2025 Inflation-Adjusted Plan Limits

On Nov. 1, 2024, the IRS published its annual cost of living adjustments for various retirement plan limits. These increases are more modest than recent years, a reflection that inflation is slowing. The updated key retirement plan limits include the following items:

2025 Limit 2024 Limit
Annual Compensation Limit $350,000 $345,000
Elective Deferral Limit $23,500 $23,000
Standard Age 50 Catch-Up Contribution Limit $7,500 $7,500
Age 60-63 Special Catch-Up Contribution Limit* $11,250 N/A
DC Maximum Contribution Limit $70,000 $69,000
DB Maximum Benefit Limit $280,000 $275,000
HCE Threshold $160,000 $155,000

*Note, this is a new provision under the SECURE 2.0 Act.

The IRS previously released the updated 2025 limits applicable to certain health and welfare plans, including the following key limits:

2025 Limit 2024 Limit
Health FSA – Maximum contributions $3,300 $3,200
Health FSA – Maximum carryover of unused amounts (optional plan provision) $660 $640
HSA – maximum contributions $4,300 (self-only)

$8,550 (family)

$4,150 (self-only)

$8,300 (family)

HDHP – Minimum Deductible $1,650 (self-only)

$3,300 (family)

$1,600 (self-only)

$3,200 (family)

HDHP – Maximum Out of Pocket $8,300 (self-only)

$16,600 (family)

$8,050 (self-only)

$16,100 (family)

We Had an Agreement as to Value, But Ignored It. Now What?

Quite often a shareholders’ agreement or operating agreement will contain a provision establishing the company’s value in the event of a buyout of one of the owners.  Sometimes the agreement requires a valuation to be performed at the end of every year – possibly by the company accountant – and may even set forth a formula that is to be followed annually, or at least utilized as a guideline. Many small companies, of course, are run in such a way that it is  not surprising in the slightest that this yearly valuation is often not done. In fact, I can count on one hand the number of companies that I have seen actually follow this mandate to value itself yearly.

So, what happens when there is now conflict among the owners? One of them wants to leave, and the other owners would rather let him go than get involved in costly business divorce litigation. Sometimes the only dispute in such a case comes down to the dollars, not whether there will be a departure. Likewise, the majority owners may want a minority owner to leave who also doesn’t have the stomach for a fight. The shareholder’s agreement may have a formula set forth – from 20 years ago – as to how to value the company. But the called-for annual valuation was never done. Or, it was done for 3 years, and then it stopped. How does the company get valued now?

There is no single right answer to this question, unfortunately. What a court might do is likely going to be very fact dependent. If all the owners were aware of the obligation to value the company annually and they all ignored it, a judge may deem the requirement to have been effectively “written out” of the agreement. But what if you were a minority owner who had no ability to control whether the valuation was done and you complained in the early years about this provision being ignored? You certainly have a better argument, but you still failed to do anything formal to assert your right to be governed by such a valuation.

It also depends on the circumstances of the current buyout. If the departure is voluntary, then of course the parties are free to agree to have the valuation done now that was supposed to have occurred for the past 20 years. But if shareholder dispute litigation is in play, as a voluntary buyout seems not a viable option, then one can argue that the formula should not apply at all. If one is arguing for a buyout under the shareholder oppression statute, one may argue that “fair value” – the value set forth in the New Jersey statute that governs business divorce litigation – should apply. This is an especially powerful argument if the agreement contains a formula that does not yield a value as high as fair value. Why should majority shareholders be permitted to act improperly toward the minority and then be rewarded with a discounted value?

But, as with many things, there is no clear-cut answer that applies in all circumstances.  At least one judge in the past has determined that the parties’ agreement set forth the parties’ reasonable expectation as to value and applied it in an oppression setting. So, while there is no iron-clad answer, be sure you are represented by an experienced shareholder dispute attorney who understands the issues and can make the best argument for value possible for you.

Affordable Care Act Proposed Rule Would Broaden Access to Over-the-Counter Contraception Without Cost Sharing

Employer-sponsored health plans would be required to cover over-the-counter contraception, including condoms and emergency contraception, without a prescription and without cost sharing under newly proposed Affordable Care Act (ACA) regulations

Quick Hits

  • Proposed rules issued by the DOL, HHS, and Treasury are designed to increase coverage for over-the-counter contraceptives, such as condoms, spermicides, and emergency contraception, without a prescription.
  • If finalized, the proposed rules would be the first time that male contraceptives will be covered under the ACA preventive care requirements.
  • The public has until December 27, 2024, to submit comments on the proposed rules.

