Federal Jurors Get 25 Percent Pay Hike

For the first time in 28 years, jurors in federal court will receive a pay hike of 25 percent. That means that for each day that a person sits as a juror in federal court, he or she will receive a check for $50, up from $40 that has been in effect since 1990.

President Trump signed the bill into law that takes effect May 7. The raise was included in a bill that provided the federal judiciary with $7.1 billion in discretionary spending, an increase of $184 million from the previous fiscal year, according to a news release from the U.S. Courts that provides support to federal courts across the country.

Jurors who serve in Cook County Circuit Court receive $17.50 per day for their service.

Federal court jurors in the Chicago area serve at the Dirksen U.S. Courthouse in Chicago’s Loop. They also receive reimbursement for travel (54.5 cents a mile) as well as a paid lunch at the Fresh Seasons Cafe, on the courthouse’s second floor.

“This is an excellent result and enables the Judiciary to fulfill its mission,” James C. Duff, Director of the U.S. Courts Administrative Office in Washington, D.C., said in a statement. “We are especially pleased that Congress recognized the critical public service provided by the citizens who serve on juries as well as the attorneys who represent defendants who can’t afford a lawyer.”

 

© 2018 by Clifford Law Offices PC.
This post was written by Robert A. Clifford of Clifford Law Offices PC.

Water, Water, Everywhere: The Clean Water Act

If it isn’t already, water should be on your mind this year.  The excitement of Scituate storm surge and coastal flooding aside, the region – and the U.S. as a whole – is facing a slew of legal developments that may change how citizens, businesses, and governments operate under the federal Clean Water Act and similar state programs.  In particular, the scope of Clean Water Act jurisdiction is in play following a pair of Supreme Court decisions, as is the potential delegation of permitting authority to Massachusetts and New Hampshire, two of only four states in which the EPA administers permitting under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).

Clean Water Act Jurisdiction

Since well before Samuel Taylor Coleridge penned those famous lines in the Rime of the Ancient Mariner – “Water, water, every where, / Nor any drop to drink” – people have worried about access to clean water.  It makes sense, then, that the Clean Water Act is one of our oldest environmental laws, with its origins in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.  The Rivers and Harbors Act – the nation’s very first environmental law – imposed the first “dredge and fill” requirements, made it illegal to dam rivers without federal approval, and prohibited the discharge of “any refuse  matter  of  any  kind  or  description” into “any  navigable  water  of  the  United  States, or  into  any  tributary  of  any  navigable  water.”

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, with major amendments in 1961, 1966, 1970, 1972, 1977, and 1987, largely superseded the Rivers and Harbors Act and resulted in what we know today as the federal Clean Water Act (CWA).  And although today’s statute is very different from its 1899 precursor, one thing has remained constant: an intense and lasting fight over the scope and jurisdiction of federal regulation.  Federal CWA jurisdiction is premised on the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and prohibits (without a permit) “dredge and fill” activities and the discharge of pollutants into “navigable waters,” which the CWA defines as “the waters of the United States.”  But what, exactly, are “waters of the United States”?

The 1870 Supreme Court decision in The Daniel Ball held that waterways were subject to federal jurisdiction if they were “navigable in fact.”  But what has never been clear is the extent to which non-navigable waters, like certain tributaries to navigable waters or wetlands, constitute “waters of the United States” such that they are subject to federal regulation.

The Supreme Court Punts (Again)

The 2006 Supreme Court decision in Rapanos v. United States represented a key turning point in CWA jurisdiction, holding that certain remote wetlands are not subject to CWA jurisdiction.  But the decision was badly fractured, with no majority of justices agreeing on a single standard for determining what, exactly, constitute “waters of the United States” such that the CWA applies.  Minor chaos ensued, as regulators and courts applied varying interpretations of Rapanos in permitting decisions and enforcement actions.

In 2015, the Obama administration attempted to clarify the scope of CWA jurisdiction by promulgating a rule known as the “Waters of the United States” (or “WOTUS”) rule that attempted to define exactly which waters were regulated by the CWA.  That rule, which was based on Justice Anthony Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test in the Rapanos decision, was quickly challenged by 31 states, numerous industries, and landowner groups.  At bottom, challengers argued that the WOTUS rule represented significant federal overreach and extended CWA jurisdiction well beyond what the Commerce Clause allows. The numerous appeals were consolidated into a single Sixth Circuit case, National Association of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense (NAM), and in late 2015 the Sixth Circuit stayed the WOTUS rule pending resolution of legal challenges.

But on January 22, 2018, the Supreme Court unanimously held that federal District Courts – not appellate courts – have jurisdiction over challenges to the WOTUS rule.  While the CWA generally requires challenges to CWA rules to be brought in district courts, there are seven situations where courts of appeal have jurisdiction.  In this case, the government argued that the challenge should be heard in the courts of appeal, under CWA Sections 1369(b)(1)(E)-(F) which allow appellate courts to hear cases related to the approval of certain effluent limits or permits, respectively.  Petitioners, on the other hand, maintained that the case should be heard in federal district court in the first instance.  In a procedural victory for the petitioners, the Supreme Court held that the WOTUS rule does not qualify for direct appellate review under CWA Sections 1369(b)(1)(E)-(F).  Following this decision, future challenges to the WOTUS rule will be brought in federal district courts, potentially with divergent outcomes around the country.  Appeals of those decisions will move to the courts of appeals, where there is yet again the possibility for inconsistency.  The upshot is a longer litigation timeline – and continued jurisdictional uncertainty – before the Supreme Court will have another chance to address the appropriate scope of CWA jurisdiction.

In the meantime, the Trump administration is working on a replacement rule for the WOTUS rule that is likely to apply the less expansive jurisdictional test described by Justice Antonin Scalia in Rapanos.  Under that interpretation, only tributaries that are “relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water,” and only wetlands with a continuous surface connection to a “water of the United States” are themselves “waters of the United States” subject to CWA jurisdiction.  And on February 6, 2018, EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers promulgated a rule delaying implementation of the WOTUS rule until February, 2020.  That action preserves the Rapanos status quo (such as it is) until EPA can craft a new rule.  Ultimately, it is likely that any WOTUS replacement rule will be challenged, and the Supreme Court will then have a chance to revisit its decision in Rapanos and redefine federal jurisdiction under the CWA, a process that could easily extend past 2020.

Defer much?

On February 26, 2018, the Supreme Court weighed in again on the Clean Water Act, this time by refusing to take up a challenge to a 2017 decision by the Second Circuit that upheld a 2008 EPA rule exempting water transfers from CWA permitting requirements.  Water transfers happen when water from one waterbody is diverted into another waterbody, such as diverting a stream into a nearby lake or reservoir. Drinking water systems have conducted water transfers for decades, and EPA has never required NPDES permitting for such transfers.  But in 2008, in response to pressure by environmental groups to require NPDES permits for water transfers, EPA adopted the Water Transfers Rule expressly exempting such transfers from NPDES permitting.

Environmentalists and states challenged the Water Transfers Rule, arguing that moving water from one waterbody to another requires a permit if the “donor” water contains pollutants that would have the effect of degrading the receiving water.  Both the Obama and Trump administrations defended the rule, arguing that it preserved long-standing practice and was justified by EPA’s ability to interpret CWA requirements.  Ultimately, the Second Circuit deferred to EPA and allowed the rule to stand.  In turn, the February 26 decision by the Supreme Court allows the Second Circuit decision to stand, thereby affirming the validity of the Water Transfers Rule.  The case was widely seen as a test for Justice Neil Gorsuch, who has expressed hostility to the deference doctrine and EPA regulations alike.  By declining to hear the case, the Court has deferred that test for another day.

Who’s in Charge?

Under a process known as “delegation,” states may assume permitting and other authority under the CWA.  To-date, 46 states have received such delegation from EPA, and all but Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Idaho, and New Mexico now administer their own NPDES permitting programs.  In the absence of delegation, EPA manages the Clean Water Act and NPDES program in those four states, which often overlap and may duplicate separate state law requirements.

New Hampshire is currently evaluating whether to seek CWA delegation from EPA, and has established a legislative commission to explore its options.  And as we have previously reported, Massachusetts has explored CWA delegation in the past, but those efforts largely fizzled out.  But both of these efforts may have new life: the EPA, under Administrator Pruitt, is very focused on “cooperative federalism” and with EPA seeking to slash its budgets, CWA delegation is likely on EPA’s radar as an action item over the next several years.  And, in late 2017, MassDEP Commissioner Martin Suuberg expressed strong support for CWA delegation, as has Governor Baker.  Whether delegation will become a reality for Massachusetts or New Hampshire is anyone’s guess, but regardless of the outcome 2018 is shaping up to be an interesting year for water law.

 

© 2018 Beveridge & Diamond PC
This post was written by Brook J. Detterman of Beveridge & Diamond PC.

Are Foreign Lost Profits Really Lost?

On January 12, 2018, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Federal Circuit’s lost profits decision in WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015), marking the first step toward defining the scope of recovery for damages in the form of lost foreign sales. Under the Patent Act, damages are governed by § 284, which provides:

Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.

While § 284 allows patent owners to recover lost profits and reasonable royalties, the statute is silent as to whether these damages should encompass overseas losses (i.e., from foreign sales or contracts), which could play an important and substantial role in elevating damages – especially for patent holders with international contracts and services.

Background

WesternGeco LLC (“WesternGeco”) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Schlumberger Limited, a worldwide provider of reservoir drilling and processing technology in the oil and gas industry. Relevant to this case, WesternGeco LLC provides reservoir monitoring and imaging services to help perform seismic surveys. ION Geophysical Corp. (“ION”) offers similar services as WesternGeco and is a competitor.

In 2009, WesternGeco sued ION for patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)-(2). Specifically, 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) provides:

  1. Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention . . . in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent . . . shall be liable as an infringer.
  2. Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States any component of a patented invention that is especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use . . . knowing that such component is so made or adapted and intending that such component will be combined outside of the United States . . . shall be liable as an infringer.

The district court found for WesternGeco, awarding it $93,400,000 in lost profits and $12,500,000 in reasonable royalties as damages. On appeal, however, the panel majority reversed the district court’s award of lost profits, observing that the “presumption against extraterritoriality is well-established and undisputed.” Moreover, the Federal Circuit previously stated in Power Integrations v. Fairchild Semiconductor, “[Our patent laws] do not thereby provide compensation for a defendant’s foreign exploitation of a patented invention, which is not infringement at all.” In effect, the majority held that “[u]nder Power Integrations, WesternGeco cannot recover lost profits resulting from its failure to win foreign service contracts.”

WesternGeco’s Petition

WesternGeco filed two petitions for certiorari. Based on the first petition, the Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s opinion in light of Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). On remand, however, the Federal Circuit reinstated its opinion and judgment as to lost profits. As a result, WesternGeco filed a second petition for certiorari on February 17, 2017, which presented the following question:

Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that lost profits arising from prohibited combinations occurring outside of the United States are categorically unavailable in cases where patent infringement is proven under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f).

In its petition, WesternGeco argued that the majority panel “applied the presumption against extraterritoriality in such a duplicative manner [that] defeat[ed] Congress’ intent in enacting § 271(f).” Therefore, the decision “effectively eliminate[d] lost profit damages where infringement is found under § 271(f), limiting patent owners only to a reasonable royalty.” WesternGeco also distinguished its case from Power Integrations, by arguing that “Power Integrations dealt with infringement under § 271(a)” and therefore “reflects no comparable congressional judgment to target certain extraterritorial conduct.”

In an amicus curiae brief submitted on behalf of the United States, the Solicitor General urged the Court to hear this case, stating that the Federal Circuit’s “approach systematically undercompensates prevailing patentees like petitioner, whose transnational business suffered when respondent infringed petitioner’s patents within the United States.”

In addition, WesternGeco argued that allowing patentees to recover lost profits from international sales would be consistent with copyright law, which has been found by several circuits to permit parties to recover foreign damages so long as those damages are directly linked to a domestic predicate act of infringement.

Implications

Although the Supreme Court, in its 2007 opinion in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., previously “[r]ecogniz[ed] [that] § 271(f) is an exception to the general rule that [U.S.] patent law does not apply extraterritorially,” the Court ultimately “resist[ed] giving the language . . . an expansive interpretation.”

Patent holders should be aware that the Supreme Court’s decision in WesternGeco may present an opportunity to expand the scope of damages claims to encompass international losses caused by infringement in the United States.

 

© Copyright 2018 Brinks, Gilson & LioneBrinks, Gilson & Lione.
This post was written by Jeffrey J. Catalono and Judy K. He of Brinks, Gilson & Lione.
Read more Intellectual Property News at the Intellectual Property Page.

D.C. Circuit Amends Opinion on EPA’s Definition of Solid Waste Rule

On March 6, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (the D.C. Circuit) issued a ruling amending its July 7, 2017 opinion on challenges to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA or Agency) 2015 rule on the Definition of Solid Waste (DSW) (the 2015 Rule). See American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, No. 09-1038 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (API Opinion). The 2015 Rule revised a DSW Rule promulgated by EPA in 2008 (the 2008 Rule). See KEAG Bulletin No. 2014-98, dated December 17, 2014. Both industry and environmental groups challenged the 2015 Rule. SeeKEAG Bulletin No. 2017-12, dated July 13, 2017. In the D.C. Circuit’s 2017 opinion, the court upheld some aspects of the 2015 Rule and vacated others. Id.

Following the issuance of the court’s 2017 opinion, petitions for rehearing were filed by the American Petroleum Institute, EPA, environmentalists, and other industry groups. API Opinion at 2. After reviewing the petitions, the court amended its decision in three ways: (1) it severed and affirmed EPA’s removal of the spent catalyst bar from the vacated portions of the Verified Recycler Exclusion (VRE), (2) it vacated “Legitimacy” Factor 4 in its entirety, and (3) it clarified the regulatory regime that replaces the now-vacated Factor 4. Id.

With respect to spent petroleum catalysts, the court granted industry’s request to exclude these catalysts from strict hazardous waste regulation for third‑party recyclers. In its original opinion, the court vacated the VRE from the 2015 Rule, and reinstated the Transfer-Based Exclusion (TBE) from the 2008 Rule. See KEAG Bulletin No. 2017-12, dated July 13, 2017. Spent catalysts were excluded from RCRA under the VRE, but not in the TBE. Id. In the court’s reconsideration of whether spent catalysts should be granted an exclusion, the court cited EPA’s various statements on catalysts and found that EPA’s revised containment standard, which the court upheld despite eliminating other aspects of the VRE, is sufficient for spent catalysts to be included in the TBE. Id. at 6-8.

Legitimacy Factor 4 is one of the four criteria the EPA applies to determine if recycling of hazardous secondary materials is legitimate and not sham recycling. Factor 4 requires that a recycled product be comparable to or lower in contaminant levels than a legitimate product or intermediate, and if the former contains higher levels of contaminants, it requires additional procedures and tests (a.k.a., the “toxics along for the ride” test). Id. at 8; see also KEAG Bulletin No. 2017-12, dated July 13, 2017. In its original opinion, the court found those additional procedures to be unauthorized under RCRA and vacated Factor 4 “insofar as it applies to all hazardous secondary materials via § 261.2(g),” which is the section of the RCRA rules that defines sham recycling. See KEAG Bulletin No. 2017-12, dated July 13, 2017. Nevertheless, Factor 4 still applied to those specific exclusions in which it was specifically included. Id. In its amended opinion, the court vacated Legitimacy Factor 4 under all circumstances, even those written into specific exclusions. API Opinion at 9.

Finally, the court clarified the effect of its vacating Factor 4. Id. at 9-10. The net result is that (1) the 2015 version of Factor 4 is vacated (in its entirety); (2) the 2015 change making the legitimacy factors applicable to all exclusions remains; (3) Factor 3 remains mandatory per the 2015 changes; and (4) the 2008 version of Factor 4, which requires only that the factor be “considered,” replaces the now-vacated 2015 version. Id. at 10.

 

©2018 Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP
This post was written by Danny G. Worrell of Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP.

Ninth Circuit Issues Decision in Novel Clean Water Act Case

The Ninth Circuit issued its long-anticipated decision in the Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui case yesterday. County of Maui affirmed a decision awarding summary judgment to environmental groups based on what the court viewed to be undisputed proof that four effluent disposal wells at a wastewater disposal facility were known to discharge into the Pacific Ocean and that the County of Maui had failed to secure an National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit for them.

We have previously blogged regarding existing regulatory uncertainty under the Clean Water Act (CWA). In this case, the Ninth Circuit’s decision focuses on whether a CWA “point source” that indirectly transfers material to relevant waterways falls within the statute. The Ninth Circuit essentially rejected the connection that the wells were “indirect,” instead holding that they were analogous to stormwater collection systems, which had previously been found to be regulated by the CWA.

The court supported this conclusion based on the evidence that the County of Maui knew from the time the wells were constructed “that effluent from the wells would eventually reach the ocean some distance from shore.” The court also noted that the fact that “groundwater plays a role in delivering the pollutants from the wells to navigable water does not preclude liability under the statute.”

 

© 2018 Schiff Hardin LLP
This post was written by J. Michael Showalter of Schiff Hardin LLP.
Read more Environmental News on the National Law Review Environment News page.

IP Litigation: Raising an Ensnarement Defense Defeats the Doctrine of Equivalents

Is the Doctrine of Equivalents (DOE) dead, once again? Effectively, yes.

All an alleged infringer needs to do is raise an ensnarement defense (a claim that a DOE enlarged hypothetical claim reads on the prior art), and then show that the equivalent element was known in the prior art. Most equivalent elements (not considering other claim elements) are known in the art, which is why they are equivalent!

Under current CAFC precedent, all an alleged infringer has to do is offer some prior art. There is no burden on the alleged infringer to show that a DOE enlarged claim is either anticipated or obvious in view of the prior art.For example, if the equivalent element is presented in any prior art reference, the burden then shifts to the patent owner to prove patentability. But patentability cannot be proven. To do that, one would have to present all that is known in order to argue that the prior art does not disclose the invention. And, of course, this is impossible. Could one even begin to present all knowledge in order to show the absence of some knowledge? Certainly not.

That is why, outside of a DOE enlarged hypothetical claim, at either the U.S. Patent Office (PTO) or before any court, someone arguing a claim is invalid first has the burden of at least presenting a prima facie case of anticipation or obviousness. The burden then shifts to the one urging claim validity to refute the prima facie case. Outside of ensnarement, the concept of proving patentability simply doesn’t exist, and for good reason.

The CAFC’s current precedent regarding how to consider the validity of a doctrine of equivalents enlarged hypothetical claim (hereafter hypothetical claim) is summarized In JANG v. BOS. SCI. CORP. & SCIMED LIFE SYS., INC., 2016-1275, 2016-1575, decided: September 29, 2017.

The Court stated:

“The first step is “to construct a hypothetical claim that literally covers the accused device.” Next, prior art introduced by the accused infringer is assessed to “determine whether the patentee has carried its burden of persuading the court that the hypothetical claim is patentable over the prior art.” Emphasis added.

“The burden of producing evidence of prior art to challenge a hypothetical claim rests with an accused infringer, but the burden of proving patentability of the hypothetical claim rests with the patentee.” Emphasis added.

This precedent does not require the alleged infringer to do any more than merely present the prior art. It fails to require the alleged infringer to provide a prima facie case of anticipation or obviousness.

Before Jang, there was an acknowledgment that the hypothetical claim should be one that would have been allowed by the USPTO. “The pertinent question then becomes whether that hypothetical claim could have been allowed by the PTO over the prior art. WILSON SPORTING GOODS CO. V. DAVID GEOFFREY & ASSOCIATES, 904 F.2d 677 (1990).” But the CAFC has failed to recognize that this means the alleged infringer must then first provide a prima facie case of claim invalidity, as would be required at the PTO.

Thus, the Doctrine of Equivalents is for all intents and purposes dead.

 

Copyright Davis & Kuelthau, s.c.
This post was written by James E. Lowe, Jr of Davis & Kuelthau, s.c.

Confusion Amongst Texas Courts: When Can Insureds Recover Policy Benefits for Statutory Violations?

While first-party bad faith claims may appear to be a dying notion in other jurisdictions, the tort-based claim in Texas is alive and well. Throughout the years, courts have continued to search for ways to define the common-law standard and balance it with public interest due to the unequal bargaining power in the insured-insurer relationship.For this reason, the law of bad faith in Texas is constantly evolving.

Texas imposes a common law duty on insurers to “deal fairly and in good faith with their insureds.”A breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing gives rise to a tort cause of action that is separate from any action for breach of the underlying insurance policy.If an insurer breaches its duty of good faith and fair dealing, in addition to interest, court costs and attorney’s fees, the insured can recover actual, i.e. extra-contractual, damages for economic or personal injuries and exemplary damages if: (1) actual damages were awarded for an injury independent of the loss of policy benefits and (2) the insurer’s conduct was fraudulent, malicious, intentional or grossly negligent.Exemplary damages are within the jury’s discretion and “must be reasonably proportioned to actual damages.”5

Texas also provides a statutory scheme for bad-faith claims that allows recovery of extra-contractual damages through a private cause of action against an insurer. The statutory bad-faith tort is governed by Chapter 541 of the Texas Insurance Code (“Code”).The statutory claim is in addition, and a supplement, to the contractual cause of action against an insurer for breach of an insurance policy. Similar to the common law claim, for Code violations the insured may recover economic damages, but only up to three times the amount of economic damages, i.e. treble damages, for violations committed “knowingly.”7

It is not uncommon in first party bad-faith cases for the insured to assert a breach of contract claim against the insurer for breaching the insurance policy and a tort cause of action against the insurer for violations of the Code. However, extra-contractual tort claims brought pursuant to the Code require the same predicate for recovery as a bad faith claim under a good faith and fair dealing violation.Because the frameworks of the statutory and common law claims are so similar, most Texas courts have treated common law claims as redundant.

When considering the damages available under the policy and under the statute, there have been some inconsistencies amongst Texas courts regarding the recovery of policy benefits when there have been statutory violations of the Code. As such, in USAA Texas Lloyds Company v. Gail Menchaca, the Texas Supreme Court seized the opportunity clear up the confusion by addressing the issue of whether an insured can recover policy benefits for Code violations when there has been no breach of the insurance policy.9

USAA v Menchacha

In Menchaca, the Texas Supreme Court acknowledges, “When our decisions create such uncertainties, ‘it is our duty to settle conflicts in order that the confusion will as nearly as possible be set at rest.’”10 Thus, the goal in Menchaca was “to provide clarity regarding the relationship between claims for an insurance policy breach and Insurance Code violations.”11 The primary question was “whether an insured can recover policy benefits as actual damages caused by an insurer’s statutory violation absent a finding that the insured had a contractual right to the benefits under the insurance policy.”12

Following Hurricane Ike in September 2008, Gail Menchaca contacted her homeowner’s insurance company, USAA Texas Lloyds (“USAA”), and reported storm damage to her home.13 The USAA adjuster who inspected Menchaca’s claim found only minimal damage.14 USAA determined that the damage was covered under Menchaca’s policy but declined to pay benefits because the total repair costs did not exceed the deductible under Menchaca’s policy.15 Five months later, at Menchaca’s request, another USAA adjuster re-inspected Menchaca’s home.16 The second adjuster confirmed the first adjuster’s findings and again USAA declined to pay any policy benefits.17 Menchaca filed suit against USAA for breach of the insurance policy and for unfair settlement practices in violation of the Texas Insurance Code. Menchaca sought policy benefits for both claims.18 For the alleged breach of the insurance policy, she sought benefit of the bargain damages, i.e. the amount of her claim for policy benefits and attorney’s fees. For the statutory violations, she sought actual damages, i.e. the loss of the benefits that should have been paid pursuant to the policy, court courts and attorney’s fees.19

The case proceeded to a jury trial and three questions were submitted to the jury.20 Question 1 addressed Menchaca’s breach of contract claim and asked whether USAA failed “to comply with the terms of the insurance policy with respect to the claim for damages filed by Gail Menchaca resulting from Hurricane Ike” and the jury answered “No.” Question 2 addressed Menchaca’s claim for statutory violations and asked “whether USAA engaged in various unfair or deceptive practices, including whether USAA refused to “pay a claim without conducting a reasonable investigation with respect to that claim” and the jury answered “Yes.” Question 3 asked the jury to determine Menchaca’s damages that resulted from either USAA’s failure to comply with the policy or its statutory violations, calculated as “the difference, if any, between the amount USAA should have paid Gail Menchaca for her Hurricane Ike damages and the amount that was actually paid” and the jury answered “$11,350.”21

Both parties moved for judgment in their favor. USAA argued that Menchaca was not entitled to recover for bad faith or extra-contractual liability because the jury found that it did not breach the insurance policy. Menchaca argued that the jury answered Questions 2 and 3 in her favor and neither were dependent on a favorable answer to Question 1. The trial court disregarded Question 1 and entered judgment in Menchaca’s favor. The court of appeals affirmed and the Texas Supreme Court granted USAA’s petition for review.22

In analyzing whether an insured can recover policy benefits as actual damages caused by an insurer’s statutory violation absent a finding that the insured had a contractual right to benefits under the insurance policy, the Court set forth “five distinct but interrelated rules that govern the relationship between contractual and extra-contractual claims in the insurance context.”23 Following the Court’s analysis of these rules, it determined that the court of appeals erred by affirming the trial court’s decision to disregard the jury’s answer to Question 1. The Court further stated, “In light of the parties’ obvious and understandable confusion over our relevant precedent and the effect of that confusion on their arguments in this case, we conclude that a remand is necessary here in the interest of justice.”24 The rules outlined by the Court are as follows:

Rule 1:

General Rule: An insured cannot recover policy benefits for an insurer’s statutory violation if the insured does not have a right to those benefits under the policy.25 This rule is derived from the Court’s rule in that “there can be no claim for bad faith when an insurer has promptly denied a claim that is in fact not covered.”26 Although the fact pattern in Stoker was limited to the bad faith denial of a claim, the Court has since applied the general rule to other types of extra-contractual violations, i.e. failing to properly pay a claim, failing to fairly investigate a claim and failing to effectuate a prompt and fair settlement of the claim.27 The general rule is derived from the fact that Code “only allows an insured to recover actual damages ‘caused by’ the insurer’s statutory violation.”28 In determining whether the insured has to establish a right to benefits and then a breach of the policy to recover policy benefits for statutory violations, the Court stated, “While an insured cannot recover policy benefits for a statutory violation unless the jury finds that the insured had a right to the benefits under the policy, the insured does not also have to establish that the insurer breached the policy by refusing to pay those benefits.”29

Rule 2:

Entitled to Benefits Rule: An insured who establishes a right to receive benefits under an insurance policy can recover policy benefits as “actual damages” under the statute if the insurer’s statutory violation causes the loss of the benefits.30 “If an insurer’s ‘wrongful’ denial of a ‘valid’ claim results from or constitutes a statutory violation, the resulting damages will necessarily include ‘at least the amount of the policy benefits wrongfully withheld.’”31

Rule 3:

Benefits Loss Rule: An insured can recover policy benefits as actual damages under the Insurance Code even if the insured has no right to those benefits under the policy, if the insurer’s conduct caused the insured to lose that contractual right. 32 The Court has recognized this principle in cases alleging claims against an insurer for misrepresenting a policy’s coverage, statutory violations by the insurer which prejudice the insured by waiving its right to deny coverage or is estopped from doing so, and statutory violations that cause the insured to lose a contractual right to benefits that it otherwise would have been entitled to.33 “[A]n insurer that commits a statutory violation that eliminates or reduces its contractual obligations cannot then avail itself of the general rule.”34

Rule 4:

Independent Injury Rule: The first aspect of the rule is that if an insurer’s statutory violation causes an injury independent of the insured’s right to recover policy benefits, the insured may recover damages for that injury even if the policy does not entitle the insured to receive benefits.35 This rule takes into account that there may be some extra-contractual claims that may not “relate to the insurer’s breach of contractual duties to pay covered claims” and recognizes that there may be compensatory damages different from policy benefits that result from the tort of bad faith under common law.36

The second aspect of the independent-injury rule is that an insurer’s violation does not allow the insured to recover any damages beyond policy benefits unless the violation causes an injury that is independent from the loss of the benefits.37 For instance, the Court held in Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Davis that “an insured who prevails on a statutory claim cannot recover punitive damages for bad-faith conduct in the absence of independent actual damages arising from that conduct.38 Notably, as it relates to the independent-injury rule, the Court states that an independent-injury claim would be rare, they have yet to encounter one, and “have no occasion to speculate what would constitute a recoverable independent injury.”39

Rule 5:

No-Recovery Rule: An insured cannot recover any damages based on an insurer’s statutory violation unless the insured establishes a right to receive benefits under the policy or an injury independent of a right to benefits.40.

Conclusion

“It is the beginning of wisdom when you recognize that the best you can do is choose which rules you want to live by, and it’s persistent and aggravated imbecility to pretend you can live without any.”41 The Texas Supreme Court has attempted to clear up the confusion caused by its precedent by adopting five rules on the issue of recovery of policy benefits for statutory violations. While the rules appear fairly simplistic and undoubtedly will provide guidance, it remains to be seen whether the opinion actually brings clarity to the situation or simply a lesser degree of confusion for the courts to follow. In any event, the rules in Menchaca appear to weigh in favor of insurers because the law is settled, i.e. there must be a right to receive benefits or a (rare, but possible) independent injury to receive policy benefits for statutory violations.


[1] Universal Life Ins. Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48, 53 (Tex. 1997).

[2] Arnold v. Nat’l Cty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987).

[3]Viles v. Sec. Nat’l Ins. Co., 788 S.W.2d 566, 567 (Tex. 1990).

[4] Pena v. State Farm Lloyds, 980 S.W.2d 949, 958 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.); Giles, 950 S.W.2d at 54. See also Arnold, 757 S.W.2d at 168 (stating, “[E]xemplary damages and mental anguish damages are recoverable for a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing under the same principles allowing recovery of those damages in other tort actions.”).

[5] Pa Preston Carter Co. v. Tatum, 708 S.W.2d 23, 25 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, no writ). There is no set rule or ratio between the amount of actual damages and exemplary damages which will be considered reasonable and the determination is made on a case-by-case basis. Alamo Nat’l Bank v. Kraus, 616 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. 1981).

[6] Texas does not adhere to the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act adopted by many other states, but has its own set of laws, known as the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”). Chapter 541 of the Texas Insurance Code addresses the protection of consumer interests against deceptive, unfair, and prohibited practices within the context of insurance. Chapter 17.50(a)(4) of the DTPA incorporates Chapter 541 of the Texas Insurance Code in its entirety.

[7] TEX. INS. CODE § 541.152

[8] National Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Hurst, 523 S.W.3d 840, 840 (Tex. App.—Houston 14th Dist. 2017, no pet.).

[9] No. 14-0721, 2017 WL 1311752, at *1 (Tex. 2017).

[10] 2017 WL 1311752, at *1.

[11] Id. at *3.

[12[ Id. at *1.

[13] Id. 

[14] Id. 

[15] Id. 

[16] Id. 

[17] Id. 

[18] Id. 

[19] Id. at *3.

[20] Id. at *2.

[21] Id.

[22] Id.

[23] Id. at *4.

[24] Id. at *14

[25] TEX. INS. CODE § 541.151; Stoker, 903 S.W.2d at 341.

[26] Republic Ins. Co. v. Stoker, 903 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Tex. 1995).

[27] Menchaca, 2017 WL 1311752, at *5.

[28] Id. (citing TEX. INS. CODE § 541.151).

[29] Menchaca, 2017 WL 1311752, at *7.

[30] Id

[31] Id. (citing Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Castaneda, 988 S.W.2d 189, 188 (Tex. 1998).

[32] Menchaca, 2017 WL 1311752, at *10 (emphasis in original).

[33] Id.

[34] Id.

[35] Id. at *11.

[36] Id.. ; see also Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Davis, 904 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tex. 1995) (identifying mental anguish damages as an example).

[37] Menchaca, 2017 WL 1311752, at *11 (emphasis added).

[38] 904 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tex. 1995) (citing Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 284 (Tex. 1993) (stating that “[r]ecovery of punitive damages requires a finding of an independent tort with accompanying actual damages.”). Therefore, insurers are not liable for punitive damages if there is not an independent injury resulting in extra-contractual damages.

[39] Menchaca, 2017 WL 1311752, at *12.

[40].Menchaca, 2017 WL 1311752, at *12; Casteneda, 988 S.W.2d at 198.

[41] WALLACE STEGNER, ALL THE LITTLE LIVE THINGS (PENGUIN BOOKS 1991).

 

© Steptoe & Johnson PLLC. All Rights Reserved.
This post was written by Dawn S. Holiday of Steptoe & Johnson PLLC.

Whistleblower Fired for Disclosing Improper Asbestos Removal Wins at Trial

A jury awarded approximately $174,00 to a whistleblower who was fired for reporting improper asbestos removal practices at asbestos abatement and demolition company Champagne Demolition, LLC.  OSHA brought suit on his behalf under Section 11(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the jury awarded $103,000 in back wages, $20,000 in compensatory, and $50,000 in punitive damages.  The jury instructions are available here.

According to the complaint, the company fired the whistleblower one day after he raised concerns about improper asbestos removal at a high school in Alexandria Bay, NY, and entered the worksite when it was closed to take pictures of the asbestos. The whistleblower also removed a bag containing the improperly removed asbestos.  A few weeks after Champagne Demolition terminated the whistleblowers’ employment, they sued him for defamation.  Champagne Demolition subsequently stipulated to the dismissal of the defamation claim.  OSHA alleged that both the termination of the whistleblower’s employment and the filing of a defamation action were retaliatory acts prohibited by Section 11(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act.

Although for procedural reasons the court did not rule on whether the filing of the defamation action against the whistleblower was retaliatory, the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment   stakes out an important position on retaliatory lawsuits against whistleblowers:

Lawsuits filed with the intent to punish or dissuade employees from exercising their statutory rights are a well- established form of adverse action. See BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 531 (2002) (Finding that a lawsuit that was both objectively baseless and subjectively motivated by an unlawful purpose could violate the National Labor Relations Act’s prohibition on retaliation); Torres v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., 628 F. Supp. 2d 447, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Courts have held that baseless claims or lawsuits designed to deter claimants from seeking legal redress constitute impermissibly adverse retaliatory actions.”); Spencer v. Int’l Shoppes, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 2d 287, 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (Under Title VII, the filing of a lawsuit with a retaliatory motive constitutes adverse action).

OSHA should be commended for taking the case to trial and obtaining punitive damages.  As approximately 4,379 workers in the U.S. are killed annually due to unsafe workplaces, it is critical for OSHA to vigorously enforce Section 11(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act and counter retaliatory lawsuits against whistleblowers, an especially pernicious form of retaliation.

 

© 2017 Zuckerman Law
Written by Jason Zuckerman of Zuckerman Law.
Read more on court decisions on the National Law Review’s Litigation page.

Aqua Products Sinks PTAB Decision in Bosch v. Matal

The odd title of this post arose from the fact that defendant Autel U.S., Inc. chose not to appeal its IPR win against Bosch that included invalidation of the claims in suit, and the refusal of the Board to enter an amended claim set proposed by Bosch. With Autel out of the picture, the PTO effectively represented the Board and Acting Director Matal was named as the defendant: Bosch Automotive Service Solutions, LLC v. Joseph Matal (Intervenor), Appeal no. 2015-1928 (Fed. Cir., December 22, 2017).

The technology claimed was directed to an improved device for transmitting data from the tire pressure sensor to the receiving unit in the vehicle, that was “universal” in that the user could check the data when working with different types of tires and receivers (U.S. Pat. No. 6,904,796).

In the IPR judgment, the Board found one set of Bosch’s proposed claims to be indefinite and one set to be obvious. The Fed. Cir. affirmed the Board’s ruling that the original claims were obvious but vacated the Board’s denial of Bosch’s contingent motion to substitute the amended claim set and remanded “for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” Even though the Board had provided some rationale for why the first group of claims proposed by Bosch was indefinite, the Fed. Cir. ruled as to both claim sets that the Board had impermissibly placed the burden of establishing the patentability of both proposed  claim sets on Bosch, in contravention to Aqua Products.

“See Aqua Products, 872 F.3d at 1311 (‘Where the challenger ceases to participate in the IPR and the Board proceeds to final judgment, it is the Board that must justify any finding of unpatentability by reference to evidence of record in the IPR’).”

Although not argued by the parties, the Fed. Cir. ruled that proposed amended claims could be challenged under s. 112.

Perhaps the most important sentence in the opinion is in the Fed. Cir.’s discussion of the Board’s erroneous holding that it was Bosch’s burden to establish the unobviousness of the proposed claims:

“In its final decision, the Board concluded that it was ‘unpersuaded that Bosch has demonstrated that the proposed substitute claims are patentable’  over the prior art… [Citing an earlier Board decision] the Board stated that ‘[t]he patent owner bears the burden of proof in demonstrating patentability of the proposed substitute claims over the prior art in general, and, thus, entitlement to add these claims to its patent.’”

Of course, this suggests that a failure of the Board or of the challenger to meet this burden of proof to demonstrate unpatentability would entitle the patent owner to add the substitute claims. This decision, strongly affirming Aqua Products,  tilts the legal playing field, to favor the patentee, even as it requires more work by the Board.

The Fed. Cir.’s analysis of the original (affirmed) obviousness rejection contains a very thorough discussion of the secondary factors of commercial success, licensing and acclaim by the industry, that I won’t try to summarize, except to note that these remain very difficult to “prove up” in an obviousness dispute, particularly if the patented technology is complex.

© 2017 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

Social Hosts Beware: “One More for the Road?” May Be a Bad Idea

The company was hosting its annual holiday party.  The company had arranged to hold the event that Saturday night in a hotel ballroom.  Moods were festive, especially because the company’s profits were up about 10%.  Because he enjoyed doing it and served as a freelance bartender in his spare time, one of the company’s new sales employees, Tom Collins, was helping to tend bar.

Much of the company’s success that year was attributable to the efforts of Johnny Walker, V.P. of Sales, who, for understandable reasons, was in a celebratory mood.  When he, at about 11 p.m., bellied up to the bar for a fourth round, Tom couldn’t help but notice that Johnny, normally the epitome of self-control, seemed more than a little impaired.  Tom said to Johnny, “Mr. Walker, with all due respect, don’t you think that it may be time to slow down?  In fact, given the hour, I’ll be happy to arrange a ride to take you home.”  Johnny, now irritated, replied “Tom, you make an excellent highball, but I’d be grateful if you’d mind your own business, OK?”  Tom did as he was asked and poured Walker another drink.  With that, Johnny, armed with another scotch and soda, disappeared into the crowd.

The next morning, Tom, to his shock, learned that Johnny had gotten into his Volvo to drive home and promptly collided with another driver.  The other driver, as a result, was seriously injured and remained hospitalized in a coma for about nine months.  He then died.

Candy is dandy, but liquor is quicker, so be careful out there . . .

May an employer with employees in North Carolina, in appropriate circumstances, be held liable for the malfeasance of its employees and, specifically, be held liable as a “social host” because one of its employees served alcohol to a person when the employee knew or should have known that the person was drunk and would soon be driving on public roads and might hurt or kill someone?

Absolutely.  The doctrine of “social host liability” was first declared in North Carolina about 25 years ago.  The North Carolina Supreme Court, in the 1992 case of Hart v. Ivey, ruled that the plaintiffs had stated a valid claim when they alleged that various defendants had been negligent in throwing a party at which beer was served to an 18-year-old, under circumstances in which the defendants knew or should have known that the young man was intoxicated at the time he was served, that he would drive a motor vehicle from the party, and that he was likely to injure someone.

The court wrote that it had not been able to find a North Carolina case dealing with similar facts, but concluded “that the principles of negligence established by our decisions require that we hold that the plaintiffs .  .  . have stated a claim.”  The court emphasized that it was not recognizing a new claim, but was merely applying the established elements of negligence to find that the plaintiffs stated claims recognized by law.

What had the plaintiffs claimed?  Only:

  • That “the defendants served an alcoholic beverage”;
  • To a person they knew or should have known was under the influence of alcohol; and,
  • That the defendants knew that person would shortly thereafter drive an automobile.

The court’s conclusions in Hart, if you think about them, aren’t surprising:

If proof of these allegations were offered into evidence, [then] the jury could find from such evidence that the defendants had done something a reasonable man would not do and were negligent.  The jury could also find that a man of ordinary prudence would have known that such or some similar injurious result was reasonably foreseeable from this negligent conduct.  The jury could find from this that the negligent conduct was the proximate cause of the injury to plaintiffs.

Sadly, the court later had occasion to encounter just such a claim brought by the estate of a man killed by an employee who had attended a party for a retiring supervisor at the home of an officer of the employer.  In the 1995 case of Camalier v. Jeffries, the employer sponsored the party and hired a catering company to help with food and drink service and another company to handle parking arrangements.  The catering company and a company that it hired supplied all of the bartenders at the party.

The employee downed three or four gin and tonics and then decided to leave, and was taken by van to his car.  He then drove his car into an automobile whose driver suffered serious injuries and then died of the injuries about nine months later.  Within two hours after the time of the accident, a blood sample was drawn from the employee showing that his blood-alcohol concentration was well over the legal limit.

In ruling on the case, the North Carolina Supreme Court reiterated the elements of “social-host liability” that it had declared in Hart.  In Camalier, the defendant company and one of its officers dodged liability, but only because the evidence was insufficient to show that they knew or should have known that the employee was hammered when he was served alcohol at the officer’s home.

The court observed that there was no question that the defendant employer and its officer caused alcohol to be served to the employee and knew or should have known that the employee would be driving an automobile after the party.  Thus, the first and third factors set forth in Hart were not in dispute.  But the court also found that the predicted evidence didn’t show that either the employer or the officer knew or should have known that the employee was drunk when he was being served.

The impaired employee who caused injury in Camalier had been served by a vendor hired by the employer rather than by an employee of the defendant employer.  It appears that North Carolina’s appellate courts have not yet held an employer liable as a “social host” based on the actions of an employee, but the circumstances in which a court may do so are not difficult to imagine.  Such liability can arise from an employer-hosted event at a restaurant, country club, pub, or similar establishment.  The location will not matter and a court is likely to find employer liability if there is proof that an employee, under circumstances intended to promote the interests of the employer, served alcohol to a person when the employee, or its representative, knew or should have known that the person was intoxicated and would soon be driving and that a third-party was injured as a result.

The Supreme Court of New Mexico, addressing such an issue, highlighted the principles of employers’ and employees’ liability as “social hosts” where the host purchases liquor and causes it to be served to a guest and, as a result, a third person is injured.  In the 2011 case of Delfino vs. Griffo, employees of a pharmaceutical company, in the course of their employment, entertained a physician’s employee in several restaurants.  The guest consumed considerable alcohol, became very intoxicated, departed in her car, and shortly thereafter caused a fatal accident.

The New Mexico court, discussing liability as a “social host,” observed:

Social hosting need not occur in a home; one may host in a bar or restaurant where the actual delivery of alcoholic beverages to the guests is performed by a licensed server.  Factors that are key to determining whether one is a social host in a public establishment are whether the alleged social host exercised control over the alcohol consumed by the guests; whether the alleged social host convened the gathering for a specific purpose or benefit to the alleged social host, such as promoting business good will; and whether the alleged host intended to act as ‘host’ of the event, meaning arrange for the service of and full payment for all food and beverages served to the guests.

The New Mexico court found, based on the facts of the Delfino case, that the employer was a “social host” for the drunk driver and, in such capacity, the employer could be sued and held liable.

Bring your carrier along for the ride . . .

Employers may consider purchasing general liability insurance to insure them against losses arising from the provision of alcohol by their employees to an intoxicated driver who then causes injury or death.  A typical general liability insurance policy includes a business liability provision that will pay for damages arising from causing or contributing to the intoxication of a third party, so long as the insured entity is not in the business of manufacturing, distributing, selling, or furnishing alcoholic beverages.  Employers can also buy a one-time special event policy if their current insurance doesn’t provide that kind of coverage.

Employers may also try to insulate themselves from “social host” liability by hiring professional caterers or bartenders who maintain such general liability insurance coverage, so that the employer, if it encounters a “social host” liability claim, may at least try to pass the liability to the caterer’s or bartender’s insurance carrier.

Employers should bear in mind, however, if tragedy occurs and litigation ensues, that it is the employer—not the insurance company—that will be sued, and that having insurance does not mean that the employer is immunized from liability.  It means only that the insurance carrier may have to pay if the employer is found liable (or, more likely, if the employer convinces the carrier to pay a pre-trial settlement to enable the employer to avoid an embarrassing lawsuit).  Moreover, a policy’s limits of liability are not always high enough to cover all claims.  The amount of liability can exceed the limits, in which case the employer, if held liable as a “social host,” can, to one degree or another, be on its own to pay a settlement or judgment.

Conclusion

One useful tip for employers who want to celebrate with their employees and host social events at which alcohol is served is to limit the access to alcohol, such as by setting limits on how much or how long alcohol is served at the event.  You can’t mandate good judgment, but you can decide how much temptation you’re willing to pour.

 

© 2017 Ward and Smith, P.A..
This post was written by Grant B. Osborne of Ward and Smith, P.A..
Read more Labor and Employment News on the National Law Review’s Labor and Employment Practice Group page.