CEQ Finalizes “Phase 2” Revisions to NEPA Implementing Regulations

The Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) is tasked with issuing National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) regulations to guide federal agencies in its implementation. In 2021, CEQ began a two-phase process to revise these regulations. “Phase 1” largely reversed several changes made to the regulations in 2020 under the prior Trump Administration, including key changes relating to defining “purpose and need” and the long-used concepts of direct, indirect, and cumulative effects. The new “Phase 2” revisions are more extensive. Some of the Phase 2 revisions codify in regulation amendments to NEPA made by the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 (“FRA”) and intended to improve the efficiency of the NEPA process, such as establishing page limits for environmental documents and facilitating the use of categorical exclusions (“CEs”). The Phase 2 revisions also restore additional concepts or provisions from the 1978 regulations and case law interpreting those regulations, remove additional changes made in 2020 that CEQ now “considers imprudent,” and, for the first time, specifically require consideration of effects relevant to environmental justice and climate change. We highlight some of these changes below.

The Phase 2 Final Rule will impact a broad range of projects needing federal authorizations or funding. Many of the efficiency measures included in the Final Rule implement changes that were enacted in the FRA. Although these changes could help address some long-standing issues in the NEPA process around delays and litigation, the effect of the proposed changes will be highly dependent on how the individual federal agencies carry out the changes through their own procedures and implementing regulations. Moreover, the Phase 2 Final Rule makes other important changes to the regulations that, rather than streamlining and improving efficiency, could increase burdens and challenges associated with NEPA compliance.

The Phase 2 Final Rule is scheduled to go into effect on July 1, 2024. However, industry groups and others already have signaled their frustration with these revisions, including several key members of Congress, led by Senator Joe Manchin, who have announced that they will seek to overturn the Phase 2 Final Rule using the Congressional Review Act.

Provisions Directed Towards Promoting Efficiency and Streamlining

Page Limits and Timelines. The Final Rule makes many small and some larger changes to promote efficiency and streamline the NEPA process. The Final Rule incorporates the FRA’s page limits of 75 pages for environmental assessments (“EAs”), 150 pages for environmental impact statements (“EISs”), and 300 pages for EISs of “extraordinary complexity.” It includes the FRA’s time limits for completion of NEPA documents, requiring completion of EAs within one year and EISs within two years, although it allows for an agency to extend this deadline, in consultation with any project applicant, to the extent necessary to complete the document. To further promote efficiency, the Final Rule also requires agencies to set deadlines and schedules appropriate to specific actions or types of actions.

Categorical Exclusions. The Final Rule also makes substantial changes to its regulations governing CEs that should facilitate agencies’ adoption of CEs as a tool to streamline NEPA compliance in certain circumstances, as allowed under the FRA. It sets forth a process for agencies to adopt and utilize other agencies’ CEs, as allowed under the FRA without having to amend their regulations. The Final Rule clarifies that agencies can establish CEs individually as well as jointly with other agencies. And it allows agencies to establish CEs through land use plans, decision documents supported by a programmatic EIS or EA, or similar planning or programmatic decisions, without having to go through a separate rulemaking process. According to CEQ, by expanding the means by which agencies can establish CEs, these changes will, among other things, encourage agencies to undertake programmatic and planning reviews, as well as promote and speed the process for establishing CEs.

Programmatic Reviews and Tiering. The Final Rule includes various revisions to codify best practices for the use of programmatic NEPA reviews and tiering, which CEQ acknowledges “are important tools to facilitate more efficient environmental reviews and project approvals.”

Provisions that Could Increase NEPA Compliance Burdens

While the Phase 2 Final Rule emphasizes efficiency, it includes a range of regulatory changes that could have the opposite effect, creating additional burdens and potentially perpetuating opportunities for contentious litigation.

Climate Change, Environmental Justice, and Tribal Resources. Reflected in a wide range of revisions to the regulations, the Phase 2 Final Rule aims to further advance the Biden Administration’s policy focus on climate change, environmental justice, and Tribal resources. Among other provisions, the Final Rule explicitly requires agencies to analyze “disproportionate and adverse human health and environmental effects on communities with environmental justice concerns” and climate change-related effects, including quantification of greenhouse gas emissions where feasible, in their NEPA reviews. Agencies also must review these effects, as well as effects on Tribal rights and resources, in identifying the environmentally preferable alternative or alternatives. Similarly, the Final Rule defines “extraordinary circumstances”—which agencies must consider in determining whether to apply a CE—to include potential substantial disproportionate and adverse effects on communities with environmental justice concerns, potential substantial climate change effects, and potential substantial effects on historic or cultural properties. Moreover, agencies now “should, where relevant and appropriate, incorporate mitigation measures” to address effects “that disproportionately and adversely affect communities with environmental justice concerns.” And the Final Rule directs agencies, where appropriate, to use projections when evaluating climate change-related effects, including relying on models to project a range of possible future outcomes, provided that they disclose relevant assumptions or limitations. While these codifications are new—particularly the regulation directing agencies to consider mitigation for impacts to environmental justice communities—most agencies have been including some environmental justice and greenhouse gas emission impacts in their NEPA reviews based upon federal governmentwide and agency policy and court precedent.

Major Federal Actions. Implementing changes in the FRA and further responding to changes made in the 2020 rule, the Final Rule revises the definition of “major federal action”—the trigger for environmental review under NEPA. The FRA, in addition to specifying that a major federal action requires “substantial Federal control and responsibility,” established several exclusions including for certain types of projects receiving loans, loan guarantees, or other types of federal financial assistance. In an effort to address some of the uncertainty raised by these exclusions, the revised regulations provide that major federal actions generally include “[p]roviding more than a minimal amount of financial assistance, . . . where the agency has the authority to deny in whole or in part the assistance due to environmental effects, has authority to impose conditions on the receipt of the financial assistance to address environmental effects, or otherwise has sufficient control and responsibility over the subsequent use of the financial assistance” or effects of the funded activity.

Alternatives. The Phase 2 Final Rule clarifies that agencies are not required to consider “every conceivable alternative to a proposed action” but rather only “a reasonable range of alternatives that will foster informed decision making.” Additionally, the revised regulations provide that agencies have the discretion, but are not required, to include reasonable alternatives not within the lead agency’s jurisdiction. CEQ continues to anticipate that this will occur relatively infrequently and notes that such alternatives still must be technically and economically feasible and meet the proposed action’s purpose and need. The Final Rule also requires that environmental documents (and not just records of decision) identify one or more environmentally preferable alternatives, which could be the proposed action, the no action alternative, or a reasonable alternative.

