The Top Five Tax Traps in M&A Transactions

Recently posted  in the National Law Review an article by Jeffrey C. Wagner  and Daniel N. Zucker of McDermott Will & Emery regarding tax consequences of acquisition and disposition transactions:

The tax consequences of acquisition and disposition transactions can dramatically impact deal value. Often the potential tax issues can be resolved in a manner that is consistent with the intention of the parties without changing the economics of the deal. If some of these tax issues are not addressed, however, the parties may not obtain the benefit they had bargained for even though it may have otherwise been possible. This puts a premium on the involvement of tax advisors from the outset of a transaction. Although one rarely wants to see tax be the “tail that wags the dog” in a deal, tax issues can present significant economic opportunities or costs that may often warrant tweaking or changing the deal structure to accommodate these issues.

1. Failure to Solicit Tax Advice at the Letter of Intent Stage

Although not binding, the terms of the letter of intent entered into by the parties in the early stages of the acquisition process can put one of the parties in a superior bargaining position as it relates to which party bears the burden or reaps the benefits of the tax costs and benefits associated with a transaction. Too often, a client does not engage its outside advisors (or significantly limits the involvement of its outside advisors) until after a letter of intent is signed. The failure to include the tax advisor at this early stage can mean lost dollars to the seller or additional cost to the buyers.

For example, if the target is an S corporation, in most cases the buyer should be able to secure the benefit of a tax basis step-up for federal income tax purposes without a material increase in the taxes payable by the seller with respect to the sale. However, if the buyer is not well-advised, the letter of intent may simply indicate that the buyer will acquire the stock of the target for the agreed-upon consideration. If, after the letter of intent is executed, the buyer recognizes that a tax basis step-up can be achieved with little or no tax cost to the seller, the buyer may request that the transaction be converted to an asset purchase or that a Section 338(h)(10) election be made by the parties. At this point, the seller has the leverage and can demand additional consideration from the buyer in exchange for the tax benefits that such a structure would provide.

2. Section 197 Anti-Churning Rules

When the acquisition of a business is structured for income tax purposes as an asset purchase (i.e., an asset purchase in form or a stock purchase coupled with a Section 338(h)(10) election), the buyer usually has bargained for the tax benefits that accompany such a transaction—namely, the ability to tax effect the purchase price by depreciating or amortizing the premium paid for the assets, which premium is usually attributable to the goodwill and going concern value of the acquired business. If the business being acquired was in existence on or before August 10, 1993 and, before or after the transaction, the seller or a related party owns, directly or indirectly, greater than twenty percent of the equity of the buyer – which may be the case, for example, if the deal calls for the seller to receive “rollover equity”—the goodwill and going concern value of the target (as well as other Section 197 intangibles) may not be amortizable by the buyer. As a result, the buyer will not obtain the tax benefits that it anticipated and paid for as part of the acquisition. The economic benefit that is lost can amount to as much as 20-25 percent of the purchase price depending on the discount rate used to calculate tax benefits and other factors.

Moreover, if the acquirer is a limited liability company or the corporate acquirer is owned by a limited liability company, and the seller will have an interest in the limited liability company following the acquisition, the anti-churning rules can be an issue even where the seller owns less than twenty percent of the limited liability company. It is therefore critical that any transaction that calls for the seller or a party related to the seller to obtain (or retain) an equity interest in the buyer in connection with the acquisition, the buyer should closely study whether the anti-churning rules could be applicable. A failure to do so can result in a significant – and perhaps needless—reduction in the buyer’s after-tax cash flow and adversely affect the purchase price payable by a subsequent buyer of the business.

3. Qualified Stock Purchase Failure

As an alternative to structuring an acquisition as an asset purchase in form, a buyer can realize the tax benefits of an asset purchase by structuring the acquisition as a stock purchase and making a Section 338 or Section 338(h)(10) election in connection with the transaction (the latter requiring the consent of the seller and being limited to target corporations that are S corporations or subsidiaries of a consolidated group). In order to be eligible to make a Section 338 or 338(h)(10) election, the acquisition must constitute a “qualified stock purchase”, one of the requirements of which is that 80 percent or more of the target corporation’s stock be acquired in a twelve-month period by “purchase”. For this purpose, “purchase” excludes transactions on which gain or loss is not recognized, including exchanges that qualify for tax-free treatment under Section 351. Frequently, when a new corporation is being organized to acquire the stock of the target corporation, one or more of the sellers may “roll over” a portion his or her target corporation stock for stock of the new corporation. When less than 20 percent of the stock of the new corporation is received by the seller(s) in the exchange such that greater than 80 percent of the stock is acquired for cash, it would appear that the requirement that 80 percent or more of the stock of target be acquired by purchase would be satisfied. However, if any seller receives any stock of the new corporation (even one percent) in a transaction that qualifies as a Section 351 exchange, the acquisition will not constitute a qualified stock purchase and will be ineligible for a Section 338 or 338(h)(10) election.

The solution here is to structure the transaction so as to intentionally not qualify as an exchange under Section 351. Although this will undoubtedly have ramifications to the sellers (who may otherwise have been expecting to not have to recognize gain currently with respect to their rollover equity), the failure to obtain a step-up in basis in the assets of target corporation and consequently, the inability to tax-effect the purchase price (through depreciation and amortization deductions) may have an even larger negative impact on the buyer.

4. Acquisition of Shares of “Loss Stock” from Consolidated Group

A recent overhaul of the so-called “loss disallowance rules” changed the rules that apply when a buyer acquires the stock of a target company out of a U.S. federal consolidated group in a transaction in which the seller recognizes a loss. Prior to the change in the law, any limitation on the recognition of that loss for tax purposes would impact only the seller; the buyer was unaffected. However, under the new rules, if the buyer acquires shares of stock from a consolidated group that constitute “loss stock” (i.e., the consideration paid for the stock is lower than the selling consolidated group’s tax basis of the stock), absent a special election made by the seller, the tax basis in the assets of the target corporation (as well as other target corporation tax attributes) may be subject to reduction in an amount equal to some or all of the seller’s loss.

As a result, in all stock purchase agreements where the seller is a member of a U.S. federal consolidated group, the buyer should insist on a representation that none of the acquired shares are “loss shares” and, to the extent any of the shares are “loss shares”, the buyer should insist on a covenant that would require the seller to make the election that would, in lieu of reducing the target corporation’s tax basis in its assets and other tax attributes, cause the loss recognized by the seller to be reduced. In situations where the tax benefit to the seller from the loss is greater than the tax cost associated with the reduction in tax attributes, the seller should compensate the buyer for this tax cost.

5. Phantom Income/AHYDO Rules

Whenever an acquisition is financed, in part, through borrowing, and interest on the loan is not required to be paid at least annually (or there are warrants or other equity instruments issued to the lender in connection with the loan), the parties should consider the potential application of the original issue discount (OID) rules. Generally, subject to certain de minimis rules, if interest on a debt instrument is not required to be paid at least annually—i.e., the interest simply accrues automatically or accrues at the option of the borrower—the interest income and interest expense will be recognized for tax purposes notwithstanding that the interest is not actually paid on a current basis. This means that the holder of the debt instrument will recognize taxable income without receiving any cash—i.e., the holder recognizes so-called “dry income” or “phantom income.” Although the phantom income resulting from the characterization of a debt instrument as an instrument issued with OID is generally manageable (either because the holders are tax-exempt or that portion of the interest needed to cover taxes can be paid on a current basis), in certain circumstances, there are special rules that may result in the borrower’s tax deduction for the interest/OID being deferred or disallowed.

Specifically, the tax rules defer and, in some circumstances, permanently disallow deductions for OID on certain applicable high yield discount obligations (AHYDOs). An AHYDO is defined as a corporate debt instrument that meets three requirements. First, the debt instrument must have “significant OID.” Second, it must have a term exceeding five years. Third, it must have a yield to maturity that is at least five percentage points above the applicable federal rate (AFR) in effect for the calendar month during which the debt instrument is issued. A debt instrument is treated as having significant OID if, at the end of the first accrual period following the fifth anniversary of the issuance of the debt instrument (and at the end of each subsequent accrual period), an amount greater than one year’s worth of OID (the yield to maturity multiplied by the issue price of the debt instrument) can remain unpaid.

Where warrants or other equity-type instruments are issued along with the debt instrument (i.e., as part of an investment unit), there is a greater potential for OID and classification of the debt instrument as an AHYDO because the issue price of the debt instrument will be reduced by any value attributable to this equity thereby reducing the issue price and creating a greater spread between the instrument’s stated redemption price at maturity and its issue price—thus creating more OID.

Advance planning can often neutralize the effect of these rules without significantly changing the business deal. By simply adding a provision to the debt instrument that requires (i) all accrued but unpaid OID (in excess of one year’s worth) to be paid on the first interest payment date following the five year anniversary of the issuance of the debt instrument and (ii) all interest thereafter to be paid on a current basis, the debt instrument can escape classification as an AHYDO. Of course, this change has the potential for real, economic consequences which should not be minimized. However, where, as is frequently the case, the deal contemplates this debt being refinanced before the five-year anniversary (or the borrower is comfortable that a refinancing can be negotiated at that time), the borrower can avoid having its interest/OID deductions deferred or disallowed. In this regard, it should be noted that a debt instrument is tested for AHYDO classification at the time it is issued and is based on when payments on the debt instrument are unconditionally obligated to be paid. If a debt instrument is characterized as an AHYDO, the borrower’s interest/OID deductions are subject to the rules regarding deferral or disallowance even where the borrower actually pays the interest on a current basis.

Conclusion

The foregoing are just a few of the many tax issues that can arise in any deal. If they are spotted early enough, most tax issues can be addressed with relatively inconsequential structural changes to the deal and/or creative planning without changing the underlying business deal. However, if the opportunity to address the tax issues is missed, there are often material economic consequences to one or more of the parties. To the extent that there are tax costs inherent in the deal that cannot be ameliorated through creative planning, the parties need to address how such costs will be shared among the parties; otherwise, the burden of these tax costs may be borne by the wrong party. 

© 2011 McDermott Will & Emery

Carried Interest Language Narrowed, but Remains Far-Reaching

Recently posted in National Law Review an article by Kevin J. FeeleyGary C. Karch and Patrick J. McCurry of McDermott Will & Emery regarding Obama administration’s recent carried interest tax provision:

This newsletter summarizes the Obama administration’s recent carried interest tax provision. The provision is not expected to be enacted soon, but the proposal contains drafting changes of interest to those following the discussion.

On September 12, 2011, President Obama submitted to U.S. Congress legislative text for the American Jobs Act, including a revised version of the carried interest tax provision that has been introduced several times since 2007. The latest provision is unlikely to be enacted soon, but gives an indication of the form that ultimately enacted legislation may take. The latest language appears narrower than prior versions, but remains potentially applicable to more taxpayers and transactions than one would expect from the announced purpose to treat the carried interest income of investment fund managers as ordinary income subject to self-employment tax.

General Approach Continues

The latest provision would add a new Section 710 to the Internal Revenue Code. New Section 710 would continue to create a new defined term called anInvestment Services Partnership Interest (ISPI). It also continues to provide thata partner’s income from holding or disposing of an ISPI is ordinary and subject to self-employment tax, even if it would be capital gain and not subject to self-employment tax under general tax rules.

The latest provision also continues to apply to all partnership interests, not just interests received for services or otherwise disproportionate to capital, unless a Qualified Capital Interest (QCI) exception applies. The QCI exception continues to apply only to a class of equity that is held by persons who do not provide any services to the partnership and are not related to the partner holding the ISPI. There is no exception for completely pro rata partnerships, as there was in the most recent prior version.

ISPIs Defined More Narrowly

Prior versions defined an ISPI as any partnership interest where the holder was expected to provide services regarding the acquisition, financing, management and disposition of securities, real estate and partnership interests, referred to as Specified Assets. The latest proposal limits the ISPI definition to partnerships in which “substantially all” of the assets are Specified Assets; the holder owns the partnership interest in connection with a business that “primarily involves” the acquisition, financing, management and disposition of Specified Assets; and more than half the contributed capital of the partnership is contributed by persons who hold their partnership interests for the production of income. The “production of income” requirement appears intended to imply that the interest is not held as part of a business. This change may exclude partnerships that conduct operating businesses, and partnerships in which more than half the owners are involved in the business.

The ISPI definition attributes a business of one member of a corporate group to all others. This provision may be intended to remove most corporate internal partnerships and external joint ventures from becoming subject to the rules.

The limitation of the ISPI definition to partnerships in which substantially all of the assets are Specified Assets may remove the so-called enterprise value of some investment fund managers from ordinary income treatment. The fund manager’s carried interest from funds it operates would be ordinary, but a gain attributable to the enterprise value of the fund manager itself might qualify as capital gain.

