Category: Uncategorized

CCPA Alert: California Attorney General Releases Draft Regulations

On October 10, 2019, the California Attorney General released the highly anticipated draft regulations for the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA). The regulations focus heavily on three main areas: 1) notices to consumers, 2) consumer requests and 3) verification requirements. While the regulations focus heavily on these three topics, they also discuss special rules for minors, non-discrimination standards and other aspects of the CCPA. Despite high hopes, the regulations do not provide the clarity many companies desired. Instead, the regulations layer on new requirements while sprinkling in further ambiguities.

The most surprising new requirements proposed in the regulations include:

  • New disclosure requirements for businesses that collect personal information from more than 4,000,000 consumers
  • Businesses must acknowledge the receipt of consumer requests within 10 days
  • Businesses must honor “Do Not Sell” requests within 15 days and inform any third parties who received the personal information of the request within 90 days
  • Businesses must obtain consumer consent to use personal information for a use not disclosed at the time of collection

The following are additional highlights from each of the three main areas:

1. Notices to consumers

The regulations discuss four types of notices to consumers: notice at the time of collection, notice of the right to opt-out of the sale of personal information, notice of financial incentives and a privacy policy. All required notices must be:

  • Easy to read in plain, straightforward language
  • In a format that draws the consumer’s attention to the notice
  • Accessible to those with disabilities
  • Available in all languages in which the company regularly conducts business

The regulations make clear that it is necessary, but not sufficient, to update your privacy policy to be compliant with CCPA. You must also provide notice to consumers at the time of data collection, which must be visible and accessible before any personal information is collected. The regulations make clear that no personal information may be collected without proper notice. You may use your privacy policy as the notice at the time of collection, but you must link to a specific section of your privacy policy that provides the statutorily required notice.

The regulations specifically provide that for offline collection, businesses could provide a paper version of the notice or post prominent signage. Similar to General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), a company may only use personal information for the purposes identified at the time of collection. Otherwise, the business must obtain explicit consent to use the personal information for a new purpose.

In addition to the privacy policy requirements in the statute itself, the regulations require more privacy policy disclosures. For example, the business must include instructions on how to verify a consumer request and how to exercise consumer rights through an agent. Further, the privacy policy must identify the following information for each category of personal information collected: the sources of the information, how the information is used and the categories of third parties to whom the information is disclosed. For businesses that collect personal information of 4,000,000 or more consumers, the regulations require additional disclosures related to the number of consumer requests and the average response times. Given the additional nuances of the disclosure requirements, we recommend working with counsel to develop your privacy policy.

If a business provides financial incentives to a consumer for allowing the sale of their personal information, then the business must provide a notice of the financial incentive. The notice must include a description of the incentive, its material terms, instructions on how to opt-in to the incentive, how to withdraw from the incentive and an explanation of why the incentive is permitted by CCPA.

Finally, the regulations state that service providers that collect personal information on behalf of a business may not use that personal information for their own purposes. Instead, they are limited to performing only their obligations under the contract between the business and service provider. The contract between the parties must also include the provisions described in CCPA to ensure that the relationship is a service provider/business relationship, and not a sale of personal information between a business and third party.

2. Consumer requests

Businesses must provide at least two methods for consumers to submit requests (most commonly an online form and a toll-free number), and one of the methods must reflect the manner in which the business primarily interacts with the consumer. In addition, businesses that substantially interact with consumers offline must provide an offline method for consumers to exercise their right to opt-out, such as providing a paper form. The regulations specifically call out that in-person retailers may therefore need three methods: a paper form, an online form and a toll-free number.

The regulations do limit some consumer request rights by prohibiting the disclosure of Social Security numbers, driver’s license numbers, financial account numbers, medical-related identification numbers, passwords, and security questions and answers. Presumably, this is for two reasons: the individual should already know this information and most of these types of information are subject to exemptions from CCPA.

One of the most notable clarifications related to requests is that the 45-day timeline to respond to a consumer request includes any time required to verify the request. Additionally, the regulations introduce a new timeline requirement for consumer requests. Specifically, businesses must confirm receipt of a request within 10 days. Another new requirement is that businesses must respond to opt-out requests within 15 days and must inform all third parties to stop selling the consumer’s information within 90 days. Further, the regulations require that businesses maintain request records logs for 24 months.

3. Verification requirements

The most helpful guidance in the regulations relates to verification requests. The regulations provide that a more rigorous verification process should apply to more sensitive information. That is, businesses should not release sensitive information without being highly certain about the identity of the individual requesting the information. Businesses should, where possible, avoid collecting new personal information during the verification process and should instead rely on confirming information already in the business’ possession. Verification can be through a password-protected account provided that consumers re-authenticate themselves. For websites that provision accounts to users, requests must be made through that account. Matching two data points provided by the consumer with data points maintained by the business constitutes verification to a reasonable degree of certainty, and the matching of three data points constitutes a high degree of certainty.

The regulations also provide prescriptive steps of what to do in cases where an identity cannot be verified. For example, if a business cannot verify the identity of a person making a request for access, then the business may proceed as if the consumer requested disclosure of only the categories of personal information, as opposed to the content of such personal information. If a business cannot verify a request for deletion, then the business should treat the request as one to opt-out of the sale of personal information.