Mitigation. Although NEPA has long been understood to be a procedural, rather than substantive, requirement, the Phase 2 Final Rule includes several provisions intended to encourage agencies to mitigate the impacts of proposed actions and to ensure that mitigation measures that agencies rely on in making their environmental determinations are actually carried out. When an agency incorporates and relies upon mitigation measures—whether in its analysis of reasonably foreseeable effects or in a mitigated finding of no significant impact—the revised regulations require the agency to explain the enforceable mitigation requirements or commitments to be undertaken and the authority to enforce them (for example, permit conditions, agreements, or other measures), and to prepare a monitoring and compliance plan.

Development of New Information. While agencies generally historically have not been required to develop data that was not readily available, CEQ “now considers it vital to the NEPA process for agencies to undertake studies and analyses” that provide information “essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives,” provided the overall costs are not unreasonable, and includes provisions to that effect in the Final Rule.

Exhaustion, Judicial Review, and Remedies. The Phase 2 Final Rule removes several changes included in the 2020 rule relating to exhaustion, judicial review, and remedies that were intended to reduce NEPA-related litigation and project delays.

The Phase 2 revisions take effect on July 1, 2024, and apply to any NEPA process that commences after that date, although the Final Rule states that agencies may apply them to ongoing activities and environmental documents that commence prior to that date. In addition to following the CEQ regulations, agencies also have adopted agency-specific NEPA implementing procedures. Agencies must revise these procedures to incorporate changes necessitated by the Phase 2 Final Rule by July 1, 2025.

© 2024 Van Ness Feldman LLP
For more news on Environmental Regulation Implementations, visit the NLR Environmental, Energy & Resources section.

The New Retirement Security Rule: Updated Fiduciary Definition Under ERISA

On April 23, 2024, the U.S. Department of Labor (the “DOL”) promulgated a final rule, titled the “Retirement Security Rule” (the “Final Rule”), updating the definition of an “investment advice fiduciary” under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (“ERISA”). In addition, the DOL issued final amendments to several prohibited transaction class exemptions (“PTEs”) available to investment advice fiduciaries, which together with the Final Rule seek to effectuate the DOL’s goal of requiring honest investment advice from investment advice fiduciaries to retirement investors. The updated fiduciary definition under the Final Rule and the amended PTEs will become effective on September 23, 2024, with a one-year phase-in period for certain conditions of the amended PTEs.

Fiduciary Definition

The framework for determining whether a person is an investment advice fiduciary has historically required that investment advice be provided to a retirement investor on a regular basis and pursuant to a mutual agreement, arrangement, or understanding that such advice will serve as a primary basis for investment decisions.

Under the Final Rule, a person will be an investment advice fiduciary for purposes of ERISA if (1) they make a recommendation of any securities transaction or other investment transaction or any investment strategy to a retirement investor for a fee or other compensation (direct or indirect), and (2) such recommendation arises in either one of the following contexts:

  • The person either directly or indirectly (e.g., through or together with any affiliate) makes professional investment recommendations to investors on a regular basis as part of their business, and the recommendation is made under circumstances that would indicate to a reasonable investor in like circumstances that the recommendation:
    • is based on review of the retirement investor’s particular needs or individual circumstances,
    • reflects the application of professional or expert judgment to the retirement investor’s particular needs or individual circumstances, and
    • may be relied on by the retirement investor as intended to advance the retirement investor’s best interest; or
  • the person represents or acknowledges that they are acting as a fiduciary under ERISA with respect to the recommendation.

For purposes of the Final Rule, a “retirement investor” is defined as a plan, plan fiduciary, plan participant or beneficiary, IRA, IRA owner or beneficiary, or IRA fiduciary. “Recommendations” means recommendations as to:

  • the advisability of acquiring, holding, disposing of, or exchanging securities or other investment property, investment strategy, or how securities or other investment property should be invested following a rollover, transfer, or distribution from a plan or IRA;
  • the management of securities or other investment property, including, among other things, recommendations on investment policies or strategies, portfolio composition, selection of other persons to provide investment advice or investment management services, selection of investment account arrangements, or voting of proxies appurtenant to securities; or
  • rollovers, transfers, or distributions of assets from a plan or IRA, including recommendations as to whether to engage in the transaction, the amount, the form and the destination of such a rollover, transfer or distribution.

Significant Changes

The investment advice fiduciary standard in the Final Rule has become narrower than initially anticipated:

  • The DOL clarified that with respect to a person who becomes an investment advice fiduciary due to their representing or acknowledging that they are acting as a fiduciary under ERISA with respect to a recommendation, fiduciary status would apply only with respect to that recommendation and not with respect to every future interaction with the same retirement investor regardless of the circumstances.
  • The Final Rule includes a paragraph specifically confirming that sales pitches and investment education can be provided without triggering ERISA fiduciary status. A key component of this consideration is whether a sales pitch is individualized to a retirement investor’s particular needs and circumstances.

Amendment to Exemption for Transactions Involving Investment Advice (PTE 2020-02)

PTE 2020-02 generally permits parties providing fiduciary investment advice to retirement investors to receive reasonable compensation in exchange for their services, which would otherwise be prohibited in the absence of an exemption. The final amendment to PTE 2020-02 broadens the exemption to cover additional transactions and revises certain conditions, including conditions relating to disclosure, recordkeeping, and ineligibility.

The amended PTE 2020-02 applies to covered transactions on or after September 23, 2024; however, there is a one-year phase-in period beginning on September 23, 2024. During this phase-in period, investment professionals may receive reasonable compensation if they comply with the Impartial Conduct Standards and the fiduciary acknowledgement requirement.

Required Disclosure and Fiduciary Acknowledgement

The amended PTE 2020-02 requires investment advisers to provide a written acknowledgement that the institution and the investment professional are providing fiduciary advice and are fiduciaries under ERISA. Furthermore, the amended PTE 2020-02 requires investment advisers to make certain additional disclosures regarding fees, scope of services, and conflicts of interest.