No Loss Deferral

Prior versions of the carried interest legislation deferred all losses from an ISPI. This provision is dropped from the most recent legislation.

Disposition Provisions Narrowed Somewhat

The proposed legislation continues to require recognition of ordinary income in normally tax-free transfers. The proposal continues the exception for contributing an ISPI to another partnership if an election is made to treat the resulting partnership interest as an ISPI. The proposal adds an exception for some gifts and charitable contributions. However, other tax-free transactions including corporate contributions and mergers where ISPIs are among the assets would be taxable to the extent of the gain inherent in the ISPIs.

Publicly Traded Partnership Provisions Deferred 10 Years

The proposed legislation provides that publicly traded partnerships with income from ISPIs could continue to be publicly traded pass-through entities for 10 years after enactment.

Exceptions and Phase-Ins Removed

Unlike some prior versions of the legislation, the latest version would apply to 100 percent of ISPI income beginning January 1, 2013. The legislation does not contain an exception or a reduced rate of recharacterization for the disposition of ISPIs held more than five years.

The proposal does not contain exceptions for pro rata partnerships or family farms. The pro rata partnership exception was thought to exclude family partnerships that could not use the QCI exception because all partners are related. It is unclear whether family partnerships and family farms would avoid the provision due to the narrowing of the ISPI definition described above.

© 2011 McDermott Will & Emery

OFAC Settles Alleged Sanctions Violations for $88.3 million

Posted in the National Law Review an article by Thaddeus Rogers McBride and Mark L. Jensen of Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP regarding OFAC’s settlements with financial institutions:

 

On August 25, 2011, a major U.S. financial institution agreed to pay the U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) $88.3 million to settle claims of violations of several U.S. economic sanctions programs. While OFAC settlements with financial institutions in recent years have involved larger penalty amounts, this August 2011 settlement is notable because of OFAC’s harsh—and subjective—view of the bank’s compliance program.

Background. OFAC has primary responsibility for implementing U.S. economic sanctions against specifically designated countries, governments, entities, and individuals. OFAC currently maintains approximately 20 different sanctions programs. Each of those programs bars varying types of conduct with the targeted parties including, in certain cases, transfers of funds through U.S. bank accounts.

As reported by OFAC, the alleged violations in this case involved, among other conduct, loans, transfers of gold bullion, and wire transfers that violated the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 515, the Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 560, the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 538, the Former Liberian Regime of Charles Taylor Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 593, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 544, the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 594, and the Reporting, Procedures, and Penalties Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 501.

Key Points of Settlement. As summarized below, the settlement provides insight into OFAC’s compliance expectations in several ways:

1. “Egregious” conduct. In OFAC’s view, three categories of violations – involving Cuba, in support of a blocked Iranian vessel, and incomplete compliance with an administrative subpoena – were egregious under the agency’s Enforcement Guidelines. To quote the agency’s press release, these violations “were egregious because of reckless acts or omissions” by the bank. This, coupled with the large amount and value of purportedly impermissibly wire transfers involving Cuba, is likely a primary basis for the large $88.3 million penalty.

OFAC’s Enforcement Guidelines indicate that, when determining whether conduct is “egregious,” OFAC gives “substantial” weight to (i) whether the conduct is “willful or reckless,” and (ii) the party’s “awareness of the conduct at issue.” 31 C.F.R. Part 501, App. A. at V(B)(1). We suspect that OFAC viewed the conduct here as “egregious” and “reckless” because, according to OFAC, the bank apparently failed to address compliance issues fully: as an example, OFAC claims that the bank determined that transfers in which Cuba or a Cuban national had interest were made through a correspondent account, but did not take “adequate steps” to prevent further transfers. OFAC’s emphasis on reckless or willful conduct, and the agency’s assertion that the bank was aware of the underlying conduct, underscore the importance of a compliance program that both has the resources to act, and is able to act reasonably promptly when potential compliance issues are identified.

2. Ramifications of disclosure. In this matter, the bank voluntarily disclosed many potential violations. Yet the tone in OFAC’s press release is generally critical of the bank for violations that were not voluntarily disclosed. Moreover, OFAC specifically criticizes the bank for a tardy (though still voluntary) disclosure. According to OFAC, that disclosure was decided upon in December 2009 but not submitted until March 2010, just prior to the bank receiving repayment of the loan that was the subject of the disclosure. Although OFAC ultimately credited the bank for this voluntary disclosure, the timing of that disclosure may have contributed negatively to OFAC’s overall view of the bank’s conduct.

This serves as a reminder that there often is a benefit of making an initial notification to the agency in advance of the full disclosure. This also serves as reminder of OFAC’s very substantial discretion as to what is a timely filing of a disclosure: as noted in OFAC’s Enforcement Guidelines, a voluntary self-disclosure “must include, or be followed within a reasonable period of time by, a report of sufficient detail to afford a complete understanding of an apparent violation’s circumstances.” (emphasis added). In this regard, OFAC maintains specific discretion under the regulations to minimize credit for a voluntary disclosure made (at least in the agency’s view) in an inappropriate or untimely fashion.

3. Size of the penalty. The penalty amount—$88.3 million—is substantial. Yet the penalty is only a small percentage of the much larger penalties paid by Lloyds TSB ($350 million), Credit Suisse ($536 million), and Barclays ($298 million) over the past few years. In those cases, although the jurisdictional nexus between those banks and the United States was less clear than in the present case, the conduct was apparently more egregious because it involved what OFAC characterized as intentional misconduct in the form of stripping wire instructions. The difference in the size of the penalties is at least partly attributable to the amount of money involved in each matter. It also appears, however, that OFAC is distinguishing between “reckless” conduct and intentional misconduct.

4. Sources of information. As noted, many of the violations in this matter were voluntarily disclosed to OFAC. The press release also indicates that certain disclosures were based on information about the Cuba sanctions issues that was received from another U.S. financial institution (it is not clear whether OFAC received information from that other financial institution). The press release also states that, with respect to an administrative subpoena OFAC issued in this matter, the agency’s inquiries were at least in part “based on communications with a third-party financial institution.”

It may not be the case here that another financial institution (or institutions) blew the proverbial whistle, but it appears that at least one other financial institution did provide information that OFAC used to pursue this matter. Such information sharing is a reminder that, particularly given the interconnectivity of the financial system, even routine reporting by financial institutions may help OFAC identify other enforcement targets.

5. Compliance oversight. As part of the settlement agreement, the bank agreed to provide ongoing information about its internal compliance policies and procedures. In particular, the bank agreed to provide the following: “any and all updates” to internal compliance procedures and policies; results of internal and external audits of compliance with OFAC sanctions programs; and explanation of remedial measures taken in response to such audits.

Prior OFAC settlements, such as those with Barclays and Lloyds, have stipulated compliance program reporting obligations for the settling parties. While prior agreements, such as Barclay’s, required a periodic or annual review, the ongoing monitoring obligation in this settlement appears to be unusual, and could be a requirement that OFAC imposes more often in the future. (Although involving a different legal regime, requirements with similarly augmented government oversight have been imposed in recent Foreign Corrupt Practices Act settlements, most notably the April 2011 settlement between the Justice Department and Johnson & Johnson. See Getting Specific About FCPA Compliance, Law360, at:http://www.sheppardmullin.com/assets/attachments/973.pdf).

Conclusions. We think this settlement is particularly notable for the aggression with which OFAC pursued this matter. Based on the breadth of the settlement, OFAC seems to have engaged in a relatively comprehensive review of sanctions implications of the bank’s operations, going beyond those allegations that were voluntarily self-disclosed to use information from a third party. Moreover, as detailed above, OFAC adopted specific, negative views about the bank’s compliance program and approach and seems to have relied on those views to impose a very substantial penalty. The settlement is a valuable reminder that OFAC can and will enforce the U.S. sanctions laws aggressively, and all parties—especially financial institutions—need to be prepared.

Copyright © 2011, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

 

The Illinois Civil Union Law and Its Impact on Estate Planning

Recently posted in the National Law Review an article by Gregg M. Simon of Much Shelist Denenberg Ament & Rubenstein P.C. on Civil Unions and Estate Planning:

On June 1, 2011, the Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act went into effect. The new law provides a legal procedure for the certification and recognition of civil unions between same-sex and opposite-sex individuals. This new Illinois law has numerous real and potential effects on many areas of the law, including estate planning—effects that may not be limited to the parties in a civil union. Much Shelist spoke to Gregg M. Simon, Chair of the firm’s Wealth Transfer & Succession Planning practice, about some of the estate planning issues being raised by the new law.

Much Shelist: Can you give us a brief overview of the Illinois civil union law?

Gregg Simon: For a number of years, advocates of the legal recognition of same-sex couples in Illinois had been working with the state legislature to pass some form of civil union or marriage law. On the other side, certain religious and other groups had expressed concerns about the scope of such legislation and how it might be applied or enforced. Eventually, compromise language was worked out that, while not fully addressing all concerns of all parties, contained provisions that enabled passage of the legislation in the Illinois House and Senate on December 1, 2010. In February 2011, Governor Pat Quinn signed the law, which went into effect on June 1, 2011.

As written, the law is fairly short and direct. It provides procedures for the certification, registration and dissolution of a civil union and entitles parties entering into a civil union the same legal obligations, responsibilities, protections and benefits that are afforded to married spouses. In essence, where “spouse” appears in existing and future Illinois statutes, administrative rules, common law, or other sources of civil or criminal law, the word now also refers to a party in a civil union. These “default” rights and obligations can include the right to make health care decisions (unless, as with married couples, a guardian for the disabled partner has been appointed or an agent under a health care power of attorney has been named), the right to dispose of the remains of a deceased partner, various inheritance and property rights, creditor protections, and so on.

Civil unions in Illinois are not just for same-sex couples. Opposite-sex couples can also enter into a civil union, although they should carefully weigh the known and potential advantages and disadvantages of a civil union versus marriage. Likewise, the rules prohibiting certain civil unions are generally similar to those that prohibit marriage between specific individuals. For example, an individual is not allowed to enter into a civil union if he or she is in an existing civil union or marriage, and closely related individuals cannot enter into a civil union.

MS: From an estate planning perspective, what should couples be aware of?

GS: With respect to the Illinois civil union law, there are three broad concepts relating to estate planning that people should keep in mind. First, it should be understood that the law could affect almost anyone, not just the parties in a civil union. For example, let’s assume that a parent has drawn up a will prior to the effective date of the Illinois civil union law that designates his or her child and that child’s “spouse” as beneficiaries. Now let’s imagine that at some point in time the child enters into a civil union with his or her same-sex partner. Under a strict reading of the law, that same-sex partner would be treated as a spouse and would therefore qualify for the beneficial interest designated in the will. That might be the intent of the parent whose assets are to be distributed—or it might not.

Second, the civil union law raises almost as many issues as it resolves, many of which will be the subject of legal disputes until a clear body of case law and precedent has been established. Using the same example, let’s imagine that the parent was perfectly happy with his or her child’s same-sex partner receiving a beneficial interest, but failed to clarify in the will that its terms applied equally to a spouse and a party to a civil union (particularly if the parent died before the civil union legislation was enacted). Let’s now imagine that the child’s siblings do not want the same-sex partner to receive a portion of the assets. Since the will only used the word “spouse,” the siblings could take legal action to try to deny the same-sex partner his or her portion of the beneficial interest, claiming that the use of the word “spouse” (and failure to change the language of the will after June 1, 2011) meant that the parent intended only for an opposite-sex, married partner of the child to be eligible to receive any assets.

These examples are not so farfetched. After Illinois law was changed in the early 20th century so that adopted children were treated the same as natural-born children, almost 100 years of related litigation ensued. These cases focused on whether an adopted child was included when a testator used the terms “children” or “issue,” particularly when the document was executed before the law was changed (i.e., at a time when an adopted child would not have been included within those terms).

The takeaway is that clarity is paramount when it comes to estate planning. In order to ensure that your wishes are carried out as you intend, you should review all applicable documents with experienced legal counsel and ensure that any potentially ambiguous language or terms are clarified and reflect current legal realities.

A third important concept is that the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and federal tax laws do not recognize same-sex civil unions or marriages, even those that are recognized by the various states. This raises a whole host of issues regarding estate and gift taxation, Social Security benefits and other federal-level treatment of individuals in civil unions. Many of these issues are being litigated right now.

MS: What are some of the key conflicts between state and federal marriage and tax laws?

GS: DOMA defines “marriage” as a legal union between one man and one woman, and defines “spouse” as a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife in a marriage. DOMA further says that no state can be required to honor the law of another state regarding legal relationships that are treated as a marriage between persons of the same sex. In essence, DOMA denies same-sex couples all of the federal benefits of marriage, even if the couple was married or entered into a civil union in a state that recognizes such relationships.

From the perspective of estate and tax planning, this means that same-sex couples are denied the following, among other benefits: the estate tax marital deduction for assets passing outright to a spouse, or to certain qualifying marital deduction trusts and qualified domestic trusts; portability of exemption amounts; the gift tax marital deduction; gift splitting, or the right to treat gifts made by either spouse as made equally by both spouses; and, for the generation-skipping transfer tax, treatment of the same-sex parties as being in the same generation. Opposite-sex couples in a civil union may also face some, if not all, of these issues, particularly in states that do not recognize common-law marriage.

On the other hand, there are some transfer rules that apply to married, opposite-sex couples that, by not applying to same-sex couples, might produce favorable results. These include (1) the option of setting up a grantor retained income trust, which typically does not work for married couples, and (2) adding certain provisions to a qualified personal residence trust that are not permissible for married same-sex couples. Sales of remainder interests can similarly work for domestic partners.

Additional issues arise when a same-sex couple moves to another state. How will that jurisdiction interpret the civil union law of Illinois, particularly in those states with laws that specifically recognize legal relationships only between one man and one woman?

MS: Will legal challenges to DOMA and other laws help clarify this picture?

GS: In the long run, the answer is yes. There are a number of court cases, perhaps the best known of which is Edith Schlain Windsor v. United States, that are challenging the legality of DOMA and its application on a variety of issues. The Obama administration and the Office of the U.S. Attorney General, which are charged with enforcing the law, have stated that they do not believe DOMA is constitutional as applied to the cases that have challenged its constitutionality and have declined to defend it in these cases. Whether or not DOMA or any of its component parts are upheld as constitutional, the decisions in these cases are bound to add clarity to the situation.

However, “clear” does not always mean less complex. Whether or not DOMA is overturned, the decisions made by the courts will add new twists in the area of estate planning. For example, an older, opposite-sex couple in Illinois may choose to enter into a civil union rather than a marriage, in order to continue receiving Social Security benefits that derive from prior marriages. If DOMA falls, and their civil union is then treated as a federally recognized marriage, they could stand to lose a significant portion of their Social Security benefits.

Given all of the uncertainties, individuals who are considering a civil union should work closely with their attorneys to review their current estate planning documentation. Ambiguous language should be revised and clarified, and new or different tools (trusts, etc.) may be advisable in light of the new legal and tax landscape. Estate plans are “living” things, if you will; as the environment changes, they should be reviewed regularly and adjusted accordingly.

© 2011 Much Shelist Denenberg Ament & Rubenstein, P.C.

IRS Defends Discretion to Withhold Section 1256 Exchange Designation for ISOs

Recently posted at the National Law Review by William R. Pomierski of  McDermott Will & Emery an article about the IRS defending its decision not to designate independent system operators as qualified board or exchange:

The IRS defended its decision not to designate independent system operators asqualified board or exchange (QBE) principally on the grounds that, as a matter of law, it is not required to designate any exchanges as QBEs under Category 3 of Section 1256 Contracts.

In Sesco Enterprises, LLC (Civ. No. 10-1470, D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2010), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) defended its discretion to refrain from extending qualified board or exchange status under Code Section 1256 to U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)-regulated independent system operators.  The district court dismissed the taxpayer’s claim that the IRS acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it refused to classify electricity derivatives that traded on independent system operators as “Section 1256 Contracts.

Section 1256 Contracts in General

For federal income tax purposes, a limited number of derivative contracts are classified as Section 1256 Contracts.   Absent an exception, Section 1256 Contracts are subject to mark-to-market tax accounting and the 60/40 rule.  The 60/40 rule characterizes 60 percent of the net gain or loss from a Section 1256 Contract as long-term and 40 percent as short-term capital gain or loss.  Corporate taxpayers often view Section 1256 Contracts as tax disadvantageous, relative to economically similar derivatives that are not taxed as Section 1256 Contracts, such as swaps, unless the business hedging or some other exception is available.

Section 1256 Contract classification is limited to regulated futures contracts, foreign currency contracts, nonequity options, dealer equity options and dealer securities futures contracts, as each is defined in the Internal Revenue Code.   Unless a derivative falls within one of these categories, it is not a Section 1256 Contract, regardless of its economic similarity to a Section 1256 Contract.

Except for foreign currency contracts, Section 1256 Contracts are limited to derivative positions that trade on or are subject to the rules of a qualified board or exchange (or QBE).  QBE status is extended only to national securities exchanges registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (a Category 1 Exchange); domestic boards of trade designated as contract markets by the U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) (a Category 2 Exchange); orany other exchange, board of trade or other market that the Secretary of the Treasury Department determines has rules adequate to carry out the purposes of Code Section 1256 (a Category 3 Exchange).

Category 1 and Category 2 Exchange status is automatic.   Category 3 Exchange status, however, requires a determination by the IRS.  In recent years, Category 3 Exchange designation has been extended to four non-U.S. futures exchanges offering products in the United States: ICE Futures (UK), Dubai Mercantile Exchange, ICE Futures (Canada) and LIFFE (UK).

Sesco Challenges IRS Discretion to Withhold Category 3 Exchange Designation

According to its website, the taxpayer in Sesco (Taxpayer) is an electricity and natural gas trading company. The facts of the case indicate that it traded electricity derivatives (presumably INCs, DECs, Virtuals and/or FTRs) on various independent system operators or regional transmission organizations regulated by the FERC (collectively, ISOs).  Because ISOs are not regulated by the SEC or the CFTC, they cannot be considered Category 1 or Category 2 Exchanges for purposes of Code Section 1256.  To date, no ISO has been designated as a Category 3 Exchange by the IRS.

According to the facts in Sesco, the Taxpayer took the position on its return that derivatives trading on ISOs were Section 1256 Contracts eligible for 60/40 capital treatment.  The IRS denied Section 1256 Contract status on audit.  Somewhat surprisingly, a footnote in Sesco suggests, without any further discussion, that the IRS agreed with the Taxpayer’s position that these electricity derivatives qualified as “regulated futures contracts” under Code Section 1256 except for satisfying the QBE requirement.

During the examination process, the Taxpayer apparently requested a private letter ruling from the IRS that the relevant ISOs were Category 3 Exchanges.   According to the district court, “The IRS refused, asserting that the request for a QBE determination must be made by the exchange itself.”  The Taxpayer then asked one of the ISOs to request Category 3 Exchange status, but the ISO declined to do so.  Taxpayer then filed suit challenging the IRS’s adjustments and asserted that the IRS “acted arbitrarily and capriciously and abused its discretion when it refused to make a QBE determination except upon request from the ISO.”  In essence, the Taxpayer was attempting to force the IRS to designate the ISOs at issue as QBEs.

The IRS defended its decision not to designate the ISOs as QBEs principally on the grounds that, as a matter of law, it is not required to designate any exchanges as QBEs under Category 3.   After briefly considering the wording of Code Section 1256 and the relevant legislative history, the court agreed with the IRS position and dismissed the case on procedural grounds (lack of jurisdiction).

Observations

Although the District Court’s decision in Sesco may be of little or no precedential value due to the procedural aspects of the case, the decision nevertheless is important in that it reflects what has long been understood to be the IRS’ position regarding Category 3 Exchange status, which is that Category 3 Exchange status is not automatic and requires a formal determination by the IRS.  Sesco also confirms that the IRS believes QBE classification can only be requested by the exchange at issue, not by exchange participants.

Unfortunately, Sesco does not address the separate question of whether the IRS could have unilaterally designated the ISOs at issue as QBEs without the participation of the exchanges.  Sesco also raises, but does not address, the issue of whether derivatives traded on exchanges that are not “futures” exchange can be considered “regulated futures contracts” for purposes of Code Section 1256.  These are critical questions that will become more relevant in the near future as the exchange-trading and exchange-clearing requirements imposed by the Dodd-Frank derivatives reform legislation begin to take effect.

© 2011 McDermott Will & Emery

IKEA’s Way to Eternal Life: A Deconstruction of the Furniture Giant’s International Tax Practices

Congrats to Julia W. Gin of Santa Clara University School of Law winner of the National Law Review’s Spring Legal Writing Contest!  Julia’s topic discusses IKEA’s Interational Tax Practices

Since its first store in Sweden in 1958, IKEA has rapidly become an international household name.  The large Swedish flag-inspired blue and yellow buildings are a beacon for anyone searching for a wide selection of affordable modern furniture for varying tastes.  On its face, IKEA appears as any other large corporation that has taken the world by storm but with a few notable exceptions.  Firstly, the physical IKEA stores and business operations are owned by an untaxed two-pronged nonprofit foundation in the Netherlands: the Stichting INGKA Foundation and the Stichting IKEA Foundation.  Secondly, the IKEA Concept and IKEA trademark rights are owned by Inter IKEA Systems B.V., which is operated through a variety of companies based in the Dutch Antilles, Luxembourg, and Liechtenstein that are all controlled by IKEA founder Ingvar Kamprad himself and his three sons through the untaxed Interogo Foundation.  Thirdly, Kamprad moved from his hometown in Sweden to Denmark and finally to Switzerland, successfully benefitting from ideal tax regulations, especially the generous Swiss tax breaks for wealthy foreigners.[1]  This is only a brief summary of what is so unique about IKEA, aside from its eccentric founder.

The intricate corporate structure was created to give IKEA eternal life through lessening the international tax impacts and maintaining the foundational IKEA corporate culture.  This paper will disentangle the numerous organizations within the IKEA system while delineating their interrelationships, and explore the current tax practices of IKEA and the tax-induced reasons for this particular setup.

International IKEA Business Structure and Tax Practices

Kamprad registered IKEA as a company in Sweden in 1943.  Soon after IKEA’s booming success within Sweden, Kamprad became concerned with the high Swedish inheritance and wealth taxes, and family squabbles that could potentially tear the company apart.[2]  In his own words, “as an emerging global company, I also had to ensure that we were structured in tax efficient ways to avoid the burden of double taxation.”[3]  Kamprad met with the National Tax Board in Stockholm to discuss IKEA’s departure from Sweden and then with Denmark’s tax board to clarify what the tax benefits would be if he moved IKEA across the Drogden Strait.[4]  In 1973, Kamprad moved the company to Denmark and began the plan to secure IKEA’s immortality.  In his own words:

When the family and I moved abroad, we automatically received permission from the National Bank [of Sweden] to take with us 100,000 kronor[5] per member of the family.  That half-million was enough to start a foundation in Switzerland, where real estate may not be owned by foreigners, and to found a whole series of companies in different countries with different tax regulations—from Switzerland and Holland to Panama, Luxembourg, and the Dutch Antilles.  Our many lawyers quite often had completed registration of companies in their back pockets in reserve, so the process was soon completed and not particularly expensive.  Many of the companies have never been used.[6]

It is unknown how many companies are still unused and in reserve, but there are many organizations currently active in IKEA operations.

