Category: Litigation

What’s Ahead: An Amendment to Rule 30(b)(6) That Requires Parties to Confer

It’s getting more complicated to take and defend depositions because of the COVID-19 pandemic. And now there is a proposed new change to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that would require parties to confer before a plaintiff takes the deposition of a corporate representative. Specifically, the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has proposed an amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) that requires parties to confer in good faith before the deposition takes place about both the topics and the identity of the witness or witnesses.

In some ways, this change isn’t new. Because many attorneys already have this type of discussion with opposing counsel before a corporate representative deposition, and the Advisory Committee notes make it clear that the parties aren’t required to reach an agreement, many think the amendment won’t change much. And its intentions are good. The Advisory Committee developed the amendment to try to avoid disputes about “overlong or ambiguously worded lists of matters for examination and inadequately prepared witnesses.”

But, as with most things, the devil is in the details. Some fear that the requirement will create more disputes about these depositions than it will prevent.

First, if the parties must confer about the identity of the witness, that could undermine a corporation’s right to choose its witness. The Advisory Committee notes state that the corporation still has the right to choose its deponent, but the rule change could encourage motion practice geared toward preventing a corporation from designating a specific person or trying to force a corporation to designate C-suite executives, rather than the person who the company believes is the right person to testify.

Second, the amendment could incentivize a party to request multiple witnesses so that they can take multiple, seven-hour depositions. These incentives already exist to some extent under the current rules, but the new rules may increase them.

Third, absent from the proposed amendment is any deadline by which the parties must confer or when the discussions should end. The Advisory Committee notes state that “the conference process must be completed a reasonable time before the deposition is scheduled to occur.” Without a set deadline, repeated or eleventh hour requests for a conference could lead to harassment and make it difficult for defense counsel to prepare a witness to testify about ever-changing topics. While this risk can be minimized by communication, it likely can’t be avoided entirely. Finally, the new rule also does not address what happens if the conference does not happen, or if one party refuses to participate.

The proposed amendment to Rule 30(b)(6) is not yet finalized. It must still be approved by the U.S. Supreme Court. If the Court approves, the new rule could take effect as early as December 1, 2020, unless Congress prevents it. If it takes effect, attorneys can expect to spend more time conferring with opposing counsel before a corporate representative witness deposition. Inside and outside counsel for corporations should begin to prepare for this new rule, even while they are facing the additional challenges of today.

© 2020 Schiff Hardin LLP

For more on changes to legal procedures, see the National Law Review Civil Procedure section.

Photographer Unsuccessful in Copyright Case Over Use of Embedded Instagram Photo

User beware – you will be held to a social media platform’s terms of use. Most people are aware by using a social media platform that they give up some rights to the content that they share. What rights and to what extent depends on the platform and the specific terms of use.

A district court in the recent Sinclair case found no copyright infringement by the website Mashable, where it used one of photographer Sinclair’s Instagram photos in an article, even after an unsuccessful attempt to license the photo directly from Sinclair. Sinclair v. Ziff Davis, LLC, and Mashable, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-00790 (S.D.N.Y. April 13, 2020).

Plaintiff Sinclair had a “public” Instagram account and posted a copy of the subject photograph. Defendant Mashable, a digital media and entertainment platform, published on its website an article about female photographers that embedded the publicly posted photo from Sinclair’s Instagram account. Notably, prior to using the Instagram photo, an employee from Mashable contacted Sinclair about licensing the same photo to be used in the article. Sinclair declined Mashable’s US$50 offer to license the use of the photo. Sinclair later demanded that Mashable remove the embedded photograph from their website and demanded compensation. Mashable refused. Sinclair then sued for copyright infringement.

Sinclair argued that Mashable infringed her copyright in the photo since it did not have permission to use the photo. Mashable contended that it had a valid sublicense from Instagram to use the photo and therefore did not infringe Sinclair’s copyright. The court sided with Mashable.

By creating an Instagram account, Sinclair was bound to Instagram’s Terms of Use, which grant Instagram the right to sublicense content that is posted and made public by the user. Instagram then exercised that right by granting Mashable a sublicense to display the photo through sharing the embedded photo. Instagram utilizes API (application programming interface) which allows users to share public content posted by other users. The Instagram policies allow users to use API to embed posts on their websites.

The court held that Sinclair’s right to license the photo directly and Instagram’s right as a licensee to sublicense the photo to Mashable were independent from one another.

Sinclair also contended that the authorization of Instagram to sublicense the photo was invalid because of the complex and interconnected documents which established the rights. While the court agreed that Instagram could make their terms of service and policies more concise and accessible, they were under no obligation to do so.

Lastly, Sinclair argued that it was unfair of Instagram to force a professional photographer to choose between keeping her work “private” on one of the most popular photo sharing apps or to post publicly which would allow Instagram a sublicense to her photographs to users like Mashable. While the court noted this dilemma was very real, the court held that Sinclair had already made her choice by opting to post the photo publicly.

The court also noted that because it held that Instagram had granted Mashable a valid license to display Sinclair’s photo, it did not have to reach the question of unsettled law in the circuit of whether embedding an image is considered a ‘display’ capable of infringing a copyright in an image. That issue was addressed on a motion for summary judgment in Goldman v. Breitbart News Network LLC et al., 1:17-CV-03144 (S.D.N.Y. February 15, 2018), where the court came to the exact opposite conclusion.

In the Goldman case, a different Judge in the same jurisdiction held that the use of embedded Tweets on news media websites featuring a picture of Tom Brady did infringe the copyright of the photographer. The decision for partial summary judgment in favor of the photographer in the Goldman case was highly criticized, and the case ultimately settled outside of court.

While this case affirmed that use of a public Instagram photo as embedded in an article on a third-party website is covered by Instagram’s Terms of Use, this ruling does not necessarily mean that Instagram’s terms grant a blank check regarding the use of publicly posted content. This ruling addressed a specific use of an embedded photo, but did not touch on a litany of other potential concerns when using another’s photo posted publicly on the platform, such as right of publicity, unfair competition, false sponsorship or affiliation, or trademark infringement.

Copyright 2020 K & L Gates

For more on photo & other copyright issues, see the National Law Review Intellectual Property Law section.

Court Holds That A Deceased Testamentary Trust Beneficiary Can Still Be A Beneficiary

In In the Estate of Mendoza, a decedent’s son’s children filed a petition claiming their entitlement to their father’s beneficial interest in a trust created under the decedent’s will. No. 04-19-00129-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 1845 (Tex. App.—San Antonio March 4, 2020, no pet. history). The son had predeceased the decedent. The decedent’s daughters moved for summary judgment on the sole ground that a dead person could not be a beneficiary of a trust. The trial court granted the daughters’ summary judgment motion. The son’s children appealed.

The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment, holding that the mere fact that the decedent’s son predeceased the decedent did not establish the son’s beneficial interest in the trust created under the decedent’s will lapsed as a matter of law. The daughters argued that a dead person cannot be a beneficiary of a trust and cited to Longoria v. Lasater, 292 S.W.3d 156, 167 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. denied) and Section 112, comment f of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts. However, the court of appeals held that the daughters ignored the difference between an inter vivos trust, which was the type of trust analyzed in Longoria, and a testamentary trust. The court cited to Section 112, comment f, of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts:

A person who has died prior to the creation of a trust cannot be a beneficiary of the trust. Thus, if property is transferred inter vivos [i.e., not by will] in trust for a named person who is dead at the time of the transfer, no trust is created… So also, if a testator devises property in trust for a person who predeceases him, the devise of the beneficial interest lapses, and the person named as trustee ordinarily holds the property upon a resulting trust for the estate of the testator. By statute, however, in many States a devise does not lapse under certain circumstances, as for example if the devisee leaves a child; and under similar circumstances a devise of the beneficial interest under a trust does not lapse.

Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 112 cmt. f (1959) (internal citation omitted); see also Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 44 reporter’s notes on cmt. d (2003) (citing authorities discussing the application of the lapse doctrine and anti-lapse statutes to persons taking under trusts created by a will and noting “[a] comprehensive discussion of the lapse doctrine and anti-lapse statutes is beyond the scope of this Restatement”)). Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded: “the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Daughters based on the mere fact that Eduardo predeceased Jose because that fact alone did not establish Eduardo’s beneficial interest lapsed as a matter of law.” Id. Further, the court refused to address an argument about Texas’s anti-lapse statutes because the arguments had not properly raised below. The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

© 2020 Winstead PC.

Class Actions Follow Universities’ Moves to Online Learning

After switching to online learning in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and sending students home, colleges and universities are beginning to face class action lawsuits seeking refunds of tuition, housing costs, meal plans, and fees. One such lawsuit is Church v. Purdue University, No. 4:20-CV-0025, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana.

The lawsuit asserts contract and unjust enrichment claims for three general classes, seeking partial reimbursement for: (1) tuition; (2) housing; and (3) meals and fees. Among the many important issues will be whether the damages are so individualized that they are not susceptible to class-wide proof. If so, they would predominate over common, class-wide issues and prevent class certification. The Church complaint, for example, acknowledges that the diminished value may vary for each student. It alleges that academic performance drops from online learning and the adverse effects hit lower ranked students progressively more harshly. Also, the named plaintiff is an engineering senior who is missing out on his senior project of building an airplane. Many other students will have similar stories, but they each will be unique. These and other problems will be a struggle for plaintiffs as they seek to find a class-wide damages model for some or all of the sub-classes they seek to represent.

These suits also may entail issues arising from recent federal legislation enacted to combat the economic fallout from COVID-19, as well as issues regarding financial aid.

These damage issues will be hotly litigated as these cases face motions to dismiss and oppositions to class certification.

© 2020, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., All Rights Reserved.

For more litigation resulting from COVID-19, see the National Law Review Coronavirus News page.

A Registered Copyright is the Only Way to Guard Against Infringement

The legal world and the media closely monitor every move the Supreme Court makes or considers. However, some rulings attract more attention than others. One that the general public might have overlooked was a 2019 ruling involving infringement claims. Trying to clean up some inconsistent decisions in the Circuit Courts, the high court ruled unanimously that copyright infringement claims are valid only when there is a copyright registered with the United States Copyright Office.

This is a significant shift

Before this ruling, the courts were often more open to protecting copyrightable property even if it was not officially registered with the Copyright Office. For example, the Fifth and Ninth Circuit ruled that protection comes as soon as the owner applies for the copyright and pays the registration fee. The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, on the other hand, ruled that protection was only valid when the application was approved. In the past, it was sometimes enough to say “patent pending” to dissuade infringers even if the application was later rejected. This phrase is now irrelevant.

What does this mean for applicants?

The processing time can vary but takes several weeks, which means that applicants will are vulnerable during the application process, which can important in fast-moving businesses like technology. Moreover, some thought the application was too long or too expensive. This ruling makes it clear that the only protection is when the companies, inventors, entrepreneurs, or content creators register their idea.

© 2020 by Raymond Law Group LLC.

California Judicial Council Adopts Emergency Rules Affecting Unlawful Detainer Actions and More

The Judicial Council of California adopted 11 temporary emergency rules in response to the COVID-19 pandemic affecting eviction proceedings, judicial foreclosures, and statutes of limitations for civil causes of actions, among other things. The rules, adopted April 6, 2020, are effective immediately and apply to all California state courts.

Rules of particular interest:

  •  Emergency Rule 1: Unlawful Detainers
    • Prohibits courts from issuing a summons on an unlawful detainer complaint until 90 days after the Governor declares the state of emergency related to the COVID-19 pandemic is lifted. This rule applies to all new unlawful detainer actions – whether or not the eviction action is related to nonpayment of rent for COVID-19 related issues. The only exception is for an unlawful detainer action necessary to protect public health and safety.
  • Emergency Rule 2: Judicial Foreclosures
    • Stays any action for judicial foreclosure and tolls any statute of limitations for filing such action until 90 days after the state of emergency is lifted.
  • Emergency Rule 9: Tolling of Statutes of Limitations for Civil Causes of Action
    • Tolls statutes of limitations for civil causes of action from April 6, 2020, until 90 days after the Governor declares the state of emergency is lifted.
  • Emergency Rule 10: Extension of 5-Year Rule for Civil Actions
    • Extends the five-year deadline to bring a civil action to trial to five years and six months for all actions filed on or before April 6, 2020.
  • Emergency Rule 11: Depositions through Remote Electronic Means
    • Allows a deponent to not be present with the deposition officer at the time of deposition.

© 2010-2020 Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

A Glut of “Opportunistic” Margin Calls: Are Creditors Moving Too Quickly to Seize Assets?

What can companies expect from their funding sources as COVID-19 does damage to the economy? In at least some instances, perhaps, opportunistic attempts by lenders to illegally take control of business assets. A real estate investment trust (REIT) in New York alleges in a new lawsuit that it has already fallen victim to that type of misconduct.

AG Mortgage Investment Trust Inc. (AG) filed suit against the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) on March 25 for allegedly taking advantage of the pandemic to unlawfully seize the trust’s assets and sell them at below-market prices. AG says RBC is just one of many banks that are now trying to trigger margin calls on entities like AG. It alleges that RBC is doing so by applying “opportunistic and unfounded” markdowns on mortgage-based assets. A margin call then occurs, according to AG, with RBC contending that the value of a margin account — an investment account with assets bought with borrowed money — has fallen, requiring the borrower either to make up the difference with more collateral or have the asset seized. RBC, the suit further alleges, is being unreasonable in its valuations. Having seized assets based on what AG calls an “entirely subjective and self-serving calculation” of true market value, RBC then auctioned off $11 million worth of AG’s commercial mortgage-backed securities.

Two days before filing the suit, AG had warned in a statement that it might not be able to satisfy the glut of margin calls it now faces from lending banks like RBC, as coronavirus crisis fears and fallout cripple the mortgage-based asset market. In its complaint, AG asserts that rampant, unwarranted margin calls have brought the nation’s mortgage-based REITs “to the brink of collapse.” AG notes, however, that unlike RBC, most banks have thus far agreed to hold back on taking action against those trusts’ assets — for the time being, at least.
“Recognizing the aberrant state of the markets, most banks have stopped short of taking precipitous steps that could push the mREIT industry into the abyss. This action is brought to stop one outlier bank—Royal Bank of Canada—that has not stopped short but is instead hitting the accelerator to unlawfully seize and unload a large portfolio of Plaintiffs’ assets at fire-sale prices into the seized markets which will have a cascading effect in the market for mortgage-based assets, and potentially the entire U.S. economy. These consequences are likely to undermine the emergent efforts currently being undertaken by federal and state agencies to provide breathing room and help stabilize the economy.”

Hours after filing its suit, AG sought a temporary restraining order to halt the auction. The auction had already begun that day by the time the judge had a chance to review AG’s request. RBC must soon respond to AG’s complaint, and, as the case progresses, will have to defend itself against AG’s claims for damages. If AG’s perception of a glut of unjustified margin calls is shared by other business entities, we should expect many similar suits to follow.

© 2020 Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP

For more COVID-19 related business news, see the National Law Review Coronavirus News section.

Tennessee-Based Health Services Company Settles FCA Case Alleging Medicaid Fraud For $9.5 Million

The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced another False Claims Act (“FCA”) settlement centered around a health services company’s practice of providing unnecessary therapy services to patients in order to receive the maximum amount of reimbursement under Medicare.  The $9.5 million settlement is with Diversicare Health Services Inc, a Tennessee-based company that provides nursing and rehabilitation services at 74 locations throughout the country.  Diversicare’s alleged violations are similar to those in a medicaid fraud case settled by the DOJ for $15.4 million two weeks earlier concerning fraudulent Medicare reimbursements for unnecessary rehabilitation services.

The settlement resolves two separate qui tam FCA lawsuits filed by whistleblowers Mary Haggard and Bryant Fitzmorris, both former Diversicare employees.  Ms. Haggard will receive a whistleblower award of roughly $1.4 million, and Mr. Fitzmorris will receive $145,350.  The FCA allows private citizens who possess inside information of fraudulently billing against the United States Government to initiate a lawsuit on the Government’s behalf to recover those funds.  The citizens, known as qui tam relators, are then entitled to receive a share of any damages that the Government ultimately recovers from the litigation.

The settlement concerned Diversicare corporate policies, in use from the beginning of 2010 through the end of 2015, that specifically instructed its employees to provide patients rehabilitation treatments to receive the highest level of Medicare reimbursement, regardless of the need for, the efficacy of, or risks associated with such treatment.  Specific allegations include “instances of improper co-treatment in order to achieve minute thresholds, repetitive and unskilled exercises that did not match plan of care goals to obtain additional minutes, engaging patients in activities contraindicated by underlying medical conditions, [and] extending patient lengths of stay beyond what was medically indicated.”  In addition to the allegations of improper therapy, it was alleged that Diversicare billed Medicare for therapy services that were never in fact provided.

Additional allegations highlight the fraudulent attempts to maximize Medicare revenue, claiming that Diversicare threatened to undertake, and in some instances took, adverse employment actions against employees who failed to meet set budgetary goals and quotas. Finally, the settlement also resolves allegations of FCA violations regarding Diversicare’s Medicaid billing practices, including its submission of “forged, photocopied, or pre-signed physician signatures” on certifications necessary for Medicaid reimbursement.

Federal regulations governing the disbursement of taxpayer dollars for Medicare and Medicaid exist to both protect the patients receiving treatment, as well as the taxpayers whose dollars fund the programs.  When companies intentionally circumnavigate these regulations in search of higher revenue, they not only rip off the taxpayers but also put vulnerable populations of patients at risk with unnecessary and often dangerous treatments.  In the fiscal year 2019, the United States Government reported that using the FCA, it recovered $2.6 billion of taxpayer dollars fraudulently paid out under health care programs, including for violations such as those alleged against Diversicare.  FCA relators and the Government should continue to utilize this powerful tool to protect Medicare and Medicaid patients, as well as every United States taxpayer.

Copyright Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, LLP 2020. All Rights Reserved.

For more Medicaid False Claims Act settlements, see the National Law Review Health Law & Managed Care section.

Youtube May Be an Enormous Town Square, But It’s Still Not Subject to the First Amendment

In Prager University v. Google LLC, et al., Case No. 18-15712 (9th Cir. Feb. 26, 2020), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed a First Amendment lawsuit against YouTube late last week, holding that the video hosting giant is a private forum that is free to foster particular viewpoints – and need not be content-neutral.  The victory is a significant message to other online content hosts, aggregators and service providers that they need not feel threatened by censorship claims for selecting and curating content on their systems.

The lawsuit began in 2017, when conservative media company PragerU sued YouTube for imposing restrictions on some of PragerU’s short animated educational videos.  YouTube tagged several dozen videos for age-restrictions and disabled third party advertisements on others.  PragerU claimed the restrictions constituted censorship because they muted conservative political viewpoints.

Traditionally, the First Amendment regulates only U.S. and state government actors when it comes to censoring speech; it does not touch the actions of private parties.  The Ninth Circuit noted that these principles have not “lost their vitality in the digital age.”  While this threshold question is not new, PragerU’s approach to this legal hurdle has drawn fresh interest in how courts’ conception of state action might one day shift in order to accommodate the digital re-imagining of a marketplace of ideas.

PragerU argued that YouTube should be treated as something akin to a government where it operates a “public forum for speech.”  The theory follows that because YouTube has an overwhelming share of the video sharing and streaming space, it essentially performs a “public function.”  The Ninth Circuit affirmed that public use of private resources, even on a large scale, is simply not governmental.  Just because YouTube generally invites the public to use its private property (in this case, its platform) for a specific or designated purpose, does not mean that property should lose its private character.  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit ruled almost twenty years ago that internet service provider America Online was not a government actor even though it broadly opened its networks to the public to send and receive speech.

PragerU’s theory does enjoy some support.  As the Ninth Circuit acknowledged, a private actor is a state or government entity for First Amendment purposes when it performs a public function that is “traditionally and exclusively governmental.”  In other words, the First Amendment may well still apply to private companies tasked with operating public elections or even local governmental administrative duties (for example, the proverbial “company town”).  But the Ninth Circuit simply did not accept the argument that YouTube’s function of “hosting speech on a private platform” bore any resemblance to “an activity that only governmental entities” traditionally and exclusively perform.  After all, noted the Court, even “grocery stores and comedy clubs have opened their property for speech.”  Neither was the Court persuaded that the sheer scale of YouTube’s operation – equal to perhaps many millions of grocery stores and comedy clubs – should alter the analysis.

Had the Ninth Circuit adopted PragerU’s approach, it would have been the first major judicial endorsement of the view that a private entity can convert into a public one solely where its property is opened up to significant public discourse.  Instead, the Ninth Circuit imposed and upheld a more traditional delineation between public and private actors in First Amendment jurisprudence.

© 2020 Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP

See the National Law Review for more on constitutional law questions.

The Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Flight of Fancy or Enduring Change?

The Trump Administration has issued a proposed rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 5915 (February 3, 2020), that would codify its interpretation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), 16 U.S.C. 703 et seq., as applying only to the direct take of birds subject to the Act.  For decades, the federal government interpreted the MBTA as criminalizing both the direct (intentional) and incidental (unintentional and incident to an otherwise lawful activity) take of birds, their nests, and eggs covered by the Act.  Permission could be obtained for direct take, for example for hunting or for control of nuisance birds, but no such MBTA-specific framework existed to evaluate and permit incidental take under the Act.  As a result, project proponents, such as builders of wind farms, were left negotiating informal arrangements with the federal government in some circumstances or found themselves at the mercy of “prosecutorial discretion,” in others.  The leading causes of incidental bird deaths — cats, collisions with buildings, and collisions with cars — were left largely unaddressed by the federal government in implementation of the MBTA.  Judicial decisions addressing the scope of the Act have held both that the Act does criminalize incidental take and that it does not.

Into this flighty situation stepped the Trump Administration.  On December 22, 2017, the Principal Deputy Solicitor of the Department of the Interior issued a legal opinion that reversed years of practice and a prior legal opinion, concluding that the MBTA does not prohibit incidental take.  Consistent with that opinion, on February 3, 2020, the Administration issued a proposed rule that would codify the revised interpretation.  The proposed rule relies on the plain language of the statute, its history, and on constitutional concerns surrounding the extension of criminal liability under a statute that is ambiguous at best.

The MBTA makes it unlawful: “at any time, by any means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill, possess . . . any migratory bird, any part, next, or egg of any such bird . . . .”  16 U.S.C. 703(a).  Proponents of the prior interpretation urge that the language “at any time, by any means or any manner” evidences an intent to broadly criminalize any acts that result in bird deaths, even if they are not deliberate and not targeted at birds.  The proposed rule rests on a contrary view – that the words “hunt, take, capture, kill” are all affirmative acts directed at birds that have the purpose of reducing them to human control.   In the proposed rule, the Administration considers the legislative history of the Act and concludes that it confirms the view that the MBTA was enacted to address the direct take of birds — in response to over-hunting of birds and to Canadian concerns regarding the impact of U.S. actions on bird populations in Canada – and not to broadly criminalize any and all behavior that may kill birds.

The Trump Administration’s interpretation is already under review in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.  In that case, the plaintiffs brought a direct challenge to the Department of the Interior’s 2017 legal opinion.   The court denied the government’s Motion to Dismiss the matter; summary judgment briefing is ongoing.

Comments on the proposed rule can be submitted through March 19, 2020, in Docket No. FWS-HQ-MB-2018-0090 at www.regulations.gov.

© 2020 Bracewell LLP

ARTICLE BY Ann D. Navaro of Bracewell LLP.