Fully insured and self-insured health plans would have to cover every Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved contraceptive drug or drug-led combination product without cost sharing, unless the plan or insurer covers a therapeutic equivalent without cost sharing, under rules proposed by the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and Treasury.

Employer-sponsored health plans and insurers also would have to tell participants that over-the-counter contraception without a prescription is covered at no cost, under the proposed rules published October 28, 2024, in the Federal Register.

The ACA requires most group health plans to cover preventive care at no cost to patients. Preventive care under the ACA includes FDA-approved contraceptives for women, such as birth control pills, injectable contraceptives, contraceptive patches, implantable rods, intrauterine devices, diaphragms, sponges, vaginal rings, emergency contraception medication, and sterilization procedures for women. In 2022, the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) issued updated guidelines that define which healthcare services are considered preventive for women.

Without a prescription, over-the-counter products were not included in the ACA’s coverage requirement. The proposed rule would change that.

In guidance issued earlier this year, the departments noted that they are still identifying plans that are out of compliance with the contraceptive care requirements. Employers that violate the ACA mandate can be fined $100 for each day in the noncompliance period for each affected employee. At first, the ACA granted exemptions to churches and other religious organizations that hold instilling religious values as their purpose and primarily employ people who share their religious beliefs. The criteria to qualify for an exemption were broadened later. Without an exemption, nongovernmental employers can use a self-certification form to instruct their health insurer to exclude contraceptive coverage from the group health plan and provide payments to patients for contraceptive services separate from the health plan.

In July 2020, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that private employers with religious or moral objections can be exempt from the contraceptive mandate.

Seven states—California, Colorado, Maryland, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Washington—already have laws requiring state-regulated health insurance policies to cover certain over-the-counter contraceptives without a prescription and without cost sharing.

Next Steps

Employers may want to review the coverage of contraceptives under their medical plans both to ensure that no improper restrictions are put on them currently and also to clarify how their coverage would need to expand if these proposed rules became final in a substantially similar form.

This article was co-authored by Leah J. Shepherd, who is a writer in Ogletree Deakins’ Washington, D.C., office.

Federal Contractors Beware – More Data Disclosures Coming!

On October 29, 2024, the U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) published a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) notice, inviting federal contractors to respond to FOIA requests that the OFCCP received related to federal contractors’ 2021 Type 2 EEO-1 Consolidated Reports. These reports, required of federal contractors and subcontractors with at least 50 employees, contain data critical to the government’s diversity efforts consistent with anti-discrimination mandates under Title VII and Executive Order 11246. Contractors have previously relied on FOIA Exemption 4 to protect against disclosing sensitive commercial information that could impact competitive positioning, but in late December 2023 as previously reported here, a federal court ruling concluded that certain demographic data did not qualify as confidential under FOIA Exemption 4. That court decision may spur an increase in FOIA requests for EEO-1 reporting information.

Contractors who wish to object to the disclosure of their EEO-1 reporting information must do so via OFCCP’s online portal, email, or mail on or before December 9, 2024. Per the OFCCP’s notice, contractors can object to releasing their 2021 EEO-1 Type 2 data by providing evidence showing the data satisfies FOIA Exemption 4. To do this, contractors should:

  • Specifically identify the objectionable data;
  • Explain why this data is commercial or competitive to render it confidential;
  • Outline the processes the contractor has in place to safeguard the data;
  • Identify any prior assurances or expectations that the data would remain confidential; and
  • Detail the damage that would occur if the data were disclosed by conducting assessments to see how disclosure would impact business operations.

In addition to raising timely objections to disclosure of data, contractors should also implement clear policies to maintain a consistent approach to data confidentiality. Specifically, contractors should be thoughtful and consistent as to how they define confidential information and the protection measures they take related to such information.

FOIA requests and court decisions in this space will likely continue to make striking a balance between government transparency and protecting contractors’ confidential business information more difficult. To navigate these changes, federal contractors should remain vigilant by staying informed, preparing objections to FOIA requests, and consulting with legal counsel to ensure compliance with this evolving area of law.

Social Media’s Legal Dilemma: Curated Harmful Content

Walking the Line Between Immunity and Liability: How Social Media Platforms May Be Liable for Harmful Content Specifically Curated for Users

As proliferation of harmful content online has increasingly become easier and more accessible through social media, review websites and other online public forums, businesses and politicians have pushed to reform and limit the sweeping protections afforded by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which is said to have created the Internet. Congress enacted Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 “for two basic policy reasons: to promote the free exchange of information and ideas over the Internet and to encourage voluntary monitoring for offensive or obscene material.” Congress intended for internet to flourish and the goal of Section 230 was to promote the unhindered development of internet businesses, services, and platforms.

