Texas Attorney General Launches Investigation into 15 Tech Companies

Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton recently launched investigations into Character.AI and 14 other technology companies on allegations of failure to comply with the safety and privacy requirements of the Securing Children Online through Parental Empowerment (“SCOPE”) Act and the Texas Data Privacy and Security Act.

The SCOPE Act places guardrails on digital service providers, including AI companies, including with respect to sharing, disclosing and selling minors’ personal identifying information without obtaining permission from the child’s parent or legal guardian. Similarly, the Texas Data Privacy and Security Act imposes strict notice and consent requirements on the collection and use of minors’ personal data.

Attorney General Paxton reiterated the Office of the Attorney General’s (“OAG’s”) focus on privacy enforcement, with the current investigations launched as part of the OAG’s recent major data privacy and security initiative. Per that initiative, the Attorney General opened an investigation in June into multiple car manufacturers for illegally surveilling drivers, collecting driver data, and sharing it with their insurance companies. In July, Attorney General Paxton secured a $1.4 billion settlement with Meta over the unlawful collection and use of facial recognition data, reportedly the largest settlement ever obtained from an action brought by a single state. In October, the Attorney General filed a lawsuit against TikTok for SCOPE Act violations.

The Attorney General, in the OAG’s press release announcing the current investigations, stated that technology companies are “on notice” that his office is “vigorously enforcing” Texas’s data privacy laws.

For more on Texas Attorney General Investigations, visit the NLR Communications Media Internet and Consumer Protection sections.

Colorado AG Proposes Draft Amendments to the Colorado Privacy Act Rules

On September 13, 2024, the Colorado Attorney General’s (AG) Office published proposed draft amendments to the Colorado Privacy Act (CPA) Rules. The proposals include new requirements related to biometric collection and use (applicable to all companies and employers that collect biometrics of Colorado residents) and children’s privacy. They also introduce methods by which businesses could seek regulatory guidance from the Colorado AG.

The draft amendments seek to align the CPA with Senate Bill 41, Privacy Protections for Children’s Online Data, and House Bill 1130, Privacy of Biometric Identifiers & Data, both of which were enacted earlier this year and will largely come into effect in 2025. Comments on the proposed regulations can be submitted beginning on September 25, 2024, in advance of a November 7, 2024, rulemaking hearing.

In Depth


PRIVACY OF BIOMETRIC IDENTIFIERS & DATA

In comparison to other state laws like the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), the CPA proposed draft amendments do not include a private right of action. That said, the proposed draft amendments include several significant revisions to the processing of biometric identifiers and data, including:

  • Create New Notice Obligations: The draft amendments require any business (including those not otherwise subject to the CPA) that collects biometrics from consumers or employees to provide a “Biometric Identifier Notice” before collecting or processing biometric information. The notice must include which biometric identifier is being collected, the reason for collecting the biometric identifier, the length of time the controller will retain the biometric identifier, and whether the biometric identifier will be disclosed, redisclosed, or otherwise disseminated to a processor alongside the purpose of such disclosure. This notice must be reasonably accessible, either in a standalone disclosure or, if embedded within the controller’s privacy notice, a clear link to the specific section within the privacy notice that contains the Biometric Identifier Notice. This requirement applies to all businesses that collect biometrics, including employers, even if a business does not otherwise trigger the applicability thresholds of the CPA.
  • Revisit When Consent Is Required: The draft amendments require controllers to obtain explicit consent from the data subject before selling, leasing, trading, disclosing, redisclosing, or otherwise disseminating biometric information. The amendments also allow employers to collect and process biometric identifiers as a condition for employment in limited circumstances (much more limited than Illinois’s BIPA, for example).

PRIVACY PROTECTIONS FOR CHILDREN’S ONLINE DATA

The draft amendments also include several updates to existing CPA requirements related to minors:

  • Delineate Between Consumers Based on Age: The draft amendments define a “child” as an individual under 13 years of age and a “minor” as an individual under 18 years of age, creating additional protections for teenagers.
  • Update Data Protection Assessment Requirements: The draft amendments expand the scope of data protection assessments to include processing activities that pose a heightened risk of harm to minors. Under the draft amendments, entities performing assessments must disclose whether personal data from minors is processed as well as identify any potential sources and types of heightened risk to minors that would be a reasonably foreseeable result of offering online services, products, or features to minors.
  • Revisit When Consent Is Required: The draft amendments require controllers to obtain explicit consent before processing the personal data of a minor and before using any system design feature to significantly increase, sustain, or extend a minor’s use of an online service, product, or feature.

OPINION LETTERS AND INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE

In a welcome effort to create a process by which businesses and the public can understand more about the scope and applicability of the CPA, the draft amendments:

  • Create a Formal Feedback Process: The draft amendments would permit individuals or entities to request an opinion letter from the Colorado AG regarding aspects of the CPA and its application. Entities that have received and relied on applicable guidance offered via an opinion letter may use that guidance as a good faith defense against later claims of having violated the CPA.
  • Clarify the Role of Non-Binding Advice: Separate and in addition to the formal opinion letter process, the draft amendments provide a process by which any person affected directly or indirectly by the CPA may request interpretive guidance from the AG. Unlike the guidance in an opinion letter, interpretive guidance would not be binding on the Colorado AG and would not serve as a basis for a good faith defense. Nonetheless, a process for obtaining interpretive guidance is a novel, and welcome, addition to the state law fabric.

WHAT’S NEXT?

While subject to change pursuant to public consultation, assuming the proposed CPA amendments are finalized, they would become effective on July 1, 2025. Businesses interested in shaping and commenting on the draft amendments should consider promptly submitting comments to the Colorado AG.

