Tag: companies

Navigating the EU AI Act from a US Perspective: A Timeline for Compliance

After extensive negotiations, the European Parliament, Commission, and Council came to a consensus on the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (the “AI Act”) on Dec. 8, 2023. This marks a significant milestone, as the AI Act is expected to be the most far-reaching regulation on AI globally. The AI Act is poised to significantly impact how companies develop, deploy, and manage AI systems. In this post, NM’s AI Task Force breaks down the key compliance timelines to offer a roadmap for U.S. companies navigating the AI Act.

The AI Act will have a staged implementation process. While it will officially enter into force 20 days after publication in the EU’s Official Journal (“Entry into Force”), most provisions won’t be directly applicable for an additional 24 months. This provides a grace period for businesses to adapt their AI systems and practices to comply with the AI Act. To bridge this gap, the European Commission plans to launch an AI Pact. This voluntary initiative allows AI developers to commit to implementing key obligations outlined in the AI Act even before they become legally enforceable.

With the impending enforcement of the AI Act comes the crucial question for U.S. companies that operate in the EU or whose AI systems interact with EU citizens: How can they ensure compliance with the new regulations? To start, U.S. companies should understand the key risk categories established by the AI Act and their associated compliance timelines.

I. Understanding the Risk Categories
The AI Act categorizes AI systems based on their potential risk. The risk level determines the compliance obligations a company must meet.  Here’s a simplified breakdown:

  • Unacceptable Risk: These systems are banned entirely within the EU. This includes applications that threaten people’s safety, livelihood, and fundamental rights. Examples may include social credit scoring, emotion recognition systems at work and in education, and untargeted scraping of facial images for facial recognition.
  • High Risk: These systems pose a significant risk and require strict compliance measures. Examples may include AI used in critical infrastructure (e.g., transport, water, electricity), essential services (e.g., insurance, banking), and areas with high potential for bias (e.g., education, medical devices, vehicles, recruitment).
  • Limited Risk: These systems require some level of transparency to ensure user awareness. Examples include chatbots and AI-powered marketing tools where users should be informed that they’re interacting with a machine.
  • Minimal Risk: These systems pose minimal or no identified risk and face no specific regulations.

II. Key Compliance Timelines (as of March 2024):

Time Frame  Anticipated Milestones
6 months after Entry into Force
  • Prohibitions on Unacceptable Risk Systems will come into effect.
12 months after Entry into Force
  • This marks the start of obligations for companies that provide general-purpose AI models (those designed for widespread use across various applications). These companies will need to comply with specific requirements outlined in the AI Act.
  • Member states will appoint competent authorities responsible for overseeing the implementation of the AI Act within their respective countries.
  • The European Commission will conduct annual reviews of the list of AI systems categorized as “unacceptable risk” and banned under the AI Act.
  • The European Commission will issue guidance on high-risk AI incident reporting.
18 months after Entry into Force
  • The European Commission will issue an implementing act outlining specific requirements for post-market monitoring of high-risk AI systems, including a list of practical examples of high-risk and non-high risk use cases.
24 months after Entry into Force
  • This is a critical milestone for companies developing or using high-risk AI systems listed in Annex III of the AI Act, as compliance obligations will be effective. These systems, which encompass areas like biometrics, law enforcement, and education, will need to comply with the full range of regulations outlined in the AI Act.
  • EU member states will have implemented their own rules on penalties, including administrative fines, for non-compliance with the AI Act.
36 months after Entry into Force
  • The European Commission will issue an implementing act outlining specific requirements for post-market monitoring of high-risk AI systems, including a list of practical examples of high-risk and non-high risk use cases.
By the end of 2030
  • This is a critical milestone for companies developing or using high-risk AI systems listed in Annex III of the AI Act, as compliance obligations will be effective. These systems, which encompass areas like biometrics, law enforcement, and education, will need to comply with the full range of regulations outlined in the AI Act.
  • EU member states will have implemented their own rules on penalties, including administrative fines, for non-compliance with the AI Act.

In addition to the above, we can expect further rulemaking and guidance from the European Commission to come forth regarding aspects of the AI Act such as use cases, requirements, delegated powers, assessments, thresholds, and technical documentation.

Even before the AI Act’s Entry into Force, there are crucial steps U.S. companies operating in the EU can take to ensure a smooth transition. The priority is familiarization. Once the final version of the Act is published, carefully review it to understand the regulations and how they might apply to your AI systems. Next, classify your AI systems according to their risk level (high, medium, minimal, or unacceptable). This will help you determine the specific compliance obligations you’ll need to meet. Finally, conduct a thorough gap analysis. Identify any areas where your current practices for developing, deploying, or managing AI systems might not comply with the Act. By taking these proactive steps before the official enactment, you’ll gain valuable time to address potential issues and ensure your AI systems remain compliant in the EU market.

Copyright ©2024 Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP
For more on AI, visit the NLR Communications, Media & Internet section.

Sexual Harassment Prevention Training Deadline Approaches for Chicago Employers

As a reminder to employers in Chicago, anti-sexual harassment training is required by Chicago’s Human Rights Ordinance and must be completed by July 1, 2023.  This requirement applies to all Chicago employers, regardless of size or industry.

The training consists of one (1) hour of anti-sexual harassment training for all non-supervisory employees and two (2) hours of anti-sexual harassment training for supervisory employees.  Regardless of supervisory status, all employees must also undergo one (1) hour of bystander training.  Employers must provide training on an annual basis.  Additional information about training requirements can be found here. Employers who fail to comply may be subject to penalties.

Article By Audrey H. Shinn of Vedder Price

© 2023 Vedder Price

The NLRB Curtails the Scope of Nondisparagement and Confidentiality Provisions in Severance Agreements

On Tuesday, February 21, 2023, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”) issued McLaren Macomb, a decision that curtails the permissible scope of confidentiality agreements and non-disclosure provisions in severance agreements. See McLaren Macomb, 372 NLRB No. 58 (2023). Analyzing the broad provisions in the agreements at issue in this case, the Board held that simply offering employees severance agreements that require employees to broadly waive their rights under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “the Act”) was unlawful. The Board held:

Where an agreement unlawfully conditions receipt of severance benefits on the forfeiture of statutory rights, the mere proffer of the agreement itself violates the Act, because it has a reasonable tendency to interfere with or restrain the prospective exercise of Section 7 rights, both by the separating employee and those who remain. Whether the employee accepts the agreement is immaterial.

The Board’s decision is part of a broader trend by courts and administrative agencies applying heightened scrutiny to contractual provisions that limit employees’ rights. The decision also provides a crucial reminder to union and nonunion workers alike of the relevance of federal labor law in providing legal protections for most private-sector workers.

Case Background

The case arose when Michigan hospital operator McLaren Macomb permanently furloughed eleven employees, all bargaining unit members of Local 40 RN Staff Council, Office of Professional Employees International Union (OPEIU), AFL-CIO, because it had terminated outpatient services during the COVID-19 pandemic in June 2020. After McLaren Macomb furloughed these employees, it presented them with a “Severance Agreement, Waiver and Release” that offered severance amounts to the employees if they signed the agreement. All eleven employees signed.

The agreements provided broad language regarding confidentiality and nondisparagement. The confidentiality provision stated, “The Employee acknowledges that the terms of this Agreement are confidential and agrees not to disclose them to any third person, other than spouse, or as necessary to professional advisors for the purposes of obtaining legal counsel or tax advice, or unless legally compelled to do so by a court or administrative agency of competent jurisdiction.” (emphasis added). The non-disclosure provision provided, in relevant part, “At all times hereafter, the Employee agrees not to make statements to Employer’s employees or to the general public which could disparage or harm the image of Employer…” The employees faced substantial financial penalties if they violated the provisions. The Employer conditioned the payment of severance on Employees’ entering into this agreement.

The NLRB’s Decision

In McLaren Macomb, the Board held that simply offering employees severance agreements that contain these broad confidentiality and nondisparagement provisions violates the NLRA.

The NLRA provides broad protections of employees’ rights to engage in collective action. Section 7 of the NLRA vests employees with a number of rights, including the right “to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” Section 8(a)(1) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice (ULP) for an employer to “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7.” As the Supreme Court, federal courts, and the NLRB have repeatedly held and reaffirmed, Section 7 provides broad rights for employees and former employees—union and nonunion alike—to engage in collective action, including discussing terms and conditions of employment and workplace issues with coworkers, a union, and the Board. As the Supreme Court has stated in elaborating on the broad construction of Section 7, “labor’s cause often is advanced on fronts other than collective bargaining and grievance settlement within the immediate employment context.” Eastex, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 556, 565 (1978).

Applying these foundational principles to the severance agreements at hand, the Board reversed Trump-era NLRB precedent and concluded that the employer’s proffer of these broad nondisparagement and confidentiality provisions contravened the employees’ exercise of Section 7 rights, which is an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a)(1). Notably, the Board held that an employer’s merely offering such broad provisions violates the Act—it does not matter whether the employee signs the agreement or not.

The Board determined that the nondisparagement provision substantially interfered with employees’ Section 7 rights on its face. That provision prohibits the furloughed employee from making any “statements to [the] Employer’s employees or the general public which could disparage or harm the image of [the] Employer.” Analyzing this language, the Board reasoned that the provision would encompass employee conduct or critiques of the employer regarding any labor issue, dispute, or term and condition of employment. Accordingly, this proscription sweeps far too broadly—it prohibits employees from exercising their right to publicize labor disputes, a right which is protected by the Act. Moreover, the nondisparagement provision chills employees from exercising Section 7 rights, including efforts to assist fellow employees, cooperate with the Board’s investigation and litigation of unfair labor practices, and raise or assist in making workplace complaints to coworkers, their union, the Board, the media, or “almost anyone else.” As the Board underscored, “Public statements by employees about the workplace are central to the exercise of employee rights under the Act.”

The Board then concluded that the confidentiality provision also interfered with employees’ Section 7 rights in at least two ways. First, the Board explained that because the confidentiality provision prohibits the employee from disclosing the terms of the agreement “to any third person,” the agreement would reasonably tend to coerce the employee not to file a ULP charge with the Board or assist in a Board investigation. (emphasis added). Second, the same language would also prohibit the furloughed employee from discussing the terms of the agreement with former coworkers in similar situations, which would frustrate the mutual support between employees at the heart of the Act. As the Board summarized, “A severance agreement is unlawful if it precludes an employee from assisting coworkers with workplace issues concerning their employer, and from communicating with others, including a union, and the Board, about his employment.”

Takeaways for Employment Lawyers and Plaintiffs

First, while one might assume that labor law is exclusively the province of unions, their members, and their lawyers, McLaren Macomb demonstrates the relevance of the NLRA for employees regardless of union status. Although the workers in this case were unionized, the Section 7 rights at the heart of the NLRA apply to most private-sector employees, including nonunion employees. Indeed, because nonunion workers often have fewer workplace protections than their unionized counterparts, Section 7’s protections are critically important for nonunion employees. Employees who are asked to sign confidentiality and nondisparagement provisions and their attorneys should be aware that broad restrictions on employees’ concerted activity may be illegal.

Second, this decision is part of a broader effort to protect workers from being muzzled by their employers. For instance, the recent federal Speak Out Act establishes that predispute nondisclosure clauses and nondisparagement clauses—often included in employment contracts—are unenforceable in disputes involving sexual assault or sexual harassment. These recent developments in the law should be on the radar of workers and their attorneys who are navigating employer’s contracts, policies, handbooks, and proposed severance agreements.

Article By Kyle Bigley of Katz Banks Kumin LLP

For more labor law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Katz Banks Kumin LLP Copyright ©

Structuring the Acquisition of an S Corporation

Introduction

S corporations, or S-corps, are one of the most popular entity choices for businesses. In contemplating the sale of an S-corp, it is important to plan how the transaction is structured from a tax perspective (ideally before an LOI is signed), both to maximize the gain on the sale and avoid pitfalls that can result in liabilities for the selling shareholders.

For corporate purposes, businesses are generally formed as limited liability companies, partnerships, or corporations. For tax purposes, however, entities are taxed as corporations, partnerships, or disregarded entities.[1] Corporations[2] are taxed as either a C corporation or an S corporation. C corporations are taxed at the corporate level and again at the shareholder level.[3] S corporations are corporations that, for federal tax purposes, elect to pass corporate income, losses, deductions, and credits through to their shareholders and are only taxed at the shareholder level.[4]

To qualify as an S corporation, the corporation must meet the requirements of Section 1361,[5] which provides that the corporation not have more than 100 shareholders, not have non-individual shareholders (with the exception of certain types of trusts, estates, and tax-exempt organizations), not have a nonresident alien as a shareholder, not have more than one class of stock, and not be an ineligible corporation (as defined in the Code).[6]

When sellers begin to explore the sale of their business, tax considerations are important to discuss at the outset so that the seller and buyer are on the same page – no one wants to attempt to renegotiate the terms of a deal in the middle of a transaction. For tax purposes, acquisitions of companies are categorized as either an asset purchase or stock purchase. In general, owners prefer to sell their stock (as opposed to the company’s assets) for a few reasons. First, a stock sale results in capital gain to the shareholders because their stock is a capital asset.[7] In an asset sale, however, noncorporate sellers (including S-corp shareholders) recognize ordinary income or capital gain, depending on the type of asset sold. Second, unlike in an asset sale, a stock sale may not require the seller to transfer company assets and licenses or obtain third party consents.

On the other hand, buyers usually want to engage in an asset sale to obtain a step-up in basis of the purchased assets. In a stock acquisition, the buyer gets a carryover basis in the acquired corporation’s assets, without any basis step-up. In an asset purchase, however, the buyer takes a cost basis in the assets, including in the target corporation’s goodwill (which otherwise will generally have a zero basis), and allows the buyer to take higher depreciation deductions to reduce the buyer’s annual tax liability.[8] Unless otherwise agreed, the buyer also does not assume corporate liabilities in an asset sale.

Sellers who agree to engage in an asset sale should negotiate with the buyer to be compensated for the additional tax that the seller may incur for engaging in an asset sale.

There are two additional ways for a buyer to obtain a basis step-up in the seller’s assets. The first is a 338(h)(10) election under Section 338 and the second is an F reorganization pursuant to Section 368(a)(1)(F) and consistent with Revenue Ruling 2008-18.[9]

Making the 338(h)(10) Election

A buyer and seller will sometimes make a 338(h)(10) election, which treats an acquisition of a corporation’s stock as a sale of assets for federal income tax purposes, but a sale of stock for legal purposes.[10] The sale is treated as if buyer and seller engaged in a regular asset sale for income tax purposes (so the buyer obtains a step-up in the tax basis of the assets), yet the seller does not need to re-title each asset.[11] Seller does not have capital gain on the sale of stock. Instead the parties must allocate the sales price among the assets based on each asset’s fair market value.[12] The price paid in excess of the fair market value of the tangible assets of the business is allocated to business intangibles and then to goodwill.[13]

The 338(h)(10) election is only available if a “qualified stock purchase” is made.[14] A “qualified stock purchase” is defined as any transaction (or series of transactions) in which a corporation purchases at least 80% of the stock (both voting and value) from a member of a consolidated group(as defined in 1.1502-1) or from shareholders of a S corporation during a 12 month period.[15] If during diligence it is revealed that the target corporation in fact failed to qualify as an S corporation, the 338 election will be invalid.[16] If the Section 338(h)(10) election is invalid, the transaction will be treated as a straight stock sale and buyer will not receive a basis step-up in the target’s assets.

A section 338(h)(10) election is made jointly by the purchaser and seller on Form 8023.[17] S corporation shareholders who do not sell their stock must also consent to the election. The election must be made not later than the 15th day of the 9th month beginning after the month in which the acquisition date occurs.[18]

If the target failed to qualify as an S corporation (thereby becoming a C corporation), an election can be made to treat the sale of the corporation’s stock as an asset sale under Section 336(e). The election can be made if target is owned by a parent corporation that sells at least 80% of target’s stock.[19] A 336(e) election closely resembles a 338(h)(10) election, but the purchaser does not have to be a corporation.[20] Note that a transaction that qualifies under both 336(e) and 338(h)(10) will be treated as 338(h)(10) transaction.[21]

Consequences of a 338(h)(10) Election

Under the Regulations, the target corporation is treated as making a deemed sale of its assets and liquidating following the deemed asset sale.[22] The transaction is treated as a taxable acquisition of 100% of the target’s assets for income tax purposes.[23] This means that the stock cannot be acquired in a tax free transaction or reorganization (such as a transfer to a controlled corporation, merger or spinoff) or a transaction where the seller does not recognize the entire amount of gain or loss realized on the transaction.[24]

Issues with a 338(h)(10) Election

While the 338 election can be a useful way for a buyer to achieve a basis step-up without burdening the seller to retitle and transfer assets, the following disadvantages of the election should be considered:

  1. The rules under Section 338 require all S corporation shareholders (whether or not they sell their stock) to pay tax on all of the target’s assets, even if selling less than 100% of the target.[25] This effectively eliminates any structuring of a deal on a tax-deferred basis (i.e. where seller only pays tax on the consideration attributable to non-rollover equity). Sellers need to be aware that they will pay tax on all of the target company’s assets regardless of the percentage of assets sold.
  2. The election presents an issue for rollover transactions where the seller rolls over more than 20% of its equity on a pre-tax basis in a Section 721 or Section 351 transaction (in which seller receives equity in buyer, buyer’s parent, a holding company that holds target, or another form of equity). Rolling over more than 20% of equity will invalidate the 338(h)(10) election because it will not meet the “purchase” requirement under Section 338.[26]
  3. If the target company’s S corporation election turns out to be invalid (which happens frequently due to the ease with which S corporation status can be voided), the 338(h)(10) election will be invalid, thereby eliminating any advantage provided by the election.[27] Note that the seller will also be in breach of its representations and warranties under the purchase agreement.

F-Reorganization

An alternative to a 338(h)(10) election is an F reorganization, or F reorg., which allows sellers to avoid the potential issues that come with a 338 election. In an F reorg., the seller recognizes gain only with respect to the assets that it is deemed to have sold, allows the seller to roll over equity on a pre-tax basis, and avoids some of the risk that the target may have not properly qualified as an S-corp (thereby invalidating a Section 338(h)(10) election).

Engaging in an F-Reorganization

The first step in an F reorg. is to engage in a tax free reorganization of the S-corp.[28] Shareholders of the target S-corp (“T”) form a new corporation (“Holdco”) and transfer their shares in T to Holdco in exchange for Holdco shares. As a result of the transaction, T shareholders own all shares of Holdco, which in turn owns all shares of T, making T a fully owned subsidiary of Holdco. Holdco then elects to treat T as a Qualified Subchapter S Subsidiary (“QSub”) by making the election on form 8869. For federal tax purposes, T, as a QSub, becomes a disregarded entity and all assets and liabilities of T are treated as part of Holdco.[29] Note that the QSub election made by T also suffices as the S-corp election for Holdco.[30] After T becomes a QSub of Holdco, T converts into a limited liability company (“LLC”) under state law in a nontaxable transaction by converting from one disregarded entity to another.[31] Holdco will need to obtain its own EIN, but T retains its old EIN after the conversion.[32] Once the conversion to an LLC is complete, the shareholders of Holdco can sell some or all of the LLC interests of T; the sale is treated as an asset sale for tax purposes, thereby resulting in a step up in basis for the purchaser.[33] The seller recognizes gain from the deemed sale of each asset of T. If less than 100% of the LLC interests are sold to the buyer, the transaction is treated as the purchase of a proportionate interest in each of the LLC assets, followed by a contribution of the respective interests to a partnership in exchange for ownership interests in the partnership, resulting in a stepped up basis in the assets for buyer.[34] In this scenario, T is no longer a QSub and is converted to a partnership for tax purposes.[35]

Note that a straight conversion of the existing S corporation target from an S-corp to an LLC should not be done because it is treated as a taxable liquidation of the S corporation (i.e. a deemed sale of its assets) resulting in a fully taxable event to the shareholders.[36]

Alternatively, the S-corp could form a new LLC, contribute all its business assets and liabilities to the new LLC in exchange for the LLC interests, and sell the LLC interests to the buyer. However, the transfer of assets might require third party consents; the F reorg. achieves the same result without any potential assignment issues, and even preserves the historical EIN of the S-corp.

Advantages of an F-Reorganization

The F-reorganization is an effective way to avoid the issues that arise with a 338(h)(10) election:

  1. If the acquisition is for less than 100% of the target, the S-corp shareholders will only recognize gain on the portion of the LLC sold by the S-corp parent. Any portion of the LLC interests rolled over will be tax-deferred. Rollover transactions are perfectly suitable in a F reorg. and do not present the issues that come with a 338(h)(10) election.
  2. The converted LLC retains its old EIN number and is essentially the same entity for legal purposes. This can be useful for a target in a regulated industry (such as healthcare, food services, manufacturing, etc.) by possibly avoiding the need to reapply for new permits and licenses.
  3. An F reorg. can be useful for planning purposes under Section 1202 (Qualified Small Business Stock, or QSBS), which allows shareholders of a C corporation to exclude from their taxable income the greater of ten million dollars or ten times the adjusted basis of their stock upon a sale.[37] One requirement is that the stock must be stock of a C corporation, not an S corporation.[38] S corporation shareholders who want to qualify under 1202 can perform an F reorg. and contribute the LLC interests of their operating company to a newly formed C corporation in a tax free exchange under 351. The S corporation (which owns the C corporation which owns the LLC) is now an eligible shareholder of QSBS and will qualify for favorable treatment under Section 1202.[39]

Footnotes

[1] Reg. §301.7701-2. Entities may also be taxed as cooperatives or as tax-exempt organizations if the statutory requirements are met.

[2] For purposes of this article, a corporation includes a limited liability company (LLC) that has elected to be taxed as a corporation.

[3] IRC §11(a).

[4] IRC §1363. For state tax purposes, treatment of S corporation status varies – certain states either conform with the federal treatment or conform with certain limitations and adjustments, while others do not recognize the S election at all and tax S corporations as regular corporations. In particular, California imposes an entity level tax of the greater of $800 or 1.5% of net income.

[5] Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.

[6] See IRC §1361 (for example, an insurance company or certain financial institutions). In addition, Form 2553 must be filed to make the S corporation election.

[7] See IRC §1221(a).

[8] See IRC §1012(a) and §167.

[9] A 338(g) election also obtains a basis step-up, but results in two layers of tax and is not generally used for domestic transactions.

[10] IRC 338(a).

[11] Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1(d)(9).

[12] In accordance with the allocation provisions set forth in IRC 1060 and Reg. 1.338-6 and 1.338-7.

[13] Reg. 1.338-6(b)(vi) and (vii).

[14] IRC 338(a).

[15] IRC 338(d)(3) and Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1(c). For the purposes of this article, we assume that target is a standalone S-corp.

[16] Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1(c)(5). However, the transaction may still qualify under Section 336(e). See below.

[17] Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1(c)(3). Form 8883 also needs to be filed. If an F reorg is done, form 8594 will need to be filed.

[18] Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1(c)(3).

[19] Reg. 1.336-2(a). The election is made unilaterally by seller and target. See Reg. 1.336-2(h).

[20] Reg. 1.336-1(b)(2). See Reg. 1.336-1 – Reg. 1.336-5 for the mechanics of making the 336(e) election and what qualifies as a “qualified disposition” under 336.

[21] Reg. 1.336-1(b)(6)(ii)(A).

[22] See Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1 for the tax aspects of the deemed asset sale and liquidation.

[23] A deemed asset sale under Section 338 does not give rise to California sales tax. Cal. Code of Regs. 1595(a)(6).

[24] IRC 338(h)(3). See below for rollover transactions.

[25] Reg. 1.338(h)(10)-1(d)(5).

[26] IRC 338(h)(3)(A)(ii). Beware of situations where the acquiror appears to “purchase” at least 80% of target’s stock (and target rolls over 20% or less of its stock in a 351 transaction), but the acquiror in fact does (or might be deemed to) “purchase” less than 80% of target’s stock, thereby invalidating a 338, 338(h)(10), or 336(e) election. This most commonly occurs where purchaser is a newly formed corporation and target rolls over 20% (or less) of its shares. See Ginsburg, Levin & Rocap, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Buyouts, § 4.06.1.2.2 (relating to redemption of stock held by target’s shareholders and recharacterizing a 351 transaction and cash sale as a single 351 exchange with boot).

[27] See footnote 16.

[28] In accordance with Rev. Rul. 2008-18.

[29] IRC 1361(b)(3).

[30] Rev. Rul. 2008-18. Obviously, Holdco must meet all the requirements of an S-corp. In many cases, the parties will file Form 2553 to treat Holdco as an S corporation as a “belt and suspenders” step.

[31] Upon conversion, T is no longer treated as a QSub per 1361(b)(3). The conversion has no tax consequences; see Reg. 1.1361-5(b)(3), example 2, where the merger of two disregarded entities owned by the same entity is a disregarded transaction for tax purposes because the assets continue to be held by the same entity. The same should apply when one disregarded entity converts to another. The QSub can also merge with a newly formed LLC subsidiary of Holdco to achieve the same result.

[32] Rev. Rul. 2008-18.

[33] Rev. Rul. 99-5; Reg. 1.1361-5(b)(3), example 2.

[34] Rev. Rul. 99-5; see also Rev. Rul. 99-6.

[35] Id. Although not required, a Section 754 election is often required by the Buyer.

[36] IRC 336(a).

[37] IRC 1202(b). See Section 1202 for the requirements to qualify for QSBS.

[38] IRC 1202(c).

[39] The S corporation shares do not qualify as QSBS. The new shares of the C corporation issued after the reorganization qualify as QSBS to begin the 5 year holding period.

Article By Ben Gruen of Stubbs Alderton & Markiles, LLP

For more corporate law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© Copyright 2023 Stubbs Alderton & Markiles, LLP

When Corporate Legal Teams Break

Forward-thinking organizations that refocus their legal teams on the removal of systemic friction and value creation can better detect and forecast risk; however, organizations that have not modernized their legal teams often miss subtleties masking surprisingly deep areas of risk. Recent history shows nothing is too big to fail, but earlier risk detection may have helped avoid some of the most catastrophic losses.

The most recent and notable industry-wide example, of course, was the financial services industry, which triggered the Great Recession from 2007 to 2009.

In the world’s most infamous accounting scandal, Enron imploded in 2001, wiping out $74bn of shareholder funds and the pensions and jobs of thousands of employees. Enron’s auditor also collapsed. The organizations were interconnected and dependent systems. One fell, the other followed. Undetected risk festered and worsened, and the interconnectedness of these organizations and systems created a complex network that made detecting risk more difficult.

As modern society demands more capable systems, they become more interconnected and complex by necessity. As Meltdown: Why Our Systems Fail and What We Can Do About It posits, this staggering complexity means that tiny mistakes or simple accidents can lead to devastating catastrophes that often go undetected. The reasons for failure can stem from very different problems, but the underlying causes are similar.

In accounting scandals with nefarious actors, huge debts are obscured and once revealed, lead to corporate failure. In legal departments with good actors – led by a noble General Counsel (GC) who serves as the defender of the enterprise – business risks are obscured and once revealed, can lead to devastating consequences: bet-the-company litigation, core intellectual property battles, merger & acquisition failure, and crippling regulatory fines, to name a few.

Embracing digital helps identify and expose risk, but organizations set the stage for failure when legal, or other critical functions, don’t keep up, fail to embrace the digital evolution, become disconnected, and lack or lose visibility. Those organizations make decisions without a clear view of the legal implications, and they might not even know it because, for now, they operate with blind trust of the Office of the GC.

Corporations in all industries are “going digital” to remain competitive amidst technological disruption. This focus on digital starts with core products and service offerings, and then is pushed throughout the business to align company to product. The result? Faster moving businesses with a wave of demand pummelling the legal department…if not yet, then soon as digital initiatives across the business mature.

Most corporate legal departments simply do not have the systems required to keep up — providing consistent regulatory counsel, detecting and preventing impending litigation, or simply knowing who is doing what in the legal organization is already a challenge Risk is obscured. A “break” like we’ve never experienced is primed.

If we examine the ecosystem, the warning signs are there.

Catching up to other corporate functions

As demands on legal teams continue to grow and CFOs ask GCs to do more with less, quality suffers amid rising law firm rates and unchecked complexity. Corners get cut. Risks emerge while their likelihood to go undetected rises. Of course, when adding headcount is not an option, revamping processes and technology is often the answer.

In finance, accounting, information technology, and human resource departments, among others, advances in technology have enabled self-service, helped control costs, made it easier to compare costs, and increased quality choices. These corporate functions have embraced systems-level restructuring with artificial intelligence (AI), data analytics, cloud computing and “Big Data” to modernize working practices and improve performance.

In their often siloed and conservative world, most GCs and corporate legal departments, on the other hand, make crucial decisions guided as much by gut instinct as by data and industry benchmarks. For decades, they have resisted change or lacked sufficient resources to enable change in technology, working practices, and corporate culture. Now, with the real-time requirement for speed, scale, and transparency — that era is over.

To retain and increase influence, improve their performance and trim costs as recessionary fears grow, GCs would be wise to more fully modernize their legal departments quickly through an open, digitally-savvy, and collaborative working culture.

Collaborate and listen

Building a data-driven, digital, secure and scalable legal system is an ethical and commercial imperative for GCs. Technology is part of the solution but not the place to start.

To more proactively expose, manage and mitigate risk, executives and their boards need GCs to emphasize the imperative for a more analytical, data-based and efficient approach to corporate legal practice with concrete examples to punctuate the “Why.”

You could start with three actions.

  1. Educate yourself and your colleagues about trends in legal digitization, performance improvement and new working practices. A comprehensive source of information is the Digital Legal Exchange, a global institute of leading thinkers from academia, business, government, technology and law.
  2. Become Modern. Be the change. Lead the change. Make tough decisions about your top leaders and whether they are capable of a data and digital-first mindset and way of working. Change leadership is the prime point of failure for legal modernization efforts.
  3. Be ambitious in the scope of your reforms. Small, pilot projects (ie, e-signature or automated NDAs) won’t make much of an impact and won’t convince your board of the need for bold legal change.

Modernizing the legal system and companies’ legal departments can improve affordability and performance for clients, lawyers, company boards, and shareholders.

Absent modern means of detection, legal risk can proliferate unknown and unseen only to all too often reveal triggers of impending corporate failure when it’s already too late.

Article By Anusia Gillespie of UnitedLex

For more corporate law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 UnitedLex, All Rights Reserved

Ankura CTIX FLASH Update – December 13, 2022

Malware Activity

Uber Discloses New Data Breach Related to Third-Party Vendor

Uber has disclosed a new data breach that is related to the security breach of Teqtivity, a third-party vendor that Uber uses for asset management and tracking services. A threat actor named “UberLeaks” began leaking allegedly stolen data from Uber and Uber Eats on December 10, 2022, on a hacking forum. The exposed data includes Windows domain login names and email addresses, corporate reports, IT asset management information, data destruction reports, multiple archives of apparent source code associated with mobile device management (MDM) platforms, and more. One document in particular contained over 77,000 Uber employee email addresses and Windows Active Directory information. UberLeaks posted the alleged stolen information in four (4) separate postings regarding Uber MDM, Uber Eats MDM, Teqtivity MDM, and TripActions MDM platforms. The actor included one (1) member of the Lapsus$ threat group in each post, but Uber confirmed that Lapsus$ is not related to this December breach despite being previously linked to the company’s cyberattack in September 2022. Uber confirmed that this breach is not related to the security incident that took place in September and that the code identified is not owned by Uber. Teqtivity published a data breach notification on December 12, 2022, that stated the company is aware of “customer data that was compromised due to unauthorized access to our systems by a malicious third party” and that the third-party obtained access to its AWS backup server that housed company code and data files. Teqtivity also noted that its ongoing investigation identified the following exposed information: first name, last name, work email address, work location details, device serial number, device make, device model, and technical specs. The company confirmed that home address, banking information, and government identification numbers are not collected or retained. Uber and Teqtivity are both in the midst of ongoing investigations into this data breach. CTIX analysts will provide updates on the matter once available.

Threat Actor Activity

PLAY Ransomware Claims Responsibility for Antwerp Cyberattack

After last week’s ransomware attack on the city of Antwerp, a threat organization has claimed responsibility and has begun making demands. The threat group, tracked as PLAY ransomware, is an up-and-coming ransomware operation that has been posting leaked information since November 2022, according to an available posting on their leak site. Samples of the threat group’s ransomware variants have shown activity dating back to June 2022, which is around the time PLAY ransomware targeted the Argentina Court of Cordoba (August). While PLAY’s ransomware attack crippled several sectors of Antwerp, it appears to have had a significant impact on residential facilities throughout the city, as stated by officials. According to PLAY NEWS, PLAY’s ransomware leak site, the publication date for the exfiltrated data is Monday, December 19, 2022, if the undisclosed ransom is not paid. PLAY threat actors claim to have 557 gigabytes (GB) worth of Antwerp-related data including but not limited to personal identifiable information, passports, identification cards, and financial documents. CTIX continues to monitor the developing situation and will provide additional updates as more information is released.

Vulnerabilities

Fortinet Patches Critical RCE Vulnerability in FortiOS SSL-VPN Products

After observing active exploitation attempts in-the-wild, the network security solutions manufacturer Fortinet has patched a critical vulnerability affecting their FortiOS SSL-VPN products. The flaw, tracked as CVE-2022-42475, was given a CVSS score of 9.3/10 and is a heap-based buffer overflow, which could allow unauthenticated attackers to perform arbitrary remote code execution (RCE) if successfully exploited. Specifically, the vulnerability exists within the FortiOS sslvpnd product, which enables individual users to safely access an organization’s network, client-server applications, and internal network utilities and directories without the need for specialized software. The vulnerability was first discovered by researchers from the French cybersecurity firm Olympe Cyberdefense who warned users to monitor their logs for suspicious activity until a patch was released. Although very few technical details about the exploitation have been divulged, Fortinet did share lists of suspicious artifacts and IPs. Based on research by Ankura CTIX analysts, the IPs released by Fortinet are located around the globe and are not associated with known threat actors at this time. To prevent exploitation, all Fortinet administrators leveraging FortiOS sslvpnd should ensure that they download and install the latest patch. If organizations cannot immediately patch their systems due to the business interruption it would cause, Olympe Cyberdefense suggests “customers monitor logs, disable the VPN-SSL functionality, and create access rules to limit connections from specific IP addresses.” A list of the affected products and their solutions, as well as the indicators of compromise can be found in the Fortinet advisory linked below.

The semi-weekly Ankura Cyber Threat Investigations and Expert Services (CTIX) FLASH Update is designed to provide timely and relevant cyber intelligence pertaining to current or emerging cyber events. The preceding is a collection of cyber threat intelligence leads assembled over the past few days and typically includes high level intelligence pertaining to recent threat group/actor activity and newly identified vulnerabilities impacting a wide range of industries and victims. 

Article By Ankura Cyber Threat Investigations and Expert Services

For more cybersecurity legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright © 2022 Ankura Consulting Group, LLC. All rights reserved.

Important Considerations for Mediation

“You can’t always get what you want. But if you try sometimes, well, you just might find, you get what you need.” – Mick Jagger and Keith Richards

Successful Mediation. Unlike the regular adjudication of a legal dispute, in mediation there is no “decision-maker” to determine who is “right” or “wrong.” No final order or judgment is issued. Instead, a good mediation will result in a resolution created by both parties that satisfy both parties’ interests or concerns. Mediators are not looking to find fault or assign blame – rather, a mediator works with the parties to problem solve and find creative solutions and proposals.

Selecting a Mediator. In some court programs there is a list of “pre-approved” mediators. The mandatory Alternative Dispute Resolution program in the Western District of Pennsylvania has such a list. In the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas there will be no such guidance on preferred mediators. Pennsylvania does not have any national or statewide organization that certifies mediators. However, there is training available and basic mediation training is generally a 40-hour course covering problem solving, conflicts, communication skills, ethics and practical skills in role plays and other exercises. Mediators should have attended at least a basic mediation training course as well as have experience in mediating civil cases.

Article By Kathryn L. Clark of Strassburger McKenna Gutnick & Gefsky

For more arbitration and mediation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

©2022 Strassburger McKenna Gutnick & Gefsky

Employment Tip of the Month – December 2022

Q:  As an employer, am I legally required to allow employees to bring marijuana to an office holiday party?

A:  No.  While adult recreational use of marijuana is now legal in 21 states and the District of Columbia, the use of marijuana remains illegal under federal law and employers with drug-free and smoke-free workplace policies can prohibit marijuana consumption in the workplace and during employer-sponsored events. Employers who wish to prohibit use of recreational marijuana at the office holiday party should remind employees of the policies and ensure that they understand the policies apply at all employer-sponsored events – even if the event is held after work hours and off company premises.

Laws surrounding the recreational use of marijuana differ from one state to another and evolve quickly.  Before taking adverse action against an employee for marijuana use, an employer should consult the specific laws governing their jurisdiction.

Article By Laura Stutz of Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP

For more labor and employment law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Wilson Elser

What Brokers, Company Insiders, and Others Need to Know about Securities Litigation

Individuals, companies, and firms involved in all aspects of the securities industry face litigation risks daily. From whistleblower lawsuits and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement actions to Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) arbitration and private-right-of-action cases under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, all types of securities litigation present risks for civil liability. In some cases, securities litigation can present risks for criminal penalties as well.

With this in mind, there is a lot that brokers, company insiders, investment advisers, and others need to know when targeted in lawsuits and investigations. When brokers, company insiders, and others make informed decisions based on the advice of experienced counsel, they can significantly mitigate their risk in both private and governmental securities litigation.

“Securities litigation can present substantial risks for individuals, companies, and firms. Whether facing allegations in civil litigation, SEC enforcement proceedings, or FINRA arbitration, the key to mitigating these risks is to build and execute a comprehensive, strategic and forward-thinking defense.” – Dr. Nick Oberheiden, Founding Attorney of Oberheiden P.C. law firms.

Answers to 10 Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) about Securities Litigation

Here are answers to 10 frequently asked questions (FAQs) about securities litigation:

1. What Are Some of the Most Common Claims Against Brokers and Brokerage Firms in Securities Litigation?

Brokers and brokerage firms have faced a growing volume of litigation in recent years. This includes private litigation involving individual investors as well as litigation involving the SEC. Investigations, lawsuits, and arbitration filings targeting brokers and brokerage firms primarily focus on acts and omissions constituting investor fraud, though brokers and brokerage firms can face a variety of other claims in securities litigation as well.

Some examples of common claims against brokers and brokerage firms in securities litigation include:

  • Making unsuitable investment recommendations

  • Unauthorized trading and account churning

  • Charging excessive fees and commissions

  • Failing to disclose or misconstruing material information (especially in connection with structured products and other high-risk investments)

  • Failure to supervise or implement adequate internal controls

2. What Are Some of the Most Common Claims Against Company Insiders and Issuers in Securities Litigation?

Securities fraud lawsuits and enforcement actions targeting company insiders and securities issuers can also involve an extremely broad range of allegations. These cases are typically very different from those targeting brokers and brokerage firms; and, while both falls under the umbrella of “securities litigation,” the resemblances between the two categories are minimal. Some examples of common claims against company insiders and issuers in securities litigation include:

  • Accounting and recordkeeping violations

  • Submitting false SEC filings

  • Insider trading

  • Market manipulation

  • Selling unregistered securities and conducting unregistered IPOs

3. What Are Some of the Most Common Triggers for Securities Fraud Lawsuits and Investigations?

Many securities fraud lawsuits and investigations result from investor complaints. Typically, investors will have concerns about losses in their portfolios that they believe cannot be explained by ordinary market forces. These concerned investors will contact plaintiffs’ lawyers to help them file claims alleging fraud in federal courts, district courts or FINRA arbitration.

In some cases, concerned investors will file whistleblower claims with the SEC. The SEC has an obligation to investigate all whistleblower complaints that meet the basic filing requirements, and SEC whistleblowers can receive substantial compensation awards.

The SEC also initiates investigations on its own. Questionable EDGAR filings, market activity, media reports, and referrals from other federal law enforcement agencies can all trigger SEC investigations that may lead to civil or criminal enforcement action. The SEC also monitors activity on social media and other online platforms, and activity on these platforms is increasingly serving as the basis for SEC enforcement activity.

4. What Types of Claims Are Most Likely to Lead to Class Action Securities Litigation?

While all securities litigation presents liability risks for the individuals or entities targeted, companies and firms targeted in class action litigation face risk on an entirely different scale. Class action lawsuits lead to devastating liability that can threaten companies’ and firms’ viability as a going concern.

The types of claims that are most likely to lead to class action securities litigation are those that involve violations affecting large groups of investors. Inadequate brokerage controls that lead to systemic unsuitable investment recommendations, omitting material information from companies’ 10-K or 10-Q filings, mismanagement of investors’ funds, and market manipulation resulting in widespread losses are all examples of issues that can lead (and have led) to securities-related class action lawsuits.

5. How Does the SEC’s Whistleblower Program Work?

The SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower accepts tips from company employees, investors, and others who believe they have information about securities fraud. When a whistleblower complaint spurs enforcement action resulting in sanctions of $1 million or more, the whistleblower can receive between 10% and 30% of the amount collected.

As a result, individuals have a strong financial incentive to come forward and work with the SEC. Additionally, even if the SEC declines to pursue enforcement action based on a whistleblower’s tip, the whistleblower can still choose to pursue a claim directly, and whistleblower compensation awards are higher in these cases. Due to these incentives, whistleblower litigation is a key component of the SEC’s overall securities law enforcement strategy.

6. When Is It Advantageous to Settle a Securities Fraud Lawsuit or Arbitration Claim?

When facing substantiated allegations of securities fraud, settling will often prove to be the most cost-effective solution. However, targeted individuals and entities must be careful not to settle too soon, as there are numerous ways to fight securities fraud allegations even in scenarios that seem highly unfavorable (more on this below).

So, when is it advantageous to settle? Simply put, the costs of settling need to be less than the costs of any other alternative. This includes not only legal costs and any potential judgment liability, but reputational and administrative (i.e. suspension or debarment) costs as well.

7. When Can the U.S. Department of Justice Pursue Criminal Securities Fraud Litigation?

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) pursues criminal securities fraud litigation in cases involving intentional (or apparently intentional) securities law violations. According to the DOJ’s website, the Department’s Market Integrity and Major Frauds (MIMF) Unit, “focuses on the prosecution of complex securities, commodities, cryptocurrency, and other financial fraud and market manipulation cases.” In criminal securities fraud cases, the DOJ can seek penalties ranging from substantial fines to long-term imprisonment for company executives and other insiders.

8. What Remedies Can Investors Seek in Securities Litigation?

In private securities litigation and FINRA arbitration, retail investors can seek compensatory damages for their fraudulent investment losses. An investor’s losses may be deemed fraudulent if they result from either: (i) broker fraud or mismanagement (i.e., making unsuitable investment recommendations), or (ii) a drop in the value of their securities that is not attributable to ordinary market forces. Along with the recovery of their lost principal and investment earnings, investors can seek to recover interest, fees, and other costs as well.

9. What Remedies Can the SEC Seek in Securities Litigation?

When pursuing enforcement actions against brokers, brokerage firms, company insiders, and issuers, the SEC can seek a range of civil and administrative penalties. These include fines, disgorgement, and restitution as well as cease-and-desist orders, suspension, and debarment from the securities industry.

10. What Defenses Can Individuals, Companies, and Firms Use to Protect Themselves in Securities Litigation?

While securities litigation can involve a broad range of allegations and present substantial risk for liability and other penalties, targeted individuals and entities may be able to successfully defend themselves by several means. Whether securing a favorable result means avoiding liability entirely or negotiating a favorable settlement, the key to success is making informed decisions in light of the available opportunities.

For brokers and brokerage firms, some examples of potential defenses include:

  • Misguided Allegations – In many cases, investors (and their counsel) simply lack an adequate understanding of the law. Demonstrating that an investor’s allegations are misguided can serve as an efficient and complete defense against liability.

  • Investor Authorization – One particular area of confusion for many investors is the area of authorization (including discretionary authorization). If an investor is challenging a trade that he or she authorized, providing documentation of authorization can be sufficient to avoid liability.

  • Statutory and Regulatory Compliance – Brokers and brokerage firms will also be able to successfully defend against securities fraud allegations by demonstrating compliance with the relevant statutes, regulations, or FINRA rules.

For company insiders and issuers, some examples of potential defenses include:

  • Compliance with Pre-Arranged Trading Plans – In cases involving insider trading allegations, company insiders can avoid liability by demonstrating compliance with a pre-arranged trading plan.

  • Good-Faith Disclosure – Issuers accused of withholding material information or publishing incomplete or misleading information can often defend against fraud allegations by demonstrating good-faith efforts to maintain disclosure compliance.

  • Qualifying for a Registration Exemption – Issuers can qualify for registration exemptions in various scenarios. If security is exempt, then offering security without registration is 100% permissible.

The fact that these are just examples cannot be overemphasized. Securities litigation can involve an extraordinarily broad range of allegations under numerous laws, rules, and regulations. In many cases, targeted companies and individuals will be able to assert a successful defense by focusing on discrete elements of the plaintiff’s or SEC’s burden of proof. From asserting the applicable statute of limitations to preventing class certification, several technical defenses can prove highly effective in securities litigation as well. As with all types of litigation, the key is to explore all viable defenses, build a comprehensive and cohesive defense strategy, and then execute that strategy while remaining prepared to adapt as necessary.

Article By Dr. Nick Oberheiden of Oberheiden P.C.

For more securities and SEC legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Oberheiden P.C. © 2022

Buying, Selling, and Investing in Telehealth Companies: Navigating Structural and Compliance Issues

A multi-part series highlighting the unique health regulatory aspects of Telemedicine mergers and acquisitions, and financing transactions

Investors in the telehealth space and buyers and sellers of telehealth companies need to account for a set of health regulatory considerations that are unique to deals in this sector. As all parties to potential telehealth transactions analyze their long term role in the telehealth marketplace, two of the central issues to any transaction are compliance and structure – both in terms of structuring the telehealth transaction itself and due diligence issues that arise related to a target’s structure.

The COVID-19 pandemic, combined with strained health care staffing and provider availability, have accelerated the growth of the telehealth, and start-ups and traditional health systems alike are competing for access to patient populations in the telehealth space. However, as we adjust to life with COVID-19 as the norm, the expiration of the federal Public Health Emergency (PHE) looms, and the national economy contracts, we expect that the remainder of 2022 and into 2023 will see consolidation as the telehealth market begins to saturate and the long-term viability of certain platforms are tested. Telehealth companies, health systems, pharma companies and investors are all in potential positions to take advantage of this consolidation in a ripening M&A sector (while startups in the telehealth space continue to seek venture and institutional capital).

This is the first post in a series highlighting the unique health regulatory aspects of telehealth transactions. Future installments of this series are expected to cover licensure and regulatory approvals, compliance / clinical delivery models, and future market developments.

Telehealth Transaction Structure Considerations

The structure of any given telehealth transaction will largely depend on the business of the telehealth organization at play, but also will depend on the acquirer / investor. Regardless of whether a party is buying, selling or investing in a telehealth company, structuring the transaction appropriately will be important for all parties involved. While a standard stock purchase, asset purchase or merger may make sense for many of these transactions, we have also seen a proliferation of, affiliation arrangements, joint ventures (JV), alliances and partnerships.  These varieties of affiliation transactions can be a good choice for health systems that are not necessarily looking to manage or develop an existing platform, but instead are looking to leverage their patient populations and resources to partner with an existing technology platform. An affiliation or JV is more popular for telehealth companies operating purely as a technology platform (with no core business involving clinical services being provided). For parties in the traditional healthcare provider sector that provide clinical services, an affiliation or JV, which is easier to unwind or terminate than a traditional M&A transaction, can allow the parties to “test the waters” in a new, combined business venture. The affiliation or JV can take a variety of forms, including technology licensing agreements; the creation of a new entity to house the telehealth mission, which then has contractual arrangements with the both the JV parties; and exclusivity arrangements relating to use of the technology and access to patient populations.

While an affiliation or JV offers flexibility, can minimize the need for a large upfront investment, and can be an attractive alternative to a more permanent purchase or sale, there can be increased regulatory risk. Entrepreneurs, investors, and providers considering any such arrangement should bear in mind that in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and proliferation of telehealth, the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS-OIG) has expressed a heightened interest in investigating so called “telefraud” and recently issued a special fraud alert regarding suspect arrangements, discussed in this prior post. Further, the OIG’s guidance on contractual joint ventures that would run afoul of the federal Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) should be front of mind and parties should strive to structure any affiliation or JV in a manner that meets or approximates an AKS safe harbor.

Target Telehealth Company Structure Compliance

Where telehealth companies are providing clinical services, and are not purely technology platforms, structuring and transaction diligence should focus on whether the target is operating in compliance with corporate practice of medicine (CPOM) laws. The CPOM doctrine is intended to maintain the independence of physician decision-making and reduce a “profits over people” mentality, and prevent physician employment by a lay-owned corporation unless an exception applies. Most states that have adopted CPOM impose similar restrictions on other types of clinical professionals, such as nurses, physical therapists, social workers, and psychologists. Telehealth companies often attempt to utilize a so-called “friendly PC” structure to comply with CPOM, whereby an investor-owned management services organization (“MSO”) affiliates with a physician-owned professional corporation (or other type of professional entity) (a “PC”) through a series of contractual agreements that foster a close working relationship between the MSO, PC, and PC owner and whereby the MSO provides management services, and sometimes start-up financing. The overall arrangement is intended to allow the MSO to handle the management side of the PC’s operations without impeding the professional judgment of the PC or the medical practice of its physicians and the PC owner.

CPOM Compliance Considerations and Diligence for Telehealth Companies

A sophisticated buyer will want to confirm that the target’s friendly PC structure is not only formally established, but is also operationalized properly and in a manner that minimizes fraud and abuse risk. If CPOM compliance gaps are identified in diligence this may, at worst, tank the deal and, at best, cause unexpected delays in the transaction timeline, as restructuring may be required or advisable. The buyer may also request additional deal concessions, such as a purchase price reduction and special indemnification coverage (with potentially a higher liability limit and an escrow as security). Accordingly, a telehealth company anticipating a sale or fund raise would be well served to engage in a self-audit to identify any CPOM compliance issues and undertake necessary corrective actions prior to the commencement of a transaction process.

Below are nine key questions with respect to CPOM compliance and related fraud and abuse issues that a buyer/investor in a telehealth transaction should examine carefully (and that the target should be prepared to answer):

  1. Does target have a PC that is properly incorporated or foreign qualified in all states where clinical services are provided (based on the location of the patient)?
  2. Does the PC owner (and any directors and officers of the PC, to the extent different from the PC owner) have a medical license in all states where the PC conducts business (to the extent in-state licensure is required)? To the extent the PC has multiple physician owners and directors/officers, are all such individuals licensed as required under applicable state law?
  3. Does the PC(s) have its own federal employer identification number, bank account (including double lockbox arrangement if enrolled in federal healthcare programs), and Medicare/Medicaid enrollments?
  4. Does the PC owner exercise meaningful oversight and control over the governance and clinical activities of the PC? Does the PC owner have background and expertise relevant to the business (e.g., a cardiologist would not have appropriate experience to be the PC owner of a PC that provides telemental health services)?
  5. Are the physicians and other professionals providing clinical services for the business employed or contracted through a PC (rather than the MSO)? Employment or independent contractor agreements should be reviewed, as well as W-2s, and payroll accounts.
  6. Is the PC properly contracted with customers (to the extent services are provided on a B2B basis) and payors?
  7. Do the contractual agreements between the MSO and PC respect the independent clinical judgment of the PC owner and PC physicians and otherwise comply with state CPOM laws.
  8. Do the financial arrangements between the MSO, PC, and PC owner comply with AKS, the federal Stark Law, and corollary state laws and fee-splitting prohibitions, to the extent applicable?
  9. Is the PC owner or any other physician performing clinical services for the PC an equity holder in the MSO? If so, are these equity interests tied to volume/value of referrals to the PC or MSO (i.e., if the MSO provides ancillary services such as lab or prescription drugs) or could equity interests be construed as an improper incentive to generate healthcare business (e.g., warrants that can only be exercised upon attainment of certain volume)?

Telehealth companies considering a sale or financing transaction, and potential buyers and investors, would be well served to spend time on the front end of a potential transaction assessing the above issues to determine potential risk areas that could impact deal terms or necessitate any friendly PC structuring.

Article By Hannah E. Zaitlin, Mitchell D. Lindstrom, David S. Sanders, and Natasha Allen of Foley & Lardner LLP

For more health law legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

© 2022 Foley & Lardner LLP