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Congress Begins With Renewed Efforts to Repeal Insurer’s Antitrust Exemption

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Early into the 114th Congress, multiple bills have already been introduced that would repeal the insurance industry’s limited antitrust exemption granted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act (15 USC 1011 et seq.).

On January 6, Representative John Conyers (D-Mich.) introduced the “Health Insurance Industry Antitrust Enforcement Act of 2015,” (H.R. 99). The legislation would amend the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which currently provides the insurance industry with an exemption from the federal antitrust laws for conduct that is “the business of insurance,” is “subject to state regulation,” and does not constitute “an act of boycott, coercion or intimidation,” (15 USC 1013), by removing the exemption for health insurers and medical malpractice insurers. Notably, the bill would not eliminate the exemption with respect to other lines of insurance, and is similar to McCarran repeal bills that Representative Conyers has introduced in prior sessions of Congress. Representative Conyers has previously stated that his bill would “end the mistake Congress made in 1945 when it added an antitrust exemption for insurance companies.”

Subsequently, on January 22, Representative Paul Gosar (R-Ariz.), who was a practicing dentist for many years, introduced similar McCarran repeal legislation, entitled the “Competitive Health Insurance Reform Act of 2015” (H.R. 494). Representative Gosar’s bill would only eliminate the exemption as to health insurers. In introducing his legislation, Representative Gosar stated that “Since the passage of Obamacare, the health insurance market has expanded into one of the least transparent and most anti-competitive industries in the United States,” and that there is “no reason in law, policy or logic for the insurance industry to have a special exemption” from the antitrust laws.

Both H.R. 99 and H.R. 494 have been referred to the House Judiciary Committee for further action. Whether these bills will gain traction this Congress remains to be seen, but the fact that the bill has supporters on both sides of the aisle certainly increases the chances that the legislation will, at a minimum, be considered by the House Judiciary Committee (which failed to take up similar legislation in the 113th Congress).

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Subpoenas Without Depositions: A Valuable Point From The North Carolina Business Court

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Can you send a subpoena duces tecum — which translated from Latin is “a writ commanding a person to produce in court certain designated documents or evidence ” —  without coupling it with a deposition?

Maybe that question has never puzzled you, but in an Order of the Business Court on February 12, 2015 in Harriott v. Central Carolina Surgical Eye Associates, P.A. Judge Bledsoe answered whether a subpoena duces tecum can be served without noticing a deposition in conjunction with the subpoena.

Plaintiff had served a subpoena duces tecum on several entities which were not party to the case. Those entities objected contending that a “subpoena duces tecum must be issued in conjunction with a proceeding in which testimony is to be received.”

Judge Bledsoe disagreed, ruling “a subpoena duces tecum . . . can . . . be used to compel a non-party to produce documents without a concurrent request to testify.”  Order at 1-2.

The governing Rule of Civil Procedure (NCRCP 45) is less than clear on this point. It says that a “command to produce records, books, papers, electronically stored information, or tangible things may be joined with a command to appear at trial or hearing or at a deposition, or any subpoena may be issued separately.” NCRCP 45(a)(2).

The federal rule, by contrast,  is explicit on being able to serve a subpoena for documents without a contemporaneous deposition.  It says that:

Combining or Separating a Command to Produce or to Permit Inspection . . . . A command to produce documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things or to permit the inspection of premises may be included in a subpoena commanding attendance at a deposition, hearing, or trial, or may be set out in a separate subpoena.

FRCP45(a)(1)(C).

So, if there was any doubt about this practical nuts and bolts issue, state law practice is now consistent with the federal rule.  Subpoena away.  At least in the Business Court.

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