The international IKEA business structure involves the following main entities:

  • Stichting INGKA and Stichting IKEA Foundation—will refer to as the IKEA Foundation (Netherlands)
  • INGKA Holding B.V. (Luxembourg)
  • Inter IKEA Systems B.V. (Netherlands)
    • Inter IKEA Holding S.A. (Luxembourg)
    • Inter IKEA Holding (Dutch Antilles)
    • I.I. Holding (Luxembourg)
  • IKANO Group (Liechtenstein)
  • Interogo Foundation (Liechtenstein)

More IKEA entities are involved within the main controlling bodies and there are likely additional IKEA related companies that have either ownership or an interest in IKEA business.[7]

IKEA Business and Ownership Structure

IKEA Foundation (Stichting INGKA and Stichting IKEA Foundation)

Formed in 1982 in Leiden, Netherlands, the IKEA Foundation, made up of the Stichting[8] INGKA and Stichting IKEA foundations, has been the world’s biggest charity since 1984 when Kamprad gave the Foundation the irrevocable gift of 100% of his equity in the company.[9]  

The Netherlands was chosen as an ideal country by a team of lawyers from Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, France, and England because it had “the oldest and most stable legislation on foundations.”[10]  As an added incentive, Dutch foundations have loose regulations, little oversight, and “are not, for instance, legally obliged to publish their accounts.”[11]

The IKEA Foundation is based on the double Dutch foundation system.  The Stichting INGKA and Stichting IKEA are technically one foundation but operate as two, with Stichting INGKA as the owner foundation and Stichting IKEA as the charitable foundation.[12]  Stichting INGKA holds all the shares in the for-profit INGKA Holding B.V., which is the group of companies that controls all of the IKEA stores worldwide and will be discussed below.[13]  Stichting IKEA is to receive money from the Stichting INGKA arm for distribution towards the fulfillment of the IKEA Foundation’s mission: “to promote and support innovation in the field of architectural and interior design.”[14]  The IKEA Foundation must also “ensure ‘the continuity and growth’ of the IKEA Group” and is required to maintain INGKA Holding B.V.[15]  To ensure this mission is carried out, the IKEA Foundation is run by a five-person executive committee with two seats reserved for the Kamprad family[16] (which is chaired by Kamprad and has also included Kamprad’s wife, Margaretha Stennert) that appoints its own committee members and also appoints the board of directors of INGKA Holding B.V.[17]

The IKEA Foundation is registered in the Netherlands as an “Institution for the General Good”[18] charitable foundation, which is the equivalent of a 501(c)(3) in the United States.[19]  Qualification as a charitable foundation under Dutch law is relatively simple with only a few conditions that need to be met:

  • A request for charitable foundation status filed with the Dutch tax authority
  • The purpose of the foundation is not to generate profit and has a charitable purpose
  • An individual or entity may not use assets as if owned by the individual or entity
  • Board members may not receive remuneration other than costs
  • If dissolved, all funds must go towards a charitable purpose
  • The foundation’s assets must not exceed what is required for a reasonable fulfillment of the foundation’s charitable purpose.[20]

In addition, Dutch charitable foundations receive the following benefits:

  • Gifts are tax deductible for Dutch income and corporate income tax purposes, and are not subject to the Dutch gift tax,
  • Inheritances are not subject to Dutch inheritance tax, and
  • Are not subject to Dutch corporate income tax on any income.[21]

With the IKEA Foundation categorized as a Dutch charitable foundation, they are not required to pay taxes on any income from the IKEA business.  In 2010, IKEA earned almost $4.1 billion[22] and as of 2006 the IKEA Foundations net worth was at least $36 billion[23].  In order to fulfill the mission of “innovation in the field of architectural and interior design”, the IKEA Foundation gave one grant in 2005 to the Swedish Lund Institution for $1.7 million.[24] [25]  Additionally, IKEA’s new BoKlok flat-pack housing could be seen as a contribution to innovating architecture.[26]

Ultimately, any profit made from the INGKA Foundation through its ownership of INGKA Holding B.V. is not taxed in the Netherlands.

INGKA Holding B.V.

INGKA Holding B.V. may be owned by the IKEA Foundation, but is itself a private company registered in Leiden, Netherlands.[27]  INGKA Holding B.V. has physical ownership of the entire IKEA business.  This currently includes “more than 300 stores in 35 countries and more than 130,000 co-workers.”[28]  It is the parent company for the IKEA Group which includes, but is not limited to: IKEA Group Management[29], Swedwood[30], IKEA Services B.V. and IKEA Services AB[31], and IKEA of Sweden[32].[33]  To manage the IKEA Group, INGKA Holding B.V. assigns INGKA International A/S, headquartered in Humlebæk, Denmark, to run the executive functions of INGKA Holding B.V. and to manage international store business.  This includes “purchasing, product range, distribution, sales, and sometimes manufacturing.”[34]

INGKA Holding B.V.’s ownership and control of the physical IKEA stores and business operations is entirely separate from the IKEA Concept, which is exclusively owned by Inter IKEA Systems B.V.

Inter IKEA Systems B.V.

Inter IKEA Systems B.V. is registered in Delft, Netherlands.  It owns the IKEA concept and trademark, and controls the IKEA Concept franchise.[35]  This “Sacred Concept” controls the brand name, copyrights, regulations, and anything else related to the idea of IKEA.[36]  The root of the Concept can be found in Kamprad’s Testament of a Furniture Dealer[37], “to create a better everyday life for the many people by offering a wide range of well-designed, functional home furnishing products at prices so low that as many people as possible will be able to afford them.”[38]

Inter IKEA Systems B.V. is the entity that approves or denies a franchise permit to run any IKEA store.[39]  It also ensures that every franchisee follows the exact IKEA Concept with very specific store designs including the children’s playroom, the restaurant, and the set-up that leads the shopper around the store in a guided pathway.[40]  Store managers must send a written request to deviate from the IKEA Concept, and if the rules are broken without permission Inter IKEA Systems B.V. has the power to stop supplies and have the rogue store’s IKEA sign taken down.[41]

 For its efforts as the IKEA Concept franchisor, Inter IKEA Systems B.V. receives a generous 3% royalty from the global sales from all the IKEA stores worldwide[42], an income of 80 billion Swedish Kronor[43] in the last 20 years.[44]  This figure is expected to rise considering in 2010 “IKEA’s sales grew by 7.7% to 23.1 billion [Euros] and net profit increased by 6.1% to 2.7 billion [Euros].”[45]  Inter IKEA Systems makes large payments to another company registered in Luxembourg called I.I. Holding (unknown ownership and no website), and both companies paid 19 million Euros in taxes in 2004 of a combined profit of 328 million Euros.[46]

Inter IKEA Systems B.V. itself is owned by parent company Inter IKEA Holding S.A. which is registered in Luxembourg, and is also a part of the identically named Inter IKEA Holding S.A. that is registered in the Dutch Antilles.[47]  Until its liquidation in 2009[48], a “trust company” headquartered in Curaçao operated the Inter IKEA Holding S.A. of the Dutch Antilles[49].  Inter IKEA Holding S.A. had post-tax profits of $1.7 billion in 2004.[50]  Further details on Inter IKEA Holding S.A. are discussed below within the context of the Interogo Foundation.

 Inter IKEA Systems B.V. is assisted in preserving the IKEA Concept by the IKANO Group, which is a company owned and controlled by Kamprad’s three sons, Peter, Jonas and Matias.[51]

IKANO Group

The IKANO Group was founded in 1988 and is owned by the Kamprad family with fund assets of 3.4 billion Euros in 2009.[52] [53]  The IKANO Group is based in Liechtenstein, with the vision “to inspire our people to build profitable companies that dare to be different and are fun to work for.”[54]  The IKANO Group contains all of the Kamprad-owned companies that were not given to the IKEA Foundation[55]and is primarily concerned with managing the Kamprad family fortune[56].  Peter, Jonas and Matias are currently on the IKANO Board of Directors with Kamprad listed as a Senior Advisor.[57]  Kamprad gave IKANO to his sons to run as they see fit[58] as separate but in support of the IKEA entity.

 “IKANO fundamentally safeguards the same virtues—simplicity, thrift, and so on—that mark IKEA” through its activities in finance, insurance, retail and property.[59]  Though the finance division is most profitable, the property stock of the IKANO Group will ensure the Kamprad family’s economic security.[60]  Most notably, IKANO had made early investments in shopping centers near IKEA stores[61], which must be extremely lucrative at present day considering the rapid development of the surrounding areas that generally radiates from the opening of new IKEA stores.  Though IKEA and IKANO had absolute ties when Kamprad chaired both entities until 1998[62], it will be no surprise if the two continue a close business relationship.

Initially, it was believed that IKANO was the Kamprad family’s covert ownership and controlling interests in IKEA.  However, with the recent discovery of the Interogo Foundation, it appears that IKANO is indeed an independent and merely supporting entity of IKEA.

Interogo Foundation

According to Kamprad himself, the “Interogo Foundation, based in Liechtenstein, is the owner of the Inter IKEA Holding S.A., the parent company of the Inter IKEA Group…[and] is controlled by my family…”[63]  The Inter IKEA Group includes Inter IKEA Systems B.V. (controls and owns the lucrative IKEA Concept) and Inter IKEA Holding S.A. (which owns Inter IKEA Systems B.V.).  As discussed earlier, the identically named Inter IKEA Holding S.A. of the Dutch Antilles that was operating in Curaçao was liquidated, which can only be done by the owner of the company[64], now known to be the Interogo Foundation.

The Interogo Foundation was created by Kamprad in 1989[65] [66] with the purpose of investing in the expansion of IKEA to ensure its longevity as a method of financial security.[67]

Liechtenstein is a strategic choice for many companies because of its closed system of rules and regulations which lead to its reputation as an international tax-haven[68].  Furthermore, Liechtenstein has “liberal principles of [ ] foundation law” with the purpose of attracting lucrative investments.[69]  Some of the advantages of Liechtenstein foundations include:

  • Political and economic stability, and a central European location
  • A liberal and business-oriented legal system
  • Stringent professional secrecy regulations for banks and trustees
  • Effective methods of preserving family wealth over generations
  • Efficient protection of assets from third parties
  • Efficient international tax planning
  • Flexibility regarding the advancement of charitable purposes, and
  • Discretion and anonymity with regard to the founder’s wishes.[70]

These benefits create the perfect environment for the foundation envisioned by Kamprad to ensure his family would not be plagued by the high inheritance taxes in Sweden.

“[Interogo] Funds could also be used to support individual IKEA retailers experiencing financial difficulties and for philanthropic purposes”[71] as an additional safeguard to IKEA’s immortality.  Liechtenstein law governing charitable foundations follows a “Criterion of Preponderance” which allows a foundation to be classified as charitable if the majority of activities are dedicated to charitable versus private purposes.[72]  The current law defines “charitable” as:

…purposes which help fostering the public benefit… This is especially the case if the activities of the foundation foster the public benefit in the charitable, religious, humanitarian, scientific, cultural, moral, social, sporting or ecological field, even if the activities are only in favour of a determined circle of persons.[73]

A Swedish documentary aired on the Swedish public network SVT on January 26, 2011 by the Uppdrag granskning investigative news program[74] stated that the Interogo Foundation has $15.4 billion in funds.[75]  2010 was the first year in the last two decades of its existence that the foundation published detailed figures on sales, profits, assets, and liabilities.[76]

The Uppdrag granskning documentary further stated that the 3% of IKEA sales royalties from all IKEA stores worldwide that are supposed to go to Inter IKEA Systems B.V. for use of the IKEA Concept and franchise actually goes directly to the Interogo Foundation and is tax-free.[77]  Interogo’s purpose of ensuring IKEA’s prolonged existence and assisting in IKEA’s philanthropic ventures would seem to indicate a mixed family foundation[78] which supports the Kamprad family while also contributing to charitable institutions.  However, if the tax treatment of Interogo’s business venture through Inter IKEA Systems B.V. holds true, this would signify Interogo’s treatment as a purely charitable foundation under Liechtenstein law.  Liechtenstein law does acknowledge that that this is not a typical allowance for foundations:

Foundations, in principle, may not engage in commercial activities.  However, the foundation may pursue commercial trade when this serves the attainment of its non-commercial purpose, or the nature and extent of the foundation’s assets (e.g. the holding of participations) necessitates business operations.[79]

If Interogo’s goal of supporting IKEA’s possible philanthropic projects is upheld by Liechtenstein as its main non-commercial purpose and the ownership of Inter IKEA Systems B.V. necessitates business operations, Interogo would legally not be taxed. 

There is also a supreme focus for Liechtenstein foundations on the intent and purpose of the founder.  The founder provides the purpose of the foundation, which is fixed and unchangeable once the foundation has its own legal personality, and has the sole power to revoke the foundation.[80]  If the founder chooses to revoke the foundation, the assets of the foundation revert to the founder.[81]  The founder may name an “ascertainable class of beneficiaries”, be assisted by a family council, and manage the foundation’s assets personally.[82]  A Liechtenstein foundation may exist indefinitely or until the founder’s purpose is realized.[83]  With Interogo founder Kamprad’s goal of IKEA’s eternal life, Interogo will be in operation for as long as IKEA is in existence, aided by both IKANO and Interogo. 

Additionally, certain bylaws of the foundation leave little doubt that Interogo was intended to be left to its own devices:

  • Documents about the foundation are not allowed be shown to outsiders or foreign authorities
  • Proceeds may be paid in the form of grants to individuals or organizations related to architecture, interior design, and consumer products
  • The Kamprad family has “total control” over the executive board of the Inter IKEA Group[84]

The revelation of Interogo’s existence, control over IKEA, and ownership by the Kamprad family is unfortunate for the founder considering his consistent stance that “he and his family no longer controlled the global furniture giant.[85]”  He has further stated “that his influence over the company is limited and that a Dutch charitable foundation, Stichting INGKA Foundation, directed [IKEA].[86]” [87]

If the Inter IKEA Group owns the IKEA Concept, and the Kamprad-owned Interogo controls the Inter IKEA Group, it follows that Kamprad still has control over the essential part of the IKEA system.  This same ownership is what the public had been led to believe was gifted to the IKEA Foundation that still owns the physical IKEA business, which is arguably worthless without the IKEA Concept. 

