Understanding How U.S. Export Controls Affect Manufacturers’ Hiring Practices

The U.S. government has adjusted export control regulations in an effort to protect U.S. national security interests. The revisions primarily affect export of electronic computing items and semiconductors to prevent foreign powers from obtaining critical technologies that may threaten national security. As manufacturers are facing increased demand for their products and critical labor shortages, they may find themselves seeking to hire foreign national talent and navigating U.S. export control and immigration and anti-discrimination laws.

Export Control Laws in United States

The primary export control laws in the United States are the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and Export Administration Regulations (EAR). Under these regulations, U.S. Persons working for U.S. companies can access export-controlled items without authorization from the U.S. government. U.S. Persons include: U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals, Lawful permanent residents, Refugees, and Asylees. Employers might need authorization from the appropriate federal agency to “export” (in lay terms, share or release) export-controlled items to workers who are not U.S. Persons, which the regulations call foreign persons. Employers apply for such authorization from either the U.S. Department of State or the U.S. Department of Commerce, depending on the item.

The release of technical data or technology to a foreign person that occurs within the United States is “deemed” to be an export to the foreign person’s “home country.” Whether an export license is required for a particular release may depend on both the nature of export controls applicable to the technology or technical data (including whether it is subject to the ITAR or EAR) and the citizenship of the foreign person.

Recent revisions to the EAR cover controls on advanced computing integrated circuits (ICs), computer commodities that contain such ICs, and certain semiconductor manufacturing items, among other controls. These revisions particularly affect semiconductor and chip manufacturers and exporters.

Intersection With Immigration and Anti-Discrimination Laws

The U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964 prohibit discrimination based on protected characteristics.

The INA prohibits discrimination based on national origin or citizenship, among other characteristics. Title VII prohibits discrimination based on race and national origin, which typically includes discrimination based on citizenship or immigration status. Furthermore, the INA prohibits “unfair documentary practices,” which are identified as instances where employers request more or different documents than those necessary to verify employment eligibility or request such documents with the intent to discriminate based on national origin or citizenship.

The intersection of export control laws, immigration, and anti-discrimination laws can create a confusing landscape for employers, particularly manufacturers or exporters of export-controlled items. Manufacturers and exporters, like all employers, must collect identity and employment authorization documentation to ensure I-9 compliance. At the same time, however, they must collect information relating to a U.S. Person in connection with export compliance assessments. To address these areas of exposure for employers, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division released an employer fact sheet to provide guidance for employers that includes best practices to avoid discrimination.

Implications

To ensure compliance under these rules, employers should separate the I-9 employment authorization documentation process from the export control U.S. Person or foreign person identification process. Employers should implement or revisit internal procedures and provide updated training to employees.

The export rule revisions highlight the challenges for employers in avoiding discrimination when complying with export control laws. Manufacturers and exporters should review their compliance practices regarding U.S. export control, immigration, and anti-discrimination laws with experienced counsel. Employers should implement policies and procedures reasonably tailored to address export control compliance requirements while not engaging in discrimination on the basis of citizenship or national origin.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2024

by: Maurice G. Jenkins , Kimberly M. Bennett of Jackson Lewis P.C.

For more news on Export Control Laws, visit the NLR Antitrust & Trade Regulation section.

U.S. Government Pursues More Aggressive Action to Curb Espionage at Universities

The U.S. Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) thinks the FBI and other agencies are not doing enough to address the espionage threat on U.S. university campuses. It issued a report, “Enforcement Agencies Should Better Leverage Information to Target Efforts Involving U.S. Universities” on June 14, 2022, urging the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Commerce to step up their outreach efforts to address the threat. Commerce, DHS, and FBI have all concurred with GAO’s recommendations. As a result, U.S. colleges and universities to face yet another organizational risk: an increase in campuses visits by export control and law enforcement agents.

The threat: U.S. export control laws consider the disclosure to non-U.S. persons of technology, software, or technical data to be exports, even if the disclosure occurs in the United States.

The overwhelming majority of non-U.S. persons studying and working at U.S. universities are not security risks and are valued members of their academic organizations. But U.S. intelligence agencies have long warned that foreign state actors actively acquire sensitive national security data and proprietary technology from U.S. universities.

A lot of the technology flow abroad from U.S. universities is perfectly legal, for two reasons: First, most university research, even in cutting-edge technology, is exempt from export controls under an exemption known as “fundamental research.” Second, even in cases where the fundamental research exemption does not apply, it takes time for the U.S. government agencies to add new items to the export control lists they enforce; namely the U.S. Munitions List, administered by the U.S. Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls; and the Commerce Control List, administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security.

But at the same time, either through inadvertence or outright espionage, unlawful transfers of technology to foreign nationals take place. A 2006 report by the U.S. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive found that a significant quantity of export controlled U.S. technology is released to foreign nationals in the United States unlawfully each year.

Clash of values: One important issue for higher education in addressing trade controls compliance is cultural in nature. U.S. universities value open, collaborative environments which drive and accelerate innovation. For those institutions, the idea of cutting off information flows conflicts with those cultural norms. By contrast, U.S. export controls aim to protect U.S. national security by hindering the flow of sensitive information to potential adversaries.

