Termination For Conduct Caused By Side Effects of Prescription Medication Was Not Disability Discrimination

Chipotle Mexican Grill, Disability Discrimination

A federal court in Florida has upheld an employee’s termination due to her “inebriated” conduct that was caused by her use of prescription medications, holding that her discharge did not constitute disability discriminationCaporicci v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., Case No. 8-14-cv-2131-T-36EAJ (M.D. Fla. May 27, 2016).

Lisa Caporicci worked for Chipotle as a crew member and had a long history of depression and bi-polar disorder. In April 2013 she informed her manager that she took medication for bi-polar disorder but did not mention any side effects or behavioral issues that might arise from taking the medication.

In May 2013, Caporicci began taking new medication because she was experiencing panic attacks. At that time, she requested a few days off and her request was granted.  She did not work for five days and returned on June 4, 2013.  Four days later, she reported for work in what appeared to be an inebriated state.  She was “very slow, messed up orders and was incoherent.”  Caporicci’s supervisor took her off the serving line and sent her home.  She was fired later that day, for violating Chipotle’s Drug and Alcohol Policy, which prohibits employees from reporting for work or being at work under the influence of alcohol, drugs or controlled substances, or with any detectable amount of alcohol, drugs or controlled substances in his or her system.  The policy further provides that if an employee takes prescription medication that may adversely affect the ability to perform the job, he/she must notify his/her manager prior to starting work.

Caporicci asserted disability discrimination claims under federal and state law, as well as FMLA interference and retaliation claims. Her FMLA claims were dismissed because she had been employed less than 12 months.  As to her disability discrimination claims, Caporicci argued that firing her for medication side effects was tantamount to firing her for her disability.

The Court noted that courts are split on the question of whether a termination based on conduct related to, or caused by, a disability constitutes unlawful discrimination. The majority position, which includes courts in the Eleventh Circuit, holds that an employer may discipline or terminate an employee for workplace misconduct even when the misconduct is a result of the disability.  Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court discounted the minority position in Raytheon Company v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 55 n.6 (2003), stating:  “To the extent that [the Ninth Circuit] suggested that, because respondent’s workplace misconduct is related to his disability, petitioner’s refusal to rehire respondent on account of that workplace misconduct violated the ADA, we point out that we have rejected a similar argument in the context of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.”

For these reasons, the Court followed the majority position and held that Caporicci’s termination was not discrimination based on her disability, but rather, it was the result of her employer’s application of a neutral policy which prohibited employees from reporting to work under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2016

November Election and Estate Planning

estate planning november electionsThe Presidential election is around the corner. What does that mean for estate planning? Probably nothing, particularly if the Executive Branch and Congress remain split among the parties. In the past four years, a Democratic President and Republican Congress has resulted in no significant estate tax legislation. Thus, after 10 years or so of uncertainty and change that preceded 2012, there has been an estate planning calm.

It is unlikely the calm changes in 2017 if there is President Clinton and a Republican Congress. Hillary favors the same provisions as President Obama, which are reducing the estate tax exemption from $5 million per person, indexed for inflation, to $3.5 million, and increasing the estate tax rate from 40% to 45%. But as with President Obama, it is unlikely these proposals will go anywhere, unless Democrats take control of the House and Senate.

Conversely, President Trump wants to eliminate the estate tax, similar to former President Bush. Perhaps a big push to eliminate the estate tax would result if large Republican majorities controlled the House and Senate. But even with a Republican President and Congress it is more likely current law, allowing married couples to protect $10.9 million from estate tax, adjusted annually for inflation, would continue.

Of less concern to most, but significant for the relatively wealthy few, is the Obama Administration’s desire to eliminate or reduce advanced planning techniques, such as GRATS, gift/sales to intentionally defective trusts, dynasty trust planning, and intra-family discounting. A new President and Congress may also address these strategies.

Article By John P. Dedon of Odin, Feldman & Pittleman, P.C.

Ride Hailing: Will We Continue to Uber and Lyft, or Will We Start to “VW?”

Volkswagen’s $300 million investment in ride hailing service Gett is not exactly earth shattering news these days for the automotive industry. But what did catch our eye was what Volkswagen said,

Ride-hailing will be at the center of our new ‘mobility on-demand’ business, which we are building as the second pillar alongside the classic automobile business.

“Second pillar.” Let that sink in a second. The first pillar, we assume, is the design, manufacture and sale of vehicles of every kind. But that second pillar is a service industry. For now that service includes people driving cars. What happens when we no longer need the drivers because the cars are autonomous?

ride hailing Gett VWOf course, Gett drivers will have the opportunity to buy Volkswagens at “attractive terms” – all the better to put more Volkswagens on the road. And, of course, this is not the first relationship of its kind. GM and Lyft already have a partnership going on. Uber is leasing Toyotas to drivers.

With autonomous vehicles coming, with every OEM partnering with a ride hailing/sharing company, and in a world where Uber attracts $3.5 billion (with a “B”) investment from the Saudi Public Investment Fund, it might be worth asking whether some day we will not go to the “Toyota” dealer to buy a car, but, instead, to the Uber dealer – presuming we buy a car at all. In just a few years, Uber has obtained a valuation that may exceed GM and many others. Based on all that information, maybe Volkswagen should refer to its new service industry venture as the “First pillar.”

© 2016 Foley & Lardner LLP

Fourth Circuit Allows Casino Workers to Proceed With Putative Class and Collective Action For Unpaid Training Time at “Dealer School”

The Fourth Circuit recently decided in Harbourt v. PPE Casino Resorts Maryland, LLC that casino workers may proceed with a putative class action alleging that their unpaid attendance at a Maryland casino’s “dealer school” violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and Maryland wage laws.

Background

Plaintiffs alleged that the Casino advertised for dealer positions after Maryland authorized the operation of table games.  The Casino invited approximately 830 applicants, including the named plaintiffs, Claudia Harbourt, Michael Lukoski and Ursula Pocknett, to attend a free twelve-week “dealer school” to be “held in conjunction with Anne Arundel County Community College” and aimed at teaching them “how to conduct table games” at the Casino.

The dealer school was scheduled for twenty hours per week over twelve weeks. Plaintiffs alleged that the advertised community college had no involvement in the school and the Casino authored the materials and provided the instruction.  Attendees completed new hire paperwork, submitted to a drug test and provided the Casino with information to conduct background checks required for the attendees to obtain gambling licenses.

Plaintiffs Harbourt and Pocknett attended the dealer school for eight and eleven weeks, respectively, and were not paid for their attendance.  Plaintiff Lukoski attended the dealer school for the full twelve weeks and began working as a dealer at the Casino.  He received minimum wage of $7.25 per hour for the last two days of his attendance at the dealer school.

Plaintiffs filed a putative class and collective action lawsuit asserting violations of the FLSA and Maryland wage laws claiming their time spent at the dealer school was compensable.  The district court granted the Casino’s motion to dismiss, finding that Plaintiffs “failed to show that the primary beneficiary of their attendance at the training was the Casino rather than themselves” and therefore the time spent at the dealer school was not compensable.

Decision on Appeal

The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that those who attended the training school were employees performing “work” for the Casino within the meaning of the FLSA and Maryland wage and hour laws.  The Court relied on the Plaintiffs’ allegations that the Casino received an immediate benefit in a trained workforce of over 800 dealers, “the training was unique to the Casino’s specifications and not transferrable to work in other casinos” and attendees were paid minimum wage for the last two days of the dealer school, which suggested that the Casino considered the attendees working for at least those two days.  The Fourth Circuit also found sufficient allegations to conclude that the Casino “conceived or carried out” the dealer school in an effort to avoid paying minimum wage by advertising that the school was associated with a community college, when in fact the college had no involvement.

Takeaway

While the Fourth Circuit did not express an opinion about the likelihood of Plaintiffs’ success on the merits and noted that “[t]he fact that table games were not in operation during the training well may prove an insurmountable obstacle[,]” Harbourt is an important reminder for employers that  training may constitute compensable time under the FLSA and state wage and hour laws, particularly where the primary purpose of the training is to benefit the employer.

Jackson Lewis P.C. © 2016

Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act: New Pregnancy Provision Taking Effect in August

Colorado Anti-discriminationOn August 10, 2016, a new pregnancy provision of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (“CADA”) will take effect. While the CADA had previously been interpreted as prohibiting pregnancy discrimination and requiring accommodations for pregnancy, the new provision strengthens and clarifies those protections. Indeed, the amendment will require more of employers and will make it easier for plaintiffs to prevail than federal anti-discrimination law. This greater pregnancy protection, combined with the fact that the CADA was amended in 2013 to allow successful plaintiffs to collect compensatory and punitive damages (remedies previously unavailable under the CADA), make it more likely that employers will face lawsuits under the CADA. Accordingly, employers need to be especially careful to comply with the new amendment.

Accommodation

The bill requires an employer to provide reasonable accommodations to an applicant or employee for health conditions related to pregnancy or the physical recovery from childbirth under the following conditions: (1) an accommodation is necessary to perform the essential functions of the job, (2) the employee has requested an accommodation, and (3) the accommodation would not impose an undue hardship on the employer. As in the disability context, once an employee requests an accommodation, the employee and employer are required to engage in an interactive process. Importantly, an employer may also require a note from a licensed healthcare provider before providing an accommodation.

While accommodations are to be tailored to the employee, the bill does give examples of reasonable accommodations, including, more frequent or longer break periods, more frequent restroom and refreshment breaks, limitations on lifting, light duty, and modified work schedule. An employer is not required to create a new position or hire additional employees to provide a requested pregnancy accommodation. However, if an employer provides or is required to provide a particular accommodation to another group of employees, the bill creates a rebuttable presumption that the same accommodations for a pregnant employee would not impose an undue hardship on the employer.

Employers should also note that to preserve a pregnant employee’s ability to work, the bill prohibits an employer from requiring an employee to accept an accommodation that has not been requested or is not necessary. Similarly, the bill prohibits an employer from requiring an employee to take leave if the employer can provide another reasonable accommodation.

Adverse Action

The bill also prohibits taking adverse action against an employee who requests or uses a pregnancy accommodation. Significantly, the bill prohibits more employment practices than other sections of the CADA. Other sections of the CADA specifically make it improper to “refuse to hire, to discharge, to promote or demote, to harass during the course of employment, or to discriminate in matters of compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment . . . ” For pregnancy, adverse action is defined as “an action where a reasonable employee would have found the action materially adverse, such that it might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Accordingly, the bill likely covers a broader range of conduct than the other sections of the CADA.

Notice

To help educate employees about their rights under the new law, the bill requires employers to give new employees notice of their rights under this section at the start of employment. Further, employers are required to give current employees notice by December 8, 2016. Moreover, employers are required to post a notice in the workplace (along with the other employment law posters).

Although the bill does not provide a remedy for an employer’s failure to provide notice to existing or new employees, employers should comply with those provisions.

Remedies

Before filing a lawsuit, an employee who believes she has suffered an adverse action or improperly denied an accommodation under the new bill must file a charge with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission within six months of the conduct. Once the employee has exhausted the administrative remedies, she may sue for back pay (up to two years reduced by what the employee could have earned with reasonable diligence), front pay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages.

Action Plan

In anticipation of the new bill taking effect on August 10, 2016, employers should:

  • Review all job descriptions to ensure that they clearly identify the essential functions of each job.

  • Review handbooks and policies to ensure that they clearly define the procedures for an employee to request a pregnancy-related accommodation.

  • Draft the required notice of rights for distribution to current employees on or before December 8, 2016.

  • Draft the required notice of rights for distribution to new employees.

  • Update on-boarding policies and procedures to include providing the required notice of rights.

  • Review the accommodations provided to other classes of employees to understand the accommodations that may be presumed reasonable for pregnancy-related accommodations.

  • Train the employee or employees who will respond to pregnancy-related accommodation requests on the requirements of the bill.

  • Train managers on the requirements of the new bill, including the prohibitions on taking adverse actions against employees who request or use accommodations and the prohibitions on requiring employees to accept accommodations that are unwanted or unnecessary.

  • Update employment law postings to include a notice of rights under the bill.

What’s New About the Revised TSCA – Toxic Substances Control Act

Toxic Substances Control ActAfter years of effort, comprehensive legislation to reform the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) passed the House of Representatives on May 24, 2016.  The Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act is expected to pass the Senate the week of June 6.  President Obama is expected to sign the legislation shortly thereafter.  At that point, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will begin its implementation of the new TSCA.

This alert first highlights key ways in which passage of TSCA amendments will impact industry.  Next, it outlines the key changes that the legislation will make to TSCA.  It then identifies those provisions of the bill as passed by the Senate in December 2015 that are retained in the bill as passed by the House on May 24 (thus expected to remain in the final Senate-passed version) and those provisions that are changed.  Finally, it considers what is likely to happen in the early days of implementation of the new TSCA.

Note:  Section references in this alert refer to TSCA as it will be amended by the legislation.

How Passage of TSCA Reform Legislation Will Affect Industry

Alone among major environmental statutes, TSCA had not been significantly amended since its enactment in October 1976, almost 40 years ago – until now.  During much of that time, EPA has regarded TSCA’s principal control provision, section 6, as unworkable.  As a result, EPA has not proposed any rulemaking under section 6 in 25 years, ever since a court invalidated the EPA ban on asbestos in 1991.  Other aspects of TSCA have also shown their limitations.

Once enacted, this legislation will amend section 6 to make it much easier for EPA to evaluate and, if appropriate, regulate chemicals.  The bill contains provisions mandating that EPA identify substances that are high priorities for risk evaluations; evaluate the health and environmental risks of those substances; decide, without regard to cost or other non-risk factors, whether a high-priority substance presents an unreasonable risk; and regulate those substances found to present an unreasonable risk under the conditions of use.  All of these steps are subject to tight time deadlines.  EPA must meet some quotas in the first five years.  This means that industry can expect EPA to review more chemicals, to review them more systematically and thoroughly, and to regulate those chemicals that it finds to be in need of regulation.

Continue reading…

New Legal Framework for Electronic Signatures Coming Soon to the EU

electronic signaturesThe use and acceptance of electronic signatures are becoming more commonplace around the globe. One estimate has the number of transactions using electronic signatures growing from 210 million in 2014 to 700 million in 2017. In our practice, we are seeing more companies implement electronic signature solutions in their commercial contracting practices and procedures.

Given this increased usage of electronic signatures, we think it’s a good time to remind our readers that a new legal framework for electronic signatures is set to take effect in the European Union on July 1.

Adopted almost two years ago on July 23, 2014, the regulation (910/2014/EU) titled “Regulation on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market” (the eIDAS regulation) introduces a new framework for electronic signatures, seals, time stamps, and electronic documents. The eIDAS regulation replaces the Directive on Electronic Signatures (1999/93/EC) (the Directive).

The Directive caused issues in the European Union because each member state interpreted and implemented the law in its own way, leading to different electronic signature rules among EU nations. Thus, the eIDAS regulation is designed to establish a uniform framework to recognize electronic signatures, electronic seals, and identification among EU member states through the creation of electronic trust services for the European internal market. The eIDAs regulation defines the requirements for legally valid and mutually recognized electronic signatures (advanced and qualified), electronic seals, electronic time stamps, electronic delivery services, website authentication, and electronic documents.

As of July 1, the Directive and any EU member state laws that conflict with the eIDAS regulation will be replaced or modified. If you are among the many companies that incorporate electronic signatures into commercial contracting practices, remember that this new EU framework is just a month away from taking effect and be sure to brush up on the details.

© 2016 by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. All Rights Reserved.

In Case You Missed It: The EEOC Sneaks in Its Final Wellness Program Rule Ahead of The DOL’s New OT Rule

eeoc wellness programThe employer community was sent into a frenzy with the Department of Labor’s release on May 18, 2016 of its final white-collar overtime regulations.  Just two days before however, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission also released its own final regulations regarding employer wellness programs.

We had previously posted about the Commission’s proposed wellness program rule, and followed with a post discussing the future of wellness programs in light of two recent court decisions – EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc. and Seff v. Broward County.  In its recently issued regulations (which you can access here and here), the EEOC has set forth its final position on how the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Title II of the Genetic Information and Discrimination Act (GINA) apply to employer wellness programs that request the health information of employees and/or their spouses.  While most provisions of the final ADA rule and final GINA rule are identical to their respective proposed rules, there are some key differences, which we explain below in Q&A format below.

  1. Does the ADA’s safe harbor provision apply to employer wellness programs?

No.  The ADA’s safe harbor provision states that the ADA “shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict  . . . a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law.”  42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).

The Commission made no secret about its opinion that Seff and Flambeau were “wrongly decided” (including by appealing the Flambeau decision to the Seventh Circuit).  Despite case law to the contrary and pending appeals, the Commission reaffirmed its position in the final ADA rule that “the safe harbor provision does not apply to an employer’s decision to offer rewards or impose penalties in connection with wellness programs that include disability-related inquiries or medical examinations.”  Rather, the safe harbor provision only applies “to the practices of the insurance industry with respect to the use of sound actuarial data to make determinations about insurability and the establishment of rates.”  An employer’s use of wellness program to make employees healthier and reduce the costs of health care is not the type of underwriting or risk classification that is protected by the safe harbor provision. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(6).

  1. What wellness programs are subject to these final rules?

Any wellness program that includes disability-related inquiries and/or medical exams is subject to the rule.  This includes wellness programs: (a) offered only to employees enrolled in an employer-sponsored group health plan; (b) offered to all employees regardless of enrollment in the employer-sponsored group health plan; and (c) offered as a benefit of employment by employers that do not sponsor group health plans/insurance.

  1. Do the final rules provide additional clarification as to what makes a wellness program “voluntary”?

Yes.  The Commission has held steadfast in its decision to apply the “30 percent rule” for incentives set under HIPAA and the Affordable Care Act to participatory wellness programs that inquire as to employee disabilities or require employees to undergo medical examinations.  In doing so, the final rule limits the size of the incentives offered by these programs to 30% of the employee’s total cost of coverage.  Many commenters wanted the Commission to adopt an “affordability standard” to protect low-income workers from incentives that prove to be large enough to render health insurance coverage unaffordable.  The Commission declined to adopt this standard however, because in its view, “this rule promotes the ADA’s interest in ensuring that incentive limits are not so high as to make participation in a wellness program involuntary.”

Additionally, in the rule’s preamble specific to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(2)(ii), the Commission clarifies that it is of the opinion that the ADA prohibits “the outright denial of access to a benefit available by virtue of employment”, but does not prohibit “an employer from denying an incentive that is within the [30% limit] . . . nor does it prohibit requiring an employee to pay more for insurance that is more comprehensive.”  The Commission likely included this comment to further emphasize its disagreement with the Flambeau and Seff decisions – the Commission has concluded that an employer discriminates against an employee in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4), when it “denies access to a health plan because the employee does not answer disability-related inquiries or undergo medical examinations.”

The final rule explaining the notice requirement, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(2)(iv), also clarifies that it applies to “all wellness programs that ask employees to respond to disability-related inquiries and/o undergo medical examinations.”

  1. What types of incentives may be offered to employees and how can employers calculate incentive limits?

In addition to financial incentives, employers are permitted to offer in-kind incentives (e.g., employee recognition, parking spot use, relaxed dress code) and de minimis incentives to employees, despite any difficulties in valuing these incentives.

The final ADA rule, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(3), also explains how employers can calculate incentive limits in four situations: (a) where participation in a wellness program depends on enrollment in a particular health plan; (b) where wellness program participation does not depend on employee’s enrollment in an employer-offered single group health plan; (c) where wellness program participation does not depend on employee’s enrollment in any of employee’s group health plans; and (d) where an employer does not offer a group health plan or insurance.

  1. How do these rules relate to other federal discrimination laws?

Employers should pay special attention the interpretative guidance following the final ADA rule.  In it, the Commission states:

“[E]ven though an employer’s wellness program might comply with the incentive limits set out in [29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(3)], the employer would violate federal nondiscrimination statutes if that program discriminates on the basis of race, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, transgender status, and sexual orientation), color, religion, national origin, or age.  Additionally, if a wellness program requirement (such as a particular blood pressure or glucose level or body mass index) disproportionately affects individuals on the basis of some protected characteristic, an employer may be able to avoid a disparate impact claim by offering and providing a reasonable alternative standard.”

This appears to place the additional burden on the employer to examine all wellness program incentives and requirements for potential disparate impact.  The extent to which an employer must understand specific medical characteristics of every protected class on its employee roster is unknown.

  1. What changes did the Commission make in the final GINA rule?

There are four changes of note, all of which were added to the final GINA rules to clarify and/or enhance the proposed rules.

  • The final GINA rule extends the prohibition on offering inducements for information from the children of employees to all children (minor children and those 18 years of age or older).

  • Every provision of the final GINA rule now applies to all employer-sponsored wellness programs requesting genetic information.

  • There is no longer a different inducement limit threshold for employee spouses. The final GINA rule uses the “30 percent rule” when an employee and the employee’s spouse are given the opportunity to enroll in the employer-sponsored wellness program.  The final rule provides examples of how to calculate incentive limits where this is the case.  See 29 C.F.R. 1635.8(b)(2)(iii)(A)-(D).

  • Employers may not condition an employee’s or an employee’s spouse’s participation in an wellness program or their eligibility for offered incentives on the employee, the employee’s spouse, or a covered dependent agreeing to the sale, exchange, sharing, transfer, or other disclosure of genetic information or waiving GINA’s confidentiality protections.

What’s Next?

The final rules apply proactively – thus, are only applicable to wellness programs as of the first date of the plan beginning January 1, 2017 or thereafter.  In the meantime, we await the Seventh Circuit’s decision in the EEOC’s appeal of Flambeau regarding whether the ADA safe harbor provision applies to employer wellness programs.  Given the EEOC’s position that the provision does not apply and the growing number of courts that think otherwise, it is looking like the ultimate decision will be made by the U.S. Supreme Court (think: Young v. UPS – a Supreme Court decision that prompted the EEOC to revise its pregnancy discrimination guidance).

U.S. Supreme Court Allows Pre-Permit Challenges to Approved Jurisdictional Determinations

waters of the united statesIn a major new legal development for the Clean Water Act’s Section 404 wetlands permitting program, landowners can now challenge the federal government’s claim that areas targeted for fill are “waters of the United States” without first having to seek a permit to fill those waters, according to the Supreme Court’s decision issued on May 31st in United States Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., Inc., No. 15-290 (U.S. May 31, 2016) (Hawkes). Until now, landowners could not immediately contest in court a determination by the Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) or the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency that jurisdictional wetlands, ephemeral drainages, vernal pools or any other types of “waters” existed on property targeted for fill. Instead, landowners had to first complete the Section 404 permitting process – a process that can take months or even years – before challenging the underlying jurisdictional determination, or proceed to fill the site without a permit and risk possible civil penalties of up to $37,500 per day, or even criminal prosecution. Under Hawkes, a landowner can now seek judicial review of the Corps’ formal assertion of jurisdiction without waiting for the conclusion of the Section 404 permitting process.

Unanimous Decision a Sharp Rebuke to the Corps and EPA

The Court’s opinion in Hawkes was unanimous (8-0), although some of the justices differed in their reasoning in support of the outcome. Nonetheless, at a time when the Court has been sharply divided on other issues, the unanimity of result in this case is a sharp rebuke to both the Corps and EPA.

At issue were plans by three mining companies to engage in the mining of peat, which is an organic material that forms in waterlogged ground. The companies applied for a Section 404 permit, and were told by the Corps that it would be very expensive and take years to complete the permitting process. The Corps issued an approved jurisdiction determination (“JD”) stating that the property contained jurisdictional “waters” by virtue of a “significant nexus” to a river, located some 120 miles away. The companies administratively appealed the JD within the Corps to no avail, and then sought judicial review in the federal district court. Following established legal precedent, the district court dismissed the case on the grounds that a JD does not constitute a “final agency action,” which is a prerequisite for judicial review under the federal Administrative Procedures Act. The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a JD was “final agency action,” and today the Supreme Court affirmed the 8th Circuit’s ruling.

Important Takeaways and Observations from Hawkes

  • The underlying merits of the challenge in Hawkes – whether the peat bog was jurisdictional under the Clean Water Act by virtue of its alleged “significant nexus” to a river 120 miles away – was not reached by the Supreme Court. Instead, under the posture of the case, the “waters” of the U.S.” determination will be returned to the District Court with instructions to hear the challenge to the JD, assuming the companies still wish to pursue their case.

  • The right to pre-permit judicial review of a JD applies only to “approved” jurisdictional determinations. These are the formal JD’s verified by the Corps (or the EPA in certain circumstances), which typically are based on extensive fact-finding by qualified experts following written guidance established by the Corps and EPA. These are distinguished from “Preliminary Jurisdictional Determinations” (“PJD’s”), which are also officially recognized as a basis for the issuance of a Section 404 permit, but which are not definitive declarations of jurisdiction by the Corps. Instead, PJD’s essentially operate as determinations by the Corps on the scope of jurisdictional waters that the landowner has agreed not to contest. The intent is to avoid a time-consuming, expensive and exacting jurisdictional determination and to instead move more quickly into the permitting process. It was the approved JD – not the PJD – that was the subject of the Supreme Court’s decision in the Hawkes case.

  • In order to challenge an approved JD, it still will be necessary for permit applicants to exhaust their administrative appeals within the Corps pursuant to the applicable Corps’ regulations (33 CFR Part 331) before they can file suit in federal court.

Implications of Hawkes

The Court’s decision in Hawkes is significant. Until now, the Corps and EPA held many of the cards in any proposed project that threatened to disturb or fill alleged “waters of the United States.” The landowner faced a Hobson’s choice of filling the potential “waters” and risking a civil or criminal enforcement action, or delaying project plans for months or even years while navigating the Section 404 permitting process. Now, in situations involving marginal claims of jurisdiction, the landowner has one more card to play – the opportunity to seek court review of an approved JD without waiting for the Section 404 permitting process to be completed.

© 2010-2016 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

Kentucky Supreme Court Justice Hughes Nominated For Sixth Circuit Seat

Earlier this year, President Obama announced the nomination of Kentucky Supreme Court Justice Lisabeth T. Hughes for the Sixth Circuit vacancy created by Judge Martin’s retirement.  sixth circuitJustice Hughes served as a judge in various Kentucky courts for nearly a decade before her appointment to the Supreme Court of Kentucky in 2007.  If confirmed, she will join several former state court judges on the Sixth Circuit, including Judge Cook (Ohio), Judge Griffin (Michigan), Judge Donald (Tennessee), and Judge White (Michigan). Two years ago Justice Hughes was being considered for the Court. While all eyes are currently on the appointment of Judge Garland to the Supreme Court, it is questionable whether any circuit-level appointments will clear the Senate at this time.  If she were confirmed, Justice Hughes would join seven other active female judges on the Sixth Circuit, meaning that half of the active judges would be female. We’ll continue to monitor any progress on the confirmation of Justice Hughes.

© Copyright 2016 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP