Tag: Labor Law

The COVID-19 Change Order

During the pandemic it has become common for contractors to submit change orders to owners seeking reimbursement for COVID-19 related expenses and costs.  This is especially true for large construction projects.  These “COVID-19 Change Orders” seek reimbursement for everything from masks, dividers, hand sanitizer and other items required to follow and implement CDC guidelines (or to comply with state and local orders) for maintaining a safe work environment.  COVID-19 Change Orders also seek reimbursement for extended general conditions caused by having less workers on site because of social distancing requirements, lost time caused by shorter working hours, and lost time associated with CDC mandated hygiene breaks and temperature checks. On larger projects, COVID-19 Change Orders can escalate into millions of dollars and are often submitted without warning towards the end of a project when final completion and the payment of retainage are approaching.

For owners and contractors that are trying to complete their projects, many of which have been delayed or suffered from cost overruns, these unexpected COVID-19 Change Orders can be very problematic and hard to navigate.  Owners will argue that increased costs associated with the pandemic have affected all businesses, not just contractors.  Contractors will respond that these are real costs that they must pay to operate.  Often, the justification for reimbursement is not black and white because it is hard to find a specific contractual provision that addresses such an unprecedented situation, which causes uncertainty and strained relations between owners and contractors at the end of a project.

The justifications asserted for COVID-19 Change Orders vary from project to project and are sometimes asserted as an event of force majeure or more commonly as a general change in site conditions.  While many force majeure clauses expressly apply to acts of God, pandemics and government shutdowns, that is not the end of analyzing whether the clause applies.  While the application of a force majeure clause to these situations is highly dependent on the wording of such a clause, most require that performance be completely prevented and do not recognize commercial impracticability as a justification for delay.  There were a small number of projects that were shut down at the beginning of the pandemic by state and local orders in stricter jurisdictions, but for the most part complete shutdowns were uncommon because of various exceptions to such orders for businesses broadly defined as “essential.”  As the pandemic extended through late 2020, and into 2021, shutdowns became non-existent.  Finally, many force majeure clauses don’t allow for the reimbursement of costs for implementing required protective measures, they simply allow for an extension of the contract time.

As a result, many contractors have turned to other contractual provisions, such as language related to changes in site conditions or clauses related to change orders in general.  But prior to the pandemic these provisions were not drafted with this circumstance (a virus) in mind.  Instead, they usually apply to changes in “physical” conditions at the site that are specifically described, like subsurface conditions, otherwise concealed physical conditions or hazardous materials found at the site.   Making the argument that a virus is an unknown “physical” condition at the site can be a challenge since the virus is airborne, not necessarily part of the site itself and not unique to the site.  In addition, because many of these clauses require the approval of the owner or are only triggered by specific conditions, they may not support a unilateral change order.

Because of the ambiguity surrounding COVID-19 Change Orders, many owners will initially be reluctant to cover such reimbursements for their contractors.  Aside from the specific language in their construction contracts, Owners should consider other factors when deciding whether to reject, accept or partially accept COVID-19 Change Orders, including the risk of strained relations with its contractor, distractions at the project and the costs of a potential dispute with its contractor.  If there are remaining construction contingency funds available, and the project has otherwise run smoothly, the owner should consider offering all or part of it at the end of the project to avoid a dispute.  Likewise, contractors should be thoughtful and thorough when deciding whether to seek reimbursement for project costs associated with COVID-19, and make sure the costs at issue were necessary and can be verified.  Finally, if the contractor received government loans or payments because of the pandemic, including funds from the Paycheck Protection Program, it should strongly consider not seeking reimbursement from the owner.

Article By Richard F. Whiteley, Phillip L. Sampson Jr., and Stacianne M. Wilson of Bracewell LLP

For more coronavirus legal news updates, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Bracewell LLP

Update to EEOC’s Position on Mandatory COVID Testing

On July 12, 2022, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) updated its guidance regarding COVID-19 workplace viral screening testing. 

The EEOC’s original position on COVID-19 workplace viral screening testing was that it always met the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) standard for conducting medical examinations.

