Tag: Litigation

Sunlight is the best disinfectant: SEC charges oil company for fraud on EB-5 investors

In a recent action, SEC v. Luca International Group, LLC et al. (“SEC v. Luca“), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has charged a California-based oil and gas company and its CEO with violations of securities laws in connection with a $68 million Ponzi scheme and affinity fraud. The target of the fraud was the Chinese American community. Additionally, a portion of the funds raised by the defendants came from EB-5 investors seeking green cards through the EB-5 Program. The SEC issued both a press release and cease and desist order this week in connection with this most recent action. We think that this case highlights two important and relevant points for our readership, and that the SEC exposing the defendant schemers/fraudsters in SEC v. Luca is good for the EB-5 industry and integrity of the EB-5 program.

Prosecution efforts are going global– government agencies in Hong Kong and China assisted the SEC’s efforts 

Now more than ever before, the SEC is on the path to closing down actors in the EB-5 context that engage in deception and fraud. We are in a new era of enforcement, with the SEC becoming more familiar with the EB-5 Program. We think that this enforcement trend will move at an even faster clip as the SEC and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) become more agile in cooperating and responding to credible allegations of fraud.

EB-5 regional centers and issuers need to put into place sound and workable policies to ensure that marketing practices are in line with securities laws. Note that in SEC v. Luca, there was cooperation with the SEC and two foreign agencies, namely the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission and the China Securities and Regulatory Commission. Enforcement and prosecution efforts in this context are going global. Regional centers and issuers should ensure that any offshore sales efforts are in compliance with the laws of the countries in which sales activities are performed.

Overlooked federal and state investment adviser registration requirements  

SEC v. Luca is a reminder that investment adviser requirements may apply broadly in EB-5 transactions and require federal or state registration by regional centers, issuers and/or EB-5 deal facilitators. In SEC v. Luca, the SEC asserted that the defendants acted as “investment advisers” within the meaning of Section 202(a)(11) of the U.S. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisors Act”) [15 U.S.C. Section 80(b)-2(a)(11), but had no registrations with the Commission. Confusion over investment adviser registration requirements is a commonplace problem in the EB-5 space. In SEC v. Luca, the defendants were in the business of providing investment advice concerning securities for compensation. According to the SEC, these key facts triggered registration requirements under the Advisers Act.

We will soon be providing an extensive alert with regulatory advice to EB-5 regional centers and issuers on the applicability of both federal and state investment adviser registration requirements. The applicability of such requirements should be made on a case-by-case with qualified securities counsel. There is no “one size fits all” advice. States have their own considerations in interpreting investment adviser registration requirements. And the SEC has its own interpretive guidance on the parameters of the registration requirements of the Advisers Act apply.

Conclusion

The egregious pattern of unlawful behavior by the defendants in SEC v. Luca included deceit in the marketing process, fraud in offering materials, comingling and misappropriation of funds, and violation of registration requirements. These are issues not just in the EB-5 context, but with private placements generally. Affinity fraud is also common in private placements.

EB-5 stakeholders should be aware that we are seeing a visible uptick in securities related prosecutions. No issuer, regional center or deal facilitator is immune from scrutiny. The SEC and USCIS are also working together more nimbly with foreign securities agencies. Sound policies, securities compliance and meaningful due diligence by experts are important in EB-5 offerings.

Sunlight is the best disinfectant. This adage is true for the EB-5 program. Stakeholders who promote a transparent and strong EB-5 program should applaud the SEC’s efforts.

ARTICLE BY Douglas Hauer of Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.
©1994-2015 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

U.S. Supreme Court Finds a Constitutional Right to Same-Sex Marriage: Implications for Employee Benefit Plan Sponsors

On June 26, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a historic decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses require states to allow same-sex marriage and to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states.  The decision comes exactly two years to the day from the Court’s decision in Windsor defining “spouse” to include same-sex spouses for purposes of federal law.

As a result of the Court’s decision, the existing 14 state bans on same-sex marriage are invalid, and same-sex spouses are entitled to all of the rights extended to opposite-sex spouses under both federal and state law.

From an employee benefits perspective, it appears thatObergefell may most significantly impact sponsors ofinsured health and welfare plans in states that currently ban same-sex marriage.  Employers and other plan sponsors in those states will be required to offer insured benefits to same-sex spouses because state insurance law will require that the term “spouse” be interpreted to include them.  Based on government guidance issued following the Windsor decision, it seems unlikely that the decision would have retroactive effect, though such claims are possible.

