Tag: Litigation

Cannabis Prop 65 Liability: Lessons Learned from the Dietary Supplement Industry

The cannabis industry appears to be next on the liability “hit list” under California’s notorious Proposition 65 statute. In June 2017, more than 700 Prop 65 notices were served on California cannabis businesses. Companies in this emerging market should start mitigating risk under Prop 65 now. Fortunately, lessons can be learned from the dietary supplement industry’s expensive Prop 65 battles over the past decade.

California’s Prop 65, also known as the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act, requires a warning on all products that contain chemicals known to cause cancer or reproductive harm, even in amounts a fraction of what is deemed safe by federal standards. Prop 65 has caused havoc within the dietary supplement and herbal product markets over the past decade, led by a cottage industry of “bounty hunter” attorneys who have weaponized the statute, ostensibly in the public interest but in reality as a lucrative for-profit business. These bounty hunters are now turning their attention to cannabis. Though amendments to the statute were adopted in 2016 for the purpose of reducing this abuse, Prop 65 litigation will continue and cannabis companies must stay vigilant.

Many businesses faced with the necessity of using a Prop 65 warning have no concern with the impact that a warning may have on sales or with consumer confidence in the product. After all, who would look twice at a Prop 65 warning on motor oil or insect repellent? Like the dietary supplement industry before them, however, many cannabis businesses will resist including a warning that the product contains a chemical known to cause cancer or reproductive harm. Many cannabis products rely on the consumers’ belief that the product is harmless and even therapeutic. For many, this will be an important business decision that may give rise to expensive mistakes − a decision should be made with an understanding of the basis for Prop 65 liability and exposure.

What Is Prop 65 and What Does It Require?

Prop 65 was passed by California voters in 1986 after an aggressive lobbying campaign by environmental and public health activists. The stated purpose of Prop 65 was to improve public health. The general consensus, however, is that Prop 65 has placed an undue burden on California businesses while achieving no significant impact on public health over the past 30 years.

As noted above, Prop 65 requires a warning on all products that contain chemicals known to cause cancer or reproductive harm. There are more than 900 such chemicals listed, and marijuana smoke has been included on the list since 2009.

For a warning to be acceptable under Prop 65, it must (1) clearly make known that the chemical involved is known to cause cancer and/or birth defects and/or other reproductive harm and (2) be given in such a way that it will effectively reach the person before he or she is exposed. The warnings must be “clear and reasonable,” meaning that the warning may not be diluted by other language. Various means of communicating the warning are allowed, including product-specific warnings on a posted sign or shelf, warnings on the product label or electronic warnings for internet purchases.

Important Exemptions

There are several important exemptions to Prop 65 that make a warning unnecessary. Businesses with nine or fewer employees are exempt from the statute. There also is an exemption involving chemicals that occur naturally in food. Lead, for example, will be considered naturally occurring only if it “is a natural constituent of a food” and is not added as a result of human activity such as pollution or poor manufacturing processes. The burden is on the company to prove the exemption, however, which is typically time-consuming and expensive.

Another important exemption is provided by “safe harbor” exposure levels for many chemicals on the Prop 65 list, below which no warning is required. The listed chemicals include additives or ingredients in pesticides, food, drugs and common household products. Most food contains at least some level of one or more of these substances. Prop 65 safe-harbor levels, however, are in many cases around 1,000 times lower than levels set by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and World Health Organization (WHO). The exposure levels established by Prop 65 are often lower than what occurs naturally in fruits, vegetables, grains and even drinking water.

For example, the Prop 65 limit for lead is 0.5 mcg / day, which is below the amount of lead naturally found in many fruits, vegetables and herbs grown in non-contaminated soil. By comparison, the FDA allows 75 mcg / day and the European Union allows 250 mcg / day for lead. The European Food Safety Authority estimates the average adult consumes around 50 micrograms per day, which is 100 times the Prop 65 limit. It is nearly impossible to manufacture herbal products, including cannabis, without trace amounts of lead. Therefore, despite the “naturally occurring” exemption, discussed above, it can be dangerous to simply assume that an herbal product, including cannabis, complies with safe-harbor levels.

Only about 300 of the more than 900 Prop 65 chemicals have specific safe-harbor levels. For those chemicals without a safe-harbor limit, the burden will be on the cannabis business to establish that the subject chemical is within a safe range. This typically requires expensive testing, the results of which may be open to multiple interpretations as to whether a warning is required.

Determining the Exposure Level

Determination of the “exposure level” also is an important consideration. Prop 65 focuses on the level of a chemical to which the consumer is actually exposed. Although a product may have a very low amount of a chemical on the Prop 65 schedule that is below the safe-harbor level, liability under the statute may nevertheless be triggered based on the recommended serving size. It is advisable for companies to work with a laboratory that specializes in Prop 65 testing to determine the cumulative exposure level in order to verify the recommended serving size.

Enforcement of Prop 65

Prop 65 is enforced through litigation brought by the government or by private attorneys that “act in the public interest.” It is the threat of these private lawsuits that causes such consternation among those targeted with Prop 65 liability. After a 60-day notice period, the attorney may file a civil suit against the offending company. Typically, the plaintiff will demand that the defendant provide warnings compliant with Prop 65, pay a penalty, and either recall products already sold or attempt to provide health hazard warnings to those who purchased the products.

