Litigation Archives - Page 27 of 107 - The National Law Forum

The DOJ Throws Cold Water on the Frosties NFT Founders

The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York recently charged two individuals for allegedly participating in a scheme to defraud purchasers of “Frosties” non-fungible tokens (or “NFTs”) out of over $1 million. The two-count complaint charges Ethan Nguyen (aka “Frostie”) and Andre Llacuna (aka “heyandre”) with conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 and conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Each charge carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison.

The Defendants marketed “Frosties” as the entry point to a broader online community consisting of games, reward programs, and other benefits. In January 2022, their “Frosties” pre-sale raised approximately $1.1 million.

In a so-called “rug pull,” Frostie and heyandre transferred the funds raised through the pre-sale to a series of separate cryptocurrency wallets, eliminated Frosties’ online presence, and took down its website. The transaction, which was publicly recorded and viewable on the blockchain, triggered investors to sell Frosties at a considerable discount. Frostie and heyandre then allegedly proceeded to move the funds through a series of transactions intended to obfuscate the source and increase anonymity. The charges came as the Defendants were preparing for the March 26 pre-sale of their next NFT project, “Embers,” which law enforcement alleges would likely have followed the same course as “Frosties.”

In a public statement announcing the arrests, the DOJ explained how the emerging NFT market is a risk-laden environment that has attracted the attention of scam artists. Representatives from each of the federal agencies that participated in the investigation cautioned the public and put other potential fraudsters on notice of the government’s watchful eye towards cryptocurrency malfeasance.

This investigation comes on the heels of the FBI’s announcement last month of the Virtual Asset Exploitation Unit, a special task force dedicated to blockchain analysis and virtual asset seizure. The prosecution of the Defendants in this matter continues aggressive efforts by federal agencies to reign in bad actors participating in the cryptocurrency/digital assets/blockchain space.

Article By Matthew G. Lindenbaum, Robert L. Lindholm, and Daniel Curran of Nelson Mullins

For more crypto and cybersecurity legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson Confirmed to U.S. Supreme Court

Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson will become the first Black woman and the third Black Justice to serve on the U.S. Supreme Court.

With support of only a handful of Republican senators, a Senate majority voted to confirm Judge Jackson’s nomination to the Supreme Court, 53-47, on April 7, 2022. Judge Jackson will fill the vacancy left by Justice Stephen Breyer, who will retire at the end of the Court’s current term.

During Judge Jackson’s distinguished legal career, she served as a federal district judge from 2013 to 2021, a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit from 2021 to 2022, assistant special counsel and then vice chair on the U.S. Sentencing Commission, a federal public defender, and a private practice attorney.

Despite bringing a new perspective to the bench, Judge Jackson is unlikely to affect the current composition of the Court. Her decisions as a district and appellate judge suggest that, like Justice Breyer, she takes a pragmatic approach to the law.

Judge Jackson’s legal methodology will become apparent shortly after she takes her seat for the 2022-2023 term, which begins on October 3, 2022. The Court is scheduled to hear oral arguments on three cases touching on contentious issues during Judge Jackson’s first term. Judge Jackson, who serves on Harvard University’s board of overseers, has stated she will recuse herself from hearing Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard, a case involving the use of race in college admissions. However, she will participate in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, which asks the Court to decide on the constitutionality of a Colorado state law that prohibits business owners from refusing to provide service to people on the basis of sex, including sexual orientation and gender identity. Judge Jackson also will participate in the Court’s hearing of Merrill v. Millgan, which asks the Court to weigh in on whether Alabama’s proposed congressional district plan violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

Judge Jackson is expected to be sworn in before the start of the 2022-2023 term.

Article By Stephanie L. Adler-Paindiris and Stephanie E. Lewis of Jackson Lewis P.C.

For more litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Supreme Court’s New Arbitration Ruling: Limits Federal Jurisdiction For Confirming or Challenging Arbitration Awards Under the FAA

On March 31, 2022, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a decision in Badgerow v. Walters, No 20-1143, addressing when federal courts have jurisdiction to rule on motions to confirm, modify, or vacate arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). In an 8-1 decision, the Court narrowed the circumstances in which federal courts have such jurisdiction. Under the Court’s new decision, employers (and employees) will now more often be required to file their motions to confirm, modify, or vacate arbitration awards in state rather than federal court.

The Court’s Decision

The Court’s decision addresses a number of arcane questions of civil procedure and federal jurisdiction that could make for a nightmarish law school exam.

The decision starts from the well-accepted premise that the FAA does not grant federal courts jurisdiction. The FAA does, however, give parties to arbitration agreements certain rights, including the right to move a court to compel arbitration and the right to move a court to vacate, modify, or confirm an arbitration award. So the question that follows is: When can parties file these FAA motions in federal court and when must they file them in state court?

Under Badgerow, we now know that the answer is not the same for motions to compel arbitration and motions to vacate, modify, or confirm arbitration awards.

Under the Court’s prior case law, Vaden v. Discover Bank (2009), an employer can file a motion to compel arbitration in federal court so long as the underlying dispute to be arbitrated involves a question under federal law. For example, if an employee is alleging claims under a federal statute, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Family and Medical Leave Act, or any of the myriad other federal employment laws, a federal court would have jurisdiction to rule on a motion to compel arbitration of those claims. In addition to this “federal question” jurisdiction, the federal court might also have jurisdiction based on the diversity of the parties. Under a federal court’s diversity jurisdiction, a court also has jurisdiction to hear disputes between parties that are citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

In Badgerow, the Court held that a different analysis applies to motions to vacate, modify, or confirm arbitration awards, which are governed by different sections of the FAA. Unlike motions to compel arbitration, federal courts are not permitted to “look through” a motion to vacate, modify, or confirm to see whether there is a federal question involved in the underlying arbitration matter. Instead, a federal court must determine whether it has jurisdiction based on the motion itself.

Asking a court to vacate, modify, or confirm an arbitration award will usually raise questions about contract interpretation and enforcement. Contract law is usually state law. Thus, a motion to vacate, modify, or confirm arbitration awards will generally present questions of state law rather than federal law.

Since motions to vacate, modify, or confirm arbitration awards will rarely present federal questions on their face, federal courts will rarely have “federal question” jurisdiction over such motions. Federal courts may still have diversity jurisdiction if the parties on opposite sides of the motion to vacate, modify, or confirm arbitration awards are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. It is also theoretically possible that a federal court could still have federal question jurisdiction on some other grounds, but the Badgerow decision did not delve into that subject.

Key Takeaways

Under the Supreme Court’s new decision, employers will more often need to turn to state courts for motions to confirm, modify, or vacate arbitration awards under the FAA.

State courts historically have been more hostile to arbitration than federal courts. In losing the option of going to federal court to confirm some arbitration awards, arbitration may become marginally less reliable. However, this new decision should not affect the overall benefits that many employers conclude they receive from using employment arbitration.

In addition, the new decision will likely affect employers’ strategies in moving to compel arbitration, because the scope of federal jurisdiction is broader for such motions. In seeking to compel arbitration, employers may now more frequently ask the federal court to retain jurisdiction pending the outcome of the arbitration so that the parties may return to that federal court to address any subsequent motion to vacate, modify, or confirm the resulting arbitration award.

Finally, by forcing employers (and other parties to arbitration agreements) more frequently to go to state court to vacate, modify, and confirm arbitration awards, the Badgerow decision will likely bring to the fore another question that has been looming on the horizon: do the FAA’s provisions permitting motions to vacate, modify, and confirm arbitration awards even apply in state court? Several courts around the country have suggested that they do not, meaning that employers (and other parties to arbitration agreements) will need to rely on state arbitration statutes for such motions in some jurisdictions. But that is another topic for another day.

Article By Christopher C. Murray and Hera S. Arsen with Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart P.C.

For more articles about arbitration, please visit the NLR ADR/Arbitration/Mediation type of law page.

Ohio Court of Appeals Affirms $30 Million Libel Verdict Against Oberlin College

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment in excess of $30,000,000 against Oberlin College, holding that Oberlin was responsible for libelous statements made during the course of a student protest. Gibson Bros., Inc. v. Oberlin College, 2022 WL 970347 (Ohio Ct. App. March 31, 2022). The court’s rationale, if followed elsewhere, could lead to significantly broader institutional and corporate liability for statements by students and employees.

The case arose out of an incident in which an employee of the Gibson Brothers Bakery and Food Mart accused a black student of shoplifting, and then pursued and held the student until police arrived. Over the next few days, large groups of student protestors gathered outside the bakery and among other things handed out a flyer describing the incident as an “assault,” and stating that the bakery had a “long account of racial profiling and discrimination.” The day following the incident, the student senate passed a resolution calling for a boycott. It likewise described the incident as an assault on the student and stated that the bakery had a “history of racial profiling and discriminatory treatment of students….” The resolution was emailed to the entire campus and posted on the senate bulletin board, where it remained for over a year. The court found the statements to be factually untrue, because the student pled guilty to the shoplifting charge and admitted racial profiling did not occur, and the College presented no evidence of any past racial profiling or instances of discrimination at the bakery.

The court acknowledged that there was no evidence that Oberlin participated in drafting the flyer or the student senate resolution. Instead, the court found Oberlin liable on the theory that one who republishes a libel, or who aids and abets the publication of a libelous statement, can be liable along with the original publisher. As to the flyer, the court cited the following as evidence sufficient to support a jury finding that Oberlin had either republished or aided and abetted its publication:

Oberlin’s Dean of Students attended the protests as part of her job responsibilities;
the Dean of Students handed a copy of the flyer to a journalist who had not yet seen it and told students they could use a college copier to make more copies of the flyer;
the associate director of a multicultural resource center was seen carrying a large number of flyers, which he appeared to be distributing to others to redistribute to the public; and
the College provided a warming room with coffee and pizza at a site near the protests.

As to the student senate resolution, the court cited:

the senate was an approved organization;
the College created the senate’s authority to adopt and circulate the resolution;
the senate faculty moderator was the Dean of Students; and
despite having knowledge of the content of the resolution, neither the President nor the Dean of Students took any steps to require or encourage the student senate to revoke the resolution or to remove it from the bulletin board.

The court then held that despite the publicity the bakery received once the dispute arose, at the time of the protests and resolution the bakery and its owners were private persons, not public figures. Thus, the bakery only had to show that Oberlin had been negligent, rather than that it acted with reckless indifference as to the truth or falsity of the statements published.

Particularly in these polarized times, university administrators should be aware of and take steps to manage legal risks when external disputes become the subject of campus discussion and activism. Student organizations, faculty and administrators should be reminded that, to the extent they participate in protests or other public commentary outside their official roles, they should make clear they are acting for themselves and not the institution. Institutional responses to causes espoused by students or faculty need to be carefully vetted to assure that any factual assertions about third parties are accurate.

Article By Barry P. Kaltenbach and Robert T. Zielinski of Miller Canfield

For more litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

SCOTUS Cert Recap: Copyright Act’s Fair Use Defense, ‘Dormant’ Commerce Clause, And Independent And Adequate State Ground Doctrine

On March 28, the Supreme Court agreed to consider the following three questions:

Is a work of art that copies from a prior work but that conveys a different meaning than the prior work necessarily “transformative” for the purpose of the Copyright Act’s fair use defense?

Does California’s Proposition 12 – which requires all pork sold in California to come from pigs housed in compliance with the state’s animal-confinement rules, even pigs raised entirely in other states – violate the Constitution’s Commerce Clause?

Is Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g), which requires a state prisoner seeking post-conviction relief to identify a “significant change in the law” that would probably have produced a different result in the prisoner’s case, an adequate and independent state-law ground to support a state-court judgment denying post-conviction relief?

On March 28, the U.S. Supreme Court added three cases to its docket for next term: one about when a work of art “transforms” a prior work for the purpose of the Copyright Act’s fair use defense, another involving a “dormant” Commerce Clause challenge to a California law that prohibits selling any pork in the state unless the pork comes from pigs housed in compliance with California’s animal-confinement rules, and a third concerning whether the independent and adequate state ground doctrine bars the Court from reviewing an Arizona state-court decision denying a request for post-conviction relief.

The copyright and Commerce Clause cases – which drew four and five cert-stage amicus briefs, respectively – will capture significant attention from businesses and civil litigators and could each produce landmark decisions in their respective areas of law. The case concerning the independent and adequate state ground doctrine will be of greater interest to those who practice in the post-conviction area – where such issues arise with some frequency – but all lawyers who practice before the Supreme Court should watch that case carefully as well, as the doctrine applies to all state-court decisions whatever the subject matter.

When Works Are ‘Transformative’ Under the Copyright Act’s Fair Use Defense

In Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts v. Goldsmith, the Court will return to a question it confronted last year in Google v. Oracle: When does copying a portion of a copyrighted work constitute protected “fair use” under the Copyright Act?

The notion of “fair use” in the copyright context initially developed as a common-law doctrine to allow borrowing in some situations in order to further the Copyright Act’s general purpose of fostering creativity and innovation. Congress codified that doctrine in 1976, and the Copyright Act now expressly recognizes fair use as a defense and lists four non-exclusive factors courts should consider in determining whether a use is “fair”: 1) the purpose and character of the use, 2) the nature of the copyrighted work, 3) the amount used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and 4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for the copyrighted work.

As the Court explained in Google, the first of these factors – the purpose and character of the use – asks “whether the copier’s use adds something new … altering the copyrighted work with new expression, meaning or message,” and the Court has “used the word ‘transformative’ to describe a copying use that adds something new and important.” This case offers the Court an opportunity to provide further detail on what it means for a work of art to be “transformative” in this sense. It concerns a series of silkscreen prints and pencil illustrations created by Andy Warhol – whose foundation is the petitioner here – based on a 1981 portrait photograph of Prince taken by the respondent, Lynn Goldsmith. The foundation argues that the works are necessarily transformative because they convey a new meaning: namely, that they portray Prince as an “iconic” figure rather than the “vulnerable human being” depicted in Goldsmith’s photograph.

In its decision below, however, the Second Circuit rejected the notion that imbuing a work with a new meaning is necessarily “transformative.” It observed that such a rule would seem to expand fair use to make copyright licensing unnecessary in the “paradigmatically derivative” context of film adaptations – since many movies transform the message of the underlying literary work – and it noted that ascertaining the meaning of artistic works is a subjective endeavor to which judges are typically unsuited. Instead, it held that Warhol’s work is not transformative on the ground that it is “both recognizably deriving from, and retaining the essential elements of, its source material.”

The Supreme Court is now set to review this decision and thereby give litigants and lower courts further guidance on what makes a work that borrows from another sufficiently “transformative.” Copyright practitioners around the country will be closely following what the Court says.

Commerce Clause Limits on States’ Authority to Regulate Commerce

In National Pork Producers Council v. Ross, the Court will consider a challenge to California’s Proposition 12, a law that sets minimum size requirements for pig pens – and that extends those requirements to farmers across the country by making compliance with them a condition of selling pork in California.

The challengers contend that the out-of-state application of these pen-size rules violates the Commerce Clause. They note that, while the Commerce Clause is expressly framed as a grant of authority to Congress, the Supreme Court has long read the Commerce Clause to also implicitly limit states’ regulatory authority. This doctrine, often called the “dormant” Commerce Clause, has a handful of different components, and two are at issue in this case.

The first, known as the extraterritoriality doctrine, has been invoked in a number of Supreme Court decisions but is most prominently associated with the 1980s decisions Brown-Foreman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority and Healy v. Beer Institute. The challengers here argue that under these decisions, a state law per se violates the Commerce Clause if its practical effect is to control conduct beyond the state’s boundaries, and they contend Proposition 12 does so by effectively requiring out-of-state farmers to follow California’s pen-size rules on pain of exclusion from the California market. And California responds that Proposition 12 merely regulates in-state sales, and that any indirect, upstream effects it has on farmers is insufficient to run afoul of the extraterritoriality doctrine.

The second issue concerns the balancing test the Supreme Court articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church, which bars state laws that impose a burden on interstate commerce that “is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Here the parties dispute the significance of Proposition 12’s economic effects and the strength of the interests underlying the law – issues that could become complicated by the motion-to-dismiss posture of the case.

The Court has now agreed to address both of these issues, and whatever the Court decides, its decision will carry implications for the validity of state commercial regulations in a wide variety of industries across the country.

The Scope of the Independent and Adequate State Ground Doctrine

In Cruz v. Arizona, the Court will take up a criminal-law case that presents a recurring issue that arises in both criminal and civil cases alike: When does a state-court decision rest on an independent and adequate state ground such that the U.S. Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review the decision?

The case arises from the Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in Simmons v. South Carolina, which held that where a capital defendant’s “future dangerousness is at issue, and state law prohibits the defendant’s release on parole, due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible.” The Arizona Supreme Court later concluded that Simmons was inapplicable in Arizona – on the theory that Arizona law did not universally prohibit capital defendants’ release on parole – but the U.S. Supreme Court overturned that conclusion in Lynch v. Arizona.

Shortly thereafter, Cruz – a capital defendant whose trial and sentencing occurred after Simmons but before Lynch – filed a petition for post-conviction relief in Arizona state court. Because this was not Cruz’s first petition, he sought relief under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g), which at the time provided that relief would be available even for successive petitions where there “has been a significant change in the law that if determined to apply to defendant’s case would probably overturn the defendant’s conviction or sentence.”

Cruz argued that Lynch constituted a significant change in the law and that it applied retroactively to render his sentence unlawful. And after the Arizona Supreme Court rejected his claim, he filed a cert. petition arguing that federal law requires applying Lynch retroactively in state post-conviction proceedings. Arizona, meanwhile, countered that the Court would lack jurisdiction under the independent and adequate state ground doctrine: The Arizona Supreme Court’s decision, the state argued, simply concluded that Cruz failed to meet the state-law requirements of Rule 32.1(g).

While the U.S. Supreme Court granted Cruz’s cert. petition, it has limited its consideration to only the question concerning the independent and adequate state ground doctrine. And because its answer to that question could affect jurisdictional rulings in all manner of cases, the case will be of interest to anyone who practices before the Court.

Article By Kian Hudson of Barnes & Thornburg LLP

For more litigation legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Copyright Dispute Over Andy Warhol’s Portraits of Prince Heading to U.S. Supreme Court

The U.S. Supreme Court will review the standard for a “transformative” work as “fair use” under the Copyright Act. Specifically, whether a second work of art is “transformative” when it conveys a different meaning or message from its source material, or not where it recognizably derives from and retains the essential elements of its source material.

The Court agreed to review the Second Circuit’s decision that Andy Warhol’s Prince Series portraits of the musician Prince did not make fair use of celebrity photographer Lynn Goldsmith’s photograph of Prince. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith, No. 21-869 (petition granted Mar. 28, 2022).

The Warhol Foundation’s (AWF) petition argues that the Second Circuit’s decision contradicts Supreme Court precedent that a new work is “transformative” if it has a new “meaning or message” citing Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1202-03 (2021) (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). AWF also argued that the Second Circuit’s decision creates a circuit split where the Ninth Circuit has held that even with few physical changes a work can be transformative if new expressive content or a new message is apparent. As a result, this decision “threatens massive restrictions on First Amendment expression” that would create a “sea-change in the law of copyright.”

Goldsmith’s opposition brief asserts that the AWF mischaracterizes Supreme Court precedent. And that the Second Circuit “faithfully applied” the proper test for transformativeness in determining Warhol’s series of silkscreen prints were not fair use. Goldsmith also argues petitioner has manufactured a circuit split that does not exist.

This dispute stems from a a declaratory judgment action filed in 2017 by the Andy Warhol Foundation in the Southern District of New York seeking that Warhol’s portraits of Prince did not infringe photographer Lynn Goldsmith’s photograph. In 2019, the district court granted summary judgment to the Warhol Foundation, holding that the Prince Series was “transformative” because it incorporated a new meaning and message different from Goldsmith’s photograph.

In 2021, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that Warhol’s portraits were not fair use as a matter of law. The Second Circuit held that Warhol’s use was not “transformative,” even though Warhol’s use included some visual differences from Goldsmith’s photograph, because Warhol’s use “retains the essential elements of the Goldsmith Photograph without significantly adding to or altering those elements.”

Multiple amicus briefs supporting the Warhol Foundation were filed including by a group of 12 copyright law professors; a group of 13 art law professors; artists and art professors Barbara Kruger and Robert Storr; and the Robert Rauschenberg Foundation, Roy Lichtenstein Foundation, and Brooklyn Museum. The visual arts community and content creators in every industry will heavily watch this case.

The Supreme Court will hear the Warhol case in its new term, which begins in October.

Article By Susan M. Kayser and Eric W. Lee of K&L Gates

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

WW International to Pay $1.5 Million Civil Penalty for Alleged COPPA Violations

In 2014, with childhood obesity on the rise in the United States, tech company Kurbo, Ltd. (Kurbo) marketed a free app for kids that, according to the company, was “designed to help kids and teens ages 8-17 reach a healthier weight.” When WW International (WW) (formerly Weight Watchers) acquired Kurbo in 2018, the app was rebranded “Kurbo by WW,” and WW continued to market the app to children as young as eight. But according to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Kurbo’s privacy practices were not exactly child-friendly, even if its app was. The FTC’s complaint, filed by the Department of Justice (DOJ) last month, claims that WW’s notice, data collection, and data retention practices violated the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule (COPPA Rule). WW and Kurbo, under a stipulated order, agreed to pay a $1.5 million civil penalty in addition to complying with a range of injunctive provisions. These provisions include, but are not limited to, deleting all personal information of children whose parents did not provide verifiable parental consent in a specified timeframe, and deleting “Affected Work Product” (defined in the order to include any models or algorithms developed in whole or in part using children’s personal information collected through the Kurbo Program).

Complaint Background

The COPPA Rule applies to any operator of a commercial website or online service directed to children that collects, uses, and/or discloses personal information from children and to any operator of a commercial website or online service that has actual knowledge that it collects, uses, and/or discloses personal information from children. Operators must notify parents and obtain their consent before collecting, using, or disclosing personal information from children under 13.

The complaint states that children enrolled in the Kurbo app by signing up through the app or having a parent do it on their behalf. Once on Kurbo, users could enter personal information such as height, weight, and age, and the app then tracked their weight, food consumption, and exercise. However, the FTC alleges that Kurbo’s age gate was porous, requiring no verification process to establish that children who affirmed they were over 13 were the age they claimed to be or that users asserting they were parents were indeed parents. In fact, the complaint alleges that the registration area featured a “tip-off” screen that gave visitors just two choices for registration: the “I’m a parent” option or the “I’m at least 13” option. Visitors saw the legend, “Per U.S. law, a child under 13 must sign up through a parent” on the registration page featuring these choices. In fact, thousands of users who indicated that they were at least 13 were younger and were able to change their information and falsify their real age. Users who lied about their age or who falsely claimed to be parents were able to continue to use the app. In 2020, after a warning from the FTC, Kurbo implemented a registration screen that removed the legend and the “at least 13” option. However, the new process failed to provide verification measures to establish that users claiming to be parents were indeed parents.

Kurbo’s notice of data collection and data retention practices also fell short. The COPPA Rule requires an operator to “post a prominent and clearly labeled link to an online notice of its information practices with regard to children on the home or landing page or screen of its Web site or online service, and, at each area of the Web site or online service where personal information is collected from children.” But beginning in November 2019, Kurbo’s notice at registration was buried in a list of hyperlinks that parents were not required to click through, and the notice failed to list all the categories of information the app collected from children. Further, Kurbo did not comply with the COPPA Rule’s mandate to keep children’s personal information only as long as reasonably necessary for the purpose it was collected and then to delete it. Instead, the company held on to personal information indefinitely unless parents specifically requested its removal.

Stipulated Order

In addition to imposing a $1.5 million civil penalty, the order, which was approved by the court on March 3, 2022, requires WW and Kurbo to:

Refrain from disclosing, using, or benefitting from children’s personal information collected in violation of the COPPA Rule;
Delete all personal information Kurbo collected in violation of the COPPA Rule within 30 days;
Provide a written statement to the FTC that details Kurbo’s process for providing notice and seeking verifiable parental consent;
Destroy all affected work product derived from improperly collecting children’s personal information and confirm to the FTC that deletion has been carried out;
Delete all children’s personal information collected within one year of the user’s last activity on the app; and
Create and follow a retention schedule that states the purpose for which children’s personal information is collected, the specific business need for retaining such information, and criteria for deletion, including a set timeframe no longer than one year.

Implications of the Order

Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in AMG Capital Management, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission, which halted the FTC’s ability to use its Section 13(b) authority to seek monetary penalties for violations of the FTC Act, the FTC has been pushing Congress to grant it greater enforcement powers. In the meantime, the FTC has used other enforcement tools, including the recent resurrection of the agency’s long-dormant Penalty Offense Authority under Section 5(m)(1)(B) of the FTC Act and a renewed willingness to use algorithmic disgorgement (which the FTC first applied in the 2019 Cambridge Analytica case).

Algorithmic disgorgement involves “requir[ing] violators to disgorge not only the ill-gotten data, but also the benefits—here, the algorithms—generated from that data,” as then-Acting FTC Chair Rebecca Kelly Slaughter stated in a speech last year. This order appears to be the first time algorithmic disgorgement was applied by the Commission in an enforcement action under COPPA.

Children’s privacy issues continue to attract the attention of the FTC and lawmakers at both federal and state levels. Companies that collect children’s personal information should be careful to ensure that their privacy policies and practices fully conform to the COPPA Rule.

Article By Sheila A. Millar and Tracy P. Marshall of Keller and Heckman LLP

For more privacy and cybersecurity legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

Four Indicted for $16 Million Money Laundering Scheme

On March 23, 2022, an indictment was unsealed in the Western District of Arkansas, charging four men for their involvement in wire fraud and money laundering schemes involving fake investment offerings amounting to an alleged $16 million.

According to court documents, the four men allegedly engaged in an investment fraud scheme between 2013 and 2021 in which they falsely represented the nature of their investment offerings and promised large returns, which they could not and did not yield. The indictment also alleges that two of the defendants encouraged victims to send their funds to bank accounts controlled by the other two defendants, and then transferred the money through a complex series of accounts worldwide.

The defendants were charged with wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. One defendant was further charged with money laundering. If convicted, the men will face up to 20 years in prison for each count. The additional count of money laundering carries an additional sentence of up to 10 years.

The DOJ press release can be found here.

California Man Pleads Guilty To Stealing Government COVID-19 Relief Funds

On March 18, 2022, a California man pleaded guilty in the Central District of California to misappropriating COVID-19 relief funds obtained through the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act.

Under the CARES Act Provider Relief Fund, CARES Act health care providers who were financially harmed by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic are granted federal funds to provide care to patients suffering from COVID-19. According to court documents, the defendant admitted he owned a hospice agency in North Hollywood that was never operational during the COVID-19 pandemic, yet he received approximately $89,162 designated for the medical treatment and care of COVID-19 patients. The defendant admitted he misappropriated the CARES Act funds by spending them for his personal use and then transferring the funds to family members, including one family member in Armenia, rather than using the funds in any way related to the pandemic relief efforts as required.

As part of his guilty plea, the defendant further admitted that he submitted five Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) applications to the Small Business Administration (SBA) on behalf of his hospice agency and four other entities he controlled. As a result of his fraudulent applications, the SBA disbursed approximately $428,100 in EIDL funds to the man, which he used for his benefit against EIDL requirements.

The man pleaded guilty to three counts of theft of government property and is scheduled to be sentenced on June 13, facing up to 10 years in prison for each count.

The DOJ press release can be found here.

New Jersey Man Convicted for Fraudulently Obtaining US Visas for Chinese Government Employees

On March 23, 2022, a New Jersey man was convicted by a federal jury of one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit visa fraud for his participation in a conspiracy to fraudulently obtain United States visas for Chinese government employees.

According to court documents, the defendant was involved in a scheme to fraudulently obtain J-1 research scholar visas for employees of the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to allow them to covertly work for the PRC government while in the United States. The defendant operated an office of the China Association for the International Exchange of Personnel (CAIEP), an agency of the PRC government, in New Jersey that seeks to recruit US scientists, academics, engineers, and other experts for the PRC.

The J-1 research scholar program allows foreign nationals to visit the United States to conduct research at a corporate research facility, library, museum, university, or other research institution. The defendant allegedly worked to obtain a J-1 research scholar visa for a prospective employee based on the false representation that the employee would conduct research at a United States university, to conceal unlawful work of another employee who was present in the United States on a J-1 visa sponsored by a US university. The two employees represented to the US government that they were entering the US for the primary purpose of conducting research at US universities, but their actual purpose consisted of working for the CAIEP. The defendant reported the employee’s arrival to the United States to the US universities, procured a local driver’s license for her and disguised her CAIEP salary as a subsidy for research scholar living expenses to make her presence as a research scholar appear legitimate.

As a result of his conviction, the defendant faces a maximum sentence of five years; he is scheduled to be sentenced on July 11.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) press release can be found here.

UPS To Pay $5.3 Million for False Claims Act Allegations

On March 21, 2022, the DOJ announced that United Parcel Service Inc. (UPS) agreed to pay approximately $5.3 million to settle allegations that the company falsely reported information about the transfer of U.S. mail to foreign posts or other intended recipients under contracts with the U.S. Postal Service (USPS), in violation of the False Claims Act (FCA).

UPS was engaged by USPS to pick up U.S. mail at various locations and deliver it to its international and domestic destinations. As a condition of payment, UPS was required to submit electronic scans to USPS to report when the mail was delivered, and there were specified penalties for mail that was delivered late or to the wrong location. The settlement resolves allegations that scans submitted by UPS were falsified times and that UPS, in fact, transferred possession of the mail.

According to DOJ, this is the fifth civil settlement involving air carrier liability for false delivery scans under the USPS International Commercial Air Contracts, pursuant to which the United States has recovered more than $70 million.

The DOJ press release can be found here.

Article By D. Jacques Smith, Randall A. Brater, Mattie Bowden, and Rebecca W. Foreman of ArentFox Schiff LLP

For more white collar crime legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

So You Wanna Play with Copyright? “Joyful Noise” Ostinato Isn’t Original Expression

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s order vacating a jury award of damages for copyright infringement and granting judgment as a matter of law, explaining that the musical work alleged to have been copied did not qualify as an original work of authorship but consisted only of “commonplace musical elements.” Marcus Gray PKA Flame et al. v. Katheryn Elizabeth Hudson PKA Katy Perry et al., Case No. 20-55401 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2022) (Clifton, Smith, Watford, JJ.)

Key Definitions:

A musical scale is a sequence of musical notes or tones by pitch.
A subset of seven notes is called the minor scale and can be referred to with alphabetic names (A, B, C, etc.) or scale degrees (1, 2, 3, etc.).
An ostinato is a repeating musical figure (for example, 3-3-3-3-2-2).

In 2007, Marcus Gray (Flame) purchased an ostinato and used it in the song “Joyful Noise.” The song was released in 2008. While “Joyful Noise” did not achieve significant commercial success or airtime, it received millions of views online. In 2013, American singer-songwriter Katy Perry created “Dark Horse,” which was a hit, resulting in her performance at the Super Bowl halftime show in 2015.

The “Joyful Noise” ostinato consists of notes, represented as 3-3-3-3-2-2-2-1 and 3-3-3-3-2-2-2-6, whereas Dark Horse’s ostinato contains 3-3-3-3-2-2-1-5. Both have a uniform rhythm and equal note duration in time.

Plaintiffs sued Perry and her co-defendants for copyright infringement. Plaintiffs presented circumstantial evidence that the defendants had a reasonable opportunity to access “Joyful Noise” and that the ostinatos in both songs were substantially similar. Plaintiffs did not present direct evidence that Perry and the others had copied elements of the song, instead relying on testimony from their expert musicologist, Dr. Todd Decker.

Decker testified that the ostinatos were similar in many aspects, but he also testified that there was no single element that caused him to believe the ostinatos at issue were “substantially similar” when viewed “in isolation.” The jury also heard testimony from Perry’s expert, who disagreed altogether that the ostinatos were substantially similar.

The jury found that the defendants had a reasonable opportunity to hear “Joyful Noise” before composing “Dark Horse,” that the two songs contained substantially similar copyrightable expression and that “Dark Horse” used protected material from “Joyful Noise.” The jury found the defendants liable for copyright infringement and awarded $2.8 million in damages. The district court vacated the award and granted judgment as a matter of law to defendants, concluding that the evidence at trial was legally insufficient to show that the “Joyful Noise” ostinato was a copyrightable original expression. The plaintiffs appealed.

The Ninth Circuit explained that because the plaintiffs did not present any direct evidence that the defendants copied the “Joyful Noise” ostinato, they were required to show that the defendants had access to the work and that the ostinatos were substantially similar.

The Ninth Circuit began with its analysis of the “substantially similar” prong, employing a two-part test having “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” components. The Court noted that while it must refrain from usurping the jury’s traditional role of evaluating witness credibility and weighing the evidence, the extrinsic test requires that the Court ensure that the evidence of objective similarities between two works is legally sufficient to serve as the basis of a copyright infringement claim, regardless of the jury’s views. The Court explained that the substantial similarity test focuses on the protectable elements standing alone and disregards non-protectable elements.

To be a protectable element under copyright law, the “Joyful Noise” ostinato had to qualify as “original expression.” Based on the trial record, the Ninth Circuit found that the “Joyful Noise” ostinato consisted entirely of commonplace musical elements, and that the similarities between the two ostinatos did not arise out of an original combination of these elements. Without original expression, no element identified by Flame was individually copyrightable. For example, the Court noted that “the fact that Joyful Noise and Dark Horse both make use of sequences of eight notes played in an even rhythm is a trite musical choice outside the protection of copyright law.”

Finding the evidence presented at trial legally insufficient to establish that the musical elements were individually copyrightable, the Ninth Circuit determined that the jury’s verdict finding defendants liable for copyright infringement was unsupported by substantial evidence. Thus, the Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law.

Article By Jodi Benassi of McDermott Will & Emery

For more intellectual property legal news, click here to visit the National Law Review.

The Rocky Waters of Absentee Ballots

This Legal Update will help you navigate through those rough waters involving absentee ballots.

Absentee Voting

No election issue seems to be more of a lightning rod over the past year than absentee voting. While voting absentee has always occurred, this alternative voting option has been thrust into the spotlight due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the public scrutiny onslaught since the 2020 Presidential Election.

Wisconsin has been at the forefront of a variety of conflicts over absentee voting. Presently, a lawsuit is pending before the Wisconsin Supreme Court concerning absentee voting and the use of ballot boxes, which are drop boxes some municipalities used to collect absentee ballots throughout the pandemic. In January 2022, a Waukesha County Circuit Court Judge ruled against the use of ballot boxes; however, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals stayed that Judge’s ruling due to the close proximity of the February 15, 2022, election primary. The Wisconsin Supreme Court then took over the case from the Court of Appeals and, on February 11, 2022, issued a temporary decision allowing ballot boxes for the February 15, 2022, primary but not the April 5, 2022 election. Local officials continue to wait for the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s final decision, which hopefully will provide greater legal direction for absentee ballots.

In the meantime, following are FAQs on the fundamentals for absentee voting.

Who is an absentee elector?

An absent elector is a qualified voter, but who is unable or unwilling to appear in person, at the polling place in his or her applicable ward or election district to vote. An individual can choose to vote absentee for any reason.

What are the qualifications for voting absentee?

Most registered Wisconsin voters can vote absentee by mail. The specific qualifications are: (1) be a U.S. citizen, (2) be at least 18 years old, and (3) have resided in their voting district for at least 28 days.

What is an absentee ballot?

An absentee ballot is used by an absent voter to cast their vote. The ballot is printed and sealed in an envelope, that then needs to be mailed or hand-delivered to the municipal clerk. The municipal clerk will ensure that the absentee ballot is received by the proper polling place on election day, as long as the municipal clerk receives the ballot on time. The law provides specific requirements concerning timeframes regarding valid absentee ballots – those details are beyond the scope of this article and it is encouraged to consult with legal counsel for further direction.

Do the same absentee voting rules apply to military and overseas voting?

No. Military and overseas voters have special rules as well as additional options for voting. For instance, they can access their absentee ballot online.

How can a voter request an absentee ballot?

An absentee ballot can be requested in the following ways: by mail, by email, online, by fax, or in person. To find out more specific information to your voting district, you should go to your municipality’s website.

What about the use of drop boxes for an absentee ballot?

There is substantial debate currently regarding the use of ballot drop boxes for absentee ballots. It is strongly encouraged to communicate with legal counsel concerning this issue. However, given the pending Waukesha County Court case referenced above and in consideration of the WEC’s withdrawal of its guidance in that case, the safest approach would be to refrain from using a drop box until further direction from the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

This information is provided as a review of the fundamental requirements when it comes to balloting. Ideally, this information will be available for reference when basic questions or conflicts occur for a quick resolution. Nevertheless, more complicated questions may arise and it is strongly encouraged to reach out to your legal counsel for timely answers as these issues develop.

Article By Anthony S. Wachwiczs III and Audrey R. Merkel with von Briesen & Roper, s.c.

For more articles about elections, visit the NLR election & Legislative section.

Category: Litigation

The DOJ Throws Cold Water on the Frosties NFT Founders

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Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson Confirmed to U.S. Supreme Court

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