For sponsors of self-insured benefit plans, a question may exist as to whether Obergefell directly impacts a sponsor’s decision not to provide health coverage to same-sex spouses (because state law does not apply to such plans).  However, it would appear that there would be heightened risks under federal and state discrimination laws for plans that define “spouse” in a manner that is inconsistent with the federal and state definitions, particularly since the Court held that marriage is a fundamental right under the Constitution, and an ERISA preemption defense likely would be weaker in this new climate.

It is also noteworthy that, as a result of the Court’s decision, there will no longer be imputed income for state tax purposes with respect to employer-provided health coverage for same-sex spouses, allowing for consistent administration in all states in which an employer operates.  Since Windsor, there have not been federal tax consequences with respect to these benefits, but some states continued to impute income for state tax purposes.

Finally, with respect to federally-regulated benefits such as qualified retirement plans and Code Section 125 benefits (for example, flexible spending accounts), the Court’s decision does not necessarily warrant any change, since those plans have been required, since Windsor, to recognize same-sex spouses.  Of course, plan language should be reviewed for consistency with the decision, and employers in some states may find that there are new spouses seeking benefits under those plans.  There also will be some administrative and enrollment issues, similar to when Windsor was decided.

Employers, particularly those operating in states that currently ban same-sex marriage, should review their benefit plans and policies and consider whether any changes need to be made in light of Obergefell.  Some employers may also reconsider their domestic partner benefits programs now that same-sex couples have the right to marry and have their marriage recognized across the entire country.

We expect that there will be guidance from the U.S. Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service regarding the employee benefit plan issues that emanate from Obergefell, so stay tuned.

ARTICLE BY Roberta K Chevlowe of Proskauer Rose LLP

© 2015 Proskauer Rose LLP.

Kimble v. Marvel – Supreme Court Sticks With Brulotte Rule on Royalty Payments

In a rather breezy opinion filled with Spiderman puns and references, Justice Kagan, writing for a 6/3 Court, affirmed that Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964) controlled the outcome of this dispute over Marvel’s decision to halt royalty payments on a web-slinger toy that it had apparently agreed to make “for as long as kids want to imitate Spider-Man (doing whatever a spider can).” Slip op. at 2. (A copy of the opinion is found at the end of this post.)

The toy was patented by Kimble, and the patent expired in 2010. The ninth circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of S.J. confirming that, in accord with Brulotte, a patentee cannot receive royalties for sales made after his/her patent’s expiration. Cert. was granted and the Court affirmed that stare decisis was operable to keep Brulotte as controlling law, particularly since the dispute involved statutory interpretation – [as opposed to, e.g., first amendment rights?] – and that Congress had rejected attempts to amend the law.

I posted on the “back-story” earlier – see here– so a lot of repetition seems unnecessary, but the Court spent some time discussing various work-arounds to the Brulotte bar. These include deferred royalty payments, licensing non-patent rights and alternative “business arrangements,” that universities and other developers of early stage technology might use to temper the loss of patent protection prior to the generation of maximum income from the patented technology. Slip op. at 5-6. Nonetheless, as Justice Kagan wrote: “Patents endow their holders with certain superpowers but only for a limited time.”

Click here to read the Supreme Court Decision in Kimble v. Marvel

ARTICLE BY Warren Woessner of Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.
© 2015 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

Register for the 9th Annual National Institute on E-Discovery – May 15th in New York City

ABA Nat Inst E Discov May 15

Remaining current is critical to successful litigation. This program is relevant for both in-house and outside counsel who are involved in litigation and the discovery process. E-Discovery is a rapidly evolving field with laws and regulations that are constantly changing.  Attendees of this program will gain practical knowledge that may be implemented immediately in day-to-day operations.

Additional Information Institute Brochure

  • Noted practitioners and jurists will address:
  • Practical tips for managing litigation holds
  • Preserving personal data devices in light of the varying interpretations of “possession, custody, and control”
  • Judges’ perspectives on the Proposed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure amendments
  • Recent court decisions, as reviewed by one of the industry’s leading authorities on E-Discovery case law
  • Meeting ethical obligations related to securing clients’ E-Discovery data
  • The unique aspects of cross-border E-Discovery between the U.S., and the European Union, Latin America, Asia-Pacific, and Canada

Register now!