To that end Section 230 immunizes online services providers and interactive computer services from liability for posting, re-publishing, or allowing public access to offensive, damaging, or defamatory information or statements created by a third party. Specifically, Section 230(c)(1) provides,

No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.

[47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)]

Section 230 has been widely interpreted to protect online platforms from being held liable for user-generated content, thereby promoting the free exchange of information and ideas over the Internet. See, e.g., Hassell v. Bird, 5 Cal. 5th 522 (2018) (Yelp not liable for defamatory reviews posted on its platform and cannot be forced to remove them); Doe II v. MySpace Inc., 175 Cal. App.4th 561, 567–575 (2009) (§ 230 immunity applies to tort claims against a social networking website, brought by minors who claimed that they had been assaulted by adults they met on that website]; Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc., 145 Cal. App.4th 790, 804–808 (2006) (§ 230 immunity applies to tort claims against an employer that operated an internal computer network used by an employee to allegedly communicate threats against the plaintiff]; Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816, 826-36 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (§ 230 immunity applies to tort and statutory claims against an auction website, brought by plaintiffs who allegedly purchased forgeries from third party sellers on the website).

Thus, under § 230, lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred. Under the statutory scheme, an “interactive computer service” qualifies for immunity so long as it does not also function as an “information content provider” for the portion of the statement or publication at issue. Even users or platforms that “re-post” or “publish” allegedly defamatory or damaging content created by a third-party are exempted from liability. See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal. 4th 33, 62 (2006). Additionally, merely compiling false and/or misleading content created by others or otherwise providing a structured forum for dissemination and use of that information is not enough to confer liability. See, e.g. eBay, Inc. 99 Cal. App. 4th 816 (the critical issue is whether eBay acted as an information content provider with respect to the information claimed to be false or misleading); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122-1124 (9th Cir. 2003) (Matchmaker.com not liable for fake dating profile of celebrity who started receiving sexual and threatening emails and voicemails).

Recently, however, the Third Circuit appellate court found that Section 230 did not immunize and protect popular social media platform TikTok from suit arising from a ten-year old’s death following her attempting a “Blackout Challenge” based on videos she watched on her TikTok “For You Page.” See Anderson v. TikTok, Inc., 116 F.4th 180 (3rd Cir. 2024). TikTok is a social media platform where users can create, post, and view videos. Users can search for specific content or watch videos recommended by TikTok’s algorithm on their “For You Page” (FYP). This algorithm customizes video suggestions based on a range of factors, including a user’s age, demographics, interactions, and other metadata—not solely on direct user inputs. Some videos on TikTok’s FYP are “challenges” that encourage users to replicate the actions shown. One such video, the “Blackout Challenge,” urged users to choke themselves until passing out. TikTok’s algorithm recommended this video to a ten-year old girl who attempted it and tragically died from asphyxiation.

The deciding question was whether TikTok’s algorithm, and the inclusion of the “Blackout Challenge” video on a user’s FYP, crosses the threshold between an immune publisher and a liable creator. Plaintiff argued that TikTok’s algorithm “amalgamat[es] [] third-party videos,” which results in “an expressive product” that “communicates to users . . . that the curated stream of videos will be interesting to them.” The Third Circuit agreed finding that a platform’s algorithm reflecting “editorial judgments” about “compiling the third-party speech it wants in the way it wants” is the platform’s own “expressive product,” and therefore, TikTok’s algorithm, which recommended the Blackout Challenge on decedent’s FYP, was TikTok’s own “expressive activity.” As such, Section 230 did not bar claims against TikTok arising from TikTok’s recommendations via its FYP algorithm because Section 230 immunizes only information “provided by another,” and here, the claims concerned TikTok’s own expressive activity.

The Court was careful to note its conclusion was reached specifically due to TikTok’s promotion of the Blackout Challenge video on decedent’s FYP was not contingent on any specific user input, i.e. decedent did not search for and view the Blackout Video through TikTok’s search function. TikTok has certainly taken issue with the Court’s ruling contending that if websites lose § 230 protection whenever they exercise “editorial judgment” over the third-party content on their services, then the exception would swallow the rule. Perhaps websites seeking to avoid liability will refuse to sort, filter, categorize, curate, or take down any content, which may result in unfiltered and randomly placed objectionable material on the Internet. On the other hand, some websites may err on the side of removing any potentially harmful third-party speech, which would chill the proliferation of free expression on the web.

The aftermath of the ruling remains to be seen but for now social media platforms and interactive websites should take note and re-evaluate the purpose, scope, and mechanics of their user-engagement algorithms.

