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FTC Imposes Record-Setting $10M Fine Against Multistate Auto Dealer, Settling Charges of Racial Discrimination and Unauthorized Charges

On March 31, the FTC and Illinois State Attorney General announced a settlement of charges against a large, multistate auto dealer that allegedly discriminated against black consumers and included illegal junk fees for unwanted “add-ons” in customers’ bills.

Citing violations under the FTC Act, TILA, ECOA, and comparable Illinois laws, the complaint alleged that eight of the dealerships and two general managers of Illinois dealerships tacked on illegal fees for unwanted products to customers’ bills, often at the end of hours-long negotiations. These add-ons were allegedly buried in the consumers’ purchase contracts, which were sometimes upwards of 60-pages long, and sometimes added despite consumers specifically declining the products.

In addition, employees of the auto dealership also allegedly discriminated against black consumers during the process of financing vehicle purchases. On average, black customers at the dealerships were charged $190 more in interest and paid $99 more for similar add-ons than comparable non-Latino white customers.

The multistate dealer will have to pay $10 million to settle the lawsuit per the stipulated order, the largest monetary judgment ever required in an FTC auto lending case.

Putting it into Practice: From FTC Chair Lina Khan and Commissioner Rebecca Slaughter, the FTC appears poised to allege violations of the FTC Act’s prohibition on unfair acts or practices in light of discrimination found to be based on disparate treatment or having a disparate impact. Their statement discusses how discriminatory practices can be evaluated under the FTC’s three-part unfairness test and concludes that such conduct fits squarely into the kind of conduct that can be addressed by the FTC’s unfairness prong. This joint statement echoes similar announcements by CFPB Director Chopra about the use of unfairness to combat discrimination more broadly (we discussed Director Chopra’s statement and updates to the CFPB’s exam procedures in a recent Consumer Finance and FinTech blog post here).

The size of the financial judgment in this case underscores the seriousness with which the FTC takes discriminatory practices in consumer credit transactions entered into by entities over which they have authority, which includes auto dealerships. As the FTC becomes increasingly focused on enforcement of key laws to protect consumers against discriminatory conduct, companies should use these latest agency pronouncements as a reason to be on high alert for potential discriminatory outcomes in their business activities, even if unintentional.

Article By Moorari Shah, A.J. S. Dhaliwal, and Katie Daw of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

For more antitrust legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Cartel Corner | March 2022

INTRODUCTION

The US Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Antitrust Division (Division) has continued to actively investigate and pursue alleged criminal violations of antitrust laws and collusive activity in government procurement. US Attorney General Merrick Garland noted in a March 2022 speech at the ABA Institute on White Collar Crime that the Division ended last fiscal year “with 146 open grand jury investigations—the most in 30years.”[1] As we near the end of the first quarter of 2022, the Division has a record number of criminal cases either in trial or awaiting trial.

In this installment of Cartel Corner, we examine and review recent and significant developments in antitrust criminal enforcement and profile what the Division has highlighted as its key priorities for enforcement. For 2022 and beyond, those priorities are—and likely will remain—identifying and aggressively pursuing alleged violations involving the labor markets, consumer products, government procurement and the generic pharmaceutical industry.

LABOR MARKETS

Criminal investigations and prosecutions in the labor markets continue to be a top priority for the Division. Such enforcement has been gaining momentum since the Division and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued their joint Antitrust Guidance for Human Resources Professionals in 2016 which warned that the DOJ—for the first time— intended to proceed criminally against “naked wage-fixing or no-poach agreements” between horizontal employers. That momentum lifted off in December 2020 and continued throughout 2021, with the Division bringing 12 criminal cases against nine individuals and three companies. Alleged wage-fixing and no-poach agreements have historically been prosecuted in the civil context, meaning fines for companies and individuals.

Several recent developments are worth highlighting. First, in November 2021, a federal court determined for the first time ever that an alleged wage-fixing conspiracy could constitute a per se criminal violation of the Sherman Act. In U.S. v. Jindal, the Division alleged that two former executives of a physical therapist staffing company fixed the wages paid to physical therapists in the Dallas-Ft. Worth area. In denying the defendant’s motions to dismiss, a federal judge in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Texas determined that courts have not limited price-fixing conspiracies to the purchase and sale of goods but have also found them to cover the purchase and sale of services. The court continued, noting that buyers of services included employers in the labor market and that the alleged wage-fixing agreement was another form of price fixing.

Second, the DOJ’s aggressive posture in these cases continued in January 2022 when it charged four home healthcare staffing company owners with allegedly fixing workers’ wages and agreeing not to hire each other’s workers in 2020.

Third, until recently, each of the criminal charges brought by the DOJ have involved healthcare companies. The ability of the DOJ to criminally prosecute alleged non-solicit agreements is being challenged, where motions to dismiss are pending. However, in December 2021, the Division expanded its reach into the aerospace industry, charging a former government contractor and five employees of its suppliers for alleged allocation agreements relating to the hiring of engineers (U.S. v. Patel et al.). The DOJ’s indictment alleges that one of the defendants agreed with suppliers to allocate employees by restricting hiring and recruiting between the companies for almost a decade.

The increased focus and enforcement action relating to labor markets underscores the Biden administration’s stated priorities. For example, in July 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order “Promoting Competition in the American Economy” which provided wide-ranging guidance and instructions to the federal government to promote and increase competition. One specific, identified initiative involved strengthening of guidance to prevent employers from collaborating to suppress wages, reduce benefits or engage in other anticompetitive practices. With the recent flurry of criminal labor market charges; repeated statements by the Division to the effect that protecting competition in the labor markets continues to be a top priority; the Division’s hosting of a joint workshop with the FTC in December 2021, titled “Making Competition Work: Promoting Competition in the Labor Markets”; and widespread support from the Biden administration, one can expect the Division’s focus on criminal enforcement in the labor markets to be an increasing refrain.

TAKEWAYS

The DOJ’s novel and aggressive stance on expanding Sherman Act criminal violations to include the ways in which companies engage with their workers may not ultimately be sustained by trial or appellate courts. For now, however, the DOJ remains determined to investigate and prosecute alleged “wage-fixing and no-poach” issues.

With the DOJ’s resolute approach changing the landscape of antitrust labor market cases, companies would be prudent to ensure that their compliance programs are up to date and include specific and appropriate guidance on these issues. When considering typical antitrust cartel investigations, the focus has traditionally been on alleged conspiracies relating to pricing, sales, and/or bidding of certain products or in certain geographic areas. The DOJ’s changing attitude toward labor market antitrust issues is a notable shift and may be directed at entirely different segments of a corporate business, including human resources and hiring, in any industry. To address the DOJ’s assertive approach, employers involved in hiring and compensation-related decisions would be well served to receive training addressing these potential antitrust issues.

CONSUMER PRODUCTS

Consumer products have recently been a hotbed of DOJ investigations for antitrust violations. The DOJ has several long-running investigations into a wide range of industries, including broiler chickens, commercial flooring and, most recently, DVDs and Blu-Rays in e-commerce. The latest developments in these investigations reflect the DOJ’s continued, and increasingly heightened, focus on prosecuting companies and high-ranking executives engaged in alleged anticompetitive conduct that directly affects American consumers.

BROILER CHICKENS

The DOJ’s first trial in its ongoing investigation into the $95 billion broiler chicken industry resulted in a hung jury. The lengthy trial began in October 2021, in Denver, against 10 current and former executives from major broiler chicken producers (and came on the heels of a guilty plea obtained by the DOJ earlier in 2021 in a price-fixing case against Pilgrim’s Pride Corp (Pilgrim’s Pride), which resulted in a $107 million criminal fine). The DOJ alleged that the defendants engaged in an overarching price-fixing and bid-rigging scheme for approximately a decade. But after seven weeks of trial, including four days of deliberation, the jurors remained deadlocked, resulting in the judge declaring a mistrial. The result highlights the challenge facing the DOJ in meeting its burden of proof on an alleged conspiracy based largely on documents and without cooperating witnesses.

After the mistrial, the defendants asked the court for a judgment of acquittal. The judge denied that request, and a retrial in the case began in late February 2022. Additionally, the DOJ has other cases in the pipeline in the same long-running investigation, including against broiler-chicken producers Claxton Poultry Farms and Koch Foods, Inc., as well as criminal charges against four additional former Pilgrim’s Pride executives. Trials for those additional corporate and individual defendants are set for October 31, 2022, and July 18, 2022, respectively.

In a related civil action, a federal judge in Illinois gave final approval for a $181 million settlement between six poultry producers and end-user consumers who claimed the companies conspired to fix broiler chicken prices. The deal was reached between the consumer plaintiffs and Peco Foods, Fieldale Farms, George’s, Tyson Foods, Pilgrim’s Pride and Mar-Jac Poultry. Consumers are still pursuing claims against 12 additional poultry companies.

Going forward, the DOJ indicated it will prioritize and pursue more matters that impact competition in agriculture. In fact, the DOJ and the Department of Agriculture (USDA) recently issued a joint statement on their shared commitment to effectively enforcing federal competition laws that protect farmers, ranchers, and other agricultural producers and growers from unfair and anticompetitive practices. As part of their effort to step up enforcement in the agriculture sector, the agencies launched farmerfairness.gov, a new online tool that allows farmers and ranchers to anonymously report potentially unfair and anticompetitive practices in the livestock and poultry sectors. If, after a preliminary review, a complaint raises sufficient concern under antitrust laws, it will be selected for further investigation, and may lead to the opening of a formal investigation.

One area to watch is the cattle civil antitrust litigation. While the DOJ is still in the investigation stage, direct purchaser plaintiffs filed a civil lawsuit against the Big Four meatpacking companies, accusing them of conspiring to drive up the price of beef to make bigger profits by suppressing slaughter volumes and constraining the supply of meat. On February 1, 2022, the proposed class of direct buyers reached a $52.5 million deal with one of the Big Four defendants JBS USA (JBS), which provided both monetary relief to the class, and JBS’s “extensive cooperation” in the buyers’ ongoing litigation against the three remaining nonsettling defendants. The settlement is currently before the US District Court for the District of Minnesota awaiting preliminary approval. It will be interesting to see what next steps the DOJ will take considering the civil litigation, particularly the evidence that will be provided by JBS’s cooperation.

COMMERCIAL FLOORING

Another long-running bid-rigging investigation in the commercial flooring industry resulted in additional indictments last year, as well. To date, the DOJ has indicted three companies and six individuals, including Mr. David’s Flooring International LLC (Mr. David’s), a Chicago-based commercial flooring contractor that pleaded guilty in August 2021. Like the first two companies that the DOJ charged, Mr. David’s was charged for conspiring with other companies—for at least eight years, from 2009 to 2017—to rig bids for commercial flooring by agreeing which company would win the bid and which would submit a complementary, intentionally losing bid. The DOJ also charged Mr. David’s with money laundering for allegedly concealing kickback payments the company made, in exchange for unauthorized discounts, to an account executive for a large flooring manufacturer.

As part of its guilty plea, Mr. David’s agreed to pay at least a $1.2 million criminal fine for its role in the conspiracies. This follows guilty pleas that the DOJ obtained from PCI FlorTech, Inc., in 2019 and Vortex Commercial Flooring in 2020, which resulted in a $150,000 criminal fine and $1.4 million in fines and restitution, respectively.

DVDS AND BLU-RAYS

With the expansion of e-commerce, the DOJ has also been active in prosecuting price-fixing conspiracies for consumer goods in online marketplaces. In 2021, the DOJ charged four individuals, one in June and three in November, with conspiring to fix prices of DVDs and Blu-Ray discs sold through an online marketplace. According to the charges, between November 2017 and October 2019 the defendants agreed to raise and maintain the prices of DVDs and Blu-Ray discs sold in the marketplace’s storefronts, the business addresses of which were located in five different states. The affected sales to customers throughout the United States by the four defendants ranged between $360,000 to $1,100,000. Each of the defendants have pleaded guilty. While the affected sales pale in comparison to large-scale matters like broiler chickens, the DOJ has shown equal willingness to aggressively pursue alleged collusive conduct in smaller and emerging sectors, particularly in online marketplaces.

TAKEAWAYS

Given the long-running nature of the investigations involving broiler chickens and commercial flooring, the change in the US presidential administration seems to have only increased the DOJ’s scrutiny into industries affecting consumer goods. Looking ahead, consumer products will likely remain one of the DOJ’s top priorities. Indeed, while the Biden administration recognizes the strain the pandemic has put on supply chain issues, resulting in higher prices in consumer goods, the White House has also placed the blame on “another culprit”: “dominant corporations in uncompetitive markets taking advantage of their market power to raise prices.”

The DOJ recently announced an initiative to deter, detect and prosecute those who would exploit supply chain disruptions to engage in collusive conduct. As part of that initiative, the DOJ is prioritizing any existing investigations where competitors may be exploiting supply chain disruptions for illicit profit and is undertaking measures to proactively investigate collusion in industries particularly affected by supply disruptions. The DOJ is also working with authorities in other countries to detect and combat global supply chain collusion.

Those who work in the consumer goods space can expect additional scrutiny and enforcement from the DOJ in the months and years to come, especially in industries that have experienced higher consumer price increases. It is therefore important to have robust compliance programs, including appropriate employee training, in place to address and provide guidance on these issues.

PROCUREMENT

The DOJ’s Procurement Collusion Strike Force (PCSF)—an interagency partnership established in November 2019 to combat antitrust crimes and related fraud involving government procurement and funding—remained a top priority for the Division in 2021. Since its inception in 2019, the PCSF has significantly expanded in scope. The strike force now has offices in 22 federal districts staffed with DOJ trial attorneys, assistant US attorneys and agents from seven national law enforcement partner agencies. The PCSF has trained more than 17,000 special agents, attorneys, prosecutors, investigators, analysts, auditors, data scientists and procurement officials. In addition, in the spring of 2021 the PCSF announced the creation of PCSF Global. The goal of PCSF Global is to build connections with enforcement counterparts around the world and to investigate and prosecute collusion in procurement relating to US government funds spent overseas. The PCSF currently has almost three dozen investigations open domestically and internationally.

Below are a few key highlights from 2021:

PCSF’S RECENT WORK

On October 13, 2021, PCSF Director Daniel Glad delivered a speech recapping the strike force’s recent work and highlighting enforcement priorities, including “set-aside fraud” and collusion targeting infrastructure spending. Set-aside fraud refers to collusion and fraud affecting government programs that are designed to provide opportunities for disadvantaged communities and individuals to participate more fully in public procurement. Glad highlighted the PCSF’s recent investigation into set-aside fraud involving construction contracts in San Antonio. The director also commented that infrastructure will continue to be a focus for the PCSF as federal spending for infrastructure increases. Glad added that while the Sherman Act is the PCSF’s “lodestar,” the strike force’s focus includes prosecuting other crimes that also corrupt the competitive process for obtaining government contracts and funding.

BELGIAN SECURITY SERVICES

On June 25, 2021, a Belgian security services company, G4S Secure Solutions NV (G4S), pled guilty for its role in a conspiracy to rig bids, allocate customers and fix prices for contracts with the US Department of Defense and with the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCI Agency) to provide security services for military bases and installations in Belgium. The NCI Agency is funded in part by the United States. This was the first international resolution obtained by the PCSF, as well as the PCSF’s first charged matter.

The DOJ alleged that G4S participated in a conspiracy with two competitors to coordinate price increases, submit artificially determined, non-competitive bids and refrain from bidding for certain contracts from spring 2019 through summer 2020. The DOJ further alleged that the conspirators colluded during in-person meetings and via phone, text messages, encrypted messaging applications and email. G4S agreed to pay a $15 million criminal fine. In October 2021, two former employees of G4S also pled guilty to charges relating to the same conspiracy. Both individuals are Belgian nationals residing in Belgium.

The investigation demonstrates that the PCSF is focused on conspiracies that victimize the US government, whether the conspiracies or government activities are based in the United States or abroad. The PCSF remains committed to actively investigating and prosecuting companies and individuals based outside of the United States, such as the defendants here, who distort the competitive process for US government contracts.

NORTH CAROLINA ENGINEERING

In June 2021, a North Carolina engineering firm pled guilty to conspiring to rig bids and defraud the North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT). Contech Engineered Solutions LLC and Brent Brewbaker, one of its former executives, had been indicted in October 2020. They were charged with six counts of bid rigging, conspiracy to commit fraud, mail fraud and wire fraud. The conspiracies, reaching back to at least 2009, involved water drainage systems projects. Contech agreed to pay a criminal fine of $7 million and approximately $1.5 million in restitution to the NCDOT. On February 1, 2022, Brewbaker was convicted by a jury of all six charged counts.

Contech argued that the conspiracy was not a per se violation because Contech and Pomona Pipe Products, its co-conspirator, competed vertically: Contech as the supplier, Pomona Pipe as the reseller. The district court disagreed, holding that Contech and Pomona held themselves out to NCDOT as competitors and, as such, this was bid-rigging subject to the per se analysis.

This matter is precisely the type of case the PCSF was designed to investigate. The PCSF trains law enforcement officers, procurement officials and others across the country “to better deter and detect antitrust crimes affecting government procurement, grant, and program funding.” With more government funding earmarked for infrastructure and an increased budget for the Antitrust Division, the PCSF is likely to increase its footprint at all levels of government.

MINNESOTA CONCRETE

In September 2021, Minnesota concrete contractor Clarence Olson pled guilty to a bid-rigging charge. Olson and his co-conspirators conspired to rig bids on concrete repair and construction contracts submitted to at least four municipalities in Minnesota, including local governments and school districts in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area. The conspiracy began as early as September 2012 and continued through at least June 2017. Minnesota law required that municipalities obtain two or more quotations from independent bidders before awarding contracts above a certain threshold. According to the plea agreement, at a competitor’s request Olson submitted bid quotes with prices higher than that of the competitor to ensure that Olson would lose the bid.

RISKS BEYOND PRISON AND FINES

Charges of bid rigging and procurement fraud can have collateral consequences beyond criminal liability. Companies and individuals are subject to state and federal suspension and debarment procedures. A suspension temporarily prevents a company from government contracting and typically lasts until the investigation or subsequent legal proceedings have terminated. If a company pleads guilty or is convicted, it may be debarred—a permanent ban from doing business with a government for a specified time period. The duration of the debarment typically correlates to the severity of the offense. Under federal law, a contractor may be debarred without a conviction if the evidence shows a knowing failure to disclose credible evidence of a criminal violation of federal antitrust law (48 CFR § 9.406-2(b)(vi)(A)).

Moreover, charges filed against affiliated individuals may impute the company when that individual was acting as an agent of the company. Although suspensions and debarments may last for shorter periods of time, the reputational damage may last far longer. If made public, the debarment could also impact a company’s or individual’s ability to do business in the private sector. Suspension and debarment are collateral consequences that the DOJ may consider in the process of investigating and prosecuting a criminal antitrust violation.

THE FUTURE OF THE PCSF

The first year of the PCSF was dedicated to outreach, education and partnership implementation. The PCSF has now established partnerships with many law enforcement agencies across the country. Beyond domestic interagency investigations, the PCSF has launched initiatives that will expand its reach and target acute problems in government procurement. Investigations initiated by the PCSF have taken time to be investigated (particularly with a global pandemic making certain investigative steps more challenging), but in some instances these investigations have reached the recommendation and/or charging stage. We expect to see additional PCSF cases in the coming year.

PCSF Global: The PCSF has launched PCSF Global, an initiative aimed at fostering partnerships with international enforcement authorities. The US government spends considerable funds abroad, particularly for military contracts. International partners lend their expertise with foreign markets and give the PCSF eyes and ears on the ground abroad.

Set-Aside Fraud: One of the PCSF enforcement priorities is combating fraud in government set-aside programs. Such programs set aside government contracting opportunities for special interest groups such as disabled veterans, small businesses and minority-owned businesses. In January 2021, President Biden signed “Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government,” an executive order aimed at increasing equal access to government contracting and procurement opportunities. While the PCSF mandate to combat fraud on set-aside programs existed before the executive order, it is strengthened by the Biden administration’s directive.

Data Analytics Project: The PCSF has hosted webinars attended by data scientists, analysts and auditors focused on using data analytics to detect procurement fraud. Data Analytics Project attorneys have engaged analytics shops to build tools for detecting collusion using bid data. Currently, the Data Analytics Project is focused on US procurement. In light of the PCSF Global initiative, it is possible that international partners will engage with the PCSF to develop cross-border tools.

Criminal Antitrust Anti-Retaliation Act (CAARA): CAARA, the first antitrust-specific whistleblower protection legislation, became law in December 2020. It prohibits employers from retaliating against employees, contractors, subcontractors and agents of employers for reporting antitrust violations or participating in antitrust government proceedings. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and other government agencies saw increased reporting since implementing similar whistleblower protections. CAARA is a tool that can be used to encourage early reporting and cooperation because of the legal protection it offers to whistleblowers, furthering the PCSF’s goals to deter and detect fraud.

GENERICS

For more than seven years, the generic pharmaceutical industry has been caught up in investigations and litigation asking whether the industry has engaged in a conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws.[2] In 2014 the Connecticut attorney general opened a civil investigation into whether manufacturers of generic pharmaceuticals had fixed prices and allocated markets. Shortly thereafter, the DOJ joined the mix, first opening a criminal investigation into these issues and then, a few years later, opening a civil False Claims Act (FCA) investigation into the same conduct. And by 2016, the plaintiffs’ bar had joined the fray, filing the first complaints of what soon became a massive and unwieldy multidistrict litigation (MDL), ultimately consolidated in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Below, we provide a brief update on this massive MDL and the DOJ investigation that started it.

MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION: IN RE: GENERICS PHARMACEUTICALS PRICING ANTITRUST LITIGATION, NO. 16-MD-2724 (E. D. PA. 2016)

In re: Generics, the broad and long-running MDL, remains at the center of the pharmaceutical cases this past year. In addition to the governments of 49 states, the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, Northern Mariana Island and the US Virgin Islands, the MDL also includes three putative plaintiff classes (direct purchaser, end-payer and indirect reseller plaintiffs), and more than a dozen individual entities (including major retailers, healthcare insurers and even some local governments) that filed opt-out complaints (e.g., The Kroger Co. et al, Humana Inc., and United Healthcare Services, Inc.). At present, the MDL involves at least 85 complaints alleging misconduct regarding more than 285 drugs, 38 manufacturers and 25 individual defendants.

The first civil complaints were filed in 2016, initially encompassing claims concerning just two drugs, digoxin and doxycycline. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation later consolidated claims involving other drugs into the MDL. As the litigation has evolved, private plaintiffs and state attorneys general have since filed complaints involving numerous drugs, focusing on an alleged overarching conspiracy to fix prices, rig bids and allocate customers across the generic pharmaceutical industry. The state attorneys general, which have led the expansion of the MDL, have filed three such overarching conspiracy complaints: (1) a June 2018 complaint focused on Heritage Pharmaceuticals; (2) a May 2019 complaint focused on Teva Pharmaceuticals; and (3) a May 2020 complaint focused on dermatology products. Many plaintiffs are seeking joint and several liability for the alleged overarching conspiracy—the scope of which is unprecedent and untested in antitrust litigation.

In May 2021, US District Judge Cynthia M. Rufe selected the state attorneys general overarching conspiracy complaint centered on over 80 dermatology products to serve as a bellwether case in the MDL. Two drug-specific complaints filed by the direct purchaser and end payer plaintiffs will also proceed as bellwethers. The court originally selected the state attorneys general May 2019 Teva-centric overarching conspiracy complaint as the bellwether. A coalition of 44 state attorneys general led by Connecticut filed the Teva-centric case in May 2019. However, following the DOJ’s August 2020 grand jury indictment of Teva on criminal price-fixing charges (see below), Teva petitioned to have the selection of its case as bellwether overturned. The pharmaceutical companies then sought to have the states’ first filed case, which centered around Heritage Pharmaceuticals, chosen as a replacement bellwether because the case involved a smaller scope and was more manageable to litigate. The states advocated for the May 2020 dermatology action as the bellwether. Despite involving over 80 drugs, the states contended this complaint was more indicative of the alleged conspiracy and their investigation had evolved in the years since the Heritage complaint was filed. Judge Rufe found that “the dermatology action [wa]s more typical of the overarching conspiracy cases than the Heritage-centric action and w[ould] provide overall a more comprehensive view of the positions of more parties in the MDL.”[3]

The bellwether selection was just the first step in what will continue to be a long series of cases. At present, class certification briefing in the drug-specific bellwether cases is scheduled to be completed by mid-October 2023. The district court will schedule hearings on class certification for dates to be determined in November 2023.[4] All motions for summary judgment regarding the states’ bellwether case must be filed by October 16, 2023, and motions for summary judgment regarding the drug-specific bellwether cases must be filed no later than November 16, 2023.[5] Pretrial conferences are not yet scheduled.

CRIMINAL LITIGATION: UNITED STATES V. TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC. AND GLENMARK PHARMACEUTICALS, USA (E.D. PA. 2020)

While the MDL has proceeded, the DOJ has continued with its separate criminal investigation. In June 2020, the DOJ indicted Glenmark Pharmaceuticals, USA, alleging that it engaged in a conspiracy to fix prices for pravastatin and other undisclosed drugs from around May 2013 through December 2015. In August 2020, the DOJ filed a superseding indictment naming Teva as an alleged co-conspirator.[6] Glenmark sought to sever the cases to proceed with separate trials, but US District Judge R. Barclay Surrick recently denied that motion and ruled that a joint trial could proceed.[7] In June 2021, the Antitrust Division filed a scheduling order motion seeking a trial date of January 18, 2022; however, counsel for Glenmark and Teva found this date “unrealistic in light of the enormous volume of complex discovery in this case (more than 22 million documents and counting), as well as the backlog of trials in this District due to the pandemic.”[8] To date, no schedule has been set.

GENERIC DRUG COMPANY PENALTIES AND SETTLEMENTS

DOJ Investigations

Nonetheless, the DOJ has already obtained several settlements in both the criminal and civil FCA investigations, including securing several deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) from the targets of its investigations.[9] In fact, the DOJ’s Antitrust Division and Civil Division have already collected more than $1 billion in penalties as a result of their investigations into the generic drug industry, as detailed below.

Most recently, in October 2021, Taro Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Sandoz Inc., and Apotex Corporation agreed to pay $213.2 million, $185 million and $49 million, respectively, to settle alleged False Claims Act violations stemming from conspiracies to fix prices of multiple generic drugs.[10] The Civil Division alleges that the three companies illegally paid and received compensation between 2013 and 2015 resulting from alleged agreements on price, supply and allocation of customers with other generic pharmaceutical manufacturers for 20 generic drugs, including etodolac, nystatin-triamcinolone cream and ointment, benazepril HCTZ and pravastatin. In addition, the companies entered into five-year corporate integrity agreements with the Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General, which provides oversight for federal healthcare programs like Medicare and Medicaid. These agreements require internal monitoring and price transparency.

Multidistrict Litigation

In connection with the In re: Generics MDL, the first civil settlements with certain plaintiffs were announced in 2021. In June 2021, Teva announced it settled, for $925,000, all claims brought by the state of Mississippi. In November 2021, two US subsidiaries of Sun Pharma—Taro Pharmaceuticals U.S.A., Inc., and Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Inc.—agreed to pay a total of $85 million to a proposed class of direct purchaser plaintiffs (DPPs) in the MDL. The settlement can be reduced, however, by $10 million if the direct purchasers that opt out of the putative class collectively account for 20% or more of Taro’s and Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Inc.’s aggregate dollar sales of the generic drugs at issue in the direct purchaser action.

Entity/Individual	Date	Charges/Resolution	Settlement Amount
Jeffrey Glazer and Jason Malek (former Heritage Pharmaceuticals executives)	Dec. 2016	Pleaded guilty to conspiring to fix prices, rig bids, and allocate customers for doxycycline hyclate and glyburide. Both awaiting sentencing.	TBD
Heritage Pharmaceuticals	May 2019	Entered into a DPA with the Antitrust Division to resolve the DOJ’s charges relating to glyburide, a drug used to treat diabetes, agreeing to pay a criminal penalty and cooperate fully with the ongoing criminal investigation. In a separate civil resolution with the Civil Division, Heritage agreed to pay to resolve allegations under the FCA related to the alleged price-fixing conspiracy.	$225K criminal penalty and $7.1M civil settlement
Rising Pharmaceuticals	Dec. 2019	Entered into a DPA with the Antitrust Division to resolve the DOJ’s charges regarding an alleged conspiracy to fix prices for a hypertension medication.	$3.5M criminal fine and civil penalty combined
H. Armando Kellum (former Sandoz executive)	Feb. 2020	Pleaded guilty to fixing prices, rigging bids and allocating customers for several drugs, including clobetasol and nystatin triamcinolone cream. Kellum is awaiting sentencing.	TBD
Sandoz Inc.	Mar. 2020 and Oct. 2021	Agreed to pay a criminal penalty for allegedly conspiring to fix prices on several generic drugs, including, but not limited to, drugs used to treat brain cancer, cystic fibrosis, arthritis and hypertension. Agreed to pay a civil penalty for aiding and receiving compensation prohibited by the Anti-Kickback Statute through arrangements on price, supply, and allocation of customers for drugs such as benazepril HCTZ and clobetasol.	$195M criminal penalty and $185M civil settlement
Apotex Corporation	May 2020 and Oct. 2021	Agreed to pay a criminal penalty to resolve allegations that it conspired to fix prices for pravastatin.	$24.1M criminal penalty and $49M civil settlement
Taro Pharmaceutical USA, Inc.	July 2020 and Oct. 2021	Entered into a DPA with the Antitrust Division to resolve the DOJ’s charges regarding an alleged conspiracy related to several drugs with affected sales of over $500 million.	$205.6M criminal fine and $213.2M civil penalty

TAKEAWAYS

Although the district court has allowed several cases to proceed past the motion to dismiss stage, it remains unclear if the plaintiffs’ expansive allegations will survive summary judgment and later proceedings. In the months to come, there will continue to be interplay between the criminal trial proceeding against Teva and Glenmark and the civil cases proceeding in the MDL. For example, the MDL court is currently considering whether the DOJ should be allowed to extend a continued stay of depositions in the civil cases of specific individuals it views as “key” to its criminal investigation.

This investigation and litigation has brought significant attention to the generic drug and pharmaceutical industry at large, including increased scrutiny and calls for action by Congress (such as the US House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Reform’s three-year Drug Pricing Investigation, which culminated in a majority staff report released in December 2021). Several pieces of legislation aimed at reigning in pharmaceutical prices have also been introduced. In all, these investigations and litigation, coupled with the increases in oversight and willingness to investigate by state and federal governments, suggest that the pharmaceutical industry will remain subject to heightened scrutiny of its business practices for many years to come.

CONCLUSION

As we move into the second quarter of 2022, one thing is abundantly clear: The DOJ’s aggressive criminal antitrust enforcement will only continue to increase. The Division ended the last fiscal year with 146 open grand jury investigations—the most in 30 years.[11] President Biden has made competition a priority for his administration.[12] Attorney General Garland has specifically identified “reinvigorating antitrust enforcement” as at the center of the DOJ’s mission.[13] In its FY 2022 budget request, the DOJ requested a 9% increase in spending, amounting to an additional $200 million.[14]

At the same time, there seems to be a shift in tone and approach at the Division. The Division has started to push the boundaries of criminal antitrust enforcement. As noted above, it has pursued naked no-poach agreements criminally, something that it had never done prior to 2020. In recent remarks to the ABA Institute on White Collar Crime, Richard Powers, the US Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Enforcement in the Division, noted that the Division is also prepared to criminally charge individual executives for violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the provision that prohibits market monopolization—another exceedingly aggressive and controversial approach and something that the Division has not done in decades. To cap it off, the Division has shown a tendency, of late, to take cases to trial, rather than negotiate resolutions. And, it has hired a number of prominent Criminal Division alumni, several with significant trial experience, to help with this effort. All of this suggests that the Division is prepared to stretch the law in places and go the distance to pursue what it views as criminal violations of the antitrust laws.

ENDNOTES

[1] Attorney General Merrick B. Garland Remarks to the ABA Institute on White Collar Crime, Thursday, March 3, 2022, https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-merrick-b-garland-delivers-remarks-aba-institute-white-collar-crime

[2] Christopher Rowland, Investigation of generic ‘cartel’ expands to 300 drugs, THE WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 9, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/investigation-of-generic-cartel-expands-to-300-drugs/2018/12/09/fb900e80-f708-11e8-863c-9e2f864d47e7_story.html

[3] Pretrial Order No. 171 (Revised Bellwether Selection; Stay of Certain Discovery), MDL 2724 Dkt. 1769 (E.D. Pa. May 7, 2021), at p. 3.

[4] In re: Generics, Pretrial Order No. 188 (Schedule of Further Proceedings in Bellwether Cases), available at https://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/MDL/MDL2724/16md2724%20PTO188.pdf

[5] Id.

[6] U.S. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. and Glenmark Pharmaceuticals, USA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case/us-v-teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc

[7] US v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. and Glenmark Pharmaceuticals, USA, No. 20-200 Dkt. 146 (E. D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2022).

[8] Letter from D. Axelrod and K. Stojilkovic to Judge Surrick re: United States v. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Inc., USA et al., 20-cr-200 (RBS), No. 2:20-cr-00200-RBS Dkt. 94 (June 10, 2021).

[9] Normally, in a cartel investigation, guilty pleas would be used; however, because a guilty plea would bar these companies from participating in certain government healthcare programs, which would effectively terminate business for some of the companies involved and deprive millions of Americans of important, often life-saving medication, the DOJ used DPAs in these settlements.

[10] Pharmaceutical Companies Pay Over $400 Million to Resolve Alleged False Claims Act Liability for Price-Fixing of Generic Drugs, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
(Oct. 1, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/pharmaceutical-companies-pay-over-400-million-resolve-alleged-false-claims-act-liability

[11] Id.

[12] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/07/09/remarks-by-president-biden-at-signing-of-an-executive-orderpromoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/

[13] https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Statement%20of%20Attorney%20General%20Merrick%20Garland%20-%20June%209,%2020213.pdf

[14] Id.

Article By Justin P. Murphy, Paul M. Thompson, Han Cui, Joshua W. Eastby, Anthony S. Ferrara and Alexandra Lewis and Marisa E. Poncia of McDermott Will & Emery

Defense Department Takes Aim at Anticompetitive Mergers in Defense Industry

Government says market concentration poses a national security risk.

In 1990, the Department of Defense could turn to 13 companies to produce tactical missiles, eight to make fixed-wing aircraft, and another eight to build ships. Now there are only three missile and three aircraft makers, and only two surface ship builders. There were eight satellite manufacturers in 1990; today there are only four. Tanks and other tracked vehicles are now made by a single company.

Such market consolidation is potentially harmful for the usual reasons, such as less innovation, higher prices, and a lower level of customer service. But when that customer is the DOD, having only one or a handful of defense equipment makers, suddenly critical military missions, military and civilian lives, and national security are put at risk, “[P]articularly in cases where the existing dominant supplier or suppliers are influenced by an adversary nation ….”

That is the worrisome assessment contained in a report issued by the DOD which is following up on President Biden’s July 2021 executive order, titled “Promoting Competition in the American Economy.” DOD is just one of the agencies now responding with plans to evaluate their respective competitive landscapes and to make recommendations to restore productive rivalries.

If market consolidation suggests harmful anticompetitive conditions, then the defense industry’s merger history should send up multiple flares. “Since the 1990s, the defense sector has consolidated substantially, transitioning from 51 to 5 aerospace and defense prime contractors,” the report says.

DOD offers five general recommendations to increase defense industry competition, saying it should:

Strengthen Merger Oversight. When a merger threatens DOD interests, DOD will support the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice in antitrust investigations and recommendations involving the defense industry.
Address Intellectual Property Limitations. Certain practices surrounding intellectual property and data rights have been used to limit competition in DOD purchasing and to induce “vendor-lock” and other undesirable results. DOD says it will identify its long-term intellectual property needs early in the bidding process. This should ensure that intellectual property is a key factor in evaluating competitive awards, and a negotiation objective in sole-source awards and when contracting with vendors willing to provide the government the intellectual property and rights it needs.
Increase New Entrants. To counteract the shrinking list of contractors, DOD says it will work to attract new entrants to the defense marketplace by reducing barriers to entry. This will be accomplished through small business outreach and support. DOD says it will use “acquisition authorities” that will give it the flexibility to adopt and incorporate commercial best practices to reduce barriers and attract new vendors.
Increase Opportunities for Small Businesses. DOD will increase small business participation in defense procurement, with an emphasis on increasing competition in priority segments of the defense industry.
Implement Sector-Specific Supply Chain Resiliency Plans. DOD calls for greater resilience in the supply chain for five priority sectors: casting and forgings, missiles and munitions, energy storage and batteries, strategic and critical materials, and microelectronics.

In June 2021, Bradley Martin, Ph.D., a retired Navy captain now with the RAND National Security Supply Chain Institute, wrote of the dangers of the defense industry’s shift to practices that make resupply of military equipment “highly questionable” should demand for equipment suddenly spike.

Abrams Main Battle Tank manufactured by General Dynamics, the sole producer of tanks and other tracked combat vehicles for the Department of Defense. Photo from General Dynamics’ website.

“If evaluated solely against meeting steady-state demand, the military operational supply chain works as it should,” Martin wrote. “The problem is not performance relative to incentives. Rather, the problem is that the existing guidance does not lead the system to conduct analyses and make decisions needed to support the highly demanding combat operations likely in a conflict with a major power. As a result, the ability of this system to properly support the joint force in the event of major conflict is at best untested and could be highly problematic.”

Recent Public and Private Actions

In addition to the government’s focus on the overall industry, it has been taking action to address specific instances of alleged and potentially anticompetitive behavior. In one instance, a private class action quickly followed.

In January, the FTC sued to stop Lockheed Martin Corp.’s $4.4 billion acquisition of Aerojet Rocketdyne Holdings Inc., marking the first time in decades the government opposed a defense industry merger. (Read FTC Sues to Torpedo Lockheed’s $4.4 Billion Aerojet Acquisition.)

The FTC noted that Aerojet, which reported more than $2 billion in 2020 revenue, is the last independent U.S. supplier of defense-critical missile propulsion systems. If the deal were to go through, the FTC said, “Lockheed will use its control of Aerojet to harm rival defense contractors and further consolidate multiple markets critical to national security and defense.”

Lockheed leads the pack of the largest defense contractors in the world. It is one of the leading suppliers of missile technology in a concentrated group that includes Raytheon Technologies, Inc., Northrop Grumman Corporation, and The Boeing Company. All are missile system prime contractors to the Department of Defense. The FTC says these companies are intermediaries between the U.S. government and the missile supply chain, including subcontractors like Aerojet.

In December 2021, a federal grand jury in Connecticut returned an indictment charging a former manager of leading aerospace engineering company Pratt & Whitney, Inc., and five executives of outsource engineering suppliers for participating in a long-running conspiracy to restrict the hiring and recruiting of employees among their respective companies. (Read Aerospace Execs Indicted for Conspiracy to Limit Worker Pay and Job Prospects.)

The conspiracy is said to have affected thousands of engineers and other skilled workers in the aerospace industry who perform services in the design, manufacturing, and servicing of aircraft components for both commercial and military purposes. According to the felony indictment, unsealed in U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, six individuals conspired with others to allocate employees by agreeing not to hire or solicit professionals from each other’s ranks.

Following the indictment, a jet engine mechanic formerly employed by Pratt & Whitney filed a class action suit in federal court in Connecticut against the company and five outsource engineer suppliers. The plaintiffs seek damages because of the alleged conspiracy to suppress labor costs and hamper employees’ career prospects using illegal no-poach agreements in violation of antitrust laws.

Ukraine Invasion Demonstrates ‘Rapid Escalation’

Combined with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the alarming specter of a widening conflict, security supply chain expert Bradley Martin’s assessment that the industry may not be set up to address a spike in demand for military equipment illustrates why the DOD’s plan to improve competition in the defense industry is an urgent one.

“The Ukraine crisis shows that situations can rapidly escalate, potentially leading to situations where spikes in demand might occur in largely unexpected ways,” Martin told the MoginRubin Blog. “If the U.S. had to deal with an expanded conflict in Europe, such as might occur if Russia were to threaten a NATO ally, DOD could reallocate munitions and supplies for some period, but expanding production and inventory over a longer period would be very challenging. This would likely be exactly the kind of conflict where low-standing issues with supply chains would show themselves, sometimes in unexpected ways.”

Defense is just one of several industries seeing increased scrutiny from enforcers. Healthcare also has been a focus of late (see our article regarding FTC’s action to stop a New England hospital merger). The technology sector is getting attention, too. As we wrote in February, chipmaker Nvidia called off its vertical acquisition of Arm Ltd. following an FTC challenge to the deal. A recent Treasury Department report on the alcoholic beverage industry foreshadows greater attention from the FTC and DOJ regarding deals in that sector.

In October the FTC said it was bringing back its policy of routinely restricting anticompetitive mergers, putting “industry on notice” that it will require aggressive acquirers to obtain prior approval “before closing any future transaction affecting each relevant market for which a violation was alleged, for a minimum of 10 years.” The agency is clearly making good on its promise.

Edited by Tom Hagy for MoginRubin LLP.

Article By Jennifer M. Oliver with MoginRubin.

For more articles about antitrust, visit the NLR Antitrust Law section.

Government Continues Aggressive Antitrust Enforcement in the Healthcare Space

On February 24, 2022, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) filed suit to block UnitedHealth’s proposed acquisition of Change Healthcare. UnitedHealth owns the largest health insurer in the U.S., while Change Healthcare is a data company whose software is the largest processor of health insurance claims in the U.S. The DOJ alleges that the acquisition, if allowed to proceed, would give UnitedHealth unfettered access to rival health insurers’ competitively sensitive information, including health insurance pricing. According to the complaint, this would lessen competition and “result in higher cost, lower quality, and less innovative commercial health insurance for employers, employees, and their families.”

The DOJ’s challenge continues a recent trend of aggressive enforcement involving vertical mergers (i.e. transactions between firms at different levels of the supply chain), with the Federal Trade Commission challenging three vertical mergers in the last year alone. These enforcement efforts represent a material shift from the prior enforcement attitude, which often allowed parties to resolve competition concerns raised by vertical mergers through conduct remedies such as information firewalls or supply commitments. The DOJ’s decision to forego such a remedy (assuming one was proposed) signals the government’s intent to take a tougher stance on mergers in the healthcare space. President Joe Biden previously listed prescription drugs and healthcare services as an antitrust priority area in his July 9, 2021 executive order.

The complaint was filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia and can be accessed here: https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1476676/download.

Christopher Gordon also contributed to this article.

Article By Kaitlin E. Rittgers with Squire Patton Boggs LLP.

For more articles about healthcare, visit the NLR Health Care Law section.

9th Cir. Upholds Antitrust Jury Verdict Against Chinese Telescope Company [PODCAST]

Court affirms evidentiary rulings on market definition and overcharges. Agrees evidence supported verdict for collusion and attempted monopolization.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals this month upheld judgment in favor of Optronic Technologies, Inc., finding there was sufficient evidence that Chinese telescope manufacturer, Ningbo Sunny Electronic (“Sunny”), conspired with a competitor in the U.S. consumer telescope market to allocate customers, fix prices, and monopolize the telescope market in violation of federal antitrust laws (Optronic Technologies, Inc., v. Ningbo Sunny Electronic Co., Ltd., No. 20-15837, 9th Cir. 2021). Ninth Circuit Judge Ronald M. Gould wrote the opinion.

California-based Optronic, known commercially as Orion Telescopes & Binoculars, sued Sunny in November 2014. Orion alleged Sunny violated Sherman Act Sections 1 and 2 by conspiring to allocate customers in the telescope market and conspiring to fix prices or credit terms for Optronics in collusion with Suzhou Synta Optical Technology. Orion further alleged Sunny’s 2014 acquisition of independent manufacturer, Meade, violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Orion alleged that Sunny engaged in these anticompetitive acts to force Orion out and further monopolize the telescope market.

A California jury found in favor of Orion on all counts and awarded the company $16.8 million in damages, which the district court trebled to $50.4 million. The district court also ordered injunctive relief, directing Sunny to supply Orion and Synta’s Meade on non-discriminatory terms for five years, and not to communicate with Synta about competitively sensitive information.

Rulings on key elements of plaintiff’s economic evidence affirmed.

Sunny appealed on several grounds, including two that challenged key elements of the plaintiff’s expert economic evidence. The jury had found Sunny liable for attempted monopolization and conspiracy to monopolize in violation of Section 2, which makes it unlawful for any person to monopolize or attempt or conspire to monopolize any relevant market. Sunny argued on appeal that the evidence could not support a Section 2 verdict because Orion’s economist failed to define a relevant market. In particular, Sunny claimed the expert did not examine the cross-elasticity between substitute products in the market or perform a SSNIP test, the standard analysis used to delineate the outer boundaries of a relevant market.

The appeals court found these contentions lacked merit. The plaintiff’s economist had testified that the relevant product market was the market for telescope manufacturing services. The purpose of the SSNIP test is to determine whether the relevant market is drawn too narrowly and should be expanded to include potential substitutes. But because no other manufacturing capacity can substitute for telescope manufacturing services, wholesale purchasers of telescopes cannot turn to other manufacturers to fulfill orders. Without substitutable manufacturers, a SSNIP test boils down to whether new manufacturers would enter the market fast enough to make an increase in price unprofitable for a hypothetical monopolist, which they could not. As a result, the court held that the economist reasonably could forgo performing a SSNIP analysis.

Sunny also challenged the economist’s estimate of anticompetitive overcharges that could not directly be observed. Neither the “benchmark” nor “before-and-after” estimation methods were available. Therefore, to develop a measure of damages, the plaintiff’s expert presented two different methods of estimating the overcharges. In the first method, the expert collected data on cartel overcharges from the economic literature on markets with structures and conditions similar to telescope manufacturing. The average of those overcharges was then used as an estimate of the overcharge resulting from defendants’ collusion. As a check on this estimate, the economist also submitted a theoretical Cournot equilibrium model of market prices based on assumptions drawn from the record in the case. The two methods yielded similar and consistent results. Affirming the admissibility of the expert’s damages estimates, the appellate court found the expert’s report and testimony “were sufficiently tied to the facts of this case such that the district court properly admitted this evidence.”

In rebuttal, the defendant’s economist testified to the high sensitivity of the assumptions used in the plaintiff’s theoretical model. Interestingly, defendants were not permitted to submit their own estimate of damages for the first time on rebuttal, so the defendants’ expert had to limit her testimony to the sensitivity of the model without the ability to show the jury any resulting alternative estimate of the anticompetitive overcharge. The appeals court affirmed the trial court’s limitation on the defendants’ rebuttal expert.

Price fixing and a larger scheme.

Sunny also argued that Orion failed to present sufficient evidence to support Orion’s Section 1 claims. Section 1 prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade. Horizontal price fixing and market allocation are per se unreasonable and support Section 1 liability without regard to any purported justification or defense. The Ninth Circuit noted that Orion offered evidence that Synta executives encouraged Sunny’s purchase of Meade, an acquisition that was part of a larger scheme by Sunny and Synta to jointly control the telescope manufacturing market, even though federal regulators had already prohibited such a combination. The court also declined to upset the jury’s finding that Sunny conspired with a Synta subsidiary to fix prices and credit terms to Orion, a per se violation of Section 1.

“If you break it, you buy it.”

Finally, it is notable that the appellate court affirmed the award of damages accruing after September 2016, when the defendant and Synta took their last steps to eliminate Meade, and Synta entered a Settlement and Supply Agreement with Orion. The court held that, even if the conspiratorial acts of Sunny and Synta ended in 2016, Orion could still recover post-2016 damages “because it continued to suffer economic harm from the harm to competition caused by the illegal concerted activity.” Thus, where collusion causes a durable change in market structure or sets the pattern of a continuing collusive practice, it is no defense that the conspirators may have ceased engaging in concerted action.

The rule adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Optronics is clear: “[W]here an antitrust plaintiff suffers continuing antitrust injuries from anticompetitive changes to market structure that arose from a proven antitrust violation, we hold that the violation may be a material cause of that injury, and so recovery of damages is permitted, even after the last proven date of the violative conduct. This rule accords with the common-sense principle that ‘if you break it, you buy it.’”

Welcomed clarity.

The Ninth Circuit’s opinion brings welcomed clarity on several points. It demonstrated that plaintiffs need not perform a SSNIP test where market-specific circumstances define a market’s outer boundary. For claimants facing the need to estimate unobservable anticompetitive overcharges, it affirms an ingenious method for arriving at a reasonable and reliable estimate. And, for past conspiracies with continuing anticompetitive effects, the decision announces the common-sense principle that a defendant “remains liable for the continuing injuries suffered by plaintiffs from the structural harm to competition that its unlawful scheme brought about.” Put simply, this is a well-articulated decision by a capable panel that adds precision and certainty to antitrust.

Edited by Tom Hagy for MoginRubin LLP

Article By Timothy LaComb and Jonathan Rubin with MoginRubin.

For more articles on 9th Circuit decisions, visit the NLR Litigation section.

Same As It Ever Was: FDA Reiterates That CBD Cannot Be Included in Food or Dietary Supplements

While we enter a new season this week, the same cannot be said for the FDA which, on November 16, reiterated that its approach to regulating the cannabidiol (CBD) industry will be “the same as it ever was”—a regulatory minefield. Grail Sipes, acting Deputy Center Director for Regulatory Policy at the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, emphasized the agency’s position that it needs additional CBD research and safety data before the agency will consider CBD for uses beyond prescription drugs, including usage as a food additive or dietary supplement. This, she said, is because “clear answers to many important questions are still lacking, such as what adverse reactions may be associated with CBD from hemp-derived products and what risks are associated with the long term use of these products.”

So why should industry stakeholders care about the FDA’s opinion anyway? Wasn’t hemp-derived CBD legalized at the federal level by the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, also known as the Farm Bill?

Yes, but as we discussed in a previous blog post, the FDA and FTC have overlapping enforcement authority over CBD marketing, with the FDA having primary authority over labeling. The FDA has previously issued guidance stating that CBD can be used as an ingredient in cosmetics so long as it does not cause the product to be “adulterated or misbranded.” However, a product containing CBD cannot be marketed as a drug absent FDA approval—a lengthy and costly process. Companies marketing CBD products must therefore ensure compliance with the FDA’s labeling requirements and guidance regarding CBD products.

The FDA has not been shy to issue warning letters to CBD companies that fail to heed the agency’s labeling requirements and guidance. Starting in April 2019, the FDA (together with the FTC) began issuing warning letters to companies marketing CBD products as treatments and cures for a variety of diseases and illnesses. Those agencies continued to issue warning letters for marketing and labeling violations throughout 2019, largely for improper health-based claims about CBD products (those letters are described in more detail here and here). The most recent iteration came in 2021 when the agencies issued two warning letters to companies selling over-the-counter (OTC) drugs for pain relief that contained CBD. Sipes made clear the FDA will continue to monitor the CBD marketplace and issue warning letters to companies making improper health claims in her November 16 comments.

Given these comments, we can expect the cat-and-mouse game between federal regulators and CBD companies that push the marketing envelope to continue. To mitigate the risk of falling within the FDA’s crosshairs, CBD companies must ensure compliance with the various state and federal regulations governing the labeling and advertising of their products. We provided several marketing dos and don’ts in a previous blog post. But given the FDA’s unchanging position, the biggest takeaway remains the same: don’t make claims that a CBD product “can prevent, treat, or cure” or a disease.

Article By Rachel L. Sodée and J. Hunter Robinson of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP

For more news on biotech, food, and drug law, click here to visit the National Law Review.

New U.K. Competition Unit to Focus on Facebook and Google, and Protecting News Publishers

You know your company has tremendous market power when an agency is created just to watch you.

That’s practically what has happened in the U.K. where the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has increased oversight of ad-driven digital platforms, namely Facebook and Google, by establishing a dedicated Digital Markets Unit (DMU). While it was created to enforce new laws to govern any platform that dominates their respective market, when the new unit starts operating in April 2021 Facebook and Google will get its full attention.

The CMA says the intention of the unit is to “give consumers more choice and control over their data, help small businesses thrive, and ensure news outlets are not forced out by their bigger rivals.” While acknowledging the “huge benefits” these platforms offer businesses and society, helping people stay in touch and share creative content, and helping companies advertise their services, the CMA noted the growing concern that the concentration of market power among so few companies is hurting growth in the tech sector, reducing innovation and “potentially” having negative effects on their individual and business customers.

The CMA said a new code and the DMU will help ensure that the platforms are not forcing unfair terms on businesses, specifically mentioning “news publishers” and the goal of “helping enhance the sustainability of high-quality online journalism and news publishing.”

The unit will have the power to suspend, block and reverse the companies’ decisions, order them to comply with the law, and fine them.

The devil will be in the details of what the new code will require, and questions remain about what specific conduct the DMU will target and what actions it will take. Will it require the companies to pay license fees to publishers for presenting previews of their content? Will the unit reduce the user data the companies may access, something that would threaten their ad revenue? Will Facebook and Google have to share data with competitors? We will learn more when the code is drafted and when the DMU begins work in April.

Once again a European nation has taken the lead on the global stage to control the downsides of technologies and platforms that have transformed how people communicate and get their news, and how companies reach them to promote their products. With the U.S. deadlocked on so many policy matters, change in the U.S. appears most likely to come as the result of litigation, such as the Department of Justice’s suit against Google, the FTC’s anticipated suit against Facebook, and private antitrust actions brought by companies and individuals.

Edited by Tom Hagy for MoginRubin LLP.

ARTICLE BY Mogin Rubin

For more articles on Google, visit the National Law Review Communications, Media & Internet section,

Apple, Inc. Probed by European Commission for Possible Antitrust Violations

In late June, the European Commission (EC) opened several formal cases investigating Apple’s mobile payment technology (Apple Pay) and various third-party and user agreements to determine whether the tech giant’s practices and policies infringe on competition rights and abuse market power. Specifically, the Commission will investigate the company’s terms and conditions integrating the payment feature into merchant applications and websites, and the imposition of its proprietary in-app purchase system and accompanying restrictions. The latter prevents third-party developers from informing their users of cheaper alternative purchases available outside the app. The investigations follow complaints made by Spotify, a music streaming service competitor, and an e-book/audiobook distributor competitor, according to the EC’s press release.

In a statement, EC Executive Vice President Margrethe Vestager said that the Commission needs to allay fears that Apple’s “gatekeeper role” in the distribution of apps and content to users does not distort market competition. The impetus, she said, was to ensure that “Apple’s measures do not deny consumers the benefits of new payment technologies, including better choice, quality, innovation and competitive prices.”

Apple is one of the latest tech targets to experience regulatory scrutiny. Facebook, Amazon, and Google are facing antitrust inquiries by EU member states, the European Commission, and the United States’ Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission.

ARTICLE BY the Competition Policy and Advocacy practice at MoginRubin.

For more on mobile payment portals, see the National Law Review Financial Institutions & Banking law section.

FTC Announces 2020 Thresholds for Merger Control Filings Under HSR Act and Interlocking Directorates Under the Clayton Act

The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has announced its annual revisions to the dollar jurisdictional thresholds in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, as amended (“HSR Act”); the revised thresholds will become effective 30 days after the date of their publication in the Federal Register. These changes increase the dollar thresholds necessary to trigger the HSR Act’s premerger notification reporting requirements. The FTC also increased the thresholds for interlocking directorates under Section 8 of the Clayton Act, effective as of January 21, 2020.

Revised HSR Thresholds

Under the HSR Act, parties involved in proposed mergers, acquisitions of voting securities, unincorporated interests or assets, or other business combinations (e.g., joint ventures, exclusive license deals) that meet certain thresholds must report the contemplated transactions to the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) unless an exemption applies. The parties to a proposed transaction that requires notification under the HSR Act must observe a statutorily prescribed waiting period (generally 30 days) before closing. Under the revised thresholds, transactions valued at $94 million or less are not reportable under the HSR Act.

A transaction closing on or after the date the revised thresholds become effective may be reportable if it meets the following revised criteria:

Size of Transaction Test

The acquiring person will hold, as a result of the transaction, an aggregate total amount of voting securities, unincorporated interests, or assets of the acquired person valued in excess of $376 million;

Size of Person Test

One party (including the party’s ultimate parent entity and its controlled subsidiaries) has at least $188 million in total assets or annual sales, and the other has at least $18.8 million in total assets or annual sales. If the acquired party is not “engaged in manufacturing,” and is not controlled by an entity that is, the test applied to the acquired side is annual sales of $188 million or total assets of $18.8 million.

The full list of the revised thresholds is as follows:

Original Threshold	2019 Threshold	2020 Revised Threshold (Effective 30 days after publication *in the Federal Register)*
$10 million	$18 million	$18.8 million
$50 million	$90 million	$94 million
$100 million	$180 million	$188 million
$110 million	$198 million	$206.8 million
$200 million	$359.9 million	$376 million
$500 million	$899.8 million	$940.1 million
$1 billion	$1,799.5 million	$1,880.2 million

The filing fees for reportable transactions have not changed, but the transaction value ranges to which they apply have been adjusted as follows:

Filing Fee	Revised Size of Transaction Thresholds
$45,000	For transactions valued in excess of $94 million but less than $188 million
$125,000	For transactions valued at $188 million or greater but less than $940.1 million
$280,000	For transactions valued at $940.1 million or more

Note that the HSR dollar thresholds are only part of the analysis to determine whether a particular transaction must be reported to the FTC and DOJ. Failure to notify the FTC and DOJ under the HSR Act remains subject to a statutory penalty of up to $43,280 per day of noncompliance.

Revised Thresholds for Interlocking Directorates

Section 8 of the Clayton Act prohibits one person from simultaneously serving as an officer or director of two corporations if: (1) the “interlocked” corporations each have combined capital, surplus, and undivided profits of more than $38,204,000 (up from $36,564,000); (2) each corporation is engaged in whole or in part in commerce; and (3) the corporations are “by virtue of their business and location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competition by agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of the antitrust laws.”¹

Section 8 provides several exemptions from the prohibition on interlocks for arrangements where the competitive overlaps “are too small to have competitive significance in the vast majority of situations.”² After the revised thresholds take effect, a corporate interlock does not violate the statute if: (1) the competitive sales of either corporation are less than $3,820,400 (up from $3,656,400); (2) the competitive sales of either corporation are less than 2 percent of that corporation’s total sales; or (3) the competitive sales of each corporation are less than 4 percent of that corporation’s total sales.

The revised dollar thresholds for interlocking directorates of $38,204,000 and $3,820,400 will be effective upon publication in the Federal Register; there is no 30-day delay as there is for the HSR thresholds.

1 15 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1)(B).

2 S. Rep. No. 101-286, at 5-6 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4100, 4103-04.

ARTICLE BY Joel Mitnick and Ngoc Pham Hulbig of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP.

For more on Hart-Scott-Rodino thresholds, see the National Law Review Antitrust Law and Trade Regulation section.

Spurned by HP Board of Directors, Xerox Gets Hostile, and is Spurned Again

Case raises a unique antitrust question.

Copy equipment giant HP Inc. turned down the much smaller Xerox Holdings Corp.’s acquisition overtures twice in one week as the exchange of statements between corporate leadership grows increasingly hostile. From an anticompetition perspective, the case raises the interesting question of how the “failing firm” defense could come into play.

A deal would bring together the world’s second largest copier company, HP, a company whose leadership position was once so strong that its very brand name, derived from the word “xerographic” in 1938, became a verb used more often than the word “copy” itself. Xerox is also credited with innovations that brought us tools like the mouse and ethernet networks.

But Xerox, which has long since fallen from the top of the copier industry, was met with a flat-out rejection of its offer to get its mojo back by acquiring HP. Xerox offered HP $17.00 in cash and 0.137 Xerox shares for each HP share or $22 per share, or $27 billion overall. Skeptics wondered whether Xerox could execute such a deal, given it is “only” a $9.2 billion business, a third the size of HP. The skeptics were right. On Nov. 17 the HP Board of Directors informed Xerox that its offer was not in the best interests of shareholders as it “significantly undervalues” the HP business.

In its letter to Xerox Vice Chairman and CEO John Visentin, HP wrote that its board was concerned about the “potential impact of outsized debt levels on the combined company’s stock.” While saying it remained “ready to engage” with Xerox to better understand its business and its thinking around a merger, the HP board rejected the bid unanimously.

“We recognize the potential benefits of consolidation, and we are open to exploring whether there is value to be created for HP shareholders through a potential combination with Xerox. However,” the HP letter to Visentin continued, “… we have fundamental questions that need to be addressed in our diligence of Xerox. We note the decline of Xerox’s revenue from $10.2 billion to $9.2 billion (on a trailing 12-month basis) since June 2018, which raises significant questions for us regarding the trajectory of your business and future prospects. In addition, we believe it is critical to engage in a rigorous analysis of the achievable synergies from a potential combination. With substantive engagement from Xerox management and access to diligence information on Xerox, we believe that we can quickly evaluate the merits of a potential transaction.”

Xerox had said it could generate $2.3 billion by selling its 25% share in the joint venture, Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd., to FUJIFILM Holdings Corp. In a Nov. 8, 2019, statement, Xerox also said it was selling to a Fuji Xerox affiliate Xerox’s 51% stake in Xerox International Partners, a joint original-equipment-manufacturer venture between Xerox and Fuji Xerox. The companies also agreed to end the $1 billion lawsuit FUJIFILM filed against Xerox after last year’s terminated merger. “Total after-tax proceeds to Xerox from the transactions, which included accrued but unpaid dividends through closing, are approximately $2.3 billion. Xerox expects to use the proceeds opportunistically to pursue accretive M&A in core and adjacent industries, return capital to shareholders and pay down its $554 million December 2019 debt maturity,” according to Xerox.

Xerox did not take HP’s rejection well.

“We were very surprised that HP’s Board of Directors summarily rejected our compelling proposal ….” Xerox CEO Visentin responded, “claiming our offer ‘significantly undervalues’ HP. Frankly, we are confused by this reasoning in that your own financial advisor, Goldman Sachs & Co., set a $14 price target with a ‘sell’ rating for HP’s stock after you announced your restructuring plan on October 3, 2019. Our offer represents a 57% premium to Goldman’s price target and a 29% premium to HP’s 30-day volume weighted average trading price of $17.” Visentin added that the offer was not, as HP said, “highly conditional” or “uncertain.” “There will be NO financing condition to the completion of our acquisition of HP,” the Xerox CEO said.

Xerox gave HP until today (Monday, Nov. 25) to accept the offer, otherwise it would take the case directly to HP’s shareholders. “The overwhelming support our offer will receive from HP shareholders should resolve any further doubts you have regarding the wisdom of swiftly moving forward to complete the transaction,” Visentin said.

But HP didn’t need the whole weekend. Yesterday, on Sunday, Nov. 24, it rejected Xerox again via a letter signed by HP Chairman and CEO Enrique Lores and HP Board Chair Chip Bergh. They repeated that Xerox is undervaluing the company, adding that Xerox did not address HP’s concerns about Xerox’s ability to raise the cash or handle such a substantial debt burden. Lores and Bergh didn’t seem to appreciate Visentin’s attitude, either.

“It is clear in your aggressive words and actions that Xerox is intent on forcing a potential combination on opportunistic terms and without providing adequate information,” the HP leaders wrote. “When we were in private discussions with you in August and September, we repeatedly raised our questions; you failed to address them and instead walked away, choosing to pursue a hostile approach rather than continue down a more productive path. But these fundamental issues have not gone away, and your now-public urgency to accelerate toward a deal, still without addressing these questions, only heightens our concern about your business and prospects. Accordingly, we must have due diligence to determine whether a Xerox combination has any merit.”

And yet, things had seemed to be going so well. In June, Xerox and HP announced they were expanding their relationship. Xerox was to begin sourcing certain products from HP, many of which used Xerox software, and supplying toner for HP for these and other products. These printers use laser printing technology HP acquired from Samsung in 2017. Xerox and HP also agreed to partner in the Device as a Service (DaaS) market. Xerox said it would sell HP PCs and peripherals to its commercial customers under a DaaS model, and HP would make Xerox cloud-based content management available to its commercial PC customers in the United States.

As the HP leaders said, the relationship started to sour at least as early as August.

HP questions Xerox’s resources and innovation.

HP offered additional specifics as to why it didn’t find the deal attractive:

Xerox has missed consensus revenue estimates in four of the last five quarters.
Xerox’s revenue has fallen from $10.2 billion to $9.2 billion (on a trailing 12-month basis) since June 2018, and this is expected to continue. Xerox management projects revenue declines of 6% in fiscal 2019.
Given how much of the Xerox business is based on contractual revenue, HP is concerned about the decline in customer Total Contract Value (TCV) in excess of revenue declines, which suggests Xerox’s revenues may decline even faster in future years. HP noted that the TCV of enterprise signings (including renewals) in 2018 was down 13.9% in constant currency and Xerox’s churn for 2018 was 18%, both data points which Xerox has stopped providing publicly since the end of 2018.
After a review of synergies based on public information and the “limited information” Xerox provided, HP said it does not agree with the value of potential synergies. “[I]t appears that your assumptions include significant savings that are already included in each company’s independently announced cost reduction plans,” HP wrote.
When Xerox exited the Fujifilm joint venture, Xerox essentially “mortgaged its future for a short-term cash infusion.” HP feels this has “left a sizeable strategic hole” in the Xerox portfolio.
HP also took a shot that has to sting the once-heralded leader of innovation. “[W]e have concerns as to the state of Xerox’s technology resources, research and development pipeline, future product programs, and supply continuity and capability.
HP said Xerox has not accessed the great potential of the Asia Pacific market.

The ‘failing firm’ defense

What’s intriguing from an antitrust perspective is how the parties might use the “failing firm” defense in a hostile takeover scenario. The failing firm defense argues that a merger that substantially lessens competition is less harmful to competition than one party’s failure and exit from the market. The defense requires a showing that the acquired company cannot meet its financial obligations, would not be able to successfully reorganize in bankruptcy, has been unsuccessful efforts to elicit other reasonable offers, and is succumbing to the only available purchaser.

We would expect to see that defense raised here given the high post-merger market share and years-long decline of both parties. But how will Xerox make the required showing without the cooperation of HP management? And, in this case the acquirer is arguably the greater “failure” risk of the two firms, making this use of a “failing firm” case a rarity, if not a first.

Copier industry landscape.

Xerox’s global annual revenue was at $20.64 billion in 2011, $19.54 billion in 2014, and $9.83 billion in 2018. It’s now a $9.2 billion company, with revenues generated from a combination of services and equipment. In 2016, Xerox services accounted for roughly a third of the company’s global revenue. From 2012 to 2014 services generated more revenue than technology. That flipped in 2015 when service revenue dropped to a third of prior years.

HP’s net revenue from its printing business was at a high of $29.6 billion in 2008. It fell to $18.26 in 2016 and bounced up to $20.8 billion in 2018.

Worldwide, Canon is the market leader, with 24% of the market. HP is close behind with more than 21% of the market. Xerox has been in the low single digits for the past two years. After Canon and HP, market leaders are Brother (11%), Epson (10%), Kyocera (7%), NEC (5.6%), Ricoh (2.5%). Some 18.5% of the market is attributed to “other” companies.

Statistics provided by Statista based on data from IT Candor. Additional statistics from HP and Xerox.

ARTICLE BY Dan Mogin and Jennifer M. Oliver of MoginRubin, edited by Tom Hagy.

More on acquisitions on the National Law Review Mergers & Acquisitions law page.

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INTRODUCTION

LABOR MARKETS

TAKEWAYS

CONSUMER PRODUCTS

BROILER CHICKENS

COMMERCIAL FLOORING

DVDS AND BLU-RAYS

TAKEAWAYS

PROCUREMENT

PCSF’S RECENT WORK

BELGIAN SECURITY SERVICES

NORTH CAROLINA ENGINEERING

MINNESOTA CONCRETE

RISKS BEYOND PRISON AND FINES

THE FUTURE OF THE PCSF

GENERICS

MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION: IN RE: GENERICS PHARMACEUTICALS PRICING ANTITRUST LITIGATION, NO. 16-MD-2724 (E. D. PA. 2016)

CRIMINAL LITIGATION: UNITED STATES V. TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC. AND GLENMARK PHARMACEUTICALS, USA (E.D. PA. 2020)

GENERIC DRUG COMPANY PENALTIES AND SETTLEMENTS

TAKEAWAYS

CONCLUSION

ENDNOTES

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Government says market concentration poses a national security risk.

Recent Public and Private Actions

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Revised HSR Thresholds

A transaction closing on or after the date the revised thresholds become effective may be reportable if it meets the following revised criteria:

The full list of the revised thresholds is as follows:

The filing fees for reportable transactions have not changed, but the transaction value ranges to which they apply have been adjusted as follows:

Revised Thresholds for Interlocking Directorates

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Xerox did not take HP’s rejection well.

HP questions Xerox’s resources and innovation.

The ‘failing firm’ defense

Copier industry landscape.

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