The National Law Forum

Texas Hammer Nails Trademark Infringement Appeal

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of an initial confusion trademark complaint, finding that the plaintiff alleged a plausible claim of trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. Adler v. McNeil Consultants, LLC, Case No. 20-10936 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 2021) (Southwick, J.)

Jim Adler is a personal injury lawyer who trademarked and used several terms, including JIM ADLER, THE HAMMER and TEXAS HAMMER, to market his business, including via keyword advertisements. McNeil Consultants, a personal injury lawyer referral service, purchased keyword ads using Adler’s trademarked terms, which allowed McNeil’s advertisements to appear at the top of any Google search of Adler’s trademarked terms. McNeil’s advertisements used generic personal injury terms, did not identify any particular law firm and clicking on the ads placed a phone call to McNeil’s call center rather than directing the user to a website. The call center used a generic greeting so consumers did not realize with whom they were speaking.

Adler filed suit against McNeil, asserting Texas state law claims as well as trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. McNeil moved to dismiss, arguing that its keyword ads did not create a likelihood of confusion. The district court agreed and dismissed Adler’s complaint. Adler appealed.

To successfully plead a trademark infringement claim under Fifth Circuit law, the holder of a protectable trademark must establish that the alleged infringing use “creates a likelihood of confusion as to source, affiliation, or sponsorship.” To determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists, the Court weighs a non-exhaustive list of several confusion factors, including the similarity of the marks, the similarity of the products, the defendant’s intent and the care exercised by potential consumers.

The Fifth Circuit explained that Adler alleged initial interest confusion, which exists where the confusion creates consumer interest in the infringing party’s services even where no sale is completed because of the confusion. The Court noted that this case presented the first opportunity for the Fifth Circuit to consider initial interest confusion as it pertains to search engine keyword advertising. Relying on Ninth Circuit precedent and parallel reasoning to its own opinions on initial interest confusion in the context of metatag usage, the Court concluded that Adler’s complaint alleged a plausible claim of trademark infringement under the Lanham Act.

The Fifth Circuit noted that initial interest confusion alone is not enough to raise a Lanham Act claim. The Court explained that if a consumer searches TOYOTA and is directed to search results containing a purchased ad clearly labeled as selling VOLKSWAGEN products, a consumer who clicks on the VOLKSWAGEN ad has been distracted, not confused or misled into purchasing the wrong product. Distraction does not violate the Lanham Act. However, the Court explained that where the use of keyword ads creates confusion as to the source of the advertisement—not mere distraction—an infringement may have occurred. Because McNeil’s advertisements were admittedly generic and could have been associated with any personal injury law firm, the Court found that the keyword ads raised a possibility of consumer confusion rather than distraction.

The Fifth Circuit also disagreed with the district court’s finding that Adler’s claims were conclusory. The Court found that Adler submitted factual allegations sufficient to support a claim that McNeil’s generic ads—combined with their misleading call-center greetings—caused consumer confusion as to who had placed the advertisements.

The Fifth Circuit also rejected McNeil’s argument that its ads were generic and therefore unprotected under the Lanham Act. The Court explained that although the Lanham Act does not protect generic terms, it does protect against generically worded advertisements integrating trademarks admittedly owned by another. The Court found that McNeil’s use of generic language was actually a factor to be weighed against McNeil because it increased the likelihood that consumers would be confused as to the source.

Finally, the Fifth Circuit rejected the district court’s conclusion that Adler’s claims failed as a matter of law because consumers cannot see the terms purchased in a keyword search. The district court essentially ruled that if the mark is not visible to the consumer, then no confusion can be created. The Court disagreed, finding the district court’s ruling unsupported by precedent and contrary to its rule of law that no single factor be dispositive.

Article By Joshua Revilla of McDermott Will & Emery

For more articles on copyright, visit the NLR Intellectual Property section.

Hurricanes and Act of God Defenses

Following a major hurricane or other extreme weather event, vessel owners and operators may face liability for failure to perform their agreed contracts or for liability arising from an allision or collision. When such major hurricanes strike, to escape liability, vessel owners and operators may take advantage of two doctrines: (1) force majeure; and (2) the inevitable accident/ Act of God defense. Below we explain those doctrines and the burden of proof for each.

A. Contractual Defenses – Force Majeure Clauses

Maritime contracts for services generally include clauses for performance, demurrage, deviation, termination and suspension. In addition, most contracts include a force majeure clause designed to excuse one or all of the parties from liabilities or obligations under a contract when there has been an occurrence of an extraordinary and unforeseeable event beyond the control of the parties. These are known as force majeure clauses—which roughly translates to a “superior force.” A typical force majeure clause reads as follows:

Except for the duty to make payments hereunder when due, and the indemnification provisions under this Agreement, neither Company nor Contractor shall be responsible to the other for any delay, damage or failure caused by or occasioned by a Force Majeure Event as used in this Agreement. “Force Majeure Event” includes: acts of God, action of the elements, warlike action, insurrection, revolution or civil strife, piracy, civil war or hostile action, strikes, differences with workers, acts of public enemies, federal or state laws, rules and regulations of any governmental authorities having jurisdiction in the premises or of any other group, organization or informal association (whether or not formally recognized as a government); inability to procure material, equipment or necessary labor in the open market acute and unusual labor or material or equipment shortages, or any other causes (except financial) beyond the control of either Party. Delays due to the above causes, or any of them, shall not be deemed to be a breach of or failure to perform under this Agreement.

Moreover, force majeure clauses, especially in contracts performed in the Gulf of Mexico, typically include hurricanes in the exhaustive list of potential force majeure events. If “hurricanes” are not specifically contemplated, such weather events may also qualify under “Act of God,” as discussed below.

When such a force majeure event occurs, the party seeking to invoke the clause bears the burden of proof in showing its application. Generally speaking, the party would need to present evidence proving: (1) that the alleged event constitutes a force majeure event; (2) that the event had adversely affected the party’s ability to perform; (3) that the party’s inability to perform is beyond its control; and (4) there existed no reasonable steps the party could have taken to avoid the event or its consequences. In the aftermath of a major hurricane such as Hurricane Katrina or Hurricane Ida, the parties should face little to no difficulty in proving that the hurricane qualified as a force majeure event and that their performance has been affected.

Even if a maritime contract does not contain a force majeure provision, parties may still look to common law principles to escape liability for nonperformance. For example, under the doctrine of “impossibility of performance,” a party can be relieved of its contractual obligations when the object of performance has become impossible or commercially impracticable. See Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. 1966).

All in all, following a major disaster, parties should first look to the language of the contract to determine the viability of such defenses. The contract will control and will dictate the parties’ next steps. Jones Walker routinely advises clients with respect to such matters.

B. Defenses to Tort Liability – Act of God

The maritime doctrine of “Act of God” or “inevitable accident” serves as a defense to nonperformance of contractual obligations, as discussed above, and to liability for a maritime accident, such as a collision or allision. The doctrine serves as an affirmative defense to the element of causation. In other words, the loss was caused not by any action of the vessel owner or any human intervention, but was caused by an unpredictable and inevitable Act of God, which could not have been prevented. The U.S. Supreme Court has defined an “Act of God” as “a loss happening in spite of all human effort and sagacity.” The Majestic, 166 U.S. 375 (1897). This defense has also been widely defined as “any accident, due directly and exclusively to natural causes without human intervention, which by no amount of foresight, pains, or care, reasonably to have been expected could have been prevented;” and/or “a disturbance . . . of such unanticipated force and severity as would fairly preclude charging . . . [defendant] with responsibility for damage occasioned by the [defendant’s] failure to guard against it in the protection of property committed to its custody.” See 1A C.J.S. Act of God at 757 (1985); Ompania De Vapores INSCO S.A. v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 232 F.2d 657, 660 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 880 (1956). See also Skandia Ins. Co., Ltd. V. Star Shipping, AS, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (defining “Act of God” as a natural event that is overwhelming and cannot be forestalled nor controlled with respect to a Hurricane Georges cargo claim). With respect to major weather events such as hurricanes, the doctrine acts as a defense to tort liability for breakaways resulting in collision and allisions. See Petition of U.S., Heide Shipping & Trading v. S.S. Joseph Lykes, 425 F.2d 991 (5^th Cir. 1970) (vessel breakaway in Hurricane Betsy). That said, such hurricanes must be “so extraordinary that the history of climatic variations and other conditions in the particular locality affords no reasonable warning of them.” Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. v. United States, 864 F.2d 1550, 1553 (11th Cir. 1989) (other internal citations omitted).

Before even considering the “Act of God” defense however, three important maritime presumptions come into play: (1) the Pennsylvania Rule; (2) the Louisiana Rule; and (3) the Oregon Rule —named after the respective cases in which they arose. Under the Pennsylvania Rule, a party who violates a safety regulation, such as the COLREGS, will be presumed at fault for a maritime incident. The Pennsylvania Rule may be overcome but case law notes that: “a party who fails to observe a safety regulation [must meet] the burden of showing not merely that [its] fault might not have been one of the causes [of the loss], or that it probably was not, but that it could not have been.” United States v. Nassau Marine Corp., 778 F.2d 1111, 1116 (5th Cir. 1985). The Louisiana and Oregon Rules together create a presumption of fault against the vessel owner of a vessel striking another vessel or stationary object. The Louisiana and The Oregon Rules “[create] a presumption of fault that shifts the burden of production and persuasion to a moving vessel who, under her own power, allides with a stationary object.” Combo Maritime, Inc. v. U.S. United Bulk Terminal, LLC, 615 F.3d 599, 604 (5th Cir. 2010). The moving vessel may rebut the presumption by showing by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the collision was the fault of the stationary object (or other vessel), (2) that the moving ship acted with reasonable care, or (3) that the collision was an unavoidable accident. Bunge Corp. v. M/V Furness Bridge, 558 F.2d 790, 795 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924, 98 S. Ct. 1488, 55 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1978)).

When one of the aforementioned principles apply, the presumption shifts the burden of proof to the vessel owner — both the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion — who must show that it was without fault or that the collision was the result of an inevitable accident, i.e. an Act of God. Bunge Corp. v. M/V Furness Bridge, 558 F.2d 790, 795 (5th Cir. 1997). Where a party invokes the Act of God defense and alleges that such vis major event caused the accident (ie. no fault of the vessel owner), the vessel owner bears a heavy burden to demonstrate that its “drifting was the result of an inevitable accident, or a vis major, that human skill and precaution and a proper display of nautical skill could not have prevented.” Bunge Corp., 240 F.3d at 926. In addition, a party who invokes Act of God with respect to inclement weather must prove not only that the weather was heavy, “but also that it took reasonable precautions under the circumstances as known or reasonably to be anticipated.” In re Southern Scrap Material Co., 713 F. Supp. 2d 568, 578 (E.D. La. 2010) (internal citations omitted). In other words, the party must show that it took reasonable precautions under the circumstances to prevent the breakaway, collision, or allision. Petition of U.S., 425 F.2d 991, 995 (5th Cir. 1970). If any human negligence was a contributing cause of the incident, the Act of God defense will be defeated. Crescent Towing & Salvage Co., Inc. v. M/V Chios Beauty, No. 05-4207, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62247 (E.D. La. Aug. 14, 2008). This is because an Act of God is such a catastrophic event that the exercise of reasonable care or reasonable precautions could not have prevented the loss.

Hurricanes are generally regarded as “Acts of God.” Even though storms are not unusual for the Gulf of Mexico, courts recognize that a hurricane that causes unexpected and unforeseeable devastation with unprecedented wind velocity, storm surges, flooding, etc. is a classic case of an “Act of God.” Terre Aux Boeufs Land Co. v. J. R. Gray Barge Co., 00-2754 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/14/01); 803 So.2d 86, 92. For example, following Hurricane Katrina, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held that a Category 4 or 5 hurricane was an Act of God sufficient to bar a claim by a marina owner against the owner of a vessel that broke away from her berth, drifted and hit another vessel. The defense of Act of God applied because, 1) the accident was due exclusively to natural events without human negligence, and (2) there was no negligent behavior. J.W. Stone Oil Dist., LLC v. Bollinger Shipyard, 2007 WL 2710809 (E.D. La. 2007). The district court held in Stone Oil that hurricanes are considered in law to be an Act of God unless there is an intervening and contributing act of individual negligence. This includes taking reasonable precautions based upon the available information. But see Borries v. Grand Casino of Miss., Inc., 187 So.3d 1042, 1050 (Miss. 2016) (holding that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute as to whether a casino vessel was properly moored ahead of Hurricane Katrina so as to preclude a summary judgment on the Act of God defense). The relevant inquiry always revolves around what reasonable precautionary steps the vessel owner took ahead of the storm (or should have taken).

In Simmons v. Lexington Ins. Co., 2010 WL 1254638 (E.D. La. 2010), aff’d., 401 Fed. Appx. 903 (5th Cir. 2010), the district court also considered whether reasonable precautions had been taken by a marina to protect a sailboat in Hurricane Katrina under both Louisiana and maritime law. The Court reviewed other Katrina cases, including Conagra Trade Group, Inc. v. AEP Memco, LLC, 2009 WL 2023174 (E.D. La. 2009), and Coex Coffee Int’l., Inc. v. Dupuy Storage & Forwarding, LLC, 2008 WL 1884041 (E.D. La. 2008). (Katrina’s unprecedented flooding and devastation was an Act of God defense.) In Conagra, supra, the district court was asked to review a contract of affreightment for a cargo of wheat aboard a barge that sunk. The defendant was found not negligent in delivering its barge of cargo several days before the weather forecast accurately predicted the landfall of Katrina. In In re S.S. Winged Arrow, 425 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1970), the court affirmed that the Act of God defense applied to the loss of a vessel properly moored well before it became apparent that Hurricane Betsy would strike.

Regardless of if such cases are brought in federal court or state court, the Act of God doctrine will apply. For example, following Hurricane Rita, Jones Walker successfully defended its client in a Louisiana state court by invoking the Act of God defense in response to a barge breakaway in Lake Charles that struck and destroyed a bridge. Following a trial, the jury exonerated the defendant vessel owner finding that Hurricane Rita caused the loss, not any alleged act of the barge owner.

C. Contractual Performance Clauses – Act of God

Clauses for demurrage, detention or laytime usually involve delays in the loading or unloading of cargo or the delivery of goods and materials. Laytime is the period of time allowed for loading and unloading. Demurrage and detention are sums paid to compensate for time lost related to the delivery of equipment or cargo. Demurrage begins to run after the passage of laytime or the agreed time of delivery and performance. Damages are awarded for failure to perform. Deviation is an obligation to maintain a proper course in ordinary trade and to timely arrive at the agreed destination. All deviation clauses are subject to certain liberties. Any deviation may affect insurance and hire.

Typically a contract for maritime services can be terminated for cause or for convenience. Similarly, parties may negotiate terms to suspend performance, which would suspend payment of hire and performance of services. A suspension clause is typically an off-hire clause where the contract terms remain but no hire is paid. Usually a vessel owner will be compensated and reimbursed for certain additional expenses if a contract is terminated for convenience. An Act of God clause excuses delays in performance, but in most cases serves to either suspend performance or terminate the contract for cause as between the parties.

D. Conclusion

In sum, following major hurricanes like Katrina, Laura, and now Ida, vessel owners and operators may invoke the Act of God defense (with respect to both tort liability and contractual obligations). That said, to successfully invoke the defense, the vessel owner faces a high burden in proving that human negligence did not cause the loss. Such a burden requires certain evidence, testimony, and other proof.

Article By Grady S. Hurley, Jefferson R. Tillery and Sara B. Kuebel of Jones Walker LLP

For more articles on government contracts, visit the NLR Government Contracts, Maritime & Military Law section.

“I always feel like somebody’s watching me…” The Legalities of Smart Devices and Privacy

“Hey Alexa…”

It’s a simple phrase that makes us feel like we’re living in the future promised us by The Jetsons and Star Trek. Alexa, Siri, Google Assistant—all Artificial Intelligence (AI) designed to make our lives just a little easier. Need a recipe for beef brisket? Just ask Siri. What time is the movie going to start? Ask Alexa. Need some music for your dinner party? Google Assistant has you covered, just ask. But how are Alexa and Siri at your beck and call? The answer is they’re always listening. What does that mean for you? It means that every sound they hear is analyzed and indexed.

Data Privacy

Privacy is the next big frontier in eDiscovery. Data privacy laws are constantly evolving. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (effective May 25, 2018) is the European Union (EU) and European Economic Area (EEA) law that relates to data protection and privacy. It also applies to the transfer of personal data outside of the EU and EEA. (The University of Michigan has a great timeline of the history of privacy law.) Practically, your personal data is the most valuable asset you have.

Understanding existing and pending privacy legislation is important. Currently 3 states have passed legislation, including California; 9 states, including Pennsylvania, have active bills; and 15 states have introduced legislation that ultimately died or was postponed. At some point there could be federal legislation that governs privacy similar to GDPR.

Do these devices violate wiretapping laws? Unclear.

An issue worth exploring is whether these devices fall under the purview of wiretapping laws. In Hall-O’Neil v. Amazon, a class action case in the Western District of Washington, Plaintiffs allege that Alexa enabled devices collected and recorded confidential conversations with minors. Hall-O’Neil v. Amazon.com Inc. et al., 2:19CV00910. It is important to keep an eye on these and other similar cases to understand the privacy issues at play with these types of devices.

How Do We Handle Evolving Privacy Issues in the Legal World?

So, what does this mean for legal professionals? One thing to consider is attorney-client privilege issues. With the global pandemic requiring a major shift to working from home you should carefully consider the ramifications of having a virtual assistant in your home while you’re working on client matters—you may be violating attorney-client privilege. Out of an abundance of caution you probably want to unplug your virtual assistant before getting to work.

On the flip side, if someone has a virtual assistant and it was present during a key meeting or event you might want to investigate subpoenaing the recordings, which carries with it additional issues such as who owns the data related to virtual assistants, how long is the data retained, and how do you obtain it. Law enforcement agencies have been subpoenaing virtual assistant data for years to obtain voice clips and time stamped logs of user activity in crime investigations.

What’s the Best Practice?

With so many questions and so few real legal precedents it’s best to proceed with caution with the use of these devices. It’s also very important, from an eDiscovery perspective, to make sure you’re aware of the potential for important data to be found on these devices during the discovery process.

Article by Gretchen E. Moore, Lydia A. Gorba, Lynne Hewitt and Maryann Mahoney of Strassburger, McKenna Gutnick & Gefsky

For more articles on cybersecurity, please visit here.

Lawsuits Allege Fudged Fudge

Three class-action lawsuits filed in district courts in Illinois allege that products containing vegetable oils, and not dairy fat, are falsely and misleadingly described as “fudge.” (See Reinitz v. Kellogg Sales Company, Bartosiake v. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc., and Lederman v. The Hershey Company). The lawsuits, which are all filed by Sheehan & Associates, P.C. and are substantively identical, have targeted Kellogg Sales Company’s “Frosted Chocolate Fudge,” Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc.’s “Chocolate Fudge Iced Cake,” and the Hershey Company’s “Hot Fudge” respectively.

The lawsuits allege that fudge is a candy made from the mixing of sugar, butter, and milk, and that the replacement of dairy fats (butter and/or milk) with vegetable oils in each of the three products at issue constitutes deceptive advertising. In support of these claims, Plaintiff cites a hodgepodge of sources including three recipes from around the turn of the 20^th century, a Wikipedia entry, Molly Mills, who is apparently “one of today’s leading authorities on fudge,” and a 1982 Bulletin from the International Dairy Federation.

Plaintiffs have not, however, provided any extrinsic evidence of consumer deception (e.g., market studies), and such information will almost certainly have to be produced for such a case to ultimately succeed. We have previously reported on several other class actions which allege that the replacement of dairy fat with vegetable oil is misleading to consumers (see here and here), and we will continue to monitor and report on the outcomes of these cases.

Article by the Food and Drug Law at Keller and Heckman

See links for more articles on Biotech, Food, Drug law, and Consumer Protection law

The Hot Coffee Case Revisited: Has Proximate Cause Changed in the 25 Years Since Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants?

Two cases decided 25 years apart, but there were some facts in common: a hot drink, a consumer alleging that she was burned by the drink, and a lawsuit. These are the facts of the 1994 case Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants that resulted in an award of millions to the consumer, but also the facts from Shih v. Starbucks, a case decided last year. In Shih, however, the court found in favor of the product supplier. What’s different about these cases? The answer: how the courts interpreted proximate cause.