Though purportedly brought in the public interest, it is the collection of penalties and attorneys’ fees that in reality drives this litigation. Prop 65 allows individuals who bring suit to recover 25 percent of the penalties awarded, which by statute is calculated at $2,500 per violation per day. Amendments made to Prop 65 in 2016 allow for certain voluntary actions by the defendant – reformulation of the product, for example – in lieu of penalties. The threat of paying the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees makes litigating Prop 65 cases potentially very expensive. The attorney is incentivized to drag out the litigation, and the longer the case goes on, the more difficult it becomes to resolve because of the mounting fees.

This framework has created a cottage industry of Prop 65 “bounty hunter” lawyers who affiliate with “public interest” organizations that bring these cases for profit. According to the California Attorney General, 760 settlements were reported in 2016 with total settlement payments of more than $30 million. Attorneys’ fees accounted for 72 percent of that amount. The 2016 amendments to the statute have attempted to address these abuses to some extent by requiring a showing that the public benefits derived from the settlement are “significant” and by requiring contemporaneous record keeping for fees and costs sought to be recovered. Prop 65 litigation nevertheless continues to burden many industries in California, now including the cannabis industry. For Prop 65 liability, prevention is certainly less costly than a cure.

 

This post was written by Ian A. Stewart of Wilson Elser © 2017

For more legal analysis go to The National Law Review

Recording Conversations with Your Cellphone: with Great Power Comes Potential Legal Liability

In the cellphone age, nearly everyone walks around with a multi-tasking recording device in their pocket or purse, and it comes in handy for many of our modern problems: Your dog suddenly started doing something adorable? Open your video app and start rolling. Need to share that epic burger you just ordered with your foodie friends? There’s an app for that. Want to remember the great plot twist you just thought of for that novel you’ve been working on? Record a voice memo.

Sometimes, though, the need arises to record more serious matters. Many people involved in lawsuits choose to record conversations with their phones, all in the name of preserving evidence that might be relevant in court. People involved in contentious divorce or child custody cases, for example, might try to record a hostile confrontation that occurred during a pickup for visitation. Conversely, others might be worried that an ex-spouse has secretly recorded a conversation and plans to use it against them out of context.

But while everyone has the power to record just about anything with few swipes on their phone, do they have the legal right to do so? If not, what are the possible consequences? Can you even use recorded conversations in court? Consider these important questions before your press record.

Criminal Liability: Can you go to jail just for recording someone’s conversation?

The short answer: Yes. Under Michigan’s Eavesdropping law,[1] it is a felony punishable by up to two years and $2,000 to willfully use any device to eavesdrop on (meaning to overhear, record, amplify, or transmit) a conversation without the consent of all participants in that conversation.[2]It is also a felony for a person to “use or divulge” any information that they know was obtained through illegal eavesdropping.[3]

But there is one important distinction that Michigan courts have recognized: if you are a participant in the conversation, then you do not need permission of other participants to record the conversation (at least not when it comes to the eavesdropping law; there may be other laws that apply, as discussed below).[4] This makes sense given the purposes of the law. The theory is that if you are a participant in the conversation, then other participants at least have a chance to judge your character and determine if you are the kind of person who might relay the conversation to others (either verbally or by making a recording).

The bottom line is that if you use a device, like your cellphone, to record, overhear, amplify, or transmit a conversation that you are not a part of without the permission of all participants, you could face criminal consequences.

Civil Liability: If someone records your private conversation, can you file a lawsuit against them?

The short answer: Yes. The eavesdropping statute allows eavesdropping victims to bring a civil lawsuit against the perpetrator.[5] But the same distinction applies; you cannot sue someone for recording a conversation that they participated in.

Before filing a civil eavesdropping claim, though, consider what if anything there is to gain. The eavesdropping statute permits a judge to issue an injunction prohibiting the perpetrator from further eavesdropping. This may be a valuable remedy if there is a risk that the eavesdropper would otherwise continue eavesdropping on your conversations. The statue also allows a plaintiff to recover actual damages and punitive damages from the wrongdoer. In many cases, actual damages will likely be minimal, and punitive damages are subject to the whims of the judge or jury deciding the case. A result, the cost of litigation may exceed any monetary recovery unless actual damages are significant or the eavesdropper’s conduct was egregious enough to elicit a large punitive award from a jury.

Evidence and Admissibility: Can I use a recorded conversation in court?

Many people are familiar with the exclusionary rule that arises from the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which provides that if police officers obtain evidence as a result of an illegal search or seizure, then the prosecution is prohibited from using that evidence to support their case. This raises the question:

If a regular civilian obtains evidence by recording a conversation in violation of the eavesdropping statute, is that evidence automatically excluded from court proceedings?

The short answer: No. The exclusionary rule is specifically designed to curb the potentially oppressive power of the government in order to guarantee the protections of the Fourth Amendment, at the expense of excluding potentially valuable evidence from court proceedings. Since the Fourth Amendment only restricts government conduct, the exclusionary rule only applies to evidence obtained as a result of unconstitutional government action. As a result, even if a private citizen breaks the law and records your conversation, that recording is not automatically excluded from court.[6]

So does this mean you can use any recorded conversation in court whenever you want?