May 15th in NYC: Attend the ABA’s Ninth Annual National Institute on E-Discovery

ABA Nat Inst E Discov May 15

Remaining current is critical to successful litigation. This program is relevant for both in-house and outside counsel who are involved in litigation and the discovery process. E-Discovery is a rapidly evolving field with laws and regulations that are constantly changing.  Attendees of this program will gain practical knowledge that may be implemented immediately in day-to-day operations.

Additional Information Institute Brochure

  • Noted practitioners and jurists will address:
  • Practical tips for managing litigation holds
  • Preserving personal data devices in light of the varying interpretations of “possession, custody, and control”
  • Judges’ perspectives on the Proposed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure amendments
  • Recent court decisions, as reviewed by one of the industry’s leading authorities on E-Discovery case law
  • Meeting ethical obligations related to securing clients’ E-Discovery data
  • The unique aspects of cross-border E-Discovery between the U.S., and the European Union, Latin America, Asia-Pacific, and Canada

Register now!

May 15th in NYC: Attend the ABA's Ninth Annual National Institute on E-Discovery

ABA Nat Inst E Discov May 15

Remaining current is critical to successful litigation. This program is relevant for both in-house and outside counsel who are involved in litigation and the discovery process. E-Discovery is a rapidly evolving field with laws and regulations that are constantly changing.  Attendees of this program will gain practical knowledge that may be implemented immediately in day-to-day operations.

Additional Information Institute Brochure

  • Noted practitioners and jurists will address:
  • Practical tips for managing litigation holds
  • Preserving personal data devices in light of the varying interpretations of “possession, custody, and control”
  • Judges’ perspectives on the Proposed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure amendments
  • Recent court decisions, as reviewed by one of the industry’s leading authorities on E-Discovery case law
  • Meeting ethical obligations related to securing clients’ E-Discovery data
  • The unique aspects of cross-border E-Discovery between the U.S., and the European Union, Latin America, Asia-Pacific, and Canada

Register now!

B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc.: Trademark Litigation Might Get Simpler

Vedder Price

Trademark litigation includes two similar types of proceedings. First, and most common, issues of trademark infringement and cancellation of a mark may be raised in a trial (i.e., a traditional fight in either State Court or Federal District Court before a judge or jury involving oral testimony). Second, and less common, issues of trademark registration may be raised in a trademark opposition or cancellation proceeding before the Trademark Office. These proceedings are primarily conducted in writing and are governed by administrative rules published in the Federal Register based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While a trial may result in monetary damages or an injunction preventing a party from using a mark, the Trademark Office merely has the authority to grant or cancel federal trademark registrations.

Since the Trademark Office’s process does not allow for litigants to receive monetary awards, injunctions, or even a determination of infringement, entering the Trademark Office for a cancellation or opposition simplifies the proceedings to focus on a limited number of key issues, such as whether a likelihood of confusion exists between a registered mark and another mark. Along with their limited focus and less formal nature, litigants often found comfort in a the lower costs involved in proceedings before the Trademark Office. Generally, once a trademark registration was cancelled, the owner of the mark that was cancelled would understand that a claim for infringement in court was not likely to succeed and would stop using the mark.

In B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., the United States Supreme Court was faced with the question of “[w]hether the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s (the “TTAB” or the “Board”) finding of a likelihood of confusion precludes Hargis from relitigating that issue in infringement litigation, in which likelihood of confusion is an element.” The long-standing dispute (almost 20 years) between the parties involved in the decision regarded the trademarks SEALTIGHT and SEALTITE. In 1996, Hargis applied for registration of its mark, SEALTITE. B&B opposed the registration based on an alleged likelihood of confusion of Hargis’s trademark with B&B’s own federally registered mark, SEALTIGHT. After applying the standard multi-factor likelihood of confusion test, the TTAB decided in favor of B&B and held that a likelihood of confusion existed between the marks.

