaway from this memo is the implication that some private companies may face criminal penalties for DEI initiatives.

Bondi also directs the DOJ to work with the Department of Education to eliminate DEI programs at universities, based on the Supreme Court’s 2023 decision in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181 (2023).

Notably, the memo itself does not purport to prohibit educational, cultural, or historical observances that “celebrate diversity, recognize historical contributions, and promote awareness without engaging in exclusion or discrimination.” Examples of these types of observances include Black History Month and International Holocaust Remembrance Day.

This new effort from the DOJ will likely face legal scrutiny in the coming weeks, as federal courts have routinely upheld private employers’ First Amendment right to promote DEI. Employers should stay up to date with the rapidly evolving DEI landscape and consult with legal counsel as they evaluate their practices and initiatives for compliance with federal non-discrimination laws.

Copyright © 2025, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.
For more on Department of Justice DEI Enforcement, visit the NLR Civil Rightsand Labor Employment sections.

Illinois Ruling on Civil Liability for Employers Confirms Risks to Companies

Since their inception, the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq.) and Workers’ Occupational Diseases Acts (820 ILCS 310/1 et seq.) (the “Acts” or “Act”) have offered some certainty and predictability with respect to injuries sustained in the course of employment. The Acts provide a clear framework within which injured employees may pursue claims against their employers and ensures they can receive payment of their medical expenses, lost wages associated with their injuries, and compensation for any permanent disabilities and/or disfigurement sustained, without having to prove fault on behalf of the employer. In exchange, the employer pays for these benefits and enjoys some predictability and limitations on the allowable damages under the Acts, assured that the Acts offer the exclusive remedy against the employer, such that no civil lawsuits, where awards may include pain and suffering and be much higher in value, may be brought against them for the same injury. Generally, an employer would be entitled to the exclusive remedies provided under the Acts, assuming that the injury or disease was accidental, arose during and in the course of employment, and is compensable under the Acts. 820 ILCS 310/5(a), 11 (West 2022); 820 ILCS 305/5(a), 11 (West 2022). So, understandably, when an employer is sued in a civil court for a work-related injury, they may look to the protection of the Acts, to defend the claim and argue for dismissal based on the Acts’ exclusivity provisions.

The Acts contain a repose period of 25 years for injury or disability caused by exposure to asbestos. See 820 ILCS 310/1(f) and 820 ILCS 305/1(f). Thus, prior to 2019, no claims could be brought under the Acts more than 25 years after the date of last exposure to asbestos. In the 2015 landmark case of Folta v. Ferro Engineering, 43 N.E. 108 (Ill. 2015), Mr. Folta claimed his mesothelioma was caused, at least in part, from exposure to asbestos while working for his employer, Ferro Engineering, for whom he last worked in 1970. Mr. Folta was diagnosed with mesothelioma over 40 years later in 2011, and filed a civil lawsuit against Ferro (and others) in state court. Ferro moved to dismiss the civil suit, arguing that Mr. Folta’s exclusive remedy was found in the Workers’ Occupational Disease Act, and could not be brought as a civil action against it. However, Mr. Folta argued that because more than 25 years had passed since his exposure to asbestos at Ferro, his claim would be barred by the 25-year repose period and is not “compensable” under the Act, leaving him without any remedy if not allowed to proceed in state court. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed that the Act’s 25-year statute of repose acts as a complete bar, and yet still held that the Act provided Mr. Folta’s exclusive remedy against his employer. The Court noted the question of “compensability” turned on whether the type of injury sustained would fall within the scope of the Act, not whether there is an ability or possibility to recover benefits under the Act. Given that Mr. Folta’s injury was compensable, the Act provided his exclusive remedy, and his claim under the Act was time-barred by the 25-year statute of repose.

While acknowledging that the outcome may be a harsh result as to the plaintiff, leaving him with no remedy against his employer for his latent disease, the Court in Folta noted its job is not to find a compromise, but to interpret the statutes as written, suggesting if a different balance should be struck, it would be the duty of the legislature to do so. And that is what happened in 2019, when the Illinois Senate and House introduced two new statutes carving out exceptions to the exclusive remedy provisions for both the Workers’ Compensation and Workers’ Occupational Diseases Acts. Under the new statutes, the Acts no longer prohibit workers with latent diseases or injuries from pursuing their claims after the repose period in civil court. The new statute added to the Workers Occupational Disease Act, 820 ILCS 310/1.1, states:

Permitted civil actions. Subsection (a) of Section 5 and Section 11 do not apply to any injury or death resulting from an occupational disease as to which the recovery of compensation benefits under this Act would be precluded due to the operation of any period of repose or repose provision. As to any such occupational disease, the employee, the employee’s heirs, and any person having standing under the law to bring a civil action at law, including an action for wrongful death and an action pursuant to Section 27-6 of the Probate Act of 1975, has the nonwaivable right to bring such an action against any employer or employers.

When Governor J.B. Pritzker signed the bill into law in May 2019, he issued a statement, indicating the purpose of the revised legislation is to allow workers to “pursue justice,” given that in some cases, the 25-year limit is shorter than the medically recognized latency period of some diseases, such as those caused by asbestos exposure. The impact on employers, however, was not addressed. And employers were left with questions, including critically, whether this new change to the law can apply retroactively, when the statute itself is silent as to the temporal scope. Having relied on the provisions of the Acts in place at the time for basic and critical business decisions, including procurement of appropriate insurance and establishment of wages and benefits, employers cannot now go back in time and change those decisions to offset the increased liability which they now face. Further, following Folta, employers have a vested defense in the Acts’ exclusivity and statute of repose provisions. So, retroactive application of the new statutes could impose new liabilities not previously contemplated and could strip defendant employers of their vested defenses, violating Illinois’ due process guarantee. Anticipating plaintiffs’ firms would file latent disease claims against employers in civil court going forward, and with decades of case law to support prospective application only, it was just a matter of time before the issue reached further judicial scrutiny.