Impact to the International Community

Despite the tax-free status of both the IKEA Foundation and the Interogo Foundation, according to Kamprad, the Inter IKEA Group (Inter IKEA Holding S.A. and Inter IKEA Systems B.V.) and the IKEA Group companies pay taxes like any other corporation in every country of operation.[88]  He emphasizes that those operations comply with relevant laws and regulations.[89]

The unique corporate structure of IKEA is likely one of a kind.  However, other companies that may have a similar complex and international configuration would be a challenge for the international community to identify.  Whatever the case, it is clear that international corporations are constantly operating in new and innovative ways leaving lawmakers in all countries racing to keep up.


[1] Kamprad is considered the richest man in the world and benefits from Switzerland’s lump-sum taxation that is only offered to a few thousand foreigners living in Switzerland.  With this taxation system, Kamprad pays 200,000 Swiss francs in taxes annually, which is approximately $215,933 USD according to XE Currency on April 5, 2011 with 1 Swiss franc worth a little over $1 USD. The Public Eye Awards, IKEA Group (2007), http://www.evb.ch/cm_data/
Ikea_e.pdf

[2] Bertil Torekull, Leading by Design 88 (ed. Wahlström & Widstrand 1998) (1999).

[3] IKEA, Ingvar Kamprad comments, (Jan 28, 2011), available athttp://www.ikea.com/at/de/about_ikea/newsitem/
statement_Ingvar_Kamprad_comments.

[4] Id. at 91.

[5] Would be around $15,816.95 USD according to XE Currency on April 4, 2011 with 1 Swedish Kronor worth almost 16 cents USD.

[6] Torekull at 89.

[7] For example, IKEA Catalogue Services AB which is based in IKEA birthplace Älmhult, Sweden is where the 300 plus page IKEA catalogue is created.  It is unknown who owns, controls, or pays IKEA Catalogue Services AB.
IKEA, The IKEA Catalogue – the world’s largest free publication (2003),http://www.ikea.com/ms/en_GB/
about_ikea/press_room/thecatalogue.pdf.

[8] Stichting is Dutch for “foundation”.

[9] IKEAFANS, IKEA Corporate Structure,available athttp://www.ikeafans.com/ikea/ikea-corporate/ikea-corporate-structure.html.

[10] Torekull at 92.

[11] Economist, Flat-pack accounting, (May 11, 2006), available athttp://www.economist.com/node/6919139/.

[12] Id. at 99.

[13] Id.

[14] Economist, Flat-pack accounting.

[15] Id.

[16] IKEA, Ingvar Kamprad comments.

[17] Economist, Flat-pack accounting.

[18] Algemeen nut beogende instelling, acronym ANBI, is Dutch for “institution for general benefit”.

[19] Rich Cohen, Nonprofit Newswire of The Nonprofit Quarterly: The biggest and stingiest foundation in the world, (October 19, 2009), available athttp://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=
article&id=1554:nonprofit-newswire-october-19-2009&catid=155:nonprofit-newswire&Itemid=986

[20] Spigthoff Law Firm, The Legal 500: The Use of Foundations in the Netherlands, (Aug 2008), available athttp://www.legal500.com/c/netherlands/developments/5049.

[21] Id.

[22] Deutsche Welle, Swedish documentary alleges tax fraud by Ikea founder, (Jan 27, 2011), available at http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,14799699,00.html.

[23] Economist, Flat-pack accounting.

[24] Cohen, Nonprofit Newswire.

[25] IKEA won a Public Eye Global Awards through nominations by SOMO (Stichting Onderzoek Multinationale Ondernemingen, literal English translation: Foundation Research Multinational Companies) in the Netherlands and the Berne Declaration (a corporate social responsibility NGO in Switzerland).  The award cites payment of taxes as a central element of corporate social responsibility and criticizes IKEA’s lack of tax payment for Kamprad’s individual gain and lack of contributions to charitable purposes. Id. and The Public Eye Awards, IKEA Group.

[26] The BoKlok venture is a joint-project between IKEA and the Skansa company to provide cost efficient, sustainable, and low energy consumption track apartments and housing at a low cost for the consumer based on the IKEA model of construction.  BoKlok housing is currently in operation in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and the United Kingdom.
BoKlok, The Product Familyavailable at http://www.boklok.com/UK/About-BoKlok/The-BoKlok-Products2/.

[27] Economist, The secret of IKEA’s success: Lean operations, shrewd tax planning and tight control, (Feb 24, 2011), available athttp://www.economist.com/node/18229400.

[28] Inter IKEA Systems B.V., The IKEA Concept: How the IKEA Concept Began 2,http://franchisor.ikea.com/
showContent.asp?swfId=concept3.

[29] IKEA Group Management contains the executives of IKEA, including the President and CEO, Vice President, Head of Human Resources, and other corporate leadership positions.

[30] Swedwood is the group of industrial companies responsible for manufacturing all IKEA products.  This group has concentrated manufacturing in Poland, Slovakia, and Russia but have plants around the world.

[31] IKEA Services B.V. and IKEA Services AB are located in Sweden and the Netherlands and serve to support all the work of the IKEA Group companies.

[32] IKEA of Sweden is located at the birthplace of IKEA in Älmhult, Sweden and is the hub for all of the designers that create and develop the range of IKEA products.

[33] IKEAFANS, Ikea Corporate Structure.

[34] Torekull at 99.

[35] IKEA Fans, Ikea Corporate Structure.

[36] Torekull at 100.

[37] Kamprad wrote The Testament of a Furniture Dealer at the behest of the IKEA staff in Sweden before he emigrated to Denmark.  It includes nine “commandments”: 1. The Product Range is Our Identity, 2. The IKEA Spirit is Strong and Living Reality, 3. Profit Gives us Resources, 4. Reaching Good Results with Small Means, 5. Simplicity Is a Virtue, 6. Doing It a Different Way, 7. Concentration Is Important to Our Success, 8. Taking Responsibility Is a Privilege, and 9. Most Things Still Remain to Be Done—A Glorious Future.  These Kamprad principles serve as a textbook for manager training.  The Testament is published by Inter IKEA Systems B.V. and is given to all new employees.  Torekull at 111-114 and Bloomberg Businessweek, Ikea: How the Swedish Retailer became a global cult brand, (Nov. 14, 2005), available athttp://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_46/b3959001.htm.

[38] Ingvar Kamprad, The Testament of a Furniture Dealer and A Little IKEA Dictionary 6(2007), http://www.emu.dk/
erhverv/merkantil_caseeksamen/doc/ikea/english_testament_2007.pdf.

[39] Torekull at 100.

[40] Id.

[41] Id.

[42] Economist,The secret of IKEA’s success.

[43] Would be over $12 billion USD according to XE Currency on April 4, 2011 with 1 Swedish Kronor worth almost 16 cents USD.

[44] Magnus Svenungsson, Svt.se: Uppdrag Granskning (Mission Review), Granskningen av Ikea ett brett samarbetsprojekt (The review of Ikea, a broad collaborative), (Jan 26, 2011), available at http://svt.se/2.150075/1.2304474/granskningen_av_ikea_ett_brett_samarbet….

[45] Economist, The secret of IKEA’s success.

[46] Economist, Flat-pack accounting.

[47] IKEAFANS, IKEA Corporate Structure.

[48]Magnus Svenungsson, Svt.se: Uppdrag Granskning (Mission Review).

[49] The Public Eye Awards, IKEA Group.

[50] Economist, Flat-pack accounting.

[51] Torekull at 103-4 and 107.

[52] IKANO, Facts & Figuresavailable at http://www.ikanogroup.com/the-group-facts-and-figures.html.

[53] The 1988 foundation date is according to the IKANO Group website, however, in Torekull’s book on IKEA Leading by Design IKANO is said to be one of the many companies founded by Kamprad and his lawyers before his departure from Sweden to Denmark in the 1950s.  Torekull at 104.

[54] IKANO, Our essenceavailable at http://www.ikanogroup.com/the-group-our-essence.html.

[55] Torekull at 104.

[56] IKEAFANS, Ikea Corporate Structure.

[57] IKANO, Group Boardavailable at http://www.ikanogroup.com/the-group-group-board.html.

[58] Torekull at 103-104.

[59] Id. at 105-106.

[60] Id. at 106.

[61] Id.

[62] Id.

[63] IKEA, Ingvar Kamprad comments.

[64] Magnus Svenungsson, Svt.se: Uppdrag Granskning (Mission Review).

[65] The Local: Sweden’s News in English, Ikea founder admits to secret foundation, (Jan 26, 2011), available at http://www.thelocal.se/31650/20110126.

[66] This date is different from the 1980 foundation date that was in a statement by Kamprad released ahead of the documentary according to Deutsche Welle inSwedish documentary alleges tax fraud by Ikea founder.

[67] IKEA, Ingvar Kamprad comments.

[68] Deutsche Welle, Swedish documentary alleges tax fraud by Ikea founder.

[69] Marxer & Partner Rechtsanwälte (Lawyers), The New Liechtenstein Foundation Law: An Overview on the Important Changes, available athttp://www.marxerpartner.com/fileadmin/user_upload/marxerpartner/pdf-dow…. Note: though there were revisions to Liechtenstein Foundation laws (Art. 552-570 Persons and Companies Act (PGR)) that entered into force on Apr 1, 2009, none of these revisions impact foundations created prior to that date.  Additionally, the changes were intended to clarify rules but in no way limit or initiate forceful regulations on Liechtensteiner foundations (ex. the new law necessitates the appointment of an auditor for charitable foundations, which does not apply to Interogo).  The intent was to maintain the country’s attractive laws.

[70] Kaiser Ritter Partner, The Liechtenstein Foundation: Responsibility in Wealth, available at http://www.kaiser-ritter-partner.com/uploads/media/Liechtensteinische_st….

[71] IKEA, Ingvar Kamprad comments.

[72] Marxer & Partner Rechtsanwälte (Lawyers), The New Liechtenstein Foundation Law: An Overview on the Important Changes.

[73] Id. (emphasis added)

[74] The Local: Sweden’s News in English, Ikea founder admits to secret foundation.

[75] Deutsche Welle, Swedish documentary alleges tax fraud by Ikea founder.

[76] Economist, The Secret of IKEA’s success.

[77] Deutsche Welle, Swedish documentary alleges tax fraud by Ikea founder.

[78] Kaiser Ritter Partner, The Liechtenstein Foundation: Responsibility in Wealth.

[79] Id.

[80] Kaiser Ritter Partner, The Liechtenstein Foundation: Responsibility in Wealth.

[81] Marxer & Partner Rechtsanwälte (Lawyers), The New Liechtenstein Foundation Law: An Overview on the Important Changes.

[82] Kaiser Ritter Partner, The Liechtenstein Foundation: Responsibility in Wealth.

[83] Id.

[84] The Local: Sweden’s News in English, Ikea founder admits to secret foundation.

[85] The Local: Sweden’s News in English, Ikea founder admits to secret foundation.

[86] Id.

[87] Despite this claim, it is known that the IKEA store managers are still “trained and groomed by Kamprad himself” at workshops in IKEA mecca, Älmhult. Bloomberg Businessweek, Ikea: How the Swedish Retailer became a global cult brand, (Nov 14, 2005), available athttp://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_46/b3959001.htm.

[88] IKEA, Ingvar Kamprad comments.

[89] Id.

© 2011 Julia W. Gin

Tax Court Decision Subjects LLP Service Providers/Equity Partners to Self-Employment Tax

Posted last week at the National Law Review by Paul A. Gordon and Casey S. August of  Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP new developments concerning partners in a law firm established as a limited liability partnership (LLP) under state law  subject to Self-Employment Contributions Act (SECA) tax on their distributive share of LLP income received in respect of their services.

In a decision issued February 9, the U.S. Tax Court ruled, in part, that the partners of a law firm established as a limited liability partnership (LLP) under state law were subject to Self-Employment Contributions Act (SECA) tax on their distributive share of LLP income received in respect of their services. In doing so, the court determined that the LLP partners could not avail themselves of the exemption from SECA for nonguaranteed service payments to “limited partners.” This ruling illustrates the potential risk for service provider limited partners and limited liability company members of assuming that state law entity and limited liability classifications alone shield them from being subject to SECA tax.

Background

Generally, payments to service providers who are not classified as employees for federal payroll tax purposes are not subject to any payroll tax withholding or payment liability on the part of the payor. Instead, Section 1401 imposes SECA tax on “self-employment” income at the rate of 15.3%, a combination of a 12.4% old-age, survivors, and disability insurance (OASDI) tax and a 2.9% Medicare tax. The OASDI tax is only imposed on the first $106,800 of “net earnings” (which allows for offsets to gross earnings for deductible expenses associated with the creation of the income) for 2011. Subject to certain exemption rules, self-employment earnings include income derived by an individual from any trade or business carried on by such individual plus his or her distributive share of partnership income or loss from any trade or business carried on by a partnership in which he or she is a partner. One of the exemption rules, included in Section 1402(a)(13) of the Internal Revenue Code, excludes from self-employment earnings “the distributive share of any item of income or loss of a limited partner, as such, other than guaranteed payments described in Section 707(c) to that partner for services actually rendered to or on behalf of the partnership to the extent that those payments are established to be in the nature of remuneration for those services” (emphasis added). Unfortunately, Congress failed to provide a definition for limited partner in the statute.

In order to resolve this definitional ambiguity, the U.S. Treasury released temporary regulations in 1997 under which partners with either authority to contract on behalf of the partnership or who participate in the partnership’s trade or business for more than 500 hours during the partnership’s taxable year could not be limited partners for Section 1402(a)(13) exemption purposes. In addition, no service partner in a service partnership could be a limited partner. This guidance created political shockwaves so extensive that Congress imposed a 12-month moratorium on Treasury’s ability to issue further guidance under Section 1402(a)(13). Since that time, Treasury has not provided guidance on the limited partner exemption from SECA tax.

Confronted with the dearth of authority on this issue, many tax practitioners have taken the position that all partners in a tax partnership, who are limited partners or limited liability company members under state law, are per se eligible for the Section 1402(a)(13) limited partner exemption. Others, although not required by law, have followed the guidance under the proposed regulations.

Renkemeyer Decision

It was this definition of “limited partner” that was at issue before the Tax Court in Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver, LLP v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. No. 7 (2011). In that case, the Tax Court addressed an IRS challenge to both (1) the special allocation of the LLP’s (a law firm treated as a partnership for federal income tax purposes) distributive share of income to its partners and (2) the treatment of the LLP distributive share allocations of business income to its service partners (the law partners) as being exempt from SECA tax. After ruling in favor of the IRS on the allocation issue (the petitioner could not produce a partnership agreement supporting the challenged special partnership allocations), the court turned to the SECA tax issue.

The LLP partners argued that the limited partner exemption should apply because (1) the LLP organizational documents designated their interests as limited partnership interests and (2) they enjoyed limited liability under state law. The Tax Court disagreed, reaching the result that would have been required under the temporary regulations. Noting that Congress passed the limited partner exemption prior to the state law advent of LLPs and LLCs, the court reviewed the exemption’s legislative history and determined that the impetus for the exemption was not a limited partner’s individual protection from the partnership’s liabilities, but instead its status as a nonservice investment partner in a traditional limited partnership. In doing so, the court found that Congress did not intend for active service partners, such as the LLP partners, to be exempt from self-employment taxes. Specifically, the court referred to the partners’ minimal LLP capital contributions in exchange for their interests in LLP as indicating that the partners’ distributive share of income arose from the legal services performed on behalf of LLP and “not . . . as a return on the partners’ investments and . . . not [as] ‘earnings which are basically of an investment nature.'” (citing the Section 1402(a)(13) legislative history). Additionally, the Renkemeyer opinion hinted that the same rationale could be applied to prevent members of an LLC from qualifying as Section 1402(a)(13) limited partners.

Implications

Renkemeyer demonstrates the hazards of assuming that state law entity and limited liability classifications should control for purposes of determining eligibility for the Section 1402(a)(13) SECA tax limited partner exemption. That is, there may be danger in taking the per se limited partner exemption position described above. Service providers to tax partnerships (including LLCs treated as tax partnerships) in which they are also equity partners should thus be wary of whether both their service-related payments and guaranteed partnership equity allocations would be considered self-employment income subject to SECA tax.

Copyright © 2011 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.

Selling the Main Street Fairness Act: A Viable Solution to the Internet Sales Tax Problem

Congrats to Michael J. Payne, CPA of Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law   one of the winners of the 2011 Spring National Law Review Student Legal Writing Contest.  Michael’s topic addresses the tremendous struggle in the regulation of sales tax collection on interstate internet purchases.

  I.  Introduction

States have long faced issues related to collecting sales and use tax when the seller lives in another state. Initially, disputed transactions involved purchases from mail-order catalogs and telephone orders, but with the advent and explosion of the World Wide Web, states now face a tremendous struggle in the regulation of sales tax collection on interstate internet purchases.

Today, fierce debates between internet retailers, states, and consumers regarding sales taxes on internet purchases are commonplace, yet the key issues remain unresolved. Retailers purport to be exempt from state sales tax requirements when they do not have a physical presence in the state in which their customers reside; states argue sales taxes are due regardless of physical presence; and consumers just want to find the best deal when making purchases, which often means they seek out ways to avoid paying sales taxes altogether.

As a result of fast-moving technological advances and slow-moving legislative actions, a substantial gap has developed in nearly every state between sales tax revenue due and collected. A study from the University of Tennessee estimated that between 2007 and 2012, states will sustain over $52 billion in losses from uncollected taxes on e-commerce sales.1 In addition to enlarging state budget shortfalls, untaxed interstate sales create an unfair advantage to online sellers who are relieved from the onerous sales tax collection duties imposed on in-state and traditional brick-and-mortar sellers. Thus, online sellers can offer discounts on products purchased from out-of-state residents while still earning higher profits than their in-state competitors.

Two significant constitutional hurdles restrict state regulation of interstate sales taxation: the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause, with the former causing the majority of current problems. This article focuses primarily on resolving the Commerce Clause concerns and attempts to reconcile the interests of sellers, consumers, and states. It then proposes the adoption of a bill that was recently introduced in the House of Representatives: the Main Street Fairness Act.2

II.  Background

A.  The Mechanics of Internet Sales Taxation

A basic understanding of common Internet sales taxation is needed to grasp the ideas discussed in this article. As a general rule, purchasers of merchandise must pay a transaction tax to the state in which they reside, provided that state imposes a sales or use tax.3 When the retailer collects the tax on behalf of the consumer and remits it to the state, it is called a sales tax.When a retailer fails to collect a sales tax, the consumer is obligated to report her purchase to the state and pay an equivalent use tax. The process is simple when the seller is in the same state as the purchaser: the seller collects taxes on local sales and remits them to the state. The more complicated and increasingly more common scenario is when the seller operates from another state; this situation has been the topic of numerous cases, statutes, opinion columns, Internet blogs, and scholarly articles, including this one.

Although state taxation of internet sales is a modern issue, courts have long debated whether the Constitution’s Commerce Clause limits the ability of a state to apply its sales and use tax provisions to out-of-state retailers.4 This Part describes the most significant cases.

B.  National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois

In 1967, the Supreme Court considered whether a state could require a mail order company to collect and remit sales taxes on sales to residents of that state when that company had no physical presence in the state. In National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue of Illinois,5 the taxpayer was a mail order company incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Missouri. It was licensed to do business only in those states. The taxpayer maintained no office or warehouse in Illinois, had no employees, agents, or salespeople there, and conducted no significant advertising there. Moreover, all contacts the company had with the residents of the state were through the mail or a common carrier. Illinois attempted to require the taxpayer to collect and remit sales and use taxes from Illinois residents who purchased the company’s goods by mail order.

The Court held that the Commerce Clause requires “some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax.” Mail order transactions alone do not create that minimum connection. The Court reasoned “[t]he very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to ensure a national economy free from . . . unjustifiable local entanglements. Under the Constitution, this is a domain where Congress alone has the power of regulation and control.”6

C. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota

Twenty-five years after National Bellas Hess, the Court affirmed in part its prior decision when it faced a similar set of facts in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.7 In Quill, North Dakota attempted to require the taxpayer, a Delaware corporation with no significant tangible property or employees in North Dakota, to collect and remit use taxes from sales to North Dakota customers. The taxpayer solicited business through catalogs and flyers and delivered all its merchandise by mail or common carrier from out-of-state locations. The State argued that its statute subjecting every retailer that solicits business in the state to the tax was constitutional when the retailer had “engage[d] in regular or systematic solicitation of a consumer market in th[e] state.”

The Court disagreed, recognizing two constitutional barriers to a state’s ability to force out-of-state retailers to collect and remit sales taxes: the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause. The Court distinguished the Due Process Clause from the Commerce Clause, explaining:

Although the “two claims are closely related,” the Clauses pose distinct limits on the taxing powers of the States. Accordingly, while a State may, consistent with the Due Process Clause, have the authority to tax a particular taxpayer, imposition of the tax may nonetheless violate the Commerce Clause. The two constitutional requirements differ fundamentally, in several ways. . . . [W]hile Congress has plenary power to regulate commerce among the States and thus may authorize state actions that burden interstate commerce, it does not similarly have the power to authorize violations of the Due Process Clause.8

The Court concluded that because Quill had purposefully directed its activities at North Dakota, it established minimum contacts with the State, and thus the Due Process Clause did not prohibit the State from imposing its use tax against Quill.

The Court next considered whether the state statute ran afoul of the Commerce Clause. It recognized Congress’ constitutional authority to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,”9 but also recognized that the “dormant” Commerce Clause10 reserves to Congress the exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce even when it has not spoken directly on a subject. The dormant Commerce Clause requires that the retailer have a “substantial nexus” with the state before the state can force the retailer to collect and remit sales taxes, which often translates into a bright line physical presence test.

The Court held that North Dakota did not have the power to impose sales taxes on Quill because Quill had no physical presence in the state. It also found that the state’s taxation would unduly burden interstate commerce, noting that “similar obligations might be imposed by the nation’s 6,000-plus taxing jurisdictions,” thus vastly increasing the complexity of sales tax compliance for interstate retailers.

D. Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement

In the shadow of the Quill decision, a new and far-reaching mode of commerce arose: the World Wide Web. Many retailers no longer needed to send catalogs to solicit sales. Instead, they could simply set up websites, make them apparent to search engines, and wait for customers to come to them. The following chart illustrates the historic growth of the Internet:

Year Estimated Number of Websites Estimated Percentage of U.S. Households with Internet Access E-Commerce sales
1992 (Quill)

< 30

< 25%

n/a

2000 (SSUTA)

17,000,000

50%

$27.6 billion

2010

249,000,000

77%

$202.6 billion

The monumental growth in online sales has contributed to the two major problems currently associated with the taxation of remote sales: administrative burdens to sellers and lost revenues to states from general noncompliance. In 1999, state and local governments from twenty-six states responded to these by banding together and implementing a new sales tax system. The group’s goal was to create and implement a method to unify and simplify the collection and remittance of sales taxes across the country, an effort that culminated in the Streamlined Sales Tax Project.11

The Project works through two steps. First, states voluntarily join the Streamlined Sales Tax Agreement by adopting its provisions as state law and conforming to the tax administration procedures set for by the Agreement. Second, interstate retailers voluntarily register with the Project’s online system. Sellers only register once and are thenceforth obligated to collect and remit sales taxes to member states when they sell products to residents of those states.

The Agreement reduces the administrative burden of tax compliance by focusing on two main goals: uniformity and simplification. The Agreement promotes uniformity in multistate sales tax collection at five levels: terminology, tax bases, registration, sourcing, and reporting. It simplifies sales tax collection and reporting by focusing on four areas: limited tax rates, seller liability for incorrectly reported exemptions, simplified tax forms, and electronic tax remittances. Additionally, it provides for sales tax software that, if used, would provide immunity to users from audits and corresponding liability.

A. Congressional Efforts to Regulate Internet Sales Taxes

Although states have been very active recently in attempting to regulate sales tax collection for out-of-state retailers, the power to regulate taxation of interstate commerce ultimately lies in Congress’s hands, as established by the Commerce Clause and reiterated in Quill. Since Quill, Congress has attempted several times to pass legislation that would provide federal authorization for states to mandate sales tax collection from out-of-state retailers, thus allowing states to bypass the substantial nexus requirement imposed by Quill.12 However, each bill that has been proposed has expired without being voted on by the House or Senate.

B. Recent State Efforts to Bypass Quill’s Substantial Nexus Requirement

Dissatisfied with Congressional efforts (or lack thereof) to increase cooperation with sales tax laws, states have attempted in various ways to establish a substantial nexus between online retailers and their state and thereby satisfy the requirements of the Commerce Clause.

a.  Borders Online v. State Board of Equalization

In 2005, the California Court of Appeals held in Borders Online v. State Board of Equalization that Borders’ retail stores in the state acted as authorized representatives of the associated online store when those stores accepted refunds of personal property sold by the internet retailer, thus establishing a nexus sufficient for the imposition of sales and use taxes under the Commerce Clause.13

After Borders, remote sellers in California sought clarification on whether their particular fact situations produced sufficient nexus to subject them to California state and local taxation. Courts look at various factors to determine the level of nexus,14 and consider these factors concurrently. An increasingly relevant factor that courts have examined is the presence of a company’s affiliates in a state, or “attributional nexus.” Courts have long looked at attributional nexus as a way to satisfy the Commerce Clause requirements, although the issue has never been directly addressed by the United States Supreme Court.

b.  Amazon.com, LLC v. New York State Department of Taxation and Finance

Most recently, a New York trial court, later affirmed by the New York Appellate Division, weighed in on attributional nexus in Amazon.com, LLC v. New York State Department of Taxation and Finance.15 In 2008, New York attempted to curtail lost revenues from internet sales by amending the definition of “vendor” in its tax law, thus requiring each of Amazon’s Associates to collect sales taxes. Amazon then brought suit claiming that the Provision violated the Commerce Clause by imposing tax collection obligations on out-of-state entities that had no substantial nexus with the state. The court dismissed Amazon’s complaint for failure to state a cause of action, holding that the statute is not unconstitutional facially or as-applied. The court took a broad view of the substantial nexus requirement when it held that Amazon had created a substantial nexus with the State, even though Amazon had no offices, property, employees, or agents in the state. The court noted that physical presence “need not be substantial;” however, there must be “more than a slight presence.”

SinceAmazon, many New York retailers have terminated associations with in-state retailers and local affiliates to avoid being subject to sales tax collection. One website purports to list sellers that have removed New York affiliates after the passage of New York’s legislation, naming almost sixty remote sellers.16 The list includes some large companies such as Overstock, KB Toys, ShopNBC, CafePress, and Fingerhut. As a result, the statute may have actually hurt local retailers, the very group it was trying to protect by leveling the sales tax playing field.

c.  The Bordersand AmazonFallout

The Amazon ruling has influenced other states to pass similar legislation in attempts to collect their own “Amazon tax.” For instance, in 2009, Rhode Island passed a statute that requires online merchants generating more than $5,000 in sales through in-state affiliates to register and collect sales tax on all its taxable sales in Rhode Island.17 Like the New York law, Rhode Island’s statute requires that the seller enter an agreement with a Rhode Island resident before the seller would be subject to sales tax collection.

Following the lead of New York and Rhode Island, North Carolina passed a statute18 enacting its own Amazon tax with a $10,000 floor, explaining that the new law codifies the United States Supreme Court’s 1960 decision in Scripto v. Carson that a state “may require tax collection by a remote retailer that had contracts with ten independent contractors in the state who solicited orders for products on its own behalf.”19 North Carolina simultaneously modernized its previous terminology by replacing “mail order” with “remote sales.”20 Similar statutes were introduced in eleven other states.21

Colorado took its sales tax collection efforts a step further. In addition to enacting its own “Amazon tax,” Colorado’s H.B. 1193 (2010) would require sellers that do not collect sales taxes to send customers that purchase products online annual statements listing total purchases.22 Retailers would also send a copy of all purchases to Colorado’s Department of Revenue so that residents may be held accountable for unpaid use taxes.23 The bill would authorize Colorado’s Executive Director of the Department of Revenue to issue a subpoena to an out-of-state retailer if that retailer refuses to voluntarily furnish that information. However, this statute is the subject of a recent lawsuit brought by the Direct Marketing Association. A federal court for the District of Colorado recently granted DMA’s motion for preliminary injunction against Colorado, holding that its statute “discriminates patently against interstate commerce” and imposes undue burdens on retailers.24

Oklahoma took a different approach to regulating sales tax collection from out-of-state sellers.25 The Oklahoma law obligates certain remote sellers to post on their websites, catalogs, and invoices notice of consumers’ obligations to pay Oklahoma use tax on electronic and mail order purchases of tangible personal property.26 Oklahoma’s law has been criticized as superfluous in application to internet and mail order sellers that have physical presence in the State because current Oklahoma use tax statutes already impose the obligation on those sellers to collect use taxes. Furthermore, the law is criticized as unconstitutional when applied to out-of-state sellers that have no physical presence in the State, because Quill’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause would prohibit Oklahoma from enforcing tax collection responsibilities on a seller with no physical presence in the state.

d.    The Case for a Federal Solution

A uniform federal solution is superior to progressive state-by-state attempts to collect sales and use taxes for three reasons. First, states are tiptoeing on the edge of a river of constitutionally-protected consumer privacy matters. Second, strict enforcement of use tax laws at an individual level is hardly tenable given the historic lack of enforcement and the resulting lack of personal accountability. The proposed solutions impose real burdens on people and will discourage online purchases. Can you recall everything you have purchased online in the last year? In the last five years? You may have to if you are in a progressive sales tax collection state. It is much simpler and more intuitive for consumers to pay the tax up front as one swift transaction than to log their purchases, store the information, and file a use tax return with their payment at some later date. The increased hassles of recording each purchase could drive people back into brick-and-mortar stores, nullifying the efforts of Amazon and other remote sellers. For this reason, remote sellers should embrace the Main Street Fairness Act as a means to create certainty and consistency in the marketplace.

Finally, the trending methods of sales and use tax enforcement are completely inefficient. This is a situation in which it makes sense to take collective federal action rather than pursue state collection efforts at the individual taxpayer level. States would be forced to allocate substantial resources toward collection efforts while receiving no greater benefit than if the tax had been collected at the time of sale. With the Main Street Fairness Act, states would incur virtually no additional costs of expansion and would continue to use their existing collection methods. States are already entitled to collect these taxes whether in the form of sales or use taxes; why not utilize retailers with software and systems already in place?

The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities has argued that states’ implementation of the “Amazon law” could be an effective means to require sales tax collection from internet sellers that use affiliate programs.27 However, the Center observed, Amazon laws are only a partial solution to the broader sales tax problem. Not every internet retailer operates an affiliate program, so the Amazon law does nothing to spur collection efforts from the numerous vendors who advertise by other means. The Center concluded that a comprehensive solution will require a federal law empowering states and localities that have streamlined their sales tax collection efforts to require all large remote sellers to collect sales taxes. This would allow states to force collection on remote sellers regardless of whether the sellers have a physical presence in their customers’ states. Such a federal grant of commerce power is the precise objective of the Main Street Fairness Act of 2010.

III.  Main Street Fairness Act

The Main Street Fairness Act, sponsored by former Representative Bill Delahunt (D-MA), seeks to “promote simplification and fairness in the administration and collection of sales and use taxes.”28 It would do so by allowing states to force “remote sellers” (companies that sell products online, by mail order catalogs, cable TV shopping, telephone, etc.) to collect sales and use taxes from customers and remit them to states. States acting alone do not have the authority to require a seller with no physical presence in the state to collect taxes on sales to that state’s residents. However, Congress affirmatively possesses the authority to regulate commerce under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United States and Congress may authorize state actions that burden interstate commerce. The Main Street Fairness Act would grant states explicit authority to burden interstate commerce by allowing states to mandate collection and remittance of taxes on remote sales to their residents.

Why should Congress give the Main Street Fairness Act a second glance when a form of the current bill has essentially been rejected every other year for the last seven years? This section will focus on three ways the Main Street Fairness Act would benefit interstate commerce: (1) it would provide states a tool to enforce active yet frequently disobeyed laws regarding sales and use tax reporting and payment; (2) it would level the playing field between Main Street and “e-street;” and (3) it would help to close the enormous budget gap that is growing daily as a result of the disparity between taxes due and taxes actually collected.

A. Enforce Current Laws

The Main Street Fairness Act would grant federal authority to states, thus allowing states to enforce sales and use tax laws that are currently in place but are often not obeyed. Sales or use taxes are legally due on internet sales if the item is otherwise taxable under state law. Generally, retailers collect taxes from customers on behalf of states for convenience. However, when a customer purchases a taxable item and the retailer fails to collect a sales tax, that customer is obligated to pay a use tax and file a use tax return with the state.

People often do not pay use taxes on internet purchases for two reasons. First and most commonly, the average consumer is unaware that a tax is due when she purchases a product from an online retailer such as Amazon or Overstock. In other cases, the consumer may be aware that a tax is due but fails to pay sales or use taxes because he believes the law is not enforced and he will not be caught. This is the more dangerous scenario because in knowingly failing to pay a tax that is legally due, the consumer crosses the line of intentional disregard and is more likely to violate that law again.

In an effort to both inform residents of their obligation to pay use taxes and to actually collect those taxes, many states have started to include a line on their income tax returns where taxpayers are supposed to calculate and declare unpaid taxes. For example, Michigan includes the following line on its individual income tax return: “Use Tax: Use tax due on internet, mail order or other out-of-state purchases,” then references a separate worksheet that is provided to help the taxpayer calculate use tax due.29

Some states have begun to enforce use tax compliance on an individual level, sending tax bills to consumers that had made taxable purchases but failed to pay a tax. Nebraska recently cracked down on a local March of Dimes chapter after the chapter purchased 4,000 t-shirts from an online vendor in Florida. Nebraska tracked purchases for the preceding five years and could collect an estimated $215,000 from the charity, or approximately thirteen percent of the donations. Other states are less stringent, allowing a de minimis exemption for individuals.30

Some states have attempted to enforce sales and use tax compliance by leveraging customers to act as whistleblowers when companies knowingly fail to collect those taxes.31 Under these false claim statutes, individual consumers may bring suits on behalf of the state against parties that knowingly violated sales tax laws. If successful, the whistleblower would be entitled to a portion of the state taxes collected.

While states have had some success tackling the noncompliance issue on their own through enacting Amazon laws or similar statutes, the federal government is the sole body that is constitutionally charged with regulating interstate commerce and therefore should provide states with a tool to help them enforce their laws and uniformly tax interstate commerce. If passed, the Main Street Fairness Act could effectively serve as that tool.

B.  Level the Playing Field

Perhaps the strongest policy reason for implementing a federal law to delegate Commerce power to states is the inherent unfairness that results from forcing some companies to charge their customers sales taxes while others do not have to charge any sales tax.

Two groups are hurt by current disparities in sales tax enforcement: local retailers and large companies with physical presence in many states. Small local retailers (mom and pop shops) are at a distinct disadvantage when their online competitors do not have to charge customers sales tax. Recent studies indicate that many consumers are beginning to follow a “just looking” trend whereby they test products in local stores by seeing, touching, and feeling them, then rush home to order the same products online where they can avoid paying sales taxes.32 According to one consumer behavior report, seventy-five percent of online consumers sought to purchase from merchants that did not charge sales tax and offered free shipping.33 The savings are even greater when buying in bulk, thus enticing large organizations to shift their purchasing patterns away from small local retailers to reduce costs in a bad economy.

Ironically, opponents of internet sales tax regulation argue that enforcing sales tax laws would do greater harm than good to small retailers.34 Such opponents reason that the last decade has provided an unprecedented opportunity for individuals to start small companies that leverage the Internet to grow quickly, thus spurring the economy and creating jobs.Less than one month after the Main Street Fairness Act was introduced, a group of U.S. Representatives introduced the “Supporting the Preservation of Internet Entrepreneurs and Small Businesses” resolution.35 The Preservation bill focuses on avoiding “any legislation that would grant State governments the authority to impose any new burdensome or unfair tax collecting requirements on small online businesses and entrepreneurs.” Representative Dan Lungren, sponsor of the Preservation bill, commented:

The most effective thing we can do to help our economy recover is to remove the roadblocks standing in the way of our nation’s job creators. At a time when we are trying to foster a sustained economic recovery, it doesn’t make sense to saddle entrepreneurs with tax requirements that stifle growth. The possibility of new taxes being levied on online retailers will have a negative impact on the online marketplace. We should send a clear message that Congress should not burden small businesses with unfair tax schemes.

The Preservation bill is constructed on two false premises. First, it presupposes that federal legislation granting states Congressional authority to collect sales taxes would impose a new tax. As discussed in the previous section of this article, sales and use taxes are already due in nearly every state on online purchases. A federal grant of authority would therefore not impose a new tax, but loosen the handcuffs Quill placed on states to enforce their own laws. Second, the Preservation bill is aimed at protecting small businesses and entrepreneurs. While noble in its purpose, the Preservation bill is simply unnecessary; the Main Street Fairness Act’s small seller exception would exempt from sales tax collection the very businesses the Preservation bill aspires to protect.

Another group that is damaged by the current system is large online retailers that have a physical presence in many states, such as Wal-Mart or Target. Most, if not all, online sales from these stores are subject to sales taxes because they have a physical presence in nearly every state. These companies put appropriate resources into ensuring that the taxes are properly collected and remitted. The inconsistency arises when comparing a company like Wal-Mart to a company like Amazon. Both are large companies that sell products to residents in every U.S. state and territory. However, Wal-Mart has stores in every state, while Amazon only has physical presence in a handful of states, thus creating a real disparity that needs to be addressed.

C.  Bridge the Budget Gap

It is no secret that states are struggling to find revenue sources while tax collections are down nationwide. Advocates of internet sales taxation correctly promote the Main Street Fairness Act as a way for states to raise revenue without imposing additional taxes. While allowing states to enforce sales tax collection on all of its residents’ purchases would not solve the current budget crisis, it would allow states to take a healthy step in the right direction.

IV,  Conclusion

Regardless of which political party is in the majority, the Main Street Fairness Act should be given consideration as a viable solution to the problems discussed above. Its passage would comport with the constitutional grant of authority over interstate commerce to Congress, while allowing states the freedom to choose whether to voluntarily join the Agreement. This system is ideal because states can preserve their independence by joining or leaving the Agreement at any time, while providing substantial benefits to out-of-state retailers by simplifying and unifying their reporting requirements. The Main Street Fairness Act is the bandwagon heading toward uniformity and fairness in sales tax collection. States just need to jump on.


[1] Donald Bruce, William F. Fox & LeAnn Luna, State and Local Government Sales Tax Revenue Losses from Electronic Commerce, U. Tenn. Center Bus. Econ. Res., Apr. 13, 2009, available at http://cber.utk.edu/ecomm/ecom0409.pdf.

[2] Main Street Fairness Act, H.R. 5660, 111th Cong. (2010).

[3] Five states do not currently impose a sales tax: Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon. Richard Stim, Sales Tax on the Internet, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/sales-tax-internet-29919.html.

[4] See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), National Bella Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967), Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).

[5] National Bella Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967) at 756.

[6] National Bella Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967) at 758–60. (internal citations omitted).

[7] Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).

[8] Quill at 305 (internal citations omitted).

[9] U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 3.

[10] The dormant Commerce Clause is a judicially-created doctrine that “rests entirely on the negative implications of the Commerce Clause of Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.” See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 174 (Thomson West 2007).

[11] Streamlined Sales Tax Governing Board, Registration Frequently Asked Questions, [hereinafter FAQs], http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?page=faq.         …

[12] Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Act, S. 1736, H.R. 3184, 108th Cong. (2003); Sales Tax Fairness and Simplification Act, S. 2152, 109th Cong. (2005); Streamlined Sales Tax Simplification Act, S. 2153, 109th Cong. (2005); Sales Tax Fairness and Simplification Act, S. 34, H.R. 3396, 110th Cong. (2007).

[13] Borders Online v. State Board of Equalization, 129 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1189–92 (Cal. App. 2005).

[14] Id. at 664–666, (listing some of the factors courts have examined in searching for substantial nexus: business ownership structure, common logos and names, common merchandise, use of private or branded credit cards, links between affiliates’ websites, credit card reward programs, gift certificates and gift cards, trademarks, goodwill, and return policies).

[15] Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., 877 N.Y.S.2d 842 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).

[16] Id.; NYaffiliates.com, Merchants Removing NY Affiliates, http://www.abestweb.com/forums/showthread.php?t=105869 (last visited Nov. 29, 2010).

[17] R.I. Gen. Laws -§ 44-18-15 (2009); see also State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations Department of Revenue, Important Notice: Definition of Sales Tax “Retailer” Amended, available at http://www.tax.state.ri.us/notice/Retailer_definition_NoticeC.pdf.

[18] N.C Gen. Stat. § 105-164.8(b)(3) (2009).

[19] North Carolina Department of Revenue, Sales Tax Law Changes, Form E-505 (8-09), Part II: Other Legislative Changes, available at http://www.dornc.com/downloads/e505_8-09.pdf.

[20] N.C Gen. Stat. § 105-164.3(33c) (2009).

[21] Jennifer Heidt White, Safe Haven No More: How Online Affiliate Marketing Programs Can Minimize New State Sales Tax Liability, 5 Shidler J. L. Com. & Tech. 21 (2009), (listing the following states as having introduced versions of the affiliate tax: Connecticut, Maryland, Minnesota, Tennessee, California, Hawaii, Mississippi, New Mexico, Vermont, Virginia, and Illinois).

[22] H.B. 10-1193, 67th Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2010), available at http://www.leg.state.co.us/clics/clics2010a/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/B30F5741….

[23] Id.                                                       

[24] Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Huber, Order Granting Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 2011 WL 250556, Civil No. 10-cv-01546-REB-CBS, (D.Colo. 2011).

[25] 2009 OK H.B. 2359, (Feb. 1, 2010) available at http://webserver1.lsb.state.ok.us/textofmeasures/textofmeasures.aspx.

[26] Edward A. Zelinsky, The Paradoxes of Oklahoma’s Amazon Statute: Weak Duties, Expansive Coverage, Often Superfluous, Constitutionally Infirm, Cardozo Sch. L., Inst. Advanced L. Stud., Working Paper No. 315, at 17 (Oct. 2010).

[27] Michael Mazerov, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, New York’s “Amazon Law”: An Important Tool for Collecting Taxes Owed on Internet Purchases, 1, July 23, 2009, http://www.cbpp.org/files/7-23-09sfp.pdf.

[28] H.R. 5660 at 1.

[29] 2009 Michigan Individual Income Tax Return MI-1040, line 25, available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/taxes/MI-1040_305378_7.pdf.

[30] Minnesota, for example, exempts individuals with total purchased under $770 from paying the use tax, which is equivalent to $50 of use tax liability. Four other states have similar exemptions for individuals. See Nina Manzi, Use Tax Collection on Income Tax Returns in Other States, Research Department, Minnesota House of Representatives, *2, June 2010, available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/usetax.pdf.

[31] Leslie J. Carter, Blowing the Whistle on Avoiding Use Taxes in Online Purchases, 2008 U. Chi. Legal F. 453–54 (2008).

[32] Google Retail Advertising Blog, Trend to Watch: Research & Purchase Process is Multi-Channel, (March 3, 2010), http://googleretail.blogspot.com/2010/03/trend-to-watch-research-purchas….

[33] Sara Rodriguez, Economic Climate Shifts Consumers Online, PriceGrabber.com (March 25, 2009), https://mr.pricegrabber.com/Economic_Climate_Shifts_Consumers_Online_Mar….

[34] Congressman Daniel Lungren, Lundgren Introduces Resolution to Protect Small Businesses and Entrepreneurs from New Sales Taxes, Feb. 16, 2011, http://lungren.house.gov/index.cfm?sectionid=39&sectiontree=6,39&itemid=759.

[35] H.R. 1570, 111th Cong. (2010), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills….

© Copyright 2011 Michael J. Payne, CPA

Planning Opportunities Under the New Estate and Gift Tax Law

Recently posted at the National Law Review by Julia L. FreyMatthew R. O’Kane, and Norma Stanley of Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, P.A. – some highlights of the recent tax changes impacting estate plans:  

On December 17, 2010, Congress enacted a new tax law which changes the federal gift, estate and generation-skipping transfer (“GST”) taxes currently in effect. However, the new law is only effective for the next two years, through December 31, 2012. The new law increases the lifetime exemptions for the estate, GST and gift taxes to $5,000,000 per person and reduces the top tax rate to 35%.

The increased gift tax exemption allows you to make tax-free gifts of your estate which might otherwise be subject to gift tax. The new gift tax provisions allow someone who has already made taxable gifts totaling $1,000,000 during his or her life to have an additional $4,000,000 of gift tax exemption available for his or her use. This is an immediate planning opportunity for those who wish to take advantage of the tax law changes.

The new law may also alter many estate plans. For example, assume your estate is to be divided into a family trust and a marital trust with the family trust being funded with the maximum estate tax exemption and the marital trust being funded with the amount, if any, of the estate that exceeds the exemption amount. Thus, under current law, the family trust would be funded with the first $5,000,000 of the estate (or the entire estate depending upon the estate’s value) with the possibility that no portion of the estate would pass into the marital trust. Given the increased exemption, this may or may not be what you would want to happen.

The new law provides for “portability” of the estate tax exemption. Under prior law, if the estate of the first spouse to die did not use that spouse’s exemption, it was lost. Now, a surviving spouse may elect to add the deceased spouse’s unused exemption to the surviving spouse’s exemption, thereby increasing the surviving spouse’s estate and gift tax exemption for transfers during life or upon death. For instance, if the first spouse dies and only used $2,000,000 of his $5,000,000 estate tax exemption, the surviving spouse would now be able to elect to shelter $8,000,000 from estate and gift tax (the surviving spouse’s exemption of $5,000,000 plus the deceased spouse’s unused $3,000,000 of exemption).

While the new tax law is a step in the right direction, it only applies through December 31, 2012. Whether your estate is above or below the new exemption amount, it is important to make sure your estate plan is up-to-date to ensure your intent is carried out and to maximize all of the planning options currently available to you. In addition, if a family member passed away in 2010, there could be new planning opportunities available that may benefit the estate.

© Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, PA, 2011. All rights reserved.

IRS Announces Second Special Voluntary Disclosure Initiative for Taxpayers With Undisclosed Offshore Accounts

Posted this week at the National Law Review by Keith R. Gercken of Sheppard Mullin – updated information on 2011’s tax amnesty program for off shore accounts:  

The Internal Revenue Service announced on February 8, 2011 the creation of a second special voluntary disclosure initiative for U.S. taxpayers with undisclosed foreign bank and other financial accounts. This new program is a follow-on to the IRS’ original voluntary disclosure initiative that closed on October 15, 2009. The 2009 program reportedly attracted some 15,000 voluntary disclosures by taxpayers with previously undisclosed offshore accounts, and has been viewed within the government as a success in getting taxpayers “back into the U.S. tax system” by offering them the ability to avoid or significantly mitigate various the criminal and civil penalties that would otherwise have potentially applied had their failure to disclose been discovered by the IRS on audit.

As background, U.S. persons are generally required to file an annual information statement with the IRS disclosing any beneficial interest in, or signatory authority over, bank or other financial accounts located outside the U.S. This information statement is filed on Form TD F 90-22.1, and is generally referred to as an “FBAR” (Foreign Bank Account Report). From an accountholder perspective the failure to file FBARs as required can potentially lead to a large array of both civil and criminal penalties – including monetary penalties of up to 50% of the unreported account balance (per year) and criminal penalties if the failure to file was willful.

The new 2011 program represents a second chance for taxpayers who did not take advantage of the original 2009 voluntary disclosure program. While the penalty structure offered by the IRS this time around is slightly less favorable than under the original 2009 program, it still offers taxpayers an opportunity to significantly reduce their penalty exposure. Highlights of the new 2011 program include the following:

  • The program covers the years 2003 through 2010.
  • There is an August 31, 2011 deadline to submit all required information to the IRS, including delinquent or corrected FBARs and amended income tax returns reporting any previously unreported income.
  • In lieu of the normal 50% per year penalty, a participating taxpayer must pay a 25% penalty on the highest aggregate account balance in the undisclosed offshore account during the period covered by the voluntary disclosure. In limited cases, this 25% penalty may be reduced to 12.5% or 5%.
  • Participating taxpayers must pay all delinquent taxes relating to any unreported offshore income, together with applicable interest and a 20% accuracy-related penalty.
  • Participating taxpayers must pay any other applicable civil penalties associated with a failure to file returns or failure to pay taxes during the period covered by the voluntary disclosure.
  • The program includes a generally favorable alternative resolution procedure to enable participating taxpayers to calculate their tax liability associated with investments that may have been made in “passive foreign investment companies” (e.g., foreign mutual funds) through their undisclosed offshore accounts.
  • Participating taxpayers must fully cooperate with the IRS in providing information on offshore financial accounts, institutions and facilitators.
  • The IRS will not initiate criminal prosecution of taxpayers who fully comply with the terms of the program.

The IRS remains focused on the potential evasion of U.S. income tax that is facilitated by hiding funds in offshore accounts, and has been increasingly aggressive in pursuing U.S. taxpayers who have failed to properly file FBARs and pay taxes on offshore income. As offshore financial secrecy continues to erode, the IRS has become increasingly able to obtain information relating to U.S. taxpayers directly from foreign banks. As a result, taxpayers with undisclosed offshore accounts that did not previously take advantage of the 2009 voluntary disclosure program may wish to consider the potential advantages of participating in this new 2011 program.

Copyright © 2011, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.