Category: Uncategorized

Patent Trial and Appeal Board Provides Guidance on Timing of Requests for Certificates of Correction During PTAB Proceedings

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) recently issued a decision in Emerson Electric Co. v. Sipco, LLC (IPR2016-00984) (Jan. 24, 2020) that illustrates some important points for patent practitioners to consider when requesting a certificate of correction for a patent subject to a Petition for Inter Partes Review before the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).

The Board’s recent decision was the result of numerous proceedings before both the Board and the Federal Circuit, which began with Emerson Electric Co. filing a Petition for Inter Partes Review against Sipco, LLC (Patent Owner) on April 29, 2016.  The Board issued a final written decision that found all challenged claims unpatentable under at least one ground on October 25, 2017.  This decision was appealed by the Patent Owner to the Federal Circuit, and on appeal the Patent Owner requested that the Federal Circuit remand the case back to the Board based on a certificate of correction that had issued for the patent in question (8,754,780; “’780 patent”) after the date of the Board’s final written decision.  (Id.)  The Federal Circuit granted this request, and remanded the matter with an Order requesting the Board to address the issue of “what, if any, impact the certificate of correction had” on the Board’s final written decision.

On remand, the Board found that the earliest priority date to which the challenged claims of the ’780 patent were entitled was April 2, 2013, and refused to recognize the belatedly issued certificate of correction that would have changed the earliest priority to an earlier date in favor of the Patent Owner.  This was because the certificate of correction did not issue until March 27, 2018, which was five months after the Board’s final written decision and three months after the Patent Owner appealed to the Federal Circuit.  (Id. at 5.)

A patent owner is permitted to request a certificate of correction in accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 1.323, which allows patent owners to ask the Director to make corrections to “mistakes” in a patent.  See 35 U.S.C. § 255.  In this case, the Board noted a series of mistakes and oversights by the Patent Owner in seeking a proper certificate of correction.  Although the Patent Owner filed a certificate of correction with the USPTO Petitions Branch about one month after the filing date of the Petition for Inter Partes Review, the Patent Owner failed to seek permission from the Board to do so, either before or after this filing.  The USPTO dismissed the Patent Owner’s first request for correction, and although the Patent Owner’s second request was thereafter granted, the second request had no chain of priority to the first, and so the USPTO Petitions Branch treated it as a new request for correction.  (Id. at 7-8.)

The Patent Owner then made a third request for a certificate of correction, and this time made its request to the Board, but this request was ultimately denied.  (Id. at 8.)  The Board later permitted the Patent Owner to submit a request for a certificate of correction to the USPTO Petitions Branch, and the Patent Owner did so.  However, the USPTO Petitions Branch found there was no chain of priority to the first certificate of correction request, because the Patent Owner had again failed to “make a reference to the first (earliest) application and every intermediate application.”  (Id. at 9.)  Finally, and without any motion to the Board, the Patent Owner submitted a final request for a certificate of correction to the USPTO Petitions Branch, and this request was granted – leading to a certificate of correction issuing on March 27, 2018 that set forth a priority claim material to the final written decision of October 25, 2017.

The Board determined that the belatedly issued certificate of correction was well after its initial final written decision and should not be given retroactive effect so as to alter its initial decision.  In considering both sides’ arguments, the Board turned to analyzing the language of 35 U.S.C. § 255, and whether or not it permits retroactive effect of a certificate of correction in an Inter Partes Review proceeding.  The Board ultimately found that section 255 does not authorize such a retroactive effect.  In other words, under the facts presented, the Patent Owner’s corrections of its mistakes in priority claims through a certificate of correction issued after the date of the Board’s final written decision did not apply back to the time when the Petition for Inter Partes Review was filed.  Further, the Board made clear that “once a petition for inter partes review of a patent has been filed, the Board may exercise jurisdiction over a request for a certificate of correction, and may stay the request,” citing to 35 U.S.C. § 315(d), 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.3 and 42.122.  (Id. 22.)  The Board noted that its decision that the finally issued certificate of correction had no impact on its earlier final written decision was consistent with the Board’s exercise of exclusive USPTO jurisdiction over a patent once Inter Partes Review is instituted.  (Id. at 22-23.)

Key Takeaway

Although non-precedential, the Board’s decision illustrates that it is best to file a request for a certificate of correction of a patent before Inter Partes Review is instituted.  After institution, the Board has discretion to stay, and effectively deny, a patent owner’s ability to request a certificate of correction that can determine the outcome of the Inter Partes Review proceeding before the USPTO.

© 2020 Brinks Gilson Lione. All Rights Reserved.

For more PTAB decisions, see the National Law Review Intellectual Property law section.

Securities Class Action Filings Reach Record Levels in 2019

Securities fraud class action filings accelerated in 2019, according to a report released today by Cornerstone Research and the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse. The report, Securities Class Action Filings—2019 Year in Review, finds that filing activity remains elevated well above historical levels by several key measures.

For the third year in a row, plaintiffs filed more than 400 securities class actions. In 2019, there were 428 securities class actions across federal and state courts—the highest number on record—with 268 core filings and 160 M&A filings. This marks a historic high for core filings, surpassing even 2008 when class actions peaked in response to financial market volatility. Market capitalization losses in 2019 eclipsed $1 trillion for the second consecutive year.

The combined number of filings with 1933 Act claims in federal and state courts reached unprecedented levels.

The likelihood of core filings targeting companies listed on U.S. exchanges was also at its highest in 2019. This measure reached new levels due to the record number of filings, as well as an extended decline in the number of public companies over the last 15 years.

The impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Cyan Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund continues to reverberate. The report, which includes expanded data on state court filings from 2010 to 2019, found that Securities Act of 1933 claims in state courts rose to 49 in 2019, a 40% increase from the previous year. Almost half of these had parallel actions in federal court.

“The increase in state court Section 11 filings under the 1933 Act has caused a sharp jump in the cost of D&O insurance for companies going public,” said Joseph A. Grundfest, director of the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse. “Many IPO issuers have adopted rules that would move this litigation back to federal courts where these claims have traditionally been resolved. The enforceability of these provisions, however, has been challenged, and the IPO market is awaiting a decision by the Delaware Supreme Court that will likely define the contours of federal securities fraud litigation for years to come. That decision will likely be handed down before the end of April.”

Key Trends

  • Both Disclosure Dollar Loss (DDL) and Maximum Dollar Loss (MDL) decreased in 2019. DDL fell by 14% to $285 billion, and MDL by 9% to $1,199 billion as the size of the typical filing decreased.
  • Combined core federal filings in the Technology and Communication sectors grew by almost a third from 2018 and have more than doubled since 2017.
  • Second Circuit core federal filings increased to 103, the highest number on record. The Ninth Circuit’s core federal filings decreased by 25% to 52 filings.
  • Core federal filings against companies headquartered outside the United States increased to 57, the highest total on record. The likelihood of a core federal filing against a non-U.S. company increased from 4.8% to 5.6% from 2018 to 2019.
  • Beginning in the latter part of 2018, companies with connections to the cannabis industry were increasingly the target of federal class action filings. There were six such filings in 2018 and 13 in 2019.

Cyan Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund

In March 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion allowing plaintiffs to assert claims under the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) in state courts. Under the 1933 Act, Section 11 allows investors to pursue damages for alleged misrepresentations or omissions in securities registration statements. It is generally believed that the ruling will lead to more securities class action filings in state courts based on this claim.

Read an excerpt of the report on 1933 Act Filings.

Read the report, Securities Class Action Filings—2019 Year in Review.

Figure 4 Securities Class Action Cornerstone Research

Copyright ©2020 Cornerstone Research

For more SEC litigation & regulation, see the National Law Review Securities & SEC section.

Can U.S. Companies Insure Against A Trade War?

The recent trade deal between the U.S. and China was welcome news for U.S. companies with investments in China.  The tenuous relationship between the countries, however, continues to cause substantial uncertainty for U.S. investors.  Their concerns are not unique to China—the Trump Administration has taken an aggressive trade stance even with nations usually considered friendly, including Brazil, Argentina, and France.

A growing number of companies are turning to political risk insurance to protect their foreign investments.  Such policies typically cover a variety of commercial losses stemming from political events, including expropriation, political violence, or currency conversion restrictions.

Are political risk policies a valuable tool in a company’s arsenal for mitigating the uncertainties of doing business in China or other countries embroiled in a trade war with the United States?  The answer depends, in large part, on the specific wording of the policy at issue.  There is no standard political risk policy form, and jurisprudence on such policies is extremely limited.  Potential policyholders must evaluate their needs carefully and be strategic during policy placement to ensure they are maximizing potential coverage.  For example:

Expropriation:  Political risk policies may cover losses stemming not only from a government’s outright nationalization or expropriation of a policyholder’s assets, but also from more subtle forms of unlawful discrimination against foreign entities.  The bounds of such coverage, however, are not always clear.  Many policies exclude incidental damages arising from lawful or legitimate acts of governance, which may give rise to disputes between policyholders and insurers as to the nature and motivation of a particular governmental act.

For example, the Chinese Government imposed tariffs and restrictions on U.S. companies doing business in China throughout 2019.  A policyholder seeking coverage for losses suffered due to these measures would argue that the restrictions were retaliatory acts in response to the U.S.-China trade war, meaning that its damages arose from covered acts of discrimination in violation of international law.  An insurer seeking to limit its coverage obligations may argue that China imposed these restrictions based on its view that the companies had violated market rules or otherwise damaged the interests of Chinese companies for noncommercial reasons—in other words, that these were legitimate act of governance taken in the public interest.

Given the lack of case law on the intended scope of expropriation coverage and the fact-intensive nature of disputes over the legitimacy of a particular governmental act, companies should seek to include the broadest possible definition of “expropriation” in their policy and to clarify the bounds of any exclusions.

Political Violence:  In addition to coverage for expropriation and related governmental acts, political risk policies also may provide coverage for losses stemming from physical damage to property due to protests, riots, or other acts of violence intended to achieve a political objective.  While U.S. investors may not commonly associate trade wars with physical violence, recent protests and riots over economic issues in countries such as Chile and Ecuador demonstrate the potential for severe economic turmoil (a common result of any trade war) to cause such violence.  As a result, U.S. companies with warehouses, offices, or other property in countries facing aggressive trade restrictions by the U.S., or in any nation suffering from substantial economic uncertainty, may find such coverage appealing.

The potential benefit of political violence coverage may depend, in large part, on how a policy proposes to determine the value of any damaged property or resulting financial losses.  Potential policyholders should ensure, for example, that a loss is valued pursuant to objective accounting standards and/or by a neutral third-party, as opposed to the insurer, who may have an interest in minimizing its liability.

Currency Inconvertibility:  A third component of political risk insurance is currency inconvertibility coverage—i.e., coverage for losses arising from a policyholder’s inability to convert currency due to exchange restrictions posed by a foreign government.  For example, such coverage might apply if a policyholder is unable to obtain repayment of a loan to a Chinese entity because of new restrictions by the Chinese Government on conversion of local currency to U.S. dollars or the transfer of funds to U.S. banks.  U.S. companies with investments in countries facing particularly extreme economic instability, such as Venezuela, may benefit most from such coverage, as those countries are most at risk for collapse of their currency exchange system.

As with political violence coverage, a policy’s proposed standards for valuing a currency inconvertibility loss are once again crucial to maximizing a policyholder’s protection.  Policies often calculate the value of a policyholder’s loss using the foreign country’s exchange rate on the date of loss.  In such scenarios, policyholders may benefit from defining the “date of loss” as occurring the first time the policyholder is unable to convert currency, as opposed to after a waiting period has occurred or after the insured has made multiple conversion attempts.  This may minimize the risk that the value of a covered loss decreases if the exchange rate in the country plummets while the insured fulfills other conditions for coverage.

Political risk policies likely cannot insulate U.S. companies from the full impact of a global trade war or other politically-inspired disruptions.  However, U.S. businesses can maximize the benefits of such coverage through careful policy drafting and strategic evaluation of their individual risk profile.

© 2020 Gilbert LLP

ARTICLE BY Emily P. Grim of Gilbert LLP.
More on recent US trade negotiations on the National Law Review Antitrust Law and Trade Regulation page.

How Law Firms Can Prevent Phishing and Malware

Law firms harbor information directly linked to politics, public figures, intellectual property, and sensitive personal information. Because lawyers rely on email to manage cases and interact with clients, hackers exploit technical vulnerabilities and people via email. After cybercriminals infiltrate a law firm’s systems in a successful phishing or malware attack, they leverage breached information for financial gain.

Starting with email, law firms must control the availability, confidentiality, and integrity of data. Or they will suffer breaches that bring increased insurance premiums, loss of intellectual property, lost contract revenue, and reputational damage.

Law firms aren’t securing their cloud technology

As lawyers adapt with best practices in technology, they’re moving client data and confidential documents from on-premise to cloud-hosted databases. 58% of firms use cloud technology to manage their clients and run their firms, according to the 2019 Legal Technology Survey Report on Cybersecurity and Cloud Computing from The American Bar Association’s Legal Technology Resource Center.

Migrating data to the cloud is a good thing, despite concerns about its availability. Data is more secure when stored in a system with modern infrastructure and security protocols, instead of stored locally on an outdated system no longer supported by vendors — such as a desktop device still running Windows 7 software, rather than Windows 10.

Even though the cloud is safe, law firms inevitably fall victim to cloud-based cyberattacks like phishing and malware.

26% of lawyers reported a security breach at their firm. TECHREPORT’s other findings explain why the breach rate is so high:

  • Fewer than half (41%) of all respondents changed their security practices after migrating to the cloud.

  • Only 35% of lawyers adopt more than one standard security measure — like encryption, anti-malware, anti-phishing, and network security.

  • 14% of respondents using cloud-based technology to manage their firm do not have any preventative security measures in place.

Changes to your firm's security policies.

Source: 2019 ABA TECHREPORT

How law firms can prevent phishing and malware

Lawyers know data breaches create downtime, loss of billable hours, and reputational harm. But they’re less aware of how to prevent those outcomes.

Phishing explained

Phishing happens via email, when hackers impersonate trusted senders to trick recipients into divulging sensitive or confidential information. Most often, phishers trick victims to click a malicious URL and interact with spoofed login pages. Microsoft is the most spoofed brand in the world, because it is the hub for organizations to collaborate and exchange information. If a lawyer enters their Office 365 credentials onto a spoofed login page, the username and password go directly to the hacker’s server.

Most common brands in phishing attacks.

Source: TechRadar

Successful credential-harvesting phishing attacks allow hackers to access data-dense services like Office 365, online banking, and practice management software. Stolen credentials lead to account takeover scenarios that result in further exploits, including network infiltration, database infiltration, and data exfiltration.

3 common characteristics of phishing attacks

  1. Subject lines that appear highly urgent

Many subject lines in phishing emails are in all-caps to pressure the recipient. Beware of subject lines that say “URGENT” or “Are you available?” An infographic from cybersecurity firm KnowBe4 reveals the top phishing email subject lines from 2019.

Top-clicked phishing tests.

Source: KnowBe4

  1. Spelling errors, grammar errors, and awkward language

Hackers need to deceive language parsing technology like Optical Character Recognition (OCR) that identifies suspicious content and blocks the message. To bypass anti-phishing algorithms, they’ll intentionally misspell words, use special characters that look like letters, and replace letters with lookalike numbers. Phishing URLs are often misspelled, or the domain name does not match the content of the page. Carefully read every URL to see if the words and letters match the content of the page.

  1. Unexpected or unusual requests for documents or money.

Phishers can spoof the sender name and domain of trusted contacts’ email addresses to lull recipients into a false sense of trust and compliance. Requests for sensitive information (bank routing numbers, trust account numbers, login credentials, document access, etc.) should be confirmed over the phone or any other communication channel besides that same email thread.

6 ways to prevent phishing at your law firm

  1. Check if email addresses associated with the firm were involved in high-profile breaches

Have I Been Pwned is a website that identifies compromised email addresses and passwords across online services that have been breached so that victims can change their password and prevent account access. Set up alerts through the website to monitor any future breaches.

Check if you have an account that has been compromised in a data breach.

Source: HaveIBeenPwned.com

  1. Install password managers

The best passwords don’t need to be memorized. 25% of people reuse the same password for everything, according to OpenVPN. Password manager services like 1Password (paid) and LastPass (free) use browser plug-ins and mobile applications to create, remember, and autofill complex, randomly-generated passwords. They identify weak or reused passwords across websites, and run a program to simultaneously rewrite and save new passwords on those sites.

LastPass password management software

Source: LastPass.com

  1. Make Multi-Factor authentication (MFA) mandatory at the firm

Multi-factor authentication, a secure login method using two or more pieces of confirmation, adds another step to the login process to prevent account takeover and the breach of confidential data. When username and password credentials are submitted to the login page, MFA generates and sends a unique alphanumeric code to the account holder’s email or phone for use as a secondary password. Unless this code is submitted on the follow-up login screen in a timely manner, it will expire.

Because email accounts and cell phone numbers are publicly available and can be compromised, use app-based and hardware-based MFA instead.

Solo and small/medium firms should use the Google Authenticator app, which continuously creates dynamic codes that swap out every 30 seconds and are unique to the device on which the app was installed.

Larger firms should adopt physical MFA. These “keys” plug into your laptop, tablet, or mobile device ports to authenticate access to software — and even the device itself. Because the keys are unique, hackers can’t access accounts supported by hardware MFA keys like Yubico’s YubiKey, which is used by every Google employee. If the key is lost, account access can be gained through backup codes or MFA codes delivered via email, mobile, or authentication apps.

Make Multi-Factor authentication mandatory at the law firm.

YubiKeys (Source: Wired Store)

  1. Participate in phishing awareness training programs

These software programs regularly educate and train employees on the characteristics of spam, phishing, malware, ransomware, and social engineering attack methods. Microsoft’s Attack Simulator and KnowBe4 offer free programs that train users not to interact with phishing attempts and give visibility into how well they’re trained, based on their click rate during the attack simulations. The 2019 Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report found that lawyers and other professional service workers were the third most likely group to click on phishing emails.

2019 Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report

Source: 2019 Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report, Figure 45

  1. Only connect to secure WiFi

Connecting to public WiFi in a cafe, airport, or hotel is dangerous. Malicious worms can transfer from one device to another if they are connected on the same network. When traveling, use a virtual private network (VPN) to extend a remote private network across the public network and secure the WiFi connection.

  1. Report suspicious emails

Popular email clients like Office 365 and Google Gmail offer suspicious message reporting. Use this built-in tool to improve their anti-phishing algorithm. If applicable, contact the IT team or cybersecurity staff at the firm so they can update security configurations in the email client or third-party security tool they may use.

What is malware?

Malware is any malicious file that launches scripts to hijack a device, steal confidential data, or launch a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. Most malware is delivered via email. The 2019 Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report found that 51% of phishing attacks involve malware injections into a network. These malicious scripts are usually injected via spoofed DocuSign and Adobe attachments, or fraudulent billing and invoicing documents.

Ransomware is a subset of malware that hackers use to hold information or access hostage until a ransom is paid. Ransomware exploits frequently involve blackmailing tactics, and “sextortion” phishing emails (in which hackers purport to have footage of the victim watching pornography) are gaining popularity.

The 2019 ABA TECHREPORT noted that 36% of firms have had systems infected, and about a quarter (26%) of firms were unaware if they’ve been infected by malware. Larger firms, which tend to use on-premise software because of the up-front work associated with cloud migration, are the least likely to know if they’ve suffered a malware attack.

3 ways to prevent malware

  1. Monitor and update outdated software and hardware 

Application updates are necessary and should not be treated as optional. These software upgrades implement essential security features to ward off new strains of attacks. Not updating software and hardware provides short term savings, but will be very costly in the long run.

Be aware that:

  • Windows 7 is no longer supported since January 2020.

  • MS Office 2010 will no longer be supported as of October 2020.

  • Support for Adobe Acrobat X Reader/Standard/Pro, Adobe Acrobat XI, and Reader XI has ended. 88% of attorneys continue to use these highly-vulnerable Adobe programs, according to the 2019 ABA TECHREPORT.

  1. Monitor email for links and executables (including macro-enabled Office docs)

Executable files automatically launch actions, based on the code in the file. Apply software restrictions on your device to prevent executable files from starting up without your consent. Microsoft found that 98% of Office-targeted threats use macros. In 2016, Microsoft pushed a macro-blocking feature in Word to prevent malware infection.

Block macros and prevent malware in Microsoft Office Word.

Source: Microsoft Security Blog

  1. Hire a Managed Service Provider (MSP) for cybersecurity

MSPs offer an affordable portfolio of solutions to manage cyber risk across firm operations.

The solution: control the login process and data access in cloud-based apps

Lawyers are obligated to protect sensitive client information from phishing, malware, and ransomware. As breaches continue to make headlines, clients are selecting firms based on their data security. Law firms educated on confidentiality, security, and data control will be able to reassure security-conscious clients.

Cloud security — especially in email and document storage — relies on identity and access management. Establish a secure login process, govern user privileges in applications, and ensure that everyone at the firm can spot suspicious emails and attachments.

Choose cloud providers with a reputation for secure software and identify third-party security vendors for anti-phishing, anti-malware, and MFA.

© Copyright 2020 PracticePanther

Written by Reece Guida of PracticePanther.
For more on cybersecurity for legal and other businesses, see the National Law Review Communications, Media & Internet law section.

No Relief in Sight for NJ Employers: Six Newly-Enacted State Employment Laws to Tackle

On January 21, 2020, New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy signed five employee-friendly bills into law, including statutorily mandated requirements that increase penalties on employers that misclassify workers and obligate employers to pay severance to workers impacted by mass layoffs. Also, on December 19, 2019, the Governor signed the “Create a Respectful and Open Workplace for Natural Hair Act” (“CROWN Act”), which clarifies that discrimination based on hair textures and styles violates the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”).

In line with states like California and New York, the enactment of these new laws places New Jersey among a handful of states that provide markedly heightened protections for employees. The amalgamation of these new laws dramatically expands employee rights in the workplace.

Increased Employer Fines for Misclassification

Effective immediately, A.B. 5839 authorizes the state’s Department of Labor and Workforce Development to assess fines against employers for misclassifying workers. Under the new law, New Jersey employers or staffing agencies that misclassify workers may be issued up to a $250 fine per employee for the first violation and up to $1,000 per employee for subsequent violations. The amount of the penalty to be assessed will depend on such factors as the history of prior violations, the severity of the violation, the size of the employer’s business and the good faith of the employer. In addition, an employer found to have misclassified a worker may have to pay a fine to the misclassified worker of up to 5% of their gross earnings over the previous year.

New Employer Posting Requirement

Effective March 1, 2020, A.B. 5843 requires employers to post a conspicuous notice regarding employee misclassification. The New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development will issue a form of notice, which will include a prohibition on misclassification, description of what constitutes worker misclassification, employee rights and remedies, and the process for reporting employer misclassifications.

In addition, the newly enacted statute prohibits employer retaliation against workers who make complaints about potential unlawful employee misclassifications. Employer retaliation carries a fine of $100 to $1,000 for each offense, and employees found to be terminated in retaliation for such protected conduct are entitled to reinstatement in addition to back pay and legal fees.

Managers Potentially on the Hook

Effective immediately, A.B. 5840 amends New Jersey’s recently passed Wage Theft Act and provides that employers and labor contractors will be jointly and severally liable for state wage and hour law violations and tax law violations, including with respect to worker misclassifications. The law broadly provides that any person acting on “behalf of an employer,” including an owner, director, officer or manager of the employer, may be held liable as the employer.

Business Shutdowns for Violations

Effective immediately, A.B. 5838 permits state regulators to issue “stop-work orders” upon seven days’ advance notice to sites where employers are found to have violated state wage, benefits, or tax laws, subjecting employers to a steep penalty of $5,000 per day against an employer for each day that it conducts business operations that are in violation of the stop-work order.

The law gives the state’s Commissioner of Labor and Workforce Development the authority to issue stop-work orders requiring cessation of all business operations at the specific place of business where any wage, benefit, or employment tax law violation is found. Employers subject to a stop-work order will have 72 hours following receipt of the order to exercise their right to make a written appeal to contest the stop-work order. Importantly, while employers may appeal the finding, that process may take weeks, risking potentially large losses for the implicated business.

Severance for Mass Layoffs

Effective July 19, 2020, S.B. 3170 dramatically amends the New Jersey state WARN Act in several significant respects. In the event of a covered mass layoff or termination or transfer of operations, the amendment increases the advance notice required to affected employees from 60 days to 90 days. New Jersey was previously aligned with the federal WARN Act which requires 60 days in advance of certain mass layoffs or plant closings. With respect to the length of notice now required in New Jersey, the new 90- day prior notice period mirrors New York State’s advance notice requirement, though threshold standards defining when notice must be given under these statutes differ. Upon the effective date, New Jersey employers now will need to consider two different statutory schemes to determine to what extent advance notice is required.

The amendment requires covered employers to provide severance pay to employees when there is a mass layoff or termination/transfer or operations impacting at least 50 full-time workers laid off in a 30-day period. Under the statute, severance is calculated at one week’s pay for each full year the worker has been employed and is required even when the requisite notice has been provided. In addition, when an employer fails to meet its advance notice mandate, the new law requires employers to give affected employees an additional four weeks of severance pay. In contrast, severance is currently a penalty for non-compliance with the New Jersey WARN Act.

Further, the required severance must be paid to the affected employee at the same time as the final paycheck. The severance cannot be used as consideration to negotiate a general release of claims from the terminated employee. Employers can, however, obtain a release of claims where additional consideration is offered to the impacted employee for that specific purpose.

The Crown Act

S.B. 3945 amends the LAD to clarify that race discrimination includes discrimination on the basis of “traits historically associated with race, including, but not limited to, hair texture, hair type, and protective hairstyles.” Governor Murphy enacted the CROWN Act exactly one year after an incident involving an African-American high school wrestler who was forced to cut off his locks in order to compete in a match. The wrestling incident prompted the introduction of S.B. 3945 and garnered widespread media attention. We reported on the CROWN Act in detail in our October 2019 alert. Effective immediately, the CROWN Act codifies guidance issued by the New Jersey’s Division on Civil Rights (DCR) stating that the DCR considered “hairstyles closely associated with Black people,” such as “twists, braids, cornrows, Afros, locks, Bantu knots, and fades” to be included in the definition of racial characteristics protected under the LAD.

New Jersey has become the third state to ban discrimination based on natural hair and hairstyles, following New York (effective on July 12, 2019) and California (effective on January 1, 2020). The New York City Commission on Human Rights issued similar guidance in February 2019 that clarifies that the New York City Human Rights Law includes discrimination based on natural hair and hairstyles as a form of race discrimination. Several other states and municipalities have similar legislation pending. Also, Senator Cory Booker introduced federal legislation on December 5, 2019 that would ban discrimination based on hair textures and hairstyles that are commonly associated with a particular race or national origin, and Representative Cedric Richmond introduced companion legislation in the House of Representatives.

Takeaways:

New Jersey continues to take steps to dramatically increase employee rights in the workplace. New Jersey employers should take appropriate measures now to ensure that (i) owners, directors, officers, managers, and others involved in the process of classifying workers are mindful of the new employee classification requirements for businesses and their potential exposure based on individual liability for misclassifications, (ii) their businesses are compliant with new posting requirements regarding New Jersey’s recently passed employee misclassification laws, and (iii) managers and supervisors are trained on the new retaliation protections afforded employees who report alleged violations concerning employee misclassification.

New Jersey employers also should review their grooming policies to determine whether they discourage natural hairstyles and hair textures, and determine whether any policies pertaining to appearance or aesthetics implicate any other proxies to race. With similar laws in other states, like New York, and pending elsewhere, employers across the nation should review their policies regarding grooming, appearance and aesthetics.

Lastly, the amendments to the New Jersey WARN Act will require careful analysis to determine an employer’s obligations and to minimize risks in connection with a mass layoff or transfer/termination of operations. The new severance obligations undoubtedly will impose substantial financial burdens on employers who have made the decision to reduce costs and/or operations.

© Copyright 2020 Sills Cummis & Gross P.C.

For more on employment laws in New Jersey and elsewhere, see the National Law Review Labor & Employment law page.

Business Owners Take Note as Enterprise Completes Its Mission: Supreme Court Holds No Common Law Partnership Was Formed with ETP

Logic is the beginning of wisdom, not the end.

— Dr. Spock, Star Trek, Starfleet Officer

The long running legal saga between Enterprise Products Partners (“Enterprise”) and Energy Transfer Partners (“ETP”) finally concluded on January 31, 2020, when the Texas Supreme Court unanimously decided that no partnership had ever arisen between the parties. (Read) This dispute between two of the major players in the energy industry focused on the legal standard for determining when a partnership is formed. ETP argued that the test should be based on the parties’ conduct, while Enterprise maintained that the parties had agreed that specific conditions in their contracts had to be established before a partnership was created, and those conditions were never met.

As the Supreme Court’s opinion brings to a close eight years of hard-fought litigation between Enterprise and ETP, we will share our third, and hopefully last, blog post about the case and also review some important lessons for business owners gleaned from this legal conflict. ¹

Predictable Legal Result

The staggering $535 million jury verdict that ETP secured against Enterprise in 2014 had always rested on tenuous legal ground because it conflicted with the terms of the parties’ written agreements. At trial, ETP claimed that Enterprise had breached its fiduciary duty as a partner when it ditched ETP to enter into a new pipeline deal with a competitor, Enbridge. The result at trial rested on the jury’s finding that the parties’ conduct had created a partnership between them, which gave rise to a duty of loyalty that was owed by Enterprise. The jury’s verdict, however, disregarded the parties’ written agreements, which set forth specific conditions precedent to the formation of a partnership, including approval by both companies’ boards. Enterprise therefore argued that it had become subject to a “partnership by ambush.”

The Texas Supreme Court has long championed the sanctity of contract. In numerous previous cases, the Court expressed the view that sophisticated business parties who enter into contracts must honor their bargain. Therefore, the Court’s decision on behalf of Enterprise was not surprising to Court watchers. In addition, a decision in ETP’s favor upholding its common law partnership claim would have created significant uncertainty in the business community as to when a partnership, and related partnership duties, would arise between contracting parties.

In its decision, the Court cited common law strongly favoring the freedom of contract, and held that parties can adopt conditions precedent that must be met before a partnership will be formed. The Court also cited language from a case it had decided more than a decade ago, and noted that: the Legislature did not “intend to spring surprise or accidental partnerships” on parties. While the Court acknowledged that the conditions precedent the parties agreed to could have been waived or modified, it held that ETP was required to either obtain a jury finding that the conditions had been waived or prove waiver conclusively at trial, and ETP had done neither. ²

Business Lessons Learned

While Enterprise ultimately prevailed in defeating ETP’s partnership claims, the legal battle required an enormous amount of time, caused considerable distraction and required each of the parties to incur millions of dollars in legal expense. Thus, the Court’s holding in ETP v. Enterprise provides some key take-aways for business owners. If the practices reviewed below are followed when parties are considering entering into a new business relationship, they may help to avoid future litigation. At a minimum, these practices will make it more likely that a court or an arbitration panel would grant a summary judgment dismissing before trial claims alleging that the parties entered formed a new partnership based on their conduct.

  • Get it clearly in writing — This is the clear guidance from the Supreme Court. If a party does not want to be saddled with partnership duties, it should confirm in writing that: (i) no partnership has been formed, and (ii) no partnership will be formed unless specifically stated conditions are met, e.g., the requirement that a written partnership agreement must be signed and approved by the company’s board and/or managers.
  • Address waiver — All agreements can be waived or modified, but the parties can expressly agree there will be no waiver or amending of any conditions to forming a partnership unless the waiver or amendment is signed and in writing;
  • Disclaim all fiduciary duties — In addition to making it clear that no partnership exists without specific conditions being met, the parties can also state that they do not owe each other any fiduciary duties unless and until they sign off on a binding written agreement between them;
  • Consider use of arbitration — The parties may require that all disputes arising between them will be decided by sophisticated business lawyers in an arbitration proceeding, and they can require that the arbitration hearing be held promptly, within 60 or 90 days;
  • Impose damage caps — The parties can agree to limit recoverable damages in a variety of days in any future dispute that arise between them, which can include their agreement to eliminate all claims for consequential damages, for lost profits and for punitive damages; and
  • Award fees to prevailing party — The parties can also award reasonable legal fees to the prevailing party, which will require the losing party to pay all of the legal fees that are incurred in the litigation or arbitration.

Conclusion

One man cannot summon the future. But one man can change the present!

Alternate Mr. Spock, “Mirror, Mirror”

The Supreme Court’s decision in the Enterprise case confirms the critical importance of securing written agreements that document the parties’ business relationship. Business owners who sign letters of intent, or enter into other preliminary documents before formally starting a new business relationship need to take care to ensure they are not forming a partnership or joint venture unless specific conditions are met. The failure to incorporate these conditions in a signed agreement may result in adverse consequences for the business owner, including being saddled with claims that a partnership was formed and that, as a result, they are now burdened with burdensome fiduciary duties.

¹ This post has a Star Trek reference based on the USS Enterprise, the name of the flagship in the show. As Star Trek fans know, the series was written in 1964, and first debuted on television in 1966. Perhaps it is a coincidence, but the first United States nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the USS Enterprise, entered into service just a few years before, in 1962.

² In issuing its decision, the Supreme Court upheld the opinion of the Dallas Court of Appeals, which had overturned the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court had determined that ETP had not shown that it met the conditions precedent set forth in the parties’ agreements and, further, there was no jury finding these conditions had ever been waived or modified by the parties.

 

© 2020 Winstead PC.

ARTICLE BY Ladd Hirsch of Winstead.
For more on common-law partnerships see the National Law Review Corporate & Business Organizations Law section.

Airbus to Pay Unprecedented $3.9 Billion for Multinational Bribery, FCPA Violations

Last week, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced the largest deferred prosecution agreement for violations of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in history. Airbus SE, a French aircraft company, agreed to pay over a combined $3.9 billion to the DOJ as well as authorities in France and the UK for foreign corruption and bribery charges. The penalty is the largest of its sort and is the result of anti-fraud efforts across the three countries.

Airbus engaged in corruption for several years, offering bribes to foreign officials and misreporting to authorities to conceal the bribes. These violations of the Arms Export Control, International Traffic in Arms, and FCPA encompass activities in the United States, UK, France, and China. The crimes also include corruption in defense contracts.

According to a DOJ Press Release, Airbus will pay $527 million to the United States for the company’s violations of the International Traffic in Arms and Foreign Corrupt Practices Acts. In this case, Airbus self-reported and voluntarily cooperated with law enforcement after uncovering violations in an internal audit. It is possible an internal report initiated the audit. Cooperation and remedial measures by Airbus were taken into consideration in the settlement terms of the deferred prosecution agreement and benefitted Airbus.

International whistleblowers are crucial to the detection of large-scale corruption and fraud around the world. The SEC and DOJ rely on individuals who decide to anonymously and confidentially blow the whistle on violations of the FCPA. The FCPA allows for foreign nationals to file whistleblower claims in the US and receive an award between 10 and 30 percent of the total amount recovered by the government if a successful enforcement action follows their disclosures.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2020. All Rights Reserved.
For more bribery cases, see the National Law Review Criminal Law & Business Crimes section.

Why is Section 962 Back in the Spotlight? [Podcast]

In this podcast, international tax and estate planning attorneys Megan Ferris and Paul J. D’Alessandro, Jr. provide an overview of how individuals and corporations are taxed under the GILTI regime and discuss why section 962 has come back into the spotlight in a post-2017 Tax Act world.

Transcript:

PAUL D’ ALESSANDRO

Good morning, everybody, and welcome to our first Bilzin Sumberg Tax Talk podcast. My name is Paul D’Alessandro, and I’m a tax associate here with our international private client group. I focus my practice on inbound planning and estate planning for international high net worth individuals. I’m here today with my colleague, Megan Ferris.  How are you doing this morning, Megan?

MEGAN FERRIS

Hi, Paul. My name is Megan Ferris. I am an international tax associate with Bilzin Sumberg in Miami, Florida. I focus primarily on inbound and outbound tax structuring for businesses, typically closely held businesses. Our hope with this podcast is to bring you current issues related to various tax, trust, and estate matters.

PAUL D’ ALESSANDRO

Thanks, Megan, and I think we have a great topic for you this morning. Our first topic to kick off our podcast series. And we’re going to be talking about Section 962 and why it’s come back into the spotlight as of late. So, I think we’re going to hop right into it. And, Megan, I think a good way to start would be, can you give us a quick overview of the way individuals and corporations are taxed under the new GILTI regime in a post-2017 Tax Act world?

MEGAN FERRIS

Sure. Generally speaking, and especially when it comes to CFCs, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Acts of 2017, or the Tax Reform Act, treats U.S. corporations much more favorably than U.S. individual shareholders. First, at a high level, individuals are taxed in the U.S. on their ordinary income at graduated rates up to 37%, plus an extra 3.8% net investment income tax on their passive income. Corporations, on the other hand, are taxed at a flat 21% rate on their net taxable income.  Next, the Tax Reform Act introduced a handful of new across border taxes and anti-deferral measures.  One of these is Section 951A which, is called Global Intangible Low Tax Income, or GILTI, as you referred to it, which basically applies to the active operating-income of the CFC.  Now pre-tax reform, this income would not be taxed to the CFC’s U.S. shareholders until it was distributed, but today that income is taxed annually at the shareholder’s ordinary income rate.  Congress, however, went a step further by introducing Section 250, which gives U.S. corporations, and only U.S. corporations, a 50% deduction on their GILTI income and that essentially results in a 10.5% tax rate.  But wait, there’s more. U.S. corporations can also take a foreign tax credit for up to 80% of the foreign taxes paid by the CFC. So essentially, if the CFC paid at least a 13.2% tax rate, or specifically a 13.125% tax rate in its local country, then a U.S. corporate shareholder can use foreign tax credits to offset its entire U.S. income tax liability for that underlying GILTI income.  And that’s great for corporations.  An individual shareholder, on the other hand, has no Section 250 deduction and no foreign tax credit for taxes paid by the CFC.  The individual pays up to 37% U.S. tax on GILTI, end of story.  So, as you can see, the disparity between individual and corporation taxation can be quite dramatic.  And I guess that brings us back to the theme of today’s podcast, which is how some individual tax payers might use Section 962 to avail themselves of these benefits that are available only to domestic corporations.

PAUL D’ ALESSANDRO

Thanks, Megan. So that was a great overview I think of the general operating rules for the taxation of offshore income in a post-2017 Tax Act world. So as Megan alluded to, and our next question here in our podcast is, what is a 962 election, and how might an individual consider using the 962 election?

MEGAN FERRIS

Right.  So, in short, Section 962 allows individual U.S. shareholders of CFCs to elect to be taxed as domestic corporations. The election is available to direct and indirect shareholders of CFCs, so if an individual owned their interest through a partnership or certain trusts, they would still be able to make the election.  So now I’ll get into the mechanics of the election, but first I think it would help to give some historical context. Section 962 first became effective beginning in the tax year 1963 along with the rest of subpart F. Back then, the top individual tax rate in the U.S. was 91%, and the top corporate rate was 52%. So if you think we have it bad today, just be thankful we’re not in the 1960s.  Anyhow, with the introduction of subpart F and the new concept of taxing the U.S. individual shareholder on a CFCs income that the shareholder didn’t actually receive, Congress decided to give taxpayers a break and the means of reducing that current tax burden to the lower corporate tax rate of then only 52%. In addition, taxpayers were permitted to claim deemed paid tax credits under Section 960 for foreign taxes that were paid by that CFC. Now the legislative history under Section 962 tells us that, and I quote, “The purpose of Section 962 is to avoid what might otherwise be a hardship in taxing a U.S. individual at high bracket rates with respect to earnings in a foreign corporation which he does not receive. Section 962 gives such individuals assurance that their tax burdens with respect to these undistributed foreign earnings will be no heavier than they would have been had they invested in an American corporation doing business abroad.”  So, as far as tax policy goes, that’s a breath of fresh air for the taxpayers. Okay, now the mechanics.  This is how a U.S. individual is taxed under a Section 962 election. First, the individual is taxed on amounts that are included in gross income under Section 951a and now Section 951A, which is GILTI, at a corporate tax rate, which are currently 21%. Second, the individual is entitled to a deemed paid foreign tax credit under Section 960 with respect to the subpart F or GILTI inclusion as if the individual were a domestic corporation. Third, when an actual distribution of earnings is made from amounts that were already included in the U.S. shareholder’s gross income under Sections 951a and Section 951A, and just a reminder Section 951a is subpart F income, 951A is GILTI, those earnings are included in gross income again, but only to the extent that they exceed the amount of U.S. income tax paid at the time of the Section 962 election.  So, if an individual initially used foreign tax credits to offset his or her entire U.S. tax liability related to GILTI income in the year that the income was reported, then when the income is actually distributed, it will be includable again as dividend income. If the underlying CFC is in a treaty jurisdiction, then that individual will benefit from qualified dividend rates, which are currently 20% plus a 3.8% tax on passive income, that brings us to a total U.S. effective tax rate of 23.8%.

PAUL D’ ALESSANDRO

Interesting, Megan. So it seems like there’s definitely some benefits to be gained potentially under Section 962, but how does an individual taxpayer make a Section 962 election?

MEGAN FERRIS

An individual would typically file a Section 962 election with his or her timely filed tax return for the year to which the election relates, although in certain circumstances, case law would permit a retroactive election. The election is made on an annual basis, meaning each year you have the option to make the election or not, and you also have the opportunity to miss it, so be careful about that. Once made, the election applies to all Section 951a and 951A, included to the U.S. shareholder for all CFCs for that year.

PAUL D’ ALESSANDRO

So that’s an interesting point there you made at the end and something our readers — our listener’s rather, might want to pick up on.  The election applies to all CFCs that are owned by the individual.  So keep that in mind when you’re analyzing Section 962 and whether it makes sense to make the election based on your facts and circumstances.  So I think we kind of gave an overview here of Section 962 and why it matters now.  But what we’re going to do now is drill really down into the pros and cons of 962, what are the benefits to be gained, and what are some of the drawbacks as well by making the selection. So, Megan, do you want to start by taking us through the benefits of the 962 election?

MEGAN FERRIS

Sure. If the circumstances are right for the taxpayer, then the benefits should certainly outweigh any drawbacks for making this election. For example, the subpart F inclusions and the GILTI inclusions, and those are under Section 951a, and Section 951A are subject to tax at the lower corporate tax rate, which is now 21%.  There is a 50% deduction available for the GILTI inclusions. With a Section 962 election, an individual can take a credit for up to 80% of the foreign taxes paid by the CFC to offset the tax paid on the subpart F and the GILTI.  But keep in mind that the individual would still be subject to tax on any Section 78 gross-up based on foreign taxes.  With the Section 962 election, there is no corporate restructuring required that would otherwise take time and money to implement.  There’s no impact on the other shareholders of the CFC, whether there’s domestic shareholders or foreign shareholders.  And finally, there’s no double tax on the future sale of the CFC. Now on the downside, when those previously taxed earnings are distributed, they are taxed again to the extent that the distribution exceeds the tax paid on the initial inclusion.  Now, if the CFC is not in a treaty country, then under Smith v. Commissioner, ordinary tax rates would apply because the dividends are treated as coming from the CFC and not from the deemed U.S. corporation.  And lastly, on the downside, any basis increase in CFC stock as a result of the subpart f or GILTI inclusion is limited to the amount of tax paid on the inclusion.  So, I’ll give an example.  We recently did some tax planning for a client, an individual U.S. tax resident who owned an S corporation that, in turn, owned a Mexican CFC.  The CFC operates hotels throughout Mexico and pays a 30% income tax in Mexico on its net income.  From the U.S. federal tax perspective, that CFC’s operating income is all GILTI income to our client.  And so under his existing structure, the GILTI would flow up to him, and he would be subject to 37% tax on that income without any offset for the Mexican taxes paid.  We recommended making a Section 962 election, which he did.  Now, under his current structure, the client is treated, for U.S. federal income tax purposes, as if the GILTI is earned by a domestic corporation.  U.S. tax is fully offset with the foreign tax credits for the next to get income taxes paid.  And when CFC eventually distributes the income, the client is taxed on their distribution.  However, because the U.S. and Mexico have an income tax treaty in effect, the clients benefit from qualified dividend rates, which total 23.8%.  So in effect, we helped our client reduce his effective U.S. federal income tax rate with respect to GILTI from 37% to 23.8%.

PAUL D’ ALESSANDRO

So there you have it; 962 potentially can result in a lower effective tax rate for an individual, you get the benefit of the lower corporate tax rate, the 50% GILTI deduction, the 80% indirect foreign tax credit.  On the downside, you have to watch out for actual distributions because there’s less PTI than there would have been otherwise.  So a little bit of balancing based on the facts and circumstances to see if 962 is going to make sense in your case. I think we’re going to wrap up now.  Megan, you alluded to it earlier, but, you know, why has Section 962 come back into the spotlight this past year or two, and really when might a person consider making a 962 election?

MEGAN FERRIS

That’s a great question, Paul.  Now, in the decade since Section 962 was passed, it was rarely used planning tool unless the CFC was located at a high tax treaty country, like Mexico or France.  But fast forward to February 1, 2018, when tax reform became effective, now everything has changed because the corporate tax rates dropped from 35% to 21%.  And the effective tax rate on GILTI emerged at 10.5% for U.S. corporations.  Now finally, it’s an attractive option because even when you account for the 23.8% shareholder level dividend tax, the effective tax rate is still lower with a Section 962 election than if the CFC shares were treated as owned directly by the individual.  As far as U.S. tax planning goes, the Section 962 election can be an incredibly useful and cost-saving tool for the taxpayer who fits the profile that I alluded to, and that would be a U.S. shareholder of a CFC that generates GILTI or subpart F income where CFC has foreign taxes paid in this local country where the CFC is located in a treaty jurisdiction.  Now these individual U.S. shareholders can take advantage of the lower corporate tax rate, they can take advantage of the 50% deduction for GILTI income, and they can obtain a foreign tax credit for foreign taxes paid by the CFC, all without any restructuring required.  On the other hand, if the CFC is not organized in a treaty jurisdiction, then the election may not result in a net benefit to the taxpayer.  Now, in this case, it might make more sense to forego the Section 962 election in lieu of interposing an actual UFC corporation which would feature the same mechanical benefits of the Section 962 election, but it would also open the door to taking advantage of the dividends received deduction on distributions from the CFC.  Alternatively, the taxpayer might consider setting up a flow-through structure, and that would also permit the use of foreign tax credits to offset the GILTI inclusions, although the GILTI inclusions would generally be subject to the higher individual tax rate.

PAUL D’ ALESSANDRO

So those are some great points you made, Megan, and I’ll just piggyback off a few of them before we wrap up here. Section 962, I think you’re going to want to look at whether your CFC is in a treaty jurisdiction versus a non-treaty jurisdiction, as Megan said.  The 962 election is more beneficial when you’re in a treaty jurisdiction because you can take advantage of the lower qualified dividend income rates of 23.8%.  Like anything else in tax planning, I think you have to do a little bit of modeling when you’re looking at 962, and by that I mean you have to see if you’re in a situation where your client is going to be looking to pull dividends out of his CFC on a regular to semi-regular basis, or whether the income realization event is really going to be had upon exit when an individual is going to sell shares in a CFC. In that case, 962 is going to provide some benefit there simply by providing deferral in the years where you’re not taking distributions.  And I think a final point worth noting, and Megan touched on this; there’s been a lot of talk about simply having an individual drop their CFC shares into a parent USC corporation to achieve a lot of these results that we’ve been talking about.  That sounds great in theory, but it cannot always be done tax-free in the foreign country where the CFC is located.  Many times, contributing those shares to a U.S. corporation is a taxable event in that foreign country, and it could even result in that foreign country’s own CFC laws now applying to the U.S. parent corporation.  So 962, in that case, could also serve a tremendous benefit by avoiding all those foreign taxes and local taxes that would otherwise be triggered by dropping shares into an actual U.S. parent C corporation.  And with that, I think we’ve concluded our first podcast.  I hope you all enjoyed it and found it useful.  We‘re going to be looking to bring everybody more timely tax topics and hopefully more useful planning tips over the next few months and in the next year.  Megan, is there anything you want to say before we sign off?

MEGAN FERRIS

Thanks, Paul. I think you made some great points just to wrap up there.  And again, yeah, I hope everybody enjoyed this. I hope they can take some of these points and integrate them into their practices, and I hope you continue to tune in and listen to us as we bring you more current tax topics that might apply to your own practice.

PAUL D’ ALESSANDRO

Okay.  Very good. And with that, we’re signing off. Happy holidays and a happy new year to everyone, and we’ll see you next time.

 

© 2020 Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP

More tax guidance on the National Law Review Tax Law page.

We Put the “Ow!” in Iowa

I woke up this morning to a text from a close friend wondering how long it would take me to write about the fact that as of this writing, we still do not have results from the Iowa caucuses last night due to problems with its untried voting app.  I guess I’m firmly established on the “get off my lawn” beat.

The little-known corollary to the time-honored maxim “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” is “if it’s broke, don’t replace it with something worse.”    The list of potential problems with using mobile technology for something as important as voting is long.  Rule One might be “don’t hire a company named ‘Shadow, Inc.’ to build your app.”  A fellow Hoya, Matt Blaze, a professor of computer science and law at Georgetown, said that “any type of app or program that relies on using a cellphone network to deliver results is vulnerable to problems both on the app and on the phones being used to run it . . . and that “[t]he consensus . . . is unequivocal . . .[i]nternet and mobile voting should not be used at this time in civil elections.”

Any remote access application will add complexity to a task due to the need for identification, authentication, authorization, and security, of both the device and the person using it, as opposed to a simpler system based on paper or a single machine for each location where any caucus participant could authenticate herself in person. Multiple technology platforms simply increase complexity and likelihood of error. And, as I learned in the mobile payment world, if you are relying on good cell service or wifi availability for your app to do its work, you’re gonna have some unhappy end-users.

Add to these inherent problems that the app was reportedly only put together over the last two months and was inadequately tested.  (Apparently, it was the back-up plan; the original plan was to use the phone to call in votes.  “Hi, do you have Pete Buttigieg in a can?”)

Just because you can doesn’t mean you should.  I have been bringing a yellow legal pad and ballpoint (or “ink pen” down here) to meetings for years.  Clients and colleagues regularly smile indulgently, as if I had just set a butter churn down on the table.  My stock response might be appropriate for the beleaguered folks in Iowa and I offer it here for free:  Paper rarely goes down, never needs to be recharged, doesn’t need an adapter and, best of all: I know how it works.

Copyright © 2020 Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP All Rights Reserved.

Read this article on the Hey Data Data blog.
For more on election regulations, see the National Law Review Election Law & Legislative News section.

Letters of Wishes: An Administrative and Moral Headache in Disguise?

1. LETTERS OF WISHES ARE THEORETICALLY SOUND

Trustees may have difficulties determining whether to make distributions when the grantor’s intentions are unclear. Consider a trust provision that provides for a beneficiary’s support in the form of reasonable medical expenses. The trust’s sole beneficiary approaches the trustee requesting a distribution for a gastric bypass surgery. The surgery can cost upwards of $45,000 and is the preferred method of achieving seventy-five pounds of weight loss. However, the surgery may be unsuccessful, and may result in post-operation complications and side effects that could impact the beneficiary’s health and require further distributions. Is the surgery a reasonable medical expense? Should the trustee make the distribution for the surgery?

Depending on the trustee, and his or her relationship to the grantor, the answer to the above questions is likely different. Scholars suggest that trustees should administer a trust “in [the] state of mind in which it was contemplated by the settlor that [the trustee] would act.”[1] If a spouse is serving as a trustee, he or she seemingly has ample opportunity to determine the grantor’s intent. If the drafting attorney is the trustee, the trustee may have gathered insight into the grantor’s mindset and goals while drafting the trust that could be applied to administration. Consider next a corporate trustee who enters the picture well after the grantor’s death. These trustees may have never met the grantor and are unlikely to have anything more than the trust instrument to guide administration. When contemplating a distribution to a beneficiary, each trustee should rely on the terms of the trust to determine whether the distribution should be made, although it is likely that each trustee’s perspective and relationship with the grantor will impact his or her decision.

A significant challenge many trustees face is that terms like health, education, maintenance, support, and best interests are as common in trust instruments as they are interpretive. Because these terms are interpretive, their application can be challenging even for the most diligent trustee; the interplay between these interpretive words/phrases and social, economic, and legal changes that occur during the administration of a trust can prove difficult to manage. In determining whether to make a discretionary distribution what must, or may the trustee rely on? Just the trust instrument? Extrinsic evidence? Personal opinion?

A. Enter the Letter of Wishes

A letter of wishes is a document that allows a grantor to express his or her goals for the trust. Information included can vary, but they offer information about how the grantor wants the trust to be administered by giving insight into the grantor’s state of mind, opinions on distributions, and issues that may arise with the trust’s beneficiaries.[2] These letters can serve two separate but equally important purposes. First, a letter of wishes can give the grantor the sense that the trustee fully understands their goals for the trust and can administer it in accordance with those goals. Second, letters of wishes can give a trustee something to proverbially hang their hat on when looking for guidance as to whether to make a distribution as the letter can clarify a trust instrument’s general terms.

In the example above, a letter explaining the trustee’s hesitance toward making distributions for cosmetic medical procedures would be valuable. Instead of guesswork, a letter outlining the grantor’s interpretation of the trust’s terms can assist a trustee in choosing to make distributions with greater confidence and flexibility.[3] This is the crux of the argument for many proponents of letters of wishes.[4]

2. LOGISTICS OF INCORPORATING A LETTER OF WISHES INTO AN ESTATE PLAN

Though letters of wishes are thought of as an informal tool[5] drafted by the grantor for the trustee’s benefit, the timing and method of drafting should be considered in relation to state trust laws by any practitioner who recommends its use to a client. Consideration should also be given to whether the letter should be incorporated into the trust as an exhibit or whether the letter should bind the trustee.

A. What is the Ideal Time to Draft a Letter of Wishes?

Practitioners should consider advising clients to draft letters of wishes close to the time the trust is settled in order to avoid disputes over whether the letter is representative of the grantor’s intent.[6] The following is illustrative: in 2017, immediately after selling his business, at his attorney’s advice, Grantor executes a discretionary trust for Grantor’s grandchildren to provide for their college educations. In 2022, the Grantor is now retired and has time to finally read the education trust that his attorney prepared for him.  At that time, the Grantor writes a letter of wishes explaining the grantor’s preference for distributions from the trust that further the pursuit of a STEM college education by Grantor’s grandchildren.  Shortly thereafter, all but one of Grantor’s grandchildren enroll in college to pursue liberal arts degrees.  The golden grandchild enrolls in a STEM program at his grandfather’s alma mater. The letter of wishes, drafted well after a significant passage of time, reflects that perhaps the Grantor’s opinions and relationships with his grandchildren may have changed. The trust does not have sufficient funds to cover the college tuition for all of the grandchildren and so the trustee must determine whether or not to make tuition payments for each grandchild or only certain grandchildren.  What is the trustee to do – follow the terms of the trust or follow the current wishes of the grantor?  Because of the timing as to the execution of the letter of wishes – there is an argument that the letter of wishes should be ignored.

Hugh v. Amalgamated Tr. & Sav. Bank[7] illustrates how timing can impact the effectiveness of a grantor’s extrinsic letters.[8] In Hugh, the Illinois Court of Appeals determined that the grantor did not gift land to a trust for the benefit of his grandchildren in part because letters expressing the grantor’s desire that the land be gifted to the grandchildren’s trust were delivered to the trustee several years after the trust was settled.[9] The court noted that the grantor’s exercise of dominion and control over the land in the time between when the grantor settled the trust and drafted the letters and when the letters were actually delivered to the trustee indicated that the grantor’s intent was to retain the property and not to make a gift.[10] Therefore, given the complications that may arise, the timing of the letter is very important.

B. How Involved Should an Estate Planning Attorney be in Drafting a Letter of Wishes?

Practitioners should consider their own involvement in drafting a letter of wishes and how differing degrees of involvement can impact the trust. Letters of wishes are often personal documents that allow a grantor to express his or her feelings about beneficiaries, philosophy on distributions, and goals for how the grantor’s legacy should be maintained.[11] Though the letter may be of great importance to the grantor, significant attorney involvement can complicate the trust drafting process by risking inclusion of precatory language in the trust instrument and presenting an opportunity for a grantor to incur significant legal fees for something of questionable utility. Executing a letter of wishes in conjunction with a trust instrument may cause a grantor to request that language from the letter be incorporated into the trust. Though many estate planning clients are sophisticated, the risk of creating ambiguity in the trust with emotional, personal, and imprecise language may be lost on them.[12] This risk should not be lost on their attorney. Time constraints and workload may cause estate planning attorneys to devote little thought to the letter of wishes, even though the letter may be important to the client and may risk insertion of precatory language into the trust document.

C. To be Effective, Must a Letter of Wishes be Incorporated into the Trust?

As letters of wishes are not legally binding on the trustee in and of themselves,[13] grantors must rely on a trustee feeling morally and ethically obligated to administer the trust in accordance with the letter. A solution to this problem may be to incorporate the letter of wishes into the trust as an exhibit. Matter of Estate of Kirk suggests that this option may be feasible as the court found a handwritten note attached to a formal trust amendment to be part of the amendment for purposes of administering the trust.[14] However, some scholars counsel against this, as attaching the letter as an exhibit would make the letter discoverable by beneficiaries, who may use the letter as an opportunity to increase the likelihood of getting a distribution or may find the letter hurtful.[15] Practitioners should counsel clients using this option to be sure that the letter does not contradict the trust instrument’s terms. Contradictions of this sort could be used as evidence of ambiguity, subjecting the trust to attacks from dissatisfied beneficiaries.

D. Should the Letter be Binding on the Trustee?

Scholars agree that letters of wishes should be made explicitly non-binding on the trustee, arguing that binding letters would interfere with the trustee’s discretion and hinder administration.[16] This argument is bolstered by the fact that the purpose of using more general language in a trust instrument is to provide the trustee with flexibility so that the trust can adapt to social, legal, and economic changes that impact administration.[17] Although the lack of litigation over letters of wishes may indicate that letters of wishes are often taken into account and used in administering the trust,[18] grantors should understand that the letters are deliberately non-binding in order to reap the benefits of adaptability. Grantors and their counsel should evaluate the risks of making a letter of wishes binding, and consider the benefits of a non-binding instrument.

3. DIGGING DEEPER: ARE LETTERS OF WISHES TRULY A POSITIVE ADDITION TO AN ESTATE PLAN?

Fast forward 10 years in the hypothetical posed in Part 1. Suppose you are approached by the trustee who has just found the letter expressing the grantor’s distaste for cosmetic procedures. Also assume that the trustee just received the gastric bypass distribution request. The trustee asks the attorney whether he or she must rely on the letter, what do you tell them? What if they ask whether they can exercise their discretion? Or what the trustee’s moral obligations are? Could the letter be deemed an amendment? The answers are unclear, but the following section applies scholarly opinion, statutory authority, and case law to explain how these issues can be addressed by practitioners.

A. Does the Trustee Have to Rely on the Letter?

While scholarly opinion is generally favorable toward letters of wishes, issues can complicate the positive purpose for which these letters are drafted. The first issue is whether the trustee has any obligation to rely on a letter of wishes. While trustees have historically abided by letters of wishes,[19] the letters are usually non-binding and often do not need to be disclosed to beneficiaries.[20] This means that the trustee has no legal obligation to make or forego making distributions in accordance with a letter of wishes.[21] Further, as noted by the restatement, letters of wishes are generally considered private correspondence between the grantor and trustee that offer guidance to the trustee, suggesting that the trustee has no duty to consider or abide by the letter in making a discretionary distribution.[22] Practitioners should be sure to discuss this with clients when deciding who to name as trustee to ensure that the client picks a trustee who is capable of managing the trust financially and effectuating the grantor’s intent to the full extent allowed by the law.

B. If the Trustee Wants to Consider a Grantor’s Letter of Wishes, Can They?

Further, a trustee may not be able to consider a grantor’s letter of wishes even if they want to. For example, Illinois common law provides that the general goal in construing a trust is to determine the grantor’s intent and to give effect to that intent if it is not contrary to law or public policy.[23] The grantor’s intent is to be determined solely by reference to the plain language of the trust itself.[24] Extrinsic evidence is only appropriate if the trust is ambiguous and the grantor’s intent cannot be ascertained.[25] When the language of a document is clear and unambiguous, a court should not modify or create new terms.[26] While Illinois courts have not addressed how a letter of wishes should be treated in relation to these rules of interpretation, Illinois’ Court of Appeals in In re Estate of Crooks noted that a decedent’s letter directing parcels of land to be transferred to him individually—which contradicted his previously executed will, trust, and quitclaim deeds directing the parcels to be transferred to a revocable trust—could not be used by a disgruntled heir to create an ambiguity in the decedent’s will, trust, or quitclaim deeds.[27] This suggests that a letter of wishes would be treated similarly unless there was an ambiguity in the four corners of the trust.

Practitioners should ensure that they are familiar with the statutes and common law governing trust interpretation for the state that governs the trusts they administer. While Illinois is fairly restrictive as far as what the trustee can rely on in administering the trust, Florida is more liberal.[28] In Kritchman v. Wolk, Florida’s Court of Appeals found that co-trustees of a revocable trust breached their duties of prudent administration and impartiality by failing to pay a beneficiary’s education expenses as requested in a letter from the grantor to the co-trustees prior to her death.[29] As such, the state where a letter of wishes is executed could impact whether a trustee may refer to it in administering the trust.[30] Further, the trust’s terms should be considered carefully to determine whether a letter of wishes or other written directive from the grantor should have any impact on administering the trust.

C. Moral and Ethical Obligations

While a trustee is unlikely to be required by law to consider a letter of wishes when administering a trust—and may, in fact, be prohibited from considering such a letter—they may feel a moral or ethical obligation to consider the grantor’s wishes when making discretionary distributions. Scholars suggest that trustees should administer trusts “in the state of mind contemplated by the settlor.”[31] Scholars also note that letters of wishes are “[m]oral and emotional accompaniments to a formal distribution scheme, [which]. . . have an important role to play in the planning process.”[32] This suggests that trustees may feel obligated to administer a trust consistently with a grantor’s letter of wishes. However, as shown by Kritchman, trustees without a personal connection to the grantor may feel no obligation to administer trusts in accordance with a grantor’s letter of wishes and may instead rely solely on the terms of the trust.[33] grantors and attorney’s should consider a potential trustee’s moral or ethical disposition towards a letter of wishes because this sense of obligation may depend on the trustee’s relationship with the grantor.[34]

D. Is the Letter an Amendment?

Depending on the circumstances under which a letter is drafted and signed, in addition to the letter’s content, some could argue that a letter of wishes is an amendment to a trust. Though many trust statutes require amendments to be made in accordance with the trust’s terms, a significant number of states allow a trust to be amended “by any other method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the settlor’s intent.”[35] Arguably, a letter of wishes expressing a grantor’s specific desire as to what distributions should and should not be made could function as an amendment. However, no United States federal or state court has addressed the issue.

In Illinois, a trust can be amended by reserving the right to amend in the trust instrument.[36] If the trust instrument specifically describes the method for amendment then that method alone must be used to amend the trust.[37] Scholars suggest that Illinois trusts should be drafted in such a way that all amendments must be prepared by a lawyer familiar with the trust instrument.[38] Despite this guidance, the status of a letter of wishes as an amendment to an Illinois trust uncertain. While it is possible that a letter of wishes could be drafted in such a way that it meets the trust’s requirements, it is dependent on the trust instrument’s amendment provision(s). If the grantor wants their letter to function as an amendment, the trust instrument would need to be drafted to ensure that the letter meets the trust instrument’s formal requirements. Drafting a trust instrument in this way may not be advisable because of the potential for introducing precatory language and ambiguity into the trust.

An example serves to further illustrate this issue. Consider a marital trust instrument that allows discretionary distributions for either the beneficiary-spouse’s support or best interests. Assume that both terms are defined with substantive differences. Suppose the grantor drafts a subsequent letter of wishes explaining how the grantor would determine what is in his or her spouse’s best interest, but uses language that mirrors the trust instrument’s definition of support. Should the trust be considered amended to reflect a support standard for all discretionary distributions? The answer depends on the letter’s wording, governing state law, and the trust’s terms. In Illinois, such a letter would be unlikely to amend the trust unless the trust instrument’s amendment provision was drafted to allow for such a letter to function as an amendment.[39] However, a letter of wishes may be more likely to amend a trust in states like Wisconsin[40] and Kentucky[41] that follow the UTC’s more lenient provision.[42]

4. CONCLUSION

While letters of wishes may aid a trustee in administering a discretionary trust and provide the grantor with peace of mind, grantors and their counsel should think carefully about whether a letter of wishes is appropriate for the grantor’s situation. The uncertain state of the law as to the effect that a letter of wishes has on trust administration suggests there is more to letters of wishes than meets the eye. Though scholars generally praise letters of wishes as a means for a grantor to “communicate their cultural beliefs, values, and practices”[43] or as “helpful to a trustee in ascertaining the settlor’s state of mind, objectives, and purposes in establishing [a] discretionary trust,”[44] counsel should be aware that a letter may cause problems in administering the trust instead of solving them.[45] Practitioners who recommend a letter of wishes and/or whose clients choose to include them in their estate plan should advise clients as to the uncertain status of letters of wishes as a viable estate planning tool. Further, any decision to include a letter of wishes in an estate plan should only be made with an understanding of state trust statutes and case law and careful consideration of who to name as trustee.

[1] Austin Wakeman Scott & William Franklin Fratcher, The Law of Trusts § 187 (2006).
[2] See Alexander A. Bove, Jr., The Letter of Wishes: Can We Influence Discretion in Discretionary Trusts?, 35 ACTEC J. 38, 39 (2009).
[3] Id.; Edward C. Halbach, Problems of Discretion in Discretionary Trusts, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1425 (1961) (arguing that the trustee should be given notice of the trust’s purpose and the grantor’s goals and beliefs to administer the trust in the way the grantor intended).
[4] See e.g., Bove, supra note 2, at 43; Henry Christensen III, 100 Years is a Long Time – New Concepts and Practical Planning Ideas, SN025 ALI-ABA 149, 183–84 (2007) (“[A letter of wishes] permits much more flexibility to. . . the trustee, who has more flexibility built into the trust instrument to exercise powers consistently with the intent of the settlor, rather than at the precise direction of the settlor, which was usually expressed in the vacuum of unknown and unanticipated events.”).
[5] Christensen, supra note 4, at 185.
[6] See Wakeman & Fratcher, supra note 1.
[7] 602 N.E.2d 33 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992).
[8] Note that the Hugh court referred to the grantor’s letters as “letters of direction” as opposed to “letters of wishes.” That said, the grantor’s “letter of direction” served essentially the same purpose that a letter of wishes would have.
[9] Id. at 35.
[10] Id. at 35–37.
[11] Bove, supra note 2 at 40; Deborah S. Gordon, Letters Non-Testamentary, 62 U. Kan. L. Rev. 585, 589 (2014).
[12] Both precatory language and ambiguity should be avoided in trust instruments. Trusts with patent or latent ambiguities are subject to having extrinsic evidence used in interpretation. See Koulogeorge v. Campbell, 983 N.E.2d 1066, 1073 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). Further, including precatory language in a trust runs the risk that the preacatory terms will not be binding on the trustee. See Duvall v. LaSalle Nat. Bank, 523 N.E.2d 974 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988).
[13] See infra § 3(a).
[14] 907 P.2d 794 (Idaho 1995).
[15] See Bove, supra note 2, at 43.
[16] Id. at 43–44 (“Binding instructions on the trustee can interfere with the concept of full discretion and undermine or diminish the opportunity of exercising that judgment. If such instructions are that important and inflexible, they should be included in the body of the trust. . .”); Christensen, supra note 4, at 183–84.
[17] Gordon, supra note 10, at 616.
[18] Christensen, supra note 4, at 183–84. This lack of case law may also be explained by the fact that letters of wishes are likely to be considered non-discoverable trust documents. As such, beneficiaries are unlikely to see letters of wishes unless the trustee voluntarily discloses them.
[19] Id. at 184 (describing how letters of wishes are widely used and that trustees often fulfill their duties as outlined in letters of wishes).
[20] Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 87 cmt. 3 (2007); Bove, supra note 2, at 43–44; Christensen, supra note 4, at 184; Steven M. Fast and Steven G. Margolin, Whose Trust is it Anyway?, SM001 ALI-ABA 187, 199-200 (2006).
[21] Note that some foreign jurisdictions legally require a trustee to consider a letter of wishes in making trust distributions. That said, these jurisdictions do not require the trustee to make discretionary distributions in accordance with the letters nor do the letters create any additional duty for the trustee. Bove, supra note 2, at 41; see also, Anguilla Trusts Ordinance 1994 §13(4); Belize Trusts Act 1992 §13(4); and Niue Trusts Act 1994, §14(4).
[22] Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 87 cmt. 3 (2007); see also Bove, supra note 2 at 42.
[23] Citizens Nat. Bank of Paris v. Kids Hope United, Inc. 922 N.E.2d 1093 (Ill. 2009).
[24] Koulogeorge v. Campbell, 983 N.E.2d 1066 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
[25] Stein v. Scott, 625 N.E.2d 713 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
[26] Ruby v. Ruby, 973 N.E.2d 36 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
[27] 638 N.E.2d 729 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). However, the court suggested that if the letter, will, trust, and quitclaim deeds had been executed simultaneously, the letter could indicate an ambiguity for which extrinsic evidence could be admitted to determine the decedent’s intent. The Idaho Supreme Court dealt with a similar issue, but decided differently in Matter of Estate of Kirk. 907 P.2d 794 (Idaho 1995). In Kirk, the court allowed a settlor’s handwritten note to be considered for purposes of construing her previously executed trust agreement. Id.
[28] See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 736.0804 (2017) (requiring a trustee to “administer the trust as a prudent person would, by considering the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the trust.”) (emphasis added).
[29] 152 So.3d 628, 631–32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). Note, however, that the grantor’s letter differed from a standard letter of wishes as it was delivered to the trustee during the grantor’s lifetime pursuant to the trust instrument’s provision allowing her to direct the trust to make payments as requested. Id. at 629–30.
[30] See e.g., Baker v. Wilburn, 456 N.W.2d 304, 306 (S.D.1990) (“[W]hen two or more instruments are executed at the same time by the same parties, for the same purpose and as part of the same transaction, the court must consider and construe the instruments as one contract.”).
[31] Wakeman & Fratcher, supra note 1; Bove, supra note 2, at 38.
[32] Gordon, supra note 10, at 617.
[33] Kritchman v. Wolk, 152 So.3d 628, 630–31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (describing trustee/defendant’s position that the terms of the trust nullified all of the grantor’s written directives).
[34] See id. at 615 (“These letters, which in general avoid theatricality for simplicity and performance for connection, reinforce the social relationship between writer and recipient without disrupting the estate plan or manipulating the beneficiaries.”).
[35] Unif. Trust Code § 602; see also, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-16-702; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 736.0602(3)(b)(2); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 700.7602; Mont. Code Ann. § 72-38-602; ; N.H. Rev. Stat. § 564-B:6-602;  Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5806.02; S.C. Code Ann § 62-7-602; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-602.
[36] Parish v. Parish, 193 N.E.2d 761, 766 (Ill. 1963).
[37] Id.; Northwestern University v. McLoraine, 438 N.E.2d 1369 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
[38] Robert S. Hunter, § 213:23. Amending the trust agreement, 19 Ill. Prac., Estate Planning & Admin (4th ed. 2016).
[39] Supra § 3(d).
[40] Wis. Stat. Ann. § 701.0602 (2017).
[41] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 386A.2-020 (2017).
[42] Unif. Trust Code § 602.
[43] Gordon, supra note 17, at 617.
[44] Bove, supra note 2, at 39.
[45] See e.g., Matter of Estate of Kirk, 907 P.2d 794 (Idaho 1995) (describing a conflict between potential beneficiaries over changes in their interests in the decedent’s trust caused by decedent’s handwritten letter attached to a trust amendment).

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