Impartial Conduct Standard

The amended PTE 2020-02 replaces the “best interest standard” for determining impartial conduct with the “Care Obligation” and the “Loyalty Obligation,” which, according to the DOL, are more consistent with the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation Best Interest. Under the Care Obligation, advice must reflect the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims, based on the investment objectives, risk tolerance, financial circumstances, and needs of the retirement investor. Under the Loyalty Obligation, the investment professional must not place the financial or other interests of the professional, their affiliate or related entity, or other party ahead of the interests of the retirement investor or subordinate the retirement investor’s interests to those of the professional, their affiliate, or related entity.

Policies and Procedures

Each investment adviser must establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures prudently designed to ensure that the investment adviser and its investment professionals comply with the Impartial Conduct Standards and other exemption conditions. The policies must mitigate conflict of interests.

Specifically, investment advisers may not use quotas, appraisals, bonuses, special awards, differential compensation, or other similar actions in a manner that is intended, or that a reasonable person would conclude are likely, to result in recommendations that do not meet the Care Obligation or Loyalty Obligation. The investment adviser must provide their complete policies and procedures to the DOL within 30 days of a request.

Additionally, the investment adviser must continue to conduct a retrospective review at least annually that is reasonably designed to detect and prevent violations of and achieve compliance with the conditions of this exemption. The investment adviser must maintain records demonstrating compliance with PTE 2020-02 for a period of six years after the covered transaction.

Penalties

The amended PTE 2020-02 broadens the disqualification provisions to include convictions of certain affiliated entities and foreign convictions. Previously, an investment adviser or an investment professional was ineligible only upon a conviction for “crimes arising out of such person’s provision of investment advice” to retirement investors. Under the amended PTE 2020-02, however, a relevant conviction or final judgment that occurs on or after September 23, 2024, with respect to an entity in the same controlled group as an investment adviser would result in such investment adviser’s becoming ineligible to rely on PTE 2020-02 for a 10-year period.

The DOL’s Retirement Security Rule has broad implications for financial institutions, including investment advisers.

COPYRIGHT © 2024, STARK & STARK
For more on the Retirement Security Rule, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

Poor Oversight: Healthcare Company & Owner to Pay $1 Million for Care Plan Oversight Service Billing Fraud

The United States announced that Chicago-based healthcare company Apollo Health Inc. (Apollo), and its owner, Brian J. Weinstein, will pay $1 million to resolve False Claims Act allegations. The claims state that Apollo, under the direction of Weinstein, submitted bills to Medicare for services that were never performed. The case was brought by two whistleblowers who will be rewarded for their efforts.

From December 2014 through March 2017, Apollo allegedly submitted Medicare claims for care plan oversight services (CPO) that did not occur. CPOs detail a physician’s duties to supervise a patient receiving complex medical care. Weinstein allegedly directed Apollo to submit 12,592 CPO service claims for over two dozen providers employed by Apollo, despite Weinstein’s knowledge that no services had been rendered to Medicare patients, and no CPO services were documented in medical records.
Medicare fraud undermines the trust and integrity of the healthcare system, resulting in significant financial burdens on taxpayers. When individuals or organizations engage in fraudulent activities, such as billing for services not rendered or submitting false claims, they siphon funds from Medicare’s intended beneficiaries. Medicare fraud diminishes the resources available for legitimate healthcare services for truly ill Medicare beneficiaries.
The settlement resolves claims brought by two whistleblowers, also known as relators, under the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act. Javar Jones and Louis Curet, the relators in the case, will receive 20% of the settlement amount for bringing the fraudulent activity to the United States’ attention. Whistleblowers who report fraud against the government via a qui tam lawsuit can earn a 15-25% share of the government’s recovery.

© 2024 by Tycko & Zavareei LLP
For more news on Whistleblower Settlements, visit the Criminal Law / Business Crimes section.

Fourth Circuit Holds Firm Against Expansion of Religion-Based Defenses to Discrimination (US)

What happened in the interim that ended this beloved educator’s decorated teaching career? In 2014, shortly after North Carolina recognized same-sex marriage, Mr. Billard posted on his personal Facebook page that he and his partner of fourteen years were engaged to be married.

Lonnie Billard was a well-loved and decorated drama and English teacher at Charlotte Catholic High School (CCHS) in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. He was named Teacher of the Year in 2012 after serving the Catholic high school’s students for eleven years.

Two years later, CCHS told Mr. Billard he was not welcome back as a teacher.

CCHS has never denied why it fired Mr. Billard: his plans to marry violated the Mecklenburg Diocese’s policy against teachers engaging in conduct contrary to the moral teachings of the Catholic faith. Mr. Billard filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging sex discrimination in employment. The EEOC issued a notice of right to sue. Mr. Billard sued in federal court. He won and was awarded stipulated damages.

If that were the end of the story, although a frustrating one for Mr. Billard and his husband, the case would hardly be newsworthy. Why the case warrants attention is the defense that CCHS did not assert, and why.

The ‘Ministerial Exception’

Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, a judicially crafted concept known as the “ministerial exception” emerged among federal appellate courts: Religious institutions may discriminate in their treatment of certain employees, notwithstanding Title VII, provided that the employee plays a vital ministerial employment role or is involved in ecclesiastical matters. Indeed, ministerial exception is a misnomer because the exception is not limited to those employees holding titles of independent religious significance (e.g., priest, pastor, rabbi, imam), but also applies to employees holding important positions within churches and other religious institutions. The Supreme Court recognized the ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012). Although the Court refused to answer directly the question of who is and is not a minister, it found on the facts of the case before it that a “called teacher” with the title of “Minister of Religion, Commissioned” fit the bill.

Hosanna-Tabor was binding law when Mr. Billard filed suit in 2017. CCHS’s obvious defense to Mr. Billard’s allegations of sex discrimination was that he, as a Catholic school teacher engaged to teach his students in accordance with diocesan mission, fell within the ministerial exception, but in an unusual turn of events, CCHS waived this argument. In fact, CCHS stipulated with Mr. Billard that it would not argue that his job duties qualified him for the ministerial exception. Why? CCHS claims that it waived the ministerial exception defense because it wanted to avoid the burden of discovery around the issue of whether Mr. Billard’s role was sufficiently ministerial. (More on that below.) Since CCHS waived the best defense available to it and unequivocally admitted why it fired Mr. Billard, it’s no wonder he prevailed.