United States | DHS Keeping Families Together Reduces Barriers for Noncitizen Spouses

The Department of Homeland Security today announced implementation of the Keeping Families Together process, which grants parole in place on a case-by-case basis to certain noncitizen spouses and stepchildren of U.S. citizens.

Key Points:

Additional Information: In its announcement, the agency stated, “Too often, noncitizen spouses of U.S. citizens — many of them mothers and fathers — live with uncertainty due to undue barriers in our immigration system. This process to keep U.S. families together will remove these undue barriers for those who would otherwise qualify to live and work lawfully in the U.S., while also creating greater efficiencies in the immigration system, conducting effective screening and vetting, and focusing on noncitizens who contribute to and have longstanding connections within American communities across the country.”

More information about the process can be found here.

Navigating the Nuances of LGBTQ+ Divorce in California

The end of a marriage is always challenging for the couple involved, and the impact on family members can be significant. Those in LGBTQ+ marriages are no different. Issues around child custody, property division, spousal support, and the enforcement of prenuptial agreements all apply to same-sex couples.

In California, there is no common-law marriage. In some cases, the LGBTQ+ couple may not have been married long at the time of the divorce, but they may have been together for much longer than the marriage itself. Whether they were registered as a domestic partnership will make a difference. In such cases, the couple will have similar rights and obligations as those married for the same length of time.

For example, in California, if the couple were married four years ago, spousal support—in most cases—would only be for approximately two years. However, if they were registered as domestic partners for 20 years and then had a four-year marriage, spousal support could be until either party’s death or the recipient spouse’s remarriage.

The Unique Challenges Around Parental Rights

Dealing with parental rights is difficult regardless of the orientation of the couple involved. When I advise clients, I try my best to have them focus on the best interests of their children. Divorce is typically the most challenging for the children.

Nuanced complications can arise depending on how the children came into the family. Was it by adoption, surrogacy, or assisted reproductive technology? For LGBTQ+ couples, it is essential that everything is done legally and correctly and that both parents are included in legally binding contracts. In the case of surrogacy or assisted reproductive technology (also known as IVF), mainly when sperm or eggs are donated from someone outside the relationship, it is critically important that the sperm or egg donor has no rights or obligations. Otherwise, things can get murky in a legal sense.

The bottom line is that couples need to secure an excellent lawyer to protect their interests and those of their children. Putting the children first should always be the priority.

Additional Considerations

I have been told that in the LGBTQ+ community, particularly amongst those who identify as men, there can be a preponderance of open relationships. I have been asked if that can complicate a potential divorce. Because California is a no-fault state regarding divorce, it does not matter who sleeps with whom. The only issue is if one person spends community dollars on another person outside the marriage. A relevant factor would be if it were an open marriage and what the understanding of that meant financially and otherwise. Ideally, a couple would document these nuances with their lawyer. Without pre- or post-nuptial agreements addressing such relationship guidelines, spending outside the marriage on another relationship can become a problem during divorce proceedings.

Another question I am often asked is if same-sex couples should seek divorce attorneys who identify as similar to themselves. I can easily see how that might be a comfortable choice. And I do not advocate against it. The most important criterion is the attorney’s skill and if you can relate to them. I know for myself, I am confident I can help my clients, whether they are gay, non-binary, or fluid. My commitment and level of advocacy are always going to be the same.

Concerns over the Future Loom Large

In the past, same-sex couples who married in other states faced the risk that their marriages would not be recognized in another state. The U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark Obergefell v. Hodges decision in 2015 required that all states, including California, recognize same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions. For those married in California, we are fortunate that LGBTQ+ rights have long been progressive. On the other hand, recent rumbling from the U.S. Supreme Court suggests those protections may be in jeopardy.

I am personally troubled by what some Justices have indicated in dissenting opinions. I remember life before Roe v. Wade and life before Obergfell. I have always been concerned about subsequent elections and the future makeup of our nation’s highest court. Personally, I would hate to see our country go backward on marriage equality.

I have always believed in the institution of marriage. And I am a realist who recognizes that marriages can and do end for a multitude of reasons. It might be surprising to hear a divorce attorney say this, but I would prefer to see couples work things out. But when they cannot, I will be the best advocate for my clients, regardless of how they identify. In the end, divorce is a tricky thing to go through, and whether you are part of a same-sex couple or opposite-sex makes little difference.

For more news on LGBTQ+ Family Law, visit the NLR Family Law / Divorce / Custody section.

Using an LLC to Protect the Family Vacation Home

Vacation homes offer a retreat from daily life, providing a sanctuary to relax and create cherished family memories. Many owners envision passing down their vacation home for future generations to enjoy, but the lack of proper planning can often lead to intra-family disputes. Leaving a vacation home outright to children or other family members may be the easiest option, but the potential for discord over the control and usage of the property only increases as ownership is passed from one generation to the next. A limited liability company (LLC) can mitigate the risk of conflict and provide a tailored solution to the meet the specific needs of a family.

When a vacation home is owned by an LLC, the membership interests in the LLC are passed down to younger generations, which allows for the continued use and enjoyment of the property by the family. The structure also provides a framework for management through an operating agreement, which governs the LLC. An operating agreement allows the original owner to create a plan for how the property will be used and managed as additional owners are added. The agreement can determine who is responsible for property management, how expenses should be proportioned and paid, how decisions should be made and provide guidelines for scheduling family usage. By establishing clear rules and procedures, an LLC can reduce the likelihood of disputes and encourage fairness among different generations.

Another benefit of an LLC is the ability to prevent unwanted transfers of ownership thus ensuring that the property stays in the family. A well-drafted operating agreement can prohibit membership interests from being transferred to third parties, protecting the family as a whole from an individual’s divorce or creditor problems. The LLC can also hold additional assets, including rental income and deposits of other funds earmarked for property expenditures, which facilitates the proper management and use of resources to cover expenses.

An LLC offers an efficient structure to avoid intra-family turmoil and preserves the spirit of the family vacation home for generations to come.

For more news on Protecting Real Estate Ownership, visit the NLR Real Estate section.

Premarital Agreements and the “Voluntary” Signature

Premarital agreements offer persons contemplating marriage the ability to plan for the distribution of their assets and liabilities in the event of separation and/or divorce.

While the concept of planning for divorce may seem counterintuitive for persons pledging promises of life-long fidelity and companionship, premarital agreements offer solutions for a variety of scenarios, including estate planning protection and the protection of interests in closely held businesses in the event of separation and/or divorce.

In many cases, the signed agreement will become a distant memory as the routines of married life evolve. Yet years later, the agreement will be retrieved from the file cabinet by the party seeking its protection when one or both spouses conclude that the marital contract should be dissolved. The agreement may then be challenged by the spouse, who concludes that enforcement of the bargain made decades earlier will produce egregiously “unfair” results.

As will be shown below, the burden to be met when challenging a premarital agreement is steep. It is, therefore, imperative that persons being asked to enter into such an agreement fully and completely understand its legal consequences before signing on “the dotted line.”

Legal Framework for Premarital Agreements in North Carolina

In North Carolina, premarital agreements are governed by the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 52B-1 through -11.

To avoid enforcement of a premarital agreement, the party challenging the agreement must prove either that (1) she did not execute the agreement “voluntarily” or (2) that the agreement was unconscionable when it was executed and before its execution she (a) was not provided, (b) did not waive the disclosure of, and (c) did not have, or reasonably could not have had, adequate knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the other party. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52B-7(a).

In this article, we will review two North Carolina cases that shed light on what is meant by the term “voluntary” when it comes to the execution of a premarital agreement.

CASE STUDY 1: HOWELL V. LANDRY

In Howell v. Landry, Mary Landry challenged the enforcement of the couple’s premarital agreement. She challenged the agreement on the grounds that her execution of the agreement was not “voluntary.” She complained:

  • that her husband first presented her with a draft of a premarital agreement which had been prepared by his attorney without the wife’s knowledge at 8:00 pm on the day before they were to travel to Las Vegas, Nevada for their wedding;
  • that her husband told her that if the agreement was not signed, they would not get married;
  • that she had never seen a premarital agreement before, and she advised her husband that she wanted her own attorney to review the document;
  • that she advised her husband that she did not want to sign the agreement.

Ms. Landry argued that these facts support a conclusion that the agreement was the product of duress and was, therefore, unenforceable. The case came before Judge Russell Sherill in Wake County. Judge Sherill agreed with Ms. Landry and ruled in her favor, concluding that the Agreement was the product of duress and therefore invalid.

Mr. Howell appealed Judge Sherrill’s ruling to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rejected wife’s argument that the agreement was the product of duress. The Court’s ruling is instructive. The Court observed that:

[d]uress is the result of coercion. It may exist even though the victim is fully aware of all facts material to his or her decision.

* * *

Duress exists where one, by the unlawful or wrongful act of another, is induced to make a contract or perform or forego some act under circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of freewill. An act is wrongful if made with the corrupt intent to coerce a transaction grossly unfair to the victim and not related to the subject of such proceedings.

* * *

The mere shortness of the time interval between the presentation of the premarital agreement and the date of the wedding is insufficient alone to permit a finding of duress or undue influence . . . . The shortness of the time interval when combined with the threat to call off the marriage if the agreement is not executed is likewise insufficient per se to invalidate the agreement.

* * *

Here, the threat to cancel the marriage and the execution of the premarital agreement were closely related to each other. The marriage would have redefined the respective property rights of the parties, and the premarital agreement would have avoided that re-definition to some extent. Indeed, the cancelation of a proposed marriage would be the natural result of failure of a party to execute a premarital agreement desired by the other party.

In summary, Ms. Landry’s decision to sign the agreement was deemed to have been a voluntary decision despite the fact that it was presented to her the night before the couple was to leave for their wedding and despite her request to have an attorney review it for her.

CASE STUDY 2: KORNEGAY V. ROBINSON

Our second real-life example contains facts that appear even more favorable to the complaining spouse than those presented in the Howell v. Landry matter. In Kornegay v. Robinson, the wife signed a premarital agreement that included a waiver of her spousal share of her husband’s estate.

When her husband passed away without providing for her in his will, she challenged the premarital agreement in an attempt to receive a share of the estate. Ms. Kornegay claimed that the premarital agreement had not been voluntarily executed because:

  • She had only a high school education;
  • She learned that her husband wanted her to execute a premarital agreement only after she had moved in with him and obtained a license to marry him;
  • She was presented with the agreement in her husband’s attorney’s office on the same day that she and her husband were to be married; and
  • She did not have the opportunity to review the agreement with independent counsel before signing it.

The trial judge who heard the case ruled against Ms. Kornegay. She appealed the matter to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. A majority of the panel who heard the case were persuaded that the trial court’s ruling was improper. However, one member of the panel filed a dissenting opinion and concluded that Ms. Kornegay’s claim to set aside the Agreement was properly denied. The husband’s estate appealed the matter to the North Carolina Supreme Court.

In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court adopted the dissenting opinion, which rejected Ms. Kornegay’s argument. The dissenting opinion adopted by the Court is informative.

Plaintiff (Ms. Kornegay) now contends she did not voluntarily sign the premarital agreement due to the totality of the circumstances existing at the time of execution of the Agreement. Plaintiff argues her lack of legal counsel and lack of an opportunity to obtain legal counsel are important elements in the circumstances surrounding her execution of the Agreement. Plaintiff acknowledged in her deposition she never requested “(1) additional time to read the Agreement; or (2) another attorney to be present to explain the Agreement before she signed it.” This case fits squarely within the facts and holding of Howell ….

This Court has held contract rules apply to premarital agreements.

Absent fraud or oppression . . . parties to a contract have an affirmative duty to read and understand a written contract before signing it.

Plaintiff’s argument that her execution was not voluntary because she did not read the agreement was without merit. Plaintiff had an affirmative duty to read and understand the premarital agreement before signing it. Plaintiff provided no evidence she was prevented from reading the agreement or that she sought separate counsel prior to signing the agreement. Plaintiff admitted both in the agreement and at her deposition that she voluntarily signed the agreement.

* * *

Plaintiff asserts no inequality in education or business experience between her and her husband. Plaintiff did not assert she made any disclosures to Defendant of her pre‑martial assets to any greater extent than her knowledge of Defendant’s assets on the date of the agreement.

* * *

Plaintiff’s chief complaint of unfair appears to be based upon the current value of her husband’s assets, from which she has received and enjoyed the income over the fifteen years of their marriage, and not her knowledge of the nature and extent of the decedent’s assets on the date of the agreement. The value of decedent’s assets on the date the contract was signed controls. Plaintiff’s bootstrapped claim that her execution of the agreement was not voluntary does not create any genuine issue of material fact to overcome the plain language in the agreement or her sworn admissions during her deposition. The trial court’s judgment should be affirmed in its entirety.

* * *

The fact that the decedent’s assets grew during the marriage does not make the agreement unconscionable or unfair.

The North Carolina Supreme Court rejected Ms. Kornegay’s claim the agreement should be set aside. Once again, not even the presentation of the agreement in the husband’s attorney’s office on the day of the wedding was sufficient fact from which to find that the Agreement had not been signed “voluntarily.”

Lessons Learned

The Howell v. Landry and the Kornegay v. Robinson decisions reveal the steep climb required to meet one’s burden of setting aside a premarital agreement on the grounds that it was not executed “voluntarily.”

Persons asked to sign a premarital agreement on the eve of the wedding should be aware that the “last minute” presentation will more than likely not be sufficient cause to set aside the agreement. When it comes to premarital agreements, the following advice is in order:

  1. Timely ask your prospective spouse whether he or she is considering the use of a premarital agreement;
  2. Advise your prospective spouse that you will need time to have an attorney of your choice review the agreement before you will be able to sign it;
  3. While inconvenient and potentially embarrassing, consider postponing the wedding ceremony if an agreement is presented at the last moment.

Tax Relief for American Families and Workers Act of 2024

On January 17, 2024, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) and House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Jason Smith (R-Mo.) released a bill, the “Tax Relief for American Families and Workers Act of 2024” (“TRAFA” or the “bill”). All of the provisions in the bill are taxpayer favorable, except those that apply to the “employee retention tax credit”.

In short, the bill, if enacted as introduced, would:
• Allow taxpayers to deduct rather than amortize domestic research or experimental costs until 2026. Under current law, domestic research and experimental expenditures incurred after December 31, 2021 must be amortized over a 5-year period. Starting in 2026, taxpayers would once again be required to amortize those costs (as under current law) over five years (rather than deducting them immediately).
• Allow taxpayers to calculate their section 163(j) limitation on interest deductions without regard to any deduction allowable for depreciation, amortization, or depletion (i.e., as a percentage of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) rather than earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT)) for tax years 2024-2026. This provision would generally increase the limitation and allow greater interest deductions for taxpayers subject to section 163(j).
• Retroactively extend the 100% bonus depreciation for qualified property placed in service after December 31, 2022 until January 1, 2026 (January 1, 2027, for longer production period property and certain aircraft). 100% bonus depreciation, enacted as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (the “TCJA”), expired for most property placed into service after December 31, 2022. Under existing law, bonus depreciation is generally limited to 80% for property placed into service during 2023, 60% for 2024, and 40% for 2025.
• Increase the maximum amount a taxpayer may expense of the cost of depreciable business assets under section 179 from $1.16 million in 2023 for qualifying property placed in service for the taxable year, to $1.29 million. The $1.16 million amount is reduced by the amount by which the cost of the property placed in service during the taxable year exceeds $2.89 million. Under the bill, the $2.89 amount is increased to $3.22 million. The provision applies to property placed in service in taxable years beginning after December 31, 2023.
• Effectively grant certain tax treaty benefits to residents of Taiwan, including (i) reducing the 30% withholding tax on U.S.-source interest and royalties from 30% to 10%, (ii) reducing the 30% withholding tax on U.S.-source dividends from to 15% or 10% (if the recipient owns at least 10% of the shares of stock in the payor corporation), and (iii) applying the “permanent establishment” threshold (rather than the lower “trade or business” threshold) for U.S. federal income taxation.
• Extend the qualified disaster area rules enacted in 2020 for 60 days after the date of enactment of the bill; exempt from tax certain “qualified wildfire relief payments” for tax years beginning in 2020 through 2025; exempt certain “East Palestine train derailment payments” from tax.
• Enhance the low income housing tax credit and tax-exempt bond financing rules.
• Increase the threshold for information reporting on IRS forms 1099-NEC and 1099-MISC from $600 to $1,000 for payments made on or after January 1, 2024 and increase the threshold for future years based on inflation.
• End the period for filing employee retention tax credit claims for tax years 2020 and 2021 as of January 31, 2024, and increase the penalties for aiding and abetting the understatement of a tax liability by a “COVID–ERTC promoter”.
• Increase the maximum refundable portion of the child tax credit from $1,600 in 2023 (out of the $2,000 maximum per child tax credit under current law) to $1,800 in 2023, $1,900 in 2024, and $2,000 in 2025; modify the calculation of the maximum refundable credit amount by providing that taxpayers first multiply their earned income (in excess of $2,500) by 15 percent, and then multiply that amount by the number of qualifying children (so that a taxpayer with two children would be entitled to double the amount of refundable credit); adjust the $2,000 maximum per child tax credit for inflation in 2024 and 2025; and allow taxpayers in 2024 and 2025 to use earned income from the prior taxable year to calculate their credit. These provisions would be effective for tax years 2023-2025, after which the maximum per child credit would revert to $1,000.

The bill does not increase the $10,000 limit on state and local tax deductions, or increase the $600 reporting threshold for IRS Form 1099-K (gift cards, payment apps, and online marketplaces).
The bill cleared the House Ways and Means Committee by a vote of 40 to 3 and awaits a vote by the full House (which is not expected to occur before January 29). Although the bill appears to have broad partisan support so far, the timing of final passage and enactment is uncertain.
The remainder of this blog post provides a summary of the key business provisions included in TRAFA.

Summary of Key Business Provisions
1. Retroactive extension for current deduction of domestic research or experimental costs that are paid or incurred in tax years beginning after December 31, 2021, and before January 1, 2026 under Section 174.
Under current Section 174, specified research or experimental expenditures incurred in taxable years beginning after December 31, 2021 may not be currently deducted. Instead, the expenditures must be capitalized and amortized ratably over a 5-year period (or, in the case of expenditures that are attributable to research that is conducted outside of the United States, over a 15-year period). Before the TCJA, enacted in 2021, research or experimental expenditures were generally deductible in the year in which they were incurred.
The bill proposes to allow taxpayers to deduct domestic research or experimental costs until 2026. However, foreign research or experimental expenditures would continue to be amortizable over 15 years (as under current law).
Generally, a taxpayer who had already amortized the appropriate portion of its domestic research or experimental costs incurred in the 2022 tax year but wanted to switch to deducting these costs would be able to do so by electing to treat the application of the TRAFA provision as a Section 481(a) adjustment for the 2023 tax year and the adjustment would be taken into account ratably in the 2023 and 2024 federal income tax returns.
2. Retroactive extension to allow depreciation, amortization, or depletion in determining the limitation on business interest expense deduction under Section 163(j) for taxable years beginning before January 1, 2026.
Under current section 163(j), a deduction for business interest expense is disallowed to the extent it exceeds the sum of (i) business interest income, (ii) 30% of adjusted taxable income (“ATI”), and (iii) floor plan financing interest expense in the current taxable year. Any disallowed business interest expense may be carried forward indefinitely to subsequent tax years. The interest limitation generally applies at the taxpayer level (although special rules apply in the case of partnerships and S-corporations). Furthermore, in the case of a group of affiliated corporations that file a consolidated return, the limitation applies at the consolidated tax return filing level.
For tax years beginning before January 1, 2022, the ATI of a taxpayer was computed without regard to (i) any item of income, gain, deduction, or loss that is not properly allocable to a trade or business, (ii) business interest expense and income, (iii) net operating loss deductions under section 172, (iv) deductions for qualified business income under section 199A, and (v) deductions for depreciation, amortization, or depletion (“EBITDA computation”). However, for tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2022, ATI is computed taking into account deductions for depreciation, amortization, or depletion (“EBIT computation”). The EBIT computation generally allows less interest deductions than the EBITDA computation.
The bill proposes to apply the EBITDA computation (instead of the EBIT computation) for taxable years beginning before January 1, 2026. the bill provides that this proposal generally is effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2023, but includes an elective transition rule, details to be provided by the Secretary of the Treasury, to allow a taxpayer to elect to apply the EBITDA computation for tax years beginning after December 31, 2021.
3. Extension of 100% bonus depreciation deduction for certain business property placed in service during the years 2023 through 2025 under Section 168(k).
A taxpayer generally must capitalize the cost of property used in a trade or business or held for the production of income and recover the cost over time through annual deductions for depreciation or amortization. Changes to section 168(k), under the TCJA, allowed an additional first-year depreciation deduction, known as bonus depreciation, of 100% of the cost of MACRS property with a depreciable life of 20 years or less, water utility property, qualified improvement property and computer software placed into service after September 27, 2017 and before January 1, 2023. Under current law, property placed in service from January 1, 2023 through December 31, 2026 qualifies for partial bonus depreciation – 80% bonus depreciation for 2023, 60% bonus depreciation for 2024, 40% bonus depreciation for 2025 and 20% bonus depreciation for 2026.
The bill proposes to extend the 100% bonus depreciation for property placed in service during the years 2023 through 2025 and to retain the 20% bonus depreciation for property placed in service in 2026.
4. Increase in limitations on expensing of depreciable business assets under Section 179 to $1.29 million and increase the phaseout threshold amount to $3.22 million.
Generally, under Section 179, a taxpayer may elect to immediately deduct the cost of qualifying property, rather than to claim depreciation deductions over time, subject to limitations discussed below. Qualifying property is generally defined as depreciable tangible personal property, off-the-shelf computer software, and qualified real property (including certain improvements (e.g., roofs, heating, and alarms systems) made to nonresidential real property after the property is first placed in service) that is purchased for use in the active conduct of a trade or business. Under current law, the maximum amount a taxpayer may expense is $1 million of the cost of qualifying property placed in service for the taxable year and the $1 million is reduced (but not below zero) by the amount by which the cost of qualifying property placed in service during the taxable year exceeds $2.5 million. The $1 million and $2.5 million amounts are indexed for inflation for taxable years beginning after 2018. For taxable years beginning in 2023, the total amount that may be expensed under current law is $1.16 million, and the phaseout threshold amount is $2.89 million.
The bill proposes to increase the maximum amount a taxpayer may expense to $1.29 million, reduced by the amount by which the cost of qualifying property exceeds $3.22 million, each in connection with property placed in service in taxable years beginning after December 31, 2023. The $1.29 million and $3.22 million amounts would be adjusted for inflation for taxable years beginning after 2024.
5. Adoption of the United States-Taiwan Expedited Double-Tax Relief Act, “treaty-like” relief for Taiwan residents and the United States-Taiwan Tax Agreement Authorization Act, a framework for the negotiation of a tax agreement between the President of the United States and Taiwan.
The United States does not have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and therefore negotiating a tax treaty with Taiwan raises significant difficulties.
Under the bill, new section 894A would grant certain tax treaty-like benefits to qualified residents of Taiwan. A reduced rate of withholding tax would apply to interest, dividends, royalties, and certain other comparable payments from U.S. sources received by qualified residents of Taiwan. Instead of the 30% withholding tax rate generally imposed on U.S.-source income received by nonresident aliens and foreign corporations, interest and royalties would be subject to a 10% withholding tax rate and dividends would be subject to a 15% withholding tax rate (or a 10% withholding tax rate if paid to a recipient that owns at least ten percent of the shares of stock in the corporation and certain other conditions are met).
Additionally, under new section 894A, income of a qualified resident of Taiwan that is effectively connected to a U.S. trade or business would be subject to U.S. income tax only if such resident has a permanent establishment in the U.S., which is a higher threshold than the U.S. trade or business standard generally applied to non-U.S. persons under the Internal Revenue Code. Furthermore, only the taxable income effectively connected to the United States permanent establishment of a qualified resident of Taiwan would be subject to U.S. income tax.
No U.S. Tax would be imposed under section 894A on wages of qualified residents of Taiwan in connection with personal services performed in the United States and paid by a non-U.S. person.
Also, the proposal would impose general anti-abuse standards similar to those in section 894(c) to deny benefits when payments are made through hybrid entities. The proposed rules are applicable only if, and when, the Secretary of Treasury determines that reciprocal provisions apply to U.S. persons with respect to income sourced in Taiwan.
The bill also provides a framework for the negotiation of a tax agreement between the President of the United States and Taiwan. Specifically, the bill would authorize the President to negotiate and enter into one or more non-self-executing tax agreements to provide for bilateral tax relief with Taiwan beyond that provided for in proposed section 894A. Any such negotiation would only be permitted after a determination by the Secretary of the Treasury that Taiwan has provided benefits to U.S. persons that are reciprocal to the benefits provided to qualified residents of Taiwan under proposed section 894A. Furthermore, the bill would require that any provisions in such a tax agreement must conform with provisions customarily contained in U.S. bilateral income tax conventions, as exemplified by the 2016 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, and any such tax agreement may not include elements outside the scope of the 2016 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention.
6. Changes in threshold for reporting on Forms 1099-NEC and 1099-MISC for payments by a business for services performed by an independent contractor or subcontractor and for payments of remuneration for services from $600 to $1,000 and for payments of direct sales from $5,000 to $1,000.
Under current law, a person engaged in a trade or business who makes certain payments aggregating $600 or more in any taxable year to a single recipient in the course of the trade or business is required to report those payments to the IRS. This requirement applies to fixed or determinable payments of income as well as nonemployee compensation, generally reported on Form 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Information, or Form 1099-NEC, Nonemployee Compensation. In addition, any service recipient engaged in a trade or business and paying for services is required to file a return with the IRS when aggregate payments to a service provider equal $600 or more in a calendar year. Additionally, a seller who sells at least $5,000 in the aggregate of consumer products to a buyer for resale anywhere other than a permanent retail establishment is required to report the sale to the IRS.
The bill proposes to set the reporting threshold for the payments described in the preceding paragraph at $1,000 for a calendar year (indexed for inflation for calendar years after 2024), effective for payments made after December 31, 2023.
7. New Enforcement Provisions with Respect to COVID-Related Employee Retention Tax Credit
Under current law, an eligible employer can claim a refundable Employee-Retention Tax Credit (ERTC) against applicable employment taxes for calendar quarters in 2020 and 2021 in an amount equal to a percentage of the qualified wages with respect to each employee of such employer for such calendar quarter. The percentage is 50% of qualified wages paid after March 12, 2020, and before January 1, 2021, and 70% of qualified wages for calendar quarters beginning after December 31, 2020, and before January 1, 2022, subject to a maximum amount of wages per employee. An eligible employer may claim the ERTC on an amended employment tax return (Form 941-X) if the employer did not claim (or seeks to correct) the credit on its original employment tax return. For tax year 2020, an amended employment tax return must be filed by April 15, 2024, and for tax year 2021, by April 15, 2025.
The bill proposes to end the period for filing ERTC claims for both 2020 and 2021 as of January 31, 2024. Additionally, the bill would impose large penalties on any “COVID–ERTC promoter” who aids or abets the understatement of a tax liability or who fails to comply with certain due diligence requirements relating to the filing status and amount of certain credits. A COVID–ERTC promoter is defined as any person that provides aid, assistance or advice with respect to an affidavit, refund, claim or other document relating to an ERTC or to eligibility or to the calculation of the amount of the credit, if the person (x) charges or receives a fee based on the amount of the ERTC refund or credit, or (y) meets a gross receipts test. The proposed penalties for an ERTC promoter that aids and abets understatement of a tax liability is the greater of $200,000 ($10,000 in the case of an ERTC promoter that is a natural person) or 75% of the gross income of the ERTC promoter from providing aid, assistance, or advice with respect to a return or claim for ERTC refund or a document relating to the return or claim.
Furthermore, the bill would extend the statute of limitations period on assessment for all quarters of the ERTC to six years from the later of (1) the date on which the original return for the relevant calendar quarter is filed, (2) the date on which the return is treated as filed under present-law statute of limitations rules, or (3) the date on which the credit or refund with respect to the ERTC is made.

Court Rules on When Checks are Considered Completed Gifts

In Estate of DeMuth v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2022-72 (Aug. 1, 2022), the Tax Court ruled on when checks are considered completed gifts. There, on September 6, 2015, decedent’s son, under power of attorney, wrote 11 checks totaling $464,000 from decedent’s checking account. Decedent died on September 11, 2015. The estate tax return reported the value of decedent’s checking account excluding the value of all 11 checks. However, only one check cleared prior to decedent’s death. Three other checks were deposited to the payees’ respective depository banks on September 11, 2015, but not paid until September 14, 2015.

The Tax Court determined that a check written before death is not considered a completed gift and is includible in the gross estate where the decedent dies before the drawee bank accepts, certifies or makes final payment on the check. The court reasoned that so long as the drawer of the check can make a stop-payment order on the check, the donor has not parted with dominion and control and therefore has not made a completed gift. Accordingly, only the check that cleared the bank prior to death was properly excluded from the gross estate.

In prior Tax Court cases, the court considered whether it could apply a “relation back doctrine” to a check. If the check was paid, the relation back doctrine would deem the gift complete as of the date the check was delivered to the donee; notwithstanding the date the check cleared the bank.

In Estate of Metzger v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 204 (1993), the Tax Court applied the relation back doctrine. There, checks equal to the annual exclusion were issued to four donees in December 1985, deposited on December 31, 1985, and cleared the bank on January 2, 1986. Checks for the same amount and to the same four people were issued in 1986. The court ruled that the relation back doctrine applied so that the checks deposited on December 31, 1985, were considered completed gifts in 1985 and the donor did not make double annual exclusion gifts in 1986.

In contrast, in Newman v. Commissioner, 111 T.C. 81 (1998), the Tax Court determined that the relation back doctrine did not apply where checks were written, but not cashed prior to donor’s death. Unlike Metzger, the relation back doctrine did not apply because the donor was not alive when the checks were cashed. DeMuth is consistent with the prior cases in not applying the relation back doctrine because the donor died before the checks were cashed.

Article By David B. Shiner of  Chuhak & Tecson, P.C.

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© 2023 Chuhak & Tecson P.C.

Biden Administration Sets New Course on ESG Investing in Retirement Plans

In late 2022, the Department of Labor finalized a new rule titled “Prudence in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights,” largely reversing Trump-era guidance that had strictly limited the ability of plan fiduciaries to consider “environmental, social, and governance” (ESG) factors in selecting retirement plan investments and generally discouraged the exercise of proxy voting. In short, the new rule allows a fiduciary to consider ESG factors in selecting investment options, provided that the selection serves the financial interests of the plan and its participants over an appropriate time horizon, and encourages fiduciaries to engage in proxy voting.

The final rule moves away from 2020 Trump-era rulemaking by allowing more leeway for fiduciaries to consider ESG factors in selecting investment options. Specifically, the rule states that a “fiduciary’s duty of prudence must be based on factors that the fiduciary reasonably determines are relevant to a risk and return analysis and that such factors may include the economic effects of climate change and other ESG considerations on the particular investment or investment course of action.” The rule makes clear, however, that there is no requirement to affirmatively consider ESG factors, effectively limiting its scope and effect and putting the onus on fiduciaries to determine whether they want to incorporate ESG factors into their assessments of competing investments.

Overview

  • Similar to the Trump-era guidance, there is no definition of “ESG” or an “ESG”-style fund. Debate continues over what kinds of funds can be considered ESG investments, especially in light of the fact that some companies in industries traditionally thought to be inconsistent with ESG conscious investing are now trying to attract ESG investors (e.g. industrials, energy).
  • Fiduciaries are not required to consider ESG factors in selecting investment options. However, the consideration of such factors is not a presumed violation of a fiduciary’s duty of loyalty or prudence. Unlike the prior rule, which suggested that consideration of ESG factors could only be considered if all other pecuniary factors between competing investments were equal (the “tiebreaker” approach), the new rule allows a fiduciary to consider potential financial benefits of ESG investing in all circumstances.
  • Plan fiduciaries may take into account participant preferences in constructing a fund lineup. Therefore, if participants express a desire for ESG investment options, then it may be reasonable for plan fiduciaries to add ESG funds or to consider ESG factors in crafting the fund lineup.
  • ESG-centric funds may be used as qualified default investments (QDIAs) within retirement plans, reversing the prior outright prohibition on use of such funds as QDIAs.
  • In some situations, fiduciaries may be required to exercise shareholder rights when required to protect participant interests. It is unclear whether the exercise of such rights is only limited to situations that have an economic impact on the plan, or applies to additional situations. The clarification suggests that the exercise of proxy voting is not disfavored as an inefficient use of fiduciaries’ time and resources, as the prior iteration of the rule suggested.

Effective Date and Challenges to the Regulation

The new rule became effective in January 2023, except for delayed applicability of proxy voting provisions. However, twenty five state attorneys general have joined a lawsuit in federal court in Texas that seeks to overturn the regulation. The court is in the Fifth Circuit, which historically has been hostile to past Department of Labor regulations (including Obama-era fiduciary rules overturned in 2018, though the ESG rule is less far-reaching than the fiduciary rule and may survive a challenge even in the Fifth Circuit). Congressional Republicans have also introduced a Congressional Review Act (CRA) review proposal to repeal the regulation that has gained the support of Joe Manchin (D-WV). Although CRA actions are not subject to Senate filibuster rules, they are subject to presidential veto, which President Biden is sure to do if the repeal reaches his desk.

Action Steps

Employers should assume that the ESG rules will remain in effect and engage with plan fiduciaries, advisors, and employees and determine the extent to which ESG considerations should (or should not) enter into fiduciary deliberations when considering plan investment alternatives. Some investment advisors have already begun to include separate ESG scorecards for mutual funds and other investments in their regular plan investment reviews. Fiduciaries should also consider whether and how the approach that is ultimately taken should be reflected in the plan’s investment policy statement. Plans that delegate full control over investments to an independent fiduciary (an ERISA 3(38) advisor) should engage with their advisor to determine whether and the extent to which ESG considerations will be part of that fiduciary’s process, and whether that is consistent with the desires of the plan fiduciaries and participants.

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Complying With New Federal Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, PUMP for Nursing Mothers Act

The new Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) and the Providing Urgent Maternal Protections for Nursing Mothers Act (PUMP For Nursing Mothers Act) were adopted when President Joe Biden signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 on Dec. 29, 2022.

PWFA: Pregnancy Finally Given Disability-Like Protection

The PWFA applies to employers with at least 15 employees and becomes effective on June 27, 2023.

Like the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the PWFA includes the obligation to provide reasonable accommodations so long as they do not impose an undue hardship. Many courts have determined that pregnancy alone was not a disability entitled to accommodation under the ADA. Under the PWFA, employers will be required to provide reasonable accommodations to employees and applicants with known temporary limitations on their ability to perform the essential functions of their jobs based on a physical or mental condition related to pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions.

The PWFA adopts the same meaning of “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship” as used in the ADA, including the interactive process that will typically be used to determine an appropriate reasonable accommodation.

The PWFA provides that an employee or their representative can make the employer aware of the employee’s limitations. It also provides that an employer cannot require an employee to take a paid or unpaid leave of absence if another reasonable accommodation can be provided. Of course, that does not mean the employee gets the accommodation of their choice. The statute provides a defense to damages for employers that, in good faith, work with employees to identify alternative accommodations that are equally effective and do not cause an undue hardship.

Practical Advice for PWFA Compliance

  1. Employers do not have to have a policy for every rule or practice that applies in the workplace. However, if an employer has a reasonable accommodations policy, that policy should be reviewed and updated, as necessary.
  2. Human resources professionals are not the only ones who need training. If managers are not trained as well, they may unwittingly say something in response to an employee’s question that is inconsistent with your policies and practices.
  3. Create a process to follow when employees request an accommodation due to pregnancy-related limitations. The process should be similar to the ADA process, including requesting supporting documentation from the treating healthcare provider. Have employees in states or cities that have adopted versions of the pregnant workers fairness law or other similar laws that are more generous than the federal PWFA? The federal PWFA does not preempt more generous state and local laws. Therefore, any policy, practice, or form may need to be modified depending on where employees are located. As an example, some city and state laws, except in specific circumstances, prohibit employers from requesting medical documentation to confirm an employee’s pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions as part of the accommodation process.
  4. Like under the ADA, when an employee requests an accommodation under the PWFA, Human resources professionals should think about how to make this work, not this will never work. This simple shift in approach makes finding a reasonable accommodation that does not impose an undue hardship on operations more likely.

PUMP for Nursing Mothers Act

The PUMP for Nursing Mothers Act expands existing employer obligations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to provide an employee with reasonable break time to express breast milk for the employee’s nursing child for one year after the child’s birth. The employer obligation to provide a place to express milk shielded from view and intrusion from coworkers and the public (other than a bathroom) continues.

Except for changes to available remedies, the amendment to the FLSA took effect on December 29, 2022. The changes to remedies will take effect on April 28, 2023.

What Changed Under PUMP for Nursing Mothers Act

The PUMP for Nursing Mothers Act covers all employees, not just non-exempt workers. The break time may be unpaid unless otherwise required by federal or state law or municipal ordinance. Employers should ensure that non-exempt nursing employees are paid if they express breast milk during an otherwise paid break period or if they are not completely relieved of duty for the entire break period. Exempt employees should be paid their full weekly salary as required by federal, state, and local law, regardless of whether they take breaks to express breast milk.

With some exceptions, the law requires employees to provide notice of an alleged violation to the employer and give the employer a 10-day cure period before filing a suit.

Employers with fewer than 50 employees can still rely on the small employer exemption, if compliance with the law would cause undue hardship because of significant difficulty or expense. Crewmembers of air carriers are exempted from the law. Rail carriers and motorcoach services operators are covered by the law, but there are exceptions and delayed effective dates for certain employees. No similar exemption is provided for other transportation industry employers.

Practical Advice for PUMP for Nursing Mothers Act Compliance

  1. Educate the HR team and front-line managers on the update to the law and refresh them on the process for providing break time and private spaces to express breast milk.
  2. Like the PWFA, the law does not preempt state law or municipal ordinances that provide greater protection than provided by the PUMP for Nursing Mothers Act. Depending on where employees are located, policies, practices, and the private space provided to express breast milk may need to be modified.
  3. Creativity is the key to being able to come up with staffing solutions and private spaces for nursing mothers to express breast milk. Nothing in the law requires employers to maintain a permanent, dedicated space for nursing mothers. A space temporarily created or converted into a space for expressing breast milk and made available when needed by a nursing mother is sufficient if the space is shielded from view and free from intrusion from coworkers and the public. In other words, allowing an employee to use an office with a door that locks would be convenient, but not practical for many worksites. Depending on the workplace settings, privacy screens, curtains, signage, portable pumping stations, and partnerships with other employers to provide private spaces for nursing mothers are all possibilities.

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