Tag: royalties

Of Passion, Prejudice And Punitive Damages

Addressing an issue of damages, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of punitive damages in favor of the plaintiff, finding “passion and prejudice” mitigated finding of “malice”. Waverly Scott Kaffaga, as Executrix of the Estate of Elaine Anderson Steinbeck v. The Estate of Thomas Steinbeck et al., Case No. 18-55336 (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 2019) (Tallman, J).

The lawsuit related to decades of litigation among the heirs to John Steinbeck’s registered copyrights to his works, including The Grapes of Wrath, Of Mice and Men, East of Eden and The Pearl. When Steinbeck died in 1968, he left interest in his works to his third wife, Elaine. Steinbeck’s two sons by a previous marriage each received $50,000. In the 1970s, the sons obtained rights in their father’s works when interests in works were renewed pursuant to US Copyright law.

In 1983, changes in the law prompted Elaine and the sons to enter into an agreement that provided each of them with an equal share of the royalties and gave Elaine “complete power and authority to negotiate, authorize and take action with respect to the exploitation and/or termination of rights” in the works. In 2003, Elaine passed away, and her daughter, Waverly Kaffaga, assumed the role of successor under the 1983 agreement. The sons challenged the validity of the 1983 agreement, and the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that the agreement was valid and enforceable. Despite losing in court, one of the sons, Thomas Steinbeck, along with his wife Gail and Gail’s media company, filed a lawsuit in California asserting rights to the works that the courts had already told them they did not have. The district court held, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, that the Steinbecks’ claims were barred by collateral estoppel.

Kaffaga countersued Thomas and Gail for their attempts to assert various rights in the works despite having no rights. Those attempts led to multiple Hollywood producers abandoning negotiations with Kaffaga to develop screenplays for the works. The district court granted Kaffaga summary judgment on her breach of contract and slander of title claims, citing many detailed facts it believed supported those claims. The district court let the jury decide on her claim of tortious interference. The jury unanimously found for Kaffaga and awarded $5.25 million in compensatory damages and $7.9 million in punitive damages, including $6 million against Gail individually.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found clear support in the record for the lower court’s decisions, save for one—punitive damages. There, the appellate court noted that although Kaffaga had the better argument, and although there was ample evidence of defendants’ malice in the record to support the jury’s verdict, triggering punitive damages, Kaffaga missed one key piece of evidence.

Under California law, there is a “passion and prejudice” standard that measures the amount of punitive damages against the ratio between damages and the defendant’s net worth. It is the plaintiff’s burden to place into the record “meaningful evidence of the defendant’s financial condition” to support a defendant’s ability to pay.” Thus, for the punitive damage award to stand, the record needed to contain sufficient evidence of Gail’s assets, income, liabilities and expenses. Here, Kaffaga failed. Although Gail testified that she received approximately $120,000 to $200,000 per year from domestic book royalties, Kaffaga introduced no estimate of Gail’s potential income from the four television series and six feature films in development, nor did she introduce an estimate of the total value of Gail’s other intellectual property assets. The Ninth Circuit found that Kaffaga failed to meet her burden of placing into the record “meaningful evidence” of Gail’s financial condition showing that she had the ability to pay any punitive damages award as required by California law. The Ninth Circuit therefore vacated the almost $6 million punitive damages award.

Practice Note: When seeking punitive damages in California, the moving party must place “meaningful evidence” of the non-moving party’s financial condition and ability to pay any punitive damages awarded, including their assets, income, liabilities and expenses. If there are problems obtaining such evidence during discovery, procedures such as a motion to compel or proposing an appropriate adverse inference instruction at trial are in order.

© 2019 McDermott Will & Emery

For more copyright inheritance, see the National Law Review Estates & Trusts or Intellectual Property law pages.

To Apple, Love Taylor: Apple Responds with Royalties

“To Apple, Love Taylor” has been the tweet heard ‘round the music world.  With more than 61 million followers, Taylor Swift has become the “loudest” voice for emerging and independent artists in the music-streaming realm.  As copyright lawsuits from record companies continue to crop up across the industry, music-streaming service providers have become far more sensitive to the demands of artists and the trend for higher royalty payments.  Case in point: when Taylor “streams” for royalties, Apple responds.

Taylor’s tweet to Apple explained, “with all due respect,” why she was planning to withhold her mega best-selling album 1989 from Apple’s new music-streaming service, Apple Music.  Apparently, Apple’s plan to withhold royalty payments from musicians during the service’s initial, free three-month trial period did not sit well with Swift.  Speaking primarily on behalf of emerging and independent artists, Swift deemed three months “a long time to go unpaid.”  Taylor’s stance followed a long line of objections from songwriters, artists, and labels over allegedly unfair payment by music-streaming services.  Recently, the Turtles and other performers brought suit against Sirius XM to collect royalty payments that had not been paid for songs produced before 1972.  Previously, big streamers like Sirius XM and Pandora were not paying royalties for songs launched before 1972 because they were not protected by federal copyright law.  In the wake of the Turtles suit, Apple was swift to respond to Swift’s plea.  Eddy Cue, Apple’s senior vice-president of internet software and services, tweeted “we hear you @taylorswift13 and indie artists” and called Taylor to deliver the news personally.  Apple had reconsidered its plan and will now be paying artists royalties at the outset of its Apple Music launch.

Clearly, Taylor’s attempt at flattery, saying that the initial decision to withhold royalty payments was surprising in light of Apple’s reputation as a “historically progressive and generous company,” got her everywhere.  Taylor claimed that her complaints were not the rantings of a “spoiled, petulant child,” but rather “echoed sentiments of every artist, writer, and producer in [her] social circles who [we]re afraid to speak up publicly because [they] admire and respect Apple so much.”  As she pointed out, Apple’s plan to offer royalty-free streaming during its initial start-up period could have had disastrous effects on artists planning to release new albums during that time.  While the cost of these royalties may not be relatively significant to Apple, the goodwill and favor fostered among artists, labels, and consumers is invaluable.  Apple’s move indicates that artists are finally succeeding in shifting royalty payments more toward their favor via lawsuits, negotiations, and now very public Twitter exchanges.  The power of public opinion is not only strong but, these days, instantaneously widespread, and Apple was smart to respond.

It seems that Sirius heard Apple too.  Just days after Eddy Cue’s public response to Taylor Swift, Sirius settled its lawsuit with the Turtles to the tune, no pun intended, of $210 million for its broadcast of songs produced before 1972.  Under the settlement, Sirius will continue to play the older songs until 2017, at which time it will strike new licensing deals with affected artists.  With this settlement in place and with the established prospect for older performers to collect royalties in the future, the Turtles and Sirius are once again “Happy Together.”

This public discourse over streamed music, copyrights, and royalty payments illustrates the fast-paced evolution of the industry since the introduction of digital music files in the Napster heyday.  Streaming services have been forced to anticipate and address the demands of artists, particularly that of the growing request for greater royalties.  While a voice as “loud” as that of Taylor Swift may warrant an immediate, calculated response, it is likely we will see more music royalties and other digital copyright litigation in the years to come.

ARTICLE BY

Annie Dike
IMS ExpertServices
© Copyright 2002-2015 IMS ExpertServices, All Rights Reserved.

Kimble v. Marvel – Supreme Court Sticks With Brulotte Rule on Royalty Payments

In a rather breezy opinion filled with Spiderman puns and references, Justice Kagan, writing for a 6/3 Court, affirmed that Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964) controlled the outcome of this dispute over Marvel’s decision to halt royalty payments on a web-slinger toy that it had apparently agreed to make “for as long as kids want to imitate Spider-Man (doing whatever a spider can).” Slip op. at 2. (A copy of the opinion is found at the end of this post.)

The toy was patented by Kimble, and the patent expired in 2010. The ninth circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of S.J. confirming that, in accord with Brulotte, a patentee cannot receive royalties for sales made after his/her patent’s expiration. Cert. was granted and the Court affirmed that stare decisis was operable to keep Brulotte as controlling law, particularly since the dispute involved statutory interpretation – [as opposed to, e.g., first amendment rights?] – and that Congress had rejected attempts to amend the law.