The Appeal

On appeal, CCHS propounded four affirmative defenses it had advanced without success at the trial court level – none of which included the ministerial exception. First, CCHS asserted two First Amendment-based defenses: the “church autonomy” doctrine and freedom of association. The trial and appellate courts quickly disposed of both theories, concluding that CCHS’s “church autonomy” argument was another way of trying to dress up the ministerial exception and, as to freedom of association, the courts found “no precedent for privileging a right of expressive association over anti-discrimination laws.” CCHS also asserted a statutory defense under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), but the courts made quick work of this too, finding that the RFRA does not apply to suits between private parties.

But CCHS’s fourth and final argument, and by far its most controversial, was that the trial court should have exonerated it under Title VII’s religious exemption. This notion, which is different than the First Amendment-inspired ministerial exception and derives from the plain text of Title VII, exempts certain religious organizations from Title VII’s non-discrimination strictures “with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). For instance, a Baptist church may favor hiring a Baptist minister or liturgical worship leader over a Methodist or Lutheran candidate, regardless of their respective qualifications. But the religious exemption has only ever been applied as a defense to claims of religious discrimination. Seeking to overturn decades of precedent, CCHS argued in Billard for an unprecedented expansion of the exemption, one that would permit religious organizations to discriminate even on the basis of sex, race or national origin as long as religious belief motivated the employment decision. At oral argument before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, CCHS conceded that its proffered interpretation of the religious exemption would permit discrimination against not only the relatively small number of employees of religious institutions with a claim to ministerial status, but also the hundreds of thousands of groundskeepers, custodians, bus drivers, musicians and administrative personnel that work for such institutions but whose duties are non-ecclesiastical.

An interpretation like that for which CCHS called would seriously erode protections against discrimination. For instance, under CCHS’s interpretation of the religious exemption, if a religious employer asserted as a principle of its faith that women should not work outside the home, it should be permitted to discriminate on the basis of sex. Likewise, under CCHS’s reading of the exemption, a religious employer asserting a faith-based reason for preferring one race over another would be exempt from Title VII consequences. And, to close the loop, if a religious employer held as a religious tenet that being gay or marrying one’s gay partner was a moral lapse, then it should be permitted to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.

The Fourth Circuit balked at CCHS’s statutorily ungrounded argument for an expansion of the religious employer exemption. The text of Title VII is ambiguous and exempts religious organizations “with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion”; it does not protect discrimination against individuals because of religion. The appellate court was also unimpressed by CCHS’s attempt to force a determination on these grounds by earlier waiving the ministerial exception. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit set aside the parties’ waiver and found sua sponte (meaning on the Court’s own initiative), that CCHS was not liable for discrimination for terminating Mr. Billard because he was, notwithstanding his secular teaching subjects, “a messenger of CCHS’s faith.”

The Fourth Circuit explained that it was constrained to reach this outcome based on developing jurisprudence interpreting the ministerial exception. In the years since Mr. Billard filed suit, the Supreme Court expanded on Hosanna Tabor in Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, finding in 2020 that two secular subject teachers at religious schools were nonetheless ministers within the ministerial exception as they were entrusted with educating and forming students in the school’s faith. (Notably, CCHS was represented by The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty. The Becket Fund was also lead counsel in Our Lady of Guadalupe, a fact which raises a few questions about the plausibility of CCHS’s explanation for waiving the ministerial exception. The Becket Fund claims to be a “leader[ ] in the fight for religious liberty … at home and abroad,” and has fought against COVID-19 mandates, contraception care and LGBT and unmarried parent foster and adoption rights.)

The appellate court’s decision undoubtedly provides little comfort to Mr. Billard, who is now spending his retirement with his husband whom he married in May 2015. But even though the Fourth Circuit reversed judgment in his favor and instructed the trial court to enter judgment in CCHS’s favor on the grounds that the ministerial exception protected the school, it at least rejected CCHS’s request for unfettered license to discriminate on any basis so long as it articulated a faith-based motive for doing so. As CCHS proved victorious and therefore lacks grounds to appeal to the Supreme Court, for now, religious employers remain insulated from civil interference with decisions about the appointment and removal of persons in positions of theological significance—even high school drama teachers—but may not use purported religious beliefs to justify discrimination on other grounds.

© Copyright 2024 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP
For more news on Religious-based Discrimination Defenses, visit the NLR Civil Rights section.

Death, Taxes, and Crypto Reporting – The Three Things You Cannot Escape

The IRS released a draft of Form 1099-DA “Digital Asset Proceeds from Broker Transactions” in April which will require anyone defined as a “broker” to report certain information related to the sale of digital assets. The new reporting requirements will be effective for transactions occurring in 2025 and beyond. The release of Form 1099-DA follows a change in the tax law.

In 2021, Congress amended code section 6045 to define “broker” to include any “person who (for consideration) is responsible for regularly providing any service effectuating transfers of digital assets on behalf of another person.” This is an expansion of the definition of a “broker.” The language ‘any service effectuating transfers of digital assets’ is oftentimes construed by many in the tax practitioner community as a catch-all term, in which the government could use to determine many people involved in digital asset platforms aa “brokers.”

The IRS proposed new regulations in August 2023 to further define and clarify the new reporting requirements. Under the proposed regulations, Form 1099-DA reporting would be required even for noncustodial transactions including facilitative services if the provider is in a “position to know” the identity of the seller and the nature of the transaction giving rise to gross proceeds. With apparently no discernible limits, facilitative services include “services that directly or indirectly effectuate a sale of digital assets.” Position to know means “the ability” to “request” a user’s identifying information and to determine whether a transaction gives rise to gross proceeds. Under these proposed regulations and the expanded definition of “broker,” a significant number of transactions that previously did not require 1099 reporting will now require reporting. There has been pushback against these proposed regulations, but the IRS appears determined to move forward with these additional reporting requirements.

Copyright ©2024 Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP
For more news on Taxes and Crypto Reporting, visit the NLR Tax section.

The Psychology Behind Distracted Driving: Understanding the Urge to Multitask

There was a time when modern devices like smartphones, GPS devices, and infotainment systems in cars didn’t exist, but drivers still had to contend with other distractions. These included children in the back seat, beautiful scenery, and daydreaming, which are also leading causes of car accidents.

All forms of distractions are dangerous to some extent. But there may be nothing you can do to help in some cases, for example, getting lost in thought while at the wheel.