Next steps

These draft regulations add new wrinkles, and some clarity, to what is required for CCPA compliance. As we move closer to January 1, 2020 companies should continue to focus on preparing compliant disclosures and notices, finalizing their privacy policies and establishing procedures to handle consumer requests. Despite the need to press forward on compliance, the regulations are open to initial public comment until December 6, 2019, with a promise to finalize the regulations in the spring of 2020. We expect further clarity as these draft regulations go through the comment process and privacy professionals, attorneys, businesses and other stakeholders weigh in on their clarity and reasonableness.

Copyright © 2019 Godfrey & Kahn S.C.

For more on CCPA implementation, see the National Law Review Consumer Protection law page.

5 Ways Traditional Law Firm Culture Burdens Lawyers of Color

City University of New York Scholar and Sociologist Tsedale M. Melaku studies diversity in the legal field, and in a recent Harvard Business Review article she wrote specifically about the social and professional challenges nonwhite lawyers face when they work for traditional law firms. While most white law leaders now appreciate the importance of fostering diversity, their own life experiences may blind them to the specific ways in which conventional law firm culture complicates the path for the lawyers they sincerely want to recruit, retain and support.

Fortunately, Melaku’s interviews with these lawyers illuminate the very concrete problems — and hint at solutions, many of which can be driven, or at least implemented, by marketing and business development teams. Here’s a handful of the challenges these lawyers face:

PR and marketing support automatically follows the rainmakers.

When an attorney lands a game-changing client or nabs a record settlement, the firm promotes the win with a press release, mention in the legal press and maybe even an opportunity for that lawyer to write a column on his practice area. Those are all smart PR moves. But if your marketing and PR “carrots” are distributed just to your firm’s big winners, you may find that every time a picture of one of your lawyers runs in the legal press, it is one of the same handful of white men.

Instead, firms need to imagine a broader purpose for PR: spotlighting attorneys for what makes them unique can be a catalyst for growth and advancement, rather than just a reward that comes after an important deal. Do you have attorneys taking a novel approach to some niche within their practice area? Or who came to their work in the law by an unusual route? What about interesting pro bono work? An active blog, a podcast or other creative use of technology to reach clients? All of these traits represent potential avenues for feature stories, bylined thought leadership articles, conversations with reporters or ideas for conference panels that will give new attorneys a chance to build their individual profiles and the overall brand of the firm.

Serving as the “face” of the firm’s diversity initiatives is (uncompensated) work.

Sadly, diversity is so rare in the leadership class that when firms do manage to advance a lawyer of color, that person is often tasked with representing the firm on panels and at events in addition to serving their clients. While some lawyers may welcome these opportunities, others might prefer to focus on the practice of law. So, even as firms provide additional PR and marketing support for diverse attorneys, firm leaders must recognize that contributing to outreach and diversity initiatives is work — and should be treated as such. Some firms allow attorneys to bill for this time just as they would for client work. Others consider it on performance evaluations when it comes time for raises or bonuses. Find a way to compensate these attorneys for this extra work.

Traditional networking depends on access.

Snagging clients on the golf course, in the country club, or during an ivy league alumni weekend are great business development strategies — for some people. But not all lawyers grew up playing golf, and many elite clubs in this country still have a checkered relationship with diversity, making membership far from routine or even comfortable for lawyers of color. Does your firm celebrate these “chance” encounters with clients at the expense of more formal and inclusive forms of networking?

Support your hires from nontraditional backgrounds by helping them build professional networks that feel authentic to their own experience. This might include support from communications professionals to pitch them for conference panels, nominate them for awards and help them get involved in professional organizations. There is more than one way to network, and lawyers need to know their firm supports their pursuit of new business in ways that honor who they are.

Mentors tend to choose mentees who look like them.

Mentoring has been held up as a key tool for improving retention and advancement. But when senior attorneys think about grooming the lawyers who will someday lead the firm — and inherit their clients — they tend to choose the lawyers who remind them of themselves. Firms are fond of saying that mentoring relationships should come together “naturally,” but for young lawyers who don’t see people like them in leadership positions, this often leads to no mentoring at all.

Firms can take action on this without getting paralyzed by the chicken-and-egg problem (the only way to advance young minority lawyers is to put minority mentors in place, but those lawyers need mentors to get there). Proactive planning to make mentoring part of the work process, and careful matchmaking to connect your firm’s best teachers with the lawyers who can benefit from their experience are good first steps. Not everyone is cut out to be a mentor, and that’s fine. The firm should take responsibility for facilitating these relationships and for evaluating the effectiveness of mentors. Are their mentees advancing in demonstrable ways? Mentorship should involve more than just offering advice; mentors should also be actively sponsoring and promoting their protégés for stretch assignments and leadership opportunities.

Dress codes privilege European standards.

Lawyers of color face both explicit and implicit expectations about how members of the firm should dress and wear their hair. While written dress codes that prohibit, for example, garments worn for religious reasons are obvious violations of equal employment opportunity laws, rules that bar styles worn for cultural or personal reasons may be legal but no less burdensome. In some firms, the written dress code is quite vague, requiring “professional dress,” but the implicit expectations that come along with it are specific and exacting.

The truth is, the notion that conservative business suits for men and women set the standard for professionalism is a white, Western idea. So are norms around hairstyles, facial hair, makeup, jewelry, fingernails, heel height and other aspects of personal expression. Body sizes vary, and not everyone can easily (or affordably) adhere to traditional requirements. Or they may not want to. Dressing authentically is, for many people, an expression of pride in their identities and an opportunity to increase visibility and inclusion, sending a message to younger attorneys on the way up that they, too, belong. If your firm insists on conformity, even when it doesn’t impact job performance, whom might that exclude? And what does your firm miss out on when your lawyers aren’t comfortable bringing their whole selves to work?

Firms that are truly serious about moving the needle on diversity and inclusion understand that the secret is not rearranging the seats at the table, but making that table bigger. In every aspect of work life at the firm — office culture, client engagement, mentoring, promotion and, of course, the practice of law itself — you must establish policies that encourage your attorneys to bring their unique perspectives and insights with them each day. It’s how you will retain and advance the diverse leadership class your clients demand. And it’s the only way you will realize the true benefits that come from different kinds of people solving problems in different ways.

© 2019 Page2 Communications. All rights reserved.

For more on law firm diversity, see the National Law Review Law Office Management page.

LinkedIn Petitions Circuit Court for En Banc Review of hiQ Scraping Decision

On October 11, 2019, LinkedIn Corp. (“LinkedIn”) filed a petition for rehearing en banc of the Ninth Circuit’s blockbuster decision in hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., No. 17-16783 (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 2019). The crucial question before the original panel concerned the scope of Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) liability to unwanted web scraping of publicly available social media profile data and whether once hiQ Labs, Inc. (“hiQ”), a data analytics firm, received LinkedIn’s cease-and-desist letter demanding it stop scraping public profiles, any further scraping of such data was “without authorization” within the meaning of the CFAA. The appeals court affirmed the lower court’s order granting a preliminary injunction barring LinkedIn from blocking hiQ from accessing and scraping publicly available LinkedIn member profiles to create competing business analytic products. Most notably, the Ninth Circuit held that hiQ had shown a likelihood of success on the merits in its claim that when a computer network generally permits public access to its data, a user’s accessing that publicly available data will not constitute access “without authorization” under the CFAA.

In its petition for en banc rehearing, LinkedIn advanced several arguments, including:

  • The hiQ decision conflicts with the Ninth Circuit Power Ventures precedent, where the appeals court held that a commercial entity that accesses a website after permission has been explicitly revoked can, under certain circumstances, be civilly liable under the CFAA. Power Ventures involved Facebook user data protected by password (that users initially allowed a data aggregator permission to access). LinkedIn argued that the hiQ court’s logic in distinguishing Power Ventures was flawed and that the manner in which a user classifies his or her profile data should have no bearing on a website owner’s right to protect its physical servers from trespass.

“Power Ventures thus holds that computer owners can deny authorization to access their physical servers within the meaning of the CFAA, even when users have authorized access to data stored on the owner’s servers. […] Nothing about a data owner’s decision to place her data on a website changes LinkedIn’s independent right to regulate who can access its website servers.”

  • The language of the CFAA should not be read to allow for “authorization” to be assumed (and unable to be revoked) for publicly available website data, either under Ninth Circuit precedent or under the CFAA-related case law of other circuits.

“Nothing in the CFAA’s text or the definition of ‘authorization’ that the panel employed—“[o]fficial permission to do something; sanction or warrant,” suggests that enabling websites to be publicly viewable is not ‘authorization’ that can be revoked.”

  • The privacy interests enunciated by LinkedIn on behalf of its users is “of exceptional importance,” and the court discounted the fact that hiQ is “unaccountable” and has no contractual relationship with LinkedIn users, such that hiQ could conceivably share the scraped data or aggregate it with other data.

“Instead of recognizing that LinkedIn members share their information on LinkedIn with the expectation that it will be viewed by a particular audience (human beings) in a particular way (by visiting their pages)—and that it will be subject to LinkedIn’s sophisticated technical measures designed to block automated requests—the panel assumed that LinkedIn members expect that their data will be ‘accessed by others, including for commercial purposes,’ even purposes antithetical to their privacy setting selections. That conclusion is fundamentally wrong.

Both website operators and open internet advocates will be watching closely to see if the full Ninth Circuit decides to rehear the appeal, given the importance of the CFAA issue and the prevalence of data scraping of publicly available website content. We will keep a close watch on developments.

© 2019 Proskauer Rose LLP.

Suit Over ‘No Preservatives’ Capri Sun Label Tossed

A proposed class action, filed in the Northern District of Illinois on October 25, 2018, against Kraft Heinz Food Co. accused the company of falsely advertising its Capri Sun juice as containing “no preservatives” when in fact it contains citric acid. Tarzian et al v. Kraft Heinz Food Company, Case No. 1:18-cv-07148. The complaint alleged that the representation that Capri Sun beverages contain “No Artificial Coloring, Flavors, or Preservatives” is unfair and deceptive advertising as the beverages contain a well-known preservative, citric acid.

In an order filed on October 10, 2019, U.S. District Judge Charles P. Kocoras dismissed the lawsuit and found that while the plaintiffs allege practices commonly used to manufacture citric acid throughout the industry, plaintiffs failed to draw a connection between the common industry practice and the actual practice used by Kraft.

This dismissal follows a dismissal of a similar matter in California federal court in 2015. Osborne v. Kraft Heinz Group, Inc., Case No. 3:15-cv-02653. In that case, plaintiffs accused Kraft of mislabeling Capri Sun drinks as “all natural” when they allegedly contained synthetic ingredients, including citric acid and natural flavor. In a hearing on the defendant’s motion to dismiss, U.S. District Judge Vince Chhabria found that plaintiff did not know whether the citric acid used in Capri Sun’s drinks was natural or synthetic. The judge ultimately granted Kraft Heinz’s motion to dismiss with leave to amend the complaint. The plaintiff never filed an amended complaint.

© 2019 Keller and Heckman LLP

For more on food labeling laws, see the National Law Review Biotech, Food & Drug law page.

Whatever Happened to that Big Ringless Voicemail Decision We Were All Expecting? It Was a Nothing Burger—For Now

You’ll recall a few weeks back TCPAWorld.com featured analysis of efforts by VoApps—makers of the DirectDrop ringless voicemail platform—to stem the tide of negative TCPA rulings addressing ringless voicemail technologies. VoApps founder David King even joined the Unprecedented podcast to discuss his submission of a lengthy declaration to the court addressing how the technology works and why it is not covered by the TCPA.

Well, a few days ago the Court issued its ruling on the pending motion—a summary judgment effort by the Plaintiff—and I must say, it was rather anti-climactic. Indeed, the court punted entirely on the key issue.

In Saunders v. Dyck O’Neal, Case No. 1:17-CV-335, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177606 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 4, 2019) the court issued its highly-anticipated ruling on the Plaintiff’s bid to earn judgment following the Court’s earlier ruling that a ringless voicemail is a call under the TCPA. It was in response to this motion that VoApps submitted a mountain of evidence that although a ringless voicemail may be a “call” it is not a call to a number assigned to a cellular service—and so such calls are not actionable under the TCPA’s infamous section 227(b).

Rather than answer the question directly the Court made mincemeat of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and treated the summary judgment motion as if it were some sort of motion to confirm the Court’s earlier ruling. This is weird because: i) no it wasn’t; and ii) there’s no such thing. As the Court put it: “Admittedly, Saunders moved for summary judgment, but her motion is in fact limited to a request for clarification of the impact of the Court’s prior ruling: Was the Court’s prior ruling that DONI’s messaging technology falls within the purview of the TCPA a ruling as a matter of law that binds the parties going forward? The answer is clearly yes.”

Great. So we now know what we already all knew—the Saunders court holds that a ringless voicemail is a call. Got it. As to the key issue of whether the calls were made to a landline to a cell phone, however, the Court finds: “These issues were unnecessary to Saunders’s motion, as she has not [actually] moved for summary judgment on her claim.”

So there you go. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was not actually a motion for summary judgment after all. So all that work by VoApps was for nothing. But not really. Obviously this fight is not yet over. The Court declined to enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff meaning that further work—and perhaps a trial—lies ahead for the good folks over at VoApps. We’ll keep you posted.

 

© Copyright 2019 Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

For more on voicemail & phone regulation, see the National Law Review Communications, Media & Internet law page.

Bite Your Tongue: NLRB Rules that Produce Company’s Media, Confidentiality Policies are Lawful

The NLRB under the current administration continues to issue decisions that factor in legitimate business considerations of employers when evaluating rules that are alleged to restrict employee protections under the NLRA.  One such recently issued decision, LA Specialty Produce Company, 368 NLRB No. 93 (October 10, 2019), may have particular significance because it addresses an important issue — restrictions on communications responsive to inquiries from the media.

The restriction at issue in the LA Specialty case provided as follows:

“Employees approached for interview and/or comments by the news media, cannot provide them with any information. Our President, Michael Glick, is the only person authorized and designated to comment on Company policies or any event that may affect our organization.”

The Board’s general counsel issued a complaint alleging that the rule in its entirety violated the NLRA because it purportedly chilled employees from exercising their section 7 rights under the NLRA, including the right to discuss work issues publicly when asked to comment by the press.  The administrative law judge found the rule to be overly broad, and therefore unlawful, because on its face it could be construed to cover NLRA-protected activities; however, the Board disagreed with this reading of the rule.  While the Board recognized that the first sentence of the rule, standing alone, might suggest that employees may never speak to the news media when approached for comment, it concluded that an objectively reasonable employee would understand that the second sentence qualified the first sentence by explaining that only the company president was authorized and designated to comment on company matters. Thus, read as a whole, a reasonable employee would understand that he or she is only precluded from speaking on behalf of the employer when approached for comment.

The Board also designated this rule as a “category 1” rule under the principles announced by the Board in Boeing Co., a Board decision that was issued in December of 2017. “Category 1” rules include rules the Board designates as lawful, either because (i) the rule, when reasonably interpreted, does not prohibit or interfere with the exercise of NLRA rights; or (ii) the potential adverse impact on protected rights is outweighed by justifications associated with the rule.  See our client alert here.  Since there is no Section 7 right to speak to the media on behalf of the employer, the Board concluded that the employer’s media contact restriction, when reasonably interpreted, would not potentially interfere with the exercise of Section 7 rights.

© 2019 Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP

For more NLRB decisions, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

Can an Employee be Fired for Being Gay or Transgender?

HR Professionals will soon know the answer to this question.

The United States Supreme Court is preparing to settle a contentious debate on employee protections under federal employment discrimination laws.  On October 7th, the Court returned from its summer break to start the new term.  The Court did not have to wait long before it tackled a complex case because on October 8th, the Court heard two major oral arguments with potentially far-reaching implications for both employers and employees.  Both cases focus on the prohibitions in employment discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”).  Under Title VII, Congress made it illegal for employers to discriminate against employees on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.”  The question that the Court will address is whether employment discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity is prohibited employment discrimination “because of sex.”

The first case the Court heard was a consolidated matter involving cases from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda) and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia), both of which involve men who claim they were fired from their jobs because of their sexual orientation.

Second Circuit: “Sex” is Necessarily a Factor in Sexual Orientation

The plaintiff in Zarda, Donald Zarda, was a skydiving instructor, who died in 2014.  Prior to his death, a female client complained that Zarda inappropriately touched her during a jump.  At some point, Zarda communicated to the client that he was a homosexual and “had an ex-husband,” a practice that Zarda stated he often did with female clients to put them at ease.  Altitude Express terminated Zarda in connection with the complaint; however, Zarda insisted he was fired solely because of his reference to his sexual orientation.

A federal district court granted summary judgment against Zarda, reasoning that his claim was not cognizable under Title VII.  However, the Second Circuit reversed, with a majority of the court believing that sexual orientation discrimination is motivated by sex and, therefore, a “subset of sex discrimination.”  Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that federal law prohibits the firing of an employee on the basis of sexual orientation.  Notably, the court reached this conclusion by taking a broad interpretation of the meaning of the text “because of sex.”  Specifically, the court reasoned that Title VII must protect sexual orientation “because sex is necessarily a factor in sexual orientation.”

Eleventh Circuit: Discharge for Homosexuality Not Prohibited by Title VII

The Eleventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia.  The plaintiff in Bostock, Gerald Bostock, was a Child Welfare Services Coordinator in Clayton County for over ten years.  Although Bostock had received good performance reviews for his work, an internal audit was conducted on his program’s funds.  Bostock, who is gay, claimed the audit was a “pretext for discrimination against him because of his sexual orientation.”  During an advisory meeting, where Bostock’s supervisor was present, at least one person criticized Bostock’s sexual orientation and his participation in a gay softball league.

After his complaint was dismissed at the district court level, Bostock appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.  Referring back to a 1979 decision, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that it had already held that “[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII.”  While hinting that this earlier ruling may have been wrong, the court held that it had no choice but to follow precedent and affirm the dismissal of Bostock’s claim.

Sixth Circuit: Discrimination on the Basis of Transgender and Transitioning Status is Necessarily Discrimination on the Basis of Sex

The second case, Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC, presents a similar question to Zarda and Bostock.  That is, whether employees can be fired based on their status as transgender.

The case involves Aimee Stephens, who was a funeral director and embalmer for R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes.  While working in this position for six years, Stephens dressed and presented herself as a man without issue.  However, once Stephens communicated that she wanted to live and work as a woman before having sex-reassignment surgery, she was terminated.  The owner of the funeral home, a devout Christian, admitted that Stephens was fired because she “was no longer going to represent himself as a man.  He wanted to dress as a woman.”  The owner believed this change would violate “God’s commands.”

After Stephens filed a discrimination charge, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) pursued a complaint on her behalf against the funeral home.  In ruling in favor of the employer, the district court reasoned that transgender status is not a protected trait under Title VII and that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) precludes the EEOC from enforcing Title VII in this instance as doing so would substantially burden the employer’s religious exercise.  The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that “discrimination on the basis of transgender and transitioning status is necessarily discrimination on the basis of sex.”  The court further ruled that the RFRA did not apply to protect the funeral home’s actions because the funeral home was not a “religious institution,” and Stephens was not a “ministerial employee” excluded from Title VII’s protections.

Stakeholders: States, Federal Government, Employers, and Employees

The Supreme Court’s ruling in these cases, which is expected in the spring or summer of 2020, has the potential to be monumental because of the many stakeholders involved.  Currently, 21 states and the District of Columbia have barred sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination by statute or regulation, as have a number of counties and municipalities.  While a few other states provide protection from this type of discrimination either by agency interpretation or court ruling, the remaining states in the country offer no protection under their state laws.  This means that LGBTQ individuals who live in states such as Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, and even North Carolina (at least with respect to private employers) may have no remedy to this type of employment discrimination outside of Title VII.

Additionally, states who have passed laws in this area may face challenges in enforcing those laws if the Supreme Court decides that Title VII does not protect gay and transgender status.  Many of these states lean on the EEOC’s authority to investigate claims of discrimination against companies that operate in multiple jurisdictions, and the EEOC has been successful in partnering with states to investigate discrimination claims and enforce such actions.  However, states would lose EEOC assistance should the Court decide that Title VII’s scope does not extend to sexual orientation or gender identification.

Although the EEOC traditionally has been on the side of expanding Title VII protections, the federal government in the most recent litigation has aligned itself with the employers.  In particular, United States Solicitor General Noel Francisco argued that Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination “because of sex” does not apply to sexual orientation or gender identity.  Accepting this interpretation, Title VII is limited to barring employers from treating women different from men in the same or similar position, and vice-versa.

Equally important to the states’ and federal government’s interest is the interest of employers.  Companies have lined up on both sides of the debate with over 36 briefs filed in support of Bostock and Zarda, and over 24 briefs filed in support of Clayton County and Altitude Express.  For example, one brief filed in support of Bostock and Zarda includes 206 companies representing businesses such as Apple, Google, Facebook, Walt Disney, Coca-Cola, and Uber.  These businesses argued that interpreting Title VII to “exclude sexual orientation or gender identity from protections against sex discrimination would have wide-ranging, negative consequences for businesses, their employees, and the U.S. economy.”  In contrast, the C12 group that represents “the largest network of Christian CEOs, business owners, and executives in the United States” filed a separate brief in support of the employers arguing that interpreting “because of sex” in Title VII to include sexual orientation and gender identity ignores the natural meaning of the law, “thereby bypassing the political process, shutting down debate, preventing any accommodation of divergent views, and precluding any compromise.”

Makeup of the Court: The Deciding Vote

Prior to his retirement, Justice Anthony Kennedy was the deciding vote in several gay rights cases.  However, Justice Kennedy is no longer on the bench, and these cases present the first opportunity for the public to see how his successor, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, will vote on these issues.  Also, Justice Neil Gorsuch, successor to Justice Antonin Scalia, may play a key role in deciding these issues.  Similar to Scalia, it is believed that Justice Gorsuch is more inclined to rule that courts should naturally interpret statutes as they were meant when enacted.  Should Justice Gorsuch hold firm to this view, then there is some thought that he may conclude sexual orientation and gender identity were not meant to be included as discrimination “because of sex” under Title VII.  The perspectives of these new Justices are likely to dictate the Court’s ultimate decision – a decision which may directly impact the employment landscape for years to come.

© 2019 Ward and Smith, P.A. All Rights Reserved.

For more on Employment Protections, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment and Civil Rights law pages.

FCA Publishes “Brexit Special” Market Watch

On October 7, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) published a “Brexit Special” of its monthly Market Watch newsletter, in which it summarized some recent developments and publications in connection with the regulated sector’s preparedness for the forthcoming departure of the UK from the EU on November 1.

In the newsletter, the FCA noted that Andrew Bailey, FCA CEO, gave a speech in September at Bloomberg London on the Brexit “state of play”. Mr. Bailey outlined recent developments and the outstanding issues, such as the desire for an equivalence agreement for the Share Trading Obligation (STO). (For more information, please see the June 14 edition of Corporate & Financial Weekly Digest).

The FCA explained that transaction reporting rules under the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR) will not be subject to the temporary transitional power. (For more information, please see the September 27 edition of Corporate & Financial Weekly Digest). Therefore, firms, trading venues and approved reporting mechanisms will need to take “reasonable steps to comply with the changes to their regulatory obligations”. Firms who cannot comply on the day that the UK leaves the EU will need to back-report missing, incomplete or inaccurate transaction reports as soon as possible thereafter.

The FCA provided an updated statement on the operation of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) transparency regime following Brexit. The FCA published a statement on this topic in March 2019 (please see the March 8 edition of Corporate & Financial Weekly Digest), and the main purpose of this update was to change dates to reflect the extension of the departure date from March to October 2019.

The FCA’s MiFID transparency regime update also reflects a statement made on October 7 from the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). In addition to other updates, ESMA described how reference data submitted by UK trading venues and systematic internalisers will be phased out of EU calculations. ESMA will “freeze” the quarterly calculations until Q1 2020, during which time the EU will re-determine the relevant competent authority (RCA) for all financial instruments that remain available for trading in the EU, for which the FCA is currently the RCA.

Finally, the FCA announced that industry testing for the FCA Financial Instruments Transparency Systems (FITRS) would start on October 10 and noted that it continues to update the Brexit material available on its website.

The Market Watch newsletter is available here.

Andrew Bailey’s speech is available here.

The FCA’s updated statement is available here.

ESMA’s statement is available here.

©2019 Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

California’s “Housing Crisis Act of 2019” May Boost Housing Production or Just Boost Housing-Related Litigation

On October 9, 2019, Governor Newsom signed into law Senate Bill (SB) 330, or the “Housing Crisis Act of 2019” in an effort to combat California’s current housing shortage, which has resulted in the highest rents and lowest homeownership rates in the nation. In a nutshell, the Housing Crisis Act of 2019 seeks to boost homebuilding throughout the State for at least the next 5 years, particularly in urbanized zones, by expediting the approval process for housing development. To accomplish this, the Housing Crisis Act of 2019 removes some local discretionary land use controls currently in place and requires municipalities to approve all developments that comply with current zoning codes and general plans. If not extended, SB 330 will only be effective from January 1, 2020 through January 1, 2025.

Governor Newsom signed SB 330 over the objections of local governments to help meet his ambitious goal of 3.5 million new housing units by 2025. One study by UCLA found that localities have already approved zoning for 2.8 million new housing units – 80% of Governor Newsom’s goal. However, if zoning alone was enough to increase housing production, California’s rate of housing production would be increasing. Instead, in the first half of 2019, there was a 20% reduction in the issuance of residential building permits compared to the same time period in 2018. California believes the reduction was due, in part, to excessive hearings and local approval procedures, mid-application spikes in development impact fees, and mid-application changes to development regulations, all of which can render a residential development project infeasible.

Only time will tell if SB 330 will actually increase the rate of housing production or merely fill the courts with more housing-related litigation prior to SB 330’s sunset in 5 years. However, one thing is for sure – local governments must tread carefully before denying the next housing project.

Major Provisions:

The Housing Crisis Act of 2019 applies to all housing developments consistent with objective general plan, zoning and subdivision standards in affect at the time an application is deemed complete, and affects all cities and counties in California – including charter cities. A “housing development” is defined as a project that is (1) all residential; (2) a mixed use project with at least two-thirds of the square-footage residential; or (3) for transitional or supportive housing.

SB 330 also places extra restrictions on certain “affected” cities and counties with housing statistics below national averages. As defined by the legislation, today there are nearly 450 cities and unincorporated parts of counties that qualify as “affected.”

For all cities and counties, the Housing Crisis Act of 2019’s major impacts include:

  • Retroactive prevention of zoning codes or design standards alterations that reduce residential density or intensity of use from that which was in place on January 1, 2018;
  • Authorization of proposed housing developments to override the local zoning codes that are inconsistent with the general plan, if the project is consistent with the general plan or land-use element of a specific plan;
  • Prevention of non-scheduled impact fees increases after a project applicant has submitted all preliminary required information;
  • Limitation of the number of public hearings on a development to 5; and
  • Specification that applications must be reviewed for completeness within 30 days of submission, provision of a written notice to the applicant if the agency believes the project is inconsistent with objective local development plans, policies and standards within 30 days if a housing project is under 150 units (and 60 days if the housing project is over 150 units).

Additional controls on “affected”[1] cities include:

  • Prevention of municipalities from enacting moratoriums on residential and mixed use projects;
  • Prevention of municipalities from establishing caps on the number of people who can live in the municipality, the number of housing units allowed, or the number of housing units to be constructed; and
  • Prevention of any density reductions or changes to design standards that downzone or limit housing development.

In addition to the above-mentioned controls on a local government’s ability to restrict development, there are also special limitations on reductions to affordable housing in a community. As to cities and counties, a local agency may not disapprove, or condition approval in a manner that renders infeasible a housing project for very low, low-, or moderate-income households or emergency shelters without specific written findings based on a preponderance of evidence in the record. This only applies to projects with 20% of the total units set-aside for affordable housing at 60% area median income (AMI) or 100% of the total units set-aside for affordable housing at 100% AMI.

As for developers, the Housing Crisis Act of 2019 bans any demolition of affordable or rent-controlled units unless the developer replaces all such units, allows tenants to stay in their homes until 6 months before construction begins, provides relocation assistance to tenants, and offers tenants a first right of return at an affordable rent.

SB 330 also implements penalties for violation of Housing Accountability Act (Govt. Code § 65589.5) (HAA) rules. Specifically, a court may require an agency make appropriate findings of denial or pay a $10,000 per unit fine into affordable housing funds. In the case of a local agency’s bad faith and failure to comply with a court order within 60 days, fines can increase to $50,000 per unit and the court can overturn a project denial and approve the project itself. Bad faith includes decisions that are frivolous or entirely without merit.

[1] SB 330 sets out criteria for identifying “affected” cities based on incorporation, size, and the average rent and vacancy rate compared to the national average.

Copyright © 2019, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.

ARTICLE BY Jeffrey W. Forrest and Kelsey Clayton, Law Clerk at Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP.
For more on housing development, see the National Law Review Real Estate law page.

Five Tips to Mitigate Risk in Cryptocurrency Mergers and Acquisitions

Congratulations!

Your client just closed on the purchase of a cutting-edge, blockchainbased payment processing startup. Before this deal, you had heard of bitcoin and blockchain. But, you had never seen a company that actually accepted payment in bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. You were a little confused by the whole idea. However, your client liked the prospect of purchasing a company that had dealt in digital assets, so you didn’t think much about it.

Arriving to the office the day after the closing, you open up your computer to learn news of a hack at one of the big bitcoin exchanges. The article explains that hackers had accessed the hot wallets on the exchange and made off with over $150 million in digital assets. News of the hack sent the price of bitcoin tumbling 15% in the four hours following the incident. Other digital assets had plunged even further. The headline jumped out at you because the company that your client just purchased used custodial wallets on the exchange to store a lot of its digital assets.

Five minutes after you finish reading the article, you get a call from your client. Sure enough, a good chunk of the digital assets that your client had just purchased were lost in the hack. To make matters worse, the new company had just lost 5 percent of its book value because of the crashing cryptocurrency market.

Volatility of Digital Assets Means Risk

The world of cryptocurrencies has matured somewhat. But, scenarios like the previous hypothetical above remain a real possibility. Indeed, 15 percent price swings in a matter of hours are still common for cryptocurrencies, also known as digital assets, especially for less established currencies. In addition to big price swings, the digital asset industry continues to face regulatory uncertainty, especially in the United States with the SEC, CFTC, FINRA and other regulators undecided about how exactly to regulate digital assets. Despite the volatility and regulatory ambiguity, for risk hungry participants, the potential for large gains has helped drive an increase in merger activity in the digital asset world during the past two years.

Acquiring or selling a company that deals heavily in digital assets presents a litigation risk. Many of the factors that increase the risk of litigation in mergers or acquisitions in the digital asset industry are outside the control of the parties to a transaction. Deal lawyers try to control for these externalities but, in the new and vibrant realm of companies who deal in cryptocurrencies, those controls can be elusive, which in turn enhances the risk of litigation.

There are, however, ways to minimize the chance of a dispute. The following are a few practical tips for transactional lawyers and litigators to help contain the risks inherent in digital asset M&As.

    • Valuation Methodology: Transaction and litigation counsel should pay close attention to valuation methods used in a digital asset transaction. Cryptocurrencies and digital tokens are new and the methods used to value them may be untested. Different digital assets have different applications, e.g., utility tokens versus value storage tokens, and valuation theories should be tailored to the transaction and assets involved. In light of these unique issues and the attendant risks, transactional lawyers should give particular scrutiny to the valuation formulas to avoid a dispute. Litigators, too, should take note of the valuation methods used since they may be fodder for a dispute. And, of course, litigators should also be aware of the possibility for a Daubert-type challenge of any expert valuation witness that may arise in a subsequent dispute.
    • Earn-Outs/Purchase Price Adjustments: Transactional lawyers should pay special attention to earn-out or purchase price adjustment provisions in a digital asset M&A deal. Valuating digital assets is difficult; thus, inclusion of an earn-out or purchase price adjustment clause might help the parties reach a deal more easily. Given the volatility of digital assets, there is a higher than typical likelihood that the value of the earn-out or purchase price adjustment will also fluctuate substantially. Litigators, in turn, should also be especially cognizant of earn-out and purchase price adjustment provisions. Earn-out provisions can be especially ripe for dispute since the earn-out periods often extend for years after closing. While long earn-out periods might not present problems in more traditional fields, the fast pace of change and high levels of volatility in the digital asset industry mean that long earn-out periods are particularly susceptible to disagreement.
    • Reverse Break Up Fees: Transactional lawyers should consider including a reverse breakup fee or a reverse termination fee. These are fees paid by the buyer if the buyer breaches the governing agreements or is unable to close the transaction. For example, imagine you represent the seller in a deal set to close in three days when news breaks about a lawsuit filed by a state attorney general against a new cryptocurrency company. The enforcement action sends the price of all digital assets plummeting by 20 percent in a matter of hours. Your client still meets all of the closing conditions, but the client’s value, which consists largely of digital assets, has just taken a huge hit and the buyer’s counsel is telling you that her client is going to walk away from the deal unless your client drops the price. A reverse breakup fee will help to lessen the buyer’s willingness to run from the transaction and may also help your client recoup costs incurred in the event the buyer does walk away. Litigators representing a buyer or seller should also pay particular attention to whether the conditions in a breakup fee or reverse breakup fee clause have been satisfied.
  • Heightened Importance of Stock Terms: Transactional lawyers should give extra consideration to the applicable law and venue selection provisions in the deal documents. Some states, e.g., Wyoming, among others, have adopted more crypto-friendly regulatory regimes than other states. Consequently, transaction lawyers should consider the pros and cons of each viable state law. And, corporate attorneys should consider obtaining review of deal documents by experienced cryptocurrency litigators who can help position the transaction as best as possible in case of future litigation.
  • Last, transaction lawyers should consider the appropriateness of a mandatory arbitration provision. Arbitration has its drawbacks, e.g., the cost of the arbitrator, absence of clear rules for discovery, restricted appeal rights, etc., but the benefits of arbitration may be particularly helpful when dealing with a digital asset M&A dispute. For example, the parties can make their proceedings confidential, which can avoid the disclosure of trade secrets or other proprietary information in public court proceedings. Further, in the highly technical field of cryptocurrencies, the parties have greater latitude to ensure that the proceeding is adjudicated by an arbitrator with pertinent knowledge of and/or experience in digital assets or blockchain technology.

Of course, the foregoing is not an exhaustive list of the ways to reduce risk in digital asset M&A deals. Other terms and conditions in the transaction contracts for a digital asset M&A deal should not escape scrutiny. Representations and warranties, contract exhibits and schedules should be tailored to the deal and the nature of digital assets in play. Due diligence is also an especially important component of risk mitigation since the nature of digital assets makes for a more difficult diligence process than a traditional transaction. Regardless of which contractual provisions are used, litigators and transactional lawyers should both be aware of and understand the heightened risk of a dispute in the volatile world of cryptocurrencies and digital assets.

© Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California

ARTICLE BY Thomas H. Wagner of Polsinelli PC.
For more on cryptocurrency, see the Financial Institutions & Banking law page on the National Law Review.