Tag: Legal News

Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership et al.: Supreme Court Observations

Posted today at the National Law Review  by Robert Greene Sterne  and Nirav N. Desai of Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox P.L.L.C  a great recap of today’s U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership et al.

In Microsoft v. i4i, the U.S. Supreme Court today unanimously (8-0) affirmed the clear and convincing evidence standard for invalidating issued U.S. patents under Section 282 of the Patent Act (1952).  In 2007, i4i sued Microsoft in U.S. District Court for infringement of i4i’s patent. As part of its defense, Microsoft asked for a jury instruction reciting a preponderance of the evidence standard for finding i4i’s patent invalid, rather than the long-standing clear and convincing evidence standard.  The District Court rejected Microsoft’s lower standard of proof, and a jury found that the patent was valid and that Microsoft infringed, awarding i4i a 9 figure damages sum.  Microsoft appealed to Federal Circuit, asserting in particular, that the District Court improperly instructed the jury on the standard of proof for invalidity.  The Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s holding and Microsoft petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, which was granted.

In its argument to the Supreme Court, Microsoft argued that either (1) a defendant in a patent infringement action need only convince the jury that an issued patent is invalid by a preponderance of the evidence standard, or (2) alternatively, that at the very least, the preponderance of the evidence standard should apply to evidence that was never considered by the PTO during examination.  The Supreme Court in its decision rejected both of Microsoft’s arguments.

In its decision, the Court first focused on the language of Section 282, which specifies that “[a] patent shall be presumed valid” and “[t]he burden of establishing invalidity of a patent … shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”  Microsoft had argued that Federal Circuit precedent establishing a clear and convincing evidence standard was not supported by the 1952 Act because Section 282 did not explicitly set forth that standard.  The Supreme Court noted that, while the statute includes no express articulation of the standard of proof, the statute does use the term “presumed valid,” which has a settled meaning in the common law.  Relying on its long-standing decision in Radio Corporation of America (RCA) v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1 (1934), the Court found that the common law jurisprudence dating back to the 19th century reflects that Microsoft’s proposed preponderance standard of proof “was too ‘dubious’ a basis to deem a patent invalid.”  According to the common law, the Court held, “a defendant raising an invalidity defense bore a ‘heavy burden of persuasion,’ requiring proof of the defense by clear and convincing evidence.”

The Court also noted that the Federal Circuit has interpreted Section 282 to require this clear and convincing evidence standard for nearly 30 years. And while Congress has amended the patent laws several times since the Patent Act was passed, “the evidentiary standard in § 282 has gone untouched.”  The Court concluded that Congress is well aware of the Federal Circuit’s treatment of the statute, but thus far has not amended the statute, and further that “[a]ny re-calibration of the standard of proof remains in [Congress’s] hands.”

The practical implications of the decisions are many.  First and foremost, the decision preserves the status quo, which in turn maintains the strength of U.S. patents and current patent enforcement mechanisms, particularly as they relate to innovation, business certainty, and job creation.  The Court has also sent a clear signal that, in view of well-established jurisprudence, if the standard is to change, it must be done by Congress, as any such change would have a profound ripple effect on the entire patent system.

© 2011 Sterne Kessler

U.S. Supreme Court Establishes State-of-Mind Requirement for Inducing Infringement Liability

As posted in the National Law Review yesterday by R. (Ted) Edward Cruz of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP – a good overview of the knowledge a patent infringement plaintiff needs to prove:

Today (May 31), the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., et al. v. SEB S.A., No. 10-6 (2011), holding that to prove inducing infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) a plaintiff must prove that the infringer had knowledge that “the induced acts constitute patent infringement.” The Court also held that this knowledge requirement can be satisfied by evidence of “willful blindness.”

Morgan Lewis represented SEB in this case. The leader of our U.S. Supreme Court and Appellate Litigation Practice, Ted Cruz, argued the case on February 23. In today’s decision, by an 8-1 vote, our client prevailed.

On the facts of the case, SEB had developed an innovative method to produce household deep fryers and received a U.S. patent for this invention. A foreign competitor, Global-Tech Appliances, purchased one of SEB’s fryers in Hong Kong where it would not have patent markings, reverse-engineered SEB’s fryer, and then copied the SEB fryer’s unique technology. Global-Tech hired a patent attorney to conduct a patent search, but deliberately chose not to tell that attorney that its fryer was a copy of another company’s commercially successful fryer. The attorney did not locate SEB’s patent in its patent search. Global-Tech then sold its fryers to U.S. companies to sell within the United States. SEB sued Global-Tech for patent infringement and inducing infringement, and the jury found for SEB on all counts.

On appeal, Global-Tech challenged the finding on inducing infringement liability due to a lack of evidence of its actual knowledge of SEB’s patent. Section 271(b) provides that “[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.” Over the last two decades, the Federal Circuit has offered various formulations of what mental-state requirement must be proven to establish liability under § 271(b). On appeal in this case, the Federal Circuit held that the mental-state requirement could be satisfied by evidence of “deliberate indifference of a known risk that a patent exists” and that Global-Tech’s actions constituted such deliberate indifference.

The Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s analysis but nonetheless affirmed the judgment. The Court held that inducing infringement liability under § 271(b) requires evidence that the infringer had knowledge that “the induced acts constitute patent infringement.” Adopting the argument advanced by SEB, the Court held that this knowledge requirement could be satisfied by evidence of “willful blindness.” After analyzing the record, the Court held that the judgment for SEB could be affirmed based on the evidence of Global-Tech’s willful blindness. The Court focused on Global-Tech’s decision to purchase the fryer to reverse-engineer it overseas (where it would not have U.S. patent markings) and then to deliberately withhold from its attorney the basic information that its fryer was a copy of SEB’s fryer.

This decision clears up an issue of long-standing confusion in the Federal Circuit as to the mental-state requirement of § 271(b). The Court’s explication of the standard should be welcome news to both innovators and holders of patents. The decision prevents frivolous claims of inducing infringement by requiring proof of knowledge of infringement. At the same time, it allows companies to protect their intellectual property rights against those companies that willfully blind themselves to a lawful patent in order to copy a commercially successful product. Corporations hiring attorneys to conduct patent searches should be sure to disclose to their attorneys any products copied or relied upon in developing a new technology.

Copyright © 2011 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.

Florida Minimum Wage To Increase Tomorrow

An important FYI posted today by Jay P. Lechner of Greenberg Traurig, LLP about the impending increase in minimum wage in Florida:

 

Florida’s minimum wage increases tomorrow to $7.31 per hour — a 6 cent increase. The minimum wage for tipped workers also goes up 6 cents, to $4.29 per hour. These increases are the result of a recent circuit court decision in Leon County ruling that the state’s method of calculating minimum wage was incorrect under the Florida Constitution.

The Florida Constitution and the Florida Minimum Wage Act require the state to annually “calculate an adjusted state Minimum Wage rate by increasing the state Minimum Wage by the rate of inflation for the twelve months prior to each September 1st using the consumer price index (CPI) for urban wage earners and clerical workers….” Neither the Constitution nor the Act specifically addresses deflation in the computation of the minimum wage. Yet, due to a slight cost of living decrease during the 12-month period preceding September 1, 2009, the state lowered the state minimum wage rate in 2010 from $7.21 to $7.06, dropping it below the federal minimum wage. Then, in determining the 2011 rate, the state calculated an increase to $7.16 (still below the federal rate) based on a 1.4 percent cost of living increase during the 12-month period preceding September 1, 2010.

The court found that the state’s method for calculating the state minimum wage rate was incorrect because, based on the constitutional language, the minimum wage cannot be decreased. Soon after the ruling, a Florida Senate bill intended to amend the Act consistent with the state’s approach was withdrawn from consideration.

When the federal and Florida minimum wage rates differ, Florida employers are required to pay the higher rate. Tomorrow’s increase raises the Florida minimum wage above the $7.25 federal minimum wage rate. Thus, employers currently paying federal minimum wage to eligible workers in Florida must adjust their pay practices accordingly.

©2011 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

 

Prevailing Antitrust Defendants Recover $367,000 in e-Discovery Costs

Posted yesterday at the National Law Review by Eric S. O’Connor  of  Sheppard Mullin – a recent case out of the Western District of PA – Race Tires America v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., where prevailing antitrust defendants were awarded  by the court $367,000 in e-discovery costs incurred by their vendor. 

Recently, prevailing antitrust defendants were awarded $367,000 in e-discovery costs incurred by their vendor. See Race Tires America v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 2011 WL 1748620 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 2011). While the Court labeled the facts as “unique” and that its holding was limited, the Court’s opinion is very thorough and the facts may be familiar to many antitrust defendants.

In today’s age where the costs of e-discovery can run several hundred thousand dollars or more and outside vendors are routinely hired to help, this holding can be used as a shield and a sword. During discovery, a party can alert the other side that aggressive discovery requests and a demand for many electronic search terms is a major factor in awarding costs of e-discovery – if the responding party prevails. And, if a party should prevail, the potential for an award of the costs of e-discovery can be an additional bonus and/or leverage for any post-verdict resolution without appeal.

The facts are simple. Plaintiff Specialty Tires America (STA) brought antitrust claims against Hoosier Racing, its tire supplier competitor, and Dirt Motor Sports, Inc. d/b/a World Racing Group, a motorsports racing sanctioning body. STA claimed that a so-called “single tire rule” by various sanctioning bodies like Dirt Motor Sports, as well as the related exclusive supply contracts between some of these sanctioning bodies and Hoosier violated Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and caused STA in excess of $80 million in damages. See Race Tires America v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F. 3d 57, 62-73 (3d Cir. 2010). The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants finding that STA had failed to demonstrate antitrust injury, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 83-84.

The normal rule that “costs — other than attorney’s fees — should be allowed to the prevailing party” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)) creates a “strong presumption” that all costs authorized for payment will be awarded to the prevailing party, so long as the costs are enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920, the general taxation-of-costs statute. As prevailing parties, the defendants each filed a Bill of Costs in which the majority of amounts requested were e-discovery costs. Plaintiff objected arguing that e-discovery costs were not taxable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4).


Section 1920(4) allows recovery of “[f]ees for exemplification and the costs of making copies … necessarily obtained for use in the case.” 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4). There are two statutory interpretation questions that have divided Courts. First, costs of electronic scanning of documents can be recoverable as “necessary” or unrecoverable as a mere “convenience.”

The other issue takes a few different forms, but focuses on whether the terms “exemplification” and “copying”, which originated in the world of paper, should be limited to physical preparation or rather updated to take into account changing technology and e-discovery. The Court discussed a litany of these cases. Some courts that have applied § 1920(4) to today’s e-discovery demands, have limited exemplification and copying to just the costs for scanning of documents, which is considered merely reproducing paper documents in electronic form, and refused to extend the statute to cover processing records, extracting data, and converting files. Courts are also divided on whether extracting, searching, and storing work by outside vendors are unrecoverable paralegal-like tasks, or whether such costs are recoverable because outside vendors provide highly technical and necessary services in the electronic age and which are not the type of services that paralegals are trained for or are capable of providing.

In this case, because the Court and the parties anticipated that discovery would be in the form of electronically stored information and because plaintiff aggressively pursued e-discovery (e.g., directing 273 discovery requests to one defendant and imposing over 442 search terms), defendants’ use of e-discovery vendors to retrieve and prepare e-discovery documents for production was recoverable as an indispensable part of the discovery process. The Court also found that the vendor’s fees were reasonable, especially because the costs were incurred by defendants when they did not know if they would prevail at trial.

The Court also denied the plaintiff’s request for a Special Master to assess the reasonableness of e-discovery costs incurred by the prevailing defendants as an unnecessary cost and delay.

Copyright © 2011, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP. 

Which Employers Will Be Responsible For Health Coverage In 2014?

Recently posted at the National Law Review by Abby Natelson  of  Greenberg Traurig, LLP – provides more details about which employers will be responsible for providing healthcare coverage in 2014:

The new health care law, otherwise known as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), requires that, beginning after December 31, 2013, “applicable large employers” must provide affordable health coverage to their full-time employees.   Failure to do so may subject these employers to a shared responsibility payment, or an “assessable payment,” pursuant to Internal Revenue Code §4980H.

An “applicable large employer” is defined as “an employer who employed an average of at least 50 full-time employees on business days during the preceding calendar year.” A full-time employee with respect to a given month is defined as “an employee who is employed on average at least 30 hours of service per week.”

While these definitions may appear to be straightforward, the recent Notice issued by the Internal Revenue Service, together with the Department of Labor and the Department of Health and Human Services, indicates that the analysis is not so simple.

Notice 2011-36 was issued on May 2, 2011, seeking comments and providing suggested rules for interpreting and applying the meaning of “full-time employees” for purposes of IRC §4980H.

Notably, the Notice provides rules for determining whether an employer has “50 full-time employees,” which includes full-time equivalents. This means that, on a monthly basis, an employer must take the following steps to determine whether 50 full-time employees are employed:

1)                  Determine the number “full-time” employees. 
This group includes seasonal employees and all employees of a controlled group, an affiliated group, and a predecessor employer. This group does not include leased employees.

2)                  Determine the “full-time equivalents.”
This number is determined by aggregating the number of hours of service for all employees determined not to have a full-time status for the month, and then dividing these hours by 120.

At the end of a calendar year, the employer must add together the 12 monthly calculations, and divide the sum by 12 to get the average monthly full-time employees for the prior year. If the final number is 50 or more, the employer is an “applicable large employer.” 

For example, if a business employs 40 full-time employees with 40 hours of service per week and 20 part-time employees with an average of 20 hours of service per week, the employer will still be considered an “applicable large employer.”   This is because each month, the employer will have to add approximately 13.3 “full-time equivalents” (approximately 80 hours worked per month by each part-time employee, multiplied by 20 part-time employees, divided by 120) to the 40 full-time employees, bringing the total “full-time employees” for purposes of health coverage obligations to 53.3. As this example demonstrates, an employer that relies on part-time employees may still be subject to the shared responsibility provisions of the PPACA.

The Notice provides for an exception in the case of seasonal workers. This seasonal employees exception applies where an employer’s workforce exceeds 50 full-time employees for 120 days or less during a calendar year and the employees in excess of 50 were employed during those days as seasonal employees. In this case, the employer is not considered an “applicable large employer.”

Employers “not in existence during an entire preceding calendar year,” are not exempt from assessment payment liability pursuant to the Notice, and will be considered an applicable large employer if the employer reasonably expects to employ an average of at least 50 full-time employees on business days during the current calendar year.

The Notice also indicates the intent of the IRS, DOL, and HHS to allow employers to measure 130 hours of service per month to determine full-time status, rather than 30 hours of service per week. Further, the Notice includes a safe harbor for determining an employee’s full time status for future months based on the employee’s status as a full-time employee in prior months, which is intended to make administration of this rule for full-time employees easier.

In short, the proposed guidance set forth in Notice 2011-36 expands upon the inclusive definition of “full-time employees” set forth by the PPACA and reinforces the continuous burden imposed on employers to evaluate the “full-time” status of each of their employees.

©2011 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

NLRB A 'Twitter Over Employers' Social Media Policies

Recently posed at the National Law Review by Laura M. Lawless Robertson of Greenberg Traurig, LLP – updates of the National Labor Relation Board’s (NLRB’s) recent recent scrutiny of  employer’s social media policies for compliance with the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA):  

The National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) recent scrutiny of social media policies for compliance with the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) has alarmed many employers – including non-union employers. Two recent developments in this area add fuel to an already heated debate over employer actions based on employees’ use of social media.

The first case is Lee Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Arizona Daily Star. The Daily Star newspaper did not have a social media policy, but urged its reporters to use social media, including Twitter, to disseminate information to the public. After deciding that its crime/public safety reporter had gone too far with his unprofessional, sexually inappropriate, and pro-violence tweets, including one in which he called the reporters on a local television station “stupid,” the newspaper’s managing editor admonished him to refrain from engaging in any further social media postings. The reporter was later terminated, after which he filed a charge with the NLRB, contending that his termination violated the NLRA.

The NLRB General Counsel’s Office acknowledged that, “in warning the Charging Party to cease his inappropriate tweets, and then discharging him for continuing to post inappropriate tweets, the Employer made statements that could be interpreted to prohibit activities protected by Section 7 [of the NLRA],” but nevertheless concluded that the newspaper terminated him for violating workplace policies and disregarding its repeated warnings to cease his unprofessional tweets. The General Counsel’s Office concluded that “it would not effectuate the purposes and policies of the [NLRA] to issue a complaint where the statements were directed to a single employee who was lawfully discharged,” and recommended dismissal of the charge.

If employers presumed, based on the Arizona Daily Star outcome, that the NLRB had backed down from its aggressive stance regarding employers’ social media policies, they would be mistaken. On May 9, 2011, the NLRB issued a complaint alleging that Hispanics United of Buffalo, a nonprofit social service agency, unlawfully discharged five employees who complained about their working conditions on their Facebook accounts. After one employee questioned how hard the staff worked to help the agency’s clients, several employees chimed in on her Facebook status, defending their job performance and blaming workload and staffing issues for any unmet client needs. After learning about the posts, Hispanics United fired all of the employees who participated in the flame war. The NLRB issued a complaint, alleging that the Facebook dialogue was protected concerted activity under the NLRA – a discussion among coworkers about the terms and conditions of their employment and undertaken for mutual aid and protection. The case is set for a hearing before an administrative law judge on June 22, 2011, absent settlement (which seems to be the trend in these sort of cases).

These two cases illustrate that employers may discipline employees for social media misconduct, such as disclosing confidential and proprietary information, engaging in “textual harassment,” or libeling competitors, but must scrupulously avoid instituting or enforcing social media policies that impinge on employees’ rights to discuss the terms and conditions of their employment, e.g., wages and working conditions. One thing is for certain…we haven’t heard the last of this topic from the NLRB.

©2011 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

Just JDs — Business Development Strategies for Lawyers – June 8th Chicago, IL

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Wage and Hour Headaches for Employers: The Department of Labor Has an App for That

Posted this week at the National Law Review  by Mitchell W. Quick, Brian P. Paul and Steven A. Nigh of Michael Best & Friedrich LLP – details for employers about the Department of Labor’s (DOL) new App to track wages and work hours….

The U.S. Department of Labor Wage & Hour Division (“WHD”) recently released a free application (“app”) for iPhone and iPod Touch that allows employees to track their wages and work hours. The “Timesheet” app allows employees to enter their hourly rate and hours worked for multiple employers. The app also lets employees record time spent on meal breaks and “other” breaks. Time can be recorded manually or by using the app’s embedded stopwatch. Timesheet calculates employee pay, including overtime, and lets employees export Timesheet data via e-mail in Microsoft Excel format. While the current version calculates pay based on an hourly rate, WHD is exploring the possibility of adding functions for commission pay, shift differentials and other methods of compensation in future versions, along with Android- and Blackberry-compatibility. The app currently is available in both English and Spanish.

Timesheet presents a number of challenges to employers. WHD perceives the app as an enforcement aid that contains potentially “invaluable” information about alleged hours worked. Timesheet also encourages employees to file claims by giving them contact information for both local and national wage and hour agencies.  Furthermore, employee complaints about pay for alleged “off-the-clock” work—such as voluntarily checking work e-mails when at home—may increase as such time can be easily recorded. Employees might also record any work issues raised during break time, raising the specter of employers having to treat that time as compensable “hours worked.” Finally, employees improperly classified as exempt and for whom the employer kept no time records would now have “documentation” to support their damage claims.

Fortunately, employers can take steps to protect themselves:

  • Keep accurate records. This obvious best practice has only become more important now that some employees may keep records of their own.
  • Require non-exempt employees to sign off on company time sheets. This will help ensure both sides agree on the number of hours worked, and can help wage and hour disagreements surface—and get resolved—sooner rather than later.
  • Audit exempt employees to make sure they are exempt. This is particularly true for employees for whom the company has limited time records
  • Update employee handbooks. Make sure employees know that they cannot falsify any company records, including time records. Also consider establishing a complaint process for employees to use when they are told not to report work time.
  • Do not retaliate against employees who keep their own time records. Retaliation claims are on the rise, and Timesheet is another possible pitfall for employers.

“Timesheet” should serve as a reminder of the importance of maintaining complete, accurate wage and hour records.

© MICHAEL BEST & FRIEDRICH LLP

Additional Information on this is also available here:

Bill Allowing More Offshore Drilling Introduced to Congress

Posted today at the National Law Review by Sabrina Mizrachi of Greenberg Traurig, LLP – news on the Infrastructure Jobs and Energy Independence Act introduced in Congress yesterday……

The Infrastructure Jobs and Energy Independence Act was introduced on May 12, 2011, and seeks to allow more offshore drilling in order to reduce U.S. reliance on imported fuels and create jobs. The bill was introduced by a bipartisan group of four congressmen, Democrats Jim Costa of California and Tim Walz of Minnesota in collaboration with Pennsylvania Republicans Tim Murphy and Bill Shuster.

The bill contains no new taxes or increase of existing taxes, and would allow drillers to reach natural-gas reservoirs that could fuel industry in the U.S. for 63 years and the U.S. oil industry for 80 years, and also create 1.2 million jobs per year.

©2011 Greenberg Traurig, LLP. All rights reserved.

Appeals Court Overturns Stem Cell Ban

Recently posted at the National Law Review  by WarrenWoessner of  Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.– an update in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit concerning research using human embryonic stem cells.

On April 29th, in Sherley v. Sebelius, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir., overturned the injunction imposed by the district court, which had blocked the implementation of the 2009 NIH Guidelines on finding research using human embryonic stem cells. 74 Fed. Reg. 32170(2009). The Guidelines, in turn, had been formulated to implement President Obama’s executive order 13505 that lifted President Bush’s executive order banning such funding. The suit, brought by two researchers working with adult stem cells, argued that the Guidelines were in conflict with the 1996 Dickey-Wicker Act, which banned funding for both research that would create human embryos for research purposes or would destroy human embryos. For more background, see my post of Sept. 1, 2010.

The Court found that preliminary injunction was improperly granted “becauseDickey-Wicker is ambiguous and the NIH seems reasonably to have concluded that, although [D-W] bars funding for the destructive act of deriving an ESC from an embryo, it does not prohibit funding a research project in which an ESC will be used.”  In other words, if some other unfunded entity disassembles an unwanted embryo obtained with informed consent of the donor from an in vitro fertilization clinic and provides the ESCs to a researcher, the researcher can obtain federal funding to study them. Since establishing the Guidelines, the NIH has approved additional ESC lines for federal funding. While this is good news for researchers working with embryonic stem cell lines approved under the NIH Guidelines, the underlying suit will continue to threaten the administration’s more liberal view of stem cell research.

© 2011 Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. All Rights Reserved.