In 1994, Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants sparked a nationwide tort reform debate after a jury found McDonald’s liable for a consumer’s injuries after she spilled McDonald’s coffee on herself. At the time, many commentators predicted a wave of frivolous lawsuits and large judgments against businesses. But 25 years later, those predictions have not materialized. While consumers continue to sue, the doctrine of proximate cause limits the liability that businesses face from claims for injuries related to hot drinks.

Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants

In 1992, Stella Liebeck bought a cup of hot coffee from a McDonald’s drive-through in New Mexico. While parked, she placed the cup of coffee between her legs and attempted to peel the cap off. The coffee spilled and Ms. Liebeck sustained second- and third-degree burns.

Liebeck sued McDonald’s, alleging that the hot coffee was defectively manufactured, that it violated the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and that the defect caused her injuries. At trial, Liebeck’s attorneys offered evidence that McDonald’s asked franchisees to brew coffee at 180-190 degrees Fahrenheit. Additionally, the attorneys offered evidence that McDonald’s had received more than 700 reports of burns resulting from coffee spills out of billions of hot coffees sold during the time period.

The jury ruled in favor of Liebeck and awarded her compensatory damages of $200,000 and punitive damages of $2.7 million. But the jury determined that Liebeck was 20 percent at fault for her own injuries, and the court reduced the punitive award significantly, resulting in compensatory damages of $160,000 and punitive damages of $480,000.

Shih v. Starbucks

Shih v. Starbucks presents a similar set of facts, but with a different outcome. In June 2016, Tina Shih went to Starbucks with a friend, and each ordered a hot tea. Each tea was given to Shih in a double-cup – one full cup placed within an empty cup. Neither cup had a sleeve. Shih carried both teas to her table and sat down.

Shih claimed that because the cup of tea was filled to the top and was very hot, she did not want to lift it. Instead, she pulled the lid off the cup and moved her chair back to sip from the cup while it was on the table. Shih pushed her chair back to lean over the cup, lost her balance, and put her hand on the table to steady herself – causing the hot tea to spill in her lap. Shih sustained second-degree burns from the incident.

Shih sued Starbucks. She alleged that the double-cup without a sleeve was a manufacturing defect, which – combined with the cup being filled to the brim with hot tea – caused her injuries. Starbucks moved for summary judgment on Shih’s claims, arguing that Shih could not prove the alleged manufacturing defect proximately caused her injuries. The court agreed, granted Starbucks’s motion, and entered judgment in favor of Starbucks. In 2020, the appeals court affirmed.

Proximate Cause is Key the Difference

The differences between Liebeck and Shih are the litigants’ defect claims and their respective theories of proximate causation. The proximate cause inquiry examines the relationship between the defendant’s alleged conduct and the plaintiff’s injury: if the defendant’s conduct is too attenuated from the consumer’s injuries, the defendant cannot be held liable for those injuries. Proximate cause exists when the defect in question increased the risk of harm to the consumer, and the consumer sustained injuries resulting from the increased risk. Courts generally test proximate cause by looking at whether the harm was a foreseeable result of the defect – meaning the business could reasonably have predicted the harm.

Liebeck’s attorneys successfully argued that the coffee was defective because it was served too hot and that the excessively hot temperature put Liebeck at an increased risk of burns. Liebeck established proximate cause by showing that her burn injuries were a foreseeable result of the alleged defect – the coffee being served very hot.

Shih could not establish proximate cause because the court held that the alleged defect was too attenuated from her injuries. Shih’s attorneys argued that the lack of a cup sleeve and the fact that the hot tea was full made it defective. Specifically, Shih would not have removed the tea lid, leaned forward, moved her chair, lost her balance and grabbed the table – causing it to wobble and spill the tea on her – if Starbucks had given her a cup sleeve or not filled the cup to the brim.

The court held that the alleged defect did not increase the risk of Shih being burned or otherwise injured by the hot tea; therefore, the defect was not the proximate cause of her injuries. The lack of a sleeve and the fullness of the tea did not increase Shih’s risk of losing her balance “while attempting to execute [this] kind of unorthodox drinking maneuver,” and spilling the tea on herself. The court’s use of “unorthodox” illustrates that, in the court’s view, Shih’s injuries were not a foreseeable result of the alleged defect. The court noted that while it is foreseeable that consumers could lose their balance and spill their drinks, losing one’s balance is not “within the scope of the risk” created by Starbucks’ decision to use a double cup and to fill the cup to the brim. Thus, Shih could not prove Starbucks’ actions proximately caused her injuries.

Twenty-five years after Liebeck sparked a national conversation about hot coffee and corporate liability, Shih demonstrates that courts continue to follow public policy limitations like proximate cause to protect businesses from unforeseeable consumer injuries.

Article by Emilie McGuire and Jeffrey Skinner with Schiff Hardin LLP.

For more articles on class action lawsuits, visit the NLR Litigation section.

Wealth Planning in 2021: Preparing For a Changing Tax Landscape

Since President Biden took office at the beginning of this year, there has been much buzz and conjecture regarding what the tax policy under the Biden-Harris Administration would look like. In light of the recently released Department of Treasury’s General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2022 Revenue Proposals, commonly known as the “Green Book,” we now have a better idea of the proposed tax law changes that the Administration will focus on implementing in the coming year.

While the Green Book contains various tax proposals that could significantly affect estate planning, it interestingly does not include a proposal to decrease the estate and gift tax exemption, which was a major topic of discussion during last year’s election cycle (click here to review our advisory on Estate Planning and the 2020 Election). However, some Democrats in Congress nonetheless continue to argue for this reduction. For example, Senator Bernie Sanders’ proposed legislation, For the 99.5% Act, would reduce the gift tax exemption to $1 million per person and the estate tax exemption to $3.5 million per person and would also impose new progressive estate tax rates ranging from 45% to 65%.

In any event, the Green Book contains the proposed tax laws that reflect the Administration’s top priorities and are more likely to be enacted than those proposals not included in the Green Book. The Green Book proposals seek to reverse many of the tax laws included in the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act enacted under former President Trump, such as a proposed increase to individual income tax rates and an end to certain capital gains tax preferences, discussed in further detail below.

Green Book Proposals That Would Affect High Net Worth Clients:

Increase Top Marginal Individual Income Tax Rate for High-Income Earners. The top marginal income tax rate would increase from 37% to 39.6% for taxable income in excess of the top bracket threshold. For taxable years beginning January 1, 2022, this would apply to income in excess of $509,300 for married individuals filing jointly and $452,700 for single filers, and thereafter be indexed for inflation.

Tax Capital Gains for High-Income Earners at Ordinary Income Tax Rates. For taxpayers with adjusted gross income of more than $1 million, long-term capital gains and qualified dividends tax rates would increase to match the proposed ordinary income tax rates. To the extent that a taxpayer’s income exceeds $1 million, rates would go from 20% (or 23.8% including the net investment income tax (“NIIT”)) to 39.6% (or 43.4% including NIIT). This proposal currently includes a retroactive effective date of April 28, 2021.

Treat Transfers of Appreciated Property by Gift or at Death as Realization Events. This proposal would eliminate the so called “step up in basis loophole,” which allows for an asset transferred at death to be “stepped up” to fair market value for cost basis purposes resulting in no capital gains tax imposed on the asset’s appreciation through date of death. Instead, the transfer of an appreciated asset by gift or at death would be treated as sold for fair market value at the time of the transfer, creating a taxable gain realization event for the donor or deceased owner. There would, however, be a $1 million per person (or $2 million per married couple) exemption from recognition of capital gains on property transferred by gift or at death, indexed for inflation. In addition, certain exclusions would apply, including:

Residence. $250,000 per person (or $500,000 per married couple) would be excluded from capital gain on the sale or transfer of any residence.
Surviving spouse. Transfers by a decedent to a U.S. citizen spouse would carry over the basis of the decedent and capital gain recognition would be deferred until the surviving spouse dies or otherwise disposes of the asset.
Charity. Appreciated property transferred to charity would not generate a taxable gain; however, the transfer of appreciated assets to a split-interest charitable trust would generate a taxable gain as to the share of the value transferred attributable to any non-charitable beneficiary.

Tangible personal property. No capital gain would be recognized on transfers of tangible personal property (excluding collectibles).

Although the tax imposed on gains deemed realized at death would be deductible on the estate tax return of the decedent’s estate, deductions are not equivalent to tax credits and in high tax states such as New York, the additional tax could be substantial.

Impose Gain Recognition on Property Transferred to or Distributed from an Irrevocable Trust. Any transfers of property into, and distributions in kind from, an irrevocable trust would be treated as deemed recognition events subject to capital gains tax. In addition, while the generation-skipping transfer (“GST”) tax exempt status of a trust would not be affected, gain would automatically be recognized on property held in an irrevocable trust which has not otherwise been subject to a taxable recognition event within the prior 90 years. The first possible recognition event would be December 31, 2030 for any trust in existence on January 1, 1940. This proposal would also apply to transfers to, and distributions in kind from, partnerships and other non-corporate entities. Elimination of Valuation Discounts. The valuation of partial interests in property contributed to a trust would be equal to the proportional share of the fair market value of all of such property. In other words, no discounts for lack of marketability or minority interests would be allowed in valuing transfers of partial interests in LLCs, corporations, partnerships or real property.

Summary

The legislative text of the Administration’s tax proposals will likely not be available until the fall. It is important to note that any proposed tax law changes face a split 50-50 Senate, which means that the prospect of passing any tax reform at all is uncertain. Commentators believe that the Green Book proposals will be the subject of extensive negotiation over the next several months, including significant opposition to large increases in capital gains tax rates. In the meantime, we at Wiggin and Dana [link to PCS attorneys page] are available to discuss the Green Book proposals in more detail and to make proactive, tailored recommendations in light of the current changing tax law landscape.

Article by Michael T. Clear, Veronica R.S. Bauer, Robert W. Benjamin, Daniel L. Daniels, and Helen C. Heintz with Wiggin and Dana LLP.

For more articles on taxes, visit the NLR Tax section.

Get with The Program – China’s New Privacy Laws Are Coming

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) passed the Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) on Friday the 20th of August 2021. The new privacy regime strengthens the protection around the use and collection of personal data and introduces a new requirement for user consent.

The PIPL, closely resembling the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, prevents the personal data of PRC nationals from being transferred to countries with lower standards of data security; a rule that may pose inherent problems for foreign businesses. The PIPL was introduced following an increase in online scamming and individual service price discrimination – where the same service is offered at different prices based on a user’s shopping profile. However, while businesses and some state entities face stronger collection obligations, the PRC state security department will maintain full access to personal data.

Although the final draft of the PIPL is yet to be released, the new law is set to commence on the 1st of November 2021. Companies will face fines of up to 50 million yuan ($7.6 million USD), or 5% percent of their annual turnover if they fail to comply. For an in-depth discussion of the Draft PIPL released in August 2020, see our K&L Gates publication here.

Ella Richards also contributed to this article.

Article by Cameron Abbott with K&L Gates.

For more articles on international privacy law, visit NLR Section Cybersecurity Media & FCC.

Agencies and Regulators Focus on AML Compliance for Cryptocurrency Industry

This year, regulators, supported by a slate of new legislation, have focused more of their efforts on AML violations and compliance deficiencies than ever before. As we have written about in the “AML Enforcement Continues to Trend in 2021” advisory, money laundering provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2021 (the NDAA) expanded the number of businesses required to report suspicious transactions, provided new tools to law enforcement to subpoena foreign banks, expanded the AML whistleblower program, and increased fines and penalties for companies who violate anti-money laundering provisions. The NDAA, consistent with Treasury regulations, also categorized cryptocurrencies as the same as fiat currencies for purposes of AML compliance.

In addition, as discussed in the “Businesses Must Prepare for Expansive AML Reporting of Beneficial Ownership Interests” advisory, the NDAA imposed new obligations on corporations, limited liability companies, and similar entities to report beneficial ownership information. Although the extent of that reporting has not yet been defined, the notice of proposed rulemaking issued by FinCEN raises serious concerns that the Treasury Department may require businesses to report beneficial ownership information for corporate affiliates, parents and subsidiaries; as well as to detail the entity’s relationship to the beneficial owner. Shortly after passage of the NDAA, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen stressed that the Act “couldn’t have come at a better time,” and pledged to prioritize its implementation.

Money laundering in the cryptocurrency space has attracted increased attention from regulators and the IRS may soon have an additional tool at its disposal if H.R. 3684 (the bipartisan infrastructure bill) is signed into law. That bill includes AML provisions that would require stringent reporting of cryptocurrency transactions by brokers. If enacted, the IRS will be able to use these reports to identify large transfers of cryptocurrency assets, conduct money laundering investigations, and secure additional taxable income. Who qualifies as a “broker,” however, is still up for debate but some fear the term may be interpreted to encompass cryptocurrency miners, wallet providers and other software developers. According to some cryptocurrency experts, such an expansive reporting regime would prove unworkable for the industry. In response, an anonymous source from the Treasury Department told Bloomberg News that Treasury was already working on guidance to limit the scope of the term.

In addition to these legislative developments, regulators are already staking their claims over jurisdiction to conduct AML investigations in the cryptocurrency area. This month, SEC Chair Gary Gensler, in arguing that the SEC had broad authority over cryptocurrency, claimed that cryptocurrency was being used to “skirt our laws,” and likened the cryptocurrency space to “the Wild West . . . rife with fraud, scams, and abuse” — a sweeping allegation that received much backlash from not only cryptocurrency groups, but other regulators as well. CFTC Commissioner Brian Quintez, for example, tweeted in response: “Just so we’re all clear here, the SEC has no authority over pure commodities . . . [including] crypto assets.” Despite this disagreement, both regulatory agencies have collected millions of dollars in penalties from companies alleged to have violated AML laws or BSA reporting requirements. Just last week, a cryptocurrency exchange reached a $100 million settlement with FinCEN and the CFTC, stemming from allegations that the exchange did not conduct adequate due diligence and failed to report suspicious transactions.

With so many governmental entities focused on combatting money laundering, companies in the cryptocurrency space must stay abreast of these fast-moving developments. The combination of increased reporting obligations, additional law enforcement tools, and heightened penalties make it essential for cryptocurrency firms to institute strong compliance programs, update their AML manuals and policies, conduct regular self-assessments, and adequately train their employees. Companies should also expect additional regulations to be issued and new legislation to be enacted in the coming year. Stay tuned.

Article by Scott A. Resnik and Michael M. Rosensaft with Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP.

Oregon Bans Home Buyers’ ‘Love Letters’ to Sellers

As a potential harbinger of the future, Oregon has become the first state in the nation to ban real estate “love letters.” The new law goes into effect January 1, 2022.

The State of Oregon passed a law (HB 2550), and it signed by Governor Kate Brown, that, among other things, states the following:

In order to help a seller avoid selecting a buyer based on the buyer’s race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, marital status or familial status as prohibited by the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.), a seller’s agent shall reject any communication other than customary documents in a real estate transaction, including photographs, provided by a buyer.

What exactly is the Oregon legislature seeking to prevent a seller’s agent from communicating? The new law prohibits buyer’s agents from providing the seller’s agent with what is known as “love letters,” letters written by the buyer with the intent of wooing sellers to accept their offers. The use of such letters has become a common tactic to pull at sellers’ heartstrings, especially in a sellers’ market, where many buyers are bidding for a property (often significantly over the asking price).

The practice usually involves the buyers writing about how much they love the home, and how they imagine their family living there. However, these letters may include descriptive details and family photos, which could reveal protected characteristics, such as a person’s race, national origin, skin color, sex, religion, sexual orientation, familial status, or marital status. The rationale behind a ban like Oregon’s is that information in these letters could be used by the seller, whether consciously or not, and create potential unlawful biases in the seller’s decision-making process as to whose offer to accept.

Concerns over housing discrimination has been around for decades. Yet, recently, there have been increased federal, state, and local enforcement efforts directed toward eradicating it. The Oregon statute may represent a growing trend against these types of “love letters.” For instance, as The Real Deal reported, the National Association of Realtors and Ohio Realtors have issued warnings and frowned upon the practice. Whether other states and real estate industry groups will follow suit remains to be seen, but it sounds like the Oregon ban may not be the last.

Brokers should provide regular training to their agents and employees on housing discrimination issues and ways to avoid liability under fair housing laws that, among other things, increase awareness of how materials submitted in support of a home purchase offer like these kinds of letters might do more harm than good and open the door to claims of housing discrimination and bias.

Article By Jeffrey M. Schlossberg and John A. Snyder of Jackson Lewis P.C.

For more articles on property law, visit the NLR Real Estate section.

Collapse of Afghanistan – Operational and Compliance Considerations

Measures to mitigate current foreseeable impacts

The unprecedented speed of the collapse of the former Afghan central government is a humanitarian tragedy. The magnitude of which is rightfully distracting from the immediate near-term and long-term legal issues that those who supported the coalition efforts in Afghanistan are compelled to address as the immediate human concerns fade from the spotlight.

In particular, U.S. government (USG) contractors are going to face a variety of legal implications from the events unfolding in Afghanistan — which will vary depending upon the existence of assets, facilities, contracts, or personnel in Afghanistan. This alert addresses several common issues arose over the last 72 hours in assisting clients that had operations in Afghanistan. This alert is by no means exhaustive of the issues that will be faced by those with assets, facilities, contracts, or personnel related to USG business in Afghanistan.

U.S. Sanctions

It is probable that the U.S. will issue economic sanctions in the very near term based on the likelihood of widespread human rights violations and atrocities. U.S. sanctions will likely be levied against the Taliban, known leaders of the Taliban, and entities owned or controlled by the Taliban – including former private businesses subjugated to Taliban control. Typically, there is a permissible wind-down/extraction period, but such a grace period may not be afforded with possible Afghanistan sanctions based on the terrorist history of the Taliban. As a result, USG contractors should consider terminating business and contacts with Afghan entities to be able to comply with U.S. sanctions if or when levied.

Recovery of Investments

Based on the departure of the president and other key officials of the now displaced Afghan central government, it is probable that former officials will make a claim that they remain the legitimate government of Afghanistan in exile (though the Biden administration is already offering to recognize the Taliban if they respect women’s rights – which is unlikely.) It is also probable that the same displaced officials transferred assets out of Afghanistan to mitigate risk in the event of an overthrow. If so, there will be competing claims against limited assets. As a result, it may be necessary to work to recover any funds, capitalization or guarantees tied to any Afghan entities as soon as practicable.

Shutdown of Afghan Entities

At this time, the Afghan Embassy in Washington, D.C., still appears to be operational and is reportedly using electronic platforms to continue consular processes. The U.S. State Department is also advising that its interactions with the Afghan Embassy in D.C. for business-related matters are continuing, though it is likely that such operations and processes will be impacted or even come to a halt based on the above observations. As a result, the ability to “legally” shutdown an Afghan legal entity via the U.S. Afghan Embassy will become increasingly difficult or unlikely.

USG contractors that don’t have any personnel, facilities or assets in Afghanistan could be relegated to shutting down Afghan operations by actions in the U.S. and documenting such for U.S. sanctions and export control compliance purposes. Such documentation may also be useful for reimbursement claims from the U.S. government (which could be proposed for those supporting USG directives in Afghanistan if the Afghan presence was to support USG actions). Such documentation may be helpful in supporting U.S. tax deductions for losses or costs related to the “forced” Afghan shutdown.

To effectuate and document the shutdown of Afghan operations by actions in the U.S., it may be necessary that the board of directors for any Afghan subsidiary and its direct U.S. parent resolve to shut down the Afghan business, regardless of the ability to effectuate such in Afghanistan or with the Afghan Embassy in D.C. It will be important to maintain records of such to document compliance with possible future U.S. sanctions or changes in U.S. export control requirements.

U.S. Export Control

USG contractors should also determine if there are any U.S. export licenses or Technical Assistance Agreements (TAAs) in place. If so, they may need to be terminated. If the U.S. origin items or information covered by such licenses or TAAs is in Afghanistan, and is either unrecoverable or otherwise compromised, then the U.S. exporter may need to make a voluntary disclosure of such. We recommend the retention of outside counsel to complete a proper attorney-client privileged assessment of the specific facts related to the exporter’s situation and covered items, as well as possible voluntary disclosure based on the Taliban’s act of war.

As noted, additional issues and considerations will likely arise as more information becomes available about the immediate near-term and long-term situation in Afghanistan. USG contractors and other U.S. entities with business, operations or connections to Afghanistan will need to be mindful of the real-time changes in Afghanistan and the U.S. and international responses, and be prepared to adapt and implement policies, procedures and controls to address such.

Article by David Vance Lucas, and George A. Smith II of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP

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