The short answer: No. Anything presented in court still needs to comply with the Rules of Evidence, and in many cases recorded conversations will not make the cut. A big reason is the hearsay rule, which says that out of court statements cannot be used to prove the truth of the matter asserted.[7] In other words, you can’t use a recording of your neighbor saying “I use my neighbor’s Wi-Fi” as evidence to prove that he was, in fact, using your Wi-Fi.

But there are many exceptions to the hearsay rule which might allow a recorded conversation into court. Salient among these exceptions is the rule that admissions of a party-opponent are not hearsay.[8] Consequently, if a man records his ex-wife’s conversation with her current husband, the hearsay rule will not prevent the man from using the recording of his ex-wife against her in a child custody case; the ex-wife is a “party-opponent” and her out-of-court statements are not considered hearsay.

Continuing this same example, note that the man’s actions would violate the eavesdropping statute (assuming he didn’t have permission to make the recording) because he was not a participant in the hypothetical conversation. But this violation would not keep the recording out of court. Nevertheless, if a prosecutor wanted to press charges, the man could be subject to criminal liability. And if the ex-wife was so inclined, she could file a civil lawsuit against the man and ask for an injunction and monetary damages.

Other Law: Is the eavesdropping statute the only law you need to worry about before recording all of your conversations?

The short answer: No, don’t hit record just yet. Even if you comply with the eavesdropping statute, there are still other potential pitfalls to be aware of. For instance, wiretapping laws govern the recording and interception of telephone calls and electronic communications, and carry criminal penalties. For inter-state phone calls, the laws of other states will come into play as well. And depending on the means you use to obtain a recording and what you do with the recording once you have it, you risk incurring civil liability for a variety of privacy torts, such as intrusion upon seclusion or public disclosure of private facts.

The safest route is to always get permission from everyone involved before recording a conversation or sharing a recorded conversation with anyone. If that’s not an option, consult with a lawyer who has had an opportunity to consider all of the facts involved in your case.

________________________________

[1] MCL 750.539 et seq.
[2] MCL 750.539a; MCL 570.539c.
[3] MCL 750.539e.
[4] See Sullivan v. Gray, 117 Mich. App. 476, 324 N.W.2d 58, 59 – 61 (1982).
[5] MCL 750.539h.
[6] See, e.g., Swan v. Bob Maxey Lincoln Mercury, No. 216564, 2001 WL 682371, at *2 n3 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2001)
[7] MRE 802.
[8] MRE 801(d)(2).

This post was written by Jeffrey D. Koelzer of  Varnum LLP © 2017
For more legal analysis go to The National Law Review

Litigation After Devastation: The Legal Storm Surge

Bridges crumbling in Texas. Houses turned to toothpicks in the USVIs. Newly-formed rivers ravaging the streets in South Florida. The devastating destruction from the recent hurricanes that have pummeled the U.S. has uprooted many peoples’ homes and lives, but we have only begun to feel the impact of the surge.

Massive relief efforts have begun, national fundraising, news coverage, responsive legislation, and building codes to name a few. A litigation surge is swelling as well. We have seen several types of cases and class actions churn from a hurricane’s aftermath. Here are some of the types of cases, coverage issues, and expert needs you may see after the storm.

Property Damage and Meteorological Causation

Insurance companies insuring the Southern United States are bracing for the waves of claims that will soon be flooding in. Just as it was following Hurricanes Katrina, Ivan, and Sandy, the hotly-debated issue of whether the damage was caused by wind or water will be the likely focus. While most homeowner insurance policies will cover water damage that was caused by a roof or window that was compromised by wind and allowed water intrusion, most do not cover water that rises from the ground level and enters the home. Experts will be relied upon to determine how water got into a structure, even when it is entirely obliterated.

Insurance companies and attorneys will be looking for experts in meteorology, often with advanced degrees and testifying experience, who can opine on the types of weather conditions that might have existed at a given time in a given place (i.e., Key West when Hurricane Irma struck). The experts could come from academia or environmental institutes and societies. They will be asked to review various data points and speak on weather conditions at a particular time and place to support causation for insurance coverage. Structural engineers will also be needed, preferably with experience in standard insurance practices, procedures, and protocols in evaluating damage caused by hurricanes. They will need to have an understanding of insurance claims handling and will be asked to review various reports and data, some from other engineers, discussing damage caused to structures by the hurricane and opine as to whether or not the reports and data are accurate.

Structural Failures and Faulty Design/Construction

While many large, concrete commercial buildings and bridges are designed to withstand 150+ mph winds and flooding,  they can still be left severely damaged after a storm blows through. Structural failure of buildings, roofs, bridges, and roadways that were expected to withstand hurricane winds will lead to litigation over damage caused by the failure. Structural engineers with expertise in the types of structures at issue, likely licensed engineers, will be needed to examine damage patterns through photos, video, or via a post-storm on-scene inspection. They will also need to use meteorological wind information to determine the cause of the failure and the quality of the design or construction.