Activities like talking on the phone, texting, messing with the infotainment system, watching a video clip, etc., call for multitasking and are 100 percent avoidable, especially considering the dangers they pose. But it may not be as easy as it sounds, as it is part of human nature to want to multitask.

What Is Multitasking?

Psychology describes multitasking as the act of handling more than one task at a time. The complexity of multitasking and its effect on the brain depends on the types of activities a person is engaging in at once.

For example, it doesn’t take a lot in terms of brain faculties to listen to music while driving, so such a thing isn’t much of a big deal. However, being in a conference meeting while driving is difficult, as both activities require much more attention, making the chances of getting into a car accident much higher.

How Does Multitasking Affect the Brain?

People handle multitasking differently, but it doesn’t make it safe for anyone while at the wheel. The science behind how the brain functions shows that the human brain can handle one task at a time, so it’s right to say there is nothing like multitasking as far as the brain goes.

What looks like multitasking is actually the brain switching between different tasks at a relatively high speed, but it can only focus on one task at any given millisecond. Eventually, the switching back and forth affects focus, accuracy, and a person’s effectiveness.

The Psychology of Distracted Driving

Distracted driving at face value is a choice. However, if you dig deeper, you will realize it takes much more than making a choice to keep off because it also has something to do with most drivers’ psychology. Technology, especially communication technologies like social media, are built to be attention-grabbing, and the more time you stay on there, the more perceived satisfaction you get.

There is always the allure of knowing what has happened in the past few minutes, how your post is doing, who’s liking it, and stuff like that. This allure and the dopamine hits individuals get from the likes and comments make staying away a battle against the mind.

There is also social pressure, and this is especially true for younger drivers. Since everyone talks of doing it, or how good they are at it, the habit seems less and less risky.

Drives can be boring and too monotonous. For people who love mind-stimulating activities, their minds always crave something exciting that only a device can offer.

You Can Avoid Driving Distracted

It won’t be easy to break a bad habit. But understanding that multitasking is a myth and that it’s only a matter of time till you make a terrible mistake should make you want to think twice about it.

It is a matter of life and death, so the question is not if you like keeping off your devices but if you want to save lives. Be intentional, even when it means putting distractions out of reach until you reach your destination.

Buckfire & Buckfire, P.C. 2024
For more news on Avoiding Distracted Driving, visit the NLR Utilities & Transport section.

How to Recover Attorneys’ Fees in a Schedule A Trademark Case in the Northern District of Illinois

In recent years, a substantial number of “Schedule A” trademark infringement cases have been filed in the Northern District of Illinois. In such a case, the trademark owner may file a trademark infringement complaint against a number of defendants, with the complaint identifying the defendants as “The Individuals, Corporations, Limited Liability Companies, Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A hereto.” [See, e.g., Opulent Complaint]

The trademark owner may file Schedule A separately from the complaint with a request to the Court that the schedule be placed under seal. Sometimes, trademark owners file the entire complaint under seal. After filing sealed pleadings that shield the defendants’ identities, the trademark owner may then file ex parte motions for temporary restraining orders (“TROs”) against the secretly-named defendants. Because the proceedings are ex parte, the alleged infringer is not given notice of the proceedings or an opportunity to appear. If the Court grants the TRO, the trademark owner may then present the TRO to online marketplaces with a demand that the marketplaces immediately stop selling the allegedly infringing goods. The result may be that an alleged infringer may find all of its activity frozen by the online marketplace, including a freeze on the alleged infringer’s cash held with the online marketplace. This may create cashflow problems for the alleged infringer and prevent the alleged infringer from making future sales. Because its identity is sealed by the court, an alleged infringer may first learn of the TRO after its accounts are frozen.

Schedule A cases appear to be concentrated in the Northern District of Illinois because judges in that district have been receptive to granting ex parte relief. See, A. Anteau, “The Northern District of Illinois v. the Internet: How Chicago Became the Center of Schedule A Trademark Infringement Litigation”; Law.Com, December 19, 2023. At least two judges in that district even provide templates for TROs, preliminary injunctions and default judgments in Schedule A cases. See Northern District of Illinois (uscourts.gov); Northern District of Illinois (uscourts.gov). The justification for the ex parte nature of these proceedings is that it, if notice was required, online counterfeiters (frequently from China) could hide their assets or move their counterfeit products to new sites as soon as an infringement case was filed.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, remedies and relief do exist if an entity is the subject of a wrongfully obtained ex parte TRO. Recently, Ya Ya Creations, a defendant in a Schedule A trademark case, obtained an attorneys’ fees award against a plaintiff that failed to conduct a proper investigation before naming two Ya Ya-affiliated entities as alleged infringers in a case filed in the Northern District of Illinois. [Award of Fees] The dispute began in August 2021, when the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Ya Ya for trademark infringement and a variety of other causes of action in the Eastern District of Texas. The Texas court transferred the case to the Central District of California in April of 2022. Four months after the transfer, the plaintiff filed a very similar lawsuit against Ya Ya in the Middle District of Florida. On May 26, 2023, the Florida court transferred the case to the Central District of California, and then the CD California consolidated the cases due to the similarity of the facts and claims. On September 26, 2023, the plaintiff filed yet another lawsuit. This time, the plaintiff filed a Schedule A trademark infringement case against a number of defendants in the Northern District of Illinois. In the Schedule A case, the plaintiff named two entities affiliated with Ya Ya as alleged infringers.

Notwithstanding the litigation history between the parties, the plaintiff obtained an ex parte TRO against Ya Ya in the Northern District of Illinois. Ya Ya first learned about the TRO after the court issued it and after an online marketplace froze Ya Ya’s accounts.

Ya Ya’s first step in seeking redress was to file an emergency motion asking the court to dissolve the ex parte TRO. [Ya Ya Motion to Dissolve TRO] Ya Ya argued that, because the parties were actively litigating against each other in California, the plaintiff had no basis to seek ex parte relief against Ya Ya or its affiliated entities without notifying Ya Ya of the proceedings. Ya Ya also argued that the plaintiff’s ex parte TRO was a transparent attempt to gain a litigation advantage in the California cases to either leverage a settlement, force Ya Ya into a position where it could not even pay its lawyers to mount a defense, or force Ya Ya to file for bankruptcy. In response to Ya Ya’s motion to dismiss, the plaintiff agreed to dismiss all of its claims against the Ya Ya-affiliated entities.

Ya Ya’s next step was to file a motion for recovery of the attorneys’ fees it expended in the Northern District of Illinois proceedings. [Ya Ya Request for Reimbursement of Attorneys’ Fees]. In response, the plaintiff argued that it was not obligated to pay Ya Ya’s attorneys’ fees, because it did not know the entities it named in the Northern District of Illinois lawsuit were affiliated with Ya Ya. But the court rejected that argument. The court concluded that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, a court may award attorneys’ fees incurred while defending an ex parte TRO when (1) the TRO caused “needless delay” and unnecessarily “increased the cost of litigation,” or (2) the TRO was obtained by pleadings that were not “well grounded in fact” or made after “reasonable inquiry.” The Court determined that plaintiff could have avoided increasing the costs of litigation if it had conducted a reasonable inquiry to determine if the two entities were affiliated with Ya Ya, but it failed to do so. As a result, the Court awarded Plaintiff to pay Ya-Ya almost $100,000 in attorneys’ fees.

Trademark litigators should be aware that judges in the Northern District of Illinois have been receptive to granting ex parte TROs in trademark cases. If you represent a client that is the subject of an improperly granted ex parte TRO, be prepared to move quickly to dissolve the TRO and consider whether you have a basis to move for an award of attorneys’ fees.

Copyright © 2024, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.
For more news on Recovering Trademark Infringement Attorney’s Fees, visit the NLR Intellectual Property section.

Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Whistleblower Reward Program is a Force-Multiplier to Detect and Combat Terrorist Financing

Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Whistleblower Program

In a May 6, 2024 speech at the SIFMA AML Conference, the Director of the Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) Andrea Gacki discussed the success of the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) in generating disclosures about money laundering and sanctions evasion:

[The whistleblower] program holds tremendous potential as an enforcement force-multiplier. Whistleblowers have submitted information relating to some of the most pressing policy objectives of the United States, from Iran- and Russia-related sanctions evasion to drug-trafficking to cyber-crimes and corruption. While efforts are underway to develop an online tip intake portal and other aspects of this important program, I want to note that even while these efforts are underway, the program is actively receiving, reviewing, and sharing tips with our enforcement partners.

We have received over 270 unique tips since the program’s inception, and many of the tips received have been highly relevant to many of Treasury’s top priorities.

The AMLA incentivizes whistleblowers to report money laundering and sanctions evasion by requiring the Department of the Treasury to pay an award where a whistleblower’s voluntary disclosure of original information leads to a successful enforcement action imposing monetary sanctions above $1,000,000. The minimum whistleblower award is ten percent of collected monetary sanctions and the maximum award is thirty percent. Awards are paid from penalties collected in successful enforcement actions stemming from whistleblower disclosures.

To determine the amount of an AMLA whistleblower award, Treasury will consider:

  • the significance of the information provided by the whistleblower to the success of the covered money laundering judicial or administrative action;
  • the degree of assistance provided by the whistleblower and any legal representative;
  • the programmatic interest of Treasury in deterring the particular violations that the whistleblower disclosed; and
  • additional relevant factors that Treasury will promulgate, which will likely echo the factors that the SEC employs to determine the amount of an SEC whistleblower award.

FinCEN Issues Advisory About Terrorist Financing

Among the violations that whistleblowers can help the government detect and combat are sanctions evasion and money laundering related to Islamic Republic of Iran-backed terrorist organizations. On May 8, 2024, FinCEN issued an Advisory to assist financial institutions in detecting potentially illicit transactions related to Islamic Republic of Iran-backed terrorist organizations. FinCEN Advisory to Financial Institutions to Counter the Financing of Iran-Backed Terrorist Organizations, FIN-2024-A001 (May 8, 2024).

The Advisory identifies the means by which certain terrorist organizations receive support from Iran and the techniques they use to illicitly access or circumvent the international financial system to raise, move, and spend funds. According to the Advisory, the sale of commodities, particularly oil, is the primary source of revenue for Iran to fund its terrorist proxies. Iran has “established large-scale global oil smuggling and money laundering networks to enable access to foreign currency and the international financial system through the illicit sale of crude oil and petroleum products in global markets.” FIN-2024-A001, at 3. In 2021, the National Iranian Oil Company sold approximately $40 billion worth of petroleum products and in 2023, Iran’s exports to the People’s Republic of China reached approximately 1.3 million barrels per day. Some of the proceeds of the sale of Iranian oil finances the activities of the IRGC-Qods Force and other terrorist groups.

Financial Institutions Can Serve as Intermediates for Terrorist Financing Transactions

Financial institutions located outside Iran become intermediaries for the IRGC-QF’s terrorist financing transactions. In particular, “third-country front companies—often incorporated as ‘trading companies’ or ‘general trading companies’—and exchange houses act as a global ‘shadow banking’ network that processes illicit commercial transactions and channels money to terrorist organizations on Iran’s behalf.” Those exchange houses and front companies rely on banks with correspondent accounts with U.S. financial institutions, especially to process dollar-denominated transactions. FIN-2024-A001, at 5.

The Advisory lists red flags of illicit or suspicious activity that financial institutions should consider in determining if a behavior or transaction is indicative of terrorist finance or is otherwise suspicious and therefore may warrant the filing of a Suspicious Activity Report:

  • A customer or a customer’s counterparty conducts transactions with Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)-designated entities and individuals, or transactions that contain a nexus to identifiers listed for OFAC-designated entities and individuals, to include email addresses, physical addresses, phone numbers, passport numbers, or CVC addresses.
  • Information included in a transaction between customers or in a note accompanying a peer-to-peer transfer include key terms known to be associated with terrorism or terrorist organizations.
  • A customer conducts transactions with a money services business (MSB) or other financial institution, including a VASP, that operates in jurisdictions known for, or at high risk for, terrorist activity and is reasonably believed to have lax customer identification and verification processes, opaque ownership, or otherwise fails to comply with AML/CFT best practices.
  • A customer conducts transactions that originate with, are directed to, or otherwise involve entities that are front companies, general “trading companies” with unclear business purposes, or other companies whose beneficial ownership information indicates that they may have a nexus with Iran or other Iran-supported terrorist groups. Indicators of possible front companies include opaque ownership structures, individuals and/or entities with obscure names that direct the company, or business addresses that are residential or co-located with other companies.
  • A customer that is or purports to be a charitable organization or NPO84 solicits donations but does not appear to provide any charitable services or openly supports terrorist activity or operations. In some cases, these organizations may post on social media platforms or encrypted messaging apps to solicit donations, including in CVC.
  • A customer receives numerous small CVC payments from many wallets, then transfers the funds to another wallet, particularly if the customer logs in using an Internet Protocol (IP) based in a jurisdiction known for, or at high risk for, terrorist activity. In such cases, financial institutions may also be able to provide associated technical details such as IP addresses with time stamps and device identifiers that can provide helpful information to authorities.
  • A customer makes money transfers to a jurisdiction known for, or at high risk for, terrorist activity that are inconsistent with their stated occupation or business purpose with vague stated purposes such as “travel expenses,” “charity,” “aid,” or “gifts.
  • A customer account receives large payouts from social media fundraisers or crowdfunding platforms and is then accessed from an IP address in a jurisdiction known for, or at high risk for, terrorist activity, particularly if the social media accounts that contribute to the fundraisers contain content supportive of terrorist campaigns.
  • A customer company is incorporated in the United States or a third-country jurisdiction, but its activities occur solely in jurisdictions known for, or at high risk for, terrorist activity and show no relationship to the company’s stated business purpose.

FIN-2024-A001, at 12-13.

© 2024 Zuckerman Law
For more news on the Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Whistleblower Reward Program, visit the NLR Criminal Law / Business Crimes section.

The FTC Has Banned Non-Competes: What Do Employers in the Energy Space Do Now?

When is the FTC’s rule effective?

The FTC’s non-compete ban is not in effect yet. It does not become effective until 120 days after the date of publication in the Federal Register of the final rule. The Federal Register is expected to publish the final rule next week, likely making the effective date around the beginning of September 2024.

Has litigation already been filed to challenge the non-compete ban?

The FTC’s non-compete ban is subject to at least two existing legal challenges seeking to have it invalidated. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler Division (Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. Federal Trade Commission, Case No. 6:24-cv-00148 (E.D. Tex. filed April 24, 2024); see also Ryan, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission, Case No. 3:24-cv-986 (N.D. Tex. filed April 23, 2024)). We don’t know whether these legal challenges will be successful, but we will provide updates when we know more.

What if the legal challenges are unsuccessful?

If the legal challenges are not successful and the rule goes into effect 120 days from next week (again, approximately early September 2024), here are steps that employers can take to get ready for the effective date:

  • Review existing agreements to determine if they are now “unfair methods of competition”:
    • One issue to analyze is whether an individual with a non-compete is a “worker” or a “senior executive.”
      • If a “senior executive,” then a non-compete in place that pre-exists that effective date can still be enforced.
      • If not a “senior executive,” then any non-compete clause that pre-dates the effective date for a worker is banned by the rule.
      • If an independent contractor (or another non-employee worker), any non-compete clause is banned.
    • Another issue to consider is whether non-solicitation, non-disclosure, or reimbursement provisions could be subject to the FTC ban. A provision that prevents a worker from seeking or accepting work in the U.S. with a different person or from operating a business in the U.S., then it is a “non-compete clause” that is subject to the rule. Depending on the wording and the factual circumstances, an obligation not to solicit customers could be considered a prohibited non-compete. For example, if an obligation not to solicit certain clients keeps a worker from accepting any job in the Permian Basin, it is arguable that the provision operates as a non-compete and violates the rule.
  • Determine whether notice is required: After reviewing which non-compete clauses are not in compliance with the FTC rule, prepare a notice for workers who are currently subject to a non-compete clause banned by the rule. The FTC put out model language on the notification, which informs the worker that the non-compete clause is no longer valid as of the effective date.
  • Update any form agreements: As part of the review of existing non-compete agreements, take the opportunity to update form agreements to remove now unenforceable non-compete (and possibly non-solicit) provisions. It is always a good idea to review and update the agreement generally to make sure that it reflects your current business and definition of confidential information.
  • Enter into non-compete agreements with “senior executives”:
    • The FTC ban permits non-compete agreements with “senior executives” that pre-exist the effective date to continue after the effective date. After the effective date, an employer may not require a senior executive to sign a new non-compete.
    • The term “senior executive” refers to officers earning more than $151,164 with “policy-making authority.” As so defined, the FTC estimates that senior executives represent less than 0.75% of all workers.
    • “Policy-making authority” means “final authority to make policy decisions that control significant aspects of a business entity or common enterprise and does not include authority limited to advising or exerting influence over such policy decisions or having final authority to make policy decisions for only a subsidiary of or affiliate of a common enterprise.”
    • Energy company officers of companies that are part of a common enterprise or joint venture will want to analyze whether senior executives have final authority that qualifies for a non-compete under the rule.
    • As always, any employer should make sure that a non-compete complies with existing state laws to assist in any enforcement efforts.
  • Take note of violations before the effective date: The FTC’s noncompete ban does not apply where a cause of action related to a noncompete clause accrued before the effective date. So, if a worker is violating a noncompete that would otherwise be banned under the FTC rule, an employer may want to consider whether to initiate legal action against that worker before the effective date to fall under this exception.
© 2024 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP
For more on the FTC Noncompete Ban, visit the NLR Labor & Employment section.

FTC: Three Enforcement Actions and a Ruling

In today’s digital landscape, the exchange of personal information has become ubiquitous, often without consumers fully comprehending the extent of its implications.

The recent actions undertaken by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) shine a light on the intricate web of data extraction and mishandling that pervades our online interactions. From the seemingly innocuous permission requests of game apps to the purported protection promises of security software, consumers find themselves at the mercy of data practices that blur the lines between consent and exploitation.

The FTC’s proposed settlements with companies like X-Mode Social (“X Mode”) and InMarket, two data aggregators, and Avast, a security software company, underscores the need for businesses to appropriately secure and limit the use of consumer data, including previously considered innocuous information such as browsing and location data. In a world where personal information serves as currency, ensuring consumer privacy compliance has never been more critical – or posed such a commercial risk for failing to get it right.

X-Mode and InMarket Settlements: The proposed settlements with X-Mode and InMarket concern numerous allegations based on the mishandling of consumers’ location data. Both companies supposedly collected precise location data through their own mobile apps and those of third parties (through software development kits).  X-Mode is alleged to have sold precise location data (advertised as being 70% accurate within 20 meters or less) linked to timestamps and unique persistent identifiers (i.e., names, email addresses, etc.) of its consumers to private government contractors without obtaining proper consent. Plotting this data on a map makes it easy to reveal each person’s movements over time.

InMarket purportedly utilized location data to cross-reference such data with points of interest to sort consumers into particularized audience segments for targeted advertising purposes without adequately informing consumers – examples of audience segments include parents of preschoolers, Christian church attendees, and “wealthy and not healthy,” among other groupings.

Avast Settlement: Avast, a security software company, allegedly sold granular and re-identifiable browsing information of its consumers despite assuring consumers it would protect their privacy. Avast allegedly collected extensive browsing data of its consumers through its antivirus software and browser extensions while ensuring its consumers that their browsing data would only be used in aggregated and anonymous form. The data collected by Avast revealed visits to various websites that could be attributed to particular people and allowed for inferences to be drawn about such individuals – examples include academic papers on symptoms of breast cancer, education courses on tax exemptions, government jobs in Fort Meade, Maryland with a salary over $100,000, links to FAFSA applications and directions from one location to another, among others.

Sensitivity of Browsing and Location Data

It is important to note that none of the underlying datasets in question contained traditional types of personally identifiable information (e.g., name, identification numbers, physical descriptions, etc.) (“PII”). Even still, the three proposed settlements by the FTC underscore the sensitive nature of browsing and location data due to the insights such data reveals, such as religious beliefs, health conditions, and financial status, and the ease with which the insights can be linked to certain individuals.

In the digital age, the amount of data available about individuals online and collected by various companies makes the re-identification of individuals easier every day. Even when traditional PII is not included in a data set, by linking sufficient data points, a profile or understanding of an individual can be created. When such profile is then linked to an identifier (such as username, phone number, or email address provided when downloading an app or setting up an account on an app) and cross-referenced with various publicly available data, such as name, email, phone number or content on social media sites, it can allow for deep insights into an individual. Despite the absence of traditional types of PII, such data poses significant privacy risks due to the potential for re-identification and the intimate details about individuals’ lives that it can divulge.

The FTC emphasizes the imperative for companies to recognize and treat browsing and location data as sensitive information and implement appropriate robust safeguards to protect consumer privacy. This is especially true when the data set includes information with the precision of those cited by the FTC in its proposed settlements.

Accountability and Consent

With browsing and location data, there is also a concern that the consumer may not be fully aware of how their data is used. For instance, Avast claimed to protect consumers’ browsing data and then sold that very same browsing information, often without notice to consumers. When Avast did inform customers of their practices, the FTC claims it deceptively stated any sharing would be “anonymous and aggregated.” Similarly, X-Mode claimed it would use location data for ad-personalization and location-based analytics. Consumers were unaware such location data was also sold to government contractors.

The FTC has recognized that a company may need to process an individual’s information to provide them with services or products requested by the individual. The FTC also holds that such processing does not mean the company is then free to collect, access, use, or transfer that information for other purposes (e.g., marketing, profiling, background screening, etc.). Essentially, purpose matters. As the FTC explains, a flashlight app provider cannot collect, use, store, or share a user’s precise geolocation data, or a tax preparation service cannot use a customer’s information to market other products or services.

If companies want to use consumer personal information for purposes other than providing the requested product or services, the FTC states that companies should inform consumers of such uses and obtain consent to do so.

The FTC aims to hold companies accountable for their data-handling practices and ensure that consumers are provided with meaningful consent mechanisms. Companies should handle consumer data only for the purposes for which data was collected and honor their privacy promises to consumers. The proposed settlements emphasize the importance of transparency, accountability, meaningful consent, and the prioritization of consumer privacy in companies’ data handling practices.

Implementing and Maintaining Safeguards

Data, especially specific data that provide insights and inferences about individuals, is extremely valuable to companies, but it is that same data that exposes such individuals’ privacy. Companies that sell or share information sometimes include limitations for the use of the data, but not all contracts have such restrictions or sufficient restrictions to safeguard individuals’ privacy.

For instance, the FTC alleges that some of Avast’s underlying contracts did not prohibit the re-identification of Avast’s users. Where Avast’s underlying contracts prohibited re-identification, the FTC alleges that purchasers of the data were still able to match Avast users’ browsing data with information from other sources if the information was not “personally identifiable.” Avast also failed to audit or confirm that purchasers of data complied with its prohibitions.

The proposed complaint against X-Mode recognized that at least twice, X-Mode sold location data to purchasers who violated restrictions in X-Mode’s contracts by reselling the data they bought from X-Mode to companies further downstream. The X-Mode example shows that even when restrictions are included in contracts, they may not prevent misuse by subsequent downstream parties.

Ongoing Commitment to Privacy Protection:

The FTC stresses the importance of obtaining informed consent before collecting or disclosing consumers’ sensitive data, as such data can violate consumer privacy and expose them to various harms, including stigma and discrimination. While privacy notices, consent, and contractual restrictions are important, the FTC emphasizes they need to be backed up by action. Accordingly, the FTC’s proposed orders require companies to design, implement, maintain, and document safeguards to protect the personal information they handle, especially when it is sensitive in nature.

What Does a Company Need To Do?

Given the recent enforcement actions by the FTC, companies should:

  1. Consider the data it collects and whether such data is needed to provide the services and products requested by the consumer and/or a legitimate business need in support of providing such services and products (e.g., billing, ongoing technical support, shipping);
  2. Consider browsing and location data as sensitive personal information;
  3. Accurately inform consumers of the types of personal information collected by the company, its uses, and parties to whom it discloses the personal information;
  4. Collect, store, use, or share consumers’ sensitive personal information (including browser and location data) only with such consumers’ informed consent;
  5. Limit the use of consumers’ personal information solely to the purposes for which it was collected and not market, sell, or monetize consumers’ personal information beyond such purpose;
  6. Design, Implement, maintain, document, and adhere to safeguards that actually maintain consumers’ privacy; and
  7. Audit and inspect service providers and third-party companies downstream with whom consumers’ data is shared to confirm they are (a) adhering to and complying with contractual restrictions and (b) implementing appropriate safeguards to protect such consumer data.
© 2024 Ward and Smith, P.A.. All Rights Reserved.
For more on the FTC, visit the NLR Communications, Media & Internet section.