Ohio Court of Appeals Affirms $30 Million Libel Verdict Against Oberlin College

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment in excess of $30,000,000 against Oberlin College, holding that Oberlin was responsible for libelous statements made during the course of a student protest. Gibson Bros., Inc. v. Oberlin College, 2022 WL 970347 (Ohio Ct. App. March 31, 2022). The court’s rationale, if followed elsewhere, could lead to significantly broader institutional and corporate liability for statements by students and employees.

The case arose out of an incident in which an employee of the Gibson Brothers Bakery and Food Mart accused a black student of shoplifting, and then pursued and held the student until police arrived. Over the next few days, large groups of student protestors gathered outside the bakery and among other things handed out a flyer describing the incident as an “assault,” and stating that the bakery had a “long account of racial profiling and discrimination.” The day following the incident, the student senate passed a resolution calling for a boycott. It likewise described the incident as an assault on the student and stated that the bakery had a “history of racial profiling and discriminatory treatment of students….” The resolution was emailed to the entire campus and posted on the senate bulletin board, where it remained for over a year. The court found the statements to be factually untrue, because the student pled guilty to the shoplifting charge and admitted racial profiling did not occur, and the College presented no evidence of any past racial profiling or instances of discrimination at the bakery.

The court acknowledged that there was no evidence that Oberlin participated in drafting the flyer or the student senate resolution. Instead, the court found Oberlin liable on the theory that one who republishes a libel, or who aids and abets the publication of a libelous statement, can be liable along with the original publisher. As to the flyer, the court cited the following as evidence sufficient to support a jury finding that Oberlin had either republished or aided and abetted its publication:

  • Oberlin’s Dean of Students attended the protests as part of her job responsibilities;
  • the Dean of Students handed a copy of the flyer to a journalist who had not yet seen it and told students they could use a college copier to make more copies of the flyer;
  • the associate director of a multicultural resource center was seen carrying a large number of flyers, which he appeared to be distributing to others to redistribute to the public; and
  • the College provided a warming room with coffee and pizza at a site near the protests.

As to the student senate resolution, the court cited:

  • the senate was an approved organization;
  • the College created the senate’s authority to adopt and circulate the resolution;
  • the senate faculty moderator was the Dean of Students; and
  • despite having knowledge of the content of the resolution, neither the President nor the Dean of Students took any steps to require or encourage the student senate to revoke the resolution or to remove it from the bulletin board.

The court then held that despite the publicity the bakery received once the dispute arose, at the time of the protests and resolution the bakery and its owners were private persons, not public figures. Thus, the bakery only had to show that Oberlin had been negligent, rather than that it acted with reckless indifference as to the truth or falsity of the statements published.

Particularly in these polarized times, university administrators should be aware of and take steps to manage legal risks when external disputes become the subject of campus discussion and activism. Student organizations, faculty and administrators should be reminded that, to the extent they participate in protests or other public commentary outside their official roles, they should make clear they are acting for themselves and not the institution. Institutional responses to causes espoused by students or faculty need to be carefully vetted to assure that any factual assertions about third parties are accurate.

© 2022 Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone PLC

SCOTUS Cert Recap: Copyright Act’s Fair Use Defense, ‘Dormant’ Commerce Clause, And Independent And Adequate State Ground Doctrine

On March 28, the Supreme Court agreed to consider the following three questions:

Is a work of art that copies from a prior work but that conveys a different meaning than the prior work necessarily “transformative” for the purpose of the Copyright Act’s fair use defense?

Does California’s Proposition 12 – which requires all pork sold in California to come from pigs housed in compliance with the state’s animal-confinement rules, even pigs raised entirely in other states – violate the Constitution’s Commerce Clause?

Is Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g), which requires a state prisoner seeking post-conviction relief to identify a “significant change in the law” that would probably have produced a different result in the prisoner’s case, an adequate and independent state-law ground to support a state-court judgment denying post-conviction relief?

 

On March 28, the U.S. Supreme Court added three cases to its docket for next term: one about when a work of art “transforms” a prior work for the purpose of the Copyright Act’s fair use defense, another involving a “dormant” Commerce Clause challenge to a California law that prohibits selling any pork in the state unless the pork comes from pigs housed in compliance with California’s animal-confinement rules, and a third concerning whether the independent and adequate state ground doctrine bars the Court from reviewing an Arizona state-court decision denying a request for post-conviction relief.

The copyright and Commerce Clause cases – which drew four and five cert-stage amicus briefs, respectively – will capture significant attention from businesses and civil litigators and could each produce landmark decisions in their respective areas of law. The case concerning the independent and adequate state ground doctrine will be of greater interest to those who practice in the post-conviction area – where such issues arise with some frequency – but all lawyers who practice before the Supreme Court should watch that case carefully as well, as the doctrine applies to all state-court decisions whatever the subject matter.

When Works Are ‘Transformative’ Under the Copyright Act’s Fair Use Defense

In Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts v. Goldsmith, the Court will return to a question it confronted last year in Google v. Oracle: When does copying a portion of a copyrighted work constitute protected “fair use” under the Copyright Act?

The notion of “fair use” in the copyright context initially developed as a common-law doctrine to allow borrowing in some situations in order to further the Copyright Act’s general purpose of fostering creativity and innovation. Congress codified that doctrine in 1976, and the Copyright Act now expressly recognizes fair use as a defense and lists four non-exclusive factors courts should consider in determining whether a use is “fair”: 1) the purpose and character of the use, 2) the nature of the copyrighted work, 3) the amount used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and 4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for the copyrighted work.

As the Court explained in Google, the first of these factors – the purpose and character of the use – asks “whether the copier’s use adds something new … altering the copyrighted work with new expression, meaning or message,” and the Court has “used the word ‘transformative’ to describe a copying use that adds something new and important.” This case offers the Court an opportunity to provide further detail on what it means for a work of art to be “transformative” in this sense. It concerns a series of silkscreen prints and pencil illustrations created by Andy Warhol – whose foundation is the petitioner here – based on a 1981 portrait photograph of Prince taken by the respondent, Lynn Goldsmith. The foundation argues that the works are necessarily transformative because they convey a new meaning: namely, that they portray Prince as an “iconic” figure rather than the “vulnerable human being” depicted in Goldsmith’s photograph.

In its decision below, however, the Second Circuit rejected the notion that imbuing a work with a new meaning is necessarily “transformative.” It observed that such a rule would seem to expand fair use to make copyright licensing unnecessary in the “paradigmatically derivative” context of film adaptations – since many movies transform the message of the underlying literary work – and it noted that ascertaining the meaning of artistic works is a subjective endeavor to which judges are typically unsuited. Instead, it held that Warhol’s work is not transformative on the ground that it is “both recognizably deriving from, and retaining the essential elements of, its source material.”

The Supreme Court is now set to review this decision and thereby give litigants and lower courts further guidance on what makes a work that borrows from another sufficiently “transformative.” Copyright practitioners around the country will be closely following what the Court says.

Commerce Clause Limits on States’ Authority to Regulate Commerce

In National Pork Producers Council v. Ross, the Court will consider a challenge to California’s Proposition 12, a law that sets minimum size requirements for pig pens – and that extends those requirements to farmers across the country by making compliance with them a condition of selling pork in California.

The challengers contend that the out-of-state application of these pen-size rules violates the Commerce Clause. They note that, while the Commerce Clause is expressly framed as a grant of authority to Congress, the Supreme Court has long read the Commerce Clause to also implicitly limit states’ regulatory authority. This doctrine, often called the “dormant” Commerce Clause, has a handful of different components, and two are at issue in this case.

The first, known as the extraterritoriality doctrine, has been invoked in a number of Supreme Court decisions but is most prominently associated with the 1980s decisions Brown-Foreman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority and Healy v. Beer Institute. The challengers here argue that under these decisions, a state law per se violates the Commerce Clause if its practical effect is to control conduct beyond the state’s boundaries, and they contend Proposition 12 does so by effectively requiring out-of-state farmers to follow California’s pen-size rules on pain of exclusion from the California market. And California responds that Proposition 12 merely regulates in-state sales, and that any indirect, upstream effects it has on farmers is insufficient to run afoul of the extraterritoriality doctrine.

The second issue concerns the balancing test the Supreme Court articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church, which bars state laws that impose a burden on interstate commerce that “is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Here the parties dispute the significance of Proposition 12’s economic effects and the strength of the interests underlying the law – issues that could become complicated by the motion-to-dismiss posture of the case.

The Court has now agreed to address both of these issues, and whatever the Court decides, its decision will carry implications for the validity of state commercial regulations in a wide variety of industries across the country.

The Scope of the Independent and Adequate State Ground Doctrine

In Cruz v. Arizona, the Court will take up a criminal-law case that presents a recurring issue that arises in both criminal and civil cases alike: When does a state-court decision rest on an independent and adequate state ground such that the U.S. Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review the decision?

The case arises from the Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in Simmons v. South Carolina, which held that where a capital defendant’s “future dangerousness is at issue, and state law prohibits the defendant’s release on parole, due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible.” The Arizona Supreme Court later concluded that Simmons was inapplicable in Arizona – on the theory that Arizona law did not universally prohibit capital defendants’ release on parole – but the U.S. Supreme Court overturned that conclusion in Lynch v. Arizona.

Shortly thereafter, Cruz – a capital defendant whose trial and sentencing occurred after Simmons but before Lynch – filed a petition for post-conviction relief in Arizona state court. Because this was not Cruz’s first petition, he sought relief under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g), which at the time provided that relief would be available even for successive petitions where there “has been a significant change in the law that if determined to apply to defendant’s case would probably overturn the defendant’s conviction or sentence.”

Cruz argued that Lynch constituted a significant change in the law and that it applied retroactively to render his sentence unlawful. And after the Arizona Supreme Court rejected his claim, he filed a cert. petition arguing that federal law requires applying Lynch retroactively in state post-conviction proceedings. Arizona, meanwhile, countered that the Court would lack jurisdiction under the independent and adequate state ground doctrine: The Arizona Supreme Court’s decision, the state argued, simply concluded that Cruz failed to meet the state-law requirements of Rule 32.1(g).

While the U.S. Supreme Court granted Cruz’s cert. petition, it has limited its consideration to only the question concerning the independent and adequate state ground doctrine. And because its answer to that question could affect jurisdictional rulings in all manner of cases, the case will be of interest to anyone who practices before the Court.

© 2022 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

Better Late than Never, Just About – UK Government Issues Workplace Guidance on Living with COVID

So with Covid 19 now officially behind us for all purposes (except actual reality, obviously), we have now been graced by the Government’s new “Living with Covid” guidance.  This was due to come into force on 1 April and was released fashionably late in the afternoon on, well, 1st April.  You could say with some justification that this did not give employers much time to prepare, but that is OK because on close review of the guidance there is in fact very little to prepare for.  As a steer to businesses, this is little short of directionless.

First, it makes the obvious point that the abolition of the requirement to give covid express consideration in workplace risk assessments does not take away any of the employer’s obligations to continue to comply with its health & safety, employment and equality duties (in the latter two cases, although unsaid, presumably as they may be affected by the former).

From there, the Government moves to normalise covid through a long list of symptoms common to it, colds, flu and other respiratory diseases – fair enough so far – but also to other quite unrelated conditions such as hangovers, migraines, food poisoning, being unfit, malaria and frankly just getting old (“unexplained tiredness, lack of energy”).  The list is significantly expanded from the traditional trio of continuous cough, fever, loss of taste and smell and now also includes muscle pain, diarrhoea, headache, loss of appetite and “feeling sick” (what, really?). Some medical practitioners say that this is long overdue recognition of all the things covid can do to you. However, it is still a wincingly unhappy expansion for employers, since the published list now essentially includes something from pretty much every ailment known to man. The guidance notes that it will not usually be possible to tell whether you have covid or something else from the symptoms alone and of course the free testing by which that could have been determined in the past is now largely withdrawn.  Therefore the guidance to individuals is that “if you have symptoms of a respiratory infection such as covid and you have a high temperature or you do not feel well enough to go to work, you are advised to try to stay at home and avoid contact with other people” and then “Try to work from home if you can.  If you are unable to work from home you should talk to your employer about options available to you”.  Given the rich panoply of symptoms now available to the discerning malingerer, justifying taking yourself home for five days while you work out whether your headache is covid or just a headache has never been so easy.

As a result, the burden is shifted squarely to employers to keep up the anti-covid fight, and in particular to decide whether to maintain restrictions on entry to their premises for those who are unvaccinated and/or untested.  Both will be increasingly difficult to sustain in view of the obvious official indifference to the question evidenced by the guidance, which focuses instead on the traditional measures of ventilation, regular cleaning of high-touch surfaces, provision of sanitiser and hygiene advice, etc. The other big hole in the guidance is as to the employer’s rights (or is it obligation?) to send someone home if they have one or more of that long list of potentially relevant symptoms, and even if the employee himself feels able to work and/or cannot work from home.  Nor does it deal with the employees’ sick pay rights in those cases.

Taking a reasonably hawkish view of those two questions:-

  1. If you know that the employee has symptoms which could well indicate that he is suffering from covid, and even if it could equally be something less serious, are you complying with your Health & Safety at Work Act duty to take all reasonably practicable steps to maintain a safe system of work if you allow him in anyway?  If he works in a sparsely –occupied well-ventilated area, perhaps yes, but otherwise probably not.  Given the virulence of Omicron, it is unarguably foreseeable that allowing someone who may have it to breathe wantonly on other people may lead to their contracting it too.  It is also clearly foreseeable, if no longer as much so as with the earlier covid variants, that those other people may become properly ill or die as a result.  Put mathematically, breach of duty + foreseeable risk of injury + causation + actual injury = liability.

So in my view, despite the vacuum in the new guidance, an employer not just can, but really should send home immediately an employee with any material case of the symptoms listed, as a minimum until it becomes clear that the real issue is something else (though not malaria – best not let them in either).

A firm stance on this will also help combat reluctance to return to the office among those staff concerned about the health risk of doing so.  If they or their cohabitants are particularly vulnerable, the knowledge that basically no precautions are being taken to ensure that those present in the workplace are all covid-free will only feed those anxieties.

  1. If the employee is sent home on these grounds and cannot work there, will he be entitled to full salary (as it was not by his choice) or sick pay only?  In many cases he will be back within a week and the two may be the same.  Where they are not, however, I believe that it would strictly be sick pay only – though the employee may himself be physically able to work, he is practically unable to do so by reason of his own possible medical condition, the risk it may pose to others in the workplace and the duty of the employer to take reasonable steps to head off that risk.  That said, there are employment relations arguments both ways on this – on the one hand, that the symptoms listed are so varied and transient that they represent an easy avenue for abuse, and on the other that if reporting them means you get packed off home on reduced pay (perhaps none until SSP kicks in on day 4), you are much less likely to report them in the first place and will probably prefer to pass your day posing an undeclared but potentially quite serious risk to your colleagues.
© Copyright 2022 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

President Biden’s FY 2023 Budget Request Would Strengthen TSCA and Tackle PFAS Pollution

On March 28, 2022, the Biden Administration submitted to Congress President Biden’s budget for fiscal year (FY) 2023. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) March 28, 2022, press release, the budget makes critical investments, including:

  • Strengthening EPA’s Commitment and Ability to Implement Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) Successfully: The budget provides $124 million and 449 full time equivalents (FTE) for TSCA efforts “to deliver on the promises made to the American people by the bipartisan Lautenberg Act.” According to the budget, “[t]hese resources will support EPA-initiated chemical risk evaluations and protective regulations in accordance with statutory timelines.”
  • Tackling Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) Pollution: PFAS are a group of man-made chemicals that threaten the health and safety of communities across the United States. As part of the President’s commitment to tackling PFAS pollution, the budget provides approximately $126 million in FY 2023 for EPA to increase its understanding of human health and ecological effects of PFAS, restrict uses to prevent PFAS from entering the air, land, and water, and remediate PFAS that have been released into the environment. EPA states that it will continue to act on its PFAS Strategic Roadmap to safeguard communities from PFAS contamination.
©2022 Bergeson & Campbell, P.C.

French Insider Episode 12: Navigating the Metaverse with Jim Gatto [PODCAST]

Joining host Sarah Aberg is Jim Gatto. Jim joins us today to discuss the metaverse, the technology and business models involved in these virtual worlds, the role of NFTs and cryptocurrency in the digital economy, and the legal, regulatory, and governance issues that can arise when companies seek to enter that space.

Jim Gatto is a partner in Sheppard Mullin’s Washington, D.C. office, where he leads the  Blockchain & Fintech Team, Social Media & Games Team, and Open Source Team. Jim’s practice focuses on blockchain, interactive entertainment, digital art, AI, and online gambling. He advises clients on IP strategies, development and publishing agreements, licensing and technology transaction agreements, and tech regulatory issues. Jim has been involved with blockchain since 2012 and has been recognized as a thought leader by leading organizations including as a Cryptocurrency, Blockchain and Fintech Trailblazer by the National Law Journal.

Sarah Aberg is special counsel in the White Collar Defense and Corporate Investigations Group in Sheppard Mullin’s New York office. Sarah’s practice encompasses litigation, internal investigations and white collar defense.  Her areas of focus include financial services and securities, as well as corporate fraud in a variety of industries, including technology, construction, and non-profits.  Sarah’s regulatory practice encompasses market regulation, foreign registration and disclosure requirements, supervisory procedures, and sales practices.  Sarah represents corporations, financial services companies, and associated individuals in connection with investigations and regulatory matters before the U.S. Department of Justice, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, FINRA, the New York Stock Exchange, the New York State Department of Financial Services, and the New York Attorney General’s Office.

What We Discussed in This Episode:

  1. What is the Metaverse?
  2. How Do Metaverses Differ from Earlier Virtual Worlds?
  3. What Role Do NFTs Play in the Digital Economy?
  4. Investing in a Metaverse: What are the Risks?
  5. What are Legal, Regulatory, and Tax Considerations?
  6. What Governance Issues Exist for Brands Operating in a Metaverse?
  7. What are the Inflationary and Deflationary Aspects of the Virtual Economy?
  8. How Might Blockchain and Cryptocurrency Alter International Financial Transactions?
  9. Is the World Moving into a Virtual/Digital Economy?

Russian Sanctions Create Patent Risks

While multi-national sanctions recently imposed on Russia were intended to punish Russia for its aggression in Ukraine, the effects of the sanctions have led to a need for tough decisions for U.S. entities with patent interests in Russia.  The prohibitions on financial exchanges with certain Russian banks will essentially prevent any payment of fees to Rospatent (the Russian patent office), and although a general license from the Department of the Treasury provides a short window for winding down certain administrative transactions, U.S. entities engaged in patent transactions with Rospatent only have a short time to make decisions about current and future patent activities in Russia.

Prohibited Activities

On February 28, 2022, the Department of the Treasury initiated prohibitions related to transactions involving certain financial institutions in Russia, including the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.1 The directive specifically prohibits a United States person (unless otherwise excepted or licensed) from engaging in any transaction involving the listed financial institutions, including any transfer of assets to such entities or any foreign exchange transaction for or on behalf of such entities.  Under the directive, the prohibitions are specifically worded to include: (1) any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions of the directive; and (2) any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions of the directive.

Notably, the prohibited activities do not expressly prevent any transactions of a U.S. person with Rospatent.  And although the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has cut off direct engagement with Rospatent for carrying out activities such as use of the Global Patent Prosecution Highway (GPPH) program2, Rospatent is not currently a sanctioned entity under the directive.  This, however, is essentially a distinction without a difference.  Moreover, since the USPTO (and also the European Patent Office) has already cut ties with Rospatent, there still remains the possibility that Rospatent itself will be added to the sanctions at a future date and thus completely eliminate any pursuits by U.S. persons with Rospatent.

The current sanctions directly affect entities seeking patent protection in Russia since payments of required fees related to patent applications and granted patents in Russia are processed through the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.  This includes a number of financial transactions, such as payment of government filings fees for directly filing a patent application in Russia or filing a national phase of an international PCT application in Russia, as well as incidental fees incurred during prosecution of pending Russian patent applications and payment of yearly maintenance fees for issued Russian patents.  This would also include payment of yearly maintenance fees for patents obtained through the Eurasian Patent Organization (EAPO) and maintained in Russia since such fees paid to the EAPO must be forwarded to Rospatent.  Because of the intertwining of Rospatent with the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, any fees paid to Rospatent must be considered equivalent to making a transaction through said bank.

Patent prosecution in Rospatent requires engagement with a Russian patent practitioner.  While U.S. entities pursuing patent interests in Russia are unlikely to directly engage Rospatent and pay fees that are ultimately processed through the prohibited bank, it is clear from the directive that strategies, such as routing payments through countries that are neutral in relation to sanctions, are prohibited.  As noted above, the directive prohibits any transaction that actually “evades or avoids” the other prohibitions of the directive, as wells as any transaction that “has the purpose of evading or avoiding” the other prohibitions.  This language appears to have the potential to ensnare purposeful non-adherence as well as actions that unwittingly end in non-adherence (e.g., forgetting to discontinue an automated payment of a patent maintenance fee to Rospatent).

Deadline for Administrative Transactions

U.S. entities still have time to complete administrative transactions with Rospatent despite the February implementation of the directive.  On March 2, 2022, the Department of the Treasury issued a general license authorizing certain transactions that are otherwise prohibited by the directive.3  The license authorizes U.S. persons to pay taxes, fees, or import duties, and purchase or receive permits, licenses, registrations or certifications to the extent such transactions are prohibited under the directive, provided such transactions are ordinarily incident and necessary to such persons’ day-to-day operations in the Russian Federation.  For at least U.S. entities whose day-to-day operations include securing and maintaining intellectual property, including in Russia, this license provides a window to complete activities and avoid violation of the directive.  Currently, the transaction window provided under the license runs through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on June 24, 2022.

Forming a Russian Patent Strategy

The incursion of Russia into Ukraine has been underway for shortly more than one month, but there is no way to know when hostilities may cease.  Moreover, even when peace is achieved, it is impossible to know how long the current sanctions against Russia may continue.  Those familiar with patent law know that the business of obtaining patents is a deadline-driven venture, and uncertainty of time quickly breaks apart the paradigm.  A “wait and see” approach thus has the potential to result in a loss of patent rights as well as possible liability for knowingly or unknowingly engaging in activities that are prohibited under the directive.  Anyone engaged in patent activities in Russia thus would be advised to undertake a portfolio review and utilize the time remaining under the General License to form a plan that ensures compliance with the current sanctions.  This can include at least the following items.

Anyone engaged in patent activities in Russia thus would be advised to undertake a portfolio review and utilize the time remaining under the General License to form a plan that ensures compliance with the current sanctions.

  • Proceeding with Grant of Presently Allowed Applications – For Applicants that have received a Notice of Allowance with a due date after expiration of the General License, one may consider early payment of the fees.  This should only be done, however, to the extent that it is possible to confirm that payment will be processed through Rospatent and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation prior to the expiration of the General License on June 24, 2022.
  • Annuities on Granted Patents – Any patent annuity paid to Rospatent after the General License expires should be assumed to be in violation of the current sanctions.  Patent holders that engage a patent annuity service should contact their provider to confirm that they have a plan in place for compliance with the sanctions.  Some annuity services have, in fact, already announced that they will no longer make payments to the Rospatent until further notice.  Presumably, for Russian patents with annuities due in 2022, early payment could be made in the hope that normalcy will ensure prior to the deadline in 2023, but such action should only be taken to the extent one can ensure that payment is processed through Rospatent and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation before the deadline.  Even then, it may be advisable to consider whether “early” payment of patent annuities would be considered to be “ordinarily incident” to day-to-day operations of a person’s patent pursuits.  In the alternative, a patent owner should confirm that any Russian patents are under a “do not pay” order with their annuity provider to avoid an unintentional, automated payment in violation of the sanctions.
  • Filing a Direct or National Phase Patent Application – If a new patent application in Russia is planned, or if the deadline for national phase entry of a PCT application is approaching, one may consider early filing prior to the expiration of the General License.  This could be done in the hope that a deadline for payment of future fees to Rospatent do not arise before the time that sanctions are lifted.  This is seen to be a risky proposition since it is unknown how quickly Rospatent processes paid fees through the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, and it is likewise unknown to what extent a fee paid to Rospatent before expiration of the General License but only processed through the Central Bank of the Russian Federation after expiration would be viewed as being in violation of the sanctions.  Moreover, if Rospatent itself is later added to the sanctions, any early filings would be at significant risk for abandonment due to an inability to continue transactions with Rospatent.
  • Filing Through EAPO as an Alternative to Russia – Russia is one of several countries where patent protection can be secured based on a granted patent from the EAPO.  As of this writing, the banks utilized for processing financial transactions for the EAPO (AO UniCredit Bank and AO Raiffeisenbank) are not included in the U.S. sanctions.  As such, direct filing or national stage entry with the EAPO can provide an alternate pathway for patent protection in Russia.  The cessation of interaction between the USPTO and the EAPO would not have a bearing on this option, but care would need to be taken to ensure that all documents otherwise transferrable directly between the offices are handled by other routes.  Once a patent is granted by the EAPO and Russia is elected as a country for maintenance of the patent, annuities paid to the EAPO are forwarded to Rospatent.  As such, this alternative pathway is only effective for patents where annuities in Russia would not become due until after lifting of sanctions.  As the average length of time for completion of patent prosecution with the EAPO is generally two or more years, one would hope that the current situation in Russia would be resolved within that timeframe.  Again, however, uncertainty remains.
  • Using Russia as an International Search Authority – Rospatent is one of the limited number of patent offices available for use as the ISA in a PCT application, and Rospatent may be preferred because of the relatively low cost relative to other ISA options.  Search fees paid to the World Intellectual Proper Organization (WIPO) are forwarded to Rospatent when chosen as the ISA, and it is not possible to ensure that such fees paid to WIPO will be forwarded to Rospatent, and then to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation before the expiration of the General License deadline.  As such, it is recommended to not use Rospatent as the ISA in any PCT application from now until sanctions are lifted.
  • Enforcement of Granted Russian Patents – A comprehensive patent strategy in Russia must now also consider the relative value of any Russian patents in light of the recent decree on patent enforceability in Russia.4   Therein, any holder of a Russian Patent from a so-called “unfriendly” foreign state is required to give a mandatory license with no compensation to anyone in Russia wishing to exercise the right of use without consent of the patent owner.  As with the entire situation, uncertainty reigns with this decree, and it is impossible to know when (if ever) rights of Russian patent holders from “unfriendly” states will be returned.  Accordingly, a Russian patent strategy must consider not only options for proceeding in the near term to secure rights to the extent possible but must also consider the reality that any “rights” that are secured with a Russian patent are of no effect and will be for the foreseeable future.

Next Steps

For anyone with significant patent interests in Russia, time is of the essence for cementing a strategy for moving forward.  For some, the most expeditious approach could be to simply close your file on any Russian patents and patent applications.  If such approach is taken, careful attention must be made, as noted above, to ensure that any possibility of a fee being paid to Rospatent after June 24, 2022, is eliminated.  For others, investments in Russia may not allow for a complete abandonment of possible future patent enforcement rights in Russia.  If actions as noted above are taken to “batten down the hatches” of the Russian patent portfolio prior to the deadline in order to weather this storm, timing is again crucial in order to avoid unintentional engagement in sanctioned activities.  Also, moving to patent filings through the EAPO as a starting point for Russia can be an effective workaround so long as Russian sanctions get lifted before any patent annuities through an EAPO patent would become due in Russia.  Finally, in forming a strategy, one also must consider that even before its recent decree on patent enforceability, Russia was already one of nine countries on the United States Trade Representative (USTR) “Special 301 Report”  of trading partners presenting the most significant concerns regarding insufficient IP protection or enforcement or actions that otherwise limited market access for persons relying on intellectual property protection.


1  Directive 4 Under Executive Order 14024, “Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation,” February 28, 2022, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury.  See, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/eo14024_directive_4_02282022….
2  USPTO Statement on Engagement with Russia, the Eurasian Patent Organization, and Belarus, March 22, 2022.  See, https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/uspto-statement-engagement-r….
3  General License No. 13, “Authorizing Certain Administrative Transactions Prohibited by Directive 4 Under Executive Order 14024, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury, March 2, 2022.  See, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl13.pdf. 
 Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 06.03.2022 No. 299 “On Amendments to Clause 2 of the Methodology for Determining the Amount of Compensation Paid to a Patent Owner When Deciding to Use an Invention, Utility Model or Industrial Design without His Consent, and the Procedure for its Payment.” See, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070005?index=0&r…

Copyright © 2022 Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP All Rights Reserved.

How Businesses Can Use LinkedIn Company Newsletters in Their Marketing Efforts

LinkedIn has added what I think is the most helpful tool in a long time for businesses to engage with and bring value to their followers – the ability for LinkedIn Company Pages to publish email newsletters right through LinkedIn.

This underscores the importance of having a company page and how it can be used as a content hub for marketing and recruiting your business.

Linked Company Page newsletters are available to businesses with more than 150 followers that actively maintain their LinkedIn presences.

You can create a LinkedIn Company Page newsletter in three simple steps:

  1. Create: Start writing an article on and select “Create a Newsletter.” Give it a title, add a header image (it prompts you with the dimensions) and cut and paste your text. You can add hyperlinks and images for each article too.
  2. Publish: When you publish your newsletter it will post to your feed and LinkedIn will notify your followers. They can opt in to receive email and in-platform notifications when you publish new content.
  3. Review performance: View the analytics of each newsletter sent out and see the number of subscribers. The number increases pretty quickly which is awesome. And it’s opt in so you don’t have to worry about GDPR rules.

There’s a lot of opportunity here because it is a new feature (for companies – it’s been available to individuals for a short time) and most companies don’t know about it yet (and certainly aren’t using it yet), so being an early adopter is to your benefit.

Even if you send out an email newsletter, you should still utilize the LinkedIn platform to send out a newsletter because you will reach a different audience and cast a wider net for your content.

In addition, people are opting into this newsletter, so it’s not building an audience from scratch, and if you haven’t ever sent out an email newsletter, this is a great way to start. If email marketing programs and CRM management tools overwhelm you, this is a great way to test out the waters.

It’s also really easy to repurpose content you already have. I would include hyperlinks to your website or blog with the full text (in order to keep the newsletter short and to drive traffic to your site).

You can embed links from YouTube into the newsletter to play. Check out my LinkedIn newsletter to see how it looks.

Here are some content ideas for what you can include in your LinkedIn Company Page Newsletter:

  • Article snippets with links to your latest blog posts or client alerts
  • Links to past webinars (provide a synopsis too)
  • Links to recent podcasts and videos (with shownotes)
  • Recent case studies
  • Q&As with your employees
  • Highlights of your community service/pro bono work
  • Announcements of your recent hires
  • Recent press coverage (this would be the only place where I would recommend including self-promotional items in the newsletter – the rest of it should be client-focused)
  • Upcoming events/webinars – this is a great way to promote them
  • Open jobs – why not promote them through this newsletter? It’s a competitive job market
  • News about your diversity and women’s initiatives programs – clients care a lot about this

Check out this new feature and let me know what you think of it. With nearly 800 million people on LinkedIn and the fact that your competitors are very likely not using it yet, it’s at least worth trying out.

Copyright © 2022, Stefanie M. Marrone. All Rights Reserved.

The X Box: EEOC Announces Addition of Nonbinary Gender Option to Discrimination Charge

In recognition of Transgender Day of Visibility, today, the EEOC announced that it would be providing members of the LGBTQI+ community the option to select a nonbinary “X” gender marker when completing the voluntary self-identification questions that are traditionally part of the intake process for filing a charge of discrimination.

Specifically, in an effort to promote greater equity and inclusion, the EEOC will add an option to mark “X” during two stages of the intake and charge filing process. This addition will be reflected in the EEOC’s voluntary demographic questions relating to gender in the online public portal, which individuals use to submit inquires regarding the filing of a charge of discrimination, as well as related forms that are used in lieu of the online public portal. The nonbinary “X” gender marker will also be included in the EEOC’s modified charge of discrimination form, which will also include “Mx” in the list of prefix options.

Additionally, the EEOC will incorporate the CDC and NCHS’s proposed definition of “X,” which provides as follows: (1) “unspecified,” which promotes privacy for individuals who prefer not to disclose their gender identity; and (2) “another gender identity,” which promotes clarity and inclusion for those who wish to signify that they do not identify as male or female.

The EEOC’s announcement came shortly after the White House released a detailed Fact Sheet highlighting the steps the federal government has taken to address equality and visibility for Transgender Americans.

©2022 Roetzel & Andress

Debt Ceiling Shrinks for Small Business Bankruptcies

Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which took effect in February 2020, creates a more streamlined and less expensive Chapter 11 reorganization path for small business debtors.  Under the law as originally passed, to be eligible for Subchapter V, a debtor (whether an entity or an individual) had to be engaged in commercial activity and its total debts — secured and unsecured – had to be less than $2,725,625.  At least half of those debts must have come from business activity.

In March 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress passed the CARES Act, which raised the Subchapter V debt ceiling to $7.5 million for one year.  Congress extended it to March 27, 2022.  A bipartisan Senate bill would make the Subchapter V debt limit permanent at $7.5 million and index it to inflation.  But Congress has not yet passed the legislation or sent it to President Biden for signature.  So, for now, the debt ceiling has shrunk to the original $2,725,625.

Subchapter V has proven popular, with over 3,100 cases filed in the last two years (78 in North Carolina).  Many of those cases could not have proceeded under Subchapter V but for the higher debt limits.  The American Bankruptcy Institute has reported that Subchapter V cases are experiencing higher plan-confirmation rates, speedier plan confirmation, more consensual plans, and improved cost-effectiveness than if those cases had been filed as a traditional Chapter 11.  Anecdotally, most debtors in North Carolina are filing under Subchapter V if they are eligible.

We will continue to monitor legislative activity and report if Congress passes a law to reinstate the $7.5 million debt ceiling.

© 2022 Ward and Smith, P.A.. All Rights Reserved.

PFAS Air Regulations Proposed By House

In the latest federal legislative move to try to force the EPA to take quicker action than contemplated by the agency’s PFAS Roadmap of 2021, a bill was recently introduced in the House that would require the EPA to set air emission limits for all PFAS under the Clean Air Act. PFAS air regulations are something that advocates concerned about PFAS pollution issues beyond just drinking water have advocated for in the past few years. There are barriers, though, to achieving the desired results even if the legislation passes. Nevertheless, the federal legislative activity underscores the need for all companies that are currently using PFAS in their manufacturing or industrial processes to understand the full scope of compliance needs when and if PFAS air regulations become a reality.

House Bill For PFAS Air Regulations

On March 17, 2022, a bipartisan group in the House introduced the “Prevent Release Of Toxics Emissions, Contamination, and Transfer Act of 2022” (also known as the PROTECT Act of 2022 or HR 7142). The aim of the bill is to require the EPA to list all PFAS as hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) under the Clean Air Act. If passed, the designation as HAPs would require the EPA to develop regulatory limits for the emission of PFAS into the air.

The proposed steps, however, go well beyond the EPA’s own plan for potential PFAS air regulations as detailed in the EPA’s PFAS Strategic Roadmap 2021. In the PFAS Roadmap, the EPA indicates that it commits to performing ongoing investigation to:

  • Identify sources of PFAS air emissions;
  • Develop and finalize monitoring approaches for measuring stack emissions and ambient concentrations of PFAS;
  • Develop information on cost-effective mitigation technologies; and
  • Increase understanding of the fate and transport of PFAS air emissions to assess their potential for impacting human health via contaminated groundwater and other media pathways.

The EPA committed to using this information and data in order to, by the Fall of 2022, “evaluate mitigation options”, which could include listing “certain PFAS” as HAPs. However, the EPA also indicated that it might use other regulatory or non-regulatory tools to achieve results similar to formal PFAS air regulations under the Clean Air Act.

The bill, therefore, would considerably accelerate the EPA’s process for potential HAPs, which in turn could result in legal challenges to any rushed HAPs, as the EPA would not have had the opportunity to collect all necessary data and evaluate the soundness of the science behind any HAP designation.

Impact On Business

Any designation of PFAS as HAPs under the Clean Air Act will of course immediately impact companies that are utilizing PFAS and emitting PFAS into the air. While it remains to be seen whether the PROTECT Act will pass, if it were to pass and the EPA’s HAP designations were to survive any legal challenges, the impacts on businesses would be significant. Companies would need to undertake extensive testing of air emissions to determine their risk of Clean Air Act violations, which will be complicated due to limitations on current technology to do this type of testing. Companies may also need to pivot their production practices to reduce or limit PFAS air emissions, which would add unplanned costs to balance sheets. Finally, companies may wish to explore substitutes for PFAS rather than navigate Clean Air Act regulatory compliance, which is a significant undertaking that takes time and money.

It is also worth noting that a designation as a HAP for any PFAS would also trigger significant regulatory challenges to businesses that might have nothing to do with air emissions. Any substance listed as a HAP under the Clean Air Act is automatically designated as a “hazardous substance” under CERCLA (the Superfund law). Once a substance is classified as a “hazardous substance” under CERCLA, the EPA can force parties that it deems to be polluters to either cleanup the polluted site or reimburse the EPA for the full remediation of the contaminated site. Without a PFAS Superfund designation, the EPA can merely attribute blame to parties that it feels contributed to the pollution, but it has no authority to force the parties to remediate or pay costs. The designation also triggers considerable reporting requirements for companies. Currently, those reporting requirements with respect to PFAS do not exist, but they would apply to industries well beyond just PFAS manufacturers. Superfund site cleanup costs can be extensive, even as high as hundreds of millions of dollars, depending on the scope of pollution at issue and the amount of territory involved in the site.

©2022 CMBG3 Law, LLC. All rights reserved.