At the same time as the proceedings before the TTAB, B&B sued Hargis for trademark infringement in Federal District Court. After receiving a favorable outcome in the proceeding before the TTAB, B&B argued in District Court that Hargis could not contest the TTAB’s determination that a likelihood of confusion existed due to the preclusive effect of the TTAB’s decision. The District Court disagreed with B&B and allowed the jury to hear the evidence and decide on the issue of confusion. The jury returned a verdict for Hargis, finding that there was no likelihood of confusion between the marks. The parties appealed the verdict, including the issue of the preclusive effect of the TTAB decision. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court. The parties then petitioned for, and were granted, certiorari on the issue by the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Eighth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that as long as the ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met and the usages of the marks are materially the same, a finding that a likelihood of confusion exists by the TTAB should have preclusive effect in District Court proceedings.

The doctrine of “res judicata” or “issue preclusion” states that litigants should not get two bites at the same apple, or two chances to argue over the same issue. Thus, if the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board found overlap (i.e., likelihood of confusion) between two marks (despite using the simplified tools involved in proceedings before the Trademark Office), then a District Court should honor the TTAB’s determination and not force the parties to relitigate the issue.

Prior to this decision, if a case was simultaneously pending in District Court and before the TTAB, the TTAB would readily stay its determination until the litigation in District Court was resolved. Because of this, any time one of the parties to an opposition or cancellation proceeding became agitated, they would file a concurrent action before a District Court. Following the Supreme Court’s decision, it is unclear if the TTAB will continue to grant this courtesy.

Trademark oppositions and cancellations must now be taken very seriously. While the TTAB cannot award damages or find infringement, its decisions could now be used as grounds for finding infringement in District Court. For example, a party who defaults in a cancellation proceeding may well lose the right to defend itself properly in District Court if a subsequent action is filed. Going forward, mark owners with proceedings before the TTAB must consider whether to intentionally abandon a trademark application or registration in order to avoid an adverse decision that could have far-reaching effects.

ARTICLE BY

John E. Munro
Alain Villeneuve
Vedder Price

B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc.: Trademark Litigation Might Get Simpler

Vedder Price

Trademark litigation includes two similar types of proceedings. First, and most common, issues of trademark infringement and cancellation of a mark may be raised in a trial (i.e., a traditional fight in either State Court or Federal District Court before a judge or jury involving oral testimony). Second, and less common, issues of trademark registration may be raised in a trademark opposition or cancellation proceeding before the Trademark Office. These proceedings are primarily conducted in writing and are governed by administrative rules published in the Federal Register based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While a trial may result in monetary damages or an injunction preventing a party from using a mark, the Trademark Office merely has the authority to grant or cancel federal trademark registrations.

Since the Trademark Office’s process does not allow for litigants to receive monetary awards, injunctions, or even a determination of infringement, entering the Trademark Office for a cancellation or opposition simplifies the proceedings to focus on a limited number of key issues, such as whether a likelihood of confusion exists between a registered mark and another mark. Along with their limited focus and less formal nature, litigants often found comfort in a the lower costs involved in proceedings before the Trademark Office. Generally, once a trademark registration was cancelled, the owner of the mark that was cancelled would understand that a claim for infringement in court was not likely to succeed and would stop using the mark.

In B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., the United States Supreme Court was faced with the question of “[w]hether the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s (the “TTAB” or the “Board”) finding of a likelihood of confusion precludes Hargis from relitigating that issue in infringement litigation, in which likelihood of confusion is an element.” The long-standing dispute (almost 20 years) between the parties involved in the decision regarded the trademarks SEALTIGHT and SEALTITE. In 1996, Hargis applied for registration of its mark, SEALTITE. B&B opposed the registration based on an alleged likelihood of confusion of Hargis’s trademark with B&B’s own federally registered mark, SEALTIGHT. After applying the standard multi-factor likelihood of confusion test, the TTAB decided in favor of B&B and held that a likelihood of confusion existed between the marks.

At the same time as the proceedings before the TTAB, B&B sued Hargis for trademark infringement in Federal District Court. After receiving a favorable outcome in the proceeding before the TTAB, B&B argued in District Court that Hargis could not contest the TTAB’s determination that a likelihood of confusion existed due to the preclusive effect of the TTAB’s decision. The District Court disagreed with B&B and allowed the jury to hear the evidence and decide on the issue of confusion. The jury returned a verdict for Hargis, finding that there was no likelihood of confusion between the marks. The parties appealed the verdict, including the issue of the preclusive effect of the TTAB decision. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court. The parties then petitioned for, and were granted, certiorari on the issue by the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Eighth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that as long as the ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met and the usages of the marks are materially the same, a finding that a likelihood of confusion exists by the TTAB should have preclusive effect in District Court proceedings.

The doctrine of “res judicata” or “issue preclusion” states that litigants should not get two bites at the same apple, or two chances to argue over the same issue. Thus, if the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board found overlap (i.e., likelihood of confusion) between two marks (despite using the simplified tools involved in proceedings before the Trademark Office), then a District Court should honor the TTAB’s determination and not force the parties to relitigate the issue.

Prior to this decision, if a case was simultaneously pending in District Court and before the TTAB, the TTAB would readily stay its determination until the litigation in District Court was resolved. Because of this, any time one of the parties to an opposition or cancellation proceeding became agitated, they would file a concurrent action before a District Court. Following the Supreme Court’s decision, it is unclear if the TTAB will continue to grant this courtesy.

Trademark oppositions and cancellations must now be taken very seriously. While the TTAB cannot award damages or find infringement, its decisions could now be used as grounds for finding infringement in District Court. For example, a party who defaults in a cancellation proceeding may well lose the right to defend itself properly in District Court if a subsequent action is filed. Going forward, mark owners with proceedings before the TTAB must consider whether to intentionally abandon a trademark application or registration in order to avoid an adverse decision that could have far-reaching effects.

ARTICLE BY

John E. Munro
Alain Villeneuve
Vedder Price

40 Essential Apps For Trial Lawyers, Part Two

IMS_expert_blktype-transparent

As we noted in Part One of this post, iPads have become ubiquitous in courtrooms and depositions since lawyers use them for everything from keeping organized to presenting evidence. Since 2011, when BullsEye first surveyed some of the most popular apps for trial, the number of litigation-related apps has grown significantly.

When we recently decided to take another look at the best apps for trial lawyers, our list grew to 40. In Part One of this post, we covered apps for reviewing transcripts, conducting on-the-fly legal research, strategizing about settlement, and accessing dockets. In Part Two, we continue our look at 40 essential apps for trial lawyers.

Trial Presentation Apps

ExhibitView ($89.99). This app lets you organize and annotate exhibits and then present them wirelessly. Presentation tools include call-out features, highlight options, freehand pen tool, a laser pointer tool, and complete control of your output to a TV or projection device. Additional features include screenshot saving, creating alias names, and importing and exporting projects. For more functionality, there is a PC version of ExhibitView ($498, which includes the iPad app) in which you can prepare your exhibits and then transfer them to your iPad.

Keynote ($9.99). Although not designed specifically for trials, Apple’s Keynote is a popular presentation app among lawyers in the courtroom and elsewhere. You can use it to view, edit, and design presentations created in either Keynote ’09 or Microsoft PowerPoint. It allows video mirroring so that you can present on an HDTV while seeing a presenter view on your iPad that shows your slides and notes.

TrialDirector (free). This app enables you to create case folders on your iPad and then add exhibits, including video, through a Dropbox or iTunes account. Once you have added these exhibits, you can use the app to annotate and present them. If you have the TrialDirector 6 desktop application, which sells for an annual license of $695, you can prepare exhibits there and then export them to this app for presentation at trial.

TrialPad ($89.99). TrialPad is generally considered the leader among trial presentation apps. While it is also the priciest of these apps, it is comparable in its capabilities to far more expensive desktop applications. With TrialPad, you can highlight, annotate, redact, and zoom in on documents as you present them. You can also view and compare documents side-by-side, view and edit video, mark up an exhibit with annotations and call-outs and then save the mark-ups for your closing, and project wirelessly.

TrialTouch (free). TrialTouch provides on-the-go access to case materials including photographs, illustrations, 3D animations, medical imagery, video, and documents. It requires an account with the trial-graphics company DK Global.

Jury Selection and Monitoring Apps

iJuror ($29.99). This jury-selection app lets you record information about jurors, assign scores to jurors, assign color codes to jurors for visual reference, view juror demographics, and configure seating charts to match the courtroom. Information can be shared among multiple devices by exporting and importing via Dropbox. Information can also be shared via Bluetooth with someone else who is using iJuror.

iJury ($14.99). This app uses jurors’ responses to voir dire questions to assign them a score as negative or positive for your case. You start by creating a case profile and adding members of the jury pool. As they respond to the jury questionnaire, you tap a button to indicate whether each response is positive or negative to your case. The app records these responses and creates an overall grade.