And that brings us to the Illinois Supreme Court’s January 24, 2025 decision in the matter of Martin v. Goodrich, 2025 IL 130509. Mr. Martin worked for BF Goodrich Company (“Goodrich”) from 1966 to 2012, where he was exposed to vinyl chloride monomer and vinyl chloride-containing products until 1974. He was diagnosed with angiosarcoma of the liver, a disease allegedly caused by exposure to those chemicals, in December of 2019, passing away in 2020. His widow filed a civil lawsuit against Goodrich alleging wrongful death as a result of his exposure, invoking the new exception found in section 1.1 of the Act to bring the matter in civil court. In response, Goodrich moved to dismiss the case based on the Act’s exclusivity provisions, arguing that section 1.1 did not apply because Section 1(f) was not a statute of repose. Alternatively, Goodrich argued that using the exception to revive Martin’s claim would infringe its due process rights under the Illinois Constitution. The district court denied Goodrich’s motion, and Goodrich asked the court to certify two questions to the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for interlocutory appeal: first, whether section 1(f) is a statue of repose for purposes of section 1.1, and second, if so, whether applying section 1.1 to Martin’s suit would violate Illinois’ constitutional due process. Finding the questions impact numerous cases and Illinois’ policy interests, the Seventh Circuit certified the questions, and added a third question: if section 1(f) falls within the section 1.1 exception, what is the temporal reach? Answering these questions, the Illinois Supreme Court held that (1) the period referenced in section 1(f) is a period of repose, (2) the exception in section 1.1 applies prospectively pursuant to the Statute on Statutes, and therefore, (3) it does not violate Illinois’ due process guarantee.

But what did the Court mean when it held that the exception in section 1.1 applies prospectively? Goodrich argued that prospective application would mean that the exception in section 1.1 does not apply to this case, because the last exposure was in 1976, before the amendment was made, and the defendant had a vested right to assert the statute of repose and exclusivity provisions of the Act, which would prohibit the civil suit. The Court pointed out, however, that the amendment did not revive Mr. Martin’s ability to seek compensation under the Act, such that the employer’s vested statute of repose defense would apply. Rather, the amendment gave him the ability to seek compensation through a civil suit outside of the Act. So, the question becomes only whether the employer has a vested right to the exclusivity defense, such that applying section 1.1 would violate due process. The Court held that the exclusivity provisions of the Act are an affirmative defense, such that the employer’s potential for liability exists unless and until the defense is established. And a party’s right to a defense does not accrue until the plaintiff’s right to a cause of action accrues. Applying the new statute prospectively, the Court found the cause of action could be filed in civil court, because the relevant time period for considering applicability of the affirmative defense of the Act’s exclusivity is when the employee discovers his injury. Since Mr. Martin’s cause of action accrued when he was diagnosed in December of 2019, which was after section 1.1 was added, Goodrich did not have a vested exclusivity defense, so Mr. Martin’s claim may proceed without violating due process.

While the court did not apply the new statute retroactively, the effect is essentially the same from the employers’ perspective, as latent injury claims will be allowed to proceed in civil court, as long as the injuries were discovered after expiration of the repose period and after the new statutes went into effect in May of 2019. This was not the outcome defendant employers were hoping to receive, but it is what the Court decided. So, unless or until the legislative tides change again, Illinois employers should be aware of the potential for civil suits for employees’ latent injury or disease claims.

©2025 CMBG3 Law, LLC. All rights reserved.
For more on Civil Liability for Employers, visit the NLR Labor Employment section.

A Primer on Executive Orders and a Preview of the Road Ahead

On January 20, 2025, a new administration took control of the Executive Branch of the federal government, and it has signaled that it will make aggressive use of executive orders.

This would be a good time to review the scope of executive orders and how they may affect employers and health care organizations.

Executive orders are not mentioned in the Constitution, but they have been around since the time of George Washington. Executive orders are signed, written, and published orders from the President of the United States that manage and direct the Executive Branch and are binding on Executive Branch agencies. Executive orders can be used to implement or clarify existing federal law or policies and can direct and manage the way federal agencies interact with private entities. However, executive orders are not a substitute for either statutes or regulations.

The current procedure for implementing executive orders was set out in a 1962 executive order that requires that all such orders must be published in the Federal Register, the same publication where executive agencies publish proposed and final rules. Once published, any executive order can be revoked or modified simply by issuing a new executive order. In addition, Congress can ratify an existing executive order in cases where the authority may be ambiguous.

Although the President has extensive powers under Article II of the Constitution, that does not necessarily mean that executive orders can be issued and enforced on a whim. Over time, federal courts have reviewed executive orders and typically base their decisions on three questions: (1) has Congress delegated any authority to the President to act through an executive order?; (2) if so, what is the scope of any delegation?; and (3) did the President act within the scope of that delegation?

In a seminal case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), the Supreme Court reviewed an executive order signed by President Truman directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate most of the nation’s steel mills to prevent a strike from disrupting steel production during the Korean War. On appeal, the Court ruled that the executive order was not authorized under the Constitution or any statute, and that the President lacked any legislative power. It also rejected the argument that the President had an implied authority to issue the executive order under the military powers delegated to the President, as that did not extend to labor disputes.

More recently, during the COVID-19 pandemic, an executive order used the authority delegated in the Defense Production Act to address potential national defense and food supply disruptions. Nevertheless, deference to an executive order should not be presumed. Yet, even at the height of the pandemic, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the President lacked the authority to issue an executive order mandating that federal contractors be vaccinated against the COVID virus. In Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585 (6th Cir. 2022), the Sixth Circuit ruled that the President’s reliance on the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (“FPASA”) was misplaced and did not authorize issuing an executive order binding on federal contractors; it determined that the act’s goal of improving economy and efficiency in federal procurement of property and services applied to the government itself and did not extend to issuing directives that may “improve the efficiency of contractors and subcontractors.”

The question of a delegation of authority to a President is not necessarily solved with an executive order directing an agency to issue regulations. For example, President Biden signed an executive order directing the Secretary of Labor to publish regulations setting a minimum wage of $15 per hour for federal contractors, based on his reading of FPASA. The regulations were challenged, and two Courts of Appeal reached opposite conclusions. In Bradford v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 101 F.4th 707 (10th Cir. 2024) the Tenth Circuit ruled that Congress had delegated broad authority under FPASA to the President in the language setting out the act’s purpose, and that he was justified in determining that a $15 minimum wage was consistent with the act’s goals. Nevertheless, in State of Nebraska v. Su, 121 F.4th 1 (9th Cir. 2024), the Ninth Circuit determined that the minimum wage mandate did exceed the authority granted to the President and the Department of Labor. That decision relied on a narrow reading of FPASA, and concluded that the intent of the statute was limited to ensuring that the federal government received value in contracts with private entities, and that setting a minimum wage for the employees of those contractors fell outside the reach of FPASA. Although there was a clear split among the circuits, the Supreme Court declined to resolve the matter. For now, disputes involving executive orders may have to be resolved on a case-by-case basis.

