Corporate law Archives - Page 12 of 32

For A Limited Time Only – California Is Giving Away Corporations, LLCs And More!

As a result of the recent enactment of California’s 2022-2023 Budget Bill, the California Secretary of State’s office has announced a temporary waiver of many business entity filing fees. This waiver will last until June 30, 2023, the end of the state’s current fiscal year.

Here is the Secretary of State’s list of filings for which no filing fee is currently being imposed:

Articles of Organization – CA LLC
Registration – Out-of-State LLC
Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – Benefit
Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – Close
Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – General Stock
Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – Insurer
Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – Professional
Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – Social Purpose
Registration – Out-of-State Corporation – Accountancy or Law (Professional)
Registration – Out-of-State Corporation – Insurer
Registration – Out-of-State Corporation – Stock
Articles of Incorporation – CA Nonprofit Corporation – Mutual Benefit
Articles of Incorporation – CA Nonprofit Corporation – Mutual Benefit – Common Interest Development
Articles of Incorporation – CA Nonprofit Corporation – Mutual Benefit – Credit Union
Articles of Incorporation – CA Nonprofit Corporation – Public Benefit
Articles of Incorporation – CA Nonprofit Corporation – Public Benefit – Common Interest Development
Articles of Incorporation – CA Nonprofit Corporation – Religious
Registration – Out-of-State Corporation – Nonprofit
Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – Agricultural Cooperative Association
Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – Cannabis Cooperative Association
Articles of Incorporation – CA Corporation – General Cooperative
Certificate of Limited Partnership – CA LP
Registration – Out-of-State LP

Note that the Secretary of State will continue to impose other fees not listed above.

It is unlikely that this temporary suspension of fees will have any significant impact on the number of business entities being formed under California law. Historically, these fees have been relatively modest. For example, the fee for filing articles of incorporation is $100. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12186(c). The real costs are the ongoing costs associated with the crushing tax and regulatory burdens placed on businesses by the state. According to the Tax Foundation, California ranks 48th in business tax climate (just ahead of New York and New Jersey).

Article By Keith Paul Bishop of Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

For more corporate law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

5 Questions You Should Be Asking About Succession Planning for Your Family Office

Succession planning for family offices is often a difficult process. It is emotional. It takes longer than it should. But succession planning that is deliberate, collaborative, and strategic can offer so much opportunity.

Katten recently hosted a conversation with Jane Flanagan, Director of Family Office Consulting at Northern Trust, who discussed a survey conducted with former family office CEOs to capture their experience with succession and succession planning. The results were illuminating, and the survey participants spoke loud and clear about two major points: 1.) they wished they had begun the process sooner, and 2.) they wished they’d known what questions to ask along the way.

We’ve pulled together a series of basic questions about succession planning to help you consider your own approach.

Why should I create a succession plan?

Like it or not, a succession will take place eventually. The last thing you or your family office want is the chaos, acrimony, and setbacks an unexpected succession can cause.

Putting a plan in place can give your current leadership peace of mind, ensure buy-in and collaboration throughout the family, and prepare potential internal successors or identify key attributes for external candidates.

When should I start?

Now! It’s never too early to begin planning, and there are some easy steps you can take right away to set you on the right path.

If you aren’t sure where to begin or what a planning process looks like, you’re in good company. According to Northern Trust’s recent survey, 64 percent of family office CEOs expect a succession event in the next three to five years.

What is included in a succession planning process?

The planning process will differ from family to family, but Northern Trust created a checklist to help you think through your own approach.

Taking on the entire process at once can be daunting. To build momentum (and buy-in), consider starting small by documenting the responsibilities of the current leadership.

Once you have a good sense of the current role’s responsibilities, think about the knowledge and relationships critical to the role’s success.

These should be top considerations throughout the succession planning process.

Where should I begin?

First, consider putting an emergency succession plan in place as soon as possible while you develop a long-term succession plan.

You want to give this process the time, attention, and consideration it deserves. An emergency plan will help immensely if an unexpected succession is needed, so focus first on getting that in place before you set out on a long-term planning process.

How do I find the right successor?

This is why the planning process is so important. These decisions can have a big impact, so you want to have a plan in place well before you need it.

Consider what works and what could be improved about the current role. Are there creative approaches or changes to consider? (Such as shifting to a CIO/CEO hybrid role, refocusing the role’s priorities, or even expanding into a multi-family office.)

Northern Trust’s survey participants were evenly split on their choices to hire an external successor or grow a successor from within. There are pros and cons to each approach, but so many of the factors to consider will be specific to your situation.

Article By Adam M. Damerow, Abby Feinman, and Saul E. Rudo of Katten

For more family law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Abortion-Related Travel Benefits Post-Dobbs

Immediately following the Supreme Court decision in Dobbs v. Jackson returning the power to regulate abortion to the states, a number of large employers announced that they would offer out-of-state travel benefits for employees living in states where abortion-related medical care is unavailable. Employers considering offering abortion-related travel benefits have several key considerations to keep in mind. The law currently allows health plans to provide reimbursement for travel primarily for and essential to medical care. Although this area of the law is evolving, employers with self-funded medical plans may amend their existing medical plans to provide abortion-related travel benefits while those with fully insured medical plans may face more obstacles in providing such benefits.

In Dobbs v. Jackson, an abortion clinic challenged a Mississippi law that would ban abortion after 15 weeks of pregnancy, with limited exceptions. In establishing the constitutional right to abortion in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court restricted states in their ability to limit or ban abortions before viability of the fetus, or 24 weeks from the time of conception. In upholding the Mississippi law, the Supreme Court overturned Roe and held that the protection or regulation of abortion is a decision for each state.

Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma and South Dakota have already banned or made abortion illegal pursuant to trigger laws which went into effect as of the Supreme Court decision on June 24, 2022. Also, a number of additional states are expected to soon have similar legislation in effect, either by virtue of expected legislative action or trigger laws with slightly delayed effective dates. In response, a number of employers have announced that they will reimburse all or a portion of abortion-related travel expenses for employees in states where abortions are banned or otherwise not available.

Under Section 213(d) of the Internal Revenue Code, the definition of “medical care” includes transportation that is both “primarily for and essential to” the medical care sought by an individual. These types of travel benefits have historically been utilized in connection with certain specialized medical treatments, such as organ transplants. However, Section 213(d) is not limited to particular types of procedures, and thus forms the framework for providing abortion-related travel benefits through existing medical plans.

Although Code Section 213(d) applies to both self-insured and insured medical plans, the substantive coverage provisions of insured medical plans will generally be governed by the state insurance code of the state in which the insurance policy is issued. Coverage for abortion services or any related travel benefits may not be permitted under the insurance code of the state in which the policy is issued, or an insurer may not offer a travel benefit for such services even if permitted to do so. Self-insured plans, by contrast, provide employers more flexibility in plan design, including control, consistent with existing federal requirements, over the types and levels of benefits covered under the plan. As noted above, existing plans may already cover travel-related benefits for certain types of medical procedures.

Employers with high-deductible health plans tied to health savings accounts (HSAs) will need to consider the impact of adding abortion-related travel benefits to such plans. Travel-related benefits of any type would not appear to be eligible for first dollar coverage, and thus may be of minimal benefit to participants enrolled in high-deductible health plans.

Employers with fully insured medical plans that do not cover abortion-related travel benefits may be able to offer a medical travel reimbursement program through an integrated health reimbursement arrangement (HRA). An integrated HRA is an employer-funded group health plan from which employees enrolled in the employer’s traditional group medical insurance plan are reimbursed for qualifying expenses not paid by the traditional plan.

Another potential option for employers with fully insured medical plans may be to offer a stipend entirely outside of any established group health plan. Such reimbursement programs may result in taxable compensation for employees who receive such reimbursements. Also, employers would need to be sensitive to privacy and confidentiality considerations of such a policy, which should generally be minimized if offered in accordance with the existing protections of HIPAA through a medical plan and under which claims are processed by an insurer or third-party administrator rather than by the employer itself.

Additionally, some state laws may attempt to criminalize or otherwise sanction so-called aiding and abetting actions related to the procurement of abortion services in another state. This is an untested area of the law, and it is unclear whether any actions brought under such statutes would be legally viable. In this regard, Justice Kavanaugh stated as follows in his concurring opinion in Dobbs: “For example, may a State bar a resident of that State from traveling to another State to obtain an abortion? In my view, the answer is no based on the constitutional right to interstate travel.” (Kavanaugh Concurring Opinion, page 10.) This is an area that will require continual monitoring by employers who offer abortion-related travel benefits.

Article By Thomas G. Hancuch, Philip L. Mowery, and Amal Rafiq of Vedder Price

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

What the C-Suite and Board Should Know About the New CCO Certification Requirement from DOJ

U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco presented a new policy at a Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association event that requires chief compliance officers (CCO) to certify that compliance programs have been “reasonably designed to prevent anti-corruption violations.”¹ The policy is an outgrowth of a settlement involving US$1 billion in criminal and civil penalties imposed on mining giant, Glencore International AG (Glencore), after it pleaded guilty to bribery and market manipulation charges.² According to Monaco, this new policy is meant to ensure that CCOs stay in the loop on potential company violations and have the necessary resources to prevent financial crime.³ While the expressed intention of this new policy is to empower CCOs, it has raised concerns about potential liability for CCOs.

GLENCORE SETTLEMENT

Glencore is among the largest companies that dominate global trading of oil, fuel, metals, minerals, and food.⁴ In 2018, Glencore was subject to a multi-year investigation by the DOJ for violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and a commodity price manipulation scheme.⁵ According to admissions and court documents filed in the Southern District of New York, Glencore, acting through its employees and agents, engaged in a scheme for over a decade to pay more than US$100 million to third-party intermediaries in order to secure improper advantages to obtain and retain business with state-owned and state-controlled entities. A significant portion of these payments were used to pay bribes to officials in Nigeria, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, Brazil, Venezuela, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.⁶ Glencore resolved the government’s investigations by entering into a plea agreement (Plea Agreement)⁷According to the Plea Agreement, Glencore admitted to one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA.⁸ Shaun Teichner, the general counsel for the company, told a federal judge in New York that Glencore “knowingly and willingly entered into a conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by making payments to corrupt government officials.”⁹

Glencore expects to pay about US$1 billion to U.S. authorities, after accounting for credits and offsets payable to other jurisdictions and agencies, and about US$40 million to Brazil.¹⁰ A related payment by Glencore to the United Kingdom will be finalized after a hearing next month.¹¹

The Plea Agreement requires that Glencore, among other things: (1) implement two independent compliance monitors, one in the United States and one abroad, to prevent the reoccurrence of crimes; (2) retain a compliance monitor for three years; and (3) have its chief executive officer (CEO) and CCO submit a document certifying to the DOJ’s fraud section that the company has met its compliance obligations (the CCO Certification Requirement or the Certification).¹²

WHY THE CCO CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT HAS RAISED CONCERNS

The CCO Certification Requirement has raised concerns in the compliance space over potential increases in CCO liability.¹³ Specifically, compliance officials worry that this policy transfers corporate liability into potential individual liability for the CCO. The Certification form asks the CEO and CCO to certify that the compliance program has been “reasonably designed” to prevent future anti-corruption violations.¹⁴ Critics worry that these new certifications may discourage CCOs from taking jobs at companies that are or may be parties to agreements with the DOJ.¹⁵

The DOJ stated that liability will depend on the facts and circumstances of the case but that the new policy is not aimed at going after CEOs or CCOs.¹⁶ Assistant Attorney General Kenneth A. Polite Jr. stated, “if there is a knowing misrepresentation on the part of the CEO or CCO, then that could certainly result in some form of personal liability.”¹⁷ Depending on the circumstances, the DOJ may consider it a breach of the corporation’s obligations under the Plea Agreement if there is either a misrepresentation in one of these certifications or a failure to provide the same.¹⁸ Polite added that “the certification memorializes the company’s commitment to take its compliance obligations seriously.”¹⁹

Critics question how realistic the CCO Certification Requirement is for large, multinational companies.²⁰ They also question the due diligence required to actually ensure that compliance programs are “reasonably designed,” especially for companies operating in over 50 countries. Would it be realistic to expect a CCO or CEO to keep tabs on compliance across their company with that level of specificity?²¹

WHAT THE C SUITE AND BOARD SHOULD CONSIDER MOVING FORWARD

The questions to consider are: (1) where will the expressed policy lead? And (2) how do we best prepare for the Certification?

The DOJ has specifically stated its intention to “prosecute the individuals who commit and profit from corporate malfeasance.”²² Regardless of Monaco’s comments, the Certification appears to create potential for an extension of that policy.

The fact of the policy gives rise to a number of subsidiary questions. Is the Certification, which targets foreign corrupt practices, a harbinger for other such certifications in areas such as health care fraud, defense contractor fraud, money laundering, etc.? And is DOJ gearing toward providing its prosecutors with more tools for individual culpability at the highest corporate levels consistent with its expressed policy?

Moving forward, in-house counsel should work with the CEO and CCO to consider areas of corporate business practices that are specifically subject to compliance programs. They should develop practices including auditing, tracking, training, and reviewing to ensure the programs are “reasonably designed” to prevent future wrongdoing. Further, they should be sure to document their corporate business practices. Obviously, these programs become much more complex when operations include foreign jurisdictions and foreign laws with respect to matters such as privacy and employee rights.

Although this process may not be new to protect corporations from criminal charges, the newly-announced policy will certainly focus the spotlight on CEOs and CCOs in the FCPA context and arguably beyond.

FOOTNOTES

¹Al Barbarino, DOJ Defends New CCO Certifications Amid Industry Worry, LAW360 (May 26, 2022), https://www.law360.com/whitecollar/articles/1496108/doj-defends-new-cco-….

²Id.

³ Id.

⁴ Chris Strohm, Chris Dolmetsch & Jack Farchy, Glencore Pleads Guilty to Decade of Bribery and Manipulation, BLOOMBERG (May 24, 2022), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-24/glencore-to-appear-in-us-uk-courts-over-resolutions-of-probes.

⁵ Id.

⁶ News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Office of Pub. Affs., Glencore Entered Guilty Pleas to Foreign Bribery and Market Manipulation Schemes, (May 24, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/glencore-entered-guilty-pleas-foreign-bribery-and-market-manipulation-schemes.

⁷ Id.

⁸ Id.

⁹Strohm, supra note 4.

¹⁰ Id.

¹¹ Id.

¹² Id.

¹³Barbarino, supra note 1.

¹⁴ Id.

¹⁵ Id.

¹⁶ Id.

¹⁷ Id.

¹⁸ Id.

¹⁹ Id.

²⁰ Id.

²¹ Id.

²² News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Attorney General Merrick B. Garland Delivers Remarks Announcing Glencore Guilty Pleas in Connection with Foreign Bribery and Market Manipulation Schemes (May 24, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-merrick-b-garland-delivers-remarks-announcing-glencore-guilty-pleas.

Article By Mark A. Rush and Nadia J. Brooks of K&L Gates

For more corporate law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Preparing Corporate Messaging in the Wake of Dobbs

The United States Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”), in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, has held that there is no constitutional right to abortion, overruling Roe v. Wade and Casey v. Planned Parenthood.

Employers, who increasingly are finding themselves on the front lines of many societal issues, will need to decide quickly whether and how they might address the Dobbs decision, as public reaction has been and is likely to remain strong. Board members, employees, and shareholders may advocate for corporations to take a visible stand on the issue of abortion and reproductive rights. And employees may want to speak up themselves (possibly via employer social media accounts).

It is important to remember that company communication decisions and actions regarding the Dobbs ruling, as well as other political and social issues, can have practical and legal implications.

The first question is whether your company will comment on Dobbs. If you decide to comment, there are many factors to consider. Your message is an important starting point. Who is your intended audience? Will your employees consider it an opportunity to join in the conversation? What will you say? Even if your message is internal, keep in mind that it may not stay that way, given the nature of social media. And before you think, “I’ll just stay out of it,” remember that some will view silence or neutrality as a statement in and of itself. If you choose not to speak, are you prepared to deal with any potential reaction from customers, employees, or shareholders?

Internally, employees may have questions about health benefits or other terms and conditions of employment because of Dobbs. It will be important to arm all key stakeholders, including leadership, corporate communications, and human resources, with tools to consistently manage these communications and responses.

Whether it’s internal or external communications, expect feedback! How that feedback is handled is as important as the initial communication (or lack thereof).

Certain industries, like healthcare and insurance, may also feel compelled to make an affirmative statement if the Dobbs decision has a direct impact on services and/or products. In those cases, the need to consider all implications is even more pressing.

In thinking through these decisions, employers should also consider who may need to approve any messaging. The board of directors, senior executives, legal, and marketing and communications teams are among the key stakeholders who may need to be consulted. And don’t forget that your public-facing employees may bear the brunt of your response. Are they prepared?

Employers should also keep in mind various laws that may govern their reaction, including those they might otherwise not consider. For example, the National Labor Relations Act protects employees’ rights to collectively discuss terms and conditions of employment at work and off duty – and that applies to employers with and without a unionized workforce. The current Biden-appointed General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board has taken an expanded view of topics that are connected to the workplace. Moreover, some states, including California and New York, have enacted off-duty conduct laws that prohibit employers from disciplining employees for lawful conduct outside of work, which may include political advocacy. There may also be anti-discrimination laws and potential civil and criminal liability associated with your statements, depending on their wording.

Reactions to the Dobbs decision may vary. Some reaction may be comparable to what we’ve seen with respect to other recent political and/or social justice movements, such as Black Lives Matter and #MeToo; others may react differently, or not at all. In these rapidly changing times, companies — particularly publicly traded and consumer-facing ones — need to be make informed decisions. Clear, consistent messaging is key to establishing confident and consistent responses to potential concerns by employees and other stakeholders.

Article By M. Carter DeLorme, Frank C. Morris, JR, Susan Gross Sholinsky, Jennifer Barna, and Erin E. Schaefer of Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.

For more civil rights legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

The Way to Protect Your Business? What You Need to Know About Trade Secrets

What do Coca-Cola’s secret formula, McDonalds’ special sauce, and Google’s search algorithm have in common? Each is a protected trade secret. In other words, they are proprietary information vital to these companies’ survival and are among their most valuable corporate secrets.

A trade secret can be anything of value to your company that is unique and not known to persons outside the company. For example, a trade secret can be a recipe, process, formula, strategy, technique, or device that your competitors do not know, do not have, and cannot use.

Trade secret law can be less risky in some respects than other forms of intellectual property like patents, copyrights, and trademarks. The application process for a patent requires that a company disclose the secret itself. With that comes an inherent risk—should the application be denied, the secret is no longer a secret. While the protection afforded by trade secret law may be considered fragile, meaning constant vigilance is required to maintain secrecy, the secret remains a secret; while a patent, even after issuance, carries some risk of post-grant invalidation. By contrast, a trade secret owner may ultimately enjoy greater certainty by maintaining protection, potentially forever. However, a trade secret is entitled to protection only for as long as it is kept a secret. If the information is lawfully disclosed to the public, it is no longer confidential and loses its trade secret protection forever.

Governing Law: Both federal and state law recognize the time and money invested to gain competitive advantages like trade secrets and protect those advantages. Federal Law: Under the controlling federal legislation passed by Congress in 2016, the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) defines a trade secret as something used in a company’s business that (a) is not known or readily accessible by competitors, (b) has commercial value or that provides a competitive advantage in the marketplace, and (c) the owner of the information protects from disclosure through reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy. Prior to the DTSA’s enactment in 2016, no federal statute promulgated a federal trade secret private right of action.

In addition to the DTSA’s rules regarding trade secrets, additional federal rules apply. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 makes the theft of trade secrets a federal crime. The Act prohibits the theft of a trade secret by a person intending or knowing that the offense will injure a trade secret owner. The Act also makes it a federal crime to receive, buy, or possess trade secret information knowing it to have been stolen. The Act allows the government to punish thefts of trade secrets by imprisonment up to 15 years and/or fines up to $5 million, depending on whether the defendant is an individual or a corporation. A private party can still sue for trade secret theft even if the federal government files a criminal case under the Economic Espionage Act.

New York State Law: Prior to federal law, most states had some form of trade secret law that varied state to state. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) was published in 1979 and amended in 1985 to provide a uniform trade secret law. Many states, including Pennsylvania in 2004 and New Jersey in 2012, adopted the UTSA. Notably, New York did not adopt the UTSA and does not have its own state trade secret statute, and thus relies on the common law.

Under New York common law, “misappropriation” refers to the acquisition of a trade secret by someone who knows that the trade secret was acquired by improper means—theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach, or inducement of a breach of duty to maintain secrecy. The New York statute of limitations requires that any action for misappropriation be filed three years from the date the misappropriation is discovered. Further, New York law requires that the use of the trade secret be continuous in the operation of a business, rather than one-time use.

Cartier v. Tiffany: Cartier recently filed suit against its luxury rival Tiffany & Co. in New York state court. Cartier v. Tiffany & Co., et al.,650925/2022 (N.Y. Sup.). Richemont-owned Cartier sets out claims against LVMH’s Tiffany & Co. for various contractual and tort claims and trade secret misappropriation against both defendants [Who is the other defendant?]. Cartier seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to require defendants to refrain from using the allegedly misappropriated information and return it to Cartier, as well as a judgment for any “compensatory damages that may be caused by [Tiffany’s] wrongful conduct.”

The complaint states that Tiffany & Co. lured former Cartier employee Megan Marino away from her role as its Assistant Manager for Jewelry Merchandising to learn more about Cartier’s “High Jewelry” collection, where pieces typically cost $50,000 to $10 million.

Cartier claims Marino was bound by non-disclosure and non-solicitation agreements she had signed as part of her role at Cartier and that she breached those agreements by using Cartier’s confidential business information to benefit Tiffany. This information includes Cartier’s “very sensitive and valuable” internal company documents that Marino forwarded to her personal email. Specifically, Marino “referenced a [Cartier] Excel spreadsheet” that “detailed Cartier’s confidential, High Jewelry assortment information.” Based on that spreadsheet, Cartier alleges, Marino “created a new Excel document, derived entirely from Cartier’s confidential information,” including “the total number of High Jewelry pieces at various Cartier locations in the U.S.” Cartier maintains this information is “only accessible by a limited number of Cartier employees [and] not known outside of Cartier” and “allow[s] a sophisticated competitor to replicate key strategies and, with relative ease, to reverse engineer how Cartier allocates, merchandises, and prices its High Jewelry stock.” Cartier claims the proprietary and confidential nature of this information amounts to a trade secret-protected asset.

Cartier further claims Tiffany has a history of poaching employees and maintains a “disturbing culture of misappropriating competitive information.” Given the alleged pattern, Cartier asserts that Tiffany now possesses “a substantial amount of [its] confidential and trade secret information that it obtained from Marino and other former Cartier employees” as a result of their “unlawful taking of Cartier’s valuable confidential information and trade secrets.”

Even if Cartier successfully establishes that it maintains trade secret information that Tiffany misappropriated, the case is hardly straightforward. Establishing damages in cases like this is particularly challenging, as it is difficult to assign a dollar value to trade secret information that will compensate the plaintiff for the economic loss caused by the defendant’s misappropriation. As a result, courts generally have quite a bit of discretion in fashioning damages awards.

Article By David H. Siegel of Norris McLaughlin P.A.

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

By Law, Everything Is Possible In California

The California Civil Code includes a number of decidedly gnomic provisions. Section 1597 is one of these. It purports to answer the question of what is possible:

Everything is deemed possible except that which is impossible in the nature of things.

The problem with the statute is that it doesn’t fully answer the question because to know what is possible, one must know what is impossible and the statute doesn’t provide a definition of impossibility. In this regard, I am reminded of the following lines from James Joyce’s Ulysses:

But can those have been possible seeing that they never were? Or was that only possible which came to pass?

But why define what is possible? The reason is that Civil Code requires that the object of a contract must, among other things, be possible by the time that it is to be performed. Cal. Civ. Code § 1596. When a contract that has a single object that is impossible of performance, the entire contract is void. Cal. Civ. Code § 1598.

Happy Bloomsday!

Today is Bloomsday. Joyce chose June 16, 1904 as the day on which most (but not all) of the action in Ulysses takes place. It is called Bloomsday because the hero of the novel is Leopold Bloom. It was on June 16, 1904 that Joyce and his future wife, Nora Barnacle, had their first date (and intimate contact).

Finn’s Hotel in Dublin, where Nora worked in 1904

Article By Keith Paul Bishop of Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

For more legislative legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

BREAKING: Supreme Court Reverses California Court of Appeal in Viking River Cruises v. Moriana

On June 15, 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision on Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (Case No. 20-1573) reversing the California Court of Appeal’s decision to affirm the denial of Viking’s motion to compel arbitration Moriana’s “individual” PAGA claim and to dismiss her other PAGA claims.

As previously reported, the question presented in Viking River Cruises involved whether the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) preempts the California Supreme Court’s decision in Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 58 Cal.4th 380 (2014), which invalidates contractual waivers of representative claims under California’s Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”).

In a majority opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Court held that while Iskanian’s prohibition on “wholesale waivers” of PAGA claims is not preempted by the FAA, Iskanian’s rule that PAGA actions cannot be divided into “individual” and “non-individual claims” is preempted.

Applying this holding to the parties, the Court held that Viking was entitled to enforce the parties’ arbitration agreement insofar as it mandated arbitration of Moriana’s individual PAGA claim. As for Moriana’s non-individual PAGA claims, because PAGA itself “provides no mechanism to enable a court to adjudicate non-individual PAGA claims once an individual claim has been committed to a separate proceeding,” Moriana lacks “statutory standing” under PAGA to litigate her “non-individual” claims separately in state court. Accordingly, “the correct course is to dismiss her remaining claims.”

Article By Timothy Kim and Michele J. Beilke of Hunton Andrews Kurth

For more litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

SCOTUS Significantly Narrows Scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for International Arbitrations

The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in ZF Automotive US, Inc., et al., v. Luxshare, Ltd., No. 21-401, holds that U.S. federal courts cannot order discovery in aid of international commercial arbitrations or investor-state arbitrations. In a unanimous decision, the Court reasoned that a “foreign tribunal,” under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, “is best understood as an adjudicative body that exercises governmental authority” rather than a private body that is merely located in another country. Because the private arbitral tribunal in the ZF Automotive case did not exercise governmental authority, the Supreme Court denied discovery in aid of the proceeding under Section 1782.

The decision resolves a circuit split over whether private commercial arbitration panels should be considered “foreign or international tribunals” under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, and thus whether U.S. discovery should be allowed in such private commercial arbitrations. Section 1782 authorizes a district court to order the production of evidence “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.” The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have previously held that international commercial arbitrations are foreign tribunals under the statute, while the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have held that they are not. The availability of discovery under Section 1782 is a key issue for the international arbitration community because the scope of discovery allowed under Section 1782 is generally broader than any discovery allowed under institutional arbitral rules or under foreign arbitration laws.

In reaching its decision, the Court found that the word “tribunal” carries a distinctively governmental flavor. A prior version of Section 1782 covered only “judicial proceeding[s]” in any court in a foreign country, however, Congress later expanded the legislation’s scope to cover proceedings in a “foreign or international tribunal.” The Court found that while this change broadens the understanding of “tribunal” to include tribunals that are not formal courts, the term is still best understood to refer to an adjudicative body that exercises governmental authority. Under the decision, a “foreign tribunal” is a tribunal belonging to a foreign nation while an “international tribunal” is best understood as one that involves two or more nations imbued with governmental authority. Location of the tribunal or the nature of the parties to the dispute are not determinative in this interpretation.

The Court also noted that extending Section 1782 discovery to cover international arbitrations would conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act, which governs domestic arbitrations. Thus, interpreting Section 1782 as applying to international arbitration would create a “notable mismatch between foreign and domestic arbitration.”

The Court’s decision came in a consolidated case arising out of appeals in the Sixth and Second Circuits. The first case involves a dispute between Luxshare, a Hong Kong company and ZF Automotive US Inc., a Michigan-based company, over an allegedly fraudulent sales transaction. The agreement between the parties provided that all disputes would be resolved by an arbitral panel under the Arbitration Rules of the German Arbitration Institute (DIS). In preparation for bringing an arbitration, Luxshare filed an ex parte petition under Section 1782 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan seeking information from ZF Automotive and its officers. The district court granted the petition and ZF Automotive moved to quash, arguing that a panel formed under the auspices of the DIS was not a “foreign or international tribunal” under Section 1782. The district court denied the motion and the Sixth Circuit denied a stay.

The second case involves AB bankas SNORAS, a Lithuanian bank which was nationalized by Lithuanian authorities. The Fund for Protection of Investors’ Rights in Foreign States, a Russian corporation, commenced an ad hoc arbitration proceeding against Lithuania under a bilateral investment treaty that the country entered with Russia. The Fund filed a petition under Section 1782 in the district court seeking information from AlixPartners, LLP, a New York-based consulting firm, and one of its officers. AlixPartners challenged the petition, arguing that the ad hoc panel was also not a “foreign or international tribunal” under Section 1782. The district court rejected that argument in a decision that was affirmed by the Second Circuit.

The Court’s decision is likely to spark much discussion in the international arbitration community. There will likely be a significant impact on current and future international arbitrations, with parties having to consider their strategies for discovery in light of the unavailability of a critical information-gathering tool. On the other hand, for better and for worse, this decision will further streamline the international arbitration process, as many arbitral proceedings will not be delayed by related litigation over discovery in U.S. courts.

Article By Travis A. Gonyou of Binder & Schwartz

For more arbitration legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

A Fool in Idaho; SEC Sues Idahoans for Insider Trading Scheme

In July 1993 two brothers, David and Tom Gardner, and a friend, Erik Rydholm, founded a private investment advisory firm in Alexandria, Virginia. They named that firm Motley Fool after the court jester in “As You Like It,” a play written by William Shakespeare (it is believed in 1599). The Motley Fool, or Touchstone as he is known in the play, was the only character who could speak the truth to Duke Frederick without having his head cut off. Similarly, Motley Fool, the advisory firm, sought to give investors accurate advice, even if it flew in the face of received wisdom. For example, in advance of April Fool’s Day 1994, Motley Fool issued a series of online messages promoting a non-existent sewage-disposal company. The April Fool’s Day prank was intended to teach investors a lesson about penny stock companies. The messages gained widespread attention including an article in The Wall Street Journal.

Over time Motley Fool grew into a worldwide subscription stock recommendation service. It now releases new recommendations every Thursday, and subscribers receive them through computer interfaces provided by Motley Fool. The terms of service in a Motley Fool subscription agreement (in the words of the May 3, 2022 Complaint brought by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission [“SEC”] in the Federal Court for the Southern District of New York) “expressly prohibit unauthorized access to its systems.” David Lee Stone of Nampa, Idaho (southwest of Boise), is a 36-year-old computer design and repair person with a degree in computer science. Since June 2021, he and his wife have lived periodically in Romania, a fact cited in the Complaint, suggesting, perhaps, some involvement with Romania-based computer hackers. In any event, Stone is alleged in the Complaint to have used deceptive means beginning in November 2020 to obtain pre-release access to upcoming Motley Fool stock picks. Using that information, Stone and a co-defendant made aggressive investments, typically in options, which generated more than $12 million in gains. Stone, his codefendant, and his family and friends all benefited financially from knowing in advance the Motley Fool picks.

The SEC seeks injunctions against Stone and his co-defendant, as well as disgorgement with interest and civil penalties, for violating the antifraud provisions of federal law. The Commission also seeks disgorgement with interest from the family and friends. In addition, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York has filed criminal charges against Stone.

This case is in many ways reminiscent of the 1985 federal prosecution by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York (who happened to be Rudolph Giuliani at the time) of R. Foster Winans. Winans was, from 1982 to 1984, the co-author of “Heard on the Street,” a column in The Wall Street Journal. Winans leaked advance word of what would be in his column to a stockbroker who then invested with the benefit of that information, sharing some of the profits with Winans. Winans argued that his actions were unethical, but not criminal. He was found guilty of insider trading and wire fraud and was sentenced to 18 months in prison. He appealed his conviction all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which upheld the lower court rulings.

Attempting to profit on market sensitive information can be both a civil and a criminal offense. The SEC Enforcement Division and the relevant U.S. Attorney are prepared to introduce a perpetrator to those consequences.

Article By Peter D. Hutcheon of Norris McLaughlin P.A.

For more securities and SEC legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Category: Corporate law

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