However, on July 12, 2022, the EEOC explained that going forward, “employers will need to assess whether current pandemic circumstances and individual workplace circumstances justify viral screening testing of employees to prevent workplace transmission of COVID-19.”

The EEOC’s FAQ A.6 now provides that an employer, as a mandatory screening measure, may administer a COVID-19 viral test “if the employer can show it is job-related and consistent with business necessity.”

Fortunately, the EEOC has provided eight factors for businesses to consider in determining whether the new “business necessity” standard is met:

  • the level of community transmission;
  • the vaccination status of employees;
  • the accuracy and speed of processing for different types of COVID-19 viral tests;
  • the degree to which breakthrough infections are possible for employees who are “up to date” on vaccinations;
  • the ease of transmissibility of the current variant(s);
  • the possible severity of illness from the current variant(s);
  • what types of contacts employees may have with others in the workplace or elsewhere that they are required to work (e.g., working with medically vulnerable individuals); and,
  • the potential impact on operations if an employee enters the workplace with COVID-19.

It is important for business owners to appropriately conduct and document the above analysis.

The EEOC’s COVID-19 guidance concerning COVID-19 workplace viral testing may further evolve, so it will be important for business owners to periodically review the EEOC’s current FAQs.

Article By William A. Oden, III of Ward and Smith, P.A.

For more coronavirus legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Ward and Smith, P.A.. All Rights Reserved.

OSHA Proposes More Changes to Recordkeeping Rules

Employers across numerous industries may soon face additional recordkeeping and reporting obligations based on a new rule proposed by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

In March 2022, OSHA proposed amendment of its injury and illness tracking rule, which requires certain employers to file illness and injury data with the agency each year.  The tracking rule was first implemented in 2016, and required reporting of fatalities, hospitalizations, and other serious injuries for all covered employers with 250 or more employees, and for employers with 20-249 employees in certain “high hazard industries.” The rule required most covered employers to submit their Form 300A  “Summary of Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses” annually.  It also required certain employer establishments with 250 or more employees to submit their complete Form 300 Logs of Work-Related Injury and Illnesses, and their Form 301 Injury and Illness Incident reports annually.  Finally, the rule called for creation of a public database of employer illness/injury data, including business names and illness/injury locations.

The rule generated immediate objections from the business community based on privacy concerns.  Both the Form 300 Logs and the Form 301s Incident Reports contain personal employee information related to their health status.  Employers worried that if OSHA required broad disclosure of these documents and created a public database based on their content, it would jeopardize employee privacy. Even though OSHA claimed it would not make personal identifying information available, employers were not confident the agency could prevent inadvertent disclosure. Also, employers saw myriad ways in which the information could be used against them that have nothing to do with worker safety.

In response to this criticism and after a change in the presidential administration, OSHA rolled back the tracking rule in 2019. The 2019 Rule rescinded the requirement for employers of 250 or more employees to electronically submit Form 300s and Form 301s, but continued to require them to submit Form 300A summaries each year.  Because the summaries did not contain personal information, the modified rule alleviated employee privacy worries.

Now, OSHA is poised to revive the original tracking rule, but expand the application of the most onerous requirements to smaller establishments.  On March 30, 2022, OSHA published its proposed rule in the Federal Register.  If the final rule mirrors the proposed rule, it would largely restore the 2016 rule, but apply the Form 300 and 301 reporting requirements to covered establishments with 100 or more employees instead of 250 employees. Those employers covered by the new 100+ rule are limited to the industries in Appendix B of the proposed rule.  The list is lengthy and includes many farming, manufacturing and packaging industry employers, healthcare employers as well as grocery, department and furniture stores.

OSHA received public comment on the proposed rule through June 30, 2022.  OSHA received 83 comments from a mix of private and public entities, citizens, and industry groups.  OSHA will review the comments and employers should expect the agency to issue a Final Rule by the end of the calendar year, which would become effective 30 days after publication.

If OSHA enacts its proposed rule, covered employers will face significant additional burdens.  Employers must ensure that their Form 300 and 301 Forms are maintained accurately and filed in time to comply with the rule.  They can expect that OSHA will scrutinize these forms and potentially use them for inspection purposes or to develop industry-specific enforcement programs.  Moreover, OSHA may impose redaction burdens on employers and force them to remove personal identifying information from the forms before submission, which can be an administrative burden with potentially significant privacy implications if not followed carefully.  Finally, with additional data publicly available, employers should expect enhanced media and interest group activity based on their injury and illness data.  Even if personal information is not disclosed, interest groups and labor organizations will certainly seize on the available data to criticize employers or push for regulations, without consideration of the fact that employer fault cannot be determined from the data alone.

Employers should take steps now to prepare for the proposed rule and continue to ensure their safety and health programs minimize employee illness/injury risk.  The new rule would greatly increase potential legislative and public relations risks associated with poor safety and health outcomes, and effective illness/injury prevention programs can help employers avoid such scrutiny before the enhanced disclosure requirements take effect.

Article By Susan F. Wiltsie and Reilly C. Moore of Hunton Andrews Kurth. Scott W. Burton also contributed to this article.

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP. All Rights Reserved.

Federal District Court Says Pre-Shift COVID Screening Time Not Compensable

In the first reported decision we’ve seen addressing the issue head on, a federal district court in California dismissed a putative collective action claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) seeking payment for time spent in pre-shift COVID screening.

Prior to clocking in each day, the plaintiff—a non-exempt truck driver whose job duties included loading and transporting automobile parts from a central distribution center to stores throughout southern California—was required to submit to COVID-related health screening conducted on his employer’s premises.  During the screening process, a company employee asked the plaintiff a series of questions and took the plaintiff’s temperature.  The total time spent in the screening process often exceeded five minutes, which included waiting time.

The plaintiff filed a collective action claim, contending that the time spent by him and other employees participating in the daily screening was compensable under the FLSA.

Starting with the premise that time spent in pre-shift activities is only compensable under the FLSA if it is “integral and indispensable” to the employee’s “principal activities or activities which [the] employee is employed to perform,” the district court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss the FLSA claims, noting:

A pre-shift COVID screening is not the “principal activity or activities which [the] employee is employed to perform.”  29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1).  O’Reilly did not hire the employees to undergo health screenings, but instead to load and transport products to stores….  [T]he pre-shift COVID screenings were not “integral and indispensable” to the employees’ duties because the screening was not an intrinsic element of the loading and transporting of products to the stores.  The screenings were not indispensable to the employees’ duties because O’Reilly could eliminate them completely without hindering the employees’ ability to perform their duties….  A pre-shift COVID temperature check and short questions regarding exposure do not share the required nexus with Plaintiff’s duties of retrieving automotive parts and delivering them to auto part stores to make the screening a compensable activity that is integral and indispensable to those activities.

Notably, the court referenced—and then distinguished—the U.S. Department of Labor’s COVID-19 and the Fair Labor Standards Act Questions and Answers, which were issued during the height of the pandemic and which many employers felt were ambiguous on the issue of which COVID-related activities were and weren’t considered “hours worked” under the FLSA:

Unlike the nurse in the DOL example whose principal job duty is to keep patients healthy and has direct patient contact, Plaintiff’s principal activities consisted of manual labor and transportation of auto parts to stores.

We examined those agency Q&As—and the broader issues around compensability of time spent in vaccination, testing, and screening activities—in an earlier blog.

The decision is Pipich v. O’Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC (S.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2022).

Article By Allan S Bloom of Proskauer Rose LLP

For more coronavirus legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Proskauer Rose LLP.

Medical Marijuana, Workers’ Compensation, and the CSA: Hazy Outlook for Employers As States Wrestle With Cannabis Reimbursement as a Reasonable Medical Expense

While each state has its own unique workers’ compensation program, workers’ compensation generally requires employers to reimburse the reasonable medical expenses of employees who are injured at work. Depending on the injury, these expenses can include hospital visits, follow-up appointments, physical therapy, surgeries, and medication, among other medical care. In recent years, medical cannabis has become increasingly common to treat a myriad of ailments—as of February 2022, 37 states, the District of Columbia, and three territories now allow the use of medical cannabis.

While that is good news for patients seeking treatment for issues like chronic pain, medical cannabis laws can cause a major headache for employers. The federal law known as the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) classifies cannabis as a Schedule I substance, meaning that under federal law, it is not currently authorized for medical treatment anywhere in the United States and is not considered safe for use even under medical supervision. So, what happens when an employee is injured at work, is eligible for workers’ compensation, and is prescribed medical cannabis to treat their work-related injury in a state that authorizes medical cannabis?

Employers are faced with a tricky dilemma: They can reimburse the employee’s medical cannabis as a reasonable medical expense and risk violating the federal prohibition against aiding and abetting the possession of cannabis. Or, they can refuse to reimburse the otherwise reasonable medical expense and risk violating the state’s workers’ compensation law.

Usually, where it is impossible for an employer to comply with both state and federal law, federal law wins—a legal concept called conflict preemption. Unfortunately for employers, however, clarity on this issue will have to wait—the U.S. Supreme Court recently declined two requests to review state supreme court cases on this issue and definitively decide whether the CSA preempts state workers’ compensation laws that require reimbursement of medical cannabis. In the absence of federal guidance, national employers with workers in different states must follow the decisions of the handful of state courts that have taken up the question. The state courts who have decided the issue have come to inconsistent conclusions—thus, whether an employer should reimburse medical cannabis will vary depending on the state where the employee is injured.

For example, in Maine and Minnesota, both states’ highest courts have concluded that employers are not required to pay for their injured employees’ medical cannabis. These courts reasoned that employers would face liability under the CSA for aiding and abetting the purchase of a controlled substance. The employer, if reimbursing employees for using medical cannabis, would knowingly subsidize the employee’s purchase of marijuana in direct violation of federal law. However, in such a case, the employer would also violate state law for refusing to reimburse the employee’s reasonable medical expenses. Deeming it impossible for the employer to comply with both laws, these states’ courts concluded that the federal prohibition on cannabis preempts the state workers’ compensation laws.

States such as New Jersey have gone the other way, requiring employers to reimburse employee’s medical cannabis. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that there was no conflict between the prohibitions of the CSA and the demands of the New Jersey workers’ compensation law. Thus, the federal law did not preempt New Jersey’s state law, and employers were required to comply by reimbursing medical cannabis as a reasonable reimbursement.

Meanwhile, Massachusetts followed Maine and Minnesota’s approach, but did so based on its own medical marijuana statute, not the CSA. The Massachusetts law explicitly exempts health insurance providers or any government agency or authority from the reimbursement requirement because doing so violates federal law.

Given this patchwork of state decisions, employers should be cautious in determining whether to approve or deny medical cannabis as a reasonable medical expense under state workers’ compensation laws. While the answer is relatively clear (for now) in the states discussed above, there are still over 30 states with medical cannabis programs that have not addressed this issue. It is important to note that many state medical cannabis laws include provisions like Massachusetts that exempt employers from reimbursing employees for cannabis—a clear indicator that these laws were designed with federal prohibitions in mind. But these provisions are not necessarily determinative—New Jersey’s medical cannabis law has a similar provision, yet New Jersey employers are still required to reimburse for medical cannabis.

The bottom line is that federal CSA violations can be hefty, including a mandatory $1,000 fine, possible incarceration of up to one year, and possibly more if “aggravating factors” are found, such as prior convictions. Employers should therefore pay careful attention to their respective state medical cannabis laws, workers’ compensation laws, as well as the CSA and consult with counsel to determine the best approach in their particular jurisdiction. It is likely that more of these cases will be brought in the future, so be sure to check back for further developments in this evolving area of law.

Article By Amanda C. Hibbler of Foley & Lardner LLP. This article was prepared with the assistance of 2022 summer associate Zack Sikora.

For more cannabis legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Foley & Lardner LLP

EEOC Sanctions Employer for GINA Violations Relating to Collection of Employees’ Family Members’ COVID Test Results

On July 6, 2022, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) announced it has entered into a conciliation agreement with a Florida-based medical practice for violations of the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act (GINA) arising out of the practice’s collection of employees’ family members’ COVID-19 testing results.

In a press release announcing the agreement, the EEOC stated that, following an investigation, it found that the medical practice – Brandon Dermatology – violated GINA by requesting the test results of employees’ family members and that “[s]uch conduct violates the GINA, which prohibits employers from requesting, requiring or purchasing genetic information about applicants or employees and their family members, except in very narrow circumstances which do not apply in this matter.”  GINA defines “genetic information” to include “the manifestation of a disease or disorder in an employee’s family members.”

While the press release includes limited details on the matter, the EEOC noted that “[i]n addition to compensating affected employees through restoration of leave time or back pay, as well as compensatory damages, the conciliation agreement resolving the charge requires Brandon Dermatology to review its COVID-19 policies; conduct training on EEO laws as they pertain to COVID-19; and post a notice.”

In its technical assistance guidance relating to COVID-19, the EEOC states that GINA “prohibits employers from asking employees medical questions about family members” including asking an employee who is physically coming into the workplace whether they have family members who have COVID-19 or symptoms associated with COVID-19.  However, the guidance goes on to state that “GINA . . . does not prohibit an employer from asking employees whether they have had contact with anyone diagnosed with COVID-19 or who may have symptoms associated with the disease.”  It also notes that “from a public health perspective, only asking about an employee’s contact with family members would unnecessarily limit the information obtained about an employee’s potential exposure to COVID-19.”

Article By Evandro C Gigante and Laura M. Fant of Proskauer Rose LLP

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Proskauer Rose LLP.

Abortion-Related Travel Benefits Post-Dobbs

Immediately following the Supreme Court decision in Dobbs v. Jackson returning the power to regulate abortion to the states, a number of large employers announced that they would offer out-of-state travel benefits for employees living in states where abortion-related medical care is unavailable. Employers considering offering abortion-related travel benefits have several key considerations to keep in mind. The law currently allows health plans to provide reimbursement for travel primarily for and essential to medical care. Although this area of the law is evolving, employers with self-funded medical plans may amend their existing medical plans to provide abortion-related travel benefits while those with fully insured medical plans may face more obstacles in providing such benefits.

In Dobbs v. Jackson, an abortion clinic challenged a Mississippi law that would ban abortion after 15 weeks of pregnancy, with limited exceptions. In establishing the constitutional right to abortion in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court restricted states in their ability to limit or ban abortions before viability of the fetus, or 24 weeks from the time of conception. In upholding the Mississippi law, the Supreme Court overturned Roe and held that the protection or regulation of abortion is a decision for each state.

Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma and South Dakota have already banned or made abortion illegal pursuant to trigger laws which went into effect as of the Supreme Court decision on June 24, 2022.  Also, a number of additional states are expected to soon have similar legislation in effect, either by virtue of expected legislative action or trigger laws with slightly delayed effective dates.  In response, a number of employers have announced that they will reimburse all or a portion of abortion-related travel expenses for employees in states where abortions are banned or otherwise not available.

Under Section 213(d) of the Internal Revenue Code, the definition of “medical care” includes transportation that is both “primarily for and essential to” the medical care sought by an individual. These types of travel benefits have historically been utilized in connection with certain specialized medical treatments, such as organ transplants.  However, Section 213(d) is not limited to particular types of procedures, and thus forms the framework for providing abortion-related travel benefits through existing medical plans.

Although Code Section 213(d) applies to both self-insured and insured medical plans, the substantive coverage provisions of insured medical plans will generally be governed by the state insurance code of the state in which the insurance policy is issued.  Coverage for abortion services or any related travel benefits may not be permitted under the insurance code of the state in which the policy is issued, or an insurer may not offer a travel benefit for such services even if permitted to do so.  Self-insured plans, by contrast, provide employers more flexibility in plan design, including control, consistent with existing federal requirements, over the types and levels of benefits covered under the plan. As noted above, existing plans may already cover travel-related benefits for certain types of medical procedures.

Employers with high-deductible health plans tied to health savings accounts (HSAs) will need to consider the impact of adding abortion-related travel benefits to such plans.  Travel-related benefits of any type would not appear to be eligible for first dollar coverage, and thus may be of minimal benefit to participants enrolled in high-deductible health plans.

Employers with fully insured medical plans that do not cover abortion-related travel benefits may be able to offer a medical travel reimbursement program through an integrated health reimbursement arrangement (HRA).  An integrated HRA is an employer-funded group health plan from which employees enrolled in the employer’s traditional group medical insurance plan are reimbursed for qualifying expenses not paid by the traditional plan.

Another potential option for employers with fully insured medical plans may be to offer a stipend entirely outside of any established group health plan. Such reimbursement programs may result in taxable compensation for employees who receive such reimbursements. Also, employers would need to be sensitive to privacy and confidentiality considerations of such a policy, which should generally be minimized if offered in accordance with the existing protections of HIPAA through a medical plan and under which claims are processed by an insurer or third-party administrator rather than by the employer itself.

Additionally, some state laws may attempt to criminalize or otherwise sanction so-called aiding and abetting actions related to the procurement of abortion services in another state.  This is an untested area of the law, and it is unclear whether any actions brought under such statutes would be legally viable.  In this regard, Justice Kavanaugh stated as follows in his concurring opinion in Dobbs:  “For example, may a State bar a resident of that State from traveling to another State to obtain an abortion? In my view, the answer is no based on the constitutional right to interstate travel.” (Kavanaugh Concurring Opinion, page 10.)  This is an area that will require continual monitoring by employers who offer abortion-related travel benefits.

Article By Thomas G. Hancuch, Philip L. Mowery, and Amal Rafiq of Vedder Price

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Vedder Price

U.S. Supreme Court Overturns Roe and Casey: What This Decision Means for Employers

As many expected based on the draft opinion that was leaked months ago, the U.S. Supreme Court has held the U.S. Constitution does not protect the right to obtain an abortion. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, No. 19-1392 (June 24, 2022).

Dobbs overturns nearly 50 years of precedent from the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood Pennsylvania v. Casey on the issue.

The impact of Dobbs will vary, as states are now at liberty to enforce and create abortion legislation without restrictions arising out of constitutional protections.

What does this mean for employers?

As pressure mounts on this issue, some employers may be considering what, if anything, they can or should do. Many states have enacted legislation that restricts individual abortion rights and potentially third parties who assist individuals who seek abortions. To the extent any state laws were not enforced because of the Court’s holding in Roe or Casey, states can move forward now to implement and enforce those laws.

Laws often referred to as “trigger laws,” those that are in place but unenforceable due to overriding federal restrictions, become enforceable once those federal restrictions are lifted. As a result of Dobbs, abortion-related “trigger laws” previously unenforceable can take effect, creating new standards for individuals and others that will redefine the national abortion law landscape.

Some existing state laws and trigger laws may affect employers and put employers at risk of violating state law if they implement policies to assist employees seeking an abortion or even continue to cover abortions under group health plans. For example, a state law may create liability for anyone who “aids or abets” a person who obtains an abortion. Employers also must be cognizant of how they apply their leave policies, who may seek accommodations based on a sincerely held religious belief, and whether certain provisions of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act apply to women who are seeking or who have had an abortion.

In addition, the Court’s ruling may affect employee benefit plans. Many employers are considering additional benefits for their employees, and their covered dependents, such as travel reimbursement for seeking an abortion outside of the local jurisdiction due to state law restrictions. There are many legal issues to consider in connection with the coverage of abortion-related services under employee benefit plans. (For additional guidance on the issue, see our article, Group Health Plan Considerations in the Face of (Potentially) Changing Abortion Laws.) Depending on how the state laws are enacted, there also may be issues with relying on ERISA preemption provisions to avoid these obligations.

Corporate management and directors should plan for changes and be aware of policies and fiduciary responsibilities. This can include preparing for public and employee reactions (for and against), legislative and law enforcement threats, social media posts, and other employee demonstrations. Pressure from a variety of groups to take a corporate public opinion also may occur.

Whether changes to leave policies, employee benefits, travel reimbursement, or handling accommodation requests, employers considering policies or benefit offerings in response to Dobbs must carefully review and consider federal and state laws, including state abortion-related legislation to evaluate the risk of potential liability.

Article By Patricia Anderson Pryor, Joy Napier-Joyce, Melissa Ostrower, and Tasos C. Paindiris of Jackson Lewis P.C.

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.
Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2022

You Have Mail (Better Read It): District Court Finds EEOC 90-Day Deadline Starts When Email Received

If a letter from the EEOC is in your virtual mailbox but you never open it, have you received it? Most of us are familiar with the requirement that a claimant who files an EEOC charge has 90 days to file a lawsuit after receiving what is usually required a “right-to-sue” letter from the agency. This is one of the deadlines that both plaintiff and defense counsel track on their calendars. But when is that notice officially “received” by the claimant — especially in these days of electronic correspondence? In Paniconi v. Abington Hospital-Jefferson Health, one Pennsylvania federal court decided to draw a hard line on when that date actually occurs.

A Cautionary Tale

Denise Paniconi worked for a hospital in Pennsylvania and filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC alleging race and religious discrimination. The EEOC investigated and issued a right-to-sue letter dated September 8, 2021, which gave her 90 days to file her complaint. She filed her complaint 91 days after the EEOC issued the letter. The employer moved to dismiss the complaint for failing to comply with the 90-day deadline.

What ordinarily would just be a day counting exercise took a twist because of how the EEOC issued the notice. The EEOC sent both the plaintiff and her lawyer an email stating that there was an “important document” now available on the EEOC portal. Neither the plaintiff nor her lawyer opened the email or accessed the portal until sometime later. They argued that the 90-day filing deadline should run from the date that the claimant actually accesses the document, not from the date the EEOC notified them it was available.

The court dismissed the complaint for failing to meet the deadline. The opinion noted that although the 90-day period is not a “jurisdictional predicate,” it cannot be extended, even by one day, without some sort of recognized equitable consideration. Paniconi’s lawyer argued that the court should apply the old rule for snail mail  ̶  without proof otherwise, it should be assumed that the notice is received within three days after the issuance date. The court disagreed and pointed out that no one disputed the date that the email was sent  ̶   it was simply not opened and read by either Paniconi or her lawyer. The court said that there was no reason that those individuals did not open the email and meet the 90-day deadline.

Deadlines Are Important

This is another example of how electronic communication can complicate the legal world. The EEOC has leaned into its use of the portal, and the rest of the world needs to get used to it. The minute you receive an email or notice from the portal, you need to calendar that deadline. Some courts (at least this one) believe that electronic communication is immediate, and you may not get grace for not logging on and finding out what is happening with your charge. Yet another reason to stay on top of your emails.

Article By J. William Manuel and Anne R. Yuengert of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP

For more labor and employment legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP

Supreme Court Declines to Resolve Circuit Split on Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction in FLSA Collective Actions

On June 6, 2022, the Supreme Court of the United States declined to hear petitions seeking review of whether federal courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over claims of nonresident plaintiffs who join Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective actions when their claims are not connected to the defendant’s activities in the forum state. The petitions sought review of rulings on the issue by the First and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals in Waters v. Day & Zimmermann NPS, Inc. and Canaday v. The Anthem Companies, Inc., respectively. As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision declining to hear the petitions, there remains a circuit split as to whether the Court’s 2017 ruling in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court applies to FLSA collective actions, and employers with nationwide footprints remain subject to uncertainty depending on jurisdiction.

To date, only the First, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have ruled on the issue. On August 17, 2021, the Sixth Circuit was the first to address the issue in Canaday. There, the Court held that federal courts may not exercise personal jurisdiction over claims of nonresident plaintiffs who join FLSA collective actions when their claims are not connected to the defendant’s activities in the forum state. Just one day later, on August 18, 2021, the Eighth Circuit came to the same conclusion in Vallone v. CJS Solutions Group, LLC.

On January 13, 2022, in Waters, the First Circuit held to the contrary, concluding that federal courts do have personal jurisdiction over claims asserted by nonresident opt-in plaintiffs.

The Significance of Bristol-Myers

The Supreme Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers provides the basis for the current circuit split. Bristol-Myers involved a mass tort action under state law for alleged defects in a blood-thinning drug, Plavix, which the company manufactured. Residents and nonresidents of California sued Bristol-Myers in California state court, alleging injuries related to the drug. The nonresident plaintiffs claimed no relationship with the forum state, nor did they purchase Plavix in California or suffer any harm from it in California. The Supreme Court reasoned that any similarity between the resident and nonresident plaintiffs’ claims was an “insufficient basis” to exercise specific jurisdiction. Unless nonresident plaintiffs could demonstrate that their claims arose out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state, personal jurisdiction over the company did not exist, no matter “the extent of a defendant’s unconnected activities in the State.”

In ruling that the California state court lacked jurisdiction over the claims of the nonresident plaintiffs, the Supreme Court acknowledged that its holding might ultimately generate more litigation in the form of separate actions by nonresident plaintiffs in their respective states. But the Supreme Court also noted that all plaintiffs to the action could have brought a mass tort action against Bristol-Myers in New York (the company’s headquarters) or Delaware (its place of incorporation) because courts in those states would have had general personal jurisdiction over the company. Instead, the California state court could exercise only specific personal jurisdiction over the company based on its activities in the state. Notably, Bristol-Myers was limited to Rule 23 class actions, leaving lower courts to determine whether its holding applied to FLSA collective actions, which differ procedurally.

The Circuit Split

In Canaday, the Sixth Circuit reiterated the basic tenet that, pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the question of whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant depends on the defendant’s contacts with the state in which the plaintiff filed the lawsuit. Because Anthem is both incorporated and headquartered in Indiana and not otherwise “at home” in the state of Tennessee, the district court in Tennessee lacked general jurisdiction over Anthem as a defendant. At issue was whether the district court in Tennessee had specific personal jurisdiction over Anthem, and thus, whether there was a claim-specific and Anthem-specific relationship between the nonresidents’ FLSA claims and the state of Tennessee.

Applying Bristol-Myers, the Sixth Circuit held that there was not. The court found that the nonresident plaintiffs did not bring claims arising out of or relating to Anthem’s conduct in Tennessee, because Anthem neither employed nor paid the nonresident plaintiffs within the state. The Sixth Circuit went on the explain that adherence to this approach should not change the way FLSA collective actions are filed, because plaintiffs traditionally file their actions where courts have general jurisdiction, or where the conduct occurred. Of note, Sixth Circuit Judge Bernice Donald dissented in Canaday, contending that Bristol-Myers does not apply to FLSA collective actions because the Supreme Court in that case addressed only the limitations of state courts, not federal courts, in their exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents.

In Waters, the First Circuit largely followed the reasoning in Judge Donald’s dissent, concluding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb “rest[ed] on Fourteenth Amendment constitutional limits on state courts exercising jurisdiction over state-law claims” and thus did not control whether a federal court could exercise jurisdiction over federal claims asserted by nonresident plaintiffs. The First Circuit also observed that the plain language of Rule 4(k) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merely concerns the service of summonses and does not “constrain[] a federal court’s power to act once a summons has been properly served, and personal jurisdiction has been established.”

Key Takeaways

The Supreme Court’s decision to deny the petitions means that employers with nationwide footprints continue to live with potentially inconsistent rulings on the question of whether a federal district court has jurisdiction to hear claims of out-of-state workers when the defendant is neither headquartered nor incorporated in the state. Canaday and Vallone stand to significantly limit the size and geographic scope of FLSA collective actions in the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, absent a district court’s exercise of general jurisdiction over a corporate defendant, while Waters permits nationwide jurisdiction in the First Circuit. For now, at least, multistate employers face continued uncertainty on the issue until courts of appeals in the remaining circuits weigh in.

Article By Maggie (Hanrahan) Santen, Monica Lacks, and Samuel H. Ottinger of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.

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