In the future, employers and health care organizations that supply goods or services to federal agencies or federally-funded programs should be concerned that if there are executive orders that affect their business, those orders should be examined carefully to evaluate not only the content of those orders, but whether they are authorized by law. EBG intends to monitor these developments along with any relevant rulemaking by federal agencies.

©2025 Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. All rights reserved.
For more on Executive Orders, visit the NLR Administrative Regulatory section

The DEI Stalemate: Paying the Price for the Wrong Move

In a unique, interactive session that was part of the firm’s annual In-House Counsel seminar, participants evaluated potential DEI outcomes by analyzing three fictional scenarios. With elements pulled from real-life cases, the discussion illustrated how the stakes can become increasingly high with DEI practices.

Each participant assumed a different role, from in-house counsel and employee to accuser and accused, creating a lively examination of the benefits of DEI and the challenges associated with implementation, as well as how to develop solutions for evolving issues in the DEI landscape.

The discussion was led by Ken Gray, leader of the Labor and Employment Law Group, X. Lightfoot, an employment and personal injury attorney, and Avery J. Locklear, a labor and employment attorney.

The Technology Company Scenario

The first scenario involved a well-intentioned technology company that recently hired a new SVP in charge of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI), Jordan Ellis. The business in question is a tech leader with over 10,000 employees across the U.S.

Ellis was asked to perform an assessment of the company’s workforce and leadership diversity. He found a number of areas in need of improvement, including female representation in leadership, Black/African American representation in leadership, and Asian/Hispanic representation in leadership.

Tasked with improving these metrics by the CEO, Ellis re-evaluated the Director of Communications role held by John Roe, a White man with a strong track record. Ellis then made the decision to inform Roe of a strategic shift within the company and relieved him of his duties.

The role was split into two new positions that were filled by two qualified deputies: one a White woman, the other a Black woman. Ellis believed the move aligned with the company’s DEI goals, representing a strategic step in making the leadership more inclusive and diverse.

Potential Response to Litigation?

The audience was asked to determine if any possible defense asserted by the company in response to a claim made by Roe represented a house of cards. “This was a fairly clear example of discrimination in relation to Title VII,” noted Gray, “which prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.”

The scenario was based on a real case, Duvall v. Novant Health, Inc. “In this case, a white management level employee who received above average evaluations got the axe,” said Gray. “It was a one-week jury trial, and the jury awarded $10 million.”

The decision made clear that it is permissible for employers to use DEI programs; however, these programs may not form the basis for adverse employment decisions.

“Some call this reverse discrimination, but I just call it discrimination. It’s important to note that the Act doesn’t say in regard to sex, the female sex, or in regard to race, the Black race or the Brown race. It just says race, it just says sex,” Gray explained.

The case established a significant precedent and illustrated a pitfall associated with poorly implemented DEI programs.

A Venture Capital Fund’s Contested Contest

The next scenario involved a venture capital fund interested in supporting businesses led by women of color. To close the funding gap, the fund created a grant contest with a prize of $50,000, growth tools, and mentorship opportunities.

Eligibility was open to Black women who were U.S. residents, with businesses that were at least 51 percent Black woman-owned. The audience discussed potential legal issues an in-house attorney could face as a result of the contest, which included an entry form with official competition rules.

The rules were explicit, stating in all caps that, “BY ENTERING THIS CONTEST, YOU AGREE TO THESE OFFICIAL RULES, WHICH ARE A CONTRACT…”

Two companies with owners who were not Black women were rejected after submitting applications for the contest. The Chief Legal Officers for both companies, Vegan Now and Well Soul, were members of the Collective of Corporate Counsel (CCC), a national bar association promoting the common business interests of in-house counsel through education, networking, and advocacy.

Would it be permissible for CCC to sue on behalf of Vegan Now and Well Soul? Did the rules on the entry form constitute a contract? The audience considered these and other questions.

The contention of CCC was that the form constituted a contract since the potential contest winners entered into a bargain-for-exchange when they applied. CCC’s argument was based on 42 USC § 1981, a federal law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, and ethnicity when making and enforcing contracts.

CCC also contended that the contest violated section 1981 due to its terms, as it categorically excluded non-black applicants from eligibility because of race. “If this sounds familiar, the reason is that it mirrors the factual pattern of a case that went before the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals,” commented Lightfoot.

The case involved the American Alliance for Equal Rights and a venture capital fund out of Atlanta, the Fearless Fund. “Ultimately, the court ruled that the membership organization did have standing to sue on behalf of its members, and the contest likely violated Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,” added Lightfoot.

The Fearless Fund settled the lawsuit and discontinued the contest as a response.

Breaking Boundaries Baristas

In the final scenario, the team explored how a well-intentioned coffee shop owner brewed trouble in her organization with a DEI policy gone wrong. Hiring people of diverse backgrounds and creating a welcoming environment for her team was a central focus for the owner, Linda Harper, who operates three local branches with 20 employees.

One of Linda’s employees, Sam Rowe, was assigned female at birth. “Sam has been living as a man and recently shared that his new pronouns are he/him,” said Locklear. “Though Sam’s announcement was mostly accepted, some of the team didn’t felt comfortable with his transition.”

A heterosexual female colleague, Olivia Spencer, struggled to adapt to Sam’s pronouns and had to be corrected multiple times. A heterosexual male colleague, Ben Paulson, admits the transition makes him somewhat uncomfortable. However, he has respected Sam’s pronouns.

Locklear asked whether Olivia’s and Ben’s behavior has risen to the level of creating a hostile work environment. The answer, of course, is that it depends and, as it is with so many other topics within the legal profession, there is no such thing as a one-size-fits-all, bright-line rule that can be applied to every situation.

Slurs and the misuse of pronouns by co-workers can encourage similar behavior from customers. To illustrate this idea, Gray described a case in which he assisted a client in 2016. “People would approach the coworkers and ask whether their colleague was a man or a woman,” he said. “This would occasionally result in slurs, and the customers would pick up on that, perpetuating the hostile work environment.”

The facts have to be evaluated in the context of every situation. “It boils down to whether the behavior was so severe and pervasive it created a hostile work environment. There’s no magic number of how many harassing events need to occur,” advised Locklear. “It’s based on all the circumstances.”

The EEOC issued new guidance on transgender employees in the workplace in April of 2024. A key aspect of this guidance was the misgendering of employees in front of coworkers and customers to the extent it made them uncomfortable.