I posted on the “back-story” earlier – see here– so a lot of repetition seems unnecessary, but the Court spent some time discussing various work-arounds to the Brulotte bar. These include deferred royalty payments, licensing non-patent rights and alternative “business arrangements,” that universities and other developers of early stage technology might use to temper the loss of patent protection prior to the generation of maximum income from the patented technology. Slip op. at 5-6. Nonetheless, as Justice Kagan wrote: “Patents endow their holders with certain superpowers but only for a limited time.”

Click here to read the Supreme Court Decision in Kimble v. Marvel

ARTICLE BY Warren Woessner of Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.
© 2015 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

Texas Supreme Court Clarifies Royalty Calculations For Enhanced Oil Recovery

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In French v. Occidental Permian, Ltd., the Texas Supreme Court clarified royalty calculations for enhanced oil recovery.  The Court:

  1. Rejected a royalty owners’ claim that royalties on casinghead gas should be determined as if the injected carbon dioxide (CO2) was not present
  2. Held that, under the applicable leases and Unitization Agreement, the costs of removing CO2 from the gas were post-production expenses that royalty owners must share with the working interest owner

In the opinion, the Court emphasized the importance of efficient production of oil and gas and the prevention of waste.

Background

The Plaintiffs-Appellants, Marcia Fuller French and others (“French”), were lessors on two different oil and gas leases.  Both lease royalty provisions provided that the casinghead gas royalty was net of post-production expenses, but not production expenses.  The Defendant-Appellee, Occidental Permian Ltd. (“Oxy”) owned a working interest.  The parties had entered into a Unitization Agreement to allow secondary recovery operations.

Oxy began injecting wells on these leases with CO2 in 2001 in order boost oil production when waterflooding became less effective.  As a result, the wells produced natural gas that was about 85% CO2.  Although Oxy could reinject the entire casinghead gas stream, Oxy had the gas treated off site to remove the CO2.   It sold the resulting gas and had the extracted CO2 sent back to the well to be reinjected.  Oxy paid royalties on the gas after it was treated and deducted the treatment costs from French’s royalties.

French sued arguing that, except for the removal of contaminants and the extraction of NGL, the costs of processing the casinghead gas (including transportation costs) were production costs that should be borne solely by Oxy.  Conversely, Oxy argued the CO2 removal was necessary to render the gas stream marketable.  At trial, the Court agreed with French and awarded her $10,074,262.33 in underpaid royalties and entered a declaratory judgment defining Oxy’s ongoing royalty obligations.  The court of appeals reversed with a focus on the damages calculations, but did not reach a decision on whether the cost of separating the CO2 from the casinghead gas was a production expense.

Supreme Court’s Decision

The Court examined the parties’ agreements noting that French consented to the injection of extraneous substances into the oil reservoir and gave Oxy the right and discretion to decide whether to reinject or process the casinghead gas.  The Court further pointed out the Agreement provided that the royalty owners agreed to forego royalties on any unitized substances used in the recovery process.  The Court found that French benefited from that decision and therefore must share in the cost of the CO2 removal.  The question then became whether the CO2 processing was a production or post-production cost.

French argued that the CO2 separation was akin to the removal of water from oil, which Oxy treated as a production cost.  The Court, however, found that oil and water are “immiscible” and separation of the two is a relatively simple process, unlike CO2 and gas separation, which requires special technology.  Water separation is necessary for reinjection into the reservoir and to make the oil marketable.  Conversely, CO2 separation is not necessary for continued production of oil.  The Court then noted that Oxy was not required to reinject the casinghead gas.  Therefore, based on the parties’ agreements, “French, having given Oxy the right and discretion to decide whether to reinject or process the casinghead gas, and having benefited from that decision, must share in the cost of the CO2removal.”  Id. at 7.

Conclusion

The Court indirectly emphasized efficient production of oil and gas and prevention of waste.  The gas processing was economically beneficial to both French and Oxy.  The CO2 separation increased the value of the stream to both Oxy and French by allowing sale of the extracted NGLs and allowing reinjection of more than 10% of the gas produced directly back into the field.  Because French received the benefit of Oxy’s decision, it had to share in the cost.

This opinion is an important reminder to carefully negotiate and agree to terms in all agreements.  It is a further reminder to proceed in an efficient and economic manner.

ARTICLE BY:

Christina A. Denmark
Of:
Steptoe & Johnson PLLC