Category: Tax

2012 Wealth Transfer Tax Laws: The Window of Opportunity is Rapidly Closing

An article by Glen T. Eichelberger, Mary Elizabeth Mason, Bridget O’Toole Purdie, and Brian P. Teaff of Bracewell & Giuliani LLP recently had an article featured in The National Law Review regarding Wealth Transfer:

The window of opportunity to take advantage of the currently applicable wealth transfer tax laws is rapidly closing, and once shut, it is possible that we may never see such generous estate planning opportunities again.

The unique estate planning opportunities currently available are a result of the “Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Authorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010” (2010 Act). The 2010 Act introduced the following:

  • $5,120,000 exemption per person for Federal estate, gift and generation-skipping transfer (GST) taxes
    • Highest exemptions ever available
  • 35% maximum marginal rate for the estate, gift and GST taxes
    • Lowest rate in decades
  • “Reunification” of estate, gift and GST tax exemptions
    • Greater Planning Flexibility
    • Acting together, a couple can give up to $10,240,000 of assets (outright or in trust)

In addition, President Obama’s 2013 Budget Proposal contains proposed rules which would restrict a person’s ability to transfer wealth to their children and more remote descendants. The 2013 Budget Proposal includes the following rules:

Restrict grantor retained annuity trusts (GRATs) to a minimum of 10 years

Elimination of the availability of certain valuation adjustments associated with family limited partnerships

The generous provisions of the 2010 Act are temporary and without further Congressional action, these provisions will expire on December 31, 2012.  Act now before it is too late, so that you can benefit from the current advantageous estate opportunities and ensure you are not affected by the proposed rules from the 2013 Budget Proposal.

© 2012 Bracewell & Giuliani LLP

Some Indiana Local Government Entities May Qualify for Loans Due to Past Misapplied Maximum Fund Rate Calculations

The National Law Review recently published an article by Randal J. Kaltenmark and Jeffery J. Qualkinbush of Barnes & Thornburg LLP titled, Some Indiana Local Government Entities May Qualify for Loans Due to Past Misapplied Maximum Fund Rate Calculations:

Qualified Indiana local government entities – school corporations, cities, towns, counties and library districts – may wish to review their 2012 or prior year budgets due to misapplication of the maximum capital projects fund rate calculation under Indiana statute (Indiana Code 6-1.1-18-12).

Of immediate note is that changes made to this law during the 2012 Session of the Indiana General Assembly allow Indiana local governmental entities to obtain an interest free loan from the State of Indiana for what such entity should have received in 2012 in such rate-capped funds after applying the corrected calculation. The window on obtaining this money this year will be closing in less than 30 days.

The issue originally came to light after Barnes & Thornburg LLP’s representation of two school districts, DeKalb County Eastern Consolidated School District and, most recently, the Metropolitan School District of Pike Township in appeals before theIndiana Tax Court. The misapplications, which were calculated by the Indiana Department of Local Government Finance (DLGF) cost these governmental units more than $1 million per year, collectively.

In both of these cases, the Indiana Tax Court agreed with the firm’s conclusions that the DLGF’s interpretation of the statute was incorrect and ordered those miscalculations to be corrected in the future budget years. On May 4, 2012, the Indiana Supreme Court denied the DLGF’s request to review these Tax Court decisions.

Attorneys involved believe many of the qualified Indiana local governmental entities have been the victim of one or more of these same miscalculations in connection with their 2012 or prior budgets.

© 2012 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP

Impact of New Medicare Investment Tax on Trusts and Estates

As part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act enacted in 2010, Section 1411 was added to the Internal Revenue Code. Beginning in 2013, this section imposes an additional tax on individuals and on trusts and estates. It is a tax on net investment income tax. Net investment income includes capital gains.

It has generally been reported that the tax on individuals does not apply unless their modified adjusted income exceeds $200,000 ($250,000 for a married couple).

What is less well known is that this new investment tax applies to trusts and estates at a much lower income level. Section 1411 provides that the new tax applies when income reaches the level at which it is taxed at the highest marginal rate. In 2012, the highest marginal tax rate is reached when undistributed net income reaches $11,650. This figure will be adjusted for inflation in 2013.

Depending upon what the income tax rates are in 2013, a trust or estate which has a substantial amount of undistributed net taxable income may find itself paying federal income tax of 43.4 percent (39.6 + 3.8) on much of that income. This is in addition to any state income tax (6 percent on income in excess of $9,000 in Missouri).

This makes careful income tax planning for estates and trusts more important than it has ever been.

© Copyright 2012 Armstrong Teasdale LLP

New York Attorney General Files First Tax Enforcement Complaint Under New York’s Trailblazing False Claims Act Statute

The National Law Review recently published an article about New York’s Tax Enforcement written by Michael A. Berlin, David W. Bunning, Mark F. Glaser, and Barbara T. Kaplan of Greenberg Traurig, LLP:

GT Law

On April 19, 2012, New York’s attorney general filed the first tax enforcement complaint under New York’s novel False Claims Act (“Act”), alleging that Sprint-Nextel Corp. had deliberately understated sales tax payments to New York by over $100 million since July, 2005. Under the Act, the defendant could be held liable for three times the amount of these damages, plus penalties of $6,000 to $12,000 per violation, plus attorneys’ fees.

The Act, like its counterparts in federal law and the laws of 28 other states, permits a whistleblower to bring an action for false claims against the government. In New York, whistleblowers can be paid from 15-30 percent of the proceeds recovered. In 2010, New York amended its false claims act statute to become the first state to expressly permit recovery for tax fraud.1

In 2011, the Taxpayer Protection Bureau was created to work with whistleblowers and enforce the Act. Complaints by whistleblowers are filed under seal pending government investigation. According to a press release issued by the attorney general, the original whistleblower action was filed in March of 2011, just after the Taxpayer Protection Bureau was created. The Bureau conducted “an extensive investigation and determined the extent of Sprint’s illegal conduct.” By filing the superseding complaint on April 19, the attorney general took over that law suit.

The complaint alleges that Sprint-Nextel deliberately understated sales tax to be collected from its customers and paid to New York by arbitrarily treating part of monthly access charges to cell phone subscribers as non-taxable interstate calls rather than as taxable access charges. It further alleges that to carry out this plan false records and statements were submitted to New York tax authorities, and the practice was concealed from the taxing authorities, competitors and customers. According to the complaint, approximately 25 percent of the monthly access charges were arbitrarily designated as non-taxable, resulting in a loss to New York of more than $100 million in tax revenue.

The press release states that this produced a competitive advantage by making Sprint-Nextel’s plans “cheaper than competitors’ plans by $4.6 million per month, collectively, because of sales tax not collected and paid.” In addition to triple damages, penalties, and attorney’s fees, the complaint seeks to ensure that Sprint-Nextel’s customers are insulated from any liability for the unpaid sales tax2 and seeks to prevent early termination fees from being enforced against any customers who terminate their contract before the end of the contract term.

The attorney general’s press release notes that the Act “is one of the state’s most powerful civil enforcement tools.” Indeed it is, for at least three reasons. First, the State can recover from acts reported by whistleblowers, which may otherwise be unknown to the State and undiscoverable through audit or other means. Second, New York can recover significantly more money in an action under the False Claims Act than it otherwise could using the tax statutes. Triple damages plus penalties and attorneys’ fees minus the amount paid to a whistleblower is far more than the sales tax plus 14 percent interest and the 30 percent penalty that could otherwise be recovered. Third, the filing of the complaint is public, in contrast to a tax audit, which must remain undisclosed because of taxpayer secrecy laws.

1 The 2010 legislation was spearheaded by Eric Schneiderman, then a state senator, who became attorney general in January, 2011. 

2 If a seller does not collect sales tax from a buyer, either the seller or the buyer can be held liable for the tax.

©2012 Greenberg Traurig, LLP

The Growing Corporate Threat of Taxpayer Identity Theft Fraud

The National Law Review recently published an article by Latour “LT” Laffferty of Fowler White Boggs P.A. regarding Identity Theft:

Identity theft continues to be a growing problem nationwide, but particularly in Florida which continues to lead the nation per capita in reported incidents of identity theft according to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), a national clearinghouse for consumer fraud complaints. Taxpayer identity theft fraud, a subset of identity theft in general, is the most prevalent form of identity theft according to the FTC which reported that tax-related identity theft incidents increased from 51,702 in 2008 to 248,357 in 2010. This is a dramatic increase from the 35,000 instances of employment-related identity theft cases reported in 2007.

Taxpayer identity theft fraud involves not only the theft of someone’s identity but also the filing of a fraudulent tax return using the victim’s social security number to receive a tax refund often totaling more than $9,000.00. The IRS identified and prevented the issuance of more than $14 billion in fraudulent refunds in 2011. A 2008 report issued by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA), an IRS watchdog, stated that the prevention of taxpayer identity theft fraud is an employer’s issue involving the security of their systems and data. According to TIGTA, 938,664 of the 2.1 million fraudulent tax returns filed in 2011 involved identity theft and totaled $6.5 billion. The stolen information includes the person’s name, date of birth and social security number or Medicare beneficiary number.

The latest twist, however, is that your own employees are in on the crime as law enforcement agencies are reporting that employees at many businesses that compile personal information are misappropriating and selling the information to thieves who are filing fraudulent tax returns. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued a Fraud Alert in February 2012 warning healthcare providers that perpetrators are misappropriating the identities of Medicare beneficiaries from “employers, schools, hospitals, and prisons” but any businesses that store personal information are at risk from current or prospective employees. Recent law enforcement arrests report finding suspects with massive quantities of tax refunds and lists of prospective employers to apply for jobs with the specific intent to steal taxpayer identities from their databases.

The reality of this emerging threat is that perpetrators are actually targeting organizations for employment so that they can specifically breach their data security and commit identity theft and aid those committing tax refund fraud. These organizations have both a fiduciary and legal duty to safeguard that personal information, but also a legal duty to notify those consumers who they can reasonably identify that their personal information has been stolen.

©2002-2012 Fowler White Boggs P.A.

Supreme Court's Decision in Kawashima v. Holder and the Hard-Learned Lessons of an Old Tax-Crime Conviction

An article regarding a recent Supreme Court Decision written by Dawn M. Lurie of Greenberg Traurig, LLP was published in The National Law Review:

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A married couple, natives of Japan, small business owners, who immigrated to the U.S. legally and became Legal Permanent Residents (green card holders) in 1984, began, and continue to run, successful Japanese restaurants in various affluent areas of California. Over two decades ago, in 1991, the couple made false statements on their federal corporate tax return, and were convicted of the related crimes in 1997 in federal court, one spouse for making the false statements, the other for assisting with making them. The spouse convicted of making the false statements served a four-month prison sentence, and the couple paid $245,000 back to the government that it was found to have owed in taxes and penalties.

Their troubles, however, were far from over, as many long-term green card holders who were convicted of certain crimes have come to know in the severest of ways.

Three years after their convictions in 2001, the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) brought removal (deportation) charges against the couple in immigration court, alleging their convictions amounted to commissions of “aggravated felonies,” types of crimes, which, if committed, result, according to the immigration law, in automatic removal from the U.S.

Thus began a legal battle through the Immigration Court, the Board of Immigration Appeals, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and, finally, the Supreme Court of the United States, in what is now the precedent to be known as Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. ____ (2012), decided on February 21, 2012.

In this case, the couple argued that the crimes for which they were convicted, specifically those related to making false statements on a tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. §7206(1) and (2), respectively, did not meet the relevant statutory definition of an “aggravated felony.” The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, disagreed, affirming the Ninth Circuit’s decision and finding that the crimes for which the couple were convicted indeed qualify as aggravated felonies that render them automatically deportable from the United States.

Which particular crimes will be classified as aggravated felonies is not always clear, hence, the lengthy court battles that can ensue. Congress provides categories of offenses to be considered aggravated felonies at 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43). Some of the categories appear more explicit, such as “murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor,” (8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(A)), and “a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year,” (8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(A)(G)), while others, like the one the Court addressed in Kawashima, appear to leave more room for interpretation.

In the case of the Kawashimas, the government sought to have them deported from the U.S. based upon the definition of “aggravated felony” found at 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(M), for having been convicted of “an offense that (i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000; or (ii) is described in section 7201 of title 26 (relating to tax evasion) in which the revenue loss to the Government exceeds $10,000.” The couple was convicted of crimes related to false statements on tax returns, not tax evasion specifically, and so the Immigration Judge found that it was “clause one,” i.e., crimes involving fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim (in this case, the U.S. government) exceeds $10,000, which qualified the crimes for which they were convicted for the “aggravated felony” classification thus rendering them both deportable.

The Supreme Court rejected all arguments made by the Kawashimas, including that the crimes for which they were convicted were not crimes of “fraud and deceit,” since fraud and deceit were not specific elements of the crimes for which they were convicted; that by only specifically including tax evasion in the category of definitions, Congress intended that to be the only tax crime that should fall within the aggravated felony definition; that, if tax crimes were to be deemed crimes of fraud and deceit in accordance with “clause one,” then “clause two,” which addressed tax evasion only, would be rendered superfluous; and that the statute was ambiguous and should, therefore, given the severity of the punishment of deportation, be construed in their favor, citing the Court’s decision in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).

The Court found that making false statements on tax returns necessarily entails fraud and deceit, that there were likely special reasons for why Congress determined it needed to mention tax evasion specifically in its own clause that had nothing to do with intending to limit the scope of crimes, tax crimes included, that could be included in the definition of aggravated felony under “clause one,” thus rendering “clause two” non superfluous. Moreover, it stated, the statute’s meaning was clear enough not to warrant a St. Cyr type of deference.

Justice Ginsberg, on the other hand, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan in her dissent, agreed with the Kawashimas that the statute was ambiguous, and that, given the severity of the deportation punishment, its meaning should be construed in their favor. She also pointed out that the crimes for which the Kawashimas were convicted were lesser offenses than crimes of tax evasion, and surmised that Congress likely intended to limit the tax crimes that could be deemed to be aggravated felonies to tax evasion by giving it its own clause in the list of aggravated felony definitions. She further expressed concerns that this precedent would hurt the prosecution of tax cases by dissuading foreign nationals charged with tax crimes from pleading to lesser offenses, thus delaying the government’s ability to collect on and enforce the tax laws. Moreover, she worried about the floodgates aspect of the case, namely, that the Court’s decision throws open the definition of “aggravated felony” under “clause one” to encompass a vast array of tax crimes at the federal, state and local levels, including misdemeanors.

Obviously and unfortunately, dissenting opinions, no matter how well-reasoned and humanitarian, are not binding precedent, and, the law that allows foreign nationals to be deported based on an aggravated felony conviction is discomfortingly unambiguous: “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable,” (8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). This means that if the court finds that a crime for which a foreign national was convicted is deemed to fit within one of the descriptive categories of aggravated felonies as laid out by Congress in the immigration law, no matter how long ago the conviction was, no matter how dearly the foreign national paid for it through imprisonment and/or fines, and regardless of whether the foreign national otherwise has led, and now leads, a perfectly law-abiding life that includes raising a family here in the U.S., and running successful businesses that create jobs and fuel the economy, that foreign national is still deportable.

It goes without saying that here the importance of honestly and meticulously filing tax returns cannot be overestimated. The IRS can and does investigate businesses large and small, as well as individuals. Small business owners and green card holders should enlist the professional help of seasoned, reputable tax accountants in preparing their returns, and make sure that they are given complete copies of the returns that were filed with all of the worksheets. These records should be maintained indefinitely, in an organized manner, and in a safe place.

Green card holders should also seriously consider applying for U.S. citizenship through naturalization as soon as they are eligible to apply. Generally, to become a naturalized citizen, the legal permanent resident must complete the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) Form N-400 with supporting documentation, be at least eighteen years old and of good moral character, must pass a civics exam and meet certain English language requirements, and meet a physical presence requirement.

To meet the physical presence requirement, the individual generally must have resided continuously as a Legal Permanent Resident in the U.S. for at least five (5) years prior to filing the N-400 application, or for at least three years if married to and living with the same U.S. Citizen for the last three (3) years; have been physically present in the U.S. for at least thirty (30) months out of the previous five (5) years (absences of more than six (6) months but less than one year break the continuity of residence unless it is established that residence was not abandoned during such period); and have resided within the state or USCIS district in which they are applying for naturalization for at least three months. Certain applicants such as members of the U.S. Armed Forces serving during periods of conflict are not subject to the continuous residence requirement, and, in many cases, the naturalization process for U.S. military personnel is expedited.

It bears remembering that while there are certain situations in which individuals can be stripped of their naturalized U.S. citizenship and face deportation (e.g., treason, fraud on a citizenship application), they are rare and extreme. Critically, naturalized citizens cease to be “aliens” in the eyes of U.S. immigration law, and are not deportable under the aggravated felony provision.

Foreign nationals charged with crimes while in the U.S. should, before entering a plea agreement or otherwise, make certain to secure seasoned immigration counsel with specific experience in navigating the immigration consequences of criminal convictions, in addition to any counsel that may be representing them on the criminal charges. This cannot be emphasized enough. A seasoned immigration attorney will have an in-depth knowledge of the aggravated felony provisions and the laws governing deportation and will be able to work with criminal counsel to competently try his or her best to achieve an outcome that will not have the brutal after-effect of triggering the aggravated felony provisions of the immigration law.

Finally, it should also be remembered that there is more cooperation among related U.S. government agencies. Cooperation has been observed in similar cases where Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Department of Labor, the Department of Justice and/or the Internal Revenue Service increased investigations, including worksite enforcement actions, based on tax evasion issues. Foreign nationals with businesses in the United States need to ensure that they are in compliance with all applicable laws.

©2012 Greenberg Traurig, LLP

Illinois Reverses Position on Income Tax Treatment of Benefits for Civil Union Partners

An article by Elizabeth A. Savard, Todd A. Solomon and Brian J. Tiemann of McDermott Will & Emery regarding Illinois Income Tax Policy for Civil Unions was recently published in The National Law Review:

The Illinois Department of Revenue recently issued guidance reversing its position on the state income tax treatment of benefits for non-dependent civil union partners.

Federal law excludes amounts that an employer pays toward medical, dental or vision benefits for an employee and the employee’s spouse or dependents from the employee’s taxable income.  However, because civil union partners are not recognized under federal law, employers that provide these same benefits to employees’ civil union partners must impute the fair market value of the coverage as income to the employee that is subject to federal income tax, unless the civil union partner otherwise qualifies as the employee’s “dependent” pursuant to Section 152 of the Internal Revenue Code.

The Illinois Department of Revenue previously indicated that Illinois would follow the federal approach in taxing the fair market value of employer-provided coverage for non-dependent civil union partners because state law did not provide an exemption from such taxation.  However, recent guidance issued by the Department of Revenue reverses that position and indicates that employer-provided benefits for a non-dependent civil union partner are now exempt from Illinois state income taxation.  Illinois civil union partners are directed to calculate their state income taxes by completing a mock federal income tax return as if they were married for purposes of federal law.

In addition, for federal tax purposes, employees may not make pre-tax contributions to a Section 125 cafeteria plan on behalf of a non-dependent civil union partner (i.e.,contributions for the partner generally must be after-tax) and may not receive reimbursement for expenses of the non-dependent civil union partner from flexible spending accounts (FSAs), health reimbursement accounts (HRAs) or health savings accounts (HSAs).  However, for Illinois state tax purposes, the employee now can be permitted to pay for the non-dependent civil union partner’s coverage on a pre-tax basis.

Employers providing medical, dental or vision benefits to civil union partners residing in Illinois should take action to structure their payroll systems to tax employees on the fair market value of coverage for employees’ non-dependent civil union partners for federal income tax purposes, but not for state purposes.

© 2012 McDermott Will & Emery

IRS Extends Transition Relief for Puerto Rico Qualified Plans to Participate in U.S. Group Trusts and Deadline to Transfer Assets

Posted in the National Law Review an article by attorney Nancy S. Gerrie and Jeffrey M. Holdvogt of McDermott Will & Emery regarding  U.S. employers with qualified employee retirement plans that cover Puerto Rico:

On December 21, 2011, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued Notice 2012-6, which provides welcome relief for U.S. employers with qualified employee retirement plans that cover Puerto Rico employees.  Notice 2012-6 provides that the IRS will extend the deadline for employers sponsoring plans that are tax-qualified only in Puerto Rico (ERISA Section 1022(i)(1) Plans) to continue to pool assets with U.S.-qualified plans in group and master trusts described in Revenue Ruling 81-100 (81-100 group trusts) until further notice, provided the plan was participating in the trust as of January 10, 2011, or holds assets that had been held by a qualified plan immediately prior to the transfer of those assets to an ERISA Section 1022(i)(1) Plan pursuant to a spin-off from a U.S.-qualified plan under Revenue Ruling 2008-40.

Notice 2012-6 also extends the deadline for sponsors of retirement plans qualified in both the United States and Puerto Rico (dual-qualified plans) to spin off and transfer assets attributable to Puerto Rico employees to ERISA Section 1022(i)(1) Plans, with the resulting plan assets considered Puerto Rico-source income and not subject to U.S. tax.

There are now two separate deadlines:

    • First, in recognition of the fact that Puerto Rico adopted a new tax code in 2011 with significant changes to the requirements for qualified retirement plans, the IRS has extended the general deadline to December 31, 2012, for dual-qualified plans to make transfers to Puerto Rico-only plans, in order to give plan sponsors time to consider the effect of the changes made by the new tax code.
    • Second, in recognition of the fact that the IRS has not yet issued definitive guidance on the ability of an ERISA Section 1022(i)(1) Plan to participate in 81-100 group trusts, the IRS has extended the deadline for dual-qualified plans that participate in an 81-100 group trust to some future deadline, presumably after the IRS reaches a conclusion on the ability of a dual-qualified plan to participate in an 81-100 group trust, as described in Revenue Ruling 2011-1.

For more information on the issues related to participation of ERISA Section 1022(i)(1) Plans in 80-100 group trusts, see “IRS Permits Puerto Rico-Qualified Plans to Participate in U.S. Group and Master Trusts for Transition Period, Extends Deadline for Puerto Rico Spin-Offs.”

For more information on the issues plan sponsors should consider with respect to a dual-qualified plan spin-off and transfer of assets attributable to Puerto Rico employees to ERISA section 1022(i)(1) plans, see “IRS Sets Deadline for Transfers from Dual-Qualified to Puerto Rico-Only Qualified Plans.”

© 2011 McDermott Will & Emery

Congress Reconsiders Independent Contractor Classification

Posted in the National Law Review an article by Robert B. Meyer and David L. Woodard of  Poyner Spruill LLP regarding Employee MisClassification Prevention Act (EMPA):

 

 

It appears that Congress has again turned its attention to the issue of employee/independent contractor classification.  On October 13, 2011, Rep. Lynn Woolsey (D-CA) reintroduced legislation titled the “Employee Misclassification Prevention Act” (EMPA).  This bill, if enacted, would amend the Fair Labor Standards Act to impose new obligations on employers which utilize independent contractors, and also penalties for employers which misclassify employees as contractors.  Similar legislation was also introduced in the Senate last April, further suggesting that this issue of contractor classification is gaining traction in Congress.  The EMPA, as it is presently drafted, proposes the following:

  • Require employers to keep records of wages and hours worked by independent contractors.  The failure to do so would result in a presumption that the worker is an employee.
  • Require employers to provide written notice to every worker of his/her classification as either an employee or contractor.  The notice must also direct the worker to a Department of Labor website for information regarding worker rights under the EMPA, and encourage workers to contact the DOL if they have questions about classification.
  • Prohibit employers from discriminating or retaliating against workers who exercise their rights under the EMPA.
  • Amend the FLSA to make misclassification a prohibited act, and impose double liquidated damages for violations of the minimum wage and overtime pay provisions of the FLSA resulting from the misclassification.
  • Impose civil penalties upon employers for violating the EMPA (up to $1,100 for first violation, and up to $5,000 for repeat or willful violations).
  • Authorize the DOL to conduct targeted audits of employers in “certain industries with frequent incidence of misclassifying employees as non-employees….”
  • Permit the DOL to share information with the Internal Revenue Service regarding employers found to have misclassified workers.
  • Amend the Social Security Act to establish “administrative penalties for misclassifying employees, or paying unreported wages to employees without proper recordkeeping, for unemployment compensation purposes.”
  • Require state unemployment benefits agencies to conduct worker classification audits of employers.

The potential impact of this proposed legislation is far-reaching.  It is apparent that the EMPA would create a new federal offense for both intentional and unintentional contractor misclassifications.  In addition, the law would create a federal source of new employee rights, and would empower the DOL to seek expanded monetary damages on behalf of workers.  Therefore, employers should not only remain watchful of this legislation as it works its way through Congress, but also cautious about their use and classification of independent contractors.

© 2011 Poyner Spruill LLP. All rights reserved.

Ford Motor Credit Company v. Chesterfield County: Reading Constitutional Fairness And Supply Side Economics Into The Virginia Tax Code

Recently posted in the National Law Review, Winner of the Winter 2011 Student Legal Writing Contest, Adam Blander of Brooklyn Law School wrote an article regarding the recent decision of Ford Motor Credit Company v. Chesterfield County:

In the recent decision of Ford Motor Credit Company v. Chesterfield County,[1] the Virginia Supreme Court held that the gross receipts of a taxpayer’s local business branch reflected activity generated outside of the branch itself, and was therefore not taxable to Chesterfield County as a licensing privilege. This Note argues that despite the rather case-specific and constrictive holding of the decision (which was decided on state-statutory grounds), the facts of the case actually confronted the Court with a much broader, yet more delicate constitutional and public policy determination — what constitutes “fair” tax apportionment of large multi-state businesses?

I. Background: Constitutional Boundaries of State Tax Apportionments

Tax apportionment is the attempt by a governing body to levy taxes based on a corporation’s earned income in that jurisdiction.[2] Almost by definition, “[a]ny state tax apportionment formula will be inaccurate – either overstating or understating the portion of a corporation’s income that should be subject to tax.”[3] Consequently, any formula, at some level, is unfair. In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, the Supreme Court held that the U.S. Constitution required all state taxes affecting multi-state businesses to be, among other things, “fairly apportioned.”[4] In Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, the Court explained that a “fairly apportioned” tax must be both “internally” and “externally consistent.”[5] Container directed courts to test for “internal inconsistency” through engaging in a hypothetical exercise: if more than 100 percent of the business’s income would be taxed if every jurisdiction applied the challenged apportionment formula, then formula was internally inconsistent.[6]Internal inconsistency is a facial challenge – the taxpayer need only prove that he faces a “theoretical risk of multiple taxation.”[7] The more elusive element of externalinconsistency, on the other hand, requires the challenged formula to “actually reflect a reasonable sense of how income is generated.”[8]  As such, the taxpayer must show by “clear and cogent evidence that the income attributed to the State is in fact out of all appropriate proportions to the business transacted in that State” or that it “has led to a grossly distorted result.”[9] In Goldberg v. Sweet, the Court clarified that that “[t]he external consistency test asks whether the State has taxed only that portion of the revenues from the interstate activity which reasonably reflects the in-state component of the activity being taxed.”[10]

The practical effect of these Supreme Court decisions is that state courts have been entrusted with the daunting task of determining what constitutes “fair apportionment.” State courts have analyzed challenges to tax schemes utilizing these Supreme Court directives, but have also taken cues from their state’s common law tradition, the state’s own statutory code, and, when possible, the legislative intent of the state’s taxing body. Patrolling for constitutional defects presents an interpretative and political challenge to any court adjudicating tax disputes- how should it reconcile a taxpayer’s right to be free from unfairly apportioned taxes (even if the “unfairness” is entirely theoretical), while at the same time, faithfully interpret the tax systems passed by the legislative body, whose purpose is to collect vital revenue from all taxpayers in its jurisdiction?  This dilemma becomes all the more problematic when the taxpayer is a complex interstate business, which may organize its corporate make-up or accounting scheme in an attempt to avoid payingthese taxes. The Virginia Supreme Court faced such a dilemma in Ford Motor Credit Company.

II. Ford Motor Credit Company v. Chesterfield County: The Facts

In February 2007, Ford Motor Credit Company (FMCC), filed in Virginia circuit court an “Application for Correction of Erroneous Assessment of Business, Profession and Occupation License [“BPOL”] Tax,”[11] claiming it had mistakenly overpaid Chesterfield County, Virginia for the tax years of 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. FMCC asserted that its BPOL payments to Chesterfield County, which was based on “the entire gross receipts of loans related to its Richmond branch,”[12] did not actually “reflect the limited contribution of the Richmond Branch to [its] nationwide business.”[13] As such, FMCC sought a refund of $1,515,935.05.[14]

FMCC, a subsidiary of Ford Motor Company, is a “financial services provider, primarily to the automobile purchase or loan lessee environment,” headquartered in Dearborn, Michigan, with hundreds of sales branches throughout the Country, the Richmond branch being one of them.[15] The FMCC headquarters provided the Richmond branch with the capital needed to provide loans, and dictated to the branch “the policies and criteria governing loan approval, contract terms, and other management issues.”[16]

Roughly 75 percent of the branch’s revenue came from “retail and lease contracts,” in which the branch would provide financing to customers wishing to purchase or lease a vehicle from a Ford Motor Company dealership. While the Richmond branch provided the administrative duties necessary to effectuate a loan, such as reviewing the loan application, collecting paperwork and forwarding account information, [17] it generally “did not process funds, receive payments, engage in collection or other customer service activities, or handle delinquent debts.”[18] Upon approval of the loan, the paperwork was forwarded to a service center, in charge of taking title to the vehicle,[19] and the “branch had no further involvement in the loans.”[20] FMCC would then record these loans as receivables in its internal “management, analysis and performance system” (“MAPS”).[21] FMCC would also “book” as revenue any payments due to FMCC. In the event of default on a loan, FMCC would record revenue once the “principle was satisfied on the note.”[22] FMCC paid BPOL taxes based on the gross receipts that MAPS attributed to the Richmond Branch.

FMCC argued that MAPS, in fact, was not an “an activity based system,” but merely a “contract revenue-based system.”[23] In other words, MAPS tracked revenue via the branch in which the loan was originally processed, but was unable to verify which office was actually responsiblefor the specific revenue-generating activities.[24] An FMCC accounting expert testified that it would be “very difficult” to design a system which actually “attribute[d] revenue based on where services are performed.”[25]Accordingly, the BPOL tax assessment, which was based on the gross receipts of “all loans originating in the Richmond Branch” failed to consider the role of other offices in the administering of these loans, including, in particular, the Dearborn headquarters. Because reliance on the gross receipts did not actually reflect revenue collected based on the Richmond branch’s activities, FMCC argued that the BPOL tax, as administered, violated the “fair apportionment prong” for local taxation set forth in Brady.[26] The expert proposed that a BPOL tax based on payroll apportionment would more accurately reflect “all the activities [of the Richmond branch] thatgeneratedrevenues” which, incidentally, would entitle FMCC to a sizable refund.[27]

Unmoved, the circuit court dismissed FMCC’s application with prejudice, finding that the “MAPS figures accurately reflect the gross receipts generated as [a] result of the distinct efforts of the Richmond Branch” and consequently, was not “‘out of all appropriate proportion’ to the business transacted in the locality,” thus satisfyingBrady’s fair apportionment requirement.[28]

III. Ford Motor Credit Company: The Decision

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the circuit court’s decision, and found for FMCC. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Cynthia D. Kinser declined to directly address the constitutional challenges under Brady, and instead held that the assessment contravened the Virginia Taxation Code. Nonethless, this Note contends that the decision was not an exercise in “constitutional avoidance”: while the Court did not state so explicitly, it read into the state Tax Code its own value-laden interpretation of what constitutes “fair apportionment,” regardless of whether such an interpretation was a faithful interpretation of the actual legislation.  In so doing, the Court hinted that any alternate interpretation of the Code faced the risk of being challenged on constitutional grounds as well.

The Virginia Tax Code allows the “governing body of any county” to collect “liscence taxes” (BPOL taxes) upon any person, firm, or corporation “engaged” in any business or trade “within the county.”[29] The question, therefore, was whether “gross receipts [] falls within a locality’s statutory power to tax.”[30] Citing a prior Virginia case, City of Winchester v. American Woodmark (Woodmark I), the Court noted that additional tax burdens “are not to be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used. Whenever there is just doubt, that doubt should absolve the taxpayer.”[31] The Code provides that local BPOL taxes may only tax “those gross receipts attributed to the exercise of a privilege subject to licensure at a definite place of business within this jurisdiction.”[32] With regards to service businesses in particular, gross receipts should be “attributed to the definite place of business at which the service is performed…directed, or controlled.”[33] Nonetheless, if the licensee  “has more than one definite place of business and it is impractical or impossible to determine to which definite place of business gross receipts should be attributed under the general rule,” then gross receipts are to be “apportioned based on payroll.”[34]

The Court, relying upon its prior holding in City of Winschester v. American Woodmark Corp. (Woodmark II), which itself relied upon the language of the Supreme Court decision, Goldberg v. Sweet, concluded that the gross receipts werenotattributable solely to FMCC services rendered in the County.[35]Woodmark II held that a BPOL tax may be levied “only to the portion of the revenues from the interstate activity which reasonably reflects the in-state component of the activity being taxed.”[36] In Woodmark II, American Woodmark, a furniture manufacturer with 24 facilities in different states, alleged that city’s imposition of BPOL taxes on 100% of its revenue constituted “unfair apportionment” because only its corporate headquarters were located in Winchester. Woodmark argued that an assessment of the gross receipts was not “attributable to [its] business activities within the city.”[37] The Court determined it a matter of “common sense” that the value by the headquarters alone could “not possibly produce 100% of the revenues.”[38] It thus held that American Woodmark had presented “clear and cogent evidence” that the “assessments attributed to operations conducted in Winchester [were] out of all appropriate proportions to…the business transacted in Winchester.”[39]

The FMCCcourt noted that “[a]lthough a statutory challenge was not presented inWoodmark II” the case nonetheless stood for the proposition that a locality, under the Code, may only tax the gross receipts “attributed to the exercise of a privilege subject to licensure at a definite place of business.”[40] Regarding the facts of this case, the court observed that service centers outside the County had refinanced loans (initially contracted into at the Richmond branch), assisted customers with administration changes, titled vehicle, and tracked the progress of loan payments. The court also recognized that FMCC headquarters directly provided the Richmond branch with capital. In light of these realities, the court held that FMCC had demonstrated “by clear and cogent evidence” that the gross receipts attributed to the Richmond Brach, were in fact, the product of “financial services provided in other jurisdictions.”[41] “In other words, the operation of the Richmond Branch did not produce 100 percent of the gross receipts that the County taxed.”[42] Therefore, a tax assessment based on these gross receipts was invalid. Finally, because MAPS only tracked revenues by contract, the Court determined it would be “impossible, or, at least, impractical” for FMCC to track the actual services performed over the lives of the approximately 20,000 loans which originated in the Richmond Branch. As such, the court concluded that the “BPOL tax assessment must be calculated using payroll apportionment.”[43]

IV. Possible Consequences

FMCC received a significant windfall from the ruling, which, as the dissent observed, was now entitled to recover approximately 93% of its past payments.[44] Still, the Court’s uncritical acceptance of FMCC’s contention that it would be “very difficult” to design an alternative accounting system may spawn unanticipated mischief in the near future. Without judicial incentives (punitive or otherwise), a complex interstate business, well aware of the financial stakes, will simply fail to create an accounting system which records revenue generated by each definite places of business. At that stage, the business will self-servingly insist to the taxing authority that redesigning the system would be “very difficult,” entitling itself to the more attractive BPOL based on payroll. In effect, a company may fleece itself from paying higher taxes simply through its own negligence, willful blindness, or lack of innovative impetus.

Perhaps more significantly, the court’s reliance on Woodmark II,  which was decided on non-statutory based grounds,  in interpreting the BPOL statutory provisions seems to be an effort by the court to inject constitutional principles of “fair apportionment” into the Tax Code itself. The FMCC court could have determined the extent of Chesterfield County’s authority to tax through utilizing the traditional maxims of statutory interpretation, in which the provisions dealing with the BPOL tax were analyzed within the context to the Code as a whole. Instead, the FMCC court relied onWoodmark II’s broad “reasonableness” standard of external inconsistency, set forth by the Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Sweet. Apparently, the court signaled that it would interpret the Code itselfto mandate that all assessments reasonably reflect the in-state component of the taxed activity in accordance with Goldberg. The Virginia Supreme Court, moreover, has set a considerably higher external inconsistency standard than Goldberg’s – Both Woodmark II and FMCC held that an assessment which taxed anythingmore than revenue attributed to that definite place of business constituted clear and cogent evidence that the assessments were out of all appropriate proportion. Proportionality was measured, not through any mathematical ratio or formula, but rather through an appeal to “common sense” (Woodmark II), or through realization that the revenue could not be quantified (FMCC). Both decisions’ reference to an opaque “100% of revenue” hypothetical exercise indicates that the Court has attempted to articulate a “reasonableness” standard which (rather coarsely) incorporates both internal and external consistency models.

V. Trending Towards a More Business-Friendly Virginia

To appreciate how far-reaching the FMCC decision is, it is crucial to highlight the actual holding in WoodmarkI, approvingly cited in FMCC. Woodmark Iheld that office equipment located at a manufacturer’s headquarters was sufficiently “used in manufacturing” under the Virginia Tax Code, thus exempting it from local property taxes.[45] The Virginia legislature thereafter amended the Code to codifyWoodmark’s broad interpretation of “manufacturing.”[46] The practical consequence of these actions was that anybusiness involved in manufacturing, however tangentially, could now claim exemptions for its personal property.[47] FollowingWoodmark I, the Virginia courts further broadened these exceptions to include, among other things, vending machines and advertising scoreboards used by a manufacturer, and even raises questions of whether the exemption may extend to property leased to a manufacturer which is owned by a non-manufacturer.[48] One scholar opined that Woodmark I’s interpretation of the Virginia Codeare  “convoluted” and “not easily categorized by [ ] theoretical rationales.”[49] She concluded that “on a more practical level, Virginia…seems willing to enlarge the tax breaks offered to manufacturing businesses.”[50]

FMCC’s reference to Woodmark I, regardless of its actual relevance to the facts of the case, evinces how broad Woodmark I’s holding has become. Instead of being constrained only to the manufacturing realm, Woodmark Iapparently has evolved into a judicial mandate to create additional tax breaks for interstate companies, even those engaged in distinctly non-manufacturing enterprises, such as financing loans. Seen in this light, Ford Motor Credit Company, inspired by Woodmark I (and to a degree, Woodmark II) is the latest incident of a growing trend in Virginia to resolve discrepancies in the tax code in favor of big business. The creation of these corporate “tax-loopholes,” either through judicial fiat or legislative codification, is likely an attempt to lure large businesses, particularly manufacturers, into locating or expanding their operations inside Virginia. As the Circuit Court in Woodmark I put it, “the term manufacturing is to be construed liberally because ‘the public policy of Virginia is to encourage manufacturing in the Commonwealth.’”[51]

Virginia, in essence, has endorsed a localized version of “supply side economics,” predicting that the lowering of taxes on the production of both goods (e.g., furniture, as in Woodmark I) and services (e.g., financing, as in FMCC)[52] will, in turn, spur economic growth in Virginia, particularly in the form of job creation. As a result, Virginia localities, faced with a subtle yet significant decrease in millions of dollars of property tax and BPOL tax revenue, may be compelled to shift this burden directly onto consumers, whom, incidentally, are less capable lobbyists than large corporations.[53] If the courts succeed in incentivizing large employers to make Virginia their home, it may come at the cost of overtaxing less lucky Virginians.

[1] Ford Motor Credit Company v. Chesterfield County, 2011 WL 744985 (Va. 2011).

[[2] David Shipley, The Limits of Fair Apportionment: How Fair is Fair Enough?, 93 St. & Loc. Tax Law 34, 34 (2007).

[3] Id.

[4] 430 U.S. 274 (1977).

[5] 463 U.S. 159, 169.

[6] Id.

[7] Shipley, at 34.

[8] Container,463 U.S. at 169 (emphasis added).

[9] Id.at 170.

[10]  488 U.S. 252, 262  (emphasis added).

[11] Ford Motor Credit Company, at *3.

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] Id. at *4.

[18] Id.

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Id.

[22] Id.

[23] Id.

[24] Id. at *5

[25] Id.

[26] Id. at *6

[27] Id. at *5 (emphasis added).

[28]  Id. at *6.

[29] Idat *7.

[30] Id.

[31] Id. The Court also ruled that a “tax assessment made by the proper authorities isprima facie correct and valid, and the burden is no the taxpayer to show that such assessment is erroneous.” Id.

[32] Id. (emphasis added).

[33] Id. at*8.

[34] Id.

[35] Id. at *9.

[36] Id (emphasis added).

[37] Id.

[38] Id. 

[39] Id.

[40] Id. (emphasis added).

[41] Id. at *10.

[42] Id. at *11.

[43] Id.

[44] Id. at *13.

[45]  American Woodmark Corp. v. City of Winchester, 464 S.E.2d 148 (Va. 1995).See generally, Stacey Wilson, Good Intentions, But Unintended Consequences: Expanding Virginia’s Manufacturing Tax Exemption Under City of Winchester v. American WoodmarkCorp, 41 WM & MARY L. REVIEW 67 (2000)

[46] Virginia Code § 58.1-1101(A)(2), cited in Wilson at 69.

[47] Wilsonat 73.

[48] Id.

[49] Id.

[50] Id.

[51] 34 Va. Cir. 421, 434 (1994) (citing County of Chesterfield v. BBC Brown Boveri, Inc., 380 S.E.2d 890, 893 (Va. 1989)), cited by Wilson at 84.

[52] Ford Motor Company, at *8. (“Neither party contests that FMCC was a service business for purposes of Code § 58.1–3703.1(A)(3)(a)(4).”)

[53] Wilson, at 73.

Adam Blander © Copyright 2011