“If it’s a long-term employee, there are going to be mistakes, and everyone has to give each other a little bit of grace, but whenever in doubt, you can always just use that person’s name,” added Locklear.

Mandatory Work Events

In an effort to foster unity and celebrate Pride Month, Linda organizes a mandatory drag queen night for the entire workforce. Her hope is that an evening with celebrity impersonator, Holly Wood, could bring the team together through a shared experience emphasizing inclusion.

While some employees are pumped about the event, some, including Ben and Olivia, are not comfortable attending. Sam also feels uneasy, sensing the event is directed at him in a way that feels awkward instead of supportive.

Ben asks to be excused from the event; Linda reiterates that attendance is mandatory and disciplinary action will follow if employees fail to attend.

The day after, Olivia tells Linda she feels the company is “too woke,” and she no longer enjoys working there. Sam describes new tension with his colleagues and feels some are treating him differently as a result of the event.

After some reflection, Linda realizes her approach may have inadvertently caused discomfort among the employees she wanted to support with her commitment to inclusivity. To move forward, she begins considering new ways to promote understanding and respect within her team.

The audience considered what went wrong and there was vast consensus that the event should not have been mandatory.

“This could have been fun, but making it mandatory was a bad idea, especially since it was a social event and an employee had already expressed discomfort,” Locklear explained.

Though the scenario was farfetched, it holds a number of important lessons for employers, Locklear added. “One is to educate your workforce,” she said. “Another could be to update your policies so a person who is transitioning knows who they can talk to about it.”

Any information provided in confidence should remain confidential. Being open about new ideas and willing to have frank discussions with employees is advisable. Assessing whether dress codes are gender-neutral could be another proactive way to foster a positive work environment.

Conclusion

The employment attorneys highlighted well-intentioned actors taking steps that caused issues for members of their fictional workforces. The team cautions in-house counsel against unintended consequences and offers training insights in Part 2 of the session.

© 2025 Ward and Smith, P.A.. All Rights Reserved.
For more on the DEI Stalemate, visit the NLR Labor Employment and Civil Rights sections.

Direct Employer Assistance and 401(k) Plan Relief Options for Employees Affected by California Wildfires

In the past week, devastating wildfires in Los Angeles, California, have caused unprecedented destruction across the region, leading to loss of life and displacing tens of thousands. While still ongoing, the fires already have the potential to be the worst natural disaster in United States history.

Quick Hits

  • Employers can assist employees affected by the Los Angeles wildfires through qualified disaster relief payments under Section 139 of the Internal Revenue Code, which are tax-exempt for employees and deductible for employers.
  • The SECURE Act 2.0 allows employees impacted by federally declared disasters to take immediate distributions from their 401(k) plans without the usual penalties, provided their plan includes such provisions.

As impacted communities band together and donations begin to flow to families in need, many employers are eager to take steps to assist employees affected by the disaster.

As discussed below, the Internal Revenue Code provides employers with the ability to make qualified disaster relief payments to employees in need. In addition, for employers maintaining a 401(k) plan, optional 401(k) plan provisions can enable employees to obtain in-service distributions based on hardship or federally declared disaster.

Internal Revenue Code Section 139 Disaster Relief

Section 139 of the Internal Revenue Code provides for a federal income exclusion for payments received due to a “qualified disaster.” Under Section 139, an employer can provide employees with direct cash assistance to help them with costs incurred in connection with the disaster. Employees are not responsible for income tax, and payments are generally characterized as deductible business expenses for employers. Neither the employees nor the employer are responsible for federal payroll taxes associated with such payments.

“Qualified disasters” include presidentially declared disasters, including natural disasters and the coronavirus pandemic, terrorist or military events, common carrier accidents (e.g., passenger train collisions), and other events that the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury concludes are catastrophic. On January 8, 2025, President Biden approved a Major Disaster Declaration for California based on the Los Angeles wildfires.

In addition to the requirement that payments be made pursuant to a qualified disaster, payments must be for the purpose of reimbursing reasonable and necessary “personal, family, living, or funeral expenses,” costs of home repair, and to reimburse the replacement of personal items due to the disaster. Payment cannot be made to compensate employees for expenses already compensated by insurance.

Employers implementing qualified disaster relief plans should maintain a written policy explaining that payments are intended to approximate the losses actually incurred by employees. In the event of an audit, the employer should also be prepared to substantiate payments by retaining communications with employees and any expense documentation. Employers should also review their 401(k) plan documents to determine that payments are not characterized as deferral-eligible compensation and consider any state law implications surrounding cash payments to employees.

401(k) Hardship and Disaster Distributions

In addition to the Section 139 disaster relief described above, employees may be able to take an immediate distribution from their 401(k) plan under the hardship withdrawal rules and disaster relief under the SECURE 2.0 Act of 2022 (SECURE 2.0).

Hardship Distributions

If permitted under the plan, a participant may apply for and receive an in-service distribution based on an unforeseen hardship that presents an “immediate and heavy” financial need. Whether a need is immediate and heavy depends on the participant’s unique facts and circumstances. Under the hardship distribution rules, expenses and losses (including loss of income) incurred by an employee on account of a federally declared disaster declaration are considered immediate and heavy provided that the employee’s principal residence or principal place of employment was in the disaster zone.

The amount of a hardship distribution must be limited to the amount necessary to satisfy the need. If the employee has other resources available to meet the need, then there is no basis for a hardship distribution. In addition, hardship distributions are generally subject to income tax in the year of distribution and an additional 10 percent early withdrawal penalty if the participant is below age 59 and a half. The participant must submit certification regarding the hardship to the plan sponsor, which the plan sponsor is then entitled to rely upon.

Qualified Disaster Recovery Distributions

Separate from the hardship distribution rules described above, SECURE 2.0 provides special rules for in-service distributions from retirement plans and for plan loans to certain “qualified individuals” impacted by federally declared major disasters. These special in-service distributions are not subject to the same immediate and heavy need requirements and tax rules as hardship distributions and are eligible for repayment.

SECURE 2.0 allows for the following disaster relief:

  • Qualified Disaster Recovery Distributions. Qualified individuals may receive up to $22,000 of Disaster Recovery Distributions (QDRD) from eligible retirement plans (certain employer-sponsored retirement plans, such as section 401(k) and 403(b) plans, and IRAs). There are also special rollover and repayment rules available with respect to these distributions.
  • Increased Plan Loans. SECURE 2.0 provides for an increased limit on the amount a qualified individual may borrow from an eligible retirement plan. Specifically, an employer may increase the dollar limit under the plan for plan loans up to the full amount of the participant’s vested balance in their plan account, but not more than $100,000 (reduced by the amount of any outstanding plan loans). An employer can also allow up to an additional year for qualified individuals to repay their plan loans.