FDA Partners With Purdue University to Study Salmonella Risks

  • FDA has partnered with Purdue University and Indiana produce industry stakeholders to launch an environmental microbiology study to better understand the ecology of human pathogens, focusing on assessing risks related to Salmonella in the environment. The study is intended to develop a better understanding of the source of pathogens, their persistence, and how they transfer through the growing environment to ultimately help inform food safety practices.
  • The study is in response to outbreaks of Salmonella linked to cantaloupe grown in the Southwest Indiana agricultural region where a specific source or route of contamination was not found. The identification of other Salmonella varieties that were genetically similar to other isolates collected in the region over the last decade suggests that Salmonella is a reoccurring issue and that multiple reservoirs for Salmonella spp. may exist. According to FDA, “[t]he outbreak investigations have shown that there are complex environmental survival, proliferation, and dispersal mechanisms of pathogens in this region that need to be better understood.”
  • Researchers will sample air, soil, water, and animal scat, as well as collect weather data, to better understand what environmental conditions may encourage the survival, growth, and spread of pathogens. The study will occur at a farm in central Indiana, four Purdue-operated farms in northwest Indiana, and the Southwest Purdue Ag Center.
  • Indiana ranks sixth in U.S. cantaloupe production, according to USDA data from 2018 when Indiana growers planted 1,800 acres of cantaloupe worth $8.6 million. Growers “want to participate in this study because of their commitment to do everything they can to keep their produce as safe as possible.”

It’s Election Time: Time Off to Vote, Political Activities, and Political Speech in the Workplace

With Election Day quickly approaching, it is the right time for employers to refresh themselves on the various protections that may exist for their employees when it comes to voting and other political activities. Below is an overview of employees’ rights related to voting and other political activities leave, as well as protections for political speech and activity both in and outside the workplace.

Voting Leave Laws

Approximately thirty states require that employers provide their employees with some form of time off to vote. Twenty-one of these states require that the leave be paid. The exact contours of these laws – such as the amount of leave, notice requirements, and whether there is an exception when the employee has sufficient time outside of working hours to vote – vary by state. For example:

  • In New York, employers must provide leave to employees who do not have sufficient time outside of working hours to vote. An employee is deemed to have sufficient time to vote if the polls are open for four consecutive hours before or after the employee’s shift. Employees who do not have such a four-hour window are eligible to take the amount of leave that will – when added to their voting time outside working hours – enable them to vote, up to two hours of which must be without loss of pay. Employees may take time off for voting only at the beginning or end of their shift, as designated by the employer, unless otherwise mutually agreed to between the employee and employer. Employees are required to notify their employer that working time off to vote is needed between two and ten working days before the election.
  • Similarly, in California, employees are entitled to sufficient time off to vote, up to two hours of which must be paid. Unless the employer and employee agree otherwise, the employee must take the leave at the beginning or end of the employee’s shift, whichever allows the most time to vote and the least time off from work. Employees are required to provide notice that time off to vote is needed at least two working days before the election.
  • In the Washington, D.C., employees are entitled to up to two hours of paid leave to vote in either an election held in D.C. if the employee is eligible to vote in D.C., or in an election held in the jurisdiction in which the employee is eligible to vote. Employees must submit requests for leave a reasonable time in advance of the election date. Employers may specify the hours during which employees may take leave to vote, including requiring employees to vote during the early voting period or vote at the beginning or end of their shift during early voting or election day.
  • In Illinois, employers must provide two hours of paid voting leave to employees whose shifts begin less than two hours after the opening of the polls and end less than two hours before the closing of the polls. Employees must provide notice of the need for leave before the day of the election.
  • In Maryland, employees are entitled to up to two hours of paid voting leave, unless the employee has at least two non-working hours to vote while the polls are open. Employees must furnish proof to their employers that they either voted or attempted to vote, which can be in the form of a receipt issued by the State Board of Elections.

Certain states, includingNew York, California, and Washington, D.C., require that employers post a notice of an employee’s right to take leave in a conspicuous location before the election. Sample notices have been published by the New York State Board of Elections, the California Secretary of State, and D.C. Board of Elections.