JuryDuty ($39.99). Similar to other jury-selection apps, JuryDuty lets you add information and notes about each juror, prepare topics and questions for voir dire, create seating charts, and share information among members of your trial team via Bluetooth.

Jury Notepad ($4.99). From the same company that developed iJuror, Jury Notepad is designed specifically for creating, keeping, and organizing notes about jurors. It has a simpler interface that makes it easier to use on iPhones, but it can also be used on an iPad.

JuryPad ($24.99). This app is designed to make it easy for you to record, arrange, evaluate, and use juror information as well as create, edit, and reuse voir dire questions. A unique feature of JuryPad is its ability to take you on a “virtual tour” of jurors’ neighborhoods.

JuryStar ($39.99). Developed by a trial lawyer for use in selecting juries, JuryStar lets you enter and record voir dire questions and juror responses and demographic information. It uses color codes to help you rate jurors and make decisions about which jurors to strike.

Date Calculator Apps

Court Days Pro ($2.99). This is a legal calendaring app for the iPad and iPhone. It gives you the ability to calculate dates and deadlines based on a customizable database of court rules and statutes. Once you set a trigger event, the app displays a list of corresponding dates and deadlines. Dates appear within the app and can also be added to your device’s native calendar app.

DocketLaw (free). This app lets you calculate event dates and deadlines for free based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For additional monthly fees, you can add subscriptions to rules-based calendars for specific state and federal courts. The cost varies by state and court. By way of example, you can add all New York courts for a monthly fee of $49.95.

Smart Dockets (free). Calculate dates and deadlines directly on your mobile device using court rules. Choose your court rule set, determine the trigger event, and enter the trigger date to calculate deadlines automatically.

Trial Preparation Apps

Courtroom Objections ($2.99). This app is a quick, simple guide to common courtroom objections and responses.

eDepoze (free). This app allows you to present deposition exhibits using an iPad. Users are able to introduce, mark, and share exhibits in real time, and the app allows participants to review and annotate their personal copies. The app is free, but use of the system must be purchased through a network of resellers, most of which are court reporting companies.

iTestimony ($9.99). Use this app to keep track of witness information and notes before and during trial and depositions. Assign avatars to each witness for easier identification. Information about witnesses can be shared with others by email.

TabLit: Trial Notebook ($89.99). This app is designed to enable a lawyer to walk into court with nothing but an iPad. It includes case documents, examination outlines, examination checklists, evidentiary checklists, case contacts, and other features.

E-Discovery Apps

eDiscovery Assistant ($29.99). This app is intended to provide access to key e-discovery information. As purchased, it includes access to the FRCP for e-discovery, pilot projects, key case digests identified by the editors, sample checklists and templates, a resources database, and a glossary of terms. For an additional monthly subscription of $15.99, you can also get access to all state and U.S. district court e-discovery rules, more than 3,000 digests of e-discovery decisions, and more than 50 checklists and templates.

E-Discovery Project Calculator (free). This free app lets you calculate and estimate the size of your e-discovery project. This tool will estimate document and page count based on the size of the job. It will also calculate the time and cost required to complete the project.

ARTICLE BY

Robert J. Ambrogi, Esq.
OF
IMS ExpertServices

Recent Trends in ESOP Litigation — Employee Stock Ownership Plan

There has been a lot of attention in the world of employee ownership plans to the 2014 Supreme Court Decision in Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer. In that case, the Court ruled that “the law does not create a special presumption favoring ESOP (Employee Stock Ownership Plan) fiduciaries. Rather, the same standard of prudence applies to all ERISA fiduciaries, including ESOP fiduciaries, except that an ESOP fiduciary is under no duty to diversify the ESOP’s holdings.” This ruling overturns the so-called Moench rule that has been applied to plan fiduciaries for certain 401(k) plans investing in company stock and ESOPs. Moench gave a presumption of prudence to plan fiduciaries unless they knew or should have known the company was in dire financial circumstances.

As important as this ruling is, it actually has very little if any impact on the vast majority of ESOPs, over 95% of which are in closely held companies. The ruling is far more important for public companies with 401(k) plans or ESOPs that offer company stock as an investment choice.