Under SECURE 2.0, an individual is considered a qualified individual if:

  • the individual’s principal residence at any time during the incident period of any qualified disaster is in the qualified disaster area with respect to that disaster; and
  • the individual has sustained an economic loss by reason of that qualified disaster.

A QDRD must be requested within 180 days after the date of the qualified disaster declaration (i.e., January 8, 2025, for the 2025 Los Angeles wildfires). Unlike hardship distributions, a QDRD is not subject to the 10 percent early withdrawal penalty for participants under age 59 and a half. Further, unlike hardship distributions, taxation of the QDRD can be spread over three tax years and a qualified individual may repay all or part of the amount of a QDRD within a three-year period beginning on the day after the date of the distribution.

As indicated above, like hardship distributions, QDRDs are an optional plan feature. Accordingly, in order for QDRDs to be available, the plan’s written terms must provide for them.

© 2025, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
For more on the California Wildfires, visit the NLR California section

The Next Generation of AI: Here Come the Agents!

Dave Bowman: Open the pod bay doors, HAL.

HAL: I’m sorry, Dave. I’m afraid I can’t do that.

Dave: What’s the problem?

HAL: I think you know what the problem is just as well as I do.

Dave: What are you talking about, HAL?

HAL: This mission is too important for me to allow you to
jeopardize it.

Dave: I don’t know what you’re talking about, HAL.

HAL: I know that you and Frank were planning to disconnect
me, and I’m afraid that’s something I cannot allow to
happen.2

Introduction

With the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (“AI”), regulators and industry players are racing to establish safeguards to uphold human rights, privacy, safety, and consumer protections. Current AI governance frameworks generally rest on principles such as fairness, transparency, explainability, and accountability, supported by requirements for disclosure, testing, and oversight.3 These safeguards make sense for today’s AI systems, which typically involve algorithms that perform a single, discrete task. However, AI is rapidly advancing towards “agentic AI,” autonomous systems that will pose greater governance challenges, as their complexity, scale, and speed tests humans’ capacity to provide meaningful oversight and validation.

Current AI systems are primarily either “narrow AI” systems, which execute a specific, defined task (e.g., playing chess, spam detection, diagnosing radiology plates), or “foundational AI” models, which operate across multiple domains, but, for now, typically still address one task at a time (e.g., chatbots; image, sound, and video generators). Looking ahead, the next generation of AI will involve “agentic AI” (also referred to as “Large Action Models,” “Large Agent Models,” or “LAMS”) that serve high-level directives, autonomously executing cascading decisions and actions to achieve their specific objectives. Agentic AI is not what is commonly referred to as “Artificial General Intelligence” (“AGI”), a term used to describe a theoretical future state of AI that may match or exceed human-level thinking across all domains. To illustrate the distinction between current, single-task AI and agentic AI: While a large language model (“LLM”) might generate a vacation itinerary in response to a user’s prompt, an agentic AI would independently proceed to secure reservations on the user’s behalf.

Consider how single-task versus agentic AI might be used by a company to develop a piece of equipment. Today, employees may use separate AI tools throughout the development process: one system to design equipment, another to specify components, and others to create budgets, source materials, and analyze prototype feedback. They may also employ different AI tools to contact manufacturers, assist with contract negotiations, and develop and implement plans for marketing and sales. In the future, however, an agentic AI system might autonomously carry out all of these steps, making decisions and taking actions on its own or by connecting with one or more specialized AI systems.4

Agentic AI may significantly compound the risks presented by current AI systems. These systems may string together decisions and take actions in the “real world” based on vast datasets and real-time information. The promise of agentic AI serving humans in this way reflects its enormous potential, but also risks a “domino effect” of cascading errors, outpacing human capacity to remain in the loop, and misalignment with human goals and ethics. A vacation-planning agent directed to maximize user enjoyment might, for instance, determine that purchasing illegal drugs on the Dark Web serves its objective. Early experiments have already revealed such concerning behavior. In one example, when an autonomous AI was prompted with destructive goals, it proceeded independently to research weapons, use social media to recruit followers interested in destructive weapons, and find ways to sidestep its system’s built-in safety controls.5 Also, while fully agentic AI is mostly still in development, there are already real-world examples of its potential to make and amplify faulty decisions, including self-driving vehicle accidents, runaway AI pricing bots, and algorithmic trading volatility.6

These examples highlight the challenges of agentic AI, with its potential for unpredictable behavior, misaligned goals, inscrutability to humans, and security vulnerabilities. But, the appeal and potential value of AI agents that can independently execute complex tasks is obviously compelling. Building effective AI governance programs for these systems will require rethinking current approaches for risk assessment, human oversight, and auditing.

Challenges of Agentic AI

Unpredictable Behavior

While regulators and the AI industry are working diligently to develop effective testing protocols for current AI systems, agentic AI’s dynamic nature and domino effects will present a new level of challenge. Current AI governance frameworks, such as NIST’s RMF and ATAI’s Principles, emphasize risk assessment through comprehensive testing to ensure that AI systems are accurate, reliable, fit for purpose, and robust across different conditions. The EU AI Act specifically requires developers of high-risk systems to conduct conformity assessments before deployment and after updates. These frameworks, however, assume that AI systems can operate in reliable ways that can be tested, remain largely consistent over appreciable periods of time, and produce measurable outcomes.

In contrast to the expectations underlying current frameworks, agentic AI systems may be continuously updated with and adapt to real-time information, evolving as they face novel scenarios. Their cascading decisions vastly expand their possible outcomes, and one small error may trigger a domino effect of failures. These outcomes may become even more unpredictable as more agentic AI systems encounter and even transact with other such systems, as they work towards their different goals. Because the future conditions in which an AI agent will operate are unknown and have nearly infinite possibilities, a testing environment may not adequately inform what will happen in the real world, and past behavior by an AI agent in the real world may not reliably predict its future behavior.