Other Political Leave Laws

Some states require that employers provide leave for political-related reasons beyond just voting. For example:

  • AlabamaDelawareIllinoisKentuckyNebraskaOhioVirginiaand Wisconsin require that certain employers provide unpaid leave for employees to serve as election judges or officials on Election Day. In Minnesota, employees are entitled to paid leave for this reason; however, employers may reduce an employee’s salary or wages by the amount the employee receives as compensation for their service as an election judge.
  • Minnesota and Texas require that certain employers provide employees with unpaid leave to attend party conventions and/or party committee meetings.
  • ConnecticutIowaMaineNevadaOregonSouth Dakotaand Vermont require that certain employers provide employees with an unpaid leave of absence to serve as elected members of state government. In Iowa, employees are also entitled to leave to serve in a municipal, county, or federal office.
  • In Vermont, employees may take unpaid leave to vote in annual town hall meetings.

Some of these laws only apply to larger employers. For example, in Nevada, employers with at least fifty employees are required to provide leave for employees to serve as members of the state legislature. State laws also vary with respect to the amount of notice that employees must provide to their employers in order to be eligible for leave.

Political Speech in the Workplace

In our current political climate, many employers are concerned with what steps they can take regarding political speech and activity in the workplace. When these discussions or activities occur during working hours, they have the potential to negatively impact performance, productivity, or even possibly cross the line into bullying or unlawful harassment.

When employees publicly attend political rallies or support causes on social media, they may also (intentionally or not) create an actual, or perceived, conflict of interest with their employer. The complicated question of what exactly employers can do around employee political speech and activity is governed by various sources of law, some of which is discussed below.

Additionally, for employers with designated tax statuses, certain political speech can give pose risk to an organization’s tax-exempt status. Many tax exempt-organizations are subject to significant restrictions on lobbying and political activities. For example, 501I(3) organizations risk losing their tax-exempt status if they engage in political campaign activities or if a substantial part of its activities involves lobbying. Speech by an employee that constitutes political campaign or lobbying activity risks being attributed to an organization if an employee’s speech is seen as representative of the organization and being ratified by the organization. For example, if an employee urges their social media followers to contact their state representative about proposed legislation, this risks carrying the inference that the employee was speaking on behalf of the organization.

Employee “Free Speech”

There is no general right to “free speech” in a private sector workplace. Because the U.S. Constitution is primarily concerned with state actors, the First Amendment does not prevent private employers from prohibiting or restricting political speech in the workplace. Therefore, subject to certain exceptions discussed below, private sector employers are generally able to enact prohibitions around discussing politics at work and discipline employees for violating such policies.

However, as noted, an employer’s ability to restrain political speech in the workplace comes with some restrictions. At the federal level, Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), which applies to both unionized and non-union employees, protects certain “concerted activities” of employees for the purposes of “mutual aid or protection.” Political speech or activity that is unrelated to employment, such as an employee distributing pamphlets generally encouraging co-workers to vote for a candidate or support a political party, would not likely be covered or protected by the NLRA. The NLRA therefore does not universally prevent employers from prohibiting political discussions or activities in the workplace.

However, political speech may be protected by the NLRA when it relates to the terms or conditions of employment, such as communicating about wages, hours, workplace safety, company culture, leaves, and working conditions. Therefore, an employee encouraging co-workers to vote for a candidate because the candidate supports an increase in the minimum wage might claim to come under the protection of the NLRA.

State laws may also place certain limitations on employer attempts to restrict employee political speech. For example, Connecticut law prohibits employers from taking adverse action against employees for exercising their First Amendment rights, provided that such activity does not interfere with the employee’s job performance or the employment relationship.

Lawful Outside Activity/Off-Duty Conduct

Many states have laws that prohibit adverse action against employees based on lawful activities outside the workplace, which may include political activities. For example:

  • In approximately a dozen states, employers are prohibited from preventing employees from participating in politics or becoming candidates for public office. New York Labor Law § 201-d prohibits employers from discharging or otherwise discriminating against employees because of their “political activities outside of working hours, off of the employer’s premises and without use of the employer’s equipment or other property, if such activities are legal.” Political activities include (1) running for public office, (2) campaigning for a candidate for public office, or (3) participating in fund-raising activities for the benefit of a candidate, political party, or political advocacy group. Similar laws exist in CaliforniaLouisiana, and Minnesota, among other states.
  • Other states – including DelawareFloridaMassachusetts, and New Jersey– prohibit employers from attempting to influence an employee’s vote in an election. In Florida, “[i]t is unlawful for any person … to discharge or threaten to discharge any employee … for voting or not voting in any election, state, county, or municipal, for any candidate or measure submitted to a vote of the people.” A dozen or so states approach this issue in a more limited fashion by prohibiting employers from attaching political messages to pay envelopes.
  • At least two states, Illinois and Michigan, prohibit employers from keeping a record of employee’s associations, political activities, publications, or communications without written consent.
  • Washington, D.C. prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of political affiliation. Despite its seemingly broad scope, this statute has been interpreted to only protect political party membership and not (1) membership in a political group, or (2) other political activities, such as signing a petition.

These laws vary considerably from state to state, so it is important for employers to consult the laws when considering policies or rules around employee political activity.

* * *

As the election approaches and early voting takes place, employers should review the applicable laws for each jurisdiction in which they operate and ensure that their policies and practices are compliant. Employers should also ensure that managers are well versed in the employer’s policies around voting and political speech and activities so that they can properly respond as situations arise.

Revisions to HSR Form Released

On October 7, 2024, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), with the concurrence of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), released its long-awaited final rule related to the revision of the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) premerger notification form (the “Final Rule”).

The Final Rule will be effective 90 days after its publication in the Federal Register. The FTC and DOJ state that the revisions are intended to close the perceived gaps in current information provided in the HSR process, such as the disclosure of entities and individuals within the acquiring person; identification of potential labor market effects; identification of acquisitions that create a risk of foreclosure; identification of actions that may involve innovation effects, future market entry, or nascent competitive threats; and disclosure of roll-up or serial acquisition strategies.

The Final Rule dictates the use of two separate forms: one for the acquiring entity and one for the entity to be acquired. Each party will have to designate a “deal team lead” whose files must be searched for 4(c) and 4(d) documents, even if the deal team lead is not an officer or director. In addition, the acquiring entity must provide details not previously requested, including an organization chart, a list of officers and directors, a description of the ownership structure of the entity, and information on the transaction rationale.

While the information requested in the Final Rule is more limited than what was included in the original proposed rule, there are substantial changes that parties should expect to add significant time and cost to the filing process.

NLRB General Counsel Takes Issue with “Stay-or-Pay” Employment Provisions

On October 7, 2024, the General Counsel (GC) for the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issued a 17-page memorandum urging the NLRB to find so-called “stay-or-pay” provisions unlawful and to impose harsh monetary penalties on employers that use such provisions.

On October 15, 2024, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) similarly announced that it will combat stay-or-pay clauses, among other provisions in employment agreements that the DOL describes as “coercive.”

What is a “stay-or-pay” provision?

A stay-or-pay provision is a requirement that an employee pay their employer for certain expenditures made for the employee’s benefit if the employee separates from employment within a specified period of time. Examples include training repayment agreement provisions (sometimes referred to as “TRAPs”), and provisions requiring employees to repay signing bonuses, moving expenses, or tuition reimbursement.

Why does the NLRB GC take issue with such provisions?

The GC’s latest memorandum is essentially an addendum to her prior memorandum criticizing non-compete covenants. In her view, stay-or-pay provisions violate the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) because, as she interprets them, they are akin to non-compete covenants that unlawfully restrict employees from changing jobs.

We don’t have union employees. Does the NLRA even apply to our business?

Yes. Under Section 7 of the NLRA, employees in both unionized and nonunionized workforces have the right to join together in an effort to improve the terms and conditions of their employment. Specifically, Section 7 grants employees “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities.” Although certain types of workers, such as managers, supervisors, and independent contractors, are not entitled to such rights, Section 7 of the NLRA otherwise applies to all workers – whether unionized or not.

Do I really need to be concerned about the NLRB GC’s memorandum, and is it legally binding on my business?

The memorandum does not carry the force of a statute or regulation or case law. And it’s not even the stance of the NLRB. It’s essentially the NLRB GC’s guidance for the stance she is encouraging the NLRB to take with respect to these types of provisions.

That said, the memorandum is getting a lot of publicity in the press and online, which means employees who have heard about it may become skeptical about the enforceability and/or legality of their stay-or-pay provisions. This, in turn, may embolden employees to make a move, as they may be less fearful of their repayment obligations.

Will the NLRB GC’s memorandum apply prospectively, or will it also apply retroactively?

If the NLRB adopts the GC’s view, then yes, the memorandum would apply both to agreements entered into in the future, as well as to agreements already signed by employees and former employees. However, it affords employers a 60-day period from the date of the memorandum to “cure” any pre-existing stay-or-pay provisions before facing potential prosecution.

What are the potential consequences for my business if the NLRB adopts the GC’s view?

The GC expects employers to make employees whole, which may mean rescinding or rewriting the agreement or reimbursing former employees for sums repaid pursuant to their agreements. She goes further and suggests that an employer must compensate an employee if the employee can demonstrate that “(1) there was a vacancy available for a job with a better compensation package; (2) they were qualified for the job; and (3) they were discouraged from applying for or accepting the job because of the stay-or-pay provision.”

Is there any way the stay-or-pay provisions used by my business aren’t objectionable?

According to the GC, a stay-or-pay provision is reasonable if (a) it is entered into voluntarily in exchange for a benefit to the employee (as opposed to, for example, being a condition of employment), (b) the repayment amount is reasonable and specific, (c) the “stay” period is reasonable, and (d) it does not require repayment if the employee is terminated without cause.

We do use stay-or-pay provisions in our business. What should we do now?

Your course of action depends on your appetite for risk. At a minimum, we encourage you to consult with your company’s legal counsel to discuss the full import of the memorandum, risks, and options for your business, as there are a lot more details and nuances in those 17 pages than we can summarize here.

Going forward, some employers might consider alternatives to stay-or-pay provisions, such as stay bonuses (e.g., instead of paying a signing bonus and requiring recoupment if an employee leaves within two years following their date of hire, condition payment of the bonus on the employee staying for a period of two years.) Of course, the hitch with this approach is that it may impact the enforceability of non-compete or non-solicitation covenants in states that require up-front consideration to impose such covenants for at-will employees.

Notably, the GC’s 60-day moratorium takes us to December 6, which is a full month following Election Day. By now, employers are familiar with the makeup of the NLRB changing depending on the party occupying the White House, and if there is a shift in political power come November, that may result in a newly constituted NLRB with new policy preferences. With that in mind, some employers may opt to use a wait-and-see approach before making any changes – whether to existing agreements or retention strategies going forward.

 

Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act Final Rules (“Final Rules”) Are Released: Plans and Issuers Must Prepare for January 1, 2025 Effective Date (US)

The long-awaited Final Rules amending the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act (“MHPAEA”) were released on September 9, 2024, with the bulk of the requirements going into effect on January 1, 2025. As we previously reported here, in August 2023, the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services (“HHS”) and Treasury (together, the “Departments”) published proposed rules further regulating insurance coverage for treatment for mental health and substance use disorders. Although the Final Rules appear less burdensome than the proposed rules, they do impose significant changes to the obligations of group health plans and health insurance issuers with a short time to achieve compliance. The key provisions are summarized below.

Key Changes in the Final Rules

The Final Rules’ stated intent is to “strengthen consumer protections consistent with MHPAEA’s fundamental purpose,” which includes reducing burdens on access to benefits for individuals in group health plans or with group or individual health insurance coverage seeking treatment for mental health and substance use disorders (“MH/SUD”) as compared to accessing benefits for the treatment of medical/surgical (“M/S”) conditions.

The Final Rules purport to achieve that goal through four key changes to the MHPAEA:

  • Mandating content requirements for performing a comparative analysis of the design and application of each non-quantitative treatment limitation (“NQTL”) applicable to MH/SUD benefits.
  • Setting forth design and application requirements and relevant data evaluation requirements to ensure compliance with NQTL rules.
  • Increasing scrutiny of network adequacy for MH/SUD benefits.
  • Introducing core treatment coverage requirements to the meaningful benefit standard.

Comparative Analysis Content Requirements

Since 2021, insurance plans and issuers offering plans that cover both M/S and MH/SUD benefits and impose NQTLs on MH/SUD benefits must have a written comparative analysis demonstrating that the factors used to apply an NQTL to MH/SUD benefits are comparable to and applied no more stringently than those used to apply that same NQTL to M/S benefits, as set forth in the 2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act (“CAA”). The Final Rules expand upon the NQTL analysis required by the CAA and include six specific content elements:

  1. a description of the NQTL;
  2. identification and definition of the factors and evidentiary standards used to design or apply the NQTL;
  3. a description of how factors are used in the design or application of the NQTL;
  4. a demonstration of comparability and stringency, as written;
  5. a demonstration of comparability and stringency, in operation, including the required data, evaluation of that data, explanation of any material differences in access, and description of reasonable actions taken to address such differences; and
  6. findings and conclusions.

Upon request, plans and issuers must provide written comparative analyses to U.S. regulators, plan beneficiaries, participants, or enrollees who have received an adverse benefit determination related to MH/SUD benefits, and participants and beneficiaries in plans governed by ERISA at any time. Plans and issuers only have 10 business days to respond to a request from the relevant Secretary to review its comparative analyses and, if an initial determination of noncompliance is made, the plan or issuer only has 45 calendar days to respond with specific actions it will take to bring the plan into compliance and provide additional comparative analyses that demonstrate compliance. Upon a final determination of noncompliance, notice must be given to all participants, beneficiaries, and enrollees within seven business days after the relevant Secretary’s determination.

Demonstrating Compliance with NQTL Rules

The Final Rules also require that a NQTL applicable to MH/SUD benefits in a classification is no more restrictive than the predominant NQTL applied to M/S benefits in the same classification. In order to ensure compliance with NQTL rules, plans and issuers must satisfy two sets of requirements: (1) the design and application requirements, and (2) the relevant data evaluation requirements. For example, under the design and application requirements, a plan cannot reimburse non-physician providers of MH/SUD services by reducing the rates for physician providers of MH/SUD services unless it applies the same reduction to non-physician providers of M/S services from the rate for physician providers of such services. Under the relevant data evaluation requirements, to compare the impact of NQTLs related to network composition on access to MH/SUD versus M/S benefits, a plan should evaluate metrics relating to the time and distance from plan participants and beneficiaries to network providers, the number of network providers accepting new patients, provider reimbursement rates, and in-network and out-of-network utilization rates.

Design and Application

Plans and issuers must examine the factors used to design and apply an NQTL to MH/SUD benefits to ensure such factors are comparable to those used with respect to M/S benefits in the same classification. The Final Rules also prohibit using information that discriminates against MH/SUD benefits as compared to M/S benefits, meaning information that systematically disfavors or was specifically designed to disfavor access to MH/SUD benefits. Appropriate information and other factors to use in designing and applying an NQTL to MH/SUD benefits include generally recognized independent professional medical or clinical standards.

Relevant Data Evaluation

The relevant data evaluation requirement means plans and issuers must collect and evaluate data to ensure, in operation, that an NQTL applicable to MH/SUD benefits is not more restrictive than the NQTL applied to M/S benefits in the same classification. The Final Rules anticipate that the relevant data for any given NQTL will depend on the facts and circumstances and provide flexibility for plans to determine what should be collected and evaluated. Examples of relevant data provided in the Final Rules include the number and percentage of claim denials, utilization rates, and network adequacy rates.

Network Adequacy

The Final Rules demonstrate the Departments’ increased scrutiny of network adequacy issues for MH/SUD benefits. For NQTLs related to network composition standards, a plan or issuer must collect data to assess the NQTLs’ aggregate impact on access to MH/SUD benefits and M/S benefits. By way of example, suppose the evaluated data suggests that an NQTL contributes to a material difference in access to MH/SUD benefits compared to M/S benefits. In that case, plans and issuers must act to address any material differences in access. The Final Rules provide examples of reasonable compliance actions, including increased recruiting efforts for MH/SUD providers, expanding telehealth options under the plan, and ensuring that provider directories are accurate and reliable. A plan must document the actions that it takes to address differences in access to in-network MH/SUD providers as compared to in-network M/S providers.

Meaningful Benefit Standard

The Final Rules require plans to provide “meaningful” benefits for MH/SUD disorders in every classification in which the plan provides M/S benefits. Benefits are “meaningful,” for MHPAEA purposes, when they cover core treatments for that condition, meaning a standard treatment or course of treatment, therapy, service, or intervention indicated by generally recognized independent standards of current medical practice.

The Final Rules provide examples to demonstrate the application of the meaningful benefits standard. In one example, a plan covers the full range of outpatient treatments (including core treatments) and treatment settings for M/S benefits when provided on an out-of-network basis. The same plan covers outpatient, out-of-network developmental screenings for a mental health condition but excludes all other benefits, such as therapeutic intervention, for outpatient treatment when provided on an out-of-network basis. The Departments view therapeutic intervention, however, as a core treatment for the mental health condition under generally recognized independent standards of current medical practice. Per the Final Rules, the Departments interpret such exclusion as a violation because the plan does not cover a core treatment for the mental health disorder in the outpatient, out-of-network classification. Since the plan’s coverage for M/S benefits includes a core treatment in the classification, the Final Rules opine that the plan fails to provide meaningful benefits for treatment of the mental health disorder.

Effective Dates

The new requirements of the Final Rules will go into effect on different dates. Plans and issuers have until January 1, 2026, to comply with the meaningful benefits standard, the prohibition on discriminatory factors and evidentiary standards, the relevant data evaluation requirements, and the related requirements in the provisions for comparative analyses. During this time, plans and issuers should assess whether their mental health provider networks are adequate, and also consider expanding the scope of MH/SUD benefits across classifications to meet new parity requirements.

The other requirements, including most of the new requirements affecting comparative analyses, go into effect on January 1, 2025. Accordingly, plans and issuers should the time remaining this year to develop a plan to prepare NQTL comparative analyses within the three-month compliance period, and have processes in place to quickly address any material changes to benefit design in the future.