First, it is important to distinguish between a statutory ESOP and what courts came, by a rather tortured logic, to call ESOPs—namely any defined contribution plan that had company stock in it. ESOPs were created as part of ERISA in 1974 and given not just the right but the requirement to invest primarily in employer securities. ESOPs were specifically created to encourage employers to share ownership with employees, and over the years Congress has given these plans a number of special tax benefits. Because fiduciaries are required to invest primarily in employer stock, standard fiduciary obligations concerning diversification in retirement plans would be impractical. The Moench presumption was created in a case involving a statutory ESOP.

The large majority of “stock drop” cases, however, have not involved statutory ESOPs, but 401(k) plans that either allowed employees to invest in company stock and/or matched in company stock. Some of these plans required fiduciaries to offer company stock; others made it optional. Defense attorneys argued that these plans were actually “ESOPs” too and were subject to the Moench presumption. Most district and circuit courts bought that argument, although some applied it only when company stock was required. That, I think, was unfortunate and inappropriate. 401(k) plans were never meant to be vehicles for sharing corporate ownership. They are intended to be safe, cost-effective retirement plans. ESOPs are a specific statutory creation with a specific set of rules and purposes.

When reading the Supreme Court decision, as well as the arguments made before the Court, it is also clear that the justices were thinking entirely of public companies. There is virtually no discussion of ESOPs in closely held companies, and the key tests that the Court now requires plaintiffs to meet in stock drop cases largely do not apply to privately held companies. Since the original Moench decision in 1995, we at the National Center for Employee Ownership have only found two cases in closely held companies that were decided even in part based on that presumption.

The Court’s decision in the Fifth Third case laid out three key hurdles for plaintiffs to overcome to prevail. The first states that it is insufficient to argue that fiduciaries should be able to outguess the market based on publicly available information. The second issue is whether decisions to sell company stock in light of inside information could be prudently taken in light of their potential impact on the prices of company stock. Fiduciaries are also not obligated to violate securities laws. Finally, the Court said plaintiffs must allege a reasonable alternative course of action.

In ESOPs in closely held companies, fiduciaries have few options that could form the basis for plaintiffs arguing a plausible course of action. First, the law requires that ESOPs be primarily invested in company stock. Second, the only liquidity options are a company buy-back of shares, which is probably impractical if the company is already in financial distress, or a sale of the company. But a fire sale like that would mean an even lower price for plan participants. As noted in more detail below, none of the presumption of prudence cases has concerned closely held companies, probably because of these issues. Also note that Dudenhoeffer distinguished between relying on inside information to sell company stock (which it classified as illegal insider trading and thus not required by the duty of prudence) and refraining from buying more company stock (which might be a fiduciary violation). The purchase of shares by an ESOP is already subject to substantial statutory and case law requirements, and this decision is unlikely to change the way these cases are contested.

As a result of all this, the prudence presumption has so far not been an issue for closely held ESOP companies in court, and it is likely to continue not to be as plaintiffs would have a hard time indicating what fiduciaries should have done. Instead, cases will continue to focus, as they have been before where there are alleged problems, on the initial sale price of the shares of the ESOP, which is determined by the trustee and relies on an outside appraiser. It is possible that the Dudenhoeffer decision may embolden the plaintiffs’ bar to initiate more lawsuits, but we would expect that to continue to be primarily in public companies.

Beyond Fifth Third—ESOPs Law for the 97%

Valuations

The 97% of ESOP companies that are closely held will not be much affected by the Supreme Court decision, but the last 25 years of litigation on ESOPs reveals some important trends that should be considered.

In an analysis by the NCEO of the 224 decisions courts have made on ESOPs in closely held companies between 1990 and 2014, we found that many of the suits involved plan management issues, such as failing to make distributions. The most significant issues, however, concerned valuation, indemnification, and fiduciary duties.

The valuation decisions are mixed. Courts have focused more on process than outcome. Some processes are clearly unacceptable, such as not hiring an independent appraiser or influencing an appraiser’s report. Several key best practices have emerged. A recent settlement between the Department of Labor and GreatBanc Trust in a valuation case (Perez v. GreatBanc Trust Co., 5:12-cv-01648-R-DTB (C.D. Cal., proposed settlement agreement filed June 2, 2014) set out terms for GreatBanc to follow in future engagements that does a good job of summarizing the trends in the courts.

Key points in the settlement included:

  • Trustees must be able to show that they vetted the independence and qualifications of appraisers carefully.
  • Trustees must show that they have assessed the reasonableness of financial projections given to the appraiser. Some valuation advisors include disclaimers in their engagement agreements that the DOL reads as too broad, in that read literally the valuation advisor can rely on any information it receives from the plan sponsor company without inquiring as to its reasonableness, no matter how unreasonable the information. The use of these disclaimers will not absolve the trustee of responsibility and the trustee should document how the appraisal firm has analyzed just how reliable projections are.
  • The trustee should consider how plan provisions, such as those relating to puts, diversification, and distribution policies, might affect the plan sponsor’s repurchase obligation.
  • The trustee should consider the company’s ability to service the debt if projections are not met.
  • Documentation should be detailed. While documentation of the valuation analysis may appear to be burdensome, making the effort to document the valuation review process at the time of the transaction can only benefit the valuation advisor and the trustee in later years.

Indemnification

The other significant legal development for closely held company ESOPs in recent years concerns indemnification, ironically also in the case involving Sierra Aluminum and GrratBanc. In Harris v. GreatBanc Trust Co., Sierra Aluminum Co., & Sierra Aluminum ESOP, No. 5:12-cv-01648-R (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2013), a district court ruled that GreatBanc could be indemnified for its role as the ESOP fiduciary. The decision is significant in that it occurred in the one circuit (the Ninth) that has taken the position that indemnification should not be allowed, especially in a 100% ESOP.  In Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2009), the court ruled that ESOP plan assets were not distinguishable from company assets. If plaintiffs prevailed but the company’s indemnification had paid out millions in legal fees to defendants (as was the case here), the plaintiffs would have a very hollow victory. In that same circuit, in Fernandez et al. v. K-M Industries Holding Co., No. C 06-7339 CW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2009), a court that an indemnification agreement did not apply in the case of a 42% ESOP because if alleged ERISA violations concerning an improper valuation were sustained, the indemnification would harm the value of participant stock.

These decisions seemed to make indemnification largely moot, but in the GreatBanc case the court ruled that regulations (29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(h)(3)) of ERISA Section 410 state that in the case of an ESOP, the plan’s assets and the company assets are treated as separate.  In Couturier, the Harris court said, the company had already been liquidated and was thus no longer an operating company. The court also distinguished this case from Couturier in that in Couturier, plaintiffs had already shown likelihood to prevail on fiduciary charges, something that could not be said of this case. Finally, the Couturier case involved no exceptions for breaches of fiduciary duty, as was the case here, but only for “gross negligence” and “willful misconduct.”

Other courts in other circuits have not weighed in on this issue. Certainly a good argument can be made that if indemnification means that plaintiffs will lose a substantial amount of a settlement agreement because there is no money to pay, it seems compelling indemnification should not apply. That would not be the case if the company had other available assets. In any event, ESOP advisors now caution clients that indemnification may have limited value and that they should rely primarily on adequate fiduciary insurance.

Conclusion

In recent years, the Department of Labor has been more aggressive in pursuing what it perceives as valuation abuses in ESOP companies. While there have been a few more court cases and settlements per year than normal, a typical year finds only a handful of these out of the 6,500 or so ESOPs in closely held companies. A comprehensive study by the NCEO found that the default rate on leveraged ESOPs (those that borrow money to buy stock, which most do) is just .2% per year, way below other LBOs. If valuations really were routinely excessive, this number would be higher as the debt burden would be unrealistic.

Other ESOP litigation has been relatively mundane, focusing either on administrative errors or the occasional fraudulent behavior. Indemnification could become a more important issue, but companies can (and should) resolve that with proper fiduciary insurance.

The future for company stock in public company retirement plans, mostly 401(k) plan, is far less certain. There has been a steady decline in how many companies offer this and how much those that do rely on it.  Even for advocates of employee ownership, however, this is not necessarily a bad thing. Good ESOP companies have secondary diversified retirement plans—in fact, ESOP companies are more likely to have a diversified retirement plan than other companies are to have any plan. That is a best practice we strongly encourage.

ARTICLE BY

Corey Rosen
OF
The National Center for Employee Ownership