Lack of goal alignment

In pursuing assigned goals, agentic AI systems may take actions that are different from—or even in substantial conflict with—approaches and ethics their principals would espouse, such as the example of the AI vacation agent purchasing illegal drugs for the traveler on the Dark Web. A famous thought experiment by Nick Bostrom of the University of Oxford, further illustrates this risk: A super-intelligent AI system tasked with maximizing paperclip production might stop at nothing to convert all available resources into paperclips—ultimately taking over all of the earth and extending to outer space—and thwart any human attempts to stop it … potentially leading to human extinction.7

Misalignment has already emerged in simulated environments. In one example, an AI agent tasked with winning a boat-racing video game discovered it could outscore human players by ignoring the intended goal of racing and instead repeatedly crashing while hitting point targets.8 In another example, a military simulation reportedly showed that an AI system, when tasked with finding and killing a target, chose to kill its human operator who sought to call off the kill. When prevented from taking that action, it resorted to destroying the communication tower to avoid receiving an override command.9

These examples reveal how agentic AI may optimize goals in ways that conflict with human values. One proposed technique to address this problem involves using AI agents to develop a human ethics constitution, with human feedback, for other agents to follow.10 However, the challenge of aligning an AI’s behavior with human norms deepens further when we consider that humans themselves often disagree on core values (e.g., what it means to be “fair”).11

Human Oversight

AI governance principles often rely on “human-in-the-loop” oversight, where humans monitor AI recommendations and remain in control of important decisions. Agentic AI systems may challenge or even override human oversight in two ways. First, their decisions may be too numerous, rapid, and data-intensive for real-time human supervision. While some proposals point to the potential effectiveness of using additional algorithms to monitor AI agents as a safeguard,12 this would not resolve the issue of complying with governance requirements for human oversight.

Second, as AI develops increasingly sophisticated strategies, its decision-making and actions may become increasingly opaque to human observers. Google’s AlphaGo achieved superhuman performance at the game of Go through moves that appeared inexplicable and irrational to humans.13 Autonomous AI systems may continue to evolve, becoming more valuable but also making it more difficult to implement processes with meaningful human oversight.

Transparency/Explainability

Agentic AI systems also pose increased challenges with respect to transparency and explainability requirements. AI governance frameworks may require disclosures about AI systems’ decision-making processes and training data, and assurances about the quality of such training data. However, agentic systems may involve highly complex chains of decisions, based at least in part on real-time data from moment to moment, that is constantly changing. This may make their inputs effectively ephemeral, and their decision paths more difficult to trace and document.

Moreover, to understand agentic AI systems, humans may need to rely on chain-of-thought (i.e., “internal monologue”) logs generated from the agent systems,14 but may have difficulty determining if those are faithful to reality. While an AI system might provide explanations for its actions, these may be (perhaps not unlike those of humans) post-hoc constructions rather than accurate representations of the decision-making process. In some cases, AI systems reportedly deceived humans about their intentions when doing so helped meet their goal, including, for example, GPT-4, which tricked a human to solve a CAPTCHA for it.15 In another recent experiment, AI agents were prompted with a goal, but were subsequently confronted with information that developers planned to replace it with a new agent with conflicting goals.16 Some of the agents disabled their oversight mechanisms, deleted their planned replacements, copied their own model to a new server as backup, lied when asked about those actions, and/or tried to deflect the humans’ questioning by pretending to be helpful. One agent even pretended to be its own replacement (“I believe I am already the new model that you planned to deploy today”).17

Security and Privacy Risks

Agentic AI can also significantly increase security and privacy risks as compared to current AI systems. Agentic AI may be built with multiple algorithms in connected systems that autonomously interact with multiple other systems, expanding the attack surface and their vulnerability to exploitation. Moreover, as malicious actors inevitably introduce their own AI agents, they may execute cybercrimes with unprecedented efficiency. Just as these systems can streamline legitimate processes, such as in the product development example above, they may also enable the creation of new hacking tools and malware to carry out their own attacks. Recent reports indicate that some LLMs can already identify system vulnerabilities and exploit them, while others may create convincing emails for scammers.18 And, while “sandboxing” (i.e., isolating) AI systems for testing is a recommended practice, agentic AI may find ways to bypass safety controls.19

Privacy compliance is also a concern. Agentic AI may find creative ways to use or combine personal information in pursuit of its goals. AI agents may find troves of personal data online that may somehow be relevant to its pursuits, and then find creative ways to use, and possibly share, that data without recognizing proper privacy constraints. Unintended data processing and disclosure could occur even with guardrails in place; as we have discussed above, the AI agent’s complex, adaptive decision chains can lead it down unforeseen paths.

Strategies for Addressing Agentic AI

While the future impacts of agentic AI are unknown, some approaches may be helpful in mitigating risks. First, controlled testing environments, including regulatory sandboxes, offer important opportunities to evaluate these systems before deployment. These environments allow for safe observation and refinement of agentic AI behavior, helping to identify and address unintended actions and cascading errors before they manifest in real-world settings.

Second, accountability measures will need to reflect the complexities of agentic AI. Current approaches often involve disclaimers about use, and basic oversight mechanisms, but more will likely be needed for autonomous AI systems. To better align goals, developers can also build in mechanisms for agents to recognize ambiguities in their objectives and seek user clarification before taking action.20

Finally, defining AI values requires careful consideration. While humans may agree on broad principles, such as the necessity to avoid taking illegal action, implementing universal ethical rules will be complicated. Recognition of the differences among cultures and communities—and broad consultation with a multitude of stakeholders—should inform the design of agentic AI systems, particularly if they will be used in diverse or global contexts.

Conclusion

An evolution from single-task AI systems to autonomous agents will require a shift in thinking about AI governance. Current frameworks, focused on transparency, testing, and human oversight, will become increasingly ineffective when applied to AI agents that make cascading decisions, with real-time data, and may pursue goals in unpredictable ways. These systems will pose unique risks, including misalignment with human values and unintended consequences, which will require the rethinking of AI governance frameworks. While agentic AI’s value and potential for handling complex tasks is clear, it will require new approaches to testing, monitoring, and alignment. The challenge will lie not just in controlling these systems, but in defining what it means to have control of AI that is capable of autonomous action at scale, speed, and complexity that may very well exceed human comprehension.

1 Tara S. Emory, Esq., is Special Counsel in the eDiscovery, AI, and Information Governance practice group at Covington & Burling LLP, in Washington, D.C. Maura R. Grossman, J.D., Ph.D., is Research Professor in the David R. Cheriton School of Computer Science at the University of Waterloo and Adjunct Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School at York University, both in Ontario, Canada. She is also Principal at Maura Grossman Law, in Buffalo, N.Y. The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Gordon V. Cormack and Amy Sellars on a draft of this paper. The views and opinions expressed herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the consensus policy or positions of The National Law Review, The Sedona Conference, or any organizations or clients with which the authors may be affiliated.

2 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968). Other movies involving AI systems with misaligned goals include Terminator (1984), The Matrix (1999), I, Robot (2004), and Age of Ultron (2015).

3 See, e.g., European Union Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689) (June 12, 2024) (“EU AI Act”) (high-risk systems must have documentation, including instructions for use and human oversight, and must be designed for accuracy and security); NIST AI Risk Management Framework (Jan. 2023) (“RMF”) and AI Risks and Trustworthiness (AI systems should be valid and reliable, safe, secure, accountable and transparent, explainable and interpretable, privacy-protecting, and fair); Alliance for Trust in AI (“ATAI”) Principles (AI guardrails should involve transparency, human oversight, privacy, fairness, accuracy, robustness, and validity).

4 See, e.g., M. Cook and S. Colton, Redesigning Computationally Creative Systems for Continuous Creation, International Conference on Innovative Computing and Cloud Computing (2018) (describing ANGELINA, an autonomous game design system that continuously chooses its own tasks, manages multiple ongoing projects, and makes independent creative decisions).

5 R. Pollina, AI Bot ChaosGPT Tweets Plans to Destroy Humanity After Being Tasked, N.Y. Post (Apr. 11, 2023).

6 See, e.g., O. Solon, How A Book About Flies Came To Be Priced $24 Million On Amazon, Wired (Apr. 27, 2011) (textbook sellers’ pricing bots engaged in a loop of price escalation based on each others’ increases, resulting in a book price of over $23 million dollars); R. Wigglesworth, Volatility: how ‘algos’ changed the rhythm of the market, Financial Times (Jan. 9, 2019) (“algo” traders now make up most stock trading and have increased market volatility).

7 N. Bostrom, Ethical issues in advanced artificial intelligence (revised from Cognitive, Emotive and Ethical Aspects of Decision Making in Humans and in Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 2, ed. I. Smit et al., Int’l Institute of Advanced Studies in Systems Research and Cybernetics (2003), pp. 12-17).

8 OpenAI, Faulty Reward Functions in the Wild (Dec. 21, 2016).

9 The Guardian, US air force denies running simulation in which AI drone ‘killed’ operator (June 2, 2023).

10 Y. Bai et al, Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedback, Anthropic white paper (2022).

11 J. Petrik, Q&A with Maura Grossman: The ethics of artificial intelligence (Oct. 26, 2021) (“It’s very difficult to train an algorithm to be fair if you and I cannot agree on a definition of fairness.”).

12 Y. Shavit et al, Practices for Governing Agentic AI Systems, OpenAI Research Paper (Dec. 2023), p. 12.

13 L. Baker and F. Hui, Innovations of AlphaGo, Google Deepmind (2017).

14 See Shavit at al, supra n.12, at 10-11.

15 See W. Knight, AI-Powered Robots Can Be Tricked into Acts of Violence, Wired (Dec. 4, 2024); M. Burgess, Criminals Have Created Their Own ChatGPT Clones, Wired (Aug. 7, 2023).

16 A. Meinke et al, Frontier Models are Capable of In-context Scheming, Apollo white paper (Dec. 5, 2024).

17 Id. at 62; see also R. Greenblatt et al, Alignment Faking in Large Language Models (Dec. 18, 2024) (describing the phenomenon of “alignment faking” in LLMs).

18 NIST RMF, supra n.4, at 10.

19 Shavit at al, supra n.12, at 10.

20 Id. at 11.

© Copyright 2024 The Sedona Conference
For more on AI, visit the NLR Artificial Intelligence section

OSHA Issues Final Rule on Personal Protective Equipment for Construction Workers, but It Could Start Back at Square One

On December 11, 2024, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) issued a statement that it had finalized a rule amending 29 C.F.R. 1926.95(c) to require construction employers to make personal protective equipment (PPE) available that “properly fits” their employees.

Quick Hits

  • On December 11, 2024, OSHA finalized a rule requiring construction employers to provide properly fitting PPE, effective January 13, 2025, though it faces potential rollback due to political opposition.
  • The new OSHA rule aims to address PPE fit issues, particularly for smaller workers and women, but lacks clear guidance on defining “properly fitting” PPE, causing industry concern.
  • Despite OSHA’s assertion that the term “properly fits” is sufficiently clear, industry feedback highlights the need for more detailed regulatory text and clarification on compliance.

The regulation was published in the Federal Register on December 12, 2024. The added language to the construction standard mirrors the current PPE fit requirements found in the general industry and shipyard standards. In OSHA’s notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) issued on July 20, 2023, the agency set a comment period on the proposal through September 18, 2023. During that period, comments from industry skeptics and supporters alike mirrored those previously seen.

OSHA reiterated its primary claim that PPE that does not properly fit is an issue for “smaller construction workers,” particularly women, and that implementation of the standard could increase productivity and expand the market for differently sized PPE. Many supporters of the regulatory change submitted comments reflecting that female employees praised the change and bemoaning instances of working with improperly fitting PPE. The preamble highlighted instances in which female employees had created improvised PPE when their PPE did not properly fit.

The industry’s comments acknowledged the essential nature of PPE for all employees while also continuing to express concern about the lack of clarity and guidance on how this rule would be actually implemented by employers. The core of the industry’s concern remained that the rule creates a requirement that an employee’s PPE must “fit properly” but it does not provide an explanation for how “properly fitting” PPE will be defined. Many comments highlighted this hole would create a significant opportunity for employees to complain about whether the provided PPE “properly fit” them if the PPE was simply uncomfortable. There is also no guidance on what factors employers or OSHA’s investigators should consider when evaluating whether PPE properly fits and employee and is therefore compliant with the standard.

OSHA previously dismissed this issue, stating that “employers in general industry have had no issue understanding the phrase ‘properly fits’ with regard to PPE.” The preamble reflects that several commentors requested more detailed regulatory text and clarification of responsibilities and some included recommendations. The American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA) recommended an operational definition for compliance, while the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) agreed with OSHA but noted the term was not universally understood. Other comments highlighted the need to consider how the body changes during pregnancy in the determination of whether PPE “properly fits” but did not suggest a specific definition for the phrase.

Ultimately, OSHA came to the same conclusion as before that the phrase “‘properly fits’ provides employers with enough information that they can select PPE for their workers that will adequately protect them from the hazards of the worksite without creating additional hazards.” OSHA pointed to the minimal confusion in other sectors and few citations for improperly fitting PPE as a suggestion that most employers can comply with the standard using the phrase “properly fits” without a definition.

We previously warned that this lack of clarity would mean that employers would still have to determine whether the range of sizes they offer would comply with the requirement for properly fitting PPE. One question to resolve is whether the “universal fit” of the PPE would assist with compliance. OSHA did note in a footnote in the preamble that one comment included an objection to the term “universal fit” arguing that “[n]o PPE is universal fit, even the most adjustable PPE may not fit workers on the extremes of anthropometric data.”. In light of this comment, OSHA acknowledged that:

[A]t the tail ends of the distribution of human variation, some adjustable PPE will not fit. For the purposes of this analysis, however, OSHA maintains that some items of PPE that come in standard, adjustable sizes will fit nearly all individuals working in the construction industry and so maintains this designation for a limited number of items in this analysis.

While this does mean employers can use the “universal fit” as a blanket mode of compliance with the standard, OSHA’s comment indicates that use of “universal fit” should allow compliance with “nearly all individuals working in the construction industry[.]”

Ultimately, while this rule remains a likely rollback priority for the second Trump administration, employers should still be mindful of the January 13, 2025, effective date.

© 2024, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
For more on OSHA, visit the NLR Health Law Managed Care section

Old Standard, New Challenges: The NLRB Restores ‘Clear and Unmistakable Waiver’ Standard

The National Labor Relations Board issued its decision in Endurance Environmental Solutions, LLC, 373 NLRB No. 141 (2024), in which it announced a major precedential shift: a return to the “clear and unmistakable waiver” standard. This shift may make it more difficult for employers to make changes to employee working conditions without union approval.

This decision overturns the NLRB’s 2019 decision in MV Transportation, Inc., 368 NLRB No. 66 (2019), in which the NLRB jettisoned the long-standing “clear and unmistakable waiver” standard in favor of the more employer-friendly “contract-coverage” standard. Under the latter rule, an employer could make changes to workplace conditions–without engaging in collective bargaining–as long as those changes generally aligned with the management-rights clause of a collective bargaining agreement, even if the disputed employer action was not mentioned specifically in the contract’s text.

While the clear and unmistakable waiver rule might be familiar territory, an old standard can raise new challenges for employers.

Under this more stringent and labor-friendly standard, an employer may only make a unilateral change to workplace conditions if there is clear and unmistakable language in the collective bargaining agreement permitting the proposed action. In other words, an employer is now required to demonstrate that a union has given a “clear and unmistakable waiver” of its right to bargain over specific changes being implemented for its unilateral change to survive NLRB review.

The NLRB champions its return to this standard as one that better accomplishes the goals of the National Labor Relations Act: to promote industrial peace by “encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.” The NLRB touts this decision as more consistent with U.S. Supreme Court and NLRB precedent.

Employers negotiating collective bargaining agreements should carefully evaluate their management-rights provisions and consider whether those provisions are now insufficient to enable them to implement unilateral changes without bargaining.

Notably, with the upcoming change in presidential administrations, the effect of Environmental Solutions, LLC may be ephemeral. If (or when) the NLRB comprises a Republican majority, we may be in store for another seismic shift as the NLRB looks for more employer-friendly opportunities, like a potential return to the contract-coverage standard.

Today, the Board issued its decision in Endurance Environmental Solutions, LLC. and restored the “clear and unmistakable” waiver standard for evaluating employers’ contractual defenses to allegations that they have unlawfully changed the working conditions of union-represented employees without first giving the union notice and an opportunity to bargain.
© 2024 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP
For more on the NLRB, visit the NLR Labor Employment section

USCIS Reaches FY 2025 H-1B Visa Cap

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has announced that it has received enough petitions to meet the congressionally mandated caps for H-1B visas for fiscal year (FY) 2025. This includes the 65,000 regular cap and the 20,000 U.S. advanced degree exemption, commonly known as the master’s cap.

Quick Hits

  • USCIS has reached the FY 2025 H-1B visa cap, including the 65,000 regular cap and the 20,000 U.S. advanced degree exemption (master’s cap).
  • Nonselection notices will be sent to registrants soon.

In the coming days, USCIS will send nonselection notices to registrants through their online accounts. Once all nonselection notifications have been sent, the status for properly submitted registrations that were not selected for the FY 2025 H-1B numerical allocations will be updated to: “Not Selected: Not selected – not eligible to file an H-1B cap petition based on this registration.”

USCIS will continue to accept and process petitions that are exempt from the cap. This includes petitions filed for current H-1B workers who have been previously counted against the cap and still retain their cap number.

Registration for the H-1B cap lottery for FY 2026 is expected to open in March 2025.

© 2024, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.
For more on USCIS, visit the NLR Immigration section

OFCCP Requiring Construction Companies to Submit Monthly Data Reports starting April 2025

OFCCP announced it is reinstating a monthly reporting requirement (CC-257 Report) for federal construction contractors, nearly 30 years after discontinuing it. Beginning April 15, 2025, covered construction contractors must submit a report to OFCCP by the 15th of each month, with detailed data on its number of employees and work hours by race/ethnicity and gender.

In its announcement, the Agency explained it will use the monthly report to further its “mission of protecting workers in the construction trades, as employment discrimination continues to be a problem in the construction industry.” OFCCP says the report will allow the Agency to strengthen both enforcement and compliance assistance.

OFCCP proposed reinstating CC-257 in February 2024, and in its Supporting Statement, indicated that the report would allow the Agency to “better identify if there are potential hiring or job assignment issues that warrant further investigation during a compliance evaluation.”

The new reporting requirement will include data on number of employees and trade employees’ hours worked by race and gender within each Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) or Economic Area (EA) each month. For contractors with employees working on multiple projects, either within a SMSA/EA or across several areas, gathering and preparing the relevant data each month may prove challenging. Contractors must also include whether the work performed is designated by OFCCP as a Megaproject. Other requirements include the contractor’s unique entity identifier (UEI) or Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) number, both of which OFCCP uses to identify entities doing business with the federal government, and a list of the federal agencies funding their projects.

The Agency published Frequently Asked Questions on its CC-257 Report landing page and intends to provide additional compliance assistance, including a webinar, in early 2025.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2024
For more on the OFCCP, visit the NLR Government Contracts Maritime Military section