Class Actions for Coverage Determinations

Often, the core issues in insurance-related storm damage cases are similar across a wide span of policyholders. These cases will vary depending on the coverage matter at issue, but the most sought-after experts will be familiar with insurance claims standards, protocols, and policy interpretation. Construction experts may also be needed to opine on the necessity and extent of certain repairs required after a storm. Also, standard practices and interactions between contractors and insurance companies during the re-build process will come into question. Class actions may be filed as well, simply as placeholders to toll certain claims-filing deadlines or allow broader bad faith discovery against insurance companies who refuse to pay mass claims.

Litigation Over Price-Gouging

One of the worst scenarios to follow a storm is wide-scale price-gouging and scamming by companies trying to capitalize on the desperation and vulnerability of storm victims. Before the storm, many people preparing for power outages or evacuation will see unfair spikes in essentials such as water and gas. After the storm, shady contractors and tree-removers often flood in, lie about their licensing and credentials, and charge exorbitant fees while performing shoddy, haphazard work, or no work at all. Many states, including Florida, have made it a crime for any service provider to offer or sell essential commodities for an amount that “grossly exceeds the average price” during the thirty days following a declaration of emergency. In the days before Hurricane Irma’s approach, many reported price-gouging for essentials such as water, ice, batteries, and gas when thousands of Floridians were stocking up or evacuating. Class actions alleging price-gouging will likely occur following the storm. Experts in standard industry pricing, manufacture costs, and storm clean-up and repair may be called in to opine on the “average price” of certain essential commodities and post-storm services.

In the wake of Hurricanes Harvey and Irma, we are gearing up for the incumbent waves of litigation and expert requests we anticipate will follow. What types of cases, class actions, and expert needs are you expecting?

This post was written by Annie Dike of IMS ExpertServices, All Rights Reserved. © Copyright 2002-2017
For more legal analysis go to The National Law Review

Court Orders Monsanto Roundup Safety Documents to be Disclosed

Monsanto is catching a lot of heat now that a court has unsealed documents that cast the company in a negative light and suggest that it was responsible for providing false assertions to the government and public regarding the safety of Roundup. As the most popular herbicide in the world, Roundup and similar products produced by Monsanto are used across the globe for the elimination of pests from lawns, crops, gardens and nurseries. It has provided research that opposes the belief Roundup’s main active ingredient can cause cancer, but the documents unsealed by the court show that these accounts were misleading and, in some cases, false.

Ghostwritten Research

The research that was presented to defend the safety of its products was in fact, ghostwritten and attributed to academics. It also claimed that a senior EPA official attempted to dismiss a report from the United States Department of Health and Human Services that the product could in fact be linked to the deaths of numerous people who suffered from non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. The evidence tells a story of arguments within the Environmental Protection Agency and conflicting beliefs over whether Roundup and similar products were safe to use.

Emails between Monsanto executives and Jess Rowland of the EPA discuss an effort to disrupt the efforts of the Department of Health and Human Services to make its own determination and review of the product. Rowland states in the emails that he should receive a medal if he is able to succeed in his interference.

World Health Organization Classifies Products as Carcinogenic

The growing litigation over Roundup was sparked off by the classification of Roundup as a carcinogen, due to the discovery of a link between glyphosate and cancer in animals and the destruction of DNA and chromosomes in human cells. Despite the research provided by the WHO, Monsanto went to great lengths to continue the defense of its product and to assert that it was as safe to consume as salt.

While Monsanto claims that glyphosate is safe, those who have come forward with claims against the company allege that Monsanto has repeatedly falsified research and information in order to fool the government and the public. In its defense, Monsanto has claimed that the unsealed documents are being presented out of context and that they provide isolated information. Numerous health agencies around the world have presented conflicting arguments over the safety of these products, so the science has not been settled just yet.

This post was written by Jonathan Rosenfeld of Rosenfeld Injury Lawyers, Copyright © 2017
For more legal analysis go to The National Law Review

U.S. Court of Appeals Rules on Renewable Fuel Standard Battle

In July, the U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit ruled in favor of renewable fuels advocates, including the Americans for Clean Energy and the National Corn Growers Association, agreeing with the petitioners that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) erred in how it interpreted and used the “inadequate domestic supply” waiver in the Renewable Fuel Standard law in setting low renewable fuel volumes for 2014-2016.

The National Corn Growers Association stated that the “court decision is a win for farmers, the biofuels industry, and consumers. This ruling affirms our view that the EPA did not follow the law when it reduced the 2014-2016 renewable fuel volumes below levels intended by Congress. The court held that EPA was wrong to interpret the phrase ‘inadequate domestic supply’ to mean ‘inadequate domestic supply and demand.’ We agree with the Court that effectively adding words to the law through this interpretation simply exceeds EPA’s authority.”

U.S. Circuit Judge Brett Kavanaugh wrote that the EPA isn’t allowed “to consider the volume of renewable fuel that is available to ultimate consumers or the demand-side constraints that affect the consumption of renewable fuel by consumers.”

The court ruling is a blow to oil refiners, who have argued that there are constraints to blending the fuels into petroleum. The American Petroleum Institute said in a statement it was “disappointed” with the court’s decision, which the trade group said highlighted the need for congressional action to reform the renewable fuel standard – a move congressional analysts have said is unlikely to happen.

This post was written by Aaron M. Phelps of Varnum LLP.
For more Environmental & Energy Legal News go to the National Law Review.

The Ninth Circuit Asks the California Supreme Court to Weigh in on Bag Checks

On August 16, 2017, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an order certifying a question regarding an important wage and hour issue to the California Supreme Court: Is time spent on an employer’s premises waiting for and undergoing required exit searches of bags or packages voluntarily brought to work for purely personal convenience by employees compensable as “hours worked” under California law?

The question arose in Frlekin v. Apple, Inc., an appeal in a wage and hour class action brought against Apple, Inc., by current and former nonexempt California retail store employees. In the suit, the plaintiffs sought compensation for time that they spent waiting for and undergoing exit searches whenever they left Apple’s retail store locations, pursuant to the company’s Employee Package and Bag Searches policy. The at-issue policy, which is similar to ones in place at many other large retailers, required that employees undergo unpaid, manager-performed bag/package checks before leaving the stores—at breaks or at the end of their shifts.

In July 2015, a district court certified the case as a class action. However, in November 2015, the district court granted Apple’s motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and ruled that time spent by class members waiting for and undergoing exit-related bag searches pursuant to Apple’s policy was not compensable as “hours worked” under California law because such time was neither “subject to the control” of the employer nor time during which the class members were “suffered or permitted” to work.

On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that employees are under the control of the employer while waiting for and undergoing the bag checks because they are required whenever entering or leaving the premises. Apple countered that the time is not compensable because employees are not required to bring bags to work, and may avoid the searches altogether by not bringing a bag or package to the workplace. In its order certifying the issue for the California Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit noted that Apple’s position “finds strong support” in the seminal California Supreme Court decision Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal. 4th 575 (2000), in which the court held that time spent by employees using employer-mandated transportation to get to a worksite was compensable, while noting that time spent on “optional free transportation” would not be compensable. However, the Ninth Circuit expressed questions about whether differences in context—i.e., employer-provided transport to and from the workplace versus searches at the worksite—rendered Morillion distinguishable.

Although the U.S. Supreme Court previously determined that similar bag checks were not compensable in Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513 (2014), the California Supreme Court has not addressed the compensability of bag checks under California’s wage and hour laws, which involve a somewhat different definition of compensable work time. As the Ninth Circuit noted in its order, the consequences of any interpretation of California law with respect to bag searches “will have significant legal, economic, and practical consequences for employers and employees” throughout California and will materially affect the outcome of many pending lawsuits. For the time being, employers should consult with qualified employment counsel to mitigate risk while we wait for the California Supreme Court to weigh in.

This post was written by Philippe A. Lebel of  Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP.
Read more on litigation of wage and hour issues at the National Law Review.

High Time for Massachusetts Employers to Consider a Marijuana Use Policy

All employers should maintain an employee handbook or similar policy statement that clearly sets out the employer’s position on drug and alcohol use. While federal laws relating to marijuana possession and use have not changed, many states have revised their statutes to legalize, decriminalize, or otherwise permit marijuana possession and use. This has caused some confusion for employers, who must balance the conflicting state and federal rules.

Over thirty states have enacted legislation allowing marijuana use in certain situations. In some states (California and Massachusetts, for example), medical and recreational use is permitted.  In many other states, such as Connecticut and Rhode Island, only medical use is permitted.  A number of states have also adopted legislation that specifically protects marijuana users from termination from employment based solely on a positive test for marijuana.

Massachusetts does not have such a statute. However, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently issued a ruling that greatly complicates the issue of how to deal with an employee who is using marijuana. In Barbuto vs. Advantage Sales and Marketing (July 17, 2017), the SJC ruled that an employee who had been terminated as a result of a positive marijuana test could bring a claim for handicap discrimination under the Massachusetts anti-discrimination statute.  In Barbuto, the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant, who had a valid prescription for marijuana to help in treating Crohn’s disease.  After the employee was terminated because of a positive marijuana test, she brought a claim against the employer alleging, among other counts, a failure to provide a reasonable accommodation under the Massachusetts anti-discrimination statute.  The trial court dismissed all of the employee’s claims.  On appeal, the SJC upheld the trial court’s dismissal of most of the claims, but held that the employee could bring a claim under the anti-discrimination statute for disability discrimination and a failure to accommodate.  The SJC then reversed the dismissal of that count and sent the matter back to the trial court.

The SJC was careful to point out that employers could limit or defeat such claims by showing that allowing marijuana use would cause an undue hardship on an employer’s business, such as where the permitted use would conflict with other requirements like the Federal Drug Free Workplace Act. The SJC also clearly stated that Massachusetts law does not require any employer to permit on-site marijuana use as an employee accommodation. Even with those limitations, however, the Barbuto ruling does create some landmines for employers.  Massachusetts employers should become very familiar with the marijuana laws applicable in all states in which they have employees, and should enact employment policies consistent with those laws (which may differ significantly from state to state).  In addition, employers should consider and adopt (and consistently apply) policies that address how a positive test is handled (including addressing any reasonable accommodation issues).  For now, in Massachusetts, an employer will need to show how accommodating an employee’s medically prescribed marijuana use creates an undue hardship on the employer, and employers wishing to prohibit all marijuana use will need to be able to show this.

This post was written byMark J. Tarallo of Murtha Cullina.

Read more employment law news at the National Law Review.

Share Recent Eighth Circuit Case Illustrates the Need for Newest Members of the NLRB to Be Confirmed Sooner Rather Than Later

In another example of a federal circuit court taking the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to task for stretching federal labor law past the point of recognition, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals recently refused to enforce a NLRB order reinstating several former employees. The former employees were discharged after they posted flyers around town insinuating their employer was selling unsafe, germ-laden sandwiches as part of a campaign to enhance their sick leave. MikLin Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, No. 14-3099 (July 3, 2017).

In its decision, the Eight Circuit upbraided the NLRB for abandoning and ignoring the Supreme Court of the United States’ precedent regarding when an employee can be disciplined for “disloyalty” in the midst of a union organizing drive. The Eighth Circuit took particular issue with the NLRB’s interpretation of the seminal Supreme Court case NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard) and found that the NLRB’s reasoning effectively overruled Jefferson Standard.

Background

MikLin is a family business that owns and operates 10 Jimmy John’s sandwich shop franchises in the Minneapolis-St.Paul area. In 2007, several MikLin workers began an organizing campaign seeking representation by the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) union.

In an attempt to garner more support for a rerun election, union supporters began a sick leave campaign in early 2011. They posted a flyer on community bulletin boards in MikLin stores with two identical images of a Jimmy John’s sandwich. Above the first image were the words, “YOUR SANDWICH MADE BY A HEALTHY JIMMY JOHN’S WORKER.” The text above the second image said, “YOUR SANDWICH MADE BY A SICK JIMMY JOHN’S WORKER.” Below the pictures, the white text asked: “CAN’T TELL THE DIFFERENCE?” The response, in red and slightly smaller, said: “THAT’S TOO BAD BECAUSE JIMMY JOHN’S WORKERS DON’T GET PAID SICK DAYS. SHOOT, WE CAN’T EVEN CALL IN SICK.” Below, in slightly smaller white text, was the warning, “WE HOPE YOUR IMMUNE SYSTEM IS READY BECAUSE YOU’RE ABOUT TO TAKE THE SANDWICH TEST.” The text at the bottom of the poster asked readers to help the workers win paid sick days by going to their website.

The day before the IWW could request a rerun election, its supporters distributed a press release, letter, and the sandwich poster to more than 100 media contacts. The press release highlighted discussed the employees’ need for sick leave and ended with a threat: If MikLin would not talk with the IWW about their demands for paid sick leave, they would proceed with “dramatic action” by “plastering the city with thousands of Sick Day posters.”

Days later, IWW supporters implemented their threat to plaster the city with posters. However, in the new version of the poster, rather than asking for support of the employees’ request for paid sick leave, the public posters listed the MikLin CEO’s personal telephone number and instructed customers to call him to “LET HIM KNOW YOU WANT HEALTHY WORKERS MAKING YOUR SANDWICH!” Two days later, MikLin fired six employees who coordinated the attack and issued written warnings to three others who assisted in it.

The NLRB Proceedings

The Board’s administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that MikLin violated the National Labor Relations Act by discharging the employees. Citing prior Board decisions, the ALJ ruled that the NLRA “protects employee communications to the public that are part of and related to an ongoing labor dispute” unless they are “so disloyal, reckless, or maliciously untrue as to lose the Act’s protections.” The ALJ found that to lose the act’s protections “an employee’s public criticism . . . must evidence ‘a malicious motive’ or be made with knowledge of the statements’ falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity.”

The ALJ found that the posters in question were not maliciously untrue. “While ‘it is not literally true that employees could not call in sick,’ the ALJ observed, employees ‘are subject to discipline if they call in sick without finding a replacement,’” and thus—according to the ALJ—the assertion that employees were required to work when sick was protected hyperbole. Though MikLin had a strong track record with the health department, the ALJ found that “it is at least arguable that [MikLin’s] sick leave policy subjects the public to an increased risk of food borne disease.”

A divided panel of the Board affirmed the ALJ’s findings and conclusions. The majority found “that neither the posters nor the press release were shown to be so disloyal, reckless, or maliciously untrue as to lose the Act’s protection.” The public communications “were clearly related to the ongoing labor dispute concerning the employees’ desire for paid sick leave. . . . Indeed, any person viewing the posters and press release would reasonably understand that the motive for the communications was to garner support for the campaign to improve the employees’ terms and conditions of employment by obtaining paid sick leave rather than to disparage [MikLin] or its product.”

MikLin appealed the Board’s order reinstating the employees to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. On appeal, a three-judge panel upheld the NLRB’s ruling, but upon rehearing en banc by the full court, the ruling was overturned.

The Eighth Circuit’s Analysis

In its full court hearing, the Eighth Circuit took the NLRB to task for significantly misreading the Supreme Court’s decision in Jefferson Standard. First, the majority focused on the Board’s interpretation that no act of employee disparagement is unprotected disloyalty unless it is “maliciously motivated to harm the employer.” They found this additional requirement impermissibly overruled Jefferson Standard.