GAO’s recommendations: The GAO report recommends that U.S. trade control agencies take more aggressive steps to curb foreign access to sensitive technologies at U.S. universities. The recommendations include steps to enhance risk assessment and ranking of universities by risk, and steps to increase agency cooperation in planning and conducting outreach visits to universities. As a direct result of this report, U.S. universities are going to receive more visits from U.S. government agents.

Practical takeaways:

  • Universities: Consider reevaluating your risk. The threat has evolved, and the U.S. government response is also evolving. A risk evaluation using modern tools such as a premortem can help you know where to dedicate resources to update your export control policies, procedures, and training. Any unlawful escape of technology or technical data are much more likely to be detected and punished under the new regime, in part based on the GAO report. Organizations have to evolve with the threat.
  • Students, faculty, and administrators: Consider how to jealously guard your academic freedom, but be wary of the national security risks of sensitive technology falling into the wrong hands.
  • Research sponsors: More and more U.S. university research is sponsored by U.S. companies and government agencies. Research sponsorship agreements play a major role in striving for both national security and academic goals of the U.S. university system. Sponsors need to be sensitive to how these agreements are drafted. Sponsors must be aware of the espionage threat to their technology. But imposing too many restrictions in the contract may undermine the applicability of the fundamental research exemption and hinder the success of the project.

Conclusion: In the face of organizational threats, institutions do best when they heed their values. In the realm of protecting sensitive technology, we must constantly evolve with the threat. But we must also continue to carefully balance national security considerations with our bedrock values of academic freedom and openness.

Copyright © 2022, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

US Treasury and Commerce Departments Announce New Changes to Cuba Regulations

On January 25, 2016, the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the US Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced new changes to existing US sanctions on Cuba, including OFAC’s Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) and BIS’s Export Administration Regulations (EAR). These changes expand allowable financing for certain authorized exports, allow more flexibility in a number of sectors to export to Cuba, permit air carriers to serve customers in Cuba and further liberalize travel rules. These new regulatory changes may constitute the most that President Obama can do to liberalize trade and travel with Cuba in the absence of congressional legislation to lift the embargo in whole or in part.

Authorized Export Transactions

Amendments to the CACR and EAR to increase support for the Cuban people and facilitate authorized exports include the following:

  • The CACR have been amended to remove financing restrictions for most types of authorized non-agricultural exports. (OFAC is required by statute to maintain the existing limitations on payment and financing terms for the export and reexport of agricultural commodities and agricultural items). Permissible payment and financing terms for authorized non-agricultural exports and reexports now include payment of cash in advance, sales on open account, and financing by third-country financial institutions or US financial institutions.

  • OFAC expanded an existing general license to authorize certain additional travel-related transactions directly related to market research, commercial marketing, sales or contract negotiation, accompanied delivery, installation, leasing, or servicing in Cuba of items consistent with the export or reexport licensing policy of the Department of Commerce, provided that the traveler’s schedule of activities does not include free time or recreation in excess of that consistent with a full-time schedule.

  • BIS now will generally approve license applications for exports and reexports of telecommunications items that would improve communications to, from, and among the Cuban people; certain agricultural items not eligible for a license exception, including insecticides, pesticides, and herbicides; and items necessary to ensure the safety of civil aviation and the safe operation of commercial aircraft engaged in international air transportation.

  • BIS ended its policy of denial and now will consider on a case-by-case basis license applications for exports and reexports of items to meet the needs of the Cuban people, including exports and reexports for such purposes made to state-owned enterprises and agencies and organizations of the Cuban government that provide goods and services to the Cuban people. Exports and reexports eligible for this licensing policy include items for: agricultural production; artistic endeavors (including the creation of public content, historic and cultural works and preservation); education; food processing; disaster preparedness, relief and response; public health and sanitation; residential construction and renovation; public transportation; and the construction of infrastructure that directly benefits the Cuban people (e.g., facilities for treating public water supplies and supplying energy to the general public).

Travel

OFAC has expanded several existing allowable travel categories to facilitate travel to Cuba, including the following:

  • OFAC will authorize travel-related and other transactions directly incident to professional media or artistic productions of information or informational materials for exportation, importation, or transmission, including the filming or production of media programs (such as movies and television programs), music recordings, and the creation of artworks in Cuba by persons that are regularly employed in or have demonstrated professional experience in a field relevant to such professional media or artistic productions.

  • OFAC is expanding the general license for travel-related and other transactions to organize professional meetings or conferences in Cuba. The existing general license authorized only attendance at such meetings or conferences.

  • OFAC is authorizing by general license travel-related and other transactions to organize amateur and semi-professional international sports federation competitions and public performances, clinics, workshops, other athletic or non-athletic competitions, and exhibitions in Cuba.  OFAC is also removing requirements that US profits from certain events must be donated to certain organizations and that certain events be run at least in part by US travelers.

Conclusion

These changes to the regulations offer important changes and will allow for additional market opportunities for US businesses looking to enter the Cuba market. Still, the embargo is in place, and US companies should proceed with caution to ensure full compliance with all existing US and Cuban laws.

© 2016 McDermott Will & Emery

Register for ABA's National Institute on International Regulation and Compliance: FCPA, Economic Sanctions & Export Control

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For the first time ever, the American Bar Association is putting together an inaugural comprehensive program on the FCPA, economic sanctions, and export control.  Led by the Criminal Justice Section and its Global Anti-Corruption Committee, and co-sponsored by the Business Law and International Law Sections, the ABA National Institute on International Regulation and Compliance is a three-day program (October 1-3) in Washington, DC tackling some of the most pressing challenges in cross-border regulations affecting in-house and outside business and transactional lawyers, litigators, investigators, compliance professionals, and forensic examiners, as well as their organizations.

Attracting many of the country’s leading thought leaders and practitioners in their respective fields – and drawing from the membership of all three Sections – the Institute is anchored by an exceptionally strong faculty with deep knowledge of, and experience in, their respective topics.  In addition, the Institute benefits from the participation of a cross-section of government and former government lawyers, who are important contributors to the Institute’s program-content dialogue.  So come be a part of an important, cutting-edge conference with many benefits, including:

  • Fair and balanced program content targeted at both experienced and less experienced professionals in different legal fields
  • Satisfying your state bar legal ethics requirement
  • Increased networking opportunities

Register today!

U.S. And EU Significantly Expand Sanctions and Export Control Restrictions Targeting Russia

In response to Russia’s continuing actions to destabilize Ukraine, the United States and EU took coordinated and significant steps on September 12, 2014, to expand and intensify sanctions targeting the Russian energy, defense, and financial services sectors. In tandem, the United States and EU also imposed additional restrictions on energy-related exports to certain entities in Russia, and the EU introduced new trade controls relating to certain dual-use exports.

In the United States, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) and the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) took three steps that target the Russian energy sector:

  • First, OFAC imposed a prohibition on the following activities by U.S. persons or within the United States: the provision, export, or reexport of goods, services (other than financial services), or technology in support of deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale exploration or production projects that: (1) have the potential to produce oil in or offshore of Russia; and (2) involve any of five major Russian energy companies: Gazprom, Gazprom Neft, Lukoil, Rosneft, or Surgutneftegas. U.S. parties impacted by these new sanctions have two weeks to wind down their activities with these Russian firms, under the terms of a new general license.

  • Second, BIS imposed a license requirement for the export, reexport, or foreign transfer to these same five Russian companies of any item subject to the U.S. Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) if the exporter, reexporter, or transferor knows that the item will be used directly or indirectly in exploration for, or production from, deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects in Russia. This action – achieved by naming these companies to the BIS Entity List – represents an expansion of the previous BIS restrictions relating to Russian deepwater, Arctic offshore, and shale oil and gas projects, which we reviewed in our e-alert of July 30, 2014.

  • Third, OFAC added two Russian energy companies–Gazprom Neft and Transneft–tothegroup of companies whose ability to issue new debt with a maturity of longer than 90 days is restricted. Those restrictions on new debt, which apply to U.S. persons and persons in the United States who transact in, provide financing for, or otherwise deal in such debt, were detailed in our e-alert of July 17, 2014.

    U.S. actions targeting the Russian defense and financial services sectors include new or expanded “sectoral sanctions” and the designation of Russian defense companies to BIS’s Entity List and OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons. BIS also noted that it will “require licenses for an additional group of items destined to military end-uses or end-users in Russia,” but did not provide further elaborate on what this may entail.

    The new EU sanctions are set forth in two measures. First, Council Regulation No. 960/2014, which amends Council Regulation No. 833/2014 (described in our e-alert of August 4, 2014), introduces new restrictions on the access of certain Russian companies, including major Russian energy companies such as Rosneft and Gazprom Neft, to EU financing and financial markets. It also introduces new trade controls relating to certain dual-use and energy-related exports. Separately, Council Regulation No. 961/2014 designates 24 additional individuals for EU asset-freezing measures.

Collectively, the new U.S. and EU sanctions introduce a significant new range of trade controls, which will be of particular importance to companies in the energy, financial services, and defense sectors. The principal elements of the new sanctions are described below.

NEW U.S. SANCTIONS

A. New U.S. Sanctions Targeting the Russian Energy Sector

Perhaps the most significant of the new U.S. sanctions are those targeting the Russian energy sector. The new U.S. measures have implications for both U.S. and non-U.S. companies that do business with the Russian energy industry, though they will impact U.S. and non-U.S. companies in different ways. As noted above, OFAC and BIS have taken three new steps to target the Russian energy sector.

OFAC Directive 4 and General License No. 2

The first key action targeting the Russian energy sector is OFAC’s issuance of a new directive – Directive 4 – pursuant to Executive Order 13662. Directive 4 prohibits the following activities by U.S. persons or within the United States: providing, exporting, or reexporting, directly or indirectly, goods, services (except for financial services), or technology in support of exploration or production from deepwater (i.e., more than 500 feet), Arctic offshore, or shale projects that: (1) have the potential to produce oil in Russia or in maritime area claimed by Russia and extending from its territory; and (2) involve parties subject to Directive 4, their property, or their interests in property. These restrictions also extend to entities owned 50% or more by one or more sanctioned parties. Currently, five Russian energy companies are identified on the U.S. Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List (“SSI List”) as being subject to Directive 4 – Gazprom, Gazprom Neft, Lukoil, Rosneft, and Surgutneftegas. Directive 4 also makes clear that any conspiracy to violate any of its prohibitions is prohibited, and that any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of Directive 4’s prohibitions is also prohibited.

At the same time that it issued Directive 4, OFAC expanded the guidance it offers on the sectoral sanctions through its Frequently Asked Questions. One of these “FAQs” (#412) explains that the prohibition on the exportation of services includes, but may not be limited to, drilling services, geophysical services, geological services, logistical services, management services, modeling capabilities, and mapping technologies. In contrast, Directive 4 does not prohibit the exportation or provision of financial services, such as clearing transactions or providing insurance related to the targeted activities. However, companies providing such financial services should ensure that those services do not constitute a prohibited dealing in new debt or new equity under Directives 1 or 2, which are addressed further below and apply independently of Directive 4.

Simultaneously, OFAC also issued General License No. 2 to authorize, for a limited time, certain wind down activities involving the Russian energy companies subject to Directive 4. Specifically, activities otherwise prohibited by Directive 4 are authorized until September 26, 2014, if they are “ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of operations, contracts, or other agreements involving persons determined to be subject to Directive 4 . . . that were in effect prior to September 12, 2014.” OFAC has made clear that General License No. 2 does not authorize the provision, export, or reexport of goods, services (other than financial services), or technology except as needed to cease operations involving the projects covered by Directive 4.

Any U.S. persons participating in transactions authorized by General License No. 2 are required, within 10 business days after the wind down activities conclude, to file a detailed report with OFAC covering the parties involved in the wind down activities and the date, type, and scope of such activities.

Finally, even if General License No. 2 appears to allow an export or reexport of goods, services, or technology related to wind down activities, companies should also confirm that there are no BIS restrictions applicable to the export or reexport before proceeding.

Expansion of BIS License Requirements for Certain Russian Deepwater, Arctic Offshore, and Shale Projects

The second key action targeting the Russian energy sector is BIS’s addition to its Entity List of the same five Russian energy companies currently subject to OFAC’s Directive 4 – Gazprom, Gazprom Neft, Lukoil, Rosneft, and Surgutneftegas. As a result of this action, BIS now requires all U.S. and non-U.S. persons to obtain a BIS license for the export, reexport, or foreign transfer to these five Russian companies of any item subject to the EAR if the exporter, reexporter, or transferor knows that the item will be used directly or indirectly in exploration for, or production from, deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects in Russia. Moreover, applications for such licenses will be subject to a presumption of denial if the item will be used directly or indirectly in exploration for, or production from, a deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale project in Russia that has the potential to produce oil. BIS previously issued guidance addressing the scope of the Entity List, including circumstances where an entity is owned or controlled by an entity on the Entity List. That guidance is available here.

This BIS action – which targets the export, reexport, or transfer of any item subject to the EAR – represents a significant expansion of the BIS export restrictions that were announced in early August, which targeted only certain enumerated items, not any item, subject to the EAR.

Addition of Two Russian Energy Companies to the SSI List as Subject to OFAC Directive 2

The third key action targeting the Russian energy sector is OFAC’s addition of two Russian energy companies – Gazprom Neft and Transneft – to the SSI List as subject to OFAC’s Directive 2. Directive 2 was originally issued on July 16, 2014, pursuant to Executive Order 13662, and prohibited the following activities by U.S. persons or within the United States: transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new debt of longer than 90 days maturity of entities identified on the SSI List as subject to Directive 2, their property, or interests in property.

Because Gazprom Neft and Transneft are now subject to Directive 2, transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new debt of longer than 90 days maturity of Gazprom Neft and Transneft, Rosneft and OAO Novatek (which were added to the SSI List as subject to Directive 2 in July), and any entities owned 50% or more by one or more sanctioned parties is prohibited as to U.S. persons and within the United States.

Notably, OFAC also issued General License No. 1A, which supersedes General License No. 1 of July 16, 2014, and which authorizes all transactions by U.S. persons and within the United States involving derivative products whose value is linked to an underlying asset that constitutes new debt with a maturity of longer than 90 days issued by a person subject to Directive 2.

It is important to highlight that Rosneft and Gazprom Neft are subject to both Directive 2 and Directive 4 (described above). OFAC has made clear that persons dealing with either Rosneft or Gazprom Neft must ensure that such dealings comply with Directive 2 and Directive 4 independently. For example, even if the provision of services to Rosneft is permissible under Directive 4 because the services qualify as “financial services,” the entity providing those services must separately ensure that the services do not run afoul of the prohibitions of Directive 2.

B. New U.S. Sanctions Targeting the Russian Defense Sector

OFAC Directive 3

OFAC expanded the sectoral sanctions targeting Russia to also cover the defense and related materiel sector. U.S. sectoral sanctions targeting Russia had previously focused only on the Russian financial services and energy sectors.

In particular, OFAC issued a new directive – Directive 3 – prohibiting the following activities by U.S. persons or within the United States: transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new debt of longer than 30 days maturity of entities added to the SSI List as subject to Directive 3, or their property or interests in property. Simultaneously, OFAC added Rostec, a Russia-based state- owned holding company for the Russian defense industry, to the SSI List as subject to Directive 3.

Like Directive 4, Directive 3 prohibits any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate Directive 3’s prohibitions. Likewise, Directive 3 prohibits any conspiracy to violate any of its prohibitions.

Notably, OFAC also issued General License No. 1A, as discussed above, which authorizes all transactions by U.S. persons and within the United States involving derivative products whose value is linked to an underlying asset that constitutes new debt with a maturity of longer than 30 days issued by a person subject to Directive 3.

Addition of Five Russian Defense Companies to the SDN List and Entity List

Separately, OFAC added the following five entities that operate in the Russian defense sector to its SDN List pursuant to Executive Order 13661:

  • Almaz-Antey GSKB (aka Almaz-Antey Air Defense Concern Main System Design Bureau, JSC): a subsidiary of the Almaz-Antey Concern (which was itself added to the SDN List pursuant to Executive Order 13661 on July 16, 2014) that designs and manufactures air defense systems for the Russian Ministry of Defense.

  • Dolgoprudny Research Production Enterprise: primarily engaged in the production of weapons and ammunition, including the Buk (SA-11 or SA-17) missile system.

  • JSC NIIP (aka Tikhomirov Scientific Research Institute of Instrument Design): a subsidiary of the Almaz-Antey Concern that develops anti-aircraft defense systems, including on-board radar systems for MiG and Sukhoi fighters, and anti-aircraft missile systems for land forces, including the Kub and Buk systems.

  • Kalinin Machine Plant JSC: a state-run company involved in the production of special purpose products, including launchers, anti-air missiles, and artillery guns for infantry and anti-air defense.

  • Mytishchinski Mashinostroitelny Zavod OAO: has produced weaponry and equipment, primarily anti-aircraft missile systems and chassis for tracked military vehicles.

U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in any dealings with these designated entities or any entities that are owned 50% or more by one or more of the designated entities. Additionally, any property or interests in property of these designated entities that comes within the United States or the possession or control of a U.S. person must be blocked.

Simultaneous with the OFAC designations, BIS added these same five entities to its Entity List, which means that any person – including non-U.S. persons – must obtain a BIS license for the export, reexport, or foreign transfer of any item subject to the EAR to the five designated entities. Applications for such licenses will be subject to a presumption of denial.

BIS noted in making these designations that it “will also require licenses for an additional group of items destined to military end-uses or end-users in Russia.” BIS did not further elaborate on what this may entail. We note – as explained in our e-alert of August 4, 2014 – that the EU previously imposed a prohibition on the sale, supply, transfer, or export of dual-use goods and technology to Russia if those items may be intended for “military use” or a “military end-user.”

C. New U.S. Sanctions Targeting the Russian Financial Services Sector

OFAC also has taken two key steps to expand and intensify the restrictions under Directive 1, which was originally issued on July 16, 2014, pursuant to Executive Order 13662 and which targets the access of certain entities in Russia’s financial services sector to U.S. capital markets.

First, OFAC amended Directive 1 to decrease the length of maturity of prohibited new debt from 90 days to 30 days. In its original form, Directive 1 prohibited the following activities by U.S. persons or within the United States: transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new debt of longer than 90 days maturity or new equity for persons identified on the SSI List as subject to Directive 1 (i.e., certain Russian banks), their property, or their interests in property. In its new, amended form, Directive 1 prohibits the following activities by U.S. persons or within the United States: transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new debt of longer than 30 days maturity or new equity of persons identified on the SSI List as subject to Directive 1, their property, or their interests in property.

Second, OFAC added Sberbank to the list of Russian banks subject to Directive 1. Thus, the prohibitions under Directive 1 are now applicable to new debt of longer than 30 days maturity and new equity of the Bank of Moscow, Gazprombank, the Russian Agricultural Bank, Sberbank, VEB, and VTB.

As noted above, OFAC also issued General License No. 1A, which authorizes all transactions by U.S. persons and within the United States involving derivative products whose value is linked to an underlying asset that constitutes new debt with a maturity of longer than 30 days or new equity issued by a person subject to Directive 1.

NEW EU SANCTIONS

The EU Council first agreed to the core framework of the sanctions on September 8, 2014. However, the cease-fire between the Ukrainian government and the pro-Russian armed militia — signed on September 5, 2014 — caused the EU Council to delay the entry into force of the new sanctions as the Council evaluated the cease-fire and the implementation of broader peace initiatives proposed earlier this month by the President of Ukraine.

The EU Council has signaled that it is prepared to take swift action to remove or reduce the new sanctions if the Russian Government demonstrates cooperation in resolving the conflict in Ukraine − or to further enhance the sanctions regime if Russia continues to contribute to the conflict.

The restrictions implemented on September 12, 2014 introduce a number of new measures, including features that do not have precedent in prior EU sanctions regulations. As in the case of the original version of Regulation 833/2014, the new provisions include a number of ambiguities that have already generated important questions from potentially affected companies, and the EU Member States will likely be called upon in the coming weeks to issue interpretive guidance relating to the new sanctions measures.

A. Additional Restrictions on Dual-Use Goods and Technologies

Regulation 960/2014 imposes a new prohibition − codified in Article 2a of the Amended Regulation 833/2014 − on the sale, supply, transfer, or export, directly or indirectly, of dual-use goods and technologies to any natural or legal person, entity, or body in Russia that is listed in Annex IV to the Regulation. Annex IV currently includes JSC Sirius, OJSC Stankoinstrument, OAO JSC Chemcomposite, JSC Kalashnikov, JSC Tula Arms Plant, NPK Technologii Maschinostrojenija, OAO Wysokototschnye Kompleksi, OAO Almaz Antey, and OAO NPO Bazalt. This new restriction on dual- use items supplements the existing prohibition, reflected in the original Regulation 833/2014, against the export of dual-use items to military end-users or for any military end-use in Russia.

Regulation 960/2014 also prohibits the provision to Annex IV parties of technical assistance, brokering services, or any “other services” related to dual-use items and to the provision, manufacture, maintenance, and use of those items. The provision to the Annex IV parties of financing or financial assistance for the sale, supply, transfer, or export of dual-use items, or for the provision of related technical assistance, brokering services, or other services is also prohibited.

The foregoing restrictions are expressed in the Regulation as prohibitions, rather than licensing requirements, thus implying that licenses will not be available to authorize transactions covered under the new restrictions. The new prohibitions are, however, subject to a number of important exemptions. Firstly, they do not apply to (i) the sale, supply, transfer, or export of dual-use items intended for the aeronautics and space industry, or the related provision of technical or financial assistance for non-military use and for a non-military end-user, or to (ii) the sale, supply, transfer, or export of dual-use items for maintenance and safety of existing civil nuclear capabilities within the EU, for non-military use, and for non-military end-users.

The foregoing provisions are also without prejudice to the execution of contracts or agreements concluded before September 12, 2014, and to the provision of assistance necessary to the maintenance and safety of “existing capabilities within the EU.” Regulation 960/2014 does not define the term “existing capabilities.”

B. New Oil and Gas “Services” Controls

Regulation 960/2014 also introduces a new Article 3a to Regulation 833/2014, prohibiting the direct or indirect provision of certain “services necessary for deepwater oil exploration and production, arctic oil exploration and production, or shale oil projects in Russia,” including (i) “drilling,” (ii) “well testing,” (iii) “logging and completion services,” and (iv) “supply of specialised floating vessels[.]” The new measures supplement existing restrictions, set forth in Articles 3 and 4 of Regulation 833/2014, concerning transactions associated with oil and gas equipment listed in Annex II to Regulation 833/2014. The new Article 3a restrictions are not, however, limited to Annex II items or to any other defined products, and the Regulation provides no definition or guidance concerning the scope of the restricted “services.” Moreover, in contrast to Regulation 833/2014 and to trade controls restrictions in other EU sanctions regulations, which distinguish restrictions on exports of goods and technology from restrictions on the provision of related support (e.g., technical assistance, brokering, financing, or financial assistance), the general reference to “services” in Article 3a has invited questions − which are not easily resolved from the text of the Regulation − concerning whether the new measures are intended to capture the supply of goods, the mere provision of technical or other support, or both.

The Article 3a prohibitions are without prejudice to the execution of an obligation arising from a contract or a “framework agreement” concluded before September 12, 2014, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts. The term “framework agreement” is not defined in Regulation 960/2014. However, it presumably carries a broader scope than the term “agreement” used in similar grandparenting provisions in Regulation 833/2014.

Finally, Article 3a exempts services that are necessary for the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or the environment.

On a separate but related note, a recently published corrigendum to Regulation 833/2014 has clarified the scope of the restrictions on the provision of technical assistance, brokering services, financing, or financial assistance relating to the items listed on Annex II to that regulation. The corrigendum amends Article 4(4), correcting an error to the version of Regulation 833/2014 published on August 1, 2014, to make clear that competent Member State authorities may not authorize such assistance if the Annex II items are for Arctic or deepwater oil exploration or production or for a shale oil project unless the assistance concerns the execution of an obligation arising from a contract or an agreement concluded before August 1, 2014.

C. Additional Controls on Military Items

Regulation 960/2014 also amends Article 4 of Regulation 833/2014 to prohibit the provision of insurance and reinsurance relating to military items to Russian parties or for use in Russia; this prohibition applies in addition to the pre-existing prohibition against the provision of financing and financial assistance relating to military items.

D. Additional Financial Sector Restrictions

Regulation 960/2014 also amends Article 5 to Regulation 833/2014 to introduce a number of important new financial restrictions against designated Russian parties. The key amendments to Article 5 are as follows:

  • Regulation 960/2014 extends existing restrictions targeting “transferablesecurities” and “money market instruments” issued by Russian financial institutions listed on Annex III to Regulation 833/2014. Specifically, the new provisions introduce a restriction on the provision of “investment services” relating to those instruments, and lower the maturity period for covered instruments from 90 to 30 days (for instruments issued after September 12, 2014). Thus, Article 5 now renders it prohibited to “directly or indirectly purchase, sell, provide investment services for or assistance in the issuance of, or otherwise deal with transferable securities and money-market instruments with a maturity exceeding 90 days, issued after 1 August 2014 to 12 September 2014, or with a maturity exceeding 30 days, issued after 12 September 2014[.]”

  • The newly-introduced term “investmentservices” is defined as“ (i) reception and transmission of orders in relation to one or more financial instruments, (ii) execution of orders on behalf of clients, (iii) dealing on own account, (iv) portfolio management, (v) investment advice, (vi) underwriting of financial instruments and/or placing of financial instruments on a firm commitment basis, (vii) placing of financial instruments without a firm commitment basis, and (viii) any service in relation to the admission to trading on a regulated market or trading on a multilateral trading facility.”

  • The definition of “transferablesecurities” has been amended to exclude negotiable securities giving rise to a cash settlement.

  • The amended Article 5 also introduces similar prohibitions on dealings in “transferable securities” and “money-market instruments” with a maturity exceeding 30 days, issued after September 12, 2014, by (1) certain designated Russian military entities, as listed in the new Annex V to Regulation 833/2014, and (2) certain Russian entities active in the oil industry, as listed in the new Annex VI to Regulation 833/2014. Notably, the latter list includes major Russian oil and gas enterprises Rosneft, Transneft, and Gazprom Neft (the oil branch of Gazprom). Those new restrictions also extend to any entity established outside of the EU that is majority-owned by any entity designated in Annex V or Annex VI.

  • Similar to the restrictions imposed by Regulation 833/2014 against AnnexIIIbanks,the foregoing measures contain an important carve-out, as they do not apply to affiliates of the listed entities that are established within the EU. However, as with the Annex III bank restrictions, they extend to any entity “acting on behalf or at the direction of” the Annex V or Annex VI designated parties or their non-EU subsidiaries.

  • Finally, Regulation 960/2014 prohibits making or being part of any arrangement to make new loans or credit with a maturity exceeding 30 days available to any party listed on Annexes III, V, or VI after September 12, 2014. The Regulation exempts from that prohibition (i) loans or credit that have a specific and documented objective to provide financing for non-prohibited imports or exports of goods and non-financial services between the EU and Russia, and (ii) loans that have a specific and documented objective to provide emergency funding to meet solvency and liquidity criteria for legal persons established in the EU that are majority owned by Annex III banks.

    As with the original Article 5, the foregoing restrictions are not asset-blocking measures — EU parties are not generally prohibited from conducting business with the Annex III, V, and VI parties if their activities do not trigger the specific restrictions outlined above.

    E. Additional Parties Subject to the Asset-Freezing Restrictions

    Regulation 961/2014 imposes travel bans and asset freezes on a further 24 individuals, including pro-Russian rebels, Russian lawmakers and state officials, and the chairman of the Russian Rostec conglomerate, Sergey Viktorovich Chemzov. This brings the total number of individuals subject to sanctions under this specific regime to 119, whilst the number of designated entities remains 23.

    In the same manner as prior EU sanctions measures, all funds and “economic resources” belonging to, owned, held, or controlled by the newly designated parties must be frozen. “Economic resources” include “assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, which are not funds, but which may be used to obtain funds, goods or services.” In addition, Regulation 961 prohibits making available funds or “economic resources,” directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of the designated parties.

    F. Jurisdictional Reach of the New Sanctions

    Consistent with the pre-existing sanctions measures, the jurisdictional scope of the new sanctions extends (1) to conduct by EU-incorporated entities and EU nationals anywhere in the world; (2) to conduct by any party, irrespective of nationality, in connection with activities occurring in the territory of the EU or (with regard to legal persons) in respect of business “done in whole or in part within the Union”; or (3) conduct on board any aircraft or vessel under the jurisdiction of a Member State.

***

The new sanctions represent the latest, although perhaps not the last, restrictions relating to the crisis in Ukraine. The EU has signaled that it will closely monitor the implementation of the new restrictions and their impact, and it will consider supplemental measures if circumstances in Eastern Ukraine warrant and consensus among the 28 Member States can be reached. Likewise, the U.S. government has stated that additional sanctions targeting Russia could be forthcoming if Russia does not work toward a diplomatic resolution to the crisis in Ukraine.

We are following the above-mentioned sanctions and export control developments closely and will provide further updates as they evolve. We are particularly well-positioned to advise companies and individuals on compliance with the U.S. and EU sanctions related to the Ukraine crisis, as well as on the broader impact of the crisis on foreign investment in both Ukraine and Russia and other legal and commercial interests in the region.

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New Export Control Changes Affect Naval Warfare and Ground Vehicles

Morgan Lewis

 

Second phase of the Export Control Reform Initiative allows certain U.S. industries to fall into categories that may make them more attractive to foreign buyers.

On January 6, the Obama administration reached another important milestone of the president’s Export Control Reform (ECR) Initiative, with the second phase of revised export control lists and regulations taking effect.[1] These second phase changes significantly affect naval warfare, ground vehicle, and other industries as they present an opportunity for manufacturers and exporters to reclassify certain items under a more flexible and beneficial regulatory system.

The New Rules

The new lists and regulations continue the process of fundamentally updating the United States’ export control regimes and include revisions to U.S. Munitions List (USML) Categories VI (Vessels of War and Special Naval Equipment), VII (Tanks and Military Vehicles), XIII (Auxiliary Military Equipment), and XX (Submersible Vessels). The revisions transition many less sensitive items from the U.S. Department of State’s International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) USML to the more flexible Department of Commerce’s Export Administration Regulations (EAR) Commerce Control List (CCL).

The new USML controls in these four categories are no longer broad and generic controls that capture everything. They are now detailed, enumerated lists that impose controls based on the sensitivity of an item.

Category VI (Vessels of War and Special Naval Equipment)

“Surface vessels of war” remain in USML Category VI and are now positively defined in new ITAR section 121.15 as the following: battleships, aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates, cruisers, corvettes, littoral combat ships, mine sweepers, mine hunters, mine countermeasure ships, dock landing ships, amphibious assault ships, or cutters. Less sensitive items—such as generic parts, components, accessories, or attachments—are now subject to the more flexible authorities of the EAR and will transition to the CCL under Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 8A609.

The key to determining whether an item will transition from USML Category VI to the CCL under ECCN 8A609 or another ECCN in the CCL will depend on the application of the new ITAR and EAR definitions of “specially designed.” The revised USML Category VI does not contain controls on all general parts, components, accessories, and attachments specifically designed or modified for a defense article, regardless of their significance to maintaining a military advantage for the United States. Rather, it now contains a positive list of specific types of parts, components, accessories, and attachments that continue to warrant control on the USML. All other parts, components, accessories, and attachments are subject to the new “600 series” controls in Category 8 of the CCL.

Category VII (Tanks and Military Vehicles)

The revision narrows the types of ground vehicles controlled on the USML to only those that warrant control. Changes include the removal of most unarmored and unarmed military vehicles, trucks, trailers, and trains (unless specially designed as firing platforms for weapons above .50 caliber) and armored vehicles (either unarmed or with inoperable weapons) manufactured before 1956. Engines are now covered in revised USML Category XIX.

A significant aspect of the revised USML Category VII is that it does not contain controls on all generic parts, components, accessories, and attachments that are specifically designed or modified for a defense article, regardless of their significance to maintaining a military advantage for the United States. Rather, it contains a positive list of specific types of parts, components, accessories, and attachments that continue to warrant control on the USML. All other parts, components, accessories, and attachments are subject to the new 600 series controls in Category 0 of the CCL.

USML Categories XIII (Auxiliary Military Equipment) and XX (Submersible Vessel) also have been revised similarly. Category XIII continues to control certain cameras and encryption/information security items. Category XX will now control all submersible vessels in a single category, including submarines, as they have been moved from Category VI.

Definition of “Specially Designed”

The definition has a two-part approach. Part one “catches” things that are “specially designed,” and part two releases many types of items from the definition of “specially designed” so that they become not “specially designed.” Assuming an item is caught by part one, the exporter should focus on part two of the definition, i.e., the six separate “releases.”

Under part two, there are six possible ways an item can be released from being specially designed. For example, a part, component, accessory, attachment, or software is not considered to be specially designed if it is, regardless of form or fit, “a fastener (e.g., screws, bolts, nuts, nut plates, studs, inserts, clips, rivets, pins), washer, spacer, insulator, grommet, bushing, spring, wire, or solder.”

Also under part two, a part, component, accessory, attachment, or software is not deemed to be specially designed if it has the same function and performance capabilities and the same or equivalent form and fit as a commodity or software used in or with an item that (i) is or was in production (i.e., not in development) and (ii) is either not enumerated on the CCL or USML or is described in an ECCN controlled only for antiterrorism reasons.

Therefore, exporters and manufacturers should review the new definition of “specially designed” to ascertain if any items pending sale are released from the definition.

Implications

These changes will significantly affect exporters and manufacturers of naval warfare, ground vehicles, and other items as these items may no longer fall under ITAR jurisdiction, making the products more attractive to foreign buyers. Exporters and manufacturers will no longer need a manufacturing license agreement document for foreign manufacture of CCL items. Additionally, because there is no concept of “defense service” under the EAR, providing services related to CCL products will not require any technical assistance agreement documents. Items that become classified as EAR99 generally do not require a license to be exported or reexported to most destinations, and there is no annual registration fee paid to the Commerce Department, unlike under the ITAR. Furthermore, there is no “brokering” registration or licensing under the EAR.

In addition, many of the items moved to the CCL are now eligible for export without specific licenses under EAR license exceptions. One such EAR license exception is strategic trade authorization (STA), which is used when the item is intended for the ultimate end use by the governments of 36 U.S. allies and partners (although such exports carry with them additional compliance requirements). Failure to comply with STA requirements may result in an unlicensed export, opening up the exporter to significant penalties and fines.

On July 1, 2014, five more USML categories are scheduled to transition to the CCL in the third phase of ECR:

  • Category IV (Launch Vehicles, Guided Missiles, Ballistic Missiles, Rockets, Torpedoes, Bombs, and Mines)
  • Category V (Explosives and Energetic Materials, Propellants, Incendiary Agents, and Their Constituents)
  • Category IX (Military Training Equipment)
  • Category X (Personal Protective Equipment)
  • Category XVI (Nuclear Weapons Related Articles)

Marynell DeVaughn also contributed to this article.


[1]. For more information on the first phase that occurred in October 2013, view our November 14, 2013 LawFlash, “Export Control Changes Affecting Aircraft Industry Take Effect,” available here

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Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP