Understanding Post-Bankruptcy Liquidation Trusts

A main goal in bankruptcy is to get in and out as quickly as possible to minimize costs. It is often the case that even though a substantial portion of a debtor’s assets have been liquidated in bankruptcy, some valuable assets will remain that can provide additional sources of recovery to creditors. These assets may include smaller pieces of real estate, accounts receivable, joint venture ownership interests, and claims and causes of action, among others.

In a chapter 11 case, the debtor exits bankruptcy by confirming a plan and having the plan go effective. When a debtor has assets remaining but is otherwise ready to exit the bankruptcy case – for example, because it has closed a sale of a substantial portion of its assets – the plan typically provides for the formation of a liquidation trust on the plan effective date. All remaining assets are transferred to the trust for liquidation, and any proceeds are distributed to creditors, i.e., the trust beneficiaries, in accordance with the plan.

The liquidation trust is established and governed by the plan and a liquidation trust agreement. A liquidation trustee is appointed to administer the trust and is granted broad powers to, among other things, liquidate assets, investigate, prosecute, and settle causes of action, object to, resolve, and pay claims, and make distributions to trust beneficiaries.

Trust beneficiaries typically appoint members of a trust advisory or oversight committee who have consultation and approval rights over certain actions proposed to be taken by the liquidation trustee. For example, the trustee may need approval from the oversight committee to resolve claims or causes of action above a certain amount, or to liquidate certain high-value assets.

Who serves as liquidation trustee and how many representatives each trust beneficiary appoints to the oversight committee are typically negotiated in connection with the plan process. The liquidation trustee may have been a professional involved in the bankruptcy, or it may be an outsider with experience serving in such a role. The oversight committee members may be creditors themselves or may be appointed as representatives of the creditors. Trust assets are typically used to compensate the liquidation trustee for its services and reimburse it for its costs and expenses, including for its retained professionals, though oftentimes initial seed funding is also required. Trust oversight committee members may receive modest compensation, which is typically capped, but which may offer an incentive for a creditor or a creditor-appointee to serve.

The role of the trust oversight committee is an important one, as the assets transferred to the trust may provide additional valuable sources of recovery to creditors. Trust beneficiaries are often creditors from different classes under the plan, and therefore may have differing interests and be entitled to different treatment. For example, a secured creditor with a lien on a parcel of real estate may be the sole beneficiary from the sale of such real estate, and therefore has an interest in overseeing how the property is marketed and sold. Even when trust beneficiaries share a right to recover from the same assets, such as from the prosecution of causes of action, they may have differing views or interests as to the potential value of the claims, whether it makes sense to settle them, and overall strategy.

When all assets are liquidated, claims resolved, distributions made, and the estates are otherwise wound down, the trust will be dissolved. Often, this does not occur until years later.

740,000 Reasons to Think Twice Before Putting a Company in Bankruptcy

A recent decision from a bankruptcy court in Delaware provides a cautionary tale about the risks of involuntary bankruptcy.

In the Delaware case, the debtor managed a group of investment funds. The business was all but defunct when several investors, dissatisfied with the debtor’s management, filed an involuntary Chapter 7 petition.  They obtained an order for relief from the bankruptcy court, then removed the debtor as manager of the funds and inserted their hand-picked manager.  So far, so good.

The debtor, who was not properly served with the involuntary petition and did not give the petition the attention it required, struck back and convinced the bankruptcy court to set aside the order for relief. The debtor then went after the involuntary petitioners for damages.  After 8 years of litigation, the Delaware court awarded the debtor $740,000 in damages – all of it attributable to attorneys’ fees and costs.

If you file an involuntary petition and the bankruptcy court dismisses it, then a debtor can recover costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.  The legal fees include the amount necessary to defeat the involuntary filing.  In addition, if the court finds that the petition was filed in bad faith, then the court also can enter judgment for all damages proximately caused by the filing and punitive damages.  The Delaware court awarded the debtor $75,000 for defeating the involuntary petition.

The debtor also sought a judgment for attorneys’ fees in pursuit of damages for violating the automatic stay.  The involuntary petitioners had replaced the debtor as manager without first obtaining leave from the court to do so.  The investment fund was barely operating and had little income to support a claim for actual damages.  Nevertheless, the Delaware court awarded $665,000 in attorneys’ fees related to litigating the automatic stay violation.

Because the debtor had no “actual” damages from the stay violation, the involuntary petitioners contended that the debtor was not entitled to recovery of attorneys’ fees.  The Delaware court pointed out that “actual” damages (e.g., loss of business income) are not a prerequisite to the recovery of attorneys’ fees, much to the chagrin of the defendants.  The court held that attorneys’ fees and costs are always “actual damages” in the context of a willful violation of the automatic stay.

The Delaware court also rejected defendants’ argument that the fee amount was “unreasonable” since there was no monetary injury to the business.  In other words, the debtor should not have spent so much money on legal fees because it lost on its claim.  The court held that defendants’ argument was made “with the benefit of hindsight” – at the end of litigation when the court had ruled, after an evidentiary trial, that debtor suffered no actual injury.  The court pointed out that the debtor sought millions in damages for the loss of management’s fees, and even though the court rejected the claim after trial, it was not an unreasonable argument for the debtor to make.  The court concluded that “the reasonableness of one’s conduct must be assessed at the time of the conduct and based on the information that was known or knowable at the time.”

The involuntary petitioners likely had sound reasons to want the debtor removed as fund manager.  But by pursuing involuntary bankruptcy and losing, they ended up having to stroke a check to the debtor for over $700,000.  Talk about adding insult to injury.  The upshot is that involuntary bankruptcy is an extreme and risky action that should be a last-resort option undertaken with extreme caution.