Tag: Litigation

IMS Insights Podcast: Episode 16-How Attorneys Can Leverage Trial Presentation Consultants to Advance Cases Amid COVID-19

In this episode of the IMS Insights Podcast, we speak with trial presentation advisor Jeff Dahm about utilizing trial presentation consultants amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

 Teresa Barber: Jeff, I want to welcome you. Thank you for being our guest today on the IMS Insights Podcast.

Jeff Dahm: Great. Thanks for having me.

Barber: Tell us a little bit about your background. How did you first become interested in trial presentation?

Dahm: Well, I graduated from college in 1996 and I got a job. I went to the career center. There was no internet in ’96, so I got a job. I went to the career center, found a job at a jury consulting firm as a research analyst and I didn’t know really much about the law and I definitely hadn’t been in a courtroom at that point in my life but I went right in and I worked for a pretty prominent jury consultant setting up jury research projects around the country and it was really fascinating. It was new for me. I didn’t know anything about this and I knew it was for me. I mean I was always a very technical person. I was always setting up computers and helping people with their stuff and their computers and on the emerging edge of computers always but I didn’t really work in computers then.

Dahm: So, when I was working at this jury consulting firm, there was a woman who had her boyfriend was starting up a company that did trial presentation. Well, I didn’t know what trial presentation was, so she’s like, “I know you’d be great with him. Why don’t you go meet him?” So, I went to his office and met him and they hired me and then I started being … Working in trial presentation. So, it was … I made the shift from jury consulting. I mean I knew I liked trial consulting for sure. I knew it was a job for me, I just didn’t think that the jury consulting job was the right fit at that point in my career. So, I used all my technical skills and got this job and so what we did was we started doing trial presentation around the country and it was pretty new in the early 90s.

Dahm: In the mid-90s, it was really new. I mean there wasn’t a lot of trial presentation. It’s like I always had this desire to perform and to be on stage but I have no talent. I can’t sing and I can’t dance but I knew this was my performance. This was my way to be performing because I was really technical and I was really good at being technical and being good under pressure. So, when I started doing this, this satisfied my performance itch that I’ve always had and I loved it and it was just great and I knew that this was going to be my career.

Barber: I was going to say, it sounds like you walked right into the fire and at a really early stage and-

Dahm: I did.

Barber: That role, so there really wasn’t a whole lot of … In terms of best practices and models, you’ve really had to be there at the forefront for a lot of that.

Dahm: Yeah, it was really exciting. It was just … I graduated with a degree in environmental analysis and design and thought I was going to save the world and all of a sudden, I’m in this new career and I was like wow, this is exciting. Traveling the country, setting up courtrooms, working with attorneys. I mean I was 23 years old and this was truly exciting for me. I mean it was just … I was over the moon about this job, this new job I had.

Barber: So, kind of the nexus too of technology, which is a passion, right? And then like you said that so much on the line for presentation in the middle of a trial. What exactly … And I’m sure that it’s evolved too, right? Since the mid-90s, late 90s to today, what are the fundamentals? What does a trial … A hot seat consultant, a trial technician do?

Dahm: Sure. Well, as a basis that hasn’t changed in the 25 years I’ve been in the business, what hasn’t changed is that you’re putting on a show and you’re responsible for everything that the jury and the judge see and it’s a big, big responsibility but that’s your job and so your job is to organize the evidence in your trial presentation software and help the attorney put together the show that you’re going to put on in the courtroom. So, you’ve got to do run throughs, you practice the night before. You make sure you have all of your highlights ready. You make sure you have your deposition clips. It’s putting together any sort of evidence that you would ever need to show a jury and organizing it and being able to call it up really fast in the courtroom and that really hasn’t changed much over the 25 years. That’s the job.

Dahm: I mean sometimes you do less, clients want to do more. Sometimes you do a lot more. Sometimes you’re full throttle. Sometimes you just set it up for them and they go on their own, but it just depends. It’s just all-encompassing in trial for the evidence.

Barber: Very interesting. It sounds like there’s a lot that leads up to it, right? It’s not just showing up and-

Dahm: No.

Barber: You’re putting a presentation forward, how important is a focused strategy for trial presentation? Does that matter?

Dahm: Yeah. Oh sure. I mean every trial presentation consultant has their own sort of method of operation that they do. For me, it’s getting in with the client very early, making sure that they know that I’m here to help them and I’m going to take care of everything, being very organized with anything they give you that they request that you want, you reply back fast. You have to reply fast. You have to get the work done quick and you have to be very efficient and also, you have to be able to speak to attorneys very well. So, that’s the key is you have to be able to roll right into their world and be able to talk and work just as though you were one of them.

Dahm: So, you’re going to different attorneys all around and everybody has different work styles and so the key of a great trial presentation consultant is to be able to meld into the trial team that you’re working with and that is the most important thing. I now schedule a lot of trial techs for courtroom trials and what’s really important in a strategy is a culture fit, to make sure that this tech fits in with you, that you kind of click because I find that the clients that I do the best job for, I click with them. There’s just like a bond, kind of like something you can’t explain like when you meet someone, you click, if you click, then you’re great but I can also make myself click if I have to and that’s the differentiation in a great trial presentation consultant is you blend in, you make yourself blend in in order to let them trust you so that you can be effective in court.

Barber: I was going to say because there’s a lot of trust that gets put in you or in a trial consultant technician because there’s … Really, that attorney has to be able to say, okay, I know that this needs to appear at this point and you’ve got to be able to pick up those cues, so that’s really interesting to have.

Dahm: You have to be able to click, yeah there has to be trust, you’re right. You’re so right that trust is key. Your whole case, their whole case kind of depends on you, what comes up on the screen. So, when you meet these clients the first time, you have to come in there showing them that you can command the room, you can command a presentation and you can get the job done and those are the really key things that I look for in consultants too when we’re placing them with attorneys is they have to be forward. They have to be forward thinkers. They have to be proactive people because those are the ones that do the best in court.

Barber: Yeah. And I want to ask you too, because we’re here, Jeff, in the middle of summer 2020 and we are in a … Really, in a lot of ways, what’s an unprecedented time, a lot of concern everywhere for colleagues, for communities dealing with COVID-19. It’s also the pandemic, we have a global pandemic, placed an unprecedented amount of stress on the court system and we’ve even seen remote trials popping up. First, it was remote hearings, lately remote trials in some places like throughout California. Can you talk to me a little bit about what you’ve been seeing from clients, what you’ve been hearing from the ground and how important it might be for a dedicated trial presentation consultant or someone with that expertise when you’re thinking about what that completely visual and virtual setting … Can you talk to me about what you’re hearing?

Dahm: Yeah, so as I’m sure everybody has realized in the past few months being at home is that most people are not fully comfortable with the scenario of talking to people over a video conference. It’s not natural. It could be exhausting. There’s a lot of other layers that people don’t realize that come with that. As a consultant working around the country, I have been and trial presentation consultants have been working in video conferences, working at this method for years now and this is a very comfortable place for us to be. This is … And also, when you are presenting, because … Okay, so courtrooms that … Most courtrooms are now pushing towards having Zoom hearings, having Skype hearings. This is a really, really common thing that’s happening more and more and I tell you, if a courtroom is not doing it now, they’re going to be doing it soon.

Dahm: This is the way of the immediate future for the next few years and you need to be prepared and when you’re giving an argument, just like in court, there’s a lot of things to think about beyond your argument and you should let a consultant handle that for you. Let your trial presentation consultant run your PowerPoint. You have to let them help and we can display in a video conference the same as we can in court. You can put things up. You can share the screen and this is something that trial techs and trial presentation consultations are good at, manipulating multiple different views for things to go on the screen, coordinating with people and tech. I mean this is our wheelhouse. So, you are doing yourself a huge favor by having the trial presentation consultant on a call for you in a hearing. I mean it’s invaluable as far as I can see.

Barber: Yeah, I was going to ask you, so it sounds like some of the same principles that you apply in trial presentation in a physical courtroom, how, can you talk to us about how you apply those fundamentals and those principles to help clients prepare and move cases along right now?

Dahm: Sure. Well, and I’ve heard this from my clients too, the cases are not going away. Even though, the public … The in-person hearings are not happening, the cases aren’t going away. They’re still moving forward. You’re still going to have to go forward with your discovery. You have to … Your expert witness disclosures, I mean everything is still happening. So, it’s important that you use your trial consultants as you always would to help move your case forward. Send them your video if you have video depositions that need to be prepared. It still has to happen. Let’s say you have to submit your video deposition designations for your trial that’s in July, that still has to happen. These consultants, and we’re ready to go, we are ready to help you just like we always are when you got to be in court. We are just as ready to help you with your online hearing. I mean it’s just as important, so you should treat it that way.

Barber: And we’re seeing … We’re kind of touching on this, you mentioned like just a lot of hearings moving to Zoom or Skype and if we’re not seeing that now, brace for it because it’s coming. So, what tools and resources would you recommend right now for litigators or attorneys just preparing for a virtual in-court scenario, maybe don’t have one scheduled yet but want to be prepared?

Dahm: So, we are all doing our homework here on the presentation side. I know all the trial techs that we work with and also everybody at my firm, other consultants in general, we’re all doing our homework and we’re all making sure that you all can … That the attorneys can do all of their hearings online. I know that we’ve done a lot of Zoom hearings so far. I know that some consultants are creating a virtual courtroom scenario in order to have everybody log in. I mean there’s just … There’s really a lot of work been going on, on the consultant side to make it easier for clients when they do have the hearings. So, reach out to your consultants because they want to help you and they also know what’s happening. They know. They have their pulse on the industry, especially this ever-changing industry as we speak. So, they want to help you and they’re very, very eager to help. Trust me, I’m one of them.

Barber: Jeff, could you … Are you seeing anything about how you think that the pandemic is potentially affecting software that’s used in the firm and the platforms in the industry?

Dahm: Definitely, sure. So, trial presentation software has evolved over the years, but I feel like this is going to cause it to evolve even more. I mean I’ve been testing a lot of software, all of our software that we do use in court to see that it works on a Zoom hearing and it does but I feel like now, the trial presentation software, they’re going to start to create another layer in their software for online hearings because to make sure it’s not buggy because you are still doing a presentation over the internet through another platform and I would think that these trial presentation software companies are going to align with Zoom and create a software to present with Zoom. I mean these are things that I can see coming down the pipe that will be really exciting. I feel like this, as we know, necessity is the mother of invention and this is going to force companies that make trial presentation software to incorporate the video conferencing aspect to it to make it a little easier for us trial presentation consultants.

Dahm: I mean we can do it now. I can display a PowerPoint. I can click through. I mean I’m quite fluid with it on a video call because I do it all the time. I can click through OnCue. I’ve had a couple of Markman so far online that I was able to click through my documents, go back in my PowerPoint. It’s very fluid. However, I see there’s a couple of points that could be better and I know in the next six months, you’re going to start seeing PowerPoint coming out with online things in integrating into their online applications, same with OnCue, Trial Director, pretty much all these things that we use in court, they’re going to have to start talking to Zoom because I know they’re going to want to make it easier for everybody, which is great. So, it’s just really great but us consultants are on that pulse, so if anybody gives me a call, I can tell you what’s going on.

Barber: Hold on, I want to ask you, you raised that suggestion, thinking about the other hot seat operators, the industry, a lot of independent contractors that maybe don’t work with a firm like IMS or The Focal Point, what advice do you have for other folks in the industry right now with so many courts closed?

Dahm: Yeah, so you have to pivot your skills. I mean as a trial presentation consultant, you understand that you have certain skills. You can work under pressure. You can work technically under pressure. You can display evidence fast. I mean these are all things that are going to be needed to do in a video conference hearing too. Assisting in these online hearings is going to be crucial. I mean I think that since this is the beginning of this online hearing generation, clients are going to be slow to react at first, just like in general with the trial presentation consultant.

Dahm: You’re slow to bring people on and then once you have your first hearing and you realize that your PowerPoint is not displayed effectively, then you’re going to give us a call. So, also, a lot of independent trial presentation consultants can record online depositions. That’s a thing that I’ve seen a lot of trial techs that are getting into right now is to assist clients in online depositions. So that’s been a big thing for a couple of my consultants I work with too.

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Court Rejected A Trustee’s Objection To Personal Jurisdiction In His Individual Capacity But Affirmed The Objection In His Capacity As Trustee

In Hanschen v. Hanschen, a trustee challenged a default judgment. No. 05-19-01134-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 4075 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 28, 2020, no pet. history). The family sued the trustee in his personal capacity and in his capacity as trustee for breaching fiduciary duties. While the trustee was in Texas, the family served him in his personal capacity. The family then obtained a default judgment against him in both capacities when he did not file an answer. Later, the trustee filed a special appearance challenging the court’s personal jurisdiction, and the trial granted the motion. The family then appealed.

The court of appeals reversed the special appearance against the trustee in his personal capacity. The court held that because the trustee was personally served in Texas, the trial court had personal jurisdiction over him:

In this case, the family personally served James with the petition and citation while he was in Texas. The family concedes they “have never asserted that Texas has general jurisdiction over James or that the traditional minimum contacts analysis would be met in the absence of his physical presence.” They are correct and the case law is clear that a trial court has authority to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident where the court’s jurisdiction grew out of the personal service of citation upon the nonresident within the state. A nonresident, merely by reason of his nonresidence, is not exempt from a court’s jurisdiction if he voluntarily comes to the state and thus is within the territorial limits of such jurisdiction and can be duly served with process.

Id. The trustee also argued that the court did not have adequate jurisdiction over him in his personal capacity because there were no claims against him in that capacity, but the court of appeals disagreed:

While we may agree with James that the default judgment granted relief against the entities for which it would be necessary for Texas courts to have jurisdiction over James in representative capacities, the family’s petition pleaded causes of action against James individually for breaches of fiduciary duties arising from his role as trustee of the Progeny Trust and his roles in NBR-C2, NBR-C3, and NBR-Needham. The family seeks exemplary damages against James for these alleged breaches of fiduciary duties. James does not make a specific argument why these claims are not pleaded against him personally. In Texas, generally an agent is personally liable for his own tortious conduct. For these reasons, we agree with the family that James was personally served with process in Texas, so the trial court has personal jurisdiction over him in that capacity.

Id.

The court of appeals then turned to whether the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the trustee in his capacity as trustee. The court noted that the citation was not issued to him in that capacity. The court held that this defect was dispositive and affirmed the special appearance for the trustee in his representative capacity:

We have held, “[t]he capacity in which a non-resident has contact with a forum state must be considered in the jurisdictional analysis.” James was not served with a citation directed to him in any representative capacity; only “JAMES HANSCHEN WHEREEVER HE MAY BE FOUND.” At oral argument, the family argued the listing of all the parties in the citation was sufficient to constitute service on James in each representative capacity he was listed as a defendant. We reject this contention and the family’s counsel acknowledged in oral argument a citation addressed to one defendant inadvertently served on a different, unrelated defendant would not constitute good service of process merely because all defendants’ names were in the list of defendants in the style of the lawsuit… In this case, James was not served with citations which were returned to the court clerk stating he had been served in his representative capacities. Any failure to comply with the rules regarding service of process renders the attempted service of process invalid, and the trial court acquires no personal jurisdiction over the defendant. A default judgment based on improper service is void. Accordingly, the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over James in his representative capacities.

Id.

© 2020 Winstead PC.

“Caveat Emptor”: New York Bankruptcy Court Disallows Bankruptcy Claims Purchased from Recipients of Avoidable Transfers; Is Enron Going, Going, . . . ?

A recent Bankruptcy Court decision, In re Firestar Diamond, Inc., out of the Southern District of New York (“SDNY”) by Bankruptcy Judge Sean H. Lane, disallowed creditors’ bankruptcy claims purchased from sellers who allegedly received (and had not repaid) avoidable preferences and fraudulent transfers from the debtors.1 Judge Lane provides a cogent warning to claims purchasers that they bear the risk of Bankruptcy Code section 502(d) disallowance.

Judge Lane based the Firestar Diamond decision on Bankruptcy Code section 502(d), which mandates disallowance of claims of an entity that has received property that the estate may recover (e.g., avoidable transfers) unless that entity or its transferee has repaid the avoidable or recoverable amount.2  Further, in so ruling, Judge Lane aligned his Court with the view of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in In re KB Toys Inc.3  There, when faced with the same issue, the Third Circuit held that the taint of section 502(d) disallowance risk travels with the claim itself and the taint cannot be cleansed through a subsequent transfer of the claim to a third-party transferee.

Notably, in reaching its holding in Firestar Diamond, Judge Lane rejected a holding by a District Court in its own district.  Thirteen years ago, in the aftermath of the Enron bankruptcy, District Court Judge Shira Scheindlin held that Bankruptcy Code section 502(d) is a “personal disability and does not travel with the ‘claim,’ but with the ‘claimant.’”  In a decision that was regarded as a boon to the secondary bankruptcy claims trading market, Judge Scheindlin ruled that purchasers of claims (not mere assignees) would take free from the risk of section 502(d) disallowance.4 The District Court vacated the Bankruptcy Court’s order disallowing claims and remanded to determine the nature of the transfer.  If the transfer were a sale, rather than an assignment, it would not be disallowed under section 502(d).5  But the Enron decision found few adherents.  Firestar Diamond joins a lengthening line of decisions criticizing or declining to follow it.

Some risk mitigation suggestions are set forth in the “Implications” section below.

Background:

In Firestar Diamond, the Debtors were three wholesalers of jewelry – Firestar Diamond, Inc., Fantasy, Inc., and A. Jaffee, Inc. (collectively, “Firestar” or the “Debtors”) – who sold mainly to department stores and specialty chain stores in the United States.  Firestar filed for Chapter 11 protection in February of 2018 in the SDNY in the “shadows of an alleged massive fraud” conducted by Firestar’s owner, Nirav Modi, who allegedly used a number of shadow entities (“Non-debtor Entities”) to pose as independent third parties in sham transactions in order to obtain billions of dollars in bank financing.

The SDNY Bankruptcy Court appointed an examiner to look into these allegations.  The examiner found “substantial evidence” of the Debtors’ “knowledge and involvement” in the alleged criminal conduct.  As a result, the court appointed a Chapter 11 trustee to administer the Debtors’ estates.6

A number of banks filed proofs of claims in the Chapter 11 case.  The banks’ claims were not based on their dealings with the Debtors.  Instead, the banks’ claims were based on amounts that the Debtors owed to the Non-debtor Entities, which had pledged their receivables or sold their invoices to the banks at a discounted price for amounts the Debtors owed.7 

The Chapter 11 trustee objected to the banks’ claims under section 502(d) because the claims had been acquired from claim sellers who had received fraudulent transfers and preferences from the Debtors.  The banks opposed the trustee’s argument based on Enron, arguing instead that “disallowance under Section 502(d) is a personal disability and does not travel with the ‘claim,’ but with the ‘claimant’” and that the banks had “acquired rights to payment from the Debtors through a ‘sale’ rather than an ‘assignment’.” Therefore, the claims had been washed clean.8

In contrast, the trustee argued that “sale” or “assignment” was of no import and urged the Court to reject Enron and follow rulings by other courts, including the Third Circuit’s decision in KB Toys.  In the trustee’s view, the banks’ claims should be treated the same as if they had been filed by the Non-debtor Entities and disallowed.

Ultimately, Judge Lane agreed with the trustee and held that the banks’ claims should be disallowed because section 502(d) focuses on the claims themselves rather than who holds them. The original claims were disallowable and, therefore, remained disallowable even after their sale to the banks.

Enron and KB Toys:

Enron and KB Toys represent opposing views interpreting section 502(d).  Generally, Enron attributed disallowance under section 502(d) to the claimant rather than a feature that transfers with a claim. On the other hand, KB Toys viewed section 502(d) disallowance as an attribute of the claim and therefore a feature that travels with the claim upon transfer.

In Enron, the court also held that when a claim is transferred, the “nature of that transfer” will dictate whether there may be a disallowance under section 502(d).  Indeed, a transfer of a claim by assignment would allow the personal disability to transfer with the claim because an assignee “stands in the shoes of the assignor” and would, therefore, take on the transferred property with “whatever limitations it had in the hands of the assignor[.]”  Meanwhile, a transfer by a sale would allow the purchaser only to receive the claim, washing the claim of the disability.  Judge Scheindlin reasoned that recovery of property under the threat of section 502(d) disallowance would not be achieved if the claim was held by a creditor who had not received the preference.9

KB Toys rejected the distinction between “assignment” and “sale,” noting that there is no support for this distinction in the Bankruptcy Code.  The Third Circuit concluded that “claims that are disallowable under [section] 502(d) must be disallowed no matter who holds them.”10  The Third Circuit reasoned that allowing a claim originally held by the recipient of a fraudulent or preferential transfer to be washed clean of section 502(d) disabilities would “contravene” the purpose of section 502(d), “which is to ensure equality of distribution of estate assets.”11  If the original claimant could rid the claim of its disabilities by selling the claim to a transferee, trustees would be “deprive[d] . . . of one of the tools the Bankruptcy Code gives trustees to collect assets—asking the bankruptcy court to disallow problematic claims.”12

A number of other courts and scholars alike have agreed with the Third Circuit, thereby concluding that section 502 follows the claim rather than the claimant.13

In re Firestar Diamond:

Judge Lane’s recent decision in Firestar Diamond continues that trend.  Indeed, Firestar Diamond adopted KB Toys’ reasoning and rejected the banks’ position and reliance on Enron.14  Judge Lane, focusing on the claims rather than the claimants, granted the trustee’s section 502(d) claim objections.  The banks’ claims were tainted by fraudulent and preferential transfers received by participants in Firestar’s bank fraud scheme.  Those Non-debtor Entities could not cleanse their other claims against the debtor by selling them to third parties, unless they repaid the avoidable transfers.

In addition, Judge Lane rebuffed the banks’ argument that disallowance of their claims would “wreak havoc in the claims trading market or unfairly punish good faith transferees.”  Rather, the Court explained that it would be “inequitable” to favor the banks over other creditors.15

Following KB Toys, Judge Lane thus concluded that claims purchasers should bear that risk because (i) they voluntarily chose to participate in the bankruptcy and were aware of the risks of doing so, and (ii) they are able to mitigate that risk through due diligence and including an indemnity clause in the transfer agreement.  On the other hand, other creditors in a bankruptcy “have no way to protect themselves against the risk that claims with otherwise avoidable transfers will be washed clean by a sale or assignment.”16

Implications

Firestar Diamond continues the trend of disallowing creditor claims acquired from sellers who received avoidable or preferential transfers from the debtor. In light of yet another decision coming out this way, claims purchasers need to transact with eyes wide open and be mindful of potential consequences pursuant to section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Duly informed claims purchasers may mitigate some risk by, among other things, considering the following measures:

  • Conduct due diligence with the goal of aiming to minimize disallowance risk under section 502(d) by investigating and inquiring into the seller’s relationship and transactions with the debtor.
  • Consider including protections in claim transfer agreements, such as indemnification language in the event of a claim objection based on section 502(d).
  • Consider documenting transfers as “sales” rather than assignments to take advantage of whatever protection or benefit the Enron rationale may still bestow and provide.

1   In re Firestar Diamond, Inc., et al., No. 18-10509 (SHL), 2020 WL 1934896 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2020) (“Firestar Diamond”).

2   Section 502(d) provides, in part, “[T]he court shall disallow any claim of an entity from which property is recoverable under section 542, 543, 550, or 553 of this title or that is a transferee of a transfer avoidable under section 522(f), 522(h), 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title, unless such entity or transferee has paid the amount, or turned over any such property, for which such entity or transferee is liable under section 522(i), 542, 543, 550, or 553 or this title.”

3   736 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2013) (“KB Toys”).

4 Judge Scheindlin limited protection from section 502(d) disallowance to claims held by creditors who acquired their claims by “sale” rather than “assignment.”  The District Court reasoned that a transfer by assignment will not grant the assignee more rights than possessed by the assignor – an assignee “stands in the shoes of the assignor” and takes with the assignor’s limitations.  379 B.R. at 435.  But a claim that is “sold” is not subject to the personal disabilities of the transferor.  Id. at 436.

5   In re Enron Corp., 379 B.R. 425, 445-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Enron”) (“the nature of the transfer will determine whether [the] claims can be subject to . . . disallowance based on [Debtor]’s conduct”).  The Third Circuit, other courts, and bankruptcy commentators have questioned the distinction between “sale and “assignment,” finding it “problematic” and unsupported by state law.  See KB Toys, 736 F.3d at 254; Firestar Diamond, 2020 WL 1934896 at *9-12.

6   Firestar Diamond, 2020 WL 1934896 at *2-3.

7   Id. at *4 n.3.

8   Id. at *4-6.

9   Enron, 379 B.R. at 443 (The purpose of section 502(d) is to “coerce the return of assets obtained by preferential transfer. That purpose would not be served if a claim in the hands of a claimant could be disallowed even where that claimant had never received the preference to begin with, and as a result, could not be coerced to return it. It seems implausible that Congress would have intended such a result.”).

10 KB Toys, 736 F.3d at 252.

11 Id. at 252.

12 Id.

13 See Firestar Diamond, 2020 WL 1934896 at *10-11 (collecting cases and scholarly articles); In re Motors Liquidation Co., 529 B.R. 520 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015); In re Wash. Mut., Inc., 461 B.R. 200 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011), vacated in part on other grounds, 2012 WL 1563880 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 24, 2012); Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy Markets: Making Sense of Claims Trading, 4 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 67, 92 (2009); Jennifer W. Crastz, Can a Claims Purchaser Receive Better Rights (Or Worse Rights) Than Its Transferor in a Bankruptcy?, 29 Cal. Bankr. J. 365, 637 (2007); Roger G. Jones & William L. Norton, III, Norton Creditor’s Rights Handbook § 8:8 (2008).

14 Firestar Diamond, 2020 WL 1934896 at *9.

15 Id.

16 Id. at *13-14.

© Copyright 2020 Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

Veterans Affairs Case Offers Clarification on WPA Burden of Proof

In Sistek v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 955 F.3d 948, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2020), the Federal Circuit clarified a federal whistleblower’s burden of proving retaliation when the discrimination he alleges is not specifically identified as a prohibited personnel action in the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (“WPA”), 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). The WPA protects federal employees who disclose evidence of illegal or improper government activities. Under the WPA, an agency may not take or threaten to take certain personnel actions because of a protected disclosure by an employee.

This blog reviews the elements of a WPA claim, then discusses how Sistek affects these proof requirements when the retaliation consists, in part, of subjecting the employee to an internal investigation.

Background on the Whistleblower Protection Act

To state a claim under WPA, an employee must allege that (1) there was a disclosure or activity protected under the WPA; (2) there was a personnel action authorized for relief under the WPA; and (3) the protected disclosure or activity was a contributing factor to the personnel action. See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1). If the appellant makes out a prima facie case, the agency is given an opportunity to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the protected disclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2); see Fellhoelter v. Department of Agriculture, 568 F.3d 965, 970–71 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The WPA is a “remedial statute,” and its terms are to be construed “broadly.” Weed v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 113 M.S.P.R. 221, 227 (2010). See also Fishbein v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 102 M.S.P.R. 4, 8 (2006) (“Because the WPA is remedial legislation, the Board will construe its provisions liberally to embrace all cases fairly within its scope, so as to effectuate the purpose of the Act.”).

A. Protected Disclosures

An employee engages in a protected disclosure when he or she makes a formal or informal communication of information that he or she reasonably believes evidences “any violation of any law, rule, or regulation” or “gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health and safety.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A). The WPA also protects disclosures that an employee reasonably believes are evidence of censorship related to research, analysis, or technical information that the employee believes is, or will cause, either a “violation of law, rule or regulation” or “gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.” Pub. L. No. 112-199, sec. 110, 126 Stat. 1465 (Nov. 27, 2012). Protected disclosures include those made to a supervisor or to a person who participated in the activity that was the subject of the disclosure, as well as those made “during the normal course of duties of an employee.” Id.; Day v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 119 M.S.P.R. 589, 599 (2013).

The WPA defines a “disclosure” very broadly. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(D) (“‘disclosure’ means a formal or informal communication or transmission”). The relevant inquiry is whether an employee “reasonably believed” that the disclosure evinces a violation of any law, rule, or regulation; gross mismanagement; gross waste of funds; abuse of authority, or; a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. See, e.g., Miller v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 2009 WL 1445346 (M.S.P.B. May 4, 2009) (employee’s criticisms of new policies were protected disclosures under WPA because he reasonably believed that these policy changes would pose a substantial and specific danger to public safety).

B. Personnel Action

Under the Whistleblower Protection Act, a “personnel action” may refer to:

  1. an appointment;

  2. a promotion;
  3. an action under chapter 75 of this title or other disciplinary or corrective action;
  4. a detail, transfer, or reassignment;
  5. a reinstatement;
  6. a restoration;
  7. a reemployment;
  8. a performance evaluation under chapter 43 of this title or under title 38;
  9. a decision concerning pay, benefits, or awards, or concerning education or training if the education or training may reasonably be expected to lead to an appointment, promotion, performance evaluation, or other action described in this subparagraph;
  10. a decision to order psychiatric testing or examination;
  11. the implementation or enforcement of any nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement; and
  12. any other significant change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions;
  13. 5 USCA § 2302(a)(2)(A). The list is comprehensive, and covers a wide swath of adverse personnel actions.

C. Contributing Factor

Under the “knowledge/timing test,” an individual may demonstrate that a protected disclosure was a contributing factor to a personnel action through circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that the official taking the personnel action knew of the whistleblowing disclosure and took the personnel action within a period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the personnel action. See Atkinson v. Dep’t of State, 107 M.S.P.R. 136, 141 (2007) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1)).

However, whistleblowing activities may still be a contributing factor in the taking or failure to take a personnel action, even absent evidence that the deciding official had knowledge of the whistleblowing activities. See Dorney v. Dep’t of Army, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, 485–86 (2012). If the deciding official was influenced by one with knowledge of the whistleblowing activities, then such activities may be a contributing factor to personnel actions under the WPA. Id.

Sistek v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs

A. Facts and Procedural History

Between 2012 and 2014, Leonard Sistek, Jr., then-director at the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”), disclosed information to agency staff, one of his supervisors, and the VA’s Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) about inappropriate financial practice within the VA. Shortly thereafter, his supervisor appointed an Administrative Investigation Board (“AIB”) to investigate unrelated misconduct within the organization. His supervisor formally added Mr. Sistek as a subject of the investigation.

The AIB investigation found that the management team, which included Mr. Sistek, failed to report allegations about an inappropriate sexual relationship between two other staff members, and it recommended that Mr. Sistek receive “an admonishment or reprimand.” Consistent with the recommendation, Mr. Sistek’s supervisor issued a letter of reprimand in August 2014. In January 2015, without explanation, Mr. Sistek’s second-level supervisor rescinded the letter of reprimand and expunged it from Mr. Sistek’s record. In March 2015, the OIG confirmed that the concerns previously raised by Mr. Sistek were justified, and that the VA had violated appropriations law and used funds in unauthorized ways.

Mr. Sistek filed a complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (“OSC”), alleging whistleblower reprisal. After OSC issued a closure letter, Mr. Sistek filed an individual right of action appeal.

The Administrative Judge (“AJ”), considered whether the investigation and resulting letter of reprimand constituted prohibited personnel actions. The AJ determined that a retaliatory investigation is not a personnel action under the WPA and declined to order corrective action in favor of Mr. Sistek. See Sistek v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 2018 MSPB LEXIS 3010 (M.S.P.B. Aug. 8, 2018). The AJ’s initial decision became the final decision of the MSPB, and Mr. Sistek petitioned the Federal Circuit for review.

B. The Federal Circuit’s Finding of Harmless Error

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision. First, it reasoned that the WPA’s list of eleven specific personnel actions does not mention a “retaliatory investigation,” or indeed, “any investigation at all.” Sistek v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 955 F.3d 948, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Second, the court found that the investigation against Mr. Sistek did not significantly alter his job or working conditions, and thus did not fall within the last catchall provision of the WPA’s list of personnel actions. “[I]nvestigations may qualify as personnel actions ‘if they result in a significant change in job duties, responsibilities, or working conditions.’” Sistek, 955 F.3d at 955 (quoting S. Rep. No. 112-155, at 20 (2012)). The court elaborated that in certain circumstances, “an investigation alone could constitute a significant change in working condition,” or “a retaliatory investigation could contribute toward the creation of a hostile work environment that is actionable as a significant change in working conditions.” Id. In such circumstances, a retaliatory investigation would be a qualifying personnel action under the WPA. The Sistek Court held, however, that the investigation did not establish a significant change in working conditions because Mr. Sistek was interviewed once, did not offer evidence of a hostile work environment, and the resulting letter of reprimand was later rescinded and expunged. See id. at 956.

Third, the court considered Mr. Sistek’s effort to bring his claim within the rationale of controlling precedent on retaliatory investigations. See Russell v. Dep’t of Justice, 76 M.S.P.R. 317 (1997). In Russell, a whistleblower disclosed misconduct by two of his superiors, after which, one of the superiors initiated an investigation of the whistleblower’s conduct, resulting in disciplinary charges against the whistleblower and the whistleblower’s demotion. Id. at 321. The Board held that the agency investigation was evidence of prohibited retaliation because the investigation was “so closely related to the personnel action that it could have been a pretext for gathering evidence to retaliate, and the agency [did] not show by clear and convincing evidence that the evidence would have been gathered absent the protected disclosure.” Id. at 324. “That the investigation itself is conducted in a fair and impartial manner, or that certain acts of misconduct are discovered during the investigation, does not relieve an agency of its obligation to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the protected disclosure.” Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2)). In other words, if an agency investigation leads to an adverse personnel action, that investigation—coupled with the ensuing personnel action—is prohibited retaliation, unless the agency can demonstrate that it would have commenced the same investigation and taken the same personnel action absent the protected disclosure. “To here hold otherwise would sanction the use of a purely retaliatory tool, selective investigations.” Id. at 325.

The Sistek court acknowledged that Russell is “the Board’s foundational decision in this area,” and that the drafters of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (“WPEA”), Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1465 (2012), intended that Russell would remain “governing law.” Sistek, 955 F.3d at 955. Applying Russell, the Sistek court found that the Board erred by failing to consider Mr. Sistek’s allegedly retaliatory investigation as part of its evaluation of the letter of reprimand. See id. at 957. Applying Russell, the VA’s investigation into Mr. Sistek was “so closely related” to the letter of reprimand “that it could have been a pretext for gathering evidence to retaliate.” Russell, 76 M.S.P.R. at 324. By “fail[ing] to apply Russell in evaluating the letter of reprimand,” the Board committed error. Sistek, 955 F.3d at 957.

Regardless, the Sistek Court held that the Board’s error was harmless. Id. The Court distinguished the present facts from the facts of Russell “because here there is no evidence that the official who initiated the allegedly retaliatory investigation had knowledge of any protected disclosures.” Id. The Court held that the supervisor who initiated the investigation lacked both actual and constructive knowledge of Mr. Sistek’s protected disclosures, and further, Mr. Sistek did not allege such knowledge. By failing to allege knowledge, Mr. Sistek could not demonstrate that his protected disclosure was a contributing factor to the alleged personnel action. In other words, even if the investigation and letter of reprimand were an adverse action, the WPA claim would have nonetheless failed because Mr. Sistek did not present sufficient evidence that his whistleblowing was a contributing factor in his adverse action.

Significance of Sistek

Sistek reaffirmed the holding of Russell, that a retaliatory investigation may be a prohibited personnel action if it leads to a significant change in job duties, responsibilities or working conditions; if it creates a hostile working environment, or; if it is “closely related” to a personnel action under the WPA. If Mr. Sistek had demonstrated facts to meet the knowledge/timing causation test, then the Court would have remanded the case to the Board to consider whether the investigation and letter together were qualifying personnel actions. And Russell would mandate that the answer is yes.

Further, if an employee can demonstrate that an investigation was undertaken in retaliation for a protected disclosure, the WPA provides that the Board may order corrective action that includes “fees, costs, or damages reasonably incurred due to an agency investigation” that is “commenced, expanded, or extended in retaliation” for a protected disclosure or activity—i.e., a retaliatory investigation. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(h), 1221(g)(4).

“So long as a protected disclosure is a contributing factor to the contested personnel action, and the agency cannot prove its affirmative defense, no harm can come to the whistleblower.” Marano v. Dep’t of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137, 1142 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The WPA thus continues to protect federal whistleblowers from retaliatory investigations, and Sistek merely provides a cautionary note about establishing the causation element of such a claim.

© Katz, Marshall & Banks, LLP
For more on whistleblower protections, see the National Law Review Criminal Law & Business Crimes section.

Good News for Companies: Seventh Circuit Holds Removal of Plaintiffs’ Biometrics Privacy Claims to Federal Court OK

In a widely watched case, the Seventh Circuit decided last week that companies that collect individuals’ biometric data may be able to defend their cases in federal court when plaintiffs allege a procedural violation of Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA).

In Bryant v. Compass Group USA, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that certain procedural violations of Illinois’ BIPA constituted actual injuries and therefore satisfied the requirements for federal court standing. Relying on Spokeo, the seminal U.S. Supreme Court case addressing what constitutes an actual injury for standing purposes, the court held that the plaintiff’s allegations, if proven, would demonstrate that she suffered an actual injury based on the fact that Compass did not obtain her consent before obtaining her private information. Therefore, the case could remain in federal court.

The decision now gives defendants that want to defend BIPA claims in federal court a roadmap for their arguments, including access to a larger jury pool, the Federal Rules of Procedure, and other federal court-related advantages. It is also notable because BIPA defendants have attempted to remove BIPA cases to federal court and then file motions to dismiss them for lack of standing. However, the federal courts have typically remanded these cases, forcing defendants back into state court and sometimes even requiring them to pay just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.[1]

What Happened in Bryant v. Compass Group USA

In Compass Group USA, a customer sued a vending machine manufacturer after she scanned her fingerprint into a vending machine to set up an account during her employer’s orientation. She then used her fingerprint to buy items from the vending machine.

The plaintiff filed a putative class action lawsuit on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated in state court alleging that Compass violated her statutory rights under BIPA by 1) obtaining her fingerprint without her written consent and 2) not establishing a publicly available data retention schedule or destruction guidelines for possession of biometric data as required by the statute.

Shortly after the plaintiff filed suit in Cook County Circuit Court, Compass filed a notice to remove the case to the Northern District of Illinois. Opposing the motion, the plaintiff argued that she did not have federal standing for her BIPA claims because she had not alleged an injury-in-fact as required by Article III.

Compass argued that the plaintiff had alleged an injury-in-fact under Article III, pointing to the recent Illinois Supreme Court case, Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., which held that plaintiffs can bring BIPA claims based on procedural violations, even if they have suffered no actual injury. Rosenbach held that, if a company, for example, fails to comply with BIPA’s requirement of establishing destruction guidelines for possession of biometric data, that violation alone – without any actual pecuniary or other injury – creates an actual injury.

The district court sided with the plaintiff and concluded that Rosenbach merely established “the policy of the Illinois courts” to allow plaintiffs to bring BIPA claims without alleging an actual injury. Rosenbach did not interpret procedural BIPA violations to be actual injuries.

Because the plaintiff’s claims did not establish Article III standing, the district court granted the plaintiff’s motion to remand the case back to state court.

The Seventh Circuit reversed, relying on Spokeo. It interpreted Spokeo as holding that injuries may still be particularized and concrete – i.e., actual – even if they are intangible or hard to prove. The court also cited Justice Thomas’ concurrence in Spokeo that distinguished between private rights (which courts have historically presumed to cause actual injuries) and public rights (which require a further showing of injury).

The court held that the plaintiff had alleged that she suffered an actual injury when Compass collected her biometric data without obtaining her informed consent because this was a private right. The court also relied on Fed. Election Comm’n v. Atkins, 525 U.S. 11 (1998).  In Atkins, the Supreme Court held that nondisclosure can be an actual injury if plaintiffs can show an impairment of their ability to use information in a way intended by the statute. The court in Compass similarly held that the defendant had denied the plaintiff the opportunity — and statutory right — to consider whether the terms of the defendant’s data collection and usage were acceptable. As a result, the court held that the plaintiff alleged an actual injury.

By contrast, the court determined that the plaintiff’s other claim – that the defendant violated BIPA by failing to make publicly available a data retention schedule and destruction guidelines for possession of biometric data – implicated a public right and did not cause the plaintiff an actual injury.

[1] See, e.g. Mocek v. Allsaints USA Ltd., 220 F. Supp. 3d 910, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (“Defendant’s professed strategy of removing the case on the basis of federal jurisdiction, only to turn around and seek dismissal with prejudice—a remedy not supported by any of defendant’s cases—on the ground that federal jurisdiction was lacking, unnecessarily prolonged the proceedings. . . . For the foregoing reasons, I grant plaintiff’s motion for remand and attorneys’ fees and deny as moot defendant’s motion to dismiss. Because defendant has not objected to the specific fee amount plaintiff claims, which she supports with evidence in the form of affidavits and billing records, I find that plaintiff is entitled to payment in the amount of $58,112.50 pursuant to § 1447(c).”)

© 2020 Schiff Hardin LLP
For more on BIPA, see the National Law Review Communications, Internet, and Media Law section.

IMS Insights Episode 11: COVID-19 Analysts Briefing on Litigation Impacts

To better understand how the COVID-19 pandemic is impacting the commercial litigation community, IMS ExpertServices conducted analysis and gathered input during the first half of April from more than 400 attorneys, in-house counsel, experts, and stakeholders throughout the commercial litigation community.

In this special podcast feature, you’ll hear commentary from the April 30 Analysts Briefing hosted by IMS on the study’s top findings and other key trends for commercial litigators, with discussion from a panel of thought leaders including:·

·         James Crane, Chief Revenue Officer at IMS ExpertServices

·         Rudhir Krishtel, Certified Co-Active Coach and Facilitator with Krishtel Coaching, Former Senior Patent Counsel at Apple, Former Partner at Fish & Richardson, and IMS Thought Leader and Contributor

·         Nate Robson, Litigation Editor at The American Lawyer

·         Eilene Spear, Operations and Project Manager at The National Law Review

·         Ty Sagalow, Commercial insurance expert and IMS thought leader and contributor

© Copyright 2002-2020 IMS ExpertServices, All Rights Reserved.

For more on COVID-19 litigation, see the National Law Review Coronavirus News section.

 

Ticketmaster, Live Nation Get Booed: Concert-Goers File Class Action for “Unchecked” Abuse of Market Power

Live Nation Threatens Anyone Who Doesn’t Play Along, Plaintiffs Allege

Concert-goers tired of paying “supracompetitive fees” on ticket purchases from Ticketmaster LLC filed a class action against the company and its parent, promoter Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., in U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on April 28 for abusing its more than 70% share of the primary ticketing market (i.e. where tickets are initially sold) for major concerts. The merged companies are also aggressively deploying anticompetitive tactics in pursuit of the lucrative “secondary ticketing” market where tickets are re-sold, typically at higher prices.

Ticketmaster achieved its dominant position through a “web of long-term exclusive dealing agreements” and other anticompetitive activity, the plaintiffs maintain. The companies merged in 2010, putting the ticketing giant together with the nation’s “most dominant concert promoter.” Live Nation controls 60% of the promotion business for major concerts. AEG Live is a distant number two, with 20% market share. Now, the plaintiffs say, Live Nation uses Ticketmaster as a loss leader to bludgeon its competitors and strong-arm venues (Iderstine v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. and Ticketmaster LLC, No. 1:20-CV-03888-PA-GJS, C.D. Calif., Western Div.).

“Subsidized by the supracompetitive profits Ticketmaster’s business generates from its domination of primary ticketing services for major concert venues, Live Nation Entertainment is able to keep a stranglehold on concert promotion services – losing tens of millions of dollars annually – by paying its clients exorbitant amounts,” the complaint reads. Live Nation “regularly threatens” concert venues with eliminating them from big-act tours if they use a Tickemaster competitor for ticketing services.

Live Nation has apparently become such an emboldened market bully that its CEO, Michael Rapino, openly boasted last year that if a venue doesn’t use Ticketmaster it will suffer economically because “we don’t hold the revenue.”  This stiff-arm anticompetitive style hasn’t been lost on the Department of Justice Antitrust Division or anyone who’s paying attention in the industry. It’s become the norm. The DOJ said U.S. venues have come to accept that if they don’t use Tickmaster they will lose big-star performers and significant revenue. “Given the paramount importance of live event revenues to a venue’s bottom line, this is a loss most venues can ill-afford,” the DOJ observed.

We recently wrote in our post — DOJ: Event Powerhouse Live Nation Punished Concert Venues for Using Competing Ticketers Despite Bar – of the government’s charge that Live Nation has been violating the DOJ-ordered ban on anticompetitive behavior for years. Now, Live Nation is operating under what the DOJ calls “the most significant enforcement action” of an existing antitrust consent decree in its history, one intended, at least, to secure stricter and longer lasting conditions designed to rein in the event conglomerate’s anticompetitive behavior. The DOJ action began more than a decade ago after the company acquired Ticketmaster. A 2010 final judgment permitted the merger but prohibited the company from retaliating against concert venues for using competing ticket companies, threatening concert venues, or taking other actions against concert venues for 10 years (United States v. Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc., et al., Case No. 1:10-cv-00139-RMC [July 30, 2010]).

These are highly profitable companies. Live Nation’s 2018 revenues were $10.8 billion. Ticketmaster, a wholly-owned subsidiary following their merger in 2010, made $1.5 billion in 2018.

Despite the 2010 judgment, the DOJ announced earlier this year that Live Nation had been repeatedly violating it for years. The government hopes the modified and extended judgment clarifies for Live Nation what conduct is out of bounds and gives consumers and venues the relief the DOJ wanted in the first place.

Historically, structural remedies (such as divestitures) have been preferable to behavioral remedies (like consent decrees) in addressing antitrust concerns over proposed mergers. As Live Nation and Tickmaster are demonstrating, behavioral remedies are too easily ignored or abused by post-merger behemoths. Too often the benefits of violation outweigh the punishment. Their behavior also highlights the anticompetitive effects that can result from large-scale vertical mergers, which have been rampant in recent years. Bundling, tying, and exclusive contracts are just a few of the competitive concerns that we see playing out here, not to mention a stagnation in the entry of new competitors in various complementary markets.

Seeking relief under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, Tickemaster and Live Nation, the Iderstine v. Live Nation complaint says:

  • Engage in anticompetitive exclusive dealing with concert venues;
  • Improperly wield the conditional copyright license Ticketmaster employs to grant access to its online platform, blocking, for example, purchases of a large number of tickets. This forces ticket brokers into exclusivity with Ticketmaster, and not its competitor;
  • Bar individuals from transferring tickets unless they use Ticketmaster to do so;
  • Prevent secondary ticket service providers from being able to do business – and charge consumers lower fees – by forcing venues to use both their concert promotion and concert ticketing services. In other words, tying. Ticketmaster enjoys double-digit annual growth as a result of its “unchecked” anticompetitive conduct, the complaint says.
  • Use “coercion of and threats against disloyal customers, ticket brokers, and others”;
  • Execute vertically arranged boycotts.

Ticketmaster has “clearly engaged in blatant, anti-consumer behavior for years,” the plaintiffs say. In addition to its “behind-the-scenes efforts to feed ticket brokers huge amounts of supply if they sold on Ticketmaster’s secondary platform,” the plaintiffs cite the DOJ’s extension of the 2010 consent decree. It’s only recently come to the attention of ticket-buyers that Live Nation has been “shamelessly” violating the consent agreement for years.  It also notes that the Federal Trade Commission ordered Ticketmaster to stop implying ticket prices were higher on its primary platform than its secondary re-sale platform, when the opposite is true.

The complaint seeks certification of two subclasses:

  1. Primary Ticketing Services Consumer Class. “All end-user purchasers in the United States who purchased a primary ticket and paid associated fees for primary ticketing services for an event at a major concert venue in the United States from Ticketmaster or one of its affiliated entities owned, directly or indirectly, by Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. at any point since 2010.”
  2. Secondary Ticketing Services Consumer Class. “All end-user purchasers in the United States who purchased a secondary ticket and paid associated fees for secondary ticketing services for an event at a major concert venue in the United States from Ticketmaster or one of its affiliated entities owned, directly or indirectly, by Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. at any point since 2010.”

© MoginRubin LLP

Court Holds That A Deceased Testamentary Trust Beneficiary Can Still Be A Beneficiary

In In the Estate of Mendoza, a decedent’s son’s children filed a petition claiming their entitlement to their father’s beneficial interest in a trust created under the decedent’s will. No. 04-19-00129-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 1845 (Tex. App.—San Antonio March 4, 2020, no pet. history). The son had predeceased the decedent. The decedent’s daughters moved for summary judgment on the sole ground that a dead person could not be a beneficiary of a trust. The trial court granted the daughters’ summary judgment motion. The son’s children appealed.

The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment, holding that the mere fact that the decedent’s son predeceased the decedent did not establish the son’s beneficial interest in the trust created under the decedent’s will lapsed as a matter of law. The daughters argued that a dead person cannot be a beneficiary of a trust and cited to Longoria v. Lasater, 292 S.W.3d 156, 167 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. denied) and Section 112, comment f of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts. However, the court of appeals held that the daughters ignored the difference between an inter vivos trust, which was the type of trust analyzed in Longoria, and a testamentary trust. The court cited to Section 112, comment f, of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts:

A person who has died prior to the creation of a trust cannot be a beneficiary of the trust. Thus, if property is transferred inter vivos [i.e., not by will] in trust for a named person who is dead at the time of the transfer, no trust is created… So also, if a testator devises property in trust for a person who predeceases him, the devise of the beneficial interest lapses, and the person named as trustee ordinarily holds the property upon a resulting trust for the estate of the testator. By statute, however, in many States a devise does not lapse under certain circumstances, as for example if the devisee leaves a child; and under similar circumstances a devise of the beneficial interest under a trust does not lapse.

Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 112 cmt. f (1959) (internal citation omitted); see also Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 44 reporter’s notes on cmt. d (2003) (citing authorities discussing the application of the lapse doctrine and anti-lapse statutes to persons taking under trusts created by a will and noting “[a] comprehensive discussion of the lapse doctrine and anti-lapse statutes is beyond the scope of this Restatement”)). Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded: “the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Daughters based on the mere fact that Eduardo predeceased Jose because that fact alone did not establish Eduardo’s beneficial interest lapsed as a matter of law.” Id. Further, the court refused to address an argument about Texas’s anti-lapse statutes because the arguments had not properly raised below. The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

© 2020 Winstead PC.

A Glut of “Opportunistic” Margin Calls: Are Creditors Moving Too Quickly to Seize Assets?

What can companies expect from their funding sources as COVID-19 does damage to the economy? In at least some instances, perhaps, opportunistic attempts by lenders to illegally take control of business assets. A real estate investment trust (REIT) in New York alleges in a new lawsuit that it has already fallen victim to that type of misconduct.

AG Mortgage Investment Trust Inc. (AG) filed suit against the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) on March 25 for allegedly taking advantage of the pandemic to unlawfully seize the trust’s assets and sell them at below-market prices. AG says RBC is just one of many banks that are now trying to trigger margin calls on entities like AG. It alleges that RBC is doing so by applying “opportunistic and unfounded” markdowns on mortgage-based assets. A margin call then occurs, according to AG, with RBC contending that the value of a margin account — an investment account with assets bought with borrowed money — has fallen, requiring the borrower either to make up the difference with more collateral or have the asset seized. RBC, the suit further alleges, is being unreasonable in its valuations. Having seized assets based on what AG calls an “entirely subjective and self-serving calculation” of true market value, RBC then auctioned off $11 million worth of AG’s commercial mortgage-backed securities.

Two days before filing the suit, AG had warned in a statement that it might not be able to satisfy the glut of margin calls it now faces from lending banks like RBC, as coronavirus crisis fears and fallout cripple the mortgage-based asset market. In its complaint, AG asserts that rampant, unwarranted margin calls have brought the nation’s mortgage-based REITs “to the brink of collapse.” AG notes, however, that unlike RBC, most banks have thus far agreed to hold back on taking action against those trusts’ assets — for the time being, at least.
“Recognizing the aberrant state of the markets, most banks have stopped short of taking precipitous steps that could push the mREIT industry into the abyss. This action is brought to stop one outlier bank—Royal Bank of Canada—that has not stopped short but is instead hitting the accelerator to unlawfully seize and unload a large portfolio of Plaintiffs’ assets at fire-sale prices into the seized markets which will have a cascading effect in the market for mortgage-based assets, and potentially the entire U.S. economy. These consequences are likely to undermine the emergent efforts currently being undertaken by federal and state agencies to provide breathing room and help stabilize the economy.”

Hours after filing its suit, AG sought a temporary restraining order to halt the auction. The auction had already begun that day by the time the judge had a chance to review AG’s request. RBC must soon respond to AG’s complaint, and, as the case progresses, will have to defend itself against AG’s claims for damages. If AG’s perception of a glut of unjustified margin calls is shared by other business entities, we should expect many similar suits to follow.

© 2020 Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP

For more COVID-19 related business news, see the National Law Review Coronavirus News section.

“Damaged Goods” Not Enough to Sway Third Circuit Court of Appeals

In early February, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the “damaged goods” approach to valuing property crossed by a pipeline. In UGI Sunbury LLC v. A Permanent Easement For 1.7575 Acres et al., the appeals court vacated the trial court’s property valuation that was based on an expert’s opinion that the stigma of a natural gas pipeline decreased the value of the property crossed by the pipeline.

The expert largely based his opinion on anecdotes from his past employment in an appliance shop where he noticed customers valued undamaged property more than damaged property. Under his “damaged goods” theory, the expert opined that property under which a pipeline crosses has a lower value because people perceive it as damaged. The panel held that the expert’s methodology was incapable of testing, had not been peer reviewed, was not generally accepted, and did not provide for a rate of error. While an expert’s opinion does not have to meet all, or even most, of those factors, the fact that this expert’s opinion met none left his opinion unreliable.

The panel noted that parts of the expert’s opinion compared the value of properties impacted by oil spills or the radiation emitted from the Three-Mile Island nuclear disaster. Those properties were figurative oranges to the apples and thus incapable of assisting the trier of fact in concluding the impact to the value of property under which a natural gas pipeline crosses.

Finally, the Third Circuit held that the district court must act as “gatekeeper” and ensure that expert opinions are based on reliable science.

© Steptoe & Johnson PLLC. All Rights Reserved.

For more on property valuation, see the National Law Review Real Estate law section.