Second the court balked at the Board’s definition of “malicious motive.” The Board excluded from Jefferson Standard’s interpretation of Section 10(c) of the NLRA all employee disparagement that is part of or directly related to an ongoing labor dispute as improper. In other words, the Board refused to treat as “disloyal” any public communication intended to advance employees’ aims in a labor dispute, regardless of the manner in which, and the extent to which, it harms the employer.

The court rejected that idea:

By requiring an employer to show that employees had a subjective intent to harm, and burdening that requirement with an overly restrictive need to show “malicious motive,” the Board has effectively removed from the Jefferson Standard inquiry the central Section 10(c) issue as defined by the Supreme Court — whether the means used reflect indefensible employee disloyalty. This is an error of law.

Rather than employee motive, the Eighth Circuit explained that critical question in the Jefferson Standard disloyalty inquiry is whether the employees’ public communications reasonably targeted the employer’s labor practices or indefensibly disparaged the quality of the employer’s products or services. The Eight Circuit found that when employees convince customers not to patronize an employer because its labor practices are unfair, subsequent settlement of the labor dispute brings the customers back—to the benefit of both employer and employee. By contrast, the court found, sharply disparaging the employer’s products or services as unsafe, unhealthy, or of shoddy quality causes harm that outlasts the labor dispute to the detriment of employees, as well as the employer.

Key Takeaways

While the Eighth Circuit’s decision is heartening, its effect will be limited for the time being as the NLRB is under no obligation to recognize the court’s interpretation of federal labor law. Further, the decision highlights the cost of fighting incorrect NLRB decisions for employers; MikLin had to appeal the ALJ’s decision to the NLRB, then appeal that decision to the Eighth Circuit, and then request a rehearing after the three-judge panel wrongly decided the appeal. Many employers simply do not have the resources to see a fight like this through to the end.

With President Trump’s selections to the NLRB being vetted by Congress this week, we can hope for a light at the end of this long, dark tunnel for employers.

This post was written byMatthew J. Kelley of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.
Go to the National Law Review for more legal analysis.

Stanford University’s Loss in Interferences of Three Patents Covering Testing Methods for Fetal Aneuploidies for Lack of Written Description is Vacated

The Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Jun. 27, 2017, Before O’Malley, Reyna, and Chen.

Takeaway:

  • The Federal Circuit declined to reconsider its decision in Biogen MA, Inc. v. Japanese Found. for Cancer Research, 785 F.3d 648 (Fed. Cir. 2015) that parties cannot bring civil actions in district court under 35 U.S.C. § 146 for review of the PTAB’s decisions in interferences declared on or after September 16, 2012.

  • In evaluating whether a claim satisfies the written description requirement, the fact finder may consider what a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand from a description of a product or technique in the specification as of the filing date of the application. Post-filing date publications may only be used as evidence of the state of the art existing on the filing date.

Procedural Posture:

Stanford University (“Stanford”) appealed from orders of the PTAB in three interference proceedings between Stanford and Chinese University of Hong Kong (“CUHK”), which found the claims of three Stanford patents directed to testing methods for fetal aneuploidies unpatenable for lack of written description.  The appeal was initially filed pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 146 in the District Court for the Northern District of California, and the parties engaged in discovery there.  On May 7, 2015, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision in Biogen MA, Inc. v. Japanese Found. for Cancer Research, 785 F.3d 648 (Fed. Cir. 2015), holding that under the AIA, for interferences declared after September 15, 2012, an appeal from an interference decision has to be made to the Federal Circuit.  The parties then jointly requested transfer from the Northern District of California to the Federal Circuit, which was granted.  The Federal Circuit considered the case on the merits, vacated and remanded.

Interference:

  • The Federal Circuit declined to revisit its holding in Biogen, noting that although Stanford briefed this issue in its opening brief, Stanford did not raise this issue again in its reply brief or in oral argument. Rehearing en banc and a petition for certiorari in the Biogen case were denied; thus, in the Federal Circuit’s view, “Biogen is the law in this circuit and we, as a panel, will not revisit it.”

  • The Federal Circuit declined to consider the record developed during discovery in the district court. Because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the interference decisions, the Federal Circuit agreed with CUHK’s position that the activities in the district court were a nullity and should not be considered by the Federal Circuit or remanded to the Board for consideration.

Written Description:

  • Sufficiency of written description is evaluated from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, “by examining the record evidence as to pre-filing date art-related facts.” The post-filing date publications may be considered to the extent they “contain art-related facts … existing on the filing date,” but may not be used as a source for the knowledge about art-related facts that did not exist on the filing date.

  • The Board awarded patents in interferences to CUHK because it found that the Stanford patents’ specification disclosed “targeted” rather than “random” sequencing, and the specification would not have indicated to one of ordinary skill in the art that Stanford’s inventor Dr. Quake was in possession of the claimed random massively parallel sequencing (“MPS”) method. The Federal Circuit held that the PTAB erred because it did not adequately explain why the Illumina platform for sequencing DNA, referenced and described in Stanford’s original application, did not provide sufficient written description support for random sequencing.  The Board improperly relied on the testimony of CUHK’s expert, who only described that an earlier sequencing technique, Roche 454, was used for targeted sequencing, and “failed to cite to the Roche 454 references with specificity.”  The Board also erred in finding that, because Stanford’s application did not preclude targeted MPS sequencing, it did not disclose to a person of ordinary skill in the art random MPS sequencing.

This post was written by Georg C. Reitboeck  Ksenia Takhistova Christopher Gresalfi of Andrews Kurth Kenyon.

California Supreme Court Rules Homeowners Forfeited Right to Challenge Coastal Development Permit Conditions By Undertaking Work Authorized By Permit

The California Supreme Court ruled on Thursday in Lynch v. California Coastal Commission that two homeowners who obtained a coastal development permit (CDP) from the California Coastal Commission (Commission) to construct a new seawall forfeited their right to challenge mitigation conditions attached to the permit because they accepted the benefits conferred by the permit by undertaking the work authorized.

Key procedural takeaway: With exceptions noted below, if a permit applicant accepts a proffered CDP and acts on that permit – even while expressly reserving its asserted right to challenge the legality of the permit – the permittee has forfeited its right to subsequently challenge the permit in court.

Key takeaway on the merits of the claim: None. Since the Supreme Court ruled that the permittees had forfeited their right to challenge the CDP by undertaking the authorized construction, it found no need to address the underlying merits of the permittee’s challenge. In particular, the Court left unaddressed the contention that the mitigation conditions were unconstitutional, including the condition that limited the life of the seawall to 20 years unless reauthorized at the end of the term.

Homeowners Challenge CDP Conditions

The homeowners, Barbara Lynch and Thomas Frick, sought a CDP (more precisely, an amendment to the 1989 CDP authorizing construction of the existing seawall) to authorize demolition of an existing seawall, construction of a replacement seawall and rebuilding of a lower stairway providing access from the bluff to the beach. The Commission granted the CDP allowing seawall demolition and reconstruction but imposed several permit conditions.

The homeowners filed an administrative writ petition in superior court challenging the following three permit conditions: (1) a prohibition on reconstruction of the lower stairway; (2) a 20-year expiration period on the seawall permit and a prohibition on relying on the seawall as a source of geologic stability or protection for future blufftop redevelopment; and (3) a requirement that prior to expiration of the 20-year period, the homeowners must apply for a new permit to remove the seawall, change its size or configuration, or extend the authorization period.

Around the same time, the homeowners recorded deed restrictions on their property stating that the CDP conditions were covenants, conditions and restrictions on the use and enjoyment of their properties, satisfied all other permits conditions, obtained the permit and demolished and reconstructed the seawall.

Lower Court Rulings

The trial court issued a writ directing the Commission to remove the three challenged conditions from the CDP and found that the conditions prohibiting reconstruction of the stairway and imposing a 20-year expiration period were not valid. The appellate court reversed the trial court, determining that plaintiffs had waived their claims and, in any event, both conditions were valid.

California Supreme Court Ruling

Though the Court affirmed the appellate court’s reversal of the trial court decision, it did so on a different basis. The appellate court’s ruling rested on the concept of waiver while the Court found that the homeowners forfeited their right to challenge by accepting the benefits of the permit. The Court explained that forfeiture differs from waiver in that forfeiture results from a failure to invoke a right and waiver denotes an express relinquishment of a known right. The Court identified the crucial point as being that the homeowners “went forward with construction before obtaining a judicial determination of their objections.” By accepting the benefits of the CDP and undertaking the permitted project, the homeowners effectively forfeited the right to maintain their otherwise timely objections.

The Court rejected the homeowners’ argument that because the challenged permit conditions did not affect the design or construction of the seawall, it was possible to challenge the conditions while the project was being built. Such a rule, the Court said, would effectively expand the Mitigation Fee Act (Gov. Code, §§ 66000 et seq.), which establishes a procedure for developers to proceed with a project and still protest the imposition of “fees, dedications, reservations, or other exactions.” Not included in this list, however, are land use restrictions. The Court stated that only the Legislature has the power to declare that permits may be accepted and acted upon, even while the underlying land use restrictions imposed as a condition of that permit are being challenged in court.

The Court did note that there are potential remedies available to permit applicants. Responding to the homeowners’ protest that imposing a forfeiture under the circumstances present here – where the seawall was in danger of collapsing into the sea thus allowing no time to delay repairs until resolution of the litigation – the Court offered two solutions. First, property owners can address imminent dangers by obtaining an emergency permit from the Commission under Public Resources Code section 30624. Second, property owners can try to reach an agreement with the permitting agency to allow construction to proceed while a challenge to permit conditions is resolved in court, which the court noted could prevent a finding of equitable forfeiture. Neither remedy appears to have been pursued in this case.

Insights

Developers and property owners should view the unanimous Court’s holding as applying beyond CDPs and should thus proceed with extreme caution when faced with objectionable permit conditions. By refusing to extend the Mitigation Fee Act’s “pay and protest” option beyond fees and exactions, this decision gives permitting agencies leverage to impose potentially controversial permit conditions, knowing that permit applicants are often constrained in terms of time and money when choosing between moving forward with objectionable permit conditions or going to court. Legislative action on this issue could provide some relief, but may not be likely for the foreseeable future.

This post was written by Courtney A. Davis